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CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

I.

WHAT IS A PARTNERSHIP.

THE QUEEN vs. ROBSON.

(‘I-own Case reserved, 1885.

English Law Reports, 16 Q. B. D. L37.

The prisoner was tried and convicted on an indictment

framed under 31 &'32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, charging that he, being

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

a member of a copartnership called the Bedlington Colliery

Young Men’s Christian Association (hereafter called the associ-

ation), feloniously did embezzle three several sums of money

of and belonging to the said copartnership.

The object of the association was, to use the language of

one of its printed rules, “the extension of the Kingdom of the

Lord Jesus'Christ among young men and the development of

their spiritual life and mental powers.” It was composed of

I.

members and associates. The number of members did not

exceed twenty. Any person was eligible for membership

“who gave decided evidence of hi conversion to God,” but,

WHAT IS A PARTNERSHIP.

before he could become a member, he must be proposed and

seconded by two members of the association and elected by
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the committee on their being satisﬁed as to his suitability.

Trustees for the time being in whom -the real property belong-

ing to the association was vested became mem-bers by virtue

of their appointment as trustees. Members were required to

subscribe three shillings per annum. The affairs of the asso-

TIIE QUEEN vs. ROBSON.
Crown Ca86 reserved, 1885.
Eugllsh I.aw Reports, 16 Q. B. D. 137.

The prisoner was trie.d and convicted on an Indictment
framed under 31 & 32 Viet. c. llG, s. 1, charging that he, being
a member of a copartnership called the Bedlington Colliery
Young Men's Christian Association (hereafter called the association), feloniously did embezzle three several sums of mone}
of and belonging to the said copactnersbip.
The object of the assoC'iation was, to use the language of
<me of its printed rules, "the extension of the Kingdom of the
Lord Jesus· Christ among young men and the development of
their spiritual life and mental powers." It was composed of
members and associates. The number of members did not
exceed twenty. Any person was eligible for membership
"who gave decided evidence of his conversion to God," but, ·
before be could become a member, he must be proposed and
seconded by two members of the assoriation and elected by
the committee on their being satisfiejl as to his suitability.
Trustees for the time being in whom the real property be}onging to the association was vested became members by Tictuc
of their appointment as trustees. Members were required to
. ambscribe three shillings per annum. The affairs of the a.uo-

2

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

2 Casss on PARTNERSHIP.

elation were in the hands of a general committee of manage-

ment, consisting of a president, two vice presidents, a treas-

urer, two secretaries, and at least nine members. The

committee had power to suspend or expel any member whose

conduct was found inconsistent in their judgment with the

Christian character. The agencies for the attainment of the

objects of the association were, 1st, the personal eﬂ:‘orts of

the members; 2d, devotional meetings; 3d, social meetings;

4th, classes for Biblical instruction; 5th, the delivering of

addresses and lectures; and, 6th, the diffusion of Christian

and other suitable literature.

Before the ﬁrst of the offenses charged against the prisoner

was committed, the members of the association proposed to

build and afterward built a hall or place of meeting for the

purposes of the association at a cost of nearly £200, of which

about £40 was still owing. To this building every member

had the right of entry and was entitled to a latch-key.

The prisoner became a member of the association in 1878,

and had continued to be a member up to the time of the trial.

As and being such member he solicited and obtained for the
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association from divers persons many sums of money as dona-

tions or subscriptions on account of and for the general pur-

poses of the association, toward the building fund, and toward

the liquidation of the aforesaid debt of £40. Three of these

sums it was that the prisoner was charged with and found

guilty of embezzling.

If the association was a copartnership within the meaning

of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, the conviction was to stand

affirmed.‘ If it was not the conviction was to.be reversed.

Walton, for the prisoner.

The only question is whether this association is a copartnership. The

terms of the statute clearly show that the copartnerships contemplated

thereby are copartnerships in the ordinary sense of the term, viz., for the

1 31 and 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, provides that “ if any person being a mem~

ber of any copartnership, or being one of two or more beneﬁcial owners of

any money, goods or effects, etc., shall steal or embezzle any such money,

goods or effects, etc., of or belonging to any such copartnership or to such

joint beneﬁcial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with,

tried, convicted and punished for the same as if such person had not been

clation were in the hands of a general committee of management, consisting of a president, two Yice presidents, a treasurer, two secretaries, and at least nine members. Tb1.?
committee had power to suspend or expel any member whose
conduct was found inconsh1tent in their judgment with the
Christian character. The agencies for the attainment of the
objects of the association were, 1st, the personal efforts of
the members; 2d, devotional meetings; 3d, social meetings;
4th, classes for Biblical instruction; 5th, the delivering or
addresses and lectures; and, 6th, the diffusion of Christian
and other suitable literature.
Before the first of the offenses charged against the prisoner
was committed, the members of the association proposed to
build and afterward built a ball or place of meeting for the
purposes of the association at a ce>st of nearly £200, of which
about £40 was still <>wing. To this building every member
bad the right of entry and was entitled to a latch-key.
The prisoner became a member of the association in 1878,
nnd had continued to be a member up to the time of the trial.
As and being such member he soli~ited and obtained for the
association from divers persons many sums of money as donations or subscriptions on account of and for the general purposes of the association, toward the building fund, and toward
the liquidation of the aforesaid debt of £40. Three of these
sums it was that the prisoner was charged with and found
guilty of embezzling.
If the association was a copartnership within the meaning
of 31 & 32 Viet. c. 11 G, s. 1, the con ,·iction was to stan<l
.amrmed. 1 If it was not the conviction was to .be reversed.

or was not a member of such eopartnership or one of such beneﬁcial

owners.”

W ~ —'— s "“"*—"* ~ ‘**"“v* ~:‘————----J

Walton, for the prisoner.
The only question is whether this aeaociation is a copartnerabfp. Tb&
terms of the statute clearly show that the copartnerships contemplated
thereby are copartnerships in the ordinary sense of the term, viz.• for the
1 31 and 32 Viet. c. 116, e. l, provides that "if any person being a member of any oopartnership, or being one of two or more beneficial owners of
any money, goods or effects, etc., shall ste&) or embezzle any such money,
eoods or effects, etc., of or belonging to any such copartnership or to such
joint beneficial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with,
tried, convicted and punished foe the same as it such person had not been
or was not a member of such copartnership or one of such beneficial
owners."

THE QUEEN vs. ROBSON. 23

purpose of gain or proﬁt. Lmnnnv, L. J ., in his work on Partnership, p.

'l'BE QUEEN VS. ROBSON.

1, gives an explanation of the term “partnevship,” which shows that the

necessary idea of a partnership is that it should have for its object the

acquisition and division of gain. He says: “Without attempting to deﬁne

the terms ‘partners’ and ‘partnership,’ it will suﬁice to point out as

accurately as possible the leading ideas involved in these words. The

terms in question are evidently derived from to part in the sense of to

divide amongst or share; and this at once limits their application, although

not very precisely: for persons may share almost anything imaginable,

and may do so either by agreement or otherwise. But, in order that per-

sons may be partners in the legal acception of the word, it is requisite that

they shall share something by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and

that that which they have agreed to share shall be the proﬁt arising from

some predetermined business engaged in for their common beneﬁt; . . . .

to use the word ‘ partnership’ to denote a society not formed for gain is to

destroy the value of the word, and can only lead to confusion. Nor is it

consistent with modern usage. Lord Hans and older writers use oopart-

nership in the sense of co-ownership, but this is no longer customary, and,

as will be shown hereafter, there are many important differences between

the two.” This is not an association for the purposes of proﬁt or gain.
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Inrd COLERIDGE, O. J. The only point reserved is whether this is a. co-

partnership. The prisoner was not indicted as one of several joint bene-

ﬁcial owners.

No counsel appeared for the prosecution.

Lord COLERIDGI-1, O. J. It seems to me that this conviction

cannot be supported. I cannot ﬁnd any authority throwing

any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Part-

nership, which makes the participation in proﬁts essential to

purpoae of gain or profit. LtNDLEY, L. J ., in his work on Partnership, p.
l, gives an explanation of the term "partnership," which showa that the
neceaaary idea of a partnership is that it should have for ita object the
acquisition and division of gain. He says: "Without at~mpting to define
the terms •partners' and 'partnership,' it will suffice to point out as
accurately ae poeeible the leading ideas involved in these words. The
terms in question are evidently derived from Co part in the 1:1ense of to
divide amongst or share; and this at once limits their application, although
not very precisely: for persona may share almost anything imaginable,
and may do so either by agreement or otherwise. But, in order that peraons may be partllers in the legal e.cception of the word, it is requisite that
they shall share eomething by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and
that that which they have agreed to share shall be the profit arising from
some predetermined busineee engaged in for their oommon benefit; ••..
to use the word 'partnership' to denote a society not formed tor gllin is to
destroy the value of the word, and can only lead to confusion. Nor is it
consistent with modern usage. Lord HALK and older writers use oopartnership in the sense of co-ownership, but this is no longer customary, and,
as will be shown hereafter, there are many important differences between
the two." This ia not an aesociation for the purposes of profit or gain.
Lord CoLERIDG11:, C. J. The only point reserved is whether this ia a copartnership. The prisoner wae not indicted as one of several· joint beneficial owners.

the English idea of partnership, and states ‘that, although in

former times the word “copartnership” was used in the sense

No counsel appeared for the prosecution.

of “co-ownership,” the modern usage has been to conﬁne the

meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number

of deﬁnitions given by writers from all parts of the world ar-.2

appended to the passage, and in all of them the idea involved

appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain.

The association in the present case is not a copartnership in

any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation

for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word

"copartnership” as used in the act according to the meaning

ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text-books on

the subject. This a._..ociation does not come within that

meaning. The only point reserved for us is whether this asso-

ciation is a copartnership within the act. Inasmuch as we

are of opinion that it is not, the conviction must be l‘8\‘0l'S?d.

- ___ ___ . _‘,__ ___ __ii___~

Lord COLERIDGE, C. J. It seems to me that this conviction
cannot be supported. I cannot find any authority throwing
any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Partnership, which m'kes the participation in profits essential to
the English idea of partnership, and states 'that, although in
former times the word "copai1nership" was used in the sense
of "co-ownership," the modern usage has been to confine the
meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number
of definitions given by writers from all parts of the world ar. ~
appended to the passage, and in all of theo the idea involved
appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain.
The association in the present case is not a copartnersbip in
any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation
for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word
·•copartnership" as used in the act acc~mling to the meaning
ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text·book8 011
· the subject. This a ...,ociation d-0es n9t come withi.n that
meaning. The oaly point reserved for us is whether this association is a copartnership within the act. lnnsmuch as we
·are of opinion that it is not, foe rnm'i<'tion m11st hf" reYc>rs:•d.

4 CAsss 0N I’AaTN ERSHIP.

CAS.88 ON PARTNEUSHIP.
DENMAN, J. I am of the same opinion. The word "copart-

nership“ in the act must be construed according to the well-

known legal meaning of the term. If the section had only

mentioned the case of a copartnership I should have thought

it impossible to say that this case was within the statute.

The conclusion to which we come is, in my opinion, much

strengthened by the fact that the section contains another

expression which covers the case of co-ownership where there

is no copartnership. Here we are dealing only with the term

“oopartnership,” for the only question reserved is whether

this association was a copartnership within the section. I am

clearly of the opinion that it was not.

FIELD, HAwK1Ns, and W1LLs, JJ., concurred.

Conviction reversed.

Nora: See Mechem’s Elem. of Pai-tn., § § 3, 7 and cases there cited.

BURT vs. LATHROP.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1883.

_ 52 Mich. 106, 17 N. W. Rep. 716.

Error to Wayne. Plaintiff appeals.

(7. O’. Burt, in pro. per., and John Atkinson, for plaintiff and

J. I am of the same opinion. The word "copartnership'' in the act must be construed according to the Wellknown legal meaning of the term. If the section had only
mentioned the case of a copartnership I should have thought
it impossible to say that this case was within the statute.
The conclusion to which we come is, in my opinion, much
strengthened by the fact that the section contains anothe1·
t>xpression which covers the case of co-ownership where there
is no copartnership. Here we are dealing only with the term
''oopartnership," for the only question reserved is whetht:r
this association was a copartnership within the section. I am
clearly of the opinion that it was not.
FIELD, HAWKINS, and \V1LLs, JJ., concurred.
Conviction reversed.
DENMAN,
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appellant.

O’. A. Kent and Julian G. Dickinson, for defendants.

CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff sued a large number of defendants

Non: Bee :Mechem'a Elem.

or Partn., § § I, 7 and OM8B ~ere oltied.
.·

as jointly liable to him for his services as attorney in defend-

ing some patent suits concerning the rights to use certain

hard-rubber material in dentistry. He declared specially and

with the common counts for these services, and also set up

two judgments rendered in Jackson county for the same causes

of action. Upon trial the court below ordered a verdict for

BURT vs. LATHROP.

defendants. The counts which <,le.<cril>e the judgments do not

set them cut in such a way as to make out any legal liability

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1883.

under thtrr '\§*_'\ins‘.t all these defeml-uits, and the proofs are

~-»_O

52 Mich. 106, 17 N. W. Rep. 716.

"v'_"'__ *""~ ' ——@ ——'— -q~

Error to Wayne.

Plaintiff appeal&.

<J. C. Burt, in pro. per., and John Atkit&Btm, for plaintiJf and
nppellant.
C . .A. Knit and Julian G. Dickinson, for defendants.
CAMPBEI.L,

J. Plaintiff sued a larlZ'e number of defendant:H

as jointly liable to him for his serviees as attorney in defend-

ing some patent suits concerning the rights to use certaio.
hard-rubbl'r material in dentistry. Ile declared specially and
with the common counts for these services, and also set up
1 wo judgments rendered in Ja<..kson county for the i:1nnw caueas
of action. Upon trial the eourt hc>low orGl'I't>d a verdict for
defendants. 'fhe counti-i wliir·h dt>i-wl'ibe tl1P judgment':! do net
set them cut in such a wa~· as to makP out any legal liability
und...·r thl't' ·1r:·linr.t all tlwse <lt>fpr11h11ts, and the proofs IU"e

BURT vs. Lnuaor. 5

not any more deﬁnite. It appears affirmatively that no juris-

BURT

vs.

LATlllWl'.

5

dict-ion existed to bind more than a part of them, and there

can be nothing claimed for them under the issue as presented.

They may, therefore, be laid aside. The ground for asserting

a claim- against the defendants jointly is that they are claimed

to have become members of an association combined for the

purpose of legal resistance to the claims of apatentee, and

that plaintiff was employed by their officers.

There is no testimony tending to show any immediate per-

sonal employment of plaintiff by the defendants, jointly or

individually, so as to justify this joint action. But it was

claimed that they stood on the footing of partners, bound by

the action of their designated managing members. The testi-

mony indicates that several of the defendants, at variou times,

became members of an association which, so far as pertinent

to this inquiry, required them to pay ﬁve dollars each into

the treasury, and to pay such assessments as should be levied

pro rota, .on pain of being left out of the association an_d its

privileges. The officers were to employ counsel, and money

was to be paid on the order of the president and secretary.
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We can ﬁnd in this arrangement nothing analogous to a

partnership. There was no common business, and nothing:

involving profit and loss in a business sense. No one was

empowered to make contracts binding on the subscribers per»

sonally, and no one was to be liable except for assessments.

nor even for those except as he saw ﬁt to pay them to keep

his membership. It was nothing more than a combination

which may have made the parties in some respects responsible

to each other, but which did not, we think. authorize any con-

tract with third persons which should bind any member per-

sonally beyond his assessments. As plaintiff was not only

aware of the articles, but showed that he acted under them

and in furtherance of them in various ways, no question arises

in the nature of’ an equitable estoppel. YVe are not concerned

on this record to consider whether plaintiﬂ’ has any other

adequate means of securing compensation. The only ques-

tion now is whether these defendants are his joint debtors.

We think they are not.

The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

(The other justices concurred.)

Norm: See Mechem’s Elem. of Part;n., § 7.

not any more definite. It appears affirmatively that no jurisdiction existed to bind more than a part of them, and there
can be nothing claimed for them under the isirne as presented.
They may, therefore, be laid aside. TJie ground for asserting
a claim against the defendants jointly is that they are claimed
to have become members of an assodation combined for the
purpose of legal resistance to the claims of a patentee, and
that plaintiff was employed by their officers.
There is no testimony tending to show any immediate perRonal employment of plaintiff by the defendants, jointly .or
individualJy, so ns to 'justify this joint action. But it was
claimed that they stood on the footing of partners, bound by
the action of their designated managing nu:'mbers. The testimony indicateN that several of the defr>ndants, at various times,
became memb<'rs of an association whieh, so far as pertinent
to this inquir·y, required them to pay five dollarfl Ntcb into
the treasury, and to pay such assessments as should be levied
pro rata, on pain of being left out of the association an.d its
privileges. The officers were to employ counsel, and money
was to be paid on ihr order of the president and seerptary.
We can find in this arrangement nothing analogous to a
partnership. There was no common business, and nothinJ.!
involving profit and loss in a business ~wnse. No one waH
empowered to make contraets binding on Hu~ subscribers per·
sonally, and no one was to be liable ey~·ept for asses1mwnt:i.
nor even for those except as he saw fit to pay them to keep
his membership. It was nothing more than a combination
which ma,v have madt> the pnrtirs in sorn(• l'P!';p1•(·tR rPsponRiblP
to each other, but whkh did not, we think. authoriiw m1y contract with third persons which should bind any nwmbl'I' pp1·sonally beyond bis m~sessments. As plaintiff was not only
aware of the articles, but showed that he acted under them
and in furtherance of them in various ways, no question ariseN
in the nature of an equitable estoppel. ~Yf' arf' not concerned
on this record to considl'I' wheth<>r plaintiff has any othf'r
adequate means of securing oompensation. The only que~
tion n<>w is whether these defendants are his joint debtors.
We think they are not.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
(The other justices concurred.)
Non: See Meohem'e Elem. of Partn., § 7.

6 Casns on PA R1‘N1~jR$H1P.

6

C.A.SBS 0.l!lf P.A. BTN EWililP.

DUNHAM vs. LOVEROCK.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1893.

158 Pa. st. 197, 21 Atl. Rep. 900, as Am. st. Rep. ass.

Dunham and Loverock were tenants in common of a lease

hold estate in oil lands. <Dunham drilled a new well in pur-

DUNHAM vs. LOVEROCK.

suance of an agreement with Loverock to that eifect./ Dunham

claimed a balance due to him from Loverock on account of the

Supreme O°ourl of Pennsylvania, 1893.

welt} In the meantime one Pickett bought Lover-ock’s half of

the property, and lmnham alleged that he and Loverock were

partners, and therefore that Pickett took subject to a settle-

1158 Pa. St. 197, 27 Atl. Rep. 900, &I Am. St. Rep. 888.

ment of the accounts between Loverock and the ﬁrm. The

court below held that there was no partnership and Dunham

appealed. "

Roger Sherman and Samuel Grumbine, for appellant.

George S. Criszrcll and J. W. Lee, for appellee.

Wrnnmms, J. (After stating the facts.) No contract of

pa rtnership,written or oral, is shown, but it is contended that a

partnership resu_lted from the agreement to drill another well

on the leasehold at the common cost of the owners. It must be

remembered that this question is not raised between third per-
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sons and the tenants in common, but inter sese. What other

person may have thought, or in what manner they may have

charged goods furnished for the work on the well, is not now

the question; but what was the actual fact as between them.

selves? When the new well was proposed they were simply

Dunham and Lovcrock were tenants in common of a leasehold estate in oil lands. (Dunham drilled a new well in pursuance of an agl'eement with Loverock to that effect.) Dunham
claimed a balance due to hlm from Loverock on account of the
· wel~ In the meantime one Pickett bought Loverock's half of
the p1-operty, and lhmham alleged that he and Loverock were
partners, and therefore tha.t Pickett took subject to a se".:tlement of the accounts between Loverock and the tirm. The
court below held that thel'e was no partnership and Dunham
appealed.
'

tenants in common of the ten acres covered by the lease,

and of the well and machinery thereon. As such they con-

tributed to the cost of operating the well, and divided the

product. The new well was on the same lease. It was to

Roger Sherman and Samuel Grumbine, for appellant.
George S. Orisrccll and J. W. Lee, for appellee.

the interest of each of the cotenants that it should be put

down,.and it was an undertaking which was appropriate to

tenants in common, since it would increase the product of

the common property. In the absence of a distinct agreement

between them that their relations to the property and to each

other should be changed, the presumption is that the old rela-

‘”"“*“~-"-—~— —‘—~—'-.~ .7 ~ W - . .\.___ _

’,)* " ' '— ’ -" 5 5}. if iiifi‘ ' -ii—>'__“"

(After stating the facts.) No contract of
partnt:>rship, Wl'itten or oral, is shown, but it is contended that it
partnership resuJted from the agreement to drill another well
on the leasehold at the common cost of the owners. It must he
remembered that this question is not raised between third persons and the tenants in common, but inter sese. \Vhat other
persons may have thought, or in what manner they may have
charged goods furnished for the work on the well, is not now
the question; but what was the actual fact as between themselvP-s? When the new well was proposed they were simply
tenants in common of the ten acrt>s covered by the lease,
and of the well and machinery thereon. As such they contributed to the cost of operating the well, and divided the
product. The new well was on the same lease. It was to
the interest of each of the cotenants that it should be put
down, and it was an undertaking which was approp1iate to
tenants in <."Ommon, since it wot"1ld increase tte product of
the common property. In the absence of a distinct agreement
lJetween them that their relations to the property and to each
other should be changed, the presumption is that the old re13.WILLIAMS,

J,

Dummn vs. LOVEILOCK. 7

iion continued, and that they treated with each other as own-

DUNHAM

vs. Lov EROCK.

1

ers of separate interests in an undivided lease.

It is elementary law that a partnership is created only by 11$

contra ct, express or implied. The burden of showing its exist-.

cnce is on him who alleges it, and this burden the court below

rightly held had not been lifted by the plaintiff. To be sure

there was undivided possession of the lease,but pn_Hy11i}3g;s;-s-

sion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a tenancy in

common. There was contribution to the cost of operating the

well, but this could be compelled between tenants in common

by bill or by account render. There was division of the prod-

uct, but this was in accordance with the rights of the co-ten-

ants. Each had a right to share in the product in proportion

to his interest in the estate. It may be said that there was a'

resulting division of proﬁts, since, if. the product exceeded the

cost of production, there was a proﬁt to each part owner; but it

so it was shown by the settlement of his individual accounts

only, and grew out of the fact that he received from his share

of the product more than it cost him to secure it. '

So it may be said there was a contribution to losses, since
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each tenant sustained a loss when the value of his share of tho

produce fell below its cost to him, but this was the individual

loss of each, with which no one else had any cohcern, and to

which no one was bound to contribute. There is, therefore, no

circumstance relating to the business done upon, or the devel-

opment of, the lease not fairly and naturally referable to the

relations the parties sustained to each other as tenants in com-

mon. There is no agreement shown that tenants in common

might not properly make with each other for the development

of the property in which each held a separate title, but an undi-

vided possession. Between persons so situated a partnership

does not result by implication of law. It must be created by

agreement. As we fully agree with the court below that no

such agreement was shown, it is not necessary to consider the

authorities cited by the learned master, and by counsel to their

printed briefs, showing what are the ordinary indie-ia of a part-

nership. There can be no controversy over such questions in

this case, for the plaintiﬁ fails for want of proof sutﬁcient to

furnisha foothold for him on the facts. Tenants in common

may become partners, like other persons, whcre they agree to

assume that relation towards each other; but the law will not

tion continued, and that they treated with <>ach other as own~
ers of separate int.erests in an undivided lease.
.
It is elementary law that a partnership is created only by a\
contract, express or implied. The burden of showing its e·xist-/
ence is on him who alleges it, and this. burden the court below
rightly held had not been lifted by the plaintiff. To be su1·e
there was undivided possession of the lease, but unity of pos!lc·~:
sion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a tenancy in
common. There was contribution to the cost of operating the
well, but this could be compelled between tenants in common
bv bill or bv account render. There was. division of the product, but this was in accordance with the rights of the co-tenants. F.ach had a right to share in the product in proportion
to his interest in the estate. It may be said that there was a:
rt'sulting division of profits, since, if. the product exceeded the
eost of production, there was a profit to ea<;h part owner; but if
so it was shown by the settlement of his individual accounts
only, and grew out of the fact that he received from his share
of the product more than it cost him to secure it. ·
So it may be said there was a contribution to losses, since
each tenant sustained a loss when the value of his share of the
produce fell below its cost to him, but this was the individual
loss of each, with which no one else bad any concern, and to
which no one was bound to contribute. There is, the refore, no
circumstance relating to the business done upon, or the development of, the lease not fairly and naturally referable to the
relations the parties sustained to each other as tenants in com·
mon. There is no agreement shown that tenants in common
might not properly make with each other for th~ development
of the property in which each held a separnte title, but an undi'"ided possession. Between persons so situated a partnership
does not result by implication of law. It must be created by
agreement. As we fully agree with the court below that no
such agreement was shown, it is not necessary to consider thP
authorities cited by the learn~d master, and by counsel to their
printe<i briefs, showing what are the ordinary indfoia of a partnership. There can be
controversy over such questions iu
this case, for the plaintiff fails for want of proof sufficient to
furnish .a foothold for him on the facts. Tenants in common
may become partners, like other persons, where they agree to
assume that relation towards ench other; but the law will not

.

.

no

8 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.

create the relation for them as the consequence of a course of

8

0ASB8 Olf' PARTNERSHIP.

conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation already

existing between them, which made such a course of conduct

to their common advantage. The plaintiff and defendants,

upon the facts before us, were tenants in common.

Affirmed.

Nora: See Mechem's Elem. of Part.n., §8, and cases there cited. See

also Coope v. Eyre post, p. -.

EATON VS. YVALKER.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1889.

c~nte the relntion for them as the consequence of a course or
conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation already
existing between them, which made such a course of conduct
to their common advnntnge. The plaintiff and defendants,
upon the facts before us, were tenants in common.
Affirmed.

76 Mich. 579, 43 N. \V. Rep.

This action wa brought by Eaton against Walker, Hop-

kins and Livingston, to recover the sum of $3,562.68, alleged

NOT11:: See Machem's Elem. of Partn., § 8, and cases there cited. See
alao Coope v. Eyre poat, p. - .

to be due from them. There was no dispute a to the amount.

The defense was that the debt was contracted by and due

from the corporation of Walker, Hopkins & Co., of which the

defendants were the members, but which had become l~i.

Prior to the organization of Walker, Hopkins & Co., the defend-

ant Walker, with others, had carried on a partnership busi-

ness under the ﬁrm name of \Valker, Summer & Co. Plaintiff

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

had had dealings with both concerns. Hopkins and Livingston

EATON vs. 'WALKER.
Supreme C01trl of Michigan, 1889.
76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. Rep. 638.

had no connection with the business of Walker, Summer &

Co. Defendants had assumed to organize as a corporation

under a statute purporting to authorize such organization, and

had done all that was necessary to comply with the statute.

Defendants Livingston and Hopkins had paid in cash for their

stock, and Walker had turned in the assets of \Valker, Sum-

mer & Co., of which he had become the owner. The court

below found that the plaintiff had dealt with YValkc1', Hopkins

8: Co., as a corporation, and that the debt sued upon was due

from the corporation as such. The plaintiff contended that

the statute under which defendants had assumed to organize

as a corporation was unconstitutional, because it violated the

constitutional provision that “no law shall embrace more than

one object, which shall be embraced in its title.” The Supreme

Court held the statute unconstitutional for this reason.

Henry M. Duﬁield, for plaintiff and appellant.

This action was brought by Eaton against Walker, Hop·
kin1 and Livingston, to recover the sum of $3,562.68, alleged
to be due from them. There was no dispute as to the amount.
The defense was that the debt was contracted by and due
from the c~~poration of " ' alkE>r, Hopkins & Co., of which the
defendants were the members, but which had become i!!§.Olvent.
Prior to the organization of Walker, Hopkins & Co., the defend·
ant \Valker, with others, bad carried on a partnership busi·
ness under the firm name of \Yalker, Summer & Co. Plaintiff
had had dealings with both concerns. Hopkins and Livingston
had no connection with the business of \Valker, Summer &
Co. Defendants had assumed to orguni:i:e as a corporation
under a statute purporting to authorize i;;uch organization, and
had done all that was nE>cessary to comply with the statutt....
Defendants Livingston and Hopkins had paid in cash for their
stock, and " ',a.Iker had turned in the assets of \Valker, Summer & Co., of which be had become the owner. The court
below found that the plaintiff had dealt with ·walker, Hopkins
& Co., as a corporation, and that the> dc>bt sued upon was due
from the corporation as such. The plaintiff contended that
the statute under which defendants bad assumed to organize
as a corporation was unconstitutionffl, because it violated th<~
constitutional provision that "no law shall embrace more than
one object, whic-h shall be C'rnbraced in its title." The Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional for this reason.

Henry M. Duffeeld, for plaintiff and appellant.
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l D-ickinson, Thurber and Stevenson, and F. H. Canﬁeld, for

vs.

wAL.KE&.

defendants.

Louo, J. (After declaring the statute unconstitutional.)

Defendants’ counsel, however, insist that Walker, Hopkins

& Go. were a corporation dc facto, if not de jure. But there

· Dickmson, Thurber and Btevenscm, and F. H. Canfl.e'ld, for

defendants.

being no valid law of this State under which. the defendants

could legally be incorporated, could they, even colorably,

become a corporation, or have any existence as a corporation

dc facto, or would the plaintiff be estopped from inquiry into

their corporate existence under such circumstances? Two

things are necessary to be shown in order to establish a cor-

poration dc facto, viz.: (1) The existence of a charter or some

law under which a corporation, with the powers assumed,

might lawfully be created; and (2) a user by the party to the

suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.

Bank 1:3. Stcarns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314. If-the law exists, and

the record exhibits a bona ﬁde attempt to organize under it,

very slight evidence of user beyond thi is all that can be

required. Methodist Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 487. In Haas-

ton vs. Railroad Co., 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430, the court
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says: “The estoppel goes to the mere dc facto organization;

not to the question of legal authority to make an organization.

A dc facto corporation, that by regularity of organization might

be one dc jure, can sue and be sued. And a person who con-

tracts with such corporation while it is acting under its do

facto organization——who contracts with it as an organized cor-

poration——is estopped, in a suit on such contract, to deny its

de facto organization at the date of the contract; but this docs

not extend to the question of legal power to organize. Hence,

if an organization is completed where there is no law, or an

unconstitutional law, authorizing an organization as a cor-

poration, the doctrine of estoppel docs not apply.” The same

rule was laid down by implication by this court in Swartzcout

vs. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 393, as follows: “Where there is thus

a corporation de facto, with no want of legislative power to

its due and legal existence; where it is proceeding in the per-

formance of corporate functions, and the public are dealing

with it on the upposition that it is what it professes to be;

and the questions suggested are only whether there has been

exact regularity and strict compliance with the provisions of

the law relating to incorporation,--it is plainly a dictate, alike

/

1

1

0

LoNG, J.

(After decluing the statute unconstitutional.)
Defendants' counsel, however, insist that Walker, Hopkins
& Co. were a oorporation de facto, if not de jiire. But there
being no valid Jaw of this State under which. the defendants
could legally be incorporated, could they, even colorably,
hecome a corporation, or have any existence as a corporation
de facto, or would the plaintiff be estopped from inquiry into
their corporate existence under such circumstances? Two
things are necessary to be sb9wn in order to establish a corporation de facto, viz.: (1) The existence of a charter or some
law under which a corporation, with the powers assumed.
might lawfully be created; and (2) a user by tile party to the
snit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.
Bank vs. Stearns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314. If· the law exists, and
the record exhibits a bona fide attempt to organize under U,
very slight evidence of user beyond this is all that can be
required. Methodist Ohurch vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 487. In Heas·
'9ra V8. Railroad Oo., 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430, the court
11ays: "The estoppel goes to the mere de facto organization;
not to the question of legal authority to make an organization.
A de facto corporation, that by regularity of organization might
be one de jure, can sue and be sued. And a person who contracts with su<'h corporation while it is acting under its fie
faclo organization-who contracts with it as an organized cor·
poration-is estopped, in a suit on such contract, to deny its
de facto organization at the date of the contract; but this docs
not extend to the question of legal power to organize. Hence,
if an organization is completed where there is no law, or an
unconstitutional law, authorizing an organization as a cor·
poration, the dm:trine of t>stop1wl clo<>s not apply." The same
rule was laid down by implication by this court in Swartzrnuf.
1'8. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 393, as follows: "\\'i:ere there is tllus
a corporation de facto, with no want of leghdative power to
its dut• nn<l legal existence; where it is proceeding· in the perform:mce of corporate fun(•tions, and the public are dealing
with it on the supposition that it is what it professes to be;
and the questions suggested are only whether there bas be~n
exact regularity and strict compliance with the provisions of
the Jaw relating to incorporation,-it is plainly a dictate, alike!
2

I
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of justice and of public policy, that in controversies between

the de facto corporation and those who have entered into con-

tract relations with it, as corporators or otherwise, such

questions should not be suffered to be raised.” And again it was

said: “But both in reason and on authority the ruling should

be the same where an attempt has been made to organize a

corporation under a general law permitting it. If due author-

ity existed for the organization, and the question is one of

regularity merely, ‘the rule established by law, as well as rea-

son, is that parties, recognizing the existence of corporations

by dealing with them, have no right to object to any irregu-

larity in their organization.’ ” In the present case, however,

there was no law authorizing the parties to ﬁle their articles

of association, or to become incorporated; and there could,

under such circumstances, be no corporation dc facto. It can-

not, therefore, in any proper legal sense, be said that the carry-

ing on of the business in the corporate name is evidence of

user which can be considered in aid of their legal corporate

existence.

Counsel for the defendants contend that the case of Bank
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-vs. Stone, 38 Mich. 779, is decisive of this case. In that case

the defendants claimed to be incorporated as the Charles Stone

Timber Company. It appeared that the plaintiff transacted

a large amount of business with the defendants, upon the

speciﬁc understanding that the concern was contracting as a

corporation, and not otherwise; and this court said: “Now,

the proof that, as matter of fact, the company carried on busi-

ness as a corporation in the name of the Charles Stone Timber

Company when the bank dealt with it, established, prima facie.

that it was a corporation pursuant to law; and certainly the

evidence the bank adduced in regard to the operations of the

company, the attitude it maintained, and the character in

which the two concerns dealt together, showed that the com-

pany was a corporation dc facto, and so acknowledged by the

bank.” In the present case the plaintiff offered evidence to

show that he never knew, or had any information, that the

defendants claimed that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-

poration, but, on the contrary, that Mr. Walker, of that ﬁrm,

asked him to continue his business with the ﬁrm as he had

carried it on formerly with YValker, Summer & Co.. and that

the ﬁrm was composed of himself, William Livingston, Jr.,

of justice and of public policy, that in controversies between
the de facto corporation and those who have entered into contract relatfons with it, as oorporators or otherwise, such
questions should not be suffered to be raised." And again it was
said: "But both in reason and on authority the ruling should
be the same where an attempt has been made to organize a
corporation under a general law permitting it. If due authority existed for the organization, and the question is one of
r~gularity merely, 'the rule established by law, as well as reason, is that parties, recognizing the existence of corporations
by dealing with them, have no right to object to any irregularity in their organization.'" In the present case, however, .
there was no law authorizing the parties to file their articles
-0f association, or to become incorporated; and there ~ould,
under such circumstances, be no corporation de facto. It cannot, therefore, in any proper legal sense, be said that the carrying on of the busilless in the corporate name is evidence of
user which can be considered in aid of their legal corporate
~xistence.

Counsel for the defendants contend that the case of Ban.k
Stone, 38 Mich. 779, is decisive of this case. In that case
the defendants claimed to be incorporated as the Charles Stone
Timber Company. It appeared tqat the plaintiff transacted
a large amount of business with the defendants, upon the
Rpecitlc understanding that the concern was contracting as a
~orporation, and not otherwise; and this court said: "Now,
the proof that, as matter of fact, the company carried on bmd·
ness as a corporation in the name of the Charles Stone Timber
Company when the bank dealt with it, established, prima facie,
that it was a corporation pursuant to law; and certainly the
evidence the bank adduced. in regard to the operations of the
company, the attitude it maintainr.d, and the character in
•which the two concerns dealt together, showed that the company was a corporation de facto, and so acknowledged by the
bank." In the present case the plaintiff offered evidence to
show that he neve1· knew, or had any information, that the
defendants claimed that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a corporation, but, on the contrary, that Mr. Walker, of that firm,
asked him to continue bis business with the firm as he had
earried it on formerly with Walker, Summer & Co.. and that
the fi1·m was composed of himself, William Livingston, Jr.,
tJB.
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and Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that he always believed and under-
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stood that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a ﬁrm. This testi-

mony the court below excluded. In addition to this, and upon

this point, this case differs radically from the case of Bank vs.

Stone. The whole facts show that the ﬁrm never had any cor-

porate existence, and never was a corporation, even do facto.

It is very evident to us that the facts here presented do not

bring this case within the ruling of the former case. In the

present case, as in that, the name would not indicate that the

ﬁrm was a corporation. It gave no clue to the nature of the

company as being corporated or unincorpora.ted,and there is no

pretense of proof that the plaintiff dealt with it as a corpora-

tion, except the fact that defendants were doing business as a

corporation, and had published such fact in two of the Detroit

papers, and mailed circulars to their customers announc-

ing that they had organized as a. corporation under the laws

of the State of Michigan, and also that their letter heads

showed this fact, some of the circulars being mailed to plaint-

iff, and the corporation having also sent by mail statements of

its accounts to plaintiﬁ written upon such letter heads. The
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plaintiff testiﬁed that he had no recollection of receiving such

circulars, or of ever having seen such announcements in the

public press. Plaintiff also testiﬁed that he had no recollection

of ever having received any letter heads containing the infor-

mation that defendants were a corporation; and it appears

that when the account was made -up by defendants showing

their indebtedness to plaintiff, and transmitted to him, it was

upon the letter head of \Valker, Summer & Co., which did not

contain a-ny showing that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-

poration. Plaintiﬁ"s counsel also oﬁ’ered to show by the testi-

mony of the plaintiff that Mr. Walker solicited the plaintiﬁ

to do business with IValker, Hopkins & 00., stating to him that

it was a partnership composed of Walker, Livingston, and

Mark Hopkins, J r., and that in the faith of that statement

the plaintiff commenced business with them. This testimony

the court excluded. Defendants’ counsel, however, contend

that inasmuch as the trial court found as a fact that Walker,

Hopkins & C0. were a corporation, and that during the time it

continued to do business plaintiff had full knowledge that they

were a corporation, and not a copartnership, and continued to

do business with them as a corporation, such ﬁnding is con-

and Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that he always believed and. under~tood that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a firm. Thie testimony the court below excluded. In addition to this, and upon
this point, this case differs radically from the case of Bank vs.
Stone. The whole facts show that the firm never had any cor·
porate existence, and never was a corporation, even de facto.
It is very evident to us that the facts here presented do not
bring this case within the ruling of the former case. In the
present case, as in that, the name would not indicate that tht>
firm was a corporation. It gave no clue to the. nature of the
<'.Ompany as being corporated or unincorporated,and there is no
pretense of proof that the plaintiff dealt with it as a corporation, except the fact that defendan_ts were doing business as a
corporation, and had published such fact in two of the Detroit
papers, and mailed circulars to their customers announcing that they had organized as a corporation under the laws
of the State of Michigan, and also that their letter heads
showed this fact, some of the circulars being mailed to plaintiff, and the corporation having also sent by mail statements of
its accounts to plaintiff written upon such letter beads. The
plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of receiving such
circulars, or of ever having seen such announcements in the
public press. Plaintiff also testified that he had no recollection
of ever having received any letter heads containing the information that defendants were a corporation; and it appears
that when the account was made ·UP by defendants showing
their indebtedness to plaintiff, and transmitted to him, it was
upon the letter head of 'Valker, Summer & Co., which did not
contain a·ny showing that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a corporation. Plaintiff's counsel also offered to show by the testimony of the plaintiff that Mr. 'Valker solicited the plaintiff
to do business with Walker, Hopkins & Co., stating to him that
it was a partnership composed of Walker, Livingston, and
Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that in the faith of that statement
the plaintiff commenced business with them. This testimony
the court excluded. Defendants' counsel, however, contend
that inasmuch as the tl'ial court found as a fact that Walker,
Hopkins & Co. were a corporation1 and that during the time it
continued to do business plaintiff bad full knowledge that they
were a corporation, and not a copartnership, and continued to
do business with them as a corporation, such finding is con-
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elusive, and will not be disturbed by this court. It would be

true that, if there was any proof to support the ﬁnding, this

court would be bound by it, though, upon the facts, it might

not be able to agree with the circuit court in its conclusions.

But the fact is made to appear, by the evidence returned, that

the court excluded the evidence of the plaintiff that he did not

know that they were a corporation, and did not deal with them

as such, but was informed by \\'alker that they were a partner-

ship, and dealt with them in the belief that they were a part-

nership; and yet the court below ﬁnds, under the evidence

which defendants were permitted to offer, that plain_tiﬁ' did

deal with them as a corporation, and had full knowledge that

they were such, and bases such ﬁnding and conclusion upon

the fact that defendants published the statements in the public

press, and mailed circulars and letter heads to plaintiff which

it is not shown he ever received. Under such circumstances,

the court was in error in excluding the testimony, and we think

there is no proof to sutain the ﬁnding. '

It is undoubtedly well settled that a person who has entered

into contract relations with a dc facto corporation cannot, in an
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action thereon, deny its corporate character, or set up any

informality in its organization, to defeat the action. The dis-

tinction between such cases and the present one is to my mind

clear. If there had been any law under which defendants had

a right to incorporate, and the offer had been to show a mere

abuse or excess of its corporate powers, or had it appeared that

it was a de fa/cto corporation, and the question related to the

regularity of its organization merely, there could be no doubt

that the plaintiﬁ would be estopped from questioning its cor--

porate existence. But the two things necessary to show a

corporation, even dc facto, do not exist. There is no law under

which the powers they assumed might lawfully be created;

and the mere fact that they assumed to act as such, even in

the full belief that they were legally incorporated, would not

constitute them a corporation de facto.‘

It is admitted upon this record that an indebtedness was due

to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,562.68 at the date of the trial,

July 19, 1888, and plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable

therefor as partners, and in this contention we think he is

right. The defendants were not a corporation. They had asso-

ciated together, each sharing the proﬁts and losses of the busi-

rluiive, and will not be disturbed by this court. It wooJd be
true that, if there was any proof to support the finding, this
c·ourt would be bound by it, though, upon the facts. it might
not be able to agree with the circuit court in its conclusions.
But the fact is made to appe~r, by the evidence returned, that
the court excluded the evidence of the plaintiff that he did not
know that they wen> a oorporation, and did not deal with them
as such, but was informed by \Yalker that they were a partnership, and dealt with them in the belief that they were a partnership; and y_et thP court below finds, under the evidence
which defendants were permitted to offer, that plaintiff did
deal with them as a corporation, and had full knowledge that
they were such, and bases such finding and conclusion upon
the fact that defend~nts published the statements in the public
press, and mailed circulars and letter heads to plaintiff which
it is not shown he ever received. Under such circumstances,
the court was in error in excluding the testimony, and we think
there is no proof to sustain the finding.
It is undoubtedly well settled that a person who bas entered
into contract relations with a de facto corporation cannot, in an
action thereon, deny its corporate character, or set up any
in(ormality in its organization, to defeat the action. The distinction between such cases and the present one is to my mind
clear. If there had been any law under which defendants bad
a right to incorporate, and the offer bad been to show a mere
abuse or excess of its corporate powers, or had it appeared that
it was a de facto corpomtion, and the question related to the
regularity of its organization merely, there could be no doubt
that the plaintiff would be estoppf:'d from questioning i1s cor·
porate exif1tence. But the two things necessary to show a
corporation, even de facto, do not exist. Th('re is no law under
which the powers th<>y assumed might lawfully be created;
and the mere fact that they assum<>d to act as such, even in
the full belief that they were legally incorporated, would not
constitute them a corporation de facto ..
It is admitted upon this record that an indebtedness was du<·
to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,uG2.G8 at the date of the trial,
July 19, 1888, and plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable
therefor as partners, and in this contention we think he is
right. The defendants were not a corporation. 'rhey had associated together, each sharing the profits and losses of the bnsi-
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uess equally, according to the money each put in as capital

.

1.:>., ·

stock, each holding and owning one-third part of the shares.

The fact that they took counsel and acted in good faith in

organizing under what they were advised was a valid law

doe not relieve them of their liability. It is well settled that

obligors are bound, not by the style which they give to them-

selves, but by the consequences which they incur by reason of

their acts. They have had the beneﬁt of the pluinti1T’s means;

they are indebted to him, as is conceded; but have sought to

shift individual liability to a corporate one. There is no such

corporation, and the mere tact that defendants assumed to

-act as such does not relieve them from personal liability. Under

the circumstances of this case the defendants must be held

liable as partners. The judgment of the court below must be

set aside and vacated, and judgment entered here in favor

of plaintiff for the sum of $3,562.68, with interest from July

27, 1883, being the date when the parties, claiming to be a cor-

poration, made an assignment for the beneﬁt of their creditors,

together with costs of both this and the circuit court.

CAMPBELL and CHAMPLXN, JJ., concurred with Lone, J.
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Smmwoon, C. J., and Monsn, J., did not sit.

N 0'1-s: Compare with the two cases following.
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FINNEGAN vs. NOERENIIERG. \£1'§-/

nese equally, according to the money each put in as capital
stock, each holding and owning one-third part of the shares.
The fact that they took counsel and acted in good faith in
org2.nizing under what they were advised was a valid law
does not relieve them of tlwir liability. It is well settled that
obligors are bound, not by the style which they gh·e to themselves, but by the consequences which they incur by reason of
their acts. They have had the benefit of the plaintiff's means;
they are indebted to him, as is conceded; but have sought to
shift individual liability to a corporate one. There is no such
<·orporation, and the mere fact that defendants assumed to
•
·~•<'t as such does not relieve them from pc•rsonn I liability. Unde1·
the circumstances of this case the defendants must be held
Hable as partners. The judgment of the court below must bt~
set aside and vacated, and judgment entered here in favor
of plaintiff for the sum of $3,5G2.G8, with interest from July
27, 1883, being the date when the parties, claiming to be a corporation, made an assignment for the bPn<>fit of their crcditors,
together with costs of both this and the circuit court.

Supreme Court of .lIinm'xofa, 1893.

CAMPBELL

52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. R81). 1150, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 18 L, R. A. 778.

This was an action to recover of the defendant for the debts

~HERWOOD,

and

CHAMPLIN,

JJ., concnl'l'ed with

LONG,

J.

c. J., and l\tORSE, J., did not Mit.

of a Building Association upon the ground that the association

had failed to become a corporation and, therefore, the associ-

NOTE: Compare with the two caeea following •

ates were liable as partners. The court below held the defend-

ant not liable. Plaintiff appealed.

Savage & Purdy, for appellant.

Ankeny <£ I main, tor defendant.

GILFILLAN, C. J. Eight persona ' igned. acknowledged, and

..

FINNEGAN vs. NOEREXBERO.
Supreme Court of .lfi1111r1wta, 1893.

52 Minn. 289, ra3 X. W. Rep. 1150, 38 Aw. St. Ul•p. rlii:!, 18 L, R. A. TTR

This was an action to recover of the defcnclaut for thl' debl~
of a Building Al'sociation upon the grnund that the as~odation
had failed to become a c01·poration and, therefore, the associHte!!I were liable as partners. The court below held the defendant not liable. Plaintiff appealed.
Savage & Purdy, for appellant.

Ankeny & Irwi'fl\ for defendant.
01L1m,LAN,

C. J. .Eight

pnson~

· 7gnrrl. arlmowlPdged, and
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caused to be ﬁled and recorded in the oﬂice of the city clerk

in Minneapolis, articles assuming and purporting to form.

under Laws 1870, c. 29, a corporation, for the purpose, as speci-

ﬁed in them, of “buying,owning,improving,selling,and leasing

of lands, tenements, and hercditamcnts, real, personal, and

mixed estates and property, including the construction and

leasing of a building in the pity of Minneapolis, Minn., as a

hall to aid and carryout the general purposes of the organi-

zation known as the ‘Knights of Labor.’ ” The association

received subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directors

and a board of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot,

erected a building on it, and, when completed, rented different

parts of it to different parties. The plaintiff furnished plumb-

ing for the building during its construction, amounting to

$599.50, for which he brings this action against several sub-

scribers to the stock, as copartners doing business under the

ﬁrm name of the “K. of L. Building Association.” The theory

upon which the action is brought is that, the association having

failed to become a corporation, it is in law a partnership, and

the members liable as partners for the debts incurred by it,
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It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation

because——First, the act under which it attempted to become

incorporated, to wit, laws 1870, c. 29, is void, because its sub-

ject is not properly expressed in the title; second, the act does

not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or

to transact the business stated in the articles; third, the place

where the business was to be carried on was not distinctly

stated in the articles, and they had, perhaps, some other minor

defects.

It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a dc jure cor-

poration, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an

action in the nature of quo warranto, in behalf of the State;

for,'although an association may not be able to justify itself

when called on by the State to show by what authority it

assumes to be, and act as, a;corporation, it may be so far a

corporation, that, for reasons of public policy, no one but the

State will be permitted to call in question the lawfulness of its

organizationk Such is what is termed a corporation dc facto—

that is, a corporation from the fact of its acting as uch,

though not in law or of right a corporation. What is essential

to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is stated by

c.·auE1ed to be 11.led and recorded in the office of the city clerk
in Minneapolis, articles assuming and purporting to form.
under Laws 1870, c. 29, a corporation, for the purpose, as specified in them, of "buying,owning,improving,selling~and leasing
of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, real, personal, and
mixed estates and property, including the construction and
leasing of a building in the l!ftY of Minneapolis, Minn., as a
hall to aid and carry-Qnt the general purposes of the organization known as the 'Knights of Labor.'" The association
received subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directorK
and a board of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot,
erected a building on it, and, when completed, rented different
parts of it to different parties. The plaintiff furnished plumb'ing for the building during its construction, amounting to
'599.50, for which he brings this actio11 against several subscribers to the stock, as copartners doing business under the.
firm name of the "K. of L. Building Association." The theory
npon which the action is brought is that, the association having
failed to become Q. corporation, it is in law a partnership, and
the members liable as partners for the debts incurred by it_..
It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation
because-First, the act nnder which it attempted to become
incorporated, to wit, laws 1870, c. 29, is void, because its subject is not properly exprC'ssed in the title; second, the act doeK .
not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or
to transact the business stated in the articles; third, the place
where the business was· to be carried on was not distinctly
stated in the artides, and they bad, perhaps, some other minor
defects.
It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a de jure corporation, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an
action in the nature of quo warranto, in beh::lf of the State;
for-t- although an ~ssociation may not be able to justify itself
when called on by the State to show by what authority it
assumes to be, and act as, a; corporation, it may be so far a
corporation, that, for reasons of public policy, no one but the
State will be permitted to call in question the lawfulness of its
organization ... Such is what is termed a corporation de factothat is, a corporation from the fact of its acting as such,
though not in law or of right a corporation. What is essential
to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is stated by

l
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SELDEN, J., in Methodist, etc., Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482,

as “(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a

corporation with the powers assumed migI.t lawfully be cre-

ated; and (2) a user by the party to the suit of the rights

claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.” This state-

ment was apparently adopted by this court in East Norway

Church vs. F-roislic, 37 Minn. 4-12', 35 N. W’. Rep. 260; but, as it

leaves out of account any attempt to organize under the char-

ter or law, we think the statement of what is essential defect-

ive. The deﬁnition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page

145) is more nearly accurate: “When a body of men are acting

as a corporation, under color of apparent organization, in pur-

suance of some charter or enabling act, their authority to act

as a corporation cannot be questioned collaterally.” To give

a body of men assuming to act as a corporation, where there

has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law

authorizing them to become such, the status of a dc facto cor-

poration might open the door to frauds upon the public. It

would certainly be impolitic to permit a number of men to
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have the status of a corporation to any extent merely because

there is a law under which they might have become incor-

porated, and they have agreed among themselves to act, and

they have acted, as a corporation. That was the condition in

Johnson rs. Corscr, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799, in which

it was held that what had been done was ineffectual to limit

the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone

far enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely

signed articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity

by ﬁling for record, which the statute required. “Color of

apparent organization under some charter or enabling act”

does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with

what the law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance.

A substantial compliance will make a corporation dc jure. But

there must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization

under the law. There being such apparent attem-pt to perfect

an organization the failure as to some substantial requirement

will prevent the body being a corporation dc jure; but, if there

be user pursuant to such attempted organization, it will not

prevent it being a corporation dc facto. p

(The court then discussed the alleged invalidity of the act

to authorize the formation of such a corporation, and held

the act valid for that purpose.)

J., in Methodist, etc., Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482, ·
as "(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a
corporation with the powers O.!i..3nmed mig:..t lawfully be created; and (2) a user by the party to the snit of the rights
claimed to be conferred by snch charter or law." This statement was apparently adopted by this court i:a. East Norway
Church vs. Froislie, 37 Minn. 44'Z 35 N. W. Rep. 260; but, as it·
leaves out of account any attem~t to organize under the charter or law, we think the statement of what is essential defective. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page
145) is more nearly accurate: "When a body of men are acting
as a corporation, under color of apparent organization, in purBU'8nce of BOme charter or enabling act, their authority to act
as a "COrporation cannot be questioned collaterally." To give
a body of men assumipg to act as a corporation, where there
has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law
authorizing them to become such, the status of a de facto corporation might open the door to frauds upon the public. lt
would certainly be impolitic to permit a number of men to
have the status of a corporation to any extent merely becaus1!'
there is a law under which they might have become incorporated, and they have agreed among themselves to act, and
they have acted, as a corporation. That was the condition in
·Johnson vs. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799, in which
ft was held that what had been done was ineffectual to limit
the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone
far enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely
signed articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity
by filing for record, which the statute required. "Color of
apparent organization under some charter or enabling act"
does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with
what the law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance.
A substantial compliance will make a corporation de jure. But
there must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization
under the law. There being such apparent attempt to perfect
an organization the failure as to some substantial requirement
will prevent the body being a corporation de jure; but, if there
be user pursuant to such attempted organization, it will not
prevent it being a corporation de facto.
.
(The court then discussed the alleged invalidity of the act
to authorize the formation of such a corporation, and held
the act valid for that purpose.)
SBLDEN,
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The omission to state distinctly in the articles the place

within which the business is to be carried on, though that

rzight be essential to make it a dc jure corporation, would

not prevent it becoming ore dc facto. The foundation for a

dc facto corporation having been laid by the attempt to organ-

ize under the law, the user shown was suﬂicient.

Judgment aﬂirmcd.

Noam: Oonipare with the preceding and following cases.

KAISER vs. LAWRENCE SAVINGS BANK.

Supreme Court of fmra, 1881.

Tlte ombsion to state distinctly in the articles the place
within which the business is to be carried on, though that
r~ight be essential to make it a de jure corporation, would
not prevent it becomi"'g ore d.e facto. The foundation for a
de facto corporation having been laid by the attempt to organize under the law, the user shown was sufficient.
Judgment affirmed.

66 Iowa 104, 8 N. W. Rep. 772, 41 Am. Rep. 85.

Action by Kaiser against a number of persons, of whom

Non: Compare with the preceding and following

08888.

Hoag alone was served with process to hold them liable as

partners doing business as the Lawrence Savings Bank.

Defense that the bank was a corporation under the laws of

Kansas, and that therefore the defendant was not person-

ally liable. Verdict for plaintiff and Hoag appeals.

Hanna, Fitzgerald ¢£ Hughes, for appellant.

Hoffman, Pick-ler (E Brown, and L. M. Fisher, for appellee.

Amms, C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain
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individuals attempted in good faith to become incorporated

K.\.ISER vs. LAWRENCE SA VINGS BANK.

under the laws of Kansas for the purpose of doing business

Supreme Court of Towa, 1881.

as a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed

corporation. For several years they did business as a savings

A Iowa 104, 8 N. W. Hep. 772, 41 Am. Rep. 815.

bank, under the supposition that they were duly incorporated.

Prior to the time that plaintiﬁ became a creditor of the bank,

the defendant Hoag purchased an interest in the bank, and

remained the owner of such interest from that time forward.

The question presented is whether the shareholders so far com-

plied with the incorporation laws of Kansas as to become

incorporated and secure an exemptiorrfrorn individual liability,

and if they did not strictly become incorporated whether the

_ ___} _— l._.__.. .-Q

1,}

Action by Kaiser against a number of perso:is, of whom
Hoag alone was served with process to hold them liable B.R
partners doing business as the Lawrence Savings Bank.
Defense that the bank was a corporation under the laws of
Kansas, and that therefore the defendant was not personally liable. Verdict for plaintiff and Hoag appeals.
Hanna, Fitzgerald & Hughes, for appellant.

Hoffman, Pickler c:E Brown, and L. M. Fi8her, for appellee.
C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain
individuals attempted in good faith to become incorporated
under the laws of Kansas for the purpose of doing business
a.s a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed
corporation. For several years they did business as a saving'.!
bank, under the oupposition that they were duly incorporated.
Prior to the time that plaintiff became a creditor of the bank,
the defendant !Ioag pqrchased an interest in the bank, and
rPmained the owner· of such interest from that time forward.
The question presented is whether the shareholders so far comvlied with the incorporation laws of Kansas as to become
incorporated and s~cure an exemption from inaividual liability,
and if they did not strictly become incorporated whether the
ADAMS,

, Kusna vs. L.uvasscn SAVINGS BANK. 17

KA.ISER VS. LA WREN CE SA. VINGS BA.l(K.

fact that they did business as a corporation, not only with

17

the general public but with the plaintlif, was suﬁlcient to

secure to them exemption from individual liability. . .

(The court here considered the statutory requirements and

held that the papers executed and ﬁled by the shareholders

were not such as the statute required.)

The defendant insists, howcver, that in order to establish

the corporate existence of the Lawrence Savings Bank as

against plaintiff it is suﬂicicnt to show :|uthorit_v to create the

corporation, a bona ﬁdc attcmpt on the part of the corpora-

tors to become incorporated, and the doing of business as a

corporation. In support of this proposition the defendant cites

’l'hc Buﬁalo (€ Allegheny Railroad Co. v. C'ar_1/, 26 l\'. Y. 77.

In that case the court said, “that if the papers ﬁler‘. are color-

able, but so defective that, in a proceeding on the part of the

State against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet

b_v the acts of user under such organization it becomcs a cor-

poration dc facto, and no advantage can be taken of such defect

in its constitution collaterally by any person." Substantially

the same doctrine was enunciated in Krutz vs. The Paola Town

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Co., 20 Kan. 403, and l'apc rs. The Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440, 27

Am. Rcp. 182. It should be observed, however, that in those

cases thc defendant sct up a want of incorporation of the

plaintitt and sought to cscapc liability upon that ground‘ In

the casc at bar thc dcfcndant sets up exemption, averring that

the attempt to become incorporated and the doing of business

under a claim of incorporation were sutticient to create the

exemption. I

It will be seen at once that the principle involved in those

cases is essentially ditto:-cnt from that in thc case at bar.

It is hardly necessary to say that where incorporation has

once taken place no act of forfeiture can be set up in‘ a

collateral action, until forfeiture has been judicially declared

in an action brought for that purpose. Sec Angcll & Ames on

Corporations, Sec. 636, and cases cited. But the principle

involved in those cases is essentially different from that in

the case at bar.

In Hmnphrc!/8 vs. Mooney, 5 Colorado, 282, a creditor of an

assumed corporation sought to hold a member as a partner.

It was held that as his right of action was based upon an

express contract With the assumed corporation he was

3.

e

fact that they did business as a corporation, not only with
the general public but with the plaint:!'f, was suf:cient to
secure to tlwm exemption from individual liability.
(The court here considered the statutory requirements and
held that the papf'rs exe('uted and filed by the shareholders
WPl'P not suC'h as the fltatntt• required.)
The defendant imdstfl, however, that in orcler to establish
the eorporute exi,,.,f1•1u·p of the Law1'PIH'P ~avings Bank _as
agai,nl'lt plaintiff it is snflidt•nt to show authOl'it~· to c1·eate the
.. orporation, a bona fidt• att1•mpt on the pnrt of the eorporatori-; to become incorpo1·att•d, and the doing of bm1iness a.s a
1·orpomtion. In support of this proposition the defendant cites
1'hl' {~uffalo & A.llegl1<111y Railroad Co. v. Car.11 . 26 N. Y. 77.
b that case the court f'laid, "that if the papers filel: are colorable, but so dPfecttve that, in a protet>ding on the part of the
Rtate against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet
by tl1e aets of user undet' such organization it beconws a corporation de fa<'fo, and no adrnntage can be taken of sneh defect
in its eonstitution eollaterall.v by any person.'' Substantially
the ~ame dodrine was enunciated in 11.rutz t'S. 'l'hc Paola. Town
Co.• 20 Kan. 40:3, au<l /'aw rs. 'l'ltc Capitol Bank, 20 Knn. 440, 27
.Am. lfrp. 1~2. It 8ho11ld be observed, however, that in those
casPK thl' dPft~nda11 t i-;..t up a want of incorporation of the
plaintiff an<l i-:011~ht to t'!·wapl' liability upon that ground4 In
the east> at um· tht• d!'f1·11da11t setl-l up exemption, averring that
the attempt to bt•1·011w itH"orpora ted and the doing of business
'
under a claim of iucorporntion
were sufficient to create the
exemption.
It will be seen at once that the principle involved in tho:ie
cases is essentiall~- differf'nt from that in the ease at bar.
It is bardl.Y necCS!oiHl',Y to say that where incorpoi·ation has
on·..e tak<.'n plaee no ad of fo1·fpiture can be set np in' a
collateral action, until forfeiture has been judicially declared
. in an aetion brought for that purpose. See AngPll & Amf's on·
Corporations, Sec. 636, and cases cited. But the principle
involved in those cases is eRsentially difff'rent from that in
the case at bar.
In Humplir<'.llll vs. Jfooncy, 5 Colorado, 282, a creditor of an
nssumed 1·orporation sought to hold a member as a partner.
It was held that as his right of action was based upon an
express contract «'ith the assumed corporation he was

3

.
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estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doc-

trine of that case is suhst..ntially that relied upon by the

defendant. But it seems to us that it is not sustained by

the weight of authority. The court cited in support of the

decision, Eaton. vs. Aspinurall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Buffalo, etc.,

1R. R. O0. vs. Cary, 26 N. Y. 77, but neither of the cases, it

appears to us, is in point.

-There may, indeed, be certain irregularities, or omissions

to comply with provisions merely directory, which would be

suﬁicient to sustain an action brought to declare a forfeiture,

but insuﬂicient to sustain a collateral action brought to

enforce an individual liability of a member. But where the

attempt at incorporation is under a general law, and there

is a non-compliance with the law in a material respect, there

is, we think, such want of incorporation that exemption from

individual liability is not secured. In lllokelum-ne Hill Min-

iny O0. rs. Il'oo(lbm"y, 14 Cal. 42-1, 73 Am. Dec. 658, the court

said: “There is a broad and obvious distinction between such

acts as are declared to be necessary steps in the process of

incorporation, and such as required of the individuals seek-
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ing to become incorporated, but which are not made prerequis-

ites to the assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the

former, any material omission will be fatal to the existence

of the corporation, and may be taken advantage of collaterally

in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly

be called in question.”

Hurt rs. Salisbury/, 55 Mo. 310, was an action brought upon

a promissory note purporting to he executed by the directors

of the North Missouri Central District Stock, Agricultural and

Mechanical Association. The action was brought against the

directors upon the ground that the association was not incor-

porated at the time the note was given, and that the directors

were. therefore. individually liable. It appeared that the asso-

ciation at the time the note was given was fully incorporated

in every respect except that it had failed to ﬁle its articles

of incorporation with the secretary of state, as the statutes

required. It was held that the directors were individually

liable.

In B-i_r/clow rs. Gregory, et a.l., 73 Ill. 197, the defendants were

held liable as partners for goods sold to an assumed cor-

poration of which they were members. The defect in the

w

\
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L

estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doctrine of that ca.se ie subsLntially that relied upon by the
defendant. But it seems to us that it is not fmstained by
the weight of authority. The court cited in support of the
decision, Eaton vs. Aspin.icall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Ruffalo, etc.,
-R. R. Co. vs. Cary, 26 N. Y. 77, but neither of the caeee, it
appears to us, is in point.
·There may, indeed, be cc>rtain irregularities, or omissions
to compl_y with pro\'isions merely directory, which would be
sufficient to sustain an action brought to declare a forfeiture,
but insufficient to sustain a collaternl action brought to
enforce an individual liability of a member. llut where the
attempt at incorporation is under a general law, and there
is a non-compliance with the law in a material respect, there
is, we think, such want of incorporation that exemption from
individual lb1hility is not secured. In ilfokelumne Hill Minittf/ Co. rs. ffoo<lbury, 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658, the court
said: "TherP is a broadand ob;fous distinction between such
aets as are dedared to be nec~ssary steps in the process of
incorporation, and such as required of the individuals seeking to become incorporat('d, but which are not made prerequisites to the assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the
former, any material omission will be fatal to the .:xistence
of the corporation, and may be taken adrnntage of collaterull,v
in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly
be called in question."
Hurt i·s. Rali.~bury, 55 l\lo. 310, was an action brought upon
a promis~ory note purporting to be <'Xt><'uted by the director1:1
of the North l\Iissouri Central District Stock, Agricultural and
Mechanical .Association. The action was brought against the>
direetors upon the ground that the association was not incorporated at the time the note was given, and that tlie directors
Wf'l't'. the1·eforP, indh·iduall~· liable. It appeared that the association at the time the note was given was fully incorporated
in every respect except that it had fail(•d to file its articles
of incoq>0ration with the io;ecrt>tary of statf>, as the statutes
reqnirt>d. It was held that the directors were individually~
liable.
In Bif1cl010 t•s. Grrgory, ct al., 73 III. 197, the defendants were
held liable as part1wrs for ~ornh; Rold to an assumed corporation of which they were mewbc1·s. The defect in the
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incorporation consisted in a failure to ﬁle the articles of incor-

K.A.ISBR

vs.

LAWRENCE

SA. VINGS

BANK.

Hi

poration with the clerk of the city where the corporation was

to transact its business. _

In that case the court said: “There is a marfifestdiﬁerence

where a corporation is created by a special charter, and there

have been acts of user, and where individuals seek to form

themselves into a corporation under a general law. In the

latter case it is only in pursuance of the provisions of the

statute for such purpose that corporate existence can be

acquired. And there would seem to be a. distinction between

a case where, in a suit between a corporation and a stock-

holder or other individuals, the plea of nul triel corporation

is set up to defeat a liability which he may have contracted

with the other, and the case of a suit against individuals who

claimed exemption from individual liability on the ground of

their having become a corporation formed under the provi-

sions of a general statute. In the latter case a stricter meas-

ure of compliance with statutory requirements will be required

than in the former.” This is a. late decision, and seems to

have been made with a full recognition of the authorities
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claimed to hold an adverse doctrine.

See also, Abbottvs. Omaha Smelting 00., 4 Neb. 416, and

Harris vs. McGregor, 29 Cal. 125.

In our opinion, the proprietors of the Lawrence Savings

Bank failed to become incorporated, and there was nothing

in what they did or claimed which can properly be held as

suﬁicient to secure them exemption from individual liability.

The judgment, therefore, of_the District Court must be

aﬁirmcd.

Norm: For other cases upon the question whether the members of a

detectively organized corporation are liable as partners, see Machem’s

Elem. of Partn., §§ 10-11. _

incorporation consisted in a failure to tile the articles of incorporation with the clerk of the city where the corporation was
to transact its business.
In that case the coul't said: "There is a m~i:riifest differenct>
where a corporation is created by a special charter, and there
have been acts of user, and where individuals seek to form
themselves into a col'poration under a general law. In the
latter case it is only in pursuance of the provisions of the
statute for such purpose that corporate existence can be
acquired. And there would seem to be a distinction between
a case where, in a suit between a corporation and a stockholder or other individuals, the plea of nul tiel corporation
is set up to defeat a liability which he may have contracted
with the other, and the case of a suit against individuals who
claimed exemption fl'om individual liability on the ground of
their having become a corporation formed under the provisions of a general statute. In the latter case a stricter measure of compliance with statutory requirements will be required
than in the former." This is a late decision, and seems to
have been made with a full recognition of the authorities
claimed to bold an adverse doctrine.
See also, Abbott vs. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416, and
Harris vs. JfcGregor, 29 Cal. 125.
In our opinion, the proprietors of the Lawrence Savings
Bank failed to become incorporated, and there was nothing
in what they did or claimed which can properly be held as
sufficient to secure them exemption from individual liability.
The judgment, therefore, of. the District Court must be
affirmed.
· NoTit: For other cases upon the question whether the members of a
defective1y organized corporation are liable u partners, see .Mechem's
Elem. of Parto., §§ 10-11.

II.

FOR WHAT PURPOSE ORGANIZED.

-_..____<

CHESTER vs. DICKERSON.

Commission of Appeals of New York, 1873.

54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550.

_ Action brought by Chester and other against Dickerson,

Reed, Jones and Dewitt for damages arising from fraud and

deceit in the sale. of'lands. It appeared that in November,

1864, defendants entered into written agreement whereby they

agreed to purchase. lease and take refusals of lands on their

IJ.

joint account, and that they should sell, lease or work the

lands thus taken. They further agreed that the expenses and

losses, gains and proﬁts, should be shared equally. There

FOR WHAT PURPOSE ORGANIZED.

was evidence that this agreement had existed by parol from

September, 1864. Lands were accordingly taken, and Reed

entered into negotiations with plaintiffs, and represented the

lands to be oil-producing. showing the indications of oil, which

it appeared had been produced by petroleum poured on the

lands by one Higgs, through the connivance of Jones. The

plaintiffs purchased the lands on the faith of these represen-

CHEATER vs. DICKERSON.
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tations and indications, and the purchase money was divided

among the defendants. There ‘was evidence that Reed par-

Com.mission of Appeals of New York, 1813.

ticipated in the fraud, but Dickerson was not implicated by

the evidence. Dewitt died pending the action. Plaintiffs

54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550.

brought suit against defendants, on discovering the fraud.

|_The court charged that the partnership could exist by parol,

and that all of the defendants were liable for the fraud com-

mitted by either in and about the partnership. The plaintiﬂs

obtained a verdict and judgmenﬂ The general term affirmed

ti ,—/"*/—~ - .— _

A

v

Action brought by Chester and others against Dickerson,
Reed, Jones and Dewitt for damages arising from fraud and
df'ceit in th .. sale of.lands. It appeared that in November,
1864, defendants entered into written agreement whereby they
ngree>d to pnrehase, lease and take refusals of lands on their·
joint account. and that they should sell, lease or work thE•
lands thus taken. They further agreed that the expenses and
losses, tiains and profits, should be shared equally. There
was evidence 1hat this agrC'emen t had existed by parol from
September, 18f>-!. J,,ands were ac('ordingly taken, and Reed
entered into nl'gotiations with plaintiffs, and repreRC'nt.ed the
lands to be oil-producing-. showin~ the indications of oil, which
it appeared had been prndu<·<'d by petroleum poured on the
lands by mw Higgs, through the connirnnce of Jon<>s. Tht>
plaintiffs 1mreha~<>d the landi;; on the faith of these rt°'preseutations and indieations, and the purchase money was divided
among the d<:>fendants. There "vas evidence that Heed participated in the fraud, but Dickerson was not impli<-ated b,v
the evidence. Dewitt died pending the action. Plaintiff8
brought suit against defendants, on discovering the fraud.
LThe court charged that the partnership could exist by parol,
and that all of the defendants were liable for the fraud committed by either in and about the partnership. The plaintiffs
obtained a verdict and ju.dgmen.£ The general term affirmed

A

"

Cnnsrnn vs. DICKERSON. 21

CHESTER VS. DICKERSON.

the judgment, and defendants, Dickerson and Reed, appealed

21

to this court.

the judgment, and defendants, Dicke1·son and Reed, appealed

James Emott, for appellants.

A. Anthony, for respondents.

to this court.

Esnn, C. It cannot be questioned that two or more persons

may become partners in buying and selling land. There is

James Emott, for appel1ants.

nothing in the nature or essence of a partnership which

A. Anthony, for respondents.

requires that it should be conﬁned to ordinar_v trade and com-

merce, or to dealings in personal property. Story on 1'art., sec.

82, 83; Collyer on Part, sec. E}, 51, and note; I)udIe_:/ rs. I.-itHc-

ﬁcld, 21 Me. 418; Sage vs. Sherman, 2 N. Y. 417; Mead rs. Shcp-

a/rd, 5-1 Barb. 474; Pendlcton vs. Wambcrsic, -1 (Branch, (U. S.)

73; Thompson rs. Bowman, 6 Wall (U. S.) 316; Ho.ric vs. Carr,

1 Sumner (U. S. C. G.) 173. N

Kent says: “-\ partnership is a contract of two or more per-

sons to place their money, etfects, labor and skill, or some or

all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the

proﬁt and share the loss in certain proportions; and that it

is not essential to a legal partnership that it be conﬁned to

commercial business. It may exist between attoi-nc_vs, con-
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veyancers, mechanics, owners of a line 'of stage coaches, arti-

sans or farmers, as well as between merchants and bankers,“

3 Kent’s Com."_’4, 28; and wh_\' may it not exist between deal-

ers and speculators in real estate?

But, as it is claimed that the partnership in this case existed

0

b_v parol before the execution of the written agrecnie-nt, dated

November 28. 1364. it is necessary to inquire whether a part-

nership. in reference to lands, can be formed and proved by

parol. Upon this question there is considerable conllict in the

authorities. On the one hand it is claimed that a parol agree-

ment for such a partliership would be within the statute of

frauds which provides that no estate or interest in lands shall

be created, assigned or declared, unless by act or operation of

law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the.

party creating, granting. assigning or declaring the same; and

to this effect is the case of Smith rs. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435.

On the other hand it is clainicd that such an agreement is not

aifected by the statute of frauds, for the reason that the real

estate i treated and administered in equity as personal prop-

erty for all the purposes of the partnership. A court of equil y

EARL, C. It cannot be questioned that two or more persons .
may become pm·tners in buying and selling land. Tht>re is
nothing in the nature or e88l'Uce of a partnerRhip which
require8 that it shonld be confined to Ol'dinary trade and COlll ·
merce, or to dealings in per8onal property. Htor·.v 011 Pm·L se1·.
82, 83; Coll~1 e1· on Part., sec. :;, 51, and note; Dudley rs. Littlefield, 21 :Me. 418; Sage vs. Nlwrman, ~)I", Y. -117; Jlead rs. Slu·pllird, 54 Barb. 474; P('ndfoton vs. ffambcrsi<', 4 Craneh, (tr. ~-)
7;.1; Thompson rs. Bo1nnan, G \\'all (G. S.) :HG; Ho.de V8. Carr,
1 ~umner ( U. K C. C.) 17:t
Kent says: ".\ partnl'l'8hip is a contract of two or more pet'·
sons to plaee their money, l ffects, labor aml skill. or some or
all of them, in lawful commerce or lmsim•ss, and to di\·ide the
profit and sharp the losR in certain p1·opm·t ions; and that it
is not essl·nl ial to a ll'gal pai·t11p1·sliip that it ill' 1·ontined to
eommerdal ltnsinPss. 1t may exist between ntto1·m·ys, conveyauee1·s, lll(•c·hanfrs, owners of a line 'of stage eoac·hes, artisans or far1111·1·s. as well as hf•twl'en me1Thants nnd uankt>t's,"
3 Kent's Con1. :!J., ~8; and wh,,· may it not exist between dt•al·
ers and s1weulato1·s in n·al estatl'?
But, as it is daimed that the partnership in this case• existt•11
by parol lwfort• tl11• ex<'cui ion of the writtPn agreP11H'11 I", da 1Pcl
NovPmber :!~. 1~fi -L it is m•cessary to inquil'e wlwthPr a pa1·tnership. in I'l'ft•l'Ptl<'e to lan<ls, eirn be fo1·1m·d nnd pl'lH"t•cl hy
parol. Upon this quPstion there is considp1·ahh• 1·onllil·t iu the
authorities. On the on(~ hautl it is dairnt•tl that a pa1·ol ag1·ec'ment fo1• such a part11p1·sliip would be withi11 the statutt• of
frauds which 1n·o,·ides that no t•staft• or inter(•st in lands shall
be created, assigned or dl·t·la1·~l. u11less hy act or opPmtion of
law, or by a deed or com·pyimce in \\Tiling- suhs1·1·ihed by thP
party creating, grantin~. n~sig11ing- 01· dl'c·lal'in~ thP l'mme; and
to this effect is the case of 8111itl1 rs. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435.
On the other hand it is claimed that suel1 an agrPPnwnt is not
affected by the statute of frauds, for the J'<•nso11 that tht• real
estate is treated and adrninh~te1·t><l in equity as pl.'rsonal propPrty for all the purposes of the partnership. A court of equi1y

..
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OASES ON PART:SEHSHlP.

having full jurisdictionof all cases between partners touching

the partnership property, it is claimed that it will inquire into,

take an account of, and administer upon all of the partnership

property. whether it be real or personal, and in such cases will

not allow one partner to commit a fraud or a breach of trust

upon his copartner by taking advantage of the statute of

frauds; and to this effect are the followingauthorities: Dale

vs. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Essex vs. Esser, 20 Beavan 449; Bun-

nell rs. Taintor, 4 Conn. 568. A full discussion of the question

is found in Dale rs. Hamilton; and the reasoning and review

of the cases there by Vice Chancellor ‘Wigram are quite sat-

isfactory. The general doctrine is there laid down that “a

partnership agreement between A and B that they shall be

jointly interested in a speculation for buying, improving for

sale and selling lands may be proved without being evidenced

by any writing, signed by or by the authority of the party to

be charged therewith within the statute of frauds; and such an

agreement being proved, A or B may establish his'interest

in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest

being evidenced by any such writing.” I am inclined to think
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this doctrine to be founded upon the best reason and the most

authority. But whether it -is or not, it is not very important

to decide in this case. Most of the conﬂict in the authorities

has arisen in controversies about the title to the real estate

after the dissolution of the partnership or the death of one of

the partners. But suppose two persons, by parol agreement;

enter into a partnership to speculate in lands, how do they

come in conﬂict with the statute of. frauds? No estate or inter-

est in land has been granted, assigned or declared. \Vhen the

agreement is made no lands are owned by the ﬁrm, and neither

party attempts to convey or assign any to the other. The con-

tract is 'a valid one, and in pursuance of this agreement they

go on and buy, improve and sell lands. VVhile they are doing

this, do they not act as partners and bear a partnership rela-

tion to each other? VVithin the meaning of the statute in such

case neither conveys or assigns any land to the other, and

hence 'there is no conﬂict with the statute. The statute is not

so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in lands;

it is simply aimed at the creation or conveyance of an estate

in lands without a writing. If there was a parol agreement

'in this case before the written one, it was just like the one

haling fall jurisdiction·of all cases between partners touching
the partnership property, it is claimed that it will inquire into,
take an account of, and administer· upon all of the partnership
property, whether it be real or personal, and in such cases will
not allow one partner to commit n fraud or a breach of trust
upon his copartner by taking udnmtage of the statnte of
frauds; and to this effect nr·e the following_autlwrities: Dale
vs. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Essex vs. Bssr.r, 20 Beavan 449; Bun·
nell i•s. 7'aintor, 4 Conn. 568. A full discussion ·of the question
is found in Dale i·s. Hamilton; and the reasoning and review
of the cases there by Vi<'t' Chaneellor '\Yigram are quite sat·
isfnctory. The general doctrine is there laid down that "a
partnership agrt.>ement between A and B that thc>y shall be
jointly interested in a speculation for buying, improving for
sale and selling lands may be proved without being evideuced
by any writing, signed by or by the authority of the party to
be charged therewith within the statute of frauds; and such an
agreement being provC'd, ~\ or B may establish his· interest
in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest
bPing evidenced by any such writing." I am inclined to think
this doctrine to be founded up-0n the best reason and the most
authority. But whether it is or not~ it is not very important
to decide in this case. Most of the conflict in the authorities
has arisen in controversies about the title to the real estate
after the dissolution of the partnership or the death of one of
the partners. But suppose two persons, by parol agreement;
enter into a partnership to speculate in lands, how do they
come in conflict with the statute of. frauds? No estate or interest in land has been gmnted, assigned or declared. "rhen the
agreement is made no lands are owned by the firm, and neither
party attempts to convey or assign any to the other. The con·
tract is ·a valid one, and in pursuance of this agreement they
go on and buy, improve and sell lands. While they are doing
this, do they not act as partners and bear a partnership relation to each other? \Vithin the meaning of the statute in such
case neither conveys or assigns any land to the other, and
hence there is no conflict with the statute. 'fhe statute is not
so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in lands;
it is simply aimed at the creation or conveyance of an estate
in lands without a writing. If there was a parol agreement
'in this case before the written one, it was just like the one

Onssrna vs. Drcxsnsozt. 23

embodied in the writing, to wit, a partnership to purchase,

0HESTER VS. DICKERSON.

23

lease and take refusals of land and then sell, lease or work

ithem for the joint beneﬁt of the parties. This is not a con-

troversy about the title to any of the lands taken or owned by

the partners, but it simply relates to the conduct of the defend=

ants while they were acting as partners; and in such a case

the statute of frauds certainly can present no obstacle to

relief.

\\’e then come to the question whether there was suﬁicient

proof of the existence of this partnership by parol before the

28th of November. 1864, and I cannot doubt that there was.

Jones distinctly testified that the partnership between all the

defendants did exist as early as September, and that it was

afterwards put into writing. Neither Reed nor Dickerson, in

their testimony, denied this, and neither of them claimed that

they did not become partners until the writing was executed.

There is abundant evidence that Reed was associated with

Jones as early as the later part of September, or the fore part

of October. It does not appear how or by what negotiation

the members of the ﬁrm were brought together in partner-
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ship, and it does not appear through what agency Dickerson

was induced to join with the others. As to him, all we have

is the evidence of Jones, above referred to, and the writing,

and the fact that he, subsequently, without objection, in the

division of the money received from the plaintiffs, allowed his

share of the sums paid for the services of Higgs, who was

employed to pour oil upon the lands, from some time about

the ﬁrst of September. Hence we must take it as proved, in

this case, that this partnership existed as early as September.

1864. But it is claimed, on the part of the appellants, that all

the rules of commercial partnerships do not apply to part-

nerships in real estate. They apply to every other kind of part-

nership, and why not to this? This kind of partnership is

formed like every other, for the mutual proﬁt and advantage

of the parties, and there is no reason why it should not be

governed by the same rules. -

In all partnerships one partner is the general agent of all

the partners for the transaction of all the partnership busi-

ness, and_I can perceive no reason for not applying the same

rule of agency to partnerships in real estate. In fact, all the

powers, duties and rights which usually appertain to partner-

embodied in the writing, to wit, a partnership to purchaae,
lease and take refusa}s of land and then sell, lease or work
ithem for the joint benefit of the parties. 'fhis is not a controversy about the title to an.r of the lands taken or owned by
the partners, but it simply relates to the conduct of the defend.
ants while they were acting as partners; and in such a case
the statute of frauds certainly can present no obstacle to
relief.
\Ve then come to the question whether there was sufficient
proof of the existence of this partnership by parol before the
28th of November~ 1864, and I cannot doubt that there was.
Jones distinctly testified that the partners4ip between all tlle
defendants did exist as early as September, and that it was
afterwards put into writing. Neither Reed nor Dickerson, in
their testimony, denied this, and neither of them claimed that
they did not become partners until the writing was executed.
'.rhere is abundaQ.t evidence that Reed was associated with
J<>nes as early as the later part of September, or the fore part
of October. It does not appear how or by what ne'g otiation
the members of the firm were brought together in partnership, and it does not appear through what agency Dickerson
was induced to join with the others. As to him, all we have
is the evidence of Jones, above referred to, and the writin~,
and the fact that he, subsequently, without objection, in th1~
division of the money received from the plaintiffs, allowed hiH
share of the sums paid for the services of Higgs, who was
employed to pour oil upon the lands, from some time about
the first of September. Hence we must take it as proved, in
this case, that this partnership existed aa early as September.
1864. But it is claimed, on the part of the appellants, that all
the rules of commercial partnerships do not apply to partnerships in real estate. They apply to every other kind of pa1'tnership, and why not to this? This kind of partnership is
formed like every other, for the mutual p1·ofit and advantage
of the parties, and there is no reason why it should not be
gov~!l!ed by the same rules.
In all partnerships one partner is the general agent of an
the partners for the transaction of all the partnership business, and! can perceive no reason for not applying the same
rule of agency to partnerships in real estate. In fact,, all the
powers, duties and rights which usually appertaiD; to partner·

•
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CASES ON PAHT.S.IH<:HllP.

ships must appertain to partnerships in real estate, except

as they are modiﬁed by the character of the property;

and the only difference grows out of the rules of law

in reference to the conveyance and transmission of real

estate. One partner cannot convey the whole title to real

estate unless the whole title is vested in him. Tan Brunt vs.

A pplcgatc, 44 N. Y.‘ 544. But he can enter into an executory

contract to convey, which a court of equity will enforce. While

a contract for the conveyance of land must be in writing. yet

an agent to execute the contract may be appointed by parol.

Willard on Real Estate, 376. .\nd hence, when the partnership

business is to deal in real estate. ouc partner has ample power.

as general agent of the ﬁrm, to enter into an executory con-

tract for the sale of real estate. I ﬁnd no authority holding

that the rules of ordinary commercial partnerships do not

apply to partnerships in real estate. except the case of Pitt-s:

vs. Wuugll, 4 Mass. -1234. It was there held that the law iner-

chant respecting dormant partners did not extend to specu-

lators in land. The learned judge writing the opinion did not

cite any authority for the decision he made, and his reasons
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for the conclusions which he reached are not satisfactory.

Dormant partners are held liable for the debts and contracts

of the ﬁrm, because they are, in fact, members of the ﬁrm, and

share in its proﬁts, and the law will not allow them secretly

to share in the proﬁts of the ﬁrm without taking their share

of the risks and bearing their share of the losses, as to third

persons. And there is precisely the same reasons for holding

a dormant partner in a real estate partnership liable to all

persons dealing with the ﬁrm. In Patterson rs. I§rcu'.<:tcr, -L

Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. I152. the vice chancellor expressed the opinion

that the law merchant does not apply to partners in buying

and selling land. This case and Pitts rs. ll'uu_r/Ii are com-

mented on by Judge Mitclicll in licnncr rs. Harrison, 19 Barb.

53, and are there shown not to be precise authority for the doc-

trines announccd. It follows, therefore, that the court com-

mitted no error in holding that all the partners were liable for

the frauds committed by either in the transaction and prose-

cution of the partnership enterprise, for it is well settled that

the ﬁrm is bound for the fraud committed by one partner in

the course of the transactions and business of the partnership,

even when the other partners have not the slightest connection

ships must appt•rtain to parlnerslilps in real estate, except
as they are modified by the cha1·acter of the 1>roperty;
and the only difference grows out of the rult-8 of law
in refert•nce to the com·evanee
and transmission
of real
.
.
estate. One partner cannot <'Oll \"p~· the whole title to real
(•state unless the whole titlt• is n•sh•<l in him. l"an Brunt v.s.
Applegate, 44 N. Y. 544. Hut he ('an entn· into an executory
C'ontract to conve~·, which a court of equity will enforn•. While
a contract for the conveyanee of land must be in w1·iting. yet
an agent to exPeute the contmct may be appointed b.v parol.
lViUard on Real E.~taft'. :~7G. .\nd heiwe, when the partnership
lrnsiness is to dPal in t·t~al estate. one partner hns ample power,
as general agent of the firm, to entl•r into an eXP<'Utory contract for the sale of real estatt>. I find no authority holding
that the rules of ordinary <·ommt•reial partnerships do not
apply to partnPrRhipR in r1•al t>Htate. 1·x<·t~pt the <'a:-w of Pitt~
vs. Wu11gh, 4 )lai-;K. 4:!4. It Wai'\ tht•1·1· lu•ld that the law nu•1·chant resp<·<·ting dormant partner!'.! •lifl not PXt<>nd to spl•enlators in Jund. The learned jud~e writing the opinion did not
cite any authority for the deeision he mad<', au<l his reasons
for the conclusions which ht~ reaehc>d are not satiMfactory.
Dor·mant partnt:rs are helcl liable fm· the debts and contracts
of the firm, bf:>l'ause they arl', in fad, 11u•111b<:>rs of th<> firm, and
share in itl'I profits, and the law will not allow thPm secretly
to share in tltt-> profits of tlw firm without taking thl'ir share
of the risks and bPa1·ing thr·ir share of the lossps, as to third
persons. ..:\nd tlu're is precis<•ly the 1-\HllW r(•a:-;ons for holding
a dormant parim·1· in a real estate pa1·tnership liable to all
persons denliu~ with the fi1111. In Pattcr.~on n~. lln·tr~fer, 4
Edw. (~. Y.) Ch. :i:>:!, the vice chancellor expr<·ssl'd the opinion
that the law Jll('l'(·lr:.111t does not applJ• to partnPrs in buying
and sdling land. Tl1is case :rnd Pitts rs. ll'au!Jh are commented on hy Ju,lgP )litcltell in Jfr1111cr rs. Harrison, rn Barb.
53, and are thPJ'(' shown not to be lH"el'ise authority for the doctrines anno111H <•1l. It follows , therefore, that the court committed no error in holding that all the partners were liable for
the frauds committed hy either in the transaction and prosecution of the partnPrf'lhip enterprise, for it is well settled that
the firm is bound for the fraud committed by one partner in
the course of the trammctions and business of the partnership,
even when the other partners ha n~ not the slightest connection
0
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WooDWORTH VS • . BENNETT.

with, or knowledge of, or participation in the fraud. Story

25

on Part., sec. 108. Collyer on Part, sec. 445; Griswold -vs.

Haven, 25 N. Y. 595, S2 Am. Dec. 380.

[The remainder of the opinion is unimportant]

Judgment affirmed.

Norm: For other cases bearing upon partnerships organized for the

purpose of dealing in land, see Mechem’s Elem. of Pai-tn., § 17 and notes.

WOOD\\'ORTH vs. BENNETT.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1870.

with, or knowledge of, or participation in the fraud. Story
on Part., sec. 108. Collyer on Part., sec. 445; Gt··iswold ·1;s.
Ha,,;en, 25 N. Y. 595, S2 Am. Dec. 380.
[The remainder of the opinion is unimportant.]
Judgment aftlrmed.

43 N. Y. 273, 3 Am. Rep. 706.

Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court affirming a

Judgment allowing a counter claim, in favor of the defendan\

NoTE: For other ca'!es bearing upon partnerships organized for the
purpoee of dealing in land, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 17 and notes.

Bennett and against the plaintiff Woodworth for $100. Opiu-

ion states the facts.

G. F. Birknell, for appellant.

Charles Mason, forprespondent. '

CHURCH, C. J . The point in this case is, whether the court

below erred in allowing to the defendant the sum of $100 as

an offset. The facts are substantially as followsz" The plaint-

WOOD,VORTH vs. BENNETT.

iﬂ’, defendant, Stephens and Truesdell, made an agreement
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in the naturetof a copartnership, to propose or bid for public

Court of Appeal.fl of

work on_ the Seneca river improvement. The bid was to be

N~w

York, 1810.

put in in the name of the plaintiff alone, the defendant and

43 N. Y. 273, 3 Am. Rep. 706.

Stephens to become sureties. Truesdell was at the time an

engineer in the employ of the State on the canals. The bid

was made in the name of the plaintiff, in accordance with the

arrangement. Before the work was awarded, the said parties

made an agreement with one Haroun, to withdraw their claim

to the work, and sell their bid to him for $400 (he being a

higher bidder for the same work), which was consummated.

Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court affirming- a
JUdgment allowing a counter claim, in favor of the defendam
Bennett and against the plaintiff \Yoodworth for flOO. Opiuion states the facts.

and he gave his note for the amount. It wa then arranged

that the note should be left with the plaintiff for collection.

G. F. JNf'knell, for appellant.

and that when collected each of said persons should be entitled

4

Olta.rles JI a.~011, for respondPnt.
CmmcH, C . .J. The point in this case is, whether the com·t
below erred in allowing to the defendant the sum of $100 as
an offset. The faets are snb~1antially as follows: The plaintiff, defendant, ~tephens and TrnesdPII, ~nnrle an agr«>ement
in the nature of a copartnership, to propose or bid for public
wor·k on. the Senera riYer improvement. 'fhe bid was to be
put in in the name of the plaintiff alone, the defendant and
Stephens to become snreti<>s. 'frnesclell was at th<.• time an
engineer in the en1plo.v of the 8tate on tlw eauals. The bid
was made in the name of the plaintiff, in aceordance with the
arrangement. Before the work was awarded, the said parties
made an agreement with one Haroun, to withdraw their claim
to the work, and sell their bid to him for $-100 (he being a
higher bidder fo1· the Aame work), which was consummated,
and he gave his note for the amount. It was then arranged
that the note shonld be left with the plaintiff for collection.
and that when collected each of said persons should be entitled
4
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CASES ON. PARTNERSHIP.

to $100. The plaintiff collected the note, paid to Stephens and

Truesdell each $1.00, and promised to pay the defendant, and

apply it on their deal, but never did. It is claimed that it can-

not be allowed, on account of the illegality of the transaction

out of which it arose. To enable the court to apply correct

legal principles, it is necessary to analyze the transaction and

ascertain its true nature and character. .

The original arrangement for a joint interest or copartner-

ship was illegal, and contrary to a positive statute in two

respects. The law of 1854, chapter 329, in substance requires

that every proposal for work shall contain the names of all

persons who are interested, and prohibits any secret agree-

ment or understanding that any person not named shall

become interested in any contract that may be made, and engi-

neers, and all other persons in the employ of the State on the

canals, are also prohibited from becoming interested in any

contract or job on the public works.

In the next place, the transaction with Haroun was contrary

to public policy, and illegal. It is manifest that the object and

purpose of the purchase of the bid was to have it withdrawn
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so as to enable Haroun to take the contract upon a higher

bid. This was directly against the interests of the State, and

tended to destroy that honest competition which public bid-

ding is designed to secure; and when, as in this case, it was

done partly for the beneﬁt of an oﬂicer of the State, whose

duty it was to protect its interests, it was not only contrary

to public policy, but was grossly corrupt.

The supreme court placed its decision in favor of the defend-

ant, upon the ground that as between these parties, the illegal

contract had been fully executed when Haroun paid the money,

and that the plaintiff then became a mere depositary, and held-

the money for the use of the other parties.

It is undoubtedly true that, if the contract or obligation

does not depend upon nor require the enforcement of the unexc-

cuted provisions of the illegal contract, it will be carried out.

It has been laid down as a test, that whether a demand con-

nected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced

at law depends upon whether the party requires any aid from

the illegal transaction to establish the case: Ohitty on Con.

657. So it has been settled that where a party pays money to

a third person for the use of another, which, on account of

to flOO. The plaintift' collected the note, paid to Stephens and
Truesdell each $1.00, and promised to pay the defendant, and
apply it on their dc>al, but never did. It is claimed that it cannot be allowed, on account of the illegality of the transaction
out of which it arose. To enable the court to apply correct
legal principles, it is necessary to analyze the transaction and
ascertain its true nature and character.
The original arrangement for a joint interest or copartnership was illegal, and contrary to a positive statute in two
respects. The la_w of 1854, chapter 3:!9, in substance requires
that every proposal for work shall contain the names of all
persons who are interested, and prohibite any secret agreement or unde1·standing that any person not named shall
become interested in any contract that may be made, and engineers, and all other persons in the employ of the State on the
canals, are also prohibited from becoming interested in any
contract or job on the public works.
In the next place, the transaction with Haroun was contrary
to public policy, and illegal. It is manifest th.at the object and
purpose of the purchase of the bid was to have it withdrawn
so as to enable Haroun to take the contract upon a higher
bid. 'fhis was dil'ectly against the interests of the State, and
tended to destroy that honest competition which public bidding is designed to sec.ore; and when, as in this case, it was
<lone partly for the benefit of an officer of the State, whose
duty it was to protect its interests, it was not only contrary
to public policy, but was grossly corrupt.
The supreme court placed its decision in favor of the defendant, upon the ground that as between these parties, the illegal
contract bad been fully executed when Haroun paid the money,
and that the plaintiff then became a mere depositary, and held·
the money for the use of the other parties.
It is undoubtedly true that, if the contract or obligation
does not depend upon nor require the enforcement of the unexecuted provisions of the illegal contract, it will be carried out.
l t has been laid down as a test, that whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced
at law depends upon whether the party requires any aid from
the illeg-al transaction to establish the case: Chitty on Con.
G57. So it has been settled that where a party pays money to
a third person for the use of another, which, on account of

i Woonwonrn vs. Bnxxnrr. 27

the illegality of the transaction, he was not obliged to pay,

°WOODWORTH

ys.

BENNETT.

21

such third person cannot interpose the defense of illegality

[to an action for the money brought by the person for whose

use it was so. paid]. Tenant vs. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3; Mer-

ritt vs. Millard, 4 Keyes, (N. Y.) 208. This principle is based

upon the undoubted right of a. person to waive the illegality,

and pay the money; and that when once paid, either to the

other party directly or to a. third person for his use, it can-

not be recalled; and that the third person, who was in no

way connected with the original transaction, cannot avail

himself of a defense which his principal saw ﬁt to waive.

If the only illegal transaction was the contract with Haroun

for the sale of the bid, these principles might be applicable,

and would probably constitute a good answer to the objection

to this counter claim. The payment of the money by Haroun

completed that contract, and nothing remained unexecuted.

But here the original partnership was illegal; not because of

its purposes and objects, but its composition was prohibited

by law. If a lawful ﬁrm should receive "funds from an illegal

trallic or business, it may be that the illegality would be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

regarded at an end, and a division of the money enforced by

virtue of the rights of the members under the contract of part-

nership. This is the utmost limit to which the rule can be car-

ried: Brooks vs. Martin, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 70.

In such a case the obligation to divide would not arise out

of the illegal purposes of tl1e.ﬁrm, nor would the division carry

out any of those purposes, but the obligation would arise out

of the contract of partnership itself. Here this contract was

illegal. The object of the statute was to enable the State

ofﬁcers to know with whom they contracted, and also to see

that the statute. prohibiting engineers and other canal oiﬁcers

from becoming interested, was not violated, and to prevent

all secret combinations in relation to obtaining work.

The money obtained by this bid belongs to the ﬁrm; and the

plaintiff could have been compelled to divide, if the ﬁrm had

been lawful, by force of the contract organizing it. In this

case he also agreed to pay the money, and defendant asks the

court to compel him to perform this obligation. The answer

to it is obvious. There is no obligation, because it was incurred

contrary to law. It rests upon the contract of partnership,

and that is void for illegality.

the illegality of the tran~action, he was not obliged to pay,
such third person canuot interpose the defense of illegality
[to an action for the money brought by the person for whose
use it was so. paid]. Tenant vs. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3; Merritt vs. Millard, 4 Keyes, (N. Y.) 208. This principle is based
upon the undoubted right of a person to waive the illegality,
and pay the money; and that when once paid, either te the
other party directly or to a thir~ person for his use, it cannot be recalled; and that the third person, who was in no
way connected with the original transaction, cannot avail
himself of a defense which his principal saw tit to waive.
If the only illegal transaction was the contract with Haroun
for the sale of the bid, these plinciples might be applicable,
and would probably constitute a good answer to the objection
to this counter claim. The payment of the money by Haroun
completed that contract, and nothing remained µnexecuted.
But here the original partnership was illegal; not because of
its purposes and objects, but its composition was prohibited
by law. If a lawful firm slwuld receive tunds from an illegal
traffic or business, it may be that the illegality would be
regarded at an end, and a division of the money enforced by
virtue of the rights of the members under the contract of partnership. This is the utmost limit to which the rule can be carried: Brooks vs. Martin, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 70.
In such a case the obligation to divide would not arise out
of the illegal purpoRes of the.firm, nor would the division carry
out any of those purposes, but the obligation would arise out
of the contract of partnership itself. Here this contract was
illegal. The object of the statute was to enable the State
officers to know with whom they contracted, and also to see
that the statute. prohibiting engineers and other canal officers
from becoming interested, was not Yiolated, and to prevent
all secret combinations in relation to obtaining work.
The money obtained by this bid belongs to the firm; and the
p~aintiff could have been compelled to divide, if the firm had
been lawful, by force of the contract organizing it. In this
case he also agrE>ed to pay the money, and defendant asks the
court to compel him to perform this obligation. The answer
to it is obvious. There is no obligation, because it was incurred
contrary to law. It rests ,upon the contract of partnership,
and that is void for illegality.

28 Cases on PABTNERs‘lllP.

2S

OASES ON PARTNEll~lllP.

In law there was no‘ partnership, and none of the parties

obtained any rights under the contract creating it: Armstrong

vs. Lewis, 3 Mylne & Keene 45.

The sentiment of "honor among thieves” cannot be enforced

in courts of justice. Suppose the engineer had sued for his

share after an express promise, would any court have tolerated

his claim for a moment in the face of a statute prohibiting him

from being interested? If not, in what respect does the defend-

ant occupy any better position? The ﬁrst step in his case is

to prove that he was a secret partner and entitled to a share

of this money. The law prohibits secret partners, and he is,

‘therefore, not a partner.

The express promise does not aid the defendant, because the

promise was only to carry out the unexecuted provision of the

contract of partnership to divide the money. The two cases

‘cited by the counsel for the defendant, if they are to be re-

regarded as good law,are distinguishable from this. In the case

of Faiknry rs. Rrnous. 4 Burr. 2060, one of two partners had

paid £3,000 to settle differences in illegal stock-jobbing opera-

tions, and the defendant executed his bond to secure the share
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of the other partner. The court overruled the defense recog-

nizing the exploded distinetion between acts malum prohibit-um.

and malum in se, and held that as between those parties the

bond was to secure the plaintiff for money paid, and the pur-

poses of the payment would not be inquired into. A similar

decision was made upon the authority of this case in Pet:-in

vs. Hannay, 3 Term Report 418, Lord I{l<lXYO.\I dissenting. The

distinction between the above cases and this is in the circum-

stance that there the illegal transactions had been closed up

and settled. and the obligations sought to be enforced were

for the money advanced for that purpose. Here it is sought

to consummate the illegal contract by a. new agreement that

it shall be performed. No case has gone this length, and the

two cases above cited have been very much shaken by sub-

sequent decisions, and are, to say the least, questionable

authority, especially the latter: Aubert vs. Jlazc, 2 Bos. & Pu].

370; Zllitchcll rs. Cockburne, 2 H. Blackstone 380; Ea: par-te Dan-

iels, 14 Ves. 190; Lozcry vs. Bourdicu, 2 Douglas 467; B-rozrn. -vs.

Turner, 7 Term Rep. 630; Balding vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines (N. Y.)

147, note a.

The general rule on this subject is laid down in this court,

._.| . W ; >

In law there was no partnership, and none of the parties
obtained any rights under the contract creating it: Armstrong
va. Lewis, 3 M~·lne & Keene 45.
The sentiment of '·honor among thieves" cannot be enforced
in courts of justice. Suppose the engineer had sued for his
share after an express promise, would any court have tolerated
his claim for a moment in the face of a statute p1·ohibiting him
from being interested? If not, in what respect does the defendant occupy any better position? The fkst step in his case is
to prove that he was a secret partner and entitled to a share
of this money. The law prohlbits sec1·et partners, and he is,
therefore, not a partner.
The express promise does not aid the defendant, because the
promise was only to carry out the unexecute<l provision of the
·contract of partnership to didde the moneJ·. The two cases
'cited by the coum1el fo1· the defendant, if thPy are to be reregarded as good law, are dh~tinguishable from this. In the case
of Faikne!f rs. Hf'1w111~. 4 Burr. 206fl, one of two partners had
paid £3,000 to settle differences in ill(•gal stock-jobbing operations, and the defendant executed his bond to secure the share
of the other partner. The court owrruled the d('fense recog-ni?.ing the exploded distinction between acts malum pt"ohihit11111.
and rnalum in se, and held that as between those parties tlie
bond was to secure the plaintiff for money paid, and the purposes of the payment would not be inquired into. A similar
dcci!-1.ion w;1s made upon the authority of this caRe in Petrir.
vs. Ha1111a!J~ 3 Term HPport -118, Lord KE'.'i'Yo;-.; clissenting. Tht~
distiudion betwl't'n the abon~ cases and this is in the circunistanee that tlwre the illegal transactions lrnd been closed up
and settled, nnd the obligations sought to he (•nforc<>d were
for the mmwy ad\'anced for that purpose. llere it is sought
to con"nmmate the illegal oontract by a new agreement that
it shall be pt>rformed. No case has gone this lPngth, and the
two cases abov0 cited ha,·e been very much shaken by subsequent decisions, and are, to say the least, questionable
authority, especially the latter: Aubert i:s. Jlazc, 2 Bos. & Pul.
370; M itchcll t;S. Cockburne, 2 H. Blackstone ~~80; Ex pa rte Daniels, 14 VeR. 190; Lou:ry vs. Rourdicu, 2 Douglas 467; Brotrn. ·vs.
Turner, 7 Term Rep. 630; Belding vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
.147, note a.
The general rule on this subject is laid down in this court,

Woonwonrn vs. BENNETT. 29

in Gray vs. Hook, 4 N. Y. 499, by liIULua'r'r, J., as follows:

WOODWORTH VS. BENNETT.

29

“The distinction between a void and a valid new contract in

relation to the subject-matter of a former illegal one depends

upon the fact whether the new contract seeks to carry out or

enforce any of the unexecuted provisions of the former con-

tract, or whether it is based upon a. moral obligation growing

out of the execution of an agreement which could not be

enforced by law, and upon the performance of which the law

will raise no implied promise. In the ﬁrst class of cases, no

change in the form of a contract will avoid the illegality of

the first consideration, while express promises based upon the

last class of considerations may be sustained.”

It is sometimes difficult to apply general rules to particular

caes, but this case comes clearly within the ﬁrst class men-

tioned in the above rule. It is not from any regard to the

rights of the party setting up this defense that courts refuse

to enforce illegal contracts, but it is for the protection of the

public. The plaintiff in this case is entitled to no sympathy

or favorable consideration. He must have made an aﬁidavit

that no other person was interested with him in the proposal,
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and when he received this money, as between him and the

defendant, the latter was entitled to it; and while we have no

disposition to justify his conduct, his position enables him to

secure the advantage of a decision which we are compelled to

make in obedience to a principle of public policy which is indis-

pensable for the protection of the community against the cor-

rupting inﬂuences of illegal transactions. S

The observation of Lord M.\Nsr1nI.n in H olmun vs. Johnson,

1 Cowper 3-13, is applicable here. He said: “The objection

that. a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and

defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the

defendant (in this case the plaintiff). It is not for his sake,

however, that the objection is ever allowed, but it is founded

in general principles of policy which the defendant has the

advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and

the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say.”

Judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs

to abide the event.

' All the judges concurring.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.

Non-1:: See following case. '

in Gray vs. Hook, 4 N. Y. 499, by :ML'LLETT, J., as follows:
"The distinction between a void and a valid new contract in
relation to the subject-matter of a former illegal one 'depends
upon the fad whether the new contract seeks to carry out or
enforce any of the unexecuted provisions of the former contract, or whether it is based upon a moral obligation growing
out of the exer'.ution of an agreement whkh could not be
enforced Ly law, aud upon the performance of whieh the law
will raise no implied promise. In the first class of f'ases, no
chan~e in the form of a contract will avoid the illc•gality of
the first considel'ntion, while express promii;ic>s lJased upon the
last class of considt>ratio1_1s ma~· be sustahwd."
It is sonwtimes ditlit:nlt to apply general rules to particular
cases, but this case conws cleal"ly within th~ first class mentioned in the above rule. It is not from any regard to the
rights of the party setting up this defense that co~tt'ts refuse
to enforce illegal eout rads. hut it is for the proketion of the
public. The plaintiff in this case is entitled to no s.nnpathy
or favorable eonsiderntion. He mnst ha,·e made an affidavit
that no other ppt·son was interested with him in the 1woposal,
and when he rece>in•d thii-; money, as hetwe<•11 him aud the
defendant, the lat1Pt' w:is entitled to it; and while we have no
disposition to jm;tif.v his comh1ct, his position enables him to
secure the advantag-e of a clPl'ision whil'h we are compPlled co
make in obPlli<'nee to a p1fodple of pnbli<- polil',Y whi<'h is indisJH'n~able for the p1·ot<•dio11 of the community against the corrupting influences of illt>gal transactions.
The olJsenation of Lord )lAKSfiELD in II ol11wn vs. ,fol111son,
1 Cowpe1· :~43, is applkahle here. He sairl: ''The ohjt•1·tio11
that a contract is immoral or illegal as betw<'<'ll plaintiff and
defendant, soundR at all times n•r.v ill in the mouth of the '
defendant (in this tas<' ihe plaintiff). It is not for his sak<'.
boweYer, that the objedion is ever allowed, hut it is fonndect
in general prineiples of polie~· which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to tht> real justice, fif-1 lwtween him and
the plaintiff, by accident, if I mu.v so say."
Judgment must be ren.'rsed and a new tl'ial 01·dered, costs
to abide the event.
All the judges concurring.
Judgment revprsed and a new trial ordered.
NOTJ1:: See following case.
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CRAF'I'Yvs. McCONOUGHY.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1875.

79 Illinois, 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171.

Bill in equity by Mcflonoughy against (‘raft and others for

an account and distribution of the proﬁts of an alleged partner-

CRAFTYvs. McCONOUGHY.

ship existing under the contract referred to in the opinion.

'l‘he defense was that the contract was void as in restraint of

trade. and opposed to public policy. Decree below for com-

Supreme Qourt of Illinois, 1815.

plainant and defendants appeal.

M. D. H athawag/, Wm. Barge and S. Diron, for defendants.

79 Illinois, 846, 22 Am. Rep. 171.

Jas. K. Eds-all, for complainant. ~

CRAIG, J. (After stating the facts.) Two questions arise

upon the record: First, whether the contract set out in the

bill is void. Second, if illegal and void, will a court of equity.

after it has been executed, require one of the parties to account

to another for a portion of the gains arising under the cou-

tract?

Prior to and up to the time of the execution of the agreement

set out in the bill, the four parties were engaged in the grain

P.iJI in equity by ?tfcConoughy against Craft and others for
an account and distribution of the profits of an allc~ged partnei·ship existing under the contract referred to in the opinion.
The d<'fense was that the contract was ,·oid as in restraint of
trade and opposed to public policy. Dec1·ee below for complainant and defendants appeal.

business in the town of Rochelle, each one on his own account.
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and in competition with each other, but, after the agreclnent

was executed, all competition ceased. All the warehouses in

U. D. Hatltm()ay, Wm. Barge and S. Di.IJon, for defendants.
Jas. K. Edsall, for complainant.

the city, and every lot suitable to erect a warehouse upon, were

controlled by the combination. Some were purchased and

others were leased, so that the combinations formed effectually

excluded all opposition in the purchase, sale, storage and ship-

ment of grain in that market.

Secret meetings were held in the night time by the parties to

the contract, at which the price to be paid for grain was :1 greed

upon, rates for storage and shipment ﬁxed, in order that the

public should be kept in ignorance of the plans and operations

of this illegal combination.

'1‘o the public the four houses were held out as competing

ﬁrms for business. Secretly they had conspired together. and

were working in a common cause, in the sole interest of each

other.

CRAIG, J. (After stating the facts.)
Two qtwstions arise
npon thP record: First, whether the contract set out in the
bill is Yoid. Second, if illegal and void, will a court of equity.
after it has been executed, require one of the partks to account
1o anotht>r for a portion of the gains arising under the contract?
Prior to and up to the time of the execution of the> agrt'l'lll<'ll t
set out in the bill, the four parties were engaged in the ~rain
busint>ss in the town of Rodwlle, each one on his own aeeonnt,
and in tompC:'tition with each other, but, after the agreenwut
was executed, all eornpetition ceased. All the warel1ousc•s ha
the city, and every lot suitable to erect a warehouse upon, wc>re
controlled by the combination.
Some were purchased and
others were leased, so 1.bat the combinations formed effectually
excluded all opposition in the purchase, sale, storage and shipment of grain in that ma1·ket.
Secret meetings were held in the night time by the parties io
the contract, at which the price to be paid for grain wa~ ag1•p1~d
upon, rates for storage and shipment fixPd,. in ort1P1' that tltr~
public f!hould be kept in ignorance of tht• plans an<l operations
of this illegal combination.
'l'o the public the four houses were held out as competing
firms for business. Secretly they had l'OnRpil'Pd togt>ther, and
W(>I'e working in a common ca mw, in tlw sole iu h·l'est of each
other.

CRAFT vs. M00021 ouenr. 31

The language used in the contract itself leaves no room for

0.&AllT VS• .McOONOUGHY.

a1

doubt as to the purpose for which the agreement was entered

into, as a few extracts will show: “Each separate ﬁrm shall

conduct their own business as heretofore, as though there was

no partnership in appearance, keep their accounts, pay their

own expenses, ship their own grain, and furnish their own fund

to do business with.” * " ' “Prices and grades to be ﬁxed

from time to time as convenient, and each one to abide by

them. All grain taken in store shall be charged one and one-

half cents per bushel monthly.” ' " " “No grain to be

shipped by any party at less rates than two cents per bushel.”

\Vhilc the agreement, upon its face, would seem to indicate

that the parties had formed a copartnerhip for the purpose

of trading in grain, yet, from. the terms of the contract, and the

other proof in the record, it is apparent that the true object

was to form a secret combination which would stiﬂe all compe-

tition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means,

to control the price of grain, cost of storage, and expense of

shipment. In other words, the four ﬁrms, by a shrewd, deep-

laid, secret combination, attempted to control and monopolize
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the entire grain trade of the town and surrounding country.

That the effect of this contract was to restrain the trade and

commerce of the country is a proposition that can not be suc-

cessfully denied. -

\"V e understand it to be a well settled rule of law, that an

agreement in general restraint of trade is contrary to public

policy, illegal and void, but an agreement in partial or particu-

lar restraint upon trade has been held good, where the

restraint was only partial, consideration adequate, and the

restraint reasonable.

This subject was ably discussed in the leading case of

Mitchel cs. Re_1/nolds, 1 P. \Villiams 181; see, also, 1 Smith’s

Lead. cases, 172, and notes, and the rule of law established,

which has been followed and adhered to in numerous cases

since. l

In reference to the point, what might be regarded a reason-

able restriction, numerous cases might be cited, but what was

said in Horner vs. Graves, 7 Bing. 743, 20 Eng. Com. L. 330, will

illustrate the principle. Tindal, C. J., said: “We do not see

how a better test can be applied to the question, whether rea-

sonable or not. than by considering whether the restraint is

The language used in the contract itself leaves no room for
doubt as to the purpose for which the agreement was entered
into, as a few extracts will show: "Each separate firm shall
conduct their own business as heretofore, ns though there was
no partnership in appearance, keep their accounts, pay their
own expenses, ship their own grain, and furnish their own fund
to do business with." • • • "Prices and grades to be fixed
!from time to time as convenient, and each one to abide by
them. A II grain taken in store shall be charged one and one- .
half centR per bushel monthly." • • • "No grain to be
shipped by any party at less rates than two cents per bushel."
'Vhile the agreement, upon its face, would seem to indicate
that the parties had formed a copartnership for the ;purpose
of trading in grain, yet, from the terms of the contract, and thP
other proof in the record, it is apparent that the true object
was to form a se~ret combination which w·ould stifle all competition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means,
to control the price of grain, cost of storage, and expense of
shipment. In other wordi,l, the four firms, by a shrewd, deep·
laid, secret co;nbination, attempted to control and monopolize
the entire grain trade of the town and surrounding country.
That the effect of this contract was to restrain the trade and
commerce of the country is a proposition that can not be successfully denied. .
'Ve understand it to be a well settled rule of law, that an
agreement in general restraint of trade is contrary to public
policy, illegal and void, but an agreement in partial or particular restraint upon trade has been held good, where the
restraint was only partial, consideration adequate, and the
restraint reasonable.
This subject was ably discussed in the IPading case of
Mitchel i·s. Re!fTtolds, 1 P. \Villiams 181; seP, also, 1 ~mith's
Lead. cases, li:!, and notes, and the rule of law established,
which has bPen followed and adhered to in numerous cases
since.
In reference to the point, what might be regarded a reasonable restriction, numerous cases might be cited, but what was
said in Horner vs. Graves, 7 Bing. 743, 20 Eng. Com. L. 330, will
illustrate the principle. Tindal, C. J., said: "We do not see
h-Ow a better test can be applied to the queHtion, whether reasonable or not. than by considering whether the restraint is

32 Onsss on PARTNERSHIP.
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such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the

party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to inter-

fere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is

larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of

no beneﬁt to either. It can only be oppressive, and if oppres-

sive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. Whatever is

injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the ground

of public policy.” '

If, therefore, the restraint imposed by the contract in ques-

tion was but partial, as insisted upon by the complainant, as

it was unreasonable, oppressive and injurious to the public,

it cannot be sanctioned in a court of equity.

YVhile these parties were in business, in competition with

each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their

own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and

sale. They could pay as high or low a price for grain as they

saw proper, and as they could make contracts with the _pro-

ducer. So long as competition was free. the interest of the

public was safe. The laws of trade. in connection with the

rigor of competition, was all the guaranty the public required,
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but the secret combination created by the contract destroyed

all competition and created a monopoly against which the pub-

lie interest had no protection. Morris Run Coal Co. rs. Barclay

Coal C'o., 68 Penn. St. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159.

It is, however, insisted that, even if the contract was con-

trary to public policy, as it has been executed, a court of equity

will require an account.

The rule is, however, well settled in this State, that a court

of equity will not lend its aid in the division of the proﬁts of

an illegal transaction between associates. Xcusturlt rs. Hall,

58 Ill. 172; Skccls rs. Phillips, 54 Ill. 309; Jerome rs. Bigclozr,

66 Ill. 452.

The complainant and the defendants were equally involved

in the unlawful combination. A court of equity will assist

neither.

The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Decree reversed.

Norm: For other cases upon the eﬁect of illegality in the purpose, see

Mechem’s Elem. of Pa:-tn., §§ 18, 20.

fu

"1..-

such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the
party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public. \VhateYer restraint is
larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of
no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive, and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. "·hateYer is
injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the ground
of public policy."
·
If, therefore, the restraint imposed by the contract in ques·
tion was but partial, as insisted upon by the complainant, as
it was unreasonable, oppressive and injurious to the public,
it cannot be sanctioned in a court of equity.
"Thile these parties were in business, in competition with
each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their
own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and
sale. They could p~\y as high or low a priee for grain as they
saw proper, and as they could make contracts with the .producer. So long as competition was free. the interest of the
public was safe. The laws of trade, in connection with the
rigor of competition, was all the guarnnty the public required,
but the secret combination created by the contract destroyell
all competition and created a monopol~· against whkh the public interest bad no protection. ill orri.<J Run Coal Co. i·s. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173, 8 Am. H<~p. l 59.
It iR, however, insisted that, even if the contract was contrary to public policy, as it bas been executed, a court of equity
will require an account.
The rule is, however, well settled in thi~ 8tate, that a court
of equity will not lend its aid in th<' diYision of the profits of
an illegal transtl<'tion betwN•n a8so<"ia1<'s. Scusta<lt rs. Hall,
58 Ill. 172; fJl:cels -i;s. Phillips, 54 Ill. 30!l; Jerome vs. Bigc1ou',
66 Ill. 452.
The complainant and the defendants were equally involvc>d
in the unlawful combination. A court of equity will assist
neither.
The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded.
J)ecree reversed.
Non: For other cases upon the effeot of illegality in the purpoee, eee
Mechem's Elem. of Parto., §§ 18, ~.
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WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.

ADAMS vs. BEALL.

Supreme Court of Maryland, 1887.

67 Md. 53. 1 Am. St. Rep. 379, 8 Atl. Rep. 664.

Appeal from the Baltimore city court.

Albert Ritchie, for appellant.

William Colton, for appellee. '

Romxsox, J. The appellee, while a minor, paid to the appel-

III.

lant $2,900, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner

in the appellant's business. The partnership continued for

more than a year, and, ﬁnding it unproﬁtable, the appellee,

WHO MAY ·BE PARTNERS.

without formally dissolving the partnership, withdrew from

the business. The question in the case is whether the appellee

is entitled to recover of the appellant the money thus paid.

His right to disatlirm the partnership contract, and to avoid

all liabilities under it, including the partnership debts, is not

denied. Being an infant when the contract was made, this

ADAMS vs. BEALL.

is a privilege to which for his protection he is entitled. But

when he seeks to recover money paid for a consideration which

Supreme Court of Maryland, 1881.
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he has enjoyed or has had the beneﬁt of, this presents quite

another question. The $2,900 was paid to the appellant in

consideration of being admitted as a partner in his business.

He was admitted as a partner, and continued to be a member

'11 Md. 53, 1 Am. St. Rep. 3i9, 8 AU. Rep. 664.

of the ﬁrm for at least a year. The business was not, it is true,

a successful one, but this, in the absence of fraudulent repre-

Appeal from the Baltimore city court.

sentations on the part of the appellant, cannot aﬂ‘ect the ques-

tion. We are dealing with a contract between an infant and

5

Albert Ritchie, for appellant.
lVilliam Colton, for appellee.
.J. ThE> appellee, while a minor, paid to the appellant $2,!JOO, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner
in the appellant's bm~hieHs. The partnership continued for
more than a year, and, fi~ding it unprofitable, the appellee,
without formally dissolving the partnership, withdrew from
the business. The question in the case is whether the appellee
is entitled to recoyer of the appellant the money thus paid.
His right to disaffirm the partnersllip contract, and to avoid
all liabilities under it, including the partnership debts, is not
denied. Being an infant when the contract was made, this
is a privilege to which for his protection he is entitled. But
when he seeks to recover rnom·y paid for a consideration which
he bas enjoyed or has had the benefit of, this presents quite
another qu(;>stion. 'l'he $2,900 was paid to the appellant in
con~ideration of being :tdll'litted as a partner in his business.
He was admitted as a partner, and continued to be a member
of the firm for at least n year. The business was not, it is true,
a successful one, but this, in the nbsence of fraudulent repntsentations on the part of the appellant, cannot affect the question. \Ye are dealing with a Mntract between an infant and
6
RoRixso~,

84 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.
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adult, executed on both sides, and upon the faith of which

money was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has

enjoyed. The privilege of infancy, says Lord hIA.\‘Sl-‘IELD in

Zouch vs. Parsons, 3 Burrows 1804, was intended as a shield

or protection to the infant, and not to be used as the instru-

ment of fraud and injustice to others; and to hold that an

infant has the right, not only to withdraw from a partnership

at his own pleasure, and to subject the adult partner to the

payment of all the partnership debts, but has the right also to

recover money paid by him as a consideration for being admit-

ted into the partnership, would be, it seems to us, to extend

the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it is

founded. ‘P

So longkas Brawner vs. Franklin, 4 Gill (Md.), 463, it was

held that, where an infant advances money upon a contract,

he cannot disafﬁrm the contract and recover the money ad-

vanced, if he has enjoyed the consideration for which the

money was paid. H olmcs vs. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, is to the same

effect. There the infant paid a sum of money as his share of

the consideration for a lease of premises in which he and his
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partner carried on the business of shoemaking. They occupied

the premises from March till June, when the infant dissolved

the partnership, and brought an action to recover back the

money he had paid the lessor for his lease. Gums, C. J., said:

“He may, it is true, avoid the lease; he may escape the burden

of the rent, and avoid the covenants; but that is all he can do.

He cannot, by putting an end to the lease, recover back any

consideration which he has paid for it. The law does not enable

him to do that.”

It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this

case was decided was either overruled, or even questioned, in

(/‘orpe vs. Orcrton, 10 Bing. 252. In the latter case, the plaint-

ilf, while an infant, signed an agreement to enter into part-

nership with the defendant, and to pay him £1,000 for a share

in the business; and to execute, on the ﬁrst day of January,

a. partnership deed, with the usual covenants. He also paid

£100 as a deposit for the fulﬁllment of his part of the contract.

The plaintiff afterwards disaﬁirmed the partnership contract,

and never did in fact become a partner. The suit was brought

to recover of the defendant the £100 paid by the infant -as

a deposit. Tmnan, C. J ., said: The case was distinguishable

?¢,
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adult, executed on both sidet1, and upon the faith of which
money was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has
enjoyed. The privilege of infancy, says Lord ~IA!llSFIELD in
Zouch -vs. Parsons, 3 Burrows 1804, was intended as a shieM
or protection to the infant, and not to be used as the instrument of fraud and injustice to others; and to bold that an
infant has the right, not only to withdraw from a partnership
at his own pleasure, and to subje<'t the adult partner to the
payment of all the partnership debts, but has the right also to
recover money paid by him as a consideration for being admit·
ted into the partnership, would be, it seems to us, to extend
the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it is
founded . .,.
So long as Bratrner vs. Franklin, 4 Gill (Md.), 463, it was
held that, '\·hl're an infant advances money upon a contract,
he cannot disaffirm the contract and recover the money ad·
vanced, if he has enjoyed the consideration for which the
money was paid. Holmes vs. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, is to the same
eft'ect. There the infant paid a sum of money as his share of
the consideration for a lease of premises in which he and his
partner carried on the business of shoemaking. They occupied
the premises from ~{arch till June, when the infant dissolvl'd
the partnership, and brought an action to recover back the
money he had pnid the lessor for his lense. Gmns, C. J., said:
"He may, it is true, avoid the lease; he may escape the burden
of the rent, and avoid the covenantR; but that is all he can do.
He cannot, by putting an end to the lense, recover back any
<'Onsideration which he has paid for it. The law does not enable
him to do that."
It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this
<·ase was deC'idl'd was eithe~ overruled, or even questioned, in
Corpe -r:s. 0-r:crton., 10 Bing. ~52. In the latter case, the plaintilJ, while an infant, sig-n<'d an ag-reement to enter into partnPrship with the defendant, and to pay him £1,000 for a share
in tlu:• business; and to execute, on the first day of January,
a partnership deed, with the usual cownants.. He also paid
£100 as a dE"posit for the fnlfillmc>nt of his part of the contracr.
The plaintiff afterwnrds disaffirnw<l the partnership_contract,
and never did in fact become a partner. The suit was brought
to recover of the defendant tlw £100 paid b_y the inf:rnt rniJ
a deposit. TINDAL, C. J., said: The case was distinguishable

ADAMS vs. B‘sA1.1.. 85

from Holmes vs. Blogg. In that case the plaintiff and partner

AD.A.llS

vs.

B"EALL.

35

occupied the premises’ from March till June, and the money

was paid for something available, that is, for three months

enjoyment of the premises. “In the present case, the plaintiﬂf

has paid to Overton £100, for which he has not received the

slightest consideration. The money was paid eitherwith a view

to a present or a future partnership. I understand it as hav-

ing been paid with a view to a future partnership. Now, the

partnership was not to be entered into till January, 1833, and

in the meanwhile the infant has derived no advantage what-

ever from the contract.” Bossnourzr, J.: “We are far from

impeaching Holmes vs. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that

case. ' ' ‘ Here the infant has derived no beneﬁt what-

ever from the contract, the consideration of which has wholly

failed. ‘ ' " The £100 paid here was in the nature of

a deposit. Money paid on a deposit may generally be recovered

back Where the contract goes oﬁ, and here the contract was

defeated before the infant derived any beneﬁt from it.”

Annsmson and GASELEE, JJ., were of the same opinion. The

plaintiff was allowed to recover the deposit money paid by
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him, while an infant, because the partnership contract was

disaﬁirnied by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to be-

gin. As it was said by Annrmson, J., “Before the contract is

performed, one of the parties revokes it, and reniits the other

to the same situation as if the contract had never been

made.” The distinction between Holmes vs. Blogg, and Corps

vs. Overton is this: In the former the plaintiff was not

allowed to recover the money paid by him while an infant,

because it was paid on a consideration which he had in part

enjoyed, while in the latter the plaintiff was allowed to recover

as upon an entire failure of consideration. .

Passing, then, from these cases, we come to Ea: parto Taylor,

13 De Gex, M. & G. 254, which is a ca se directly in point. There

an infant paid a premium on entering into a partnership, and,

before he came of age, disaﬂirmed the contract, and, upon the

banki-uptc_v of the ﬁrm, attempted to prove for the premium

thus paid. Lord Justice KNIGHT Bauer: said: “In my opinion,

a case of fraud has not been established. That being so, the

matter remains one of a_ contract fairly made, or-as fairly made

as a contract with an infant could be made, a contract upon

which the infant acted during his minority, and which during

from Holmes VB. Blogg. In that case the plaintiff and partn~r
occupied the premiseS' from March till June, and the money
was paid for something available, that is, for three months
enjoyment of the premises. "In the present case, the plaintiff
has paid to Overton £100, for which he has not received the
slightest consideration. The money was paid either with a view
to a present or a future partnership. I understand it as having been paid with a view to a future partnership. Now, the
partnership was not to be entered into till January, 1833~ and
in the meanwhile the infant has derived no advantage whatever from the contract." BosANQUET, J.: "We are far from
impeaching Holmes VB. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that
case. • • • Here the infant has derived no benefit whatever from the contract, the consideration of which has wholly
failed. • • • The £100 paid here was in the nature of
a deposit. Money paid on a deposit may generally be recovered
back where the contract g<>es off, and here the contract was
defeated before the infant dcrh·ed any benefit from it."
ALDERSON and GASELEJ<), JJ., were of the same opinion. The
plaintiff was allowed to reoover the deposit money paid by
him, while an infant, because the partnership contract was
disafflrmed by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to begin. As it was said by ALDERSON, J., "Before the contract is
performed, one of the parties revokes it, and remits the other
to the same situation as if the contract had never been
made." The distinction between Holmes vs. Blogg, and Corpe
va. Overton is this: In the former the plaintiff was not
allowed to recover t~e money paid by him while an infant,
·because it was paid on a consideration which he had in part
enjoyed, while in the latter the plaintiff wns allowed to recover
ae upon an entire failure of corn~icleration.
Passing, then, from these cases, we come to Bx partc Taylor,
~De Gex, M. & G. 254, which is u case directly in point. There
llD infant paid a premium on entering into a partne1·ship, and,
before he came of age, disafflrmed the contract, and, upon the
bankruptcy of tlie firm, attempted to prove for the premium
thus paid. Lord Justice K:-<IGHT BnucE said: "In my opinion,
a case of fraud has not been established. That being so, the
matter remains one of .a_contrad fairly made, or as fairly made
as a contract with an infant could be mad<>, a contract upon
which the infant acted during his minoritJ, and which during

36 Cases ‘ox l'ARTNEl{SHlP.
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his minority has been in part performed on each side. In such

a state of things, I conceive that, if the bankrupts had con-

tinued solvent, and an action had been brought against them

by the minor, either before or after majority, for the purpose

of recovering the money in question, there must have been

either a nonsuit or a verdict against him." Lord Justice Tun-

Nnn said: “It is clear, an infant cannot be absolutely bound

by a contract entered into during his minority. He must have

the right upon his attaining his majority to elect whether he

will adopt the contract or not. It is, however, a different ques-

tion, whether, if an infant pztys money on the footing of a con-

tract, he can afterwards recover it back. If an infant buys an

article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay

for it; but, if he does pay for it during his minority, he cannot

on attaining his majority recover the money back.”

‘Ye have quoted at length from the preceding cases, because

the question at issue is an important one, and comes before

us for the ﬁrst time for decision. And while fully recognizing

the privilege which the law accords to minors in regard to con-

tracts made during their minority, yet, in a case like the pres-
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ent, where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being

admitted as a partner in the business of the appellant, and he

does become and remains a partner for a given time, he ought

not to be allowed to recover back the money thus paid unless

he was induced to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent

representations of the appellant. Whether an infant can avoid

a. contract and sue thereon during his minority, or must wait

until he arrives at age, is a question about which the decisions

are conﬂicting. To hold that he cannot disatﬁrm a voidable

contract until he attains his majority would in many cases

work the greatest injustice to an infant. And where the con-

tract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property,

we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoided,

either before or after his majority. Sta/7'ord vs. Roof, 9 Cow.

626; Shipman vs. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; Willis vs. Turambly, 13

Mass. 204.

The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's ﬁrst and

second prayers, the judgment must be reversed. Judgment

reversed, and new trial awarded.

Norm: For other cases respecting the rights and liabilities of infant

partners, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 23 and notes.

.- . m~ -

his minority has been in part performed on each side. In such
a state of things, I eonl'eive that, if the bankrupts had continued sokent, and an action had been brought against them
by the minor, either before> 01· after majority, for the purpose
of recovering the money in question, there mu8t have been
either a nonsuit or a verdict against him.'' Lord Justice TuaNER said: "It is clear, an infant cannot be absolutely bound
by a contract entered into during his minority. He must have
the right upon his attaining his majority to elect whether he
will adopt t lie contract or not. It is, however, a different question, whetht:>r, if an inf~mt pay~ mon<>,v on the footing of a contract, be can afterwards recove1· it lmck. If an infant buys an
article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay
for it; but, if he does pa,v for it during his minority, he cannot
on attaining his majority recover the money back."
·we have quoted at length from the precPding cases, because
the question at issue is an important one, and comes before
us for the fir:d time for decision. And while fully recognizing
the privilege which the law accords to minors in regard to contracts made during tht:>ir minority, yet, in a case like the present, where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being
admitted as a partner in the business of the appellant, and he
does become and remains a partner for a given time, he ought
not to be allowPd to recover back th_e money thus paid unless
he was indueed to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent
reprt:>sentations of the appellant. ·w1wther an infant can avoid
a contract and sue thereon during bis minority, or must wait
until he arrives at age, is a question about which the decisions
are conflicting. To hold that he cannot disaffirm a voidable
contract until he attains his majority would in many cases
work the greatest injustice to an infant. And where the contract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property,
we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoidetl,
either before or after his majority. Stafford t'S. Roof, 9 Cow.
626; Shipman vs. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; H' illis vs. Tu:ombly, 1:~
Mass. 204.
The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's first an•I
second prayers, the jud~nwnt mnMt be revel'sed. .Judgment
reversed, and new trial a warded.
NOTE: For other caef'e reepectfog the rights and liabilities of infet
partDers, see Mecbem'e Elem. of P!lrtn., § 23 and notes.
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73 Mich. 146. 16 Am. St. Rep. 572, 40 N. \V. Rep. 907, 2 L. R. A. 343.

ARTMAN VI. FERGVSON.

Supreme Court of .-llichigan, 1888.

This action is brought in the circuit court for the

county of Jackson, on the common counts in a-s.~:umpsit, to

ARTMAN v& FERCTTSON.

recover goods sold and delivered to the defendants, doing busi-

ness at Jackson as Peter Ferguson & Co. The defendants are

husband and wife, and the plaintiff sought to show that, after

Supreme Court of Jf irliigan, 1888.

their marriage, they formed a copartnership, and carried on

the retail carpet business in the city of Jackson under the ﬁrm

73 Mich. 146, 16 Am. St. Rep. 572, 40 N. W. Hep. 907, 2 L. R. A. 343.

name of Peter Ferguson & Co., and that during such time the

goods involved in this suit were sold to them; that Margaret

W. Ferguson was, at the time of the formation of such copart-

nership, possessed of property in her own right, of the value

of $20,000, and furnished the entire capital for the business,

and provided a place to carry on such business; that Peter

Ferguson had no means, and was to and did manage the busi-

ness; that the copartnership continued until after the la.st item

of goods mentioned in the bill of particulars was sold. This
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evidence was objected to by defendants’ counsel, on the ground

that it wa not competent for husband and wife to enter into

a copartnership with each other. The circuit" court sustained

the objection, and directed a. verdict for defendants. Plaint-

itfs bring the case to this court by writ of error.

Thomas -A. Wilson, for appellants.

Richard Price and Austin Blair, for appellees.

Lone, J . The only quetion arising is whether the husband

andwife can enter into a. contract of partnership between them-

selves, and thus render themselves jointly liable for the con-

tracts of the ﬁrm thus established. At the common law married

women were incapable of forming a partnership, since they were

disabled, generally, to contract orlto engage in trade; and the

husband and wife were wholly incapicitated to contract with

each other. Whatever rights or powers the husband and wife

have to contract with each other, or that the wife may have to

enter into a copartnership to carry on trade or business, must

This action is brou~ht in the circuit com-t for the
county of Jnck~on, on the common counts in a.s~ump.'lit, to
recover goods sold and delivered to the defendants, doing business at ,Jackson as Peter Fe1·guson & Co. 1.'he defendants are
husband and wife, and the plaintiff sought to show that, after
their marriage, they formed a copartnership, and carried on
the retail carpet business in the city of Jackson under the firm
name of Peter Ferguson & Co., and that during such time the
gQods involved in this suit were sold to them; that Margaret
W. FPrgnson was, at the time of the formation of such copartnership, 1wssessed of :property in her own right, of the value
of '20iOOO, and furnished the entire capital for the business,
and provided a plaee to carry on such business; that Peter
J.i'erguson had no means, and was to and did manage the business; that the copartnership continued until after the last item
of goods mentioned in the bill of pa_rticulars was sold. This
evidence was objected to by defendant8' counsel, on the ground
that it was not competent for husband and wife to enter into
a copartnership with each other. 'rhc circuit court sustained
1he objection, and directed a verdict for defendants. Plaintiffs bring the case to this court by writ of error.

Thomas A.. Wilson, for appellants.
Ricllard, Prfoe. and .4.ustin Blair, for appellees.

LoNo, J. The only question arising is whether the husband
11.nd wife can enter into a contract of partnersllip betwef>n themselves, and thus render themselves jointly liable for the contracts of the firm thus established. At the common law married
women were incapable of forming a partnership, since tlleywere
disabled, gen-er-ally, to contrad or' to engage in trade; and the
husband and wife were wholly incapicitated to contract with
each other. Whatever rights or powers the husband and wife
have to contract with each other, or tliat the wife may have to
enter into a copartner~hip to en rry on trade or business, must

38 Gasss ox PA BTNERSHIP.

be conferred by our constitution and statutes. There was never

88
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any impediment to the acquisition of property through pur-

chase by a married woman. The diﬂiculty was that at the

common law the ownership passed immediately to the hus-

band by virtue of the marriage relation. Our statute has not

removed all the common-law disabilities of married women.

It has not conferred upon her the power of a fame sole, except

in certain directions. It has only provided that her real and

personal estate acquired before marriage, and all property,

real and personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled

in any manner, shall be and remain her ‘estate, and shall not

be liable for the debts, obligations, and engagements of her

husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged,

conveyed, devised, and bequeathed by her as if she were unmar-

ried; and she may sue and be sued in relation to her sole prop»

erty as if she were unmarried. How. St. §§ 6295-6297. In all

other respects she is a feme covert, and subject to all the

restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation.

A partnership is a contract of two or more competent persons

to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some one or all
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of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the

proﬁt and bear the loss in certain proportions. That a married

woman may, when she has separate estate, be a copartner with

a person other than her husband, is held in many states under

the married woman’s statutes. But where the statute gives

her no power, or only a limited power, to become a partner.

the rule of the common law provides that she cannot enter a

ﬁrm. It has been held by a great preponderance of authori-

ties, even under the broadest statutes, that a married woman

has no capacity to contract a partnership with her husband.

or, in other words, to become a member of a ﬁrm in which her

husband is a partner, even in those states in which she may

embark in another partnership; and though she holds herself

out as such partner, and her means give credit to the ﬁrm, she

is held not liable for the debts, as she cannot, by acts or declar-

ations, remove her own disabilities. Lord vs. Parker, 3 Allen.

1.27; Bowker vs. Bradford, 140 Mass. 521, 5 N. E. Rep. 480; H aas

vs. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 46 Am. Rep. 607; Payne vs. Thompson,

44 Ohio St. 192; Kaufman vs. Schoe/fcl, 37 Hun 140; Goa: vs.

M illcr, 54 Tex. 16; Mayer vs. Soyster, 30 Md. 402.

In this State a married women was subject to the com-

be conferred by onr constitution and statutes. There was never
any impediment to the acquisition of pl'operty through purchase by a married woman. 'l'he difficulty was that at the
common law the ownership pa.ssed immediately to the husband by virtue of the marriage relation. Our statute has not
removed all the common-law disabilities of married women.
Jt has not conferred upon her the power of a fcme sole, except
in certain directions. It has only provided that her real and
personal estate aequired before marriage, and all property,
real and personal, to which she may afterwards becom~ entitled
in any manner, shall be and remain lier 'estate, and shall not
be liable for the debts, obligations, and engagements of her
husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged,
conveyed, deYised, and bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried; and she may sue and be sued in relation to her sole property as if she were unmarried. How. St. §§ 6295-6297. In all
other respects she is a feme covert, nnd subject to all the
restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation.
A partnerahip is a e-0ntract of two or more competent persons
to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some one or all
of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and bear the loss in certain proportions. That a married
woman may, when she has separate estate, be a copartner with
a person other than her husband, is held in many states under
the mar1·ied woman's statutes. But where the statute gives
her no power, or only a limited power, to become a partner,
the rule of the common law provides that she cannot enter a
firm. It has been held by a great preponderance of authorities, even under the broadest statutes, that a married woman
has no capacity to contract a partnership with her husband,
or, in other words, to become a member of a firm in which her
husband is a partner, even in those states in which she ma~·
embark in another partnership; and though she holds herself
out as such partner, and her means give credit to the firm, she
is held not liable for the debts, as she cannot, by acts or declarations, remove her own disabilities. Lord vs. Parker, 3 Allen.
· l27; Bowket vs. Bradford, 140 :\lass. 521, 5 N. E. Rep. 480; Haa~
vs. Shaw, 91 Ind. 38 1, 46 Am. Rep. G07; Payne vs. Thompson,
44 Ohio St. 192; Kaufman vs. Sclweffcl, 37 Hun 140; Oo:IJ vs.
Miller, 54 Tex. 16; Mayer i·s. Soyster, 30 Md. 402.
In this State a married worn.en was subject to the com1

c
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mon-law disabilities of coverture until the passage of the

married woman's act of 1855. How. St. §§ 6295-6299. This

act does not touch a wife’s interests in her husband’s

property, and these remain under the restrictions of the

common law, unless they are removed by some other stat-

ute. The wife’s common-law disabilities are only partially

removed by the act, and one who relies on a wife’s con-

tract must show the facts in order that they may appear

whether she had capacity to make it. Edwards vs lllclfnhill,

51 Mich. 161, 16 N. W. Rep. 322. Under our statutes a

wife has no power to contract except in regard to her sepa-

rate property. The constitution and statutes are clear against

her right to make a mere personal obligation unconnected with

property, and not charging it, so that she cannot become per-

sonally bound jointly with her husband, nor as a surety, by

mere personal promise. De Vries vs. Gonklin, 22 Mich. 255;

West vs. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery vs. Lord, 26 Mich. 431.

In Jenna vs. Marble, 37 Mich. 319, Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, speak-

ing with reference to a lease, said: “The language of the statute
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is no broader than the equitable rules concerning separate

property laid down in the same words in most of the old decis-

ions. ' ' ' The disabilities of testimony are entirely

inconsistent with the idea that husband and wife may deal

with each other as third persons can. This is impossible, if

they cannot testify concerning these contracts; and when the

law recognizes, as it always has done, the peculiar power of

substantial coercion possessed by husbands over wives, it

would not be proper to infer any legal intent to remove pro-

tection against such inﬂuence from any vague provisionswhich

no one supposes were ever actually designed to reach such a

result, and which can only be made to do it by an extended

construction. Any one can readily see the mischiefs of allow-

ing persons thus related to put themselves habitually in'-busi-

ness antagonism, and legislation which can be construed as

permitting it is so radically opposed to the system which is

found embodied in our statutes generally that it should be

plain enough to admit of no other meaning.”

It is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a mar-

ried woman the right to acquire and hold property sep-

arate from her husband, and free from his inﬂuence and

control, and if she m-ight enter into a. business part-

mon-law disabilities of coverture pntil the passage of the
married woman's act of 1855. How. St. § § 6295-6299. This
act does not touch a wife's interests in her husband's
property, and these remain under the r~strictioris ()f the
common law, unless they are removed by some other statute. The wife's common-law disabilities are only partially
removed by the act, and one who relies on a wife's oontract must show the facts in order that they may a.ppear
whether she had capacity to make it. Ed1eards vs M cEnhill,
51 Mich. 161, 16 N. W. Rep. 322. Under our statutes a
wife has no power to contract except in regard to her separate property. The constitution and statutes are clear against
her right to make a mere personal obligation unconnected with
property, and not charging it, so that she cannot become personally bound jointly with her husband, nor as a surety, by
mere personal promise. De Vri.u vs. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255;
West vs. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery vs. Lord, 26 Mich. 431.
In Jenne vs. Marble, 37 l\Iich. 319, :Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, speaking with reference to a lease, said: ;'The language of the statute
is no broader than the equitable rules concerning separate
property laid down in the same words in most of the old decis·
ions. • • • The disabilities of testimony are entirely
inconsistent with the idea that husband and wife may deal
with each other as third persons can. This is impossible, if
they cann<>t testify concerning these contracts; and when the
law recognizes, a.a it always bas done, the peculiar power of
substantial coercion possessed by husbands over wives, it
would not be proper to infer any legal intent to remove protection against such influence from any vague provisions which
no one supposes were ever actually designed to reach such a
result, and which can only be made to do it by an extended
construction. Any one can readily see the mischiefs of ~llow
ing persons thus related to put themselves habitually in "business antagonism, and legislation which can be construed as
permitting it is so radically opposed to the system which is
found embodied in our statutes generally that it should be
plain enough to admit <>f no othe1· meaning."
It is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a married woman the right to acquire and hold property separate from her husband, a11d free from his influence and
control, and if she might enter into a business part-
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nership with her husband it would subject her property to his

control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation

which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might sub

ject her to an indeﬁnite liability for his engagements. A con-

tract of partnership with her husband is not included within

the power granted by our statute to married women. This

doctrine was laid down in Bassett vs. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3,

17 N. \V. Rep. 217, and we see no reason for departing from it.

The important and sacred relations between man and wife,

which lie at the very foundation of civilized society, are not

to be disturbed and destroyed by contentions which may arise

from such a community of property and a joint power of dis-

posal and a mutual liability for the contracts and obligations

of each other. The judgment of the court below must be

aﬁirmed. with costs. ‘

The other justices concurred.

No'rn: For other cases to same eﬁeot,see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.,

§ 25. Compare also with following case.

iii

SUAU vs. CAFFE.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

(‘om-t of Appeals of New York, 1890.

122 N. Y. 308, 25 N. E. Rep. 488, 9 L. R. A. 598.

On the 29th of January, 188], the defendants, George and

DE'l'Bhip with her husband it would subject her property to his
control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation
which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might subject her to an indefinite liability for his engagements. A con·
tract of partnership with her husband is not inc.laded within
the power granted by our statute to married women. This
doctrine was laid down in Bassett vs. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3,
17 N. ,V. Rep. 217, and we see no reason for departing from it.
The important and sacred relations between man and wife,
which lie at the very foundation of civilized society, are not
to be disturbed and destroyed by contentions which may arise
from such a community of property and a joint power of dis·
posal and a mutual liability for the contracts and obligations
of each other. The judgment of the court below must be
affirmed, with costs.
The other justices concurred.

‘Adele Marie Gaffe, then and now husband and wife, executed,

and, on June 1, 1881, recorded in 'the oﬂice of the clerk of

the city and county of New York a certiﬁcate by which

NOTi:: For other cuea to ame etfeot, aee Mechem'• Elem. of Partn..,
§ 25. Compare also with following case.

they assumed to form a limited partnership pursuant to the

Revised Statutes, for the purpose of importing and dealing

in'foreign goods, at the city of New York, under the ﬁrm

name of George Caﬁe, which was to continue from Febru-

ary 1, 1881, to February 1, 1886. The husband was the

general and the wife the special partner, she contributing

$25,000. Thereafter, they carried on a. business of the kind

BUA U vs. CAFFE.

speciﬁed at the city of New York, under the ﬁrm name

selected, until after the debt to the plaintilf was contracted.

Between .May 23, _1882, and December 6, 1883, the plaintiﬁ

Court of Appeals of New York, 18!l0.
122 N. Y. 808, 25 N. E. Rep. 488, 9 L. R. A. rl98.

On the 29th of January, 1881, the defendants, George and
'.Adele Marie Caffe, then and now husband and wife, executed,
end, on June 1, 1881, recorded in ·the office of the clerk of
the city and county of New York a certificate by which
they assumed to form a limited partne1·ship pursuant to the
Revised Statutes, for the purpose of importing and dealing
in· foreign goods, at the city of New York, under the firm
name of George Caffe, which was to continue from February 1, 1881, to February 1, 1886. The husband was the
general and the wife the special partner, she contributing
$25,000. Thereafter, they carried on a business of the kind
specified at the city of New York, under the firm name
selected, until after the debt to the plaintiff was contracted.
Between .May 23, .1882, and December 6, 1883, the plaintiff

Susu vs. Csrrs. 41

SUAU

loaned money to George Caffe on account of which the defend-

vs.

UAFFK.

ants conceded that there was due the plaintiﬁ January 1, 1884,

$26,799.93, to recover which this action was brought. The

defendants interposed two defenses: (1) That the partner-

ship or business relation, whatever it was, which had existed

between thembefore May 16, 1882, was on that day dissolved

with the knowledge of the plaintiff; (2) that a husband and

wife cannot, under the law of this State, be partners in busi-

ness, and that, although they agree to become so, transact busi-

ness and incur liabilities as such, the wife is not liable to the

creditors of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst question--an issue of fact—

was contested before a jury, and determined in favor of the

plaintiff. The second question, an issue of law, was decided in

favor of the plaintiff at the circuit, which ruling was atﬁrmed

at the general ter‘m. From this judgment the defendants

appealed to this court.

William Tharp, for appellants.

Abram Kling, for respondent.

FOLLETT, C. J. But a single question is involved in this

appeal, which is whether a married woman who contracts a
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debt with her husband in a business carried on for their joint

beneﬁt, can avoid liability for it on the ground of coverture.

The second section of chapter 90 of the Laws of 1860 provides

that “a married woman may ' ‘ " carry on any trade or

loaned money to George Caffe on account of which the defendants conceded that there was due the plaintiff January 1, 1884,
~26,799.93, to recover which this action was brought.
The
defendants interposed two defenses: (1) That the partnership or business relation, whatever it was, which bad existed
between them before May 16, 1882, was on that day dissolved
with the knowledge of the plaintiff; (2) that a husband and
wife cannot, under the law of this State, be partners in business, and that, although they agree to become so, transact business and incur liaLilities as such, the wife is not liable to the
creditors of the firm. The first question-an issue of factwas contested before a jury, and determined in favor of the
plaintiff. The second question, an issue of law, was decided in
favor of the plaintiff at the circuit, which ruling was affirmed
at the general tenn. From this judgment the defendants
appealed to this court.

business ' ‘ ' 011_.hﬂLgJkB_ and separate accoun_t.f’ It is

urged that this language is not broad enough to authorize

William Tharp, for appellants.

married women to engage in business as partners, or jointly

with others, or at least with their husbands, but that the stat-

Abram Kling, for respondent.

ute simply confers power on them to contract by themselves

and apart from others. This construction is too narrow, and

fails to express the evident intent of the legislature, which

was not to prescribe the mode in which married women should

carry on their business, but to free them from the restraints

of the common law, and permit them to engage in business

in their own behalf as free from the control of their husbands

as though unmarried. Before this statute, the proﬁts of their

business belonged to their husbands. and the words “sole and

separate account” were intended to convey the idea that the

beneﬁcial interest of any business in which they might engage

6

FOLLETT, C. J. Bnt a single question Is involved In this
appeal, which is whether a married woman who contracts a
debt with her husband in a business carried on for their joint
benefit, can avoid liability for it on the ground of coverture.
The second section of chapter 90 of the Laws of 1860 provides
that "a married woman may • • • carry on any trade or
business * * • 011 _hel:_sole_~nd separ_a te accoun_~·-" It is
urged that this language is not broad enough to authorize
married women t<> engage in business as partners, or jointly
with others, or at least with their husbands, but that the statute simply confers power on them to contract by themselves
abd apart from others. This construction is too narrow, and
fails to express the evident intent of the legislature, which
was n<>t to prescribe the m<>de in which married women should
carry on their business, but to free them from the restraints
of the common law, and permit them to engage in business
in their own behalf as free from the control of their husbands
as though unmarried. Before this statute, the profits of their
business belonged to their husbands, and the words "sole and
separate account" ~re intended to convey the idea that the
beneficial interest of any business in which they might engage

6
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belonged to them and not to theirhusbands. Since the enact-

ment of this statute, it has been held that husbands and wives

may legally contract with each other in reference to their sep

ate estates (Owen vs. Oawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Bodine rs. Killeen,

53 N. Y. 93); that they may become agents for each other

(Knapp vs. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277); and tl1at a husband may assign

to his wife a chose in action (SQ:/nwur vs. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178).

In Frccking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, it was held that a wife

could not escape liability on a joint promissory note given by

herself and her husband, in payment for property purchased

by her, by reason of her eoverture, nor by reason of the fact

that she contracted jointly with her husband. In Scott vs. Gon-

way, 58 N. Y. 619, the defendant and her husband were engaged

in running a theater, under the name of “Mrs. F. B. Conway’s

Brooklyn Theater,” pursuant to a contract by which the proﬁts

and losses were to be equally shared between them. To an

.action brought for the recovery of the value of goods sold, the

wife interposed the defense that she was not liable for the

debt, because it was not contracted in any trade or business

carried on for her sole or separate account or beneﬁt, but for
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the beneﬁt of a business carried on by herself and husband

for their joint beneﬁt. This defense was overruled in the

supreme court and in the court of appeals. Bitter vs. Rath-

man, 61 N. Y. 512, was an action for an accounting between

partners. The plaintiﬂ', a married woman, had been engaged

in business with the defendant under the name of H. Rath-

man & Co. The trial court found “that the plaintiff, in secret

trust for her husband, was the partner of the defendant,” and

that, “in respect to the public, she was to be regarded as the

real partner,” and ordered an accounting as to the partnership

affairs. GRAY, C., said: “Yet she, having suffered herself to

be regarded by the public as a partner, was liable, as such,

to the creditors of the ostensible ﬁrm; and, having thus

exposed herself to such liabilities, if any should be" found to

exist, she had, to any such extent, no right, as against either

the defendant or her husband, to be protected out of the share

which would belong to her in her capacity as trustee for her

husband, at whose instance she undertook the trust.” This

case does not decide that a wife may or may not be a partner

in business with her husband, but it in effect decides that a

married woman may be a partner with a third person, and

belonged to them and not to their .husbands. Since the enactment of this statute, it has been held that husbands and wives
may legally contract with each other in reference to their eepate estates (Ou:en vB. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Bodine VB. Killeen,
53 N. Y. 93); that they moy become agents for each other
(Knapp us. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277); and that a husband may assig11
to his wife a chose in action (Seymour VB. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178).
In Frecking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, it was held that a wife
could not escnpe liability on a joint promissory note given by
herself and her husband, in payment for property purchased
by her, by reason of her coverture, nor by reason of the fact
that she contracted jointly with her husband. In Scott"'· Con-.
way, 58 N. Y. 619, the defendant and her husband were engagied
in running a theater, under the name of "Mrs. F. B. Conway's
Brooklyn Theater," pursuant to a contract by which the profits
and losses were to be equally shared between them. To an
.action brought for the recovery of the value of goods sold, the
wife interposed the defense that she was not liable for the
debt, because it was not contracted in any trade or business
carried on for her sole or separate account or benefit; but for
the benefit of a business carried on by her.self and husband
for their joint benefit. This defense was overruled in th'~
supreme court and in the court of appeals. Bitter vs. Rathman, 61 N. Y. 512, was an action for an accounting between
partners. The plaintiff, a married woman, had been engaged
in business with the defendant under the name of H. Rathman & Co. The trial court found "that the plaintiff, in secre-t
trust for her ~usband, was the partner of the defendant," and
that, "in respect to the public, she was to be regarded as the
real partner," and ordered an accounting as to the partnership
affairs. GRAY, C., said: "Yet she, having suffered herself to
be regarded by the public as a partner, was liable, as such,
to the creditors of the ostensible firm; and, having thus
exposed herself to such liabilities, if any should be found to
exist, she bad, to any such extent, no right, as against either
the defendant or her husband, to be protected out of the share
which would belong to her in her capacity as trustee for her
husband, at whose instance she undertook the trust." This
case does not decide that a wife may or may not be a partner
in business with her husband, but it in effect decides that a
married woman may be a partner with a third person, 8.lld

Susu vs. Ours. ' 43

that her husband may act as her agent in the business of the

SUAU

vs.

0.AFFE.

ﬁrm.

In Noel rs. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74, 12 N. E. Rep. 351, reversing

15 Abb. N. C. 403, an action was brought against the hus-

band and wife on a note signed, “J. P. Kinney & Co.,”

and payable to the plaintiff. The complaint charged that

the defendants were liable, as partners, under the name signed

to the note. The husband made default, but the wife answered

that she was a married woman, and that the note was exc-

cuted by her husband. On the trial, the plaintiff put the note

in evidence, and it appeared that the defendants were hus-

band and wife, and there was evidence that the note was given

for mirrors placed in houses owned by the wife. A motion to

dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the note on its

face showed that it was not given in respect to her separate

business, or her estate, was overruled. In considering this

question Daxrowrn, J ., speaking for a unanimous court, said:

“ln the case cited (Freaking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422), she

became :1 joint “contractor with her husband, but she was as

much bound to perform the joint engagement as if the under-
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taking had been several, and she did not escape liability

because her joint contractor was her husband. It was not

necessary to inquire, in that case, whether thé one paying

could obtain contribution from the other, nor is it pecessary

to go into that question here. In that case, both undertook

to pay the creditor. Can it make a difference in the measure

of liability that, in one case, the married woman entered in

her own name, and her husband in his name, in the execution

of a joint obligation, and in the other case adopted a name

which represents a joint liablity, which may, in effect, also

be several? Partners are at once principals and agents,—eaeh

represents the other,—and if, in the relation of partnership.

there are obligations which a married woman cannot enforce

against her husband, or the husband against the wife, they

involve no feature of the present action, which asserts only

the obligation of a debtor to discharge her debt, or the obliga-

tion of a promisor to fulﬁll her promise.”

Partners are the agents of each other, and are jointly and

severally liable for the debts of the ﬁrm; these being two

of the essential elements of a contract of partnership. It

being settled that husbands and wives may be the agents

of each other, and that they may bind themselves by joint

that her husband may act as her agent in the business of the
firm.
In Noel t~s. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74, 12 N. E. Rep. 351, reversing
15 Abb. N. C. 403, an action was brought against the husband and wife on a note signed, "J. P. Kinney & Co.,"
and payable to the plaintiff. The complaint charged that
the defendants were liable, as partners, under the name signed
to the note. The husband made default, but the wife answered
that she was a married woman, and that the note was executed by her husband. On the trial, the plaintiff put the note
in evidence, and it appeared that the defendants were husband and wife, and there was evidence that the note was given
for mirrors placed in houses owned by the wife. A motion to
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the note on its
face showed that it was not given in respect to her separate
business, or her estate, was overruled. In considering this
question DA~FOilTH, J., speaking for a unanimous court, said:
"In the case cited (Frecking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422), she
became a joint 'c ontractor with her husband, but she was as
much bound to perforin the joint engagement as if the undertaking had been several, and she did not escape liability
because. her joint contractor was her husband. It was not
necessary to inquire, in that case, whether the one paying
could obtain contribution from the other, nor is it pecessary
to go into that question here. In that case, both undertook
to pay the creditor. Can it make a difference in the measure
of liability !hat, In one case, the married woman entered in
her own name, and her husband in his name, in the execution
of a joint obligation, and in the other case adopted a nam\~
which represents a joint liablity, which may, in effect, also
be several? Partners are at once principals and agents,-each
represents the other,-and if, in the relation of partnership.
there are obligations which a married woman cannot enforce
against her husband, or the husband against the wife, they
involve no feature of the present action, which asserts only
the obligation of a debtor to discharge her debt, or the obligation of a promisor to fulfill her promise."
Partners are the agents of each other, and are jointly and
severally liable for the debts of the firm; these being two
of the essential elements of a contract of partnership. It
being settled that husbands and wives may be the agents
of each other, and tb~t they may bind themselves by joint
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contracts entered into with third persons, we see no war-

rant in the statute for exempting them from liability to

creditors for debts incurred by ﬁrms of which they are mem-

bers. It has also been so held in Graﬁ vs. Kinney, 37 Hun

405, which aﬁirms 15 Abb. N. C. 397; Zimmerman vs. Erhard,

8 Daly, 311, aﬂirmed 83 N. Y. 74. Opposed to these are

Ohambovet vs. Cagney, 35 N. Y. Super. (‘t. -174; Kaufman vs.

Schoe/Tel, 37 Hun, 140; Fairlce vs. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr.

292; same case, 14 Abb. N. C. 341, was reversed in 38 Hun

220. Upon principle and authority, we think that when a hus-

band and wife assume to carry on a business as partners, and

contract debts in the course of it, the wife cannot escape lia-

bility on the ground of coverture. The judgment should be

affirmed, with costs.

VANN, PARKER and BROWN, JJ., concur.

HAIGHT, Porrnn and BRADLEY, JJ., dissent.

Norm: For other cases to same eﬂeet, see Mechenfs Elem. of Partn.,

§ 25. Compare with preceding case.

WHITTENTON MILLS vs. UPTON.

Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1858.

contra.eta entered into with third persons, .we see no warrant in the statute for exempting them from liability to
<'l'editors for debts incurred by firms of which they are members. It has also been so held in Graff tJB. Kinney, 37 Hun
405, which afll.nns 15 Abb. N. 0. 397; Zimmermtm 1'8. Erhard,
8 Daly, 311, affirmed 83 N. Y. 74. Opposed to these are
Chambovet vs. Cagnev, 35 N. Y. Super. 0t. 474; Kaufman "'·
Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140; Fairlee vs. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr.
292; same case, 14 Abb. N. C. 341, was reversed in 38 Hun
220. Upon principle and authority, we think that when a husband and wife assume to carry on a business as partners, and
contract debts in the course of it, the wife cannot escape liability on the ground of coverture. The judgment should be
affirmed, with costs.
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10 Gray 582, 71 Am. Dee. 681.

Petition by a manufacturing corporation to set aside insolv-

v ANN,

PARKER and

RROWN,

JJ., concur.

ency proceedings instituted against it and VVilliam Mason as

partners, upon Mason’s petition to restrain the assignee ap-

HAIGHT, POTTER and BRADLEY, JJ., dissent.

pointed under these proceedings from further meeting with

petitioner’s estate, and to compel the judge of insolvency to

entertain a petition of the corporation for the beneﬁt of the

NOTS: For other cases to same effect, see Meohem'e Elem. of Partn..
§ 25. Compare with precediDg ca-.

insolvent laws, respecting insolvent corporations. The opin-

ion states the facts.

Bartlett and Curtis, for the petitioners.

Hoar and Gray, Jr., for the assignees.

Tnomss, J. This is a petition to this court sitting in equity,

WHITTENTON MILLS vs. UPTON.
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1858.
10 Gray

~2.

71 Am. Dec. 68L

Petition by a manufacturing corporation to set aside insolvency proceedings instituted against it and \Villiam Mason as
partners, upon Mason's petition to restrain the assignee appointed under these proceedings from further meeting with
petitioner's estate, and to compel the judge of insolveno.y to
entertain a petition of the corporation for the benefit of the
insolvent laws, respecting insolvent corporations. The opinion states the facts.
Bartlett and Curtis, for the petitioners.

Hoar and Gray, Jr., for the assignees.

THOMAS, J. This is a petition to this court sitting ln equity.

Wnrrrmrron Mums vs Urcron. 45

WHITrENTON MILLS

vs UPTON.

45

and as such, having by the statute of 1838, c. 163, the juris-

diction and the supervision of all proceedings in insolvency.

The avermcnts of the petition are admitted by the answers

of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts

agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whitten-

ton Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes statedﬂf

the corporation was capablegin law, of entering into and form-

ing such partnership, and for such ends.

But the petitioners say: (1) That the Whittenton Mills

could not enter into any legal partnership. (2) That if it were

so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the prose-

cution of a business foreign to the purpose for which alone it

was created. (3) That if such legal partnership existed, the

petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon the

petition of Mason, and under the statute of 1838, c. 163, and

the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural

persons, and making no provisions for bodies corporate.

At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion

is the question, was this corporation capable of forming a

partnership, of entering into the contract? This question pre-
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sents itself in two forms. The more general one is: “Has a

corporation, as one of its usual, inherent powers, the capacity

to form a contract of copartnersl1ip?” The narrower question,

but for this case the practical and pertinent one is: “Can a

manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorpora-

ted since February, 1S31, and subject to the provisions of the

thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,

enter into a contract or society of copartnership?”

This corporation was created in March, 1836, as a manu-

facturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cot-

ton goods in the town of Taunton, and for that purpose was

invested with all the powers and privileges, and made subject

to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities, set forth in the

thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,

passed on the 4th of November preceding, but not to take effect

till the ﬁrst of May, 1836: Stats. 1836, c. 19. This charter,

with the provisions of the chapter referred to and made part

of it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of

the corporation. \Vhat powers are granted expressly or by

implication, because necessary or usual for the purposes which

and as such, having by the statute of 1838, c. 163, the jurisdiction and the supervision of all proceedings in insolvency.
The averments of the petition are admitted by the answers
of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts
agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whittenton :Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes stated\!.f
the corporation was capable)n law, of entering into and forming such partnership, and for such ends.
But the petitioners say: (1) That the \Vhittenton Mille
could not enter into any legal partnership. (2) That if it were
so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the pl'osecution of a business foreign to the P!J.rpose for which alone it
was created. (3) That if such legal partnership existed, the
petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon tbe
petition of Mason, and under the statute of 1838, c. 163, and
the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural
persons, and making no provisions for bodies corporate.
At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion
is the question, was this corporation capable of forming a
partnership, of entering into the contract? This question presents itself in two forms. The more general one is: "Has a
corporation, as one of its usual, inherent powers, the capacity
to form a contract of copartnership?" The narrower question,
but for this case the practical and pertinent one is: "Can a
manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorporated since February, 1831, and subject to the provisions of the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
enter into a contract or society of copartnership?"
This corporation was created in March, 1836, as a manufacturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cotton goods in the town of 'raunton, and for that purpose was
invested with all the powers and privileges, and made subject
to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities, set forth in the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
passed on the 4th of November preceding, but not to take effect
till the first of May, 1836: Stats. 18:{6, c. 19. This cliarter,
with the provisions of the chapter referre.d to and made part
<lf it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of
thE" corpor-ation. What powers are granted expressly or by
implication, because necessary or usual for the purpose.s which
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the charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no

more.

There is one obvious and important distinction between such

a society as this charter creates and that of a partnership.

An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by

agents authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the

collected will of the society. No member of the corporation

as such can bind the society. In a partnership, each member

binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation

may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be

two principals, the legal person and the natural person, each

having, within the scope of the society's business, full author-

ity to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its

property. ‘

The second section of chapter 38 of the revised statutes,

provides that the business of every such manufacturingcorpora-

tion shall be managed and conducted by the president and

directors thereof, and such other oﬂicers, agents, and factors

as the company shall think proper to authorize for that pur-

pose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be
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carried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner

may manage and conduct the business of the corporation, and

bindit by his acts. In so doing, he does not act as an oﬁicer

or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but

as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each

capable of binding the society by the act of its individual

will.

Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there

is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a man-

ufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the exist-

ence of a contract by which the power to manage the business

of the company, and to bind the corporation by his acts, is

vested in one not a member of the corporation, nor its olﬁcer or

agent. Such are the third, fourth and ﬁfth sections, providing

how the president and directors, and other oﬁicers, agents and

factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such, too, is the

sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make

by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the

everal provisions authorizing the stockholders to ﬁx the

amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the

. the charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no
more.
There is one obvious and important dhitinetion betweC'n such
a soci<'ty as this charter creates and that of a partnership.
An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by
agt>nts authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the
collected will of the society. No member of the corporation
as such can bind the society. In a partnership, each membe1·
. binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation
may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be
two principals, the legal pt>rson and the natural person, each
having, within the scope of the society's business, full authority to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its
property.
·
The second section of chapter 38 of the revised statutes,
provides that the business of every such manufacturingcorporation shall be rnanag-ed and conducted by the president and
dh·ectors thereof, and such other officers, agents, and facto1"H
as the company shall think proper to authorize for that purpose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be
earried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner
may manage and conduct the busint>ss of the corporation, and
bind. it by his acts. In so doing, he does not act as an ofticer
or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but
as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and <>i.l<'h
capable of binding the society by the act of its individual
will.
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there
is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a man. ufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the existence of a contraet by which the power to manage the busine8s
of the company, and to bind the corporation by bis acts, js
vested in ont> not a member of the corporation, nor its officer or
agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing
how the president and directors, and other oflicers, agentt'l nnd
factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such, too, is thr
sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make
by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the
several provisions authorizing the stockholders to fix th•~
amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the
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limit ﬁxed by law, or to reduce it: Secs. 9, 11, 19. And such

is the provision requiring the president and directors to give

annual notice of the amount of the debts of the corporation, the

means of stating which would not be in their power if another

principal had the power of creating the debts: Sec. 22. Of

the same character is the twenty-ﬁfth section, by which it is

declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corpor-

ation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the

capital stock actually paid in, and which renders the directors,

under whose administration an excess shall occur, liable per-

sonally to the extent of such excess——a provision evidently

based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract

debts is vested in such directors, and that they cannot be

divested of it, and which is wholly inconsistent with the exist-

ence of a power in the corporation toenter into a contract of

partnership by which another principal would be created, hav-

ing equal power to contract debts, and to bind the partnership

and the corporation in solido.

Indeed, the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our

legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporations,
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is that the corporation is to manage its affairs separately and

exclusively; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders

and others by otlicers who are the servants of the corporation,

and act in its name and behalf. And the formation of a con-

tract, or the entering into a relation by which the corporation,

or the officers of its appointment, should be divested of that

power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner,

with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely

powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is

wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers

expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a

inchnsistent with that policy. -

The power to form a partnership is not only not among U13

manufacturing corporation under the legislation of the com

monwealth. _

The diﬂiculties would be obviously greater in holding such a

partnership to be valid, when formed and carried on for the

prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from

that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to

see how the corporation should engage in such business, even

when under its own control, still less to enter into copartner-

hip with third persons for that purpose.

limit flxed by law, or to reduce it: Secs. 9, 11, 19. And such
is the provision requiring the president and directors to give
annual n-0tice of the amount of the debts of the corporation, the
means of stating whlch would not be in their power if anothe:r
principal had the power of creating the debts: Sec. 22. Of
the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is
declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corporation shaJI at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the
capital stock actua1Jy paid in, and which renders the directors,
under wh-0se administration an excess shall o~cur, liable personally to the extent of such excess-a provision evidently
based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract
debts is vested in such dh•ectors, and that they cannot be
divested of it, and which is wholly inc-0nsistent with the exist•
ence
of a power in the corporation to.enter into a contract of
partnership by which another principal would be created, having equal power to contract debts, and to bind the partnersliip
and the corporation in solido.
Indeed, the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our
legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporationi.;i,
is that tile corporation is to manage its affairs separately and
exclusively; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders
and otllers by otlicers who are the servants of the corporation,
and act in its name and behalf. And the fommtion of a contract, or the entering into a relation by whick the corporation,
or the officers of its appointment, should be divested of that
power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner,
with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely
inchnsistent with that policy.
The power to form
.. a partnership is not only not among the
powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is ·
wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers
expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a
manufnduring corporation under the legislation of the com
monweaJth.
The difficnlties would be obviously greater in holding such a
partnt'.>rship to be valid, when formed and carried on for th~
prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from
that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to
see how the corporation should engage in such business, even
when under its own control, still Jess to enter into copartnerahip with third persons for that purpose.
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By the statute of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argu-

ment, corporations created for the manufacture of woolen and

cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufac-

tures, but this only when four-ﬁfths of the stockholders shall,

by vote at a special meeting, called for the purpose, consent to

the same. This statute furnishes a pretty strong implication

that the power to carry on a ditferent business from that for

which the corporation was chartered did not exist before the

statute was passed.

\Ve are, therefore, all of the opinion that in the formation of

the alleged partnership the corporation exceeded the powers

given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the

contract of copartnership was illegal and void. ' ' ‘

If the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the forma-

tion of the partnership—which is not the fact—it could not

enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal

which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and

prescribing their duties. Whether, if such assent were avail-

able, it could be manifested in any other mode but a vote of the

stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire.
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The decision of the question as to the existence of the part-

nership between the Whittenton Mills and William Mason in

the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if ;a

partnership had existed, the petitioners could be subjected to

the provisions of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts

in addition thereto.

The proceedings in insolvency, founded upon the petition of

Mason as the partner of said Wliittenton Mills, under the ﬁrm

of XVilliam Mason & C0., were illegal, and must be vacated and

set aside, so far as they aﬁ'ect the estate of the Whittenton

Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for

the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the \Vhit-

tenton Mills to hear the parties, and, good cause being shown,

to issue his warrant thereon. -

Decree accordingly.

Norm: For other oases as to the power of corporations to enter into

partnership, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 26.

By the statute of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argument, corporations created for the manufactu1·e of woolen and
cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufactures, but this only when four-fifths of the stockholders shall,
by vote at a special meeting, called for the purpose, consent to
the same. This statute furnishes a pretty stl"ong implication
that the power to carl"y on a ditferent business from that for
which the corporation was chartered did not exist before the
statute was passed.
We are, therefore, all of the opinion that in the formation of
the alleged partnership the corpol"ation exceeded the powers
given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the
contract of copartnership was illegal and void. • • •
If the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the formation of the partnership-which is not the fact-it could not
enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal
which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and
prescribing their duties. \Vhether, if such assent were available, it could be manifested in any o(her mode but a vote of the
stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire.
The decision of the question as to the existence of the partnership between the \Vhittenton :Mills and \Villiam .Mason in
the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if :U.
partnership had existed~ the petitioners could be subjected to
the provisions of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts
in addition thereto.
The proceedings in insolvency, founded upon the petition of
Mason as the partner of said \Vhittenton Mills, under the firm
of William ~Jason & Ce., were illegal, and must be vacated and
set aside, so far as they affect the estate of the \Vhittenton
Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for
the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the Whittenton l\lills to h<'ar the parties, and, good cause being shown,
to issue his warrant thereon.
Decree accordingly.
NoTE: For other oase3 as to the powe~ of oorporatione to enter into
partnership, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 26.

I

IV.

WHAT CONTRACTS AND ACTS CREATE PART-

NERSHIP.

1. Of the Conslrilction of C'om'rac’s Generally.

_ ATKINS vs. HUNT.

Supreme Court of N cw H am pshirc, 1843.

14 N. H. 205.

Assmursrr on three promissory notes, all dated in the year

1840, and payable to the plaintiffs, or order, and signed “Farm-

IV.

ers’ and Mechanics‘ Company, by Greenleaf Cummings, Agent."

There were numerous defendants,all of whom were defaulted

except two, who severally pleaded the general issue. It was

proved that in the month of August, 1839, the defendants

signed written articles of association in trade, under the name

WHAT CONTRACTS AND ACTS CREATE PART·
NERSHIP.

and style of “The Farmers‘ and Mechanics’ Store.” One of the

articles provided as follows: “If any stockholder wishes to

1. Of th1 Construction of C'ontrae's Generally.

withdraw from the concern, he may do so, taking the amount

by him paid in, by giving six months’ notice of his intent, to the

executive committee in writing.” It was also provided by the

second by-law that each subscriber should become a partner,
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and the defendant was a subscriber of a certain sum; and

article 12 provided that all matters relating to the business of

the company should be decided by a major vote of those pres-

ATKINS vs. HUNT.

ent at any meeting duly notiﬁed, except in relation to certain

speciﬁed acts.

Supreme Court of New Hampsllirc. 1843.

It was proved that Greenleaf Cummings, who signed the

notes, was dul_v employed from the ﬁrst of February, 1840, to

14 N. H . 205.

the ﬁrst ot’ July, 1841, and acted as agent of the company, pro-

vided it shall appear from this case that the company con-

7

AssuMrs1T on thrc>e promissory notes, a II dated in the year

1840, and payable to the plaintiffs, or order, and signed "FarmerR' and ?\lt>C"hanirs"Company, by Greenleaf Cummings, Agent:'

There we1·e nunw1·011s deff'ndants,all of whom were dl'faulted
ex<'ept two, who sevPrally pleaded the general issue. It was
proved that in the month of .Augnst, 18!l!l, the defendants
Higned writti•n artidPs of a!'.lsodation in trade, under the name
and st;vle of "The Fal'mf'rs' and 1\Iechanics' Store." One of the
articles provided as follows: "If any ~tock holder wishes to
withdraw from the con<'t•1·11, he may do so, taking the amount
by him paid in, by gi,·ing six months' notice of his intent, to the
executive connuith•e in w1·iting.'' It was also provided by the
second by-law that each suhseriber should become a partner,
and the defendant was a subscriber of a certain sum; and
article 12 provided that all matters relating to the business of
the company should be decid(•d by a major vote of those prel'!<'nt at any meeting duly notified, except in relation to certain
specified acts.
It was proved that Greenleaf Cummings, who signed the
notes, was duly employed from the first of F'ebruary, 1840, to
the first of .July, 1841, and af't<>cl as agent of the rompan.'< provided it shall appeai· from this case that the company con7
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CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

tinned its legal existence, and that the notes in suit were given

in pursuance of his agency. for goods purchased to be used in

the business of the company. I

A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment

is to be rendered, or it is to be set aside and judgment rendered

for the defendants, according to the opinion of the Court upon

this case.

I/ieerrnore, for the defendants.

Morrison, for the plaintiff.

Gn.c1m1s'r, J . The question before the Court is, whether the

defendants are liable as partners of the Farmers and Mechan-

tinned ite legal existence, and th.at the notes in suit were given
in pursuance of his agency, for goods pur~hased to be used in
the business ot the company.
A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment
ls to be rendered, or it is to be set aside and judgment rendered
for the defendants, according to the 01>inion of the Court upon
this case.

ics’ Company. The plaintiffs allege that they are thus liable,

because it appears that they subscribed certain articles consti-

Lfrermorf., for the defendants.

tuting that company; that provision was made for the with-

drawal of persons from it; that the business of the company

Morrison, for the plaintiff.

was to be managed according to the vote of those present, and

that the second by-law provides that each subscriber shall

become a partner. These facts it is said render them liable to

the world as partners for the performance of the contracts

made by their agent, and constitute them actually partners
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among themselves.

It is said. on the other hand, that what was done amounted

merely to a proposition to form a partnership; that no money

was paid in, so as to cause them to be atfected by any eventual

proﬁt and loss; that no names were published to the world, as

those of the partners; that the defendants might have with-

drawn at any time, and that consequently they could not be

bound by the acts of the agent of the company. The question

raised by the case is. whether the defendants were actually

members of a partnership. ‘

There is of course an essential difference between a mere

proposition to form a partnership. and its actual constitution.

Persons may take a deep interest in the objects to be accom-

plished by the company; may make donations to aid its prog-

ress; or may sign their names to subscription papers for the

same end, without being liable for debts which other persons

may contract in‘the prosecution of the same purpose. lint a

ditlicult question often arises. as to where the proposition to

make the contract ends. and the contract itself begins. In

Bournc -vs. 1-'rcctli, 9 B. & C. 63:2, 17 Eng. Com. Law 285 a

,~.: ~7 77,?“ — _h —’ >

Gn.cnmsT, J. The question before the Court is, whether the
defendants are liable as partners of the Farmers and :Mechanics' Vompany. The plaintiffs allege that they are thus liable,
becamw it appears that they subscribed certain articles consti·
tuting that company; that provision was made for the with·
drawal of persons from it; that the business of the company
was to be managed lH'('Ording to the vote of those present, and
that the st>eond by-law provides that each subscriber shall
become a partner. 1'hese facts it is said render them liable to
the world as partners for the pcr·formance of the contracts
made by their agent, and constitute them actually partners
among themselves.
It is said. on th<' other hand, that what was done amounted
merely to a proposition to form a part1wri,;hip; that no money
was paid in, s6 as to cause them to be atl'Pl'ted by any eventual
profit and loss; that no names were pnuli8he<l to the world, ns
those of the partneri;;;. that the <lef<>udants might have with·
dr.nvn at any time~ nnd that conse<pwntly they could not be
bound by the aets of the agent of thc> company. The question
rais<'d hv
. the case is. whether the defendants were uctuallv
members of a partnership.
'
There is of course an e~sential dilTerence between a mere
proposition to form a pill'tnership. and its a ctual constitution.
Pel'f!ons may take a 1)e('p interest in the objects to bt• a1·1·om·
plished by tlw comp:my; ma;r mnkP donations to aid itfol progress; or may sign tht•ir nanws to suhsc1·iption papers for the
same end, without lwing- liable for dt•lits which other J>r•rsons
may contract in. thl' pro:oiecution of th(.~ f-lame purpose. But a
difficult question ~ftPn :irisPs, as to w1wre the propm~ition to
make thE' contral't 1•111ls. and thP c·nnt rad itself lwgins. In
Bour11c vs. Prccfh, 9 B. & C. 6:~:!, 17 Eng. Com. Law 285 a

.
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ATKINS VS. HUNT.

Arxms vs. Iluxr. 51

51

prospectus was issued, stating the conditions upon which

the company was formed; that the concern was to be divided

into twenty shares, to be under the management of a com-

mittee, and ten per cent of the subscriptions to be paid in

by a certain date. It was held that this prospectus imported

only that a company was to be formed, and not that it

was actually formed, and that the signature to the pros-

pectus did not indicate to any person who should read it

that the singer had become a member of a company already

formed. So in a case where all the acts proved and relied

on were equally consistent with the supposition of an

,r
intention on the part of "the defendant to become a part-

ner in a trade or business to be afterward carried on, pro-

vided certain things were done, as with that of an existing

partnership, it was held that he was not a partner: Dickinson

vs. Valpg/, 10 B. & C. 128, 21 Eng. Com. Law 63, per PARKE, J.

And where a prospectus for a company was issued, to be con-

ducted pursuant to the terms of a deed to be drawn up, it was

held that an application for shares, and payment of the ﬁrst
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deposit, did not constitute one a partner who had not other-

wise interfered in the concern: F040 vs. Clifton, 6 Bing. 776,

19 Eng. Com. Law, 347. It was an important element in

that decision, that the deed was not executed by the defend-

ant who was sought to be charged as a partner. In

Howell vs. Brodie, 6 Bing. N. C. 44, 37 Eng. Com. Law

272, the defendant from 1829 until 1833 advanced various

sums, with a view to a partnership in a market about

to be erected; knew that-the money was applied toward the

erection, and was consulted in every stage. In October, 1833,

it was settled by a written agreement that he should have a

seventh share of it; but it was held that he was not liable as a

partner until October, 1833, although proﬁts had been made

but not accounted for to him before that time. Lord C. J.

TINDAL mentions the fact that no account of proﬁts was ren-

dered previous to October, 1833, as being in favor of the

defendant. ."

These cases suﬁiciently illustrate and authorize the general

position taken by the defendants, that a mere agreeuu-nt to

constitute a partnership in futuro does not make the contract-

ing parties liable as partners. A partnership is a contract,

imposing certain liablities upon its incmbers. \Vhetl|er par-

X
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prospectus ·was issued, stating th1~ eonditions upon which
the company was formed; that the concern was to be divided
into twenty shares, to be under the management of a committee, and ten per cent of the subscriptions to be paid in
by a certain date. It was held that this prospectus imported
only tba!: a company was to be fornK•d, and not that it
was actually formed, and that the signature to the prospectus did not indicate to any person who should read it
·that the svfa.er bad become a nwmber of a company alread.v
formed. So in a case where all the acts pron>d and relied
on were equally consistent with the suppoi~dtion of an
intention on the part af the defendant to l><'l'ome a partner in a trade or business to be afterward carried on, provided certain things were done, as with that of an existin~
partnership, it was held that he was not a partnC'r: llickinsmi
vs. l'alpy, 10 B. & C. 128, 21 Eng. Com. Law fi3, per PAHKE, J.
And where a proNpeetus for a company was h~sued, to be conducted pursuant to the terms of n deed to be drawn up, it was
held that an application for shares, and payment of the first
deposit, did not constitute one a partner who had not otherwise interfered in the con<~t>rn: Po;c ts. Clifton, 6 lling. 77(),
19 Eng. Com. fatw. 347. It was an importnnt eh•ment in
that decision, that the deed was not cxecuh.•d by the defendant who was sought to be charged as a partner. In
Howell vs. Brodie, G Bing. N. C. 44, 37 Eng. Com. Law
272, the defendant from 182!) until 183:J advanced various
sumR, with a view to a pnrtnership in a markt•t about
to be erected; knew that ·the money was appJif'd toward Ow
erection, and was commltl>d in <>n~r.v stage. In Odnber, lS:Ja.
it was settled by a written agret•nwnt that he should have a
seventh share of it; but it wns held that he was not liable as a
partner until October, 1833. ~Hhough profits had he<~n mnde
but not accounted for to him before thnt time. Lord C. .J.
TINDAL mentions tlw fact thnt no account of profit~ wm~ 1·endered previous to Oetober, 18:13, as being in fa rnr of the
defendant.
ThPse cases Emfficiently illustrate and authorize th<' genPral
position taken by the defendants, that a m~re ngrP<'llll'JJt to
constitute a pnrtnf'r1-1hip in f11t11ro dews not fn:lke th<> eontmcting parties liable as partnc>rs. A pnrtiu•rship is a contract,
imposing certain linblitit>s npon its membe1·s. \Vhetlwr par-
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ties have agreed that they will at some future time enter into

such'a contract, is a very different question from the one

whether the_v have actually entered into the contract. But we

are not called upon to make a critical examination of the

numerous cases on the subjeet_of partnership which fall within

one or the other of these categories, further than to recognize

their division into the two classes referred to. Our opinion is

that the defendants are clearly liable as partners, for the acts

of Cummings. There was an association doing business under

a certain name. The defendants signed the articles which con-

stituted this association. the defendants were subscribers, and

a by-law provided that each subscriber should become a part-

ner. The business of the company was to be done in pursu-

ance of a major vote of those present, and an agent was

appointed, who purchased goods for the use of the company.

Here, then, there was not simply an agreement that a partner-

ship should be formed a_t some future day, but an actual exist-

ing reality. a subscription to articles, making a present associa-
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tion, and a by-law designating the subscribers as partners. A

right to participate in the proﬁts of a joint concern is one of the

tests of a partnership, where a party has fulﬁlled all the con-

ditions incumbent on him to perform: Fox vs. Clifton, 6 Bing.

776, 19 Eng. Com. Law 233; s. c., 9 Bing. 115, 23 Eng. Com. Law

273, per T|.\'n.u., C. J. The defendants do not appear to have

failed in this regard, and upon this case they would certainly

be entitled to a share in the proﬁts of the business. It is not

necessary that persons should hold themselves out to the world

as partners, in order to become liable in that capacity. That is

only one mode of charging them, and when that is done it dis-

penses with the ne('essit_v of proving that they actually signed

the articles of partnership. In this case, as the defendants

were partners in fact. the opinion of the Court is that there

should be judgment on the verdict.

Nora: As to contemplated partnerships, see Mechem's Elem. of Part.n.,

§ § 13-14, and cases there cited. '

As to when the contract takes effect, see Id. § 34 and cases cited: also

Karrick vs. Stevens, post, p. 55; Chester vs. Dickerson, ante p. 20.

See also Jacobs vs. Shorey, post p. —.

ties have agret>d that tht•_y will at some future time enter into
such· a contract, is a ,·e1·y different question from the one
whether the,v have actually ente1·ed into the contract. But we
are nOt call(•d upon to make a critieal t•xamination of the
numerous cases on the subject.of partnership which fall within
one or the other of these categories, further than to recognize
their dh·ision into the two classes referred to. Our opinion is
that the defE>nrlants are clearly liable as partners, for the acts
of Cummings. There was an association doing business under
a certain name. '!'he defendants signed the articles which constituted this association. the defendants were subscribers, and
a by-law providt'd that each subscriber should become a partner. The business of the company was to be done in pursuance of a major Yote of those present, and an agent was
appointed, who purt·hased goods for the use of the company.
Here1 then, there wns not simply an agreement tlrnt a partneri;;hip should he formC'd ~t some future day, but an actual existing realit~·. a subscription to articles, making a pr<.>sent association, and a b;v-law designating the subscribers as partners. A
right to participate in the profits of a joint concern is one of the
tests of a pm1nership, where a party bas fulfilled all tile conditions incnmb('nt on him to perform: Fo~ vs. Clifton, 6 Bing.
776, 19 Eng. Corn. I~aw 233; s. c., 9 Bing. 115, 23 Eng. Com. Law
:t73, per T1.:\'n.u., C. J. The defendants do _not app<.>.ar to have
failed in tbi8 r<.>gard, and upon this case they would certainly
be entitled to a share in the profits of the business. It is not
necessary that per~wns should hold tlwmselves out to the world
as partrn•rs, in order to b<>('ome liable in that capacity. That is
only onP mode of charging them, and when that is done it dispenses with the neeessity of proving that th<>y actually sign<.>d
the articlE>s of partnership. Jn this case, as the d<>fendants
were partnel's in faet, the opinion of the Court is that there
should be judgment on the rcrdict.
NoTE: As to contemplated partnerehipR, eee Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
§ § 13-14, and cases there cited.
·

As to when the contract takes effect, see Id.§ 34 and cases cited: alao
Kerrick ve. Stevens, pnst, p. 55; Chester vs. Dickerson, ante p. 20.
See also Jacobs :vs. Shorey, post p.-.
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SAILORS vs. NIXON-JONES PRINTING CO.

Appellate Court of Illinois, 1886.

I

' 20 Ill. App. 509.

Action by the Printing Company against Sailors, \"~Voodward

SAILORS vs.

NIXOX-.JO~ER

PHl~TI~G

: .l ....
>

CO.

and Guibout; to recover for printing done for the "Union Mer-

cantile A gency,” under which name it was alleged that defend-

Appellate Court of Illinois, 1886.

ants were partncrs. Each of defendants owned an interest in

certain books and business of a. commercial agency. and on

January 2, 1885, they agreed to unite their interests as a part-

'

20 Ill• .App. 50J}.

nership under the name of Union Mercantile Agency. It was

agreed, however, that for two years Sailors was to be relieved

from any participation in the business, and during that time he

was neither to share in the management nor in the proﬁts or

losses of the business. At the expiration of that time, he was

to take an active part. In May, 1885, Guibout ordered the

printing for which the action was brought. Guibout, in his

deposition, testiﬁed that he told the plaintiff when the order

was given that the ﬁrm consisted of himself, \\'oodward and

Sailors. He also testified that he told Sailors of the order and
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that the latter agreed to help pay. This Sailors denied. No

participation by Sailors in the business was shown. Judgment

for plaintiff, and Sailors appealed.

J. D. Hubbard, for appellant;

Flower, Remy cﬁ Gregory, for appellee.

Moium, J. The contract of January 2, 1895, between \\'ood-

ward and Guibout and appellant, did not constitute appellant

a partner in the business which \\'o0dward and Guibout were

to conduct in St. Louis. True, the word “partnership” is used

to designate the relation of the parties, but the whole agree-

ment shows plainly that Sailors was a joint owner merelv,

and that the business was to be conducted wholly by the

others, and they were to have the entire proﬁts accruing, and

bear all losses that might happen in running the business, till,

at the end of two years, Sailors was to come into a partici-

pation of the business, and thereafter share the proﬁts and

Action by the Prfoting Company against Sailors, Woodward
nnd Guibout; to recover for printing done for the "Cnion .l\lercantile Agency," under which name it was alleged that defendants were partners. Each of defendants owned an inte1·est in
certain books and busi1w~s of a commercial agl·nc.r~ and on
Janunry 2, 1885, they agret>d to unite their interests as a partnerl'lhip under the name of rnion ~lercantile Agency. It was
. agreed, howe\·er, that for two years ~ail ors was to be relieved
from any partieipation in the business, and during that time he
was neither to shm·e in the managemE'nt nor in the profits or
losses of the busilwss. At the expiration of that time, he was
to take an aetive part. In ~fa.v, 1885, Uuibout ordned the
printing for whieh the action was brought. Guibout, in his
deposition, h•stified that he told the plaintiff when the order
was given that the firm eonsisted of himself, \\'oo<lward urn]
fiailors. He a hm tef'!titit•d that he told Hail ors of the order and
t!iat the latter agreed to help pay. 'rhis 8ailors denied. No
participation by Sailors in the business was shown. Judgment
for plaintiff, and Sailors appealed.

losses of the business that should be done. It was a contract

J. D . Hubbard, for appe11ant;
Floircr, Remy cf Gregory, for appellee.
Mo1u~, J. The contract of January::!, 1885, betwN•n "'oodward and Guibout and appt>llant, did not com;titute ap1wllant
a partner in the business whit-h Woodward and Guibout we1·e
to conduct in St. Louis. True, the word "partnership" is used
to designate the relation of thf' parties, but the whole agreement shows plainly that Sailors was a joint owner mere)~·.
and that the business was to be ronduded wholly by tlw
others, and they were to have the entire profits a<'cruing-, and
bear all losses that might happen in running the businesf'!, till,
at the end of two ye~rs, Sailors was to come into a participation of the business, and thereafter share the profits and
loHes of the business that should be done. It was a <'ontract

5t Cssss on’ PARTNERSHIP.

CASBS ON PARTNEKSHIP.
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which bound appellant to become a partner at the end of

two years, but such contract would not make him- liable for

debts contracted before his relation as partner commenced.

The agreement is very explicit that he shall not share the

proﬁts nor be liable for the losses. He retained only his one-

third ownership in the books and good-will of the business,

and had no control over its management and no right beyond

seeing to the preservation of the property. The fact that the

parties to such relation themselves call it a partnership will

not make it so. ¥Vhere the question~of partnership is to be

determined from a contract between the parties to it, the rela-

tion must be found from the terms and provisions of the con-

tract, and even though parties intend to become partners, yet

if they so frame the terms and provisions of their contract as

to leave them without any com-munity of interest in the busi-

ness or proﬁts, they are not partners either in fact or in law:

Parsons on Partnership, 91. A partnership inter se must result

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

from the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract,

and they cannot be made to assume toward each other a rela-

tion which they have expressly contracted not to assume. The

terms of the agreement, where there is one, ﬂx the real status

of the parties toward each other.

If there is no agreement, then if they deal with each other

as partners, sharing losses and proﬁts, their interest will be

gathered from their acts, and they will be partners inter se.

Gollyer on Partnership, § 2 and note. A mere community

of interest in property will not make the owners partners.

There must be an agreement for a joint v "ture and to share

proﬁts and losses; and in the absence of such a. mutual agree-

ment they are mere tenants in common of the property and

the act of one will not bind the other: Chase vs. Barrett, 4

Paige (N. Y.) 148; Niehoﬂ‘ vs. Dudley, 40 Ill. 406; Smith vs.

K-night, 71 Ill. 149, 22 Am. Rep. 94. 7

As the contract did not make appellant a partner, he could

only be held on the ground that he had held himself out as

one, or authorized or assented to his being so held out. Nixon

says that he knew appellant was a partner when the books

were ordered, but he does not state how he knew it, and it may

well be inferred that he only knew from what Guibout told

him at the time the books were ordered. The question

whether the appellant had been, with his consent, held out as

m.~ v “

whish bound appellant to become a partner at the end of
two year~, but such contract would not make him liable for
debts contracted before his relation as partner commenced.
'rhe agreement is very explicit that he shall not share the
profits nor be liable for the losses. He retained only his onethird ownership in the books and good-will of the business,
and had no control oYer its management and no right beyond
seeing to the preservation of the property. The fact that the
parties to such relation themselves call it a partnership will
not make it so. 'Where the question· of par·tnersbip is to be
· : determined from a contract between the parties to it, the rela·
~ , tion must be found from the terms and provisions of the ron( tract, and even though parties intend to become partners, yet
/ if they so frame the terms and provisions of their contract as
<to leave them without any community of interest in the busi. ness or profits, they are not partners either in fact or in Ia w:
Parsons on Partnership, 91. A partnership inter se must .ret)ult
from the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract,
and they cannot be made to assume toward each other a relation which they have expressly contracted not to assume. The
terms of the agreement, where there is one, fix the real status
of the parties toward each other.
If there is no agreement, then if they deal with each other
as partners, sharing losses and profits, their interest will be
gathered from their acts, and they will be partners inte1· se.
Collyer on Partnership, § 2 and note. A mere community
of interest in property will not make the owners partners.
There must be an agreement for a joint v -, tore and to share
profits and losses; and in the absence of such a mutual agreement they are mere tenants in common of the property and
the act of one will not bind the other: Chase vs. Barrett, 4
Paige (N. Y.) 148; Niehoff vs. Dudley, 40 Ill. 406; Smith vs.
·Knight, 71 Ill. 149, 22 Am. Rep. 94.
As the contract did n-0t make appellant a partner, he could
only be held on the ground that he had held himself out as
one, or authorized or assented to his being so held out. Nixon
says that he knew appellant was a partner when the books
were ordered, but be does not state how he knew it, and it may
well be inferred that he only knew from what Guibout told
him at the time the books were ordered. The question
whether the appellant bad been, with bis consent, held out as

Kmmlcx vs. STEVENS. 65

KERBICK VS. STEVENS.

65

a partner to the plaintiﬂ’, was one of fact for the jury; and it

was important that in determining that question the jury

should be Conﬁned to whatever competent testimony was

before them. The statement in Guibout’sdeposition that he told

Nixon that appellant wasone of the ﬁrm without proof that

appellant authorized the statement, wasincompetent, and in

view of all the evidence in the case was calculated to mislead

the jury. A party has a right to insist that irrelevant and

incompetent testimony shall be excluded. Incompetent testi-

mony in a deposition, though not objected to when the deposi-

tion is taken, may be objected to on the trial. The objection

is not as to mere form, it is substantial: Cooke vs. Ornc, 37 Ill.

186; Lockwood vs. Mills, 39 Ill. 602.

Nor did appellant lose his right to have the evidence

excluded by failing to object to it when read from the deposi-

tion. When incompetent testimony gets into the case in the

shape of depositions or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court,

when required, at any stage of the trial, to exclude it or direct

the jury to disregard it: Pittman vs. Gaty, 5 Gilm. 186; Gweenup

1:8. Stoker, 2 Gilm. 688; Wickenakamp vs. Wickenkamp, 77 Ill. 92.
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The refusal of the Court to exclude the evidence on appel-

lant’s motion was material error, and, while we are much

inclined to the opinion that there was no legal evidence before

the jury to support a verdict that appellant was jointly liable,

still we prefer to rest the reversal on the error above speciﬁed,

and remand the case for such further action as the parties may

desire to take. ’

Reversed and remanded.

Non: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 41. /
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KERRICK vs. STEVENS. %*l9A/ .

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884. -

55 Mich. 167; 20 N. W. Rep. 888.

Action by Kerrick against Stevens, Riches and McCormick,

of whom Stevens alone defended.

Judgment below for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

a partner to the plaintiff, was one of fact for the jury; and it
was important that in determining that question the jm·y
should be confined to whatever competent testimony was
before them. The statement in Guibout'sdeposition that he told
·Nixon that appellant was .one of the firm without proof that
appellant authorized the statement, was incompetent, and in
view of all the evidence in the case was calculated to mislead
the jury. A party has a right to insist that irrelevant and
incompetent testimony shall be excluded. Incompetent testimony in a deposition, though not objected to when the deposition is taken, may be objected to on the trial. The objection
is not as to mere form, it is substantial: Cooke vs. Orne, 37 Ill.
186; Lockwood vs. Mills, 39 Ill. 602.
Nor did appellant lose bis right to have the evidence
excluded by failing to object to it when read from the deposition. When incompetent testimony gets into the case in the
shape of depositions or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court,
when required, at any stage of the trial~ to exclude it or direct
the jury to disregard it: Pittman vs. Gaty, 5 Gilm. 186; Green rtp
vs. Stoker, 2 Gilm. 688; Wickenkamp vs. Wickenlwmp, 77 Ill. U:!.
The refusal of the Court to exclude the evidence on appellant's motion was material error, and, while we are much
inclined to the opinion that there was no legal eyidence before
the jury to support a verdict that appellant was jointly liable,
still we prefer to rest the reversal on the error above specified,
and remand the case for such further action as the parties may
'" desire to take.
'
Reversed and remanded.

The opinion states the facts.

\

NOT&: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 41.
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KERRICK vs. S'fEVENS.
Supreme Oourt of Michigan, 1884.
IS5 Mich. 167; 20 N. W. Rep. 888.

Action by Kerrick against Stevens, Riches and McCormick,
of whom Stevens alone defended.
Judgment below for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. ·
The opinion states the facts.

56 Oxsss on PARTNERSHIP.

66

CASES O:N PARTNERSHIP.

N. O. Griswold, for plaintiff.

T. R. Shields and J. C.‘Shields, for defendants.

N. 0. Grisrcold, for plaintiff.

CAMPBELL, J. Defendants were sued as partners for a debt

incurred by the ﬁrm for machinery furnished by plaintiff for

T. R. Shields and J. 0. · Shi~lds, for defendants.

a factory in Hastings. Minnesota. Under the charge of the

court below a verdict was rendered for defendants, which

depended on a denial of the existence of any partnership

liability against Stevens. On the ﬁrst of March, 1882, the

defendants entered into articles which recited the ownership

by Riches of a patent for folding ladders, in which he agreed

to give the others each one-third interest in Minnesota. Stevens

agreed to furnish $5,000 for the purpose of putting up a fac-

tory in Hastings, and buying machinery and material. and was

not to do any work in the factory unless he chose. Riches was

to assist in putting up and setting in order the factory and

machinery, and McCormick to attend to sales and manufac-

ture. VVhen the factory was completed they were all to be

equal partners. As soon as this was signed the parties began

operations, and bought machinery and property for the pur-

pose of the manufacture, and Riches moved to Hastings from

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Michigan for that object. In the latter part of May, or early

in June, Stevens went there, and spent some weeks, as it is

claimed, in looking after the business. He did not furnish

the full amount which he agreed to.

The notes in suit were given for machinery purchased for

the business and put up in the factory, which wasnearly ready

for use. There was testimony that during his visit at Hastings

Stevens was introduced as at partner, said he was a partner,

and acted as a_partner, going twice with one of the witnesses

to St. Paul to purchase property which was in Hastings, as

a site for the factory, and requested the same witness to keep

an eye on the operations of the other partners and report to

him. In October, 1882. being written to on behalf of plaintiff

for payment of this claim, he wrote back a letter treating the

matter as a liability of the partnership, urging plaintiff to take

back the machinery, and promising to arrange the balance sat-

isfactorily. Evidence was also given that Stevens, on the

thirty-ﬁrst day of July, 1882, sent out various notices that he

would not be liable for any future debts. Defendant was

allowed to introduce some talk after the contract was

J. Defendants were sued aR partners for a debt
incurred by the firm for machinery furniMhed by plaintiff for
a factory in Hastings, Minnesota. Under the charge of th~
court below a verdict was rendPJ'('d for defendants, which
depended on a denial of t11e existPn(·e of any partnership
liability against Stevens. On the first of }larch, 1882, the
defendants entered into artidPs whieh rt•cited the ownership
by Riches of a patent for folding lnddt'rs, in whil·h he agrPed
to give the otherR t'ach one-third interest in Minnesota. Stevens
agreed to furnish f:l,000 for the purpose of puttin~ up n factory in HaRtings~ and bu;ring ma('hin<>ry and material. and was
not to do any work in the factory unl(>RS he chose. Hkhes was
to assist in putting 11}) and SPtting in oraer the factory an<l
machine1·y, and l\IcCormkk to attend to sales and manufacture. 'Vhen the factory was compl(•tt'd the.v were all to be
equal partners. As soon as this was signed the parties began
operations, and bought machinery and property for the purpose of the manufacture, and Riches mo,·cd to Hastings from
Michigan for that object. In the latter part of May, or early
iu June, Stevens went ther<>, and spent some weeks, as it is
claimed, in looking after the business. He did not furnish
the full amount which he agrePd to.
The n-0tes in suit were givPn for mn<'hinery purchased for
the business and put up in the factory, which was.nearly ready
for use. There was testimony that during his visit at Hastings
Stevens was introduced as a pm·tner, said he was a partner,
and acted as a.. partner, going twice with one of the witnesses
to St. Paul .to purchase pro1~rty whlch was in Hastings, as
a site for the factory, and requested the same witness to keep
an eye on the operations of the other partners and report to
him. In Octobl'r, 1882, being written to on behalf of plaintiff
·for payment qf this claim, he wrote back a Jetter treating the
matter as a liability of the partnership, urging plaintiff to take
back the machinery, and promising to arrange the balance satisfactorily. Evidence was also given that Stevens, on thP
thirty-first day of July, 1882, sent out various notices that he
would not be liable for any future debts. Defendant was
allowed to introduce some talk after the contract was
CAMPBEI.J,,
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executed, to the effect that the partnership was not to com-
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mence until after the factory was ﬁnished. But it was not

claimed that this was for the purpose of changing the agree-

ment. but only to construe it; and Mrs. Stevens spoke of this

as being said both before and after, on the same day.

There are several questions raised on the charges, but one

is suﬁicient to decide the case. The court charged that the

written contract did not make the parties partners, but only

provided for a future partnership after the factory should

be put in operation. YVe think it created a partnership from

the beginning. 'It contemplated action to be taken at once

and continuously for the joint beneﬁt.‘ Stevens was to fur-

nish the money in advance, and Riches was to give his time

and attention to putting up the factory and machinery. These

were the capital of the firm to enable it to get into prosperous

operation. It would be an anomaly to have capital paid in

and expended without any partnership existing, and without

any provision for future emergencies or failures. The purpose

must be derived from the nature of the agreement, and not

I from the technical meaning of words as present or future,
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standing alone. It was quite proper to use future words as

to the interest to be owned in future property, but this will

not do away with the necessary inference to be drawn from

the immediate action of parties and expenditure of time and

money in such a way as to be practically lost in case of there

being no partnership carried out. \Ve- think the partnership

began at once.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.

The other justices concurred.

N own: Compare with preceding cases. /

DURYEA vs. YVHITCOMB.

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1858.

31 Vt. 395.

This was an action at law brought by A. & W. E. Duryea

/

0

against Whitcomb, to recover what plaintiffs claimed to be

their share of a joint enterprise entered into by plaintiffs,

8

executed, to the effect that the partnership was not to commence until after the factory was finished. But it was not
claimed that this was for the purpose of changing the agreement, but only to construe it; and Mrs. Stevens spoke of this
as being said both before and after, on the same day.
There are several questions raised on the charges, but one
is sufficient to decide the case. The court charged that the
written contract did not make the parties partners, but only
provided for a future partnership after the factory should
be put in operation. TI'e think it created a partnership from
the beginning. 1It contemplated action to be taken at once
and continuously for the joint benefit.. Stevens was to furnish the money in adYance, and Riches was to give his time
and attention to putting up the factory and machinery. These
were the capital of the firm to enable it to get into prosperous
operation. It would be an anomaly to have capital paid in
and expended without any partnership existing, and without
any p1·ovision for future emergencies or failures. The purpose
must he derived from the nature of the agreement, and not
1 from the technical meaning of words as present or future,
standing alone. It was quite proper to use future words as
to the interest to be owned in future property, but this will
not do away with the necessary inference to be drawn from
the immediate action of parties and expenditure of time and
money in suC"h a way as to be practically lost in case of there
being no partnership carried out. "'e. think the partnersh.ip
began at once.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
NO'D:: Compare with preceding Case9.

DURYEA vs. 'VHITCOMB.

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1858.
81 Vt. 895.

This waB an action at law brought by A. & W . E. Duryea
against Whitcomb, to recover what plaintiffs claimed to be
their share of a joint enterprise entered into by plaintiffs,
8
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defendant and one Lewis. Plaintiffs and Lewis resided in New

York city and Whitcomb in Vermont. The agreement was

that Whitcomb should, on the joint account, buy potatoes in

Vermont and New Hampshire, to be sent to New York and

other markets. Whitcomb was to have a ﬁxed price per bushel

for buying, and the net proﬁts were to be divided in accordance

with the contributions of the parties. The auditor who heard

the case found defendant indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of

$845.45. Defendant claimed that the arrangement constituted

a partnership, and that therefore the aifairs could not be

adjusted in this form of action. The auditor found that the

parties said nothing about partnership and that neither of the

parties supposed they were forming a partnership or intended

to form one. Defendant appealed.

' 0'. 0'. Dewey, and A. Underwood, for defendant.

A. M. Dickey and G. B. Leslie, for plaintiﬂs.

Anms, J. As this is a case where the rights’ of the partners

inter so merely are concerned, where no question as to third

persons is involved, the criterion to determine whether the

contract is one of partnership or not, must be, what did the

defendant and one Lewis. Plaintiffs and Lewis resided In New
York city and Whitcomb in Vermont. The agreement was
that Whitc<>mb should, on the joint account, buy potatoes in
Vermont and New Hampshire, to be sent to New Y<>rk and
other markets. \Vhikomb was to have a fixed price per bushel
for buying, and the net profits were to be divided in accordancP
with the contributions of the parties. The auditor who heard
the case found defendant indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of
is45.45. Defendant claimed that the arrangement constituted
a partnership, and that therefore the affairs could not be
adjusted in this form of action. The auditor found that the
parties said nothing about partnership and that neither of the
parties supposed they were forming a partnership or intended
to form one. Defendant appealed.
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parties intend by the contract which they made as between

themselves?

· O. C. Dewey, and A. Undencood, for defendant.

If we regard the agreement itself, as set forth in the audi-

tor’s report, it is clearly a partnership. The agreement was

A.. JI. Dickey and C. B. Leslie, for plaintiffs.

verbal, but by the ﬁnding of the auditor may be considered as

in writing at this time. Giving to the contract, as stated in

the report, the same construction that we should to articles in

writing of the same tenor, it appears to us to have every ingre-

dient of a partnership.

The parties all furnish a share of the capital, Whitcomb one-

half, Lewis one-quarter, the Durycas one-quarter. They jointly

own the property when purchased. It is purchased in order

to be sold again for their joint and mutual beneﬁt, thereby

negating the idea of separate control and disposition of their

interests in the property purchased, and of separate interests

in the proceed. Each is to share in the ﬁnal proﬁt or loss;

at the close of the season the proﬁts or losses are to be divided,

to Whitcomb one-half, to Lewis a quarter, to the plaintiffs a

quarter. Each is to aid in selling. and to contribute his aid,

skill, and knowledge to get the highest price.

J. As this is a case where the rights of the partners
inter se merely are concerned, where no question as to third
ALDIS,

persons is involved, the criterion to determine whether the
eontract is one of partnership or not, must be, what did the
, parties intend by the contract which they made as between
themselves?
If we regard the agreement itself, as set forth in the auditor's report, it is clearly a partnership. The agreement was
verbal, but by the finding of the auditor may be considered as
in writing at this time. Giving to the contract, as stated in
the report, the same construction that we should to articles in
writing of the same tenor, it appears to ns to have every ingredient
of a partnership.
l
The parties all furnish a share of the capital, Whitcomb onehalf, Lewis one-quarter, the Duryeas one-quarter. They jointly
own the property when purchased. It is purchased in order
to be sold again for their joint and mutual benefit, thereby
negating the idea of separate control and disposition of their
interests in the property purchased, and of separate interests
in the proceeds. Each is to share in the final profit or loss;
at the close of the season the profits or losses are to be divided,
to Whitcomb one-half, t<> Lewis a quarter, to the plaintiffs a
quarter. Each is to aid in selling. and to contribute his ~d,
~kill, and knowledge to get the highest price.

Y
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The case of Gwiﬂith vs. Buﬁum, 22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec.

64 (post, p.——), where the defendants were held to be partners

as between themselves, is not so strong to show a partnership

as this; for there the agreement to share in the losses seems

to have been implied, whilst here it is expressed.

The fact that each was to be accountable for his own sales,

amounts only to this, that each should sell for cash; if either

did not, he was to be accountable for his sale as cash. The

proceeds of the sales by each would belong to them jointly, not

severally. This provision is as consistent with an agreement

for a partnership as with any other: Noyes vs. C-ushman, 25

Vt. 390. So that Whitcomb was to have the control of the

potatoes, and to run them to the best market, taking the

advice of Lewis‘ and the Duryeas on the subject, is, when we

consider where the parties resided, where the potatoes were to

be bought, and to what markets they might be sent, and that

Whitcomb was to buy them, as consistent with a contract of

partnership as with any other. £-

I. This agreement does not belong to the class of cases

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

where the parties are jointly interested in certain proportions

in the property purchased, but not in the ﬁnal profits or losses;

where each of the part owners has the power of separate dis-

position of his interest. Such is the case of Coope vs. Eyre, 1

H. Bl. 37 (post, p. 64), a leading illustration of the class.

II. It is not of the class where a party receives a portion of

the proﬁts as a compensation for his labor as an agent or

servant. Each furnished a portion of the capital, each was at

part owner of the property when purchased, and of the pro-

eeeds when sold. Neither could be said to be the servant or

agent of the other. An -agent who receives a share of the

proﬁt as a compensation for his services, is not expected to

share in losses; if there are no proﬁts he loses his labor or

wages, but he loses no more, though there are further losses to

be borne by the partners.

Of this class is Kellogg vs. Griswold, 12 Vt. 291; and Mason

vs. Potter, 26 Vt. T 22.

III. Nor is it a case where a share of the gross or net earn-

ings is to be paid as a compensation for the use of capital, or

as rent; and where the party receiving such compensation has

no interests in the business, the property and the proceeds, but

only a right of action against the other parties. Here the

The case of Griffith vs. Buffum., 22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec.
6.J: (post, p.--), where the defendants were held to be partners
as between themselves, is not so strong to show a partnership
as this; for there the agreement to share in the losses seems
to have been implied, whilst here it is expressed.
The fact that each was to be accountable for his own sales,
amounts only to this, that each should sell for cash; if either
did not, he was to be accountable for his sale as cash. The
proceeds of the sales by each wou1d belong to them jointly, not
severally. This provision is as consistent with an agreement
for a partnership as with any other: Noyes vs. Cushman, 25
Vt. 390. So that "rhitcomb was to have the control of the
potatoes, and to run them to the best market, taking the
advice of Lewie· and the Duryeas on the subject, is, when we
consider where the parties resided, where the potatoes were to
be bought, and to what markets they might be sent, and that
Whitcomb was to buy them, as consistent with a contract Qf
partnership as with any other.
I. This agreement does not belong to the claBS of cases
where the parties are jointly interested in certain proportions
in the propertl purchased, but not in the final profits or losseg;
where each of the part owners has the power of separate disposition of his inteN'st. Such is the case of Coope vs. Eyre, l
H. Bl. 37 (post, p. 64), a leading illustration of the ~lass.
II. It is not of the class where a party receives a portion or
the profits as a compensation for bis labor as an agent 01·
servant. Each furnished a portion of the capital, each was a
part owner of the property when purchased, and of the proceeds when sold. ~either could be said to be the servant or
agent of the other. An ·agent who receives a share of thP
profits as a compensation for his services, is not expected to
share in losses; if there are no profits he loses his labor or
wages, but he loses no more, though there are further losses to
be borne by the partners.
Of this class is Kello,qg fi8. Gri.srrold, 12 Vt. 291; and Mason
f1B. Potter, 2fl Vt. i22.
III. Nor is it a ciuw where a share of the gross or net earnings is to be paid as a compensation for the use of capital, or
as rent; and where the party receiving such compensation bas
no interests in the business, the property and the proceeds, but
only a right of action against the other parties. Here the
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parties jointly contributed capital, labor, and skill, were joint

owners of the property from the time of its purchase till the

ﬁnal division of proﬁts or loss. No severance of their interests

could be had, no ascertainment of their respective shares or

interests could be made till a ﬁnal accounting. They must

have relied on the property and its proceed to secure to each

his ﬁnal share, no matter by whom the property might be sold,

or its proceeds held.

Hence the cases of Tobias vs. Blin, 21 Vt. 544; Bowman vs.

Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Ambler vs. Bradley, 6 Vt. 119, do not

apply. Of the same class are Denny rs. Cabot, 6 Met. (Mass)

92; Holmes vs. The Old Colony R. R. 00., 5 Gray (Mass.) 58;

Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, and various

other cases cited by counsel.

1t is said, however, that the auditor ﬁnds that the pa.rties did

not intend to form a partnership, and that such intention must

govern.

It is with contracts of partnership as with all other con-

tracts, that as between the parties to them their intention
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must govern. Hence an express stipulation in a contract that

the parties thereto shall not thereby become partners, is bind-

ing and of great signiﬁcance in giving construction to the

instrument, especially if the terms are doubtful or susceptible

of more than one meaning.

1. It is to be noted that in this case there was no such

express stipulation. The auditor's report says, “at the time

of the arrangement in New York, August 20, 1854, nothing

was said about a partnership, and neither of the parties at

that time supposed they were forming a partnership, or

intended to form a partnership.” As nothing was said about

a partnership, the parties could not have stipulated that their

contract should not create one.

2. The report states what was the arrangement of August

20, 1854. That was a contract for a partnership. If their con-

tract was for a partnership by necessary legal construction

(which we have found that it was), and they intended to- make

the contract (and this appears from the report), the legal eﬂ’ect

of their contract could not be varied by their not supposing it

to be what it was. The further statement in the report that

they did not intend to form a partnership seems inconsistent

with the other facts. One is at a loss to perceive how the

parties jointly contributed capital, labor, and skill, were joint
owners of the P.r operty from the time of its purchase till the
final division of profits or loss. No severance of their interests
icould be had, no ascertainment of their i·espectlve shares or
interests could be made till a final accounting. They must
have relied on the property and its proceeds to secure to each
his final share, no matter by whom the property might be sold,
or its proceeds held.
Hence the cases of Tobias 11s. Blin, 21 Vt. 544; Bowman -vs.
Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Ambler -rs. Bradley, 6 Vt. 119, do not
apply. Of the same class are Den1111 t·s. Cabot, 6 Met. (l\Iass.)
92; Holmes vs. The Old Colo1111 R. R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 58;
Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, and various
other cases cited by coµnsel.
It is said, however, that the auditor finds that the parties did
not intend to form a partnership, and that such intention must
gcvern.
It is with contracts of partnership as with all other contracts, that as between the parties to them their intention
must govern. Hence an express stipulation in a contract that
the parties thereto shall not thereby become partners, is binding and of great significance in giving construction to the
instrument, especially if the terms are doubtful or susceptible
of ltlore than one meaning.
1. It is to be noted that in this case there was no snch
expres!'I stipulation. The auditor's report says, "at the time
of the arrangement in New York, August 20, 1854, nothing
was said about a partnership, and neither of the parties at
that time supposed they were form!ng a partnership, or
intended to form a partnership." As nothing was said about
a partnership, the parties could not have stipulated that their
contract should not create one.
2. The report states what was the arrangement of August
20, 1854. That was a contract for a partnership. If their contract was for a partnership by necessary legal construction
(which we have found that it was), and they intended to make
the contract (and this appears from the report), the legal effect
of their contract oould not be varied by their not supposing it
to be what it was. The further statement in the report that
they did not intend to form a partnership seems inconsistent
with the other facts. One is at a loss to perceive how tht~
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auditor could discover such an intention when nothing was

GRACE
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SMITH.

said about a partnership, and when the contract, which they

made, was a partnership. Probably the fair construction of

the report is that the parties were not aware of the legal

extent and obligation of the contract into which they entered.

As the contract imports a partnership, we must hold, in the

absence of any express stipulation and of any other circum-

stances to show the contrary, that they intended to create the

relation which the contract expresses.

IV. The action is book account. The accounts presented

for adjustment are all partnership accounts. None of them

are properly chargeable on book. The case of Green vs. Chap-

man-, 27 Vt. 236, has settled the construction of the statute

of November 18, 1852, viz.: that where there are no items

properly chargeable on book, the action of book account will

not lie for the adjustment of other ite_ms proper for the action

of account. .

The result is that the judgment of the county court is

reversed and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover

his costs.
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Norm: See Mechem’s Elem. of Pa:-tn., § 43, as to the etfect of contracts.

See also Jacobs vs. Shorey, post, p. -—.
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(}R.~\(,‘-E vs. SMITI-I.

King's Bench, Easter Term, 1775.

auditor could discover such an intention when nothing was
snid about a partnership, and when the contract, which they
made, was a partnership. Probably the fair construction of
the report is that the parties were not aware of the legal
extent and obligatioq of the contract into which they entered. i.
As the contract imports a partnership, we must hold, in the )
absence of any exprPss stipulation and of an.Y other circum- '
E-tances to show the contrary, that they intended to create the
r·elation which the contract expresses.
IV. The action is book account. The accounts presented
for adjustment are all partnership accounts. None of t!iem
are properly chargeable on book. The ease of Green t:s. (!hapman, 27 Vt. 236, has settled the construction of the statute
of November 18, 185~, viz.: that where there ai·e no items
properly chargeable on book, the action of book account will
uot lie for the adjustment of other ite.ms proper for the action
of account..
'l'he result is that the judgment of the county court is
r<'versed and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover
his costs.

2 VVID. Bl. 998.

Assuursrr for goods sold and delivered. Motion for new

trial after a verdict for the defendant. '

NO'l's: See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., §
Bee also Jacobs vs. Shorey, po11t, p. - .

(3,

as to the e1fect of contracts.

This was an action brought against Smith alone as a secret

•

partner with one Robinson, to whom the goods were delivered,

and who became bankrupt in 1770. On the 30th of March,

I

1

i
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S. Of their Effect in C1·eating Partnership.

GR.\CE

YS.

~)IITH.

King's Bench, Easter 'l'crm, .1715.
2 Wm. Bl. O!l8.

AssuMPSIT for goocls soJd and delin•red. ~lotion for new
trial after a wrdict fo1· the defC'ndant.
This was an action brought against ~mith nlone afol a st>eret
partner with one Robinson, to whom the goods wl:'re ch•lin•1·pd,
and who became bankrupt in 1770. On the :mth of March,
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1767, Smith and Robinson entered into partnership for seven
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years, but in the November afterward, some disputes arising,

they agreed to dissolve the partnership. The articles were

not cancelled, but the dissolution was open and notorious, and

was notiﬁed to the public on the 17th of November. 1767. The

terms of the dissolution were that all the stock in trade and

debts due to the partnership should be carried to the account

of Robinson only. Sm-ith was to have back £4,200 which he

brought into the trade, and £1,000 for the proﬁts then accrued

since the commencement of the partnership; that Smith was to

lend Robinson £4,000, part of this £5,200, or let it remain in

his hands for seven years at ﬁve per cent interest, and an

annuity of £300 per annum, for the same seven years. For

all which Robinson gave bond to Smith. In June, 1768, Rob-

inson advanced to Smith £600 for two years’ payment of the

annuity and other sums by way of interest, and gratuities, and

other large sums at different times, to enable him to pay the

partnership debts, Smith having agreed to receive all that

was due to the partnership, and to pay its debts, but at the

hazard of Robinson. On the 1st of August, 1768, the demands
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of Smith were all liquidated and consolidated into one, viz.,

£5,200 due to hin1- on the dissolution of the partnership, £1,500

for the remaining ﬁve years,of the annuity, and £300 for

Smith’s share of a ship; in all £7,000, for which Robinson gave

a bond to Smith. On the 22d of August, 1769, an assignment

was made of all Robinson‘s effects to secure the balance then

due to Smith, which was stated to be £10,000. Soon after the

commission was awarded. ._.

Davy, for the plaintiﬂ’, insisted that the agreement between Robinson

and Smith was either a secret continuance of the old partnership, or asecreta

commencement of a new one, being for the retiring partner to leave his money

in the visible partner’s hands, in order to carry on his trade, and no receive

for it twelve and a half per cent proﬁt, which could not be fairly done unless

it be understood to arise from the proﬁts of the trade; and that he ought

therefore to be considered as a secret partner. And he relied much on the case

of Bloxham do Fourdrinier against Pell & Brooke, tried at the same sittings

(7th of March, 1775) before Lord MANSFIELD in the King’s Bench, as in point.

“ This was also a partnership for seven years between Brooke &: Pell; but

at the end of one year agreed to be dissolved, but; no express dissolution

was had. The agreement recited that Brooke being desirous to have

1767, Smith and Robinson entered into partn<>1·ship for seven
years, but in the November afterward, some disputf':. arising,
they agreed to dissolve the partnership. The articles were
not cancelled, but the di1n~olution was open and notorious, and
was notified to the public on th<' 17th of Nonmb<•r. l7G7. The
terms of the dissolution were that all the stock in trade and
debts due to the partnership Should be <'lll'l'ied to the Ht'C'OUnt
of Robinson only. Smith was to have back £4,200 which he
brougllt into the trade1 and £1,000 for tlw profitl'I tlwn accruf'<l
since the commencement of the partnership; that Rmitb was to
lend Robinson £4,000, part of this £5,200, 01· Jet it remain in
his hands for seven years at five per cc>nt interest, and an
annuity of £:JOO per annum, for the same seven years. For
all which Robinson gave bond to Smith. In ,Tun<', 17f)8, Robinson advanced to Smith £600 for two years' payment of the
annuity and other sums by way of interest, and gratuiti~, and
other large sums at different times, to enable him to pay the
partnership debts, Smith having agreed to receive all that
wa.s due to the partnership, and to pay its debts, but at the
hazard of Robinson. On the 1st of August~ 1768, the demands
of Rmith were all liquidated and cons.olidated into one, viz.,
£5,200 due to him on the dissolution of the partnership, £1,500
for the remaining five ;rears., of the annuity, and £300 for
Smith's share of a ~hip; in all £7,000, for which Robinnon ga\'P
a bond to Hmith. On the :!2d of August, 1769, an assignment
was made of all Hobinson's Pffects to secure the balance then
due to Smith, which was i;1tated to be £10,000. Soon after the
commission was awarded.

the proﬁts of the trade to himself, and Pell being desirous to relinquish his

right to the trade and proﬁts, it was agreed that Brooke should give Pell

a bond for £2,-185. which Pell had brought into the trade, with interest at.

Dat'1J, for the plaintiff, insisted that the agreement between Robinson
and Smith was either a eecret continuance of the old partnership, or a secret
oommenoement of a new one, bf ing for the retiring partner to leave his money
in the visible partner's hands, in order to carry on hie trade, and to receive
for it twelve and a half per cent profit, which could not be fairly done unleSG
it be understood to arise from the profits of the trade; and that be ought
therefore to be considered as a secret partner. And he relied much on the case
of Bloxham & Fourdrinier against Pell & Brooke, tried at the same sittings
(7th of March,1775) before Lord MAl'fSl"IELD in the King's Bench, ae in point.
"Ibis was also a partnership for seven years between Brooke & Pell; but
at the end of one year agreed to be diesolved, but no express dissolution
was had. The agreement recited that Brooke being desirous to have
the profits of the trade to himself, and Pell beinl{ desirous to relinquish his
right to the trade and profi~, it was sgreed that Brooke should give Pell
a bond for £2,485, which Pell had brought into the trade, with interest at

GRACE vs. Siuru. 63
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ﬁve per cont, which was accordingly done. And it was further agreed

vs.
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that Brooke should pay to Pell £200 per annum for six years, if Brooke so

long lived, as in lieu of the proﬁts of the trade; and Brooke covenants that

Pell should have free liberty to inspect his books. Brooke became a bank-

rupt before anything was paid to Pell. And this action being brought for a

debt incurred by Brooke in the course of trade, Lord MANSFIELD held that

Pell was a secret partner. This was a device to make more than legal

interest of money, and it it was not a partnership it was a crime. And it

shall not lie in the defendant Pell’s mouth to say, ‘It. is usury and not

a partnership.’ ”

Grose and Adair, for the defendant, argued that the present case is very

distinguishable from that of Bloxham and Pell. Pell was to be paid out of

the proﬁts of the trade, as appears from the covenant to inspect the books,

which also would be useless. His annuity was expressly given, as and in lieu

of those proﬁts. It was contingent in another view, as it depended on the life

of Brooke, by whom those proﬁts were to be made. In our case the annuity

is certain, not casual; it does not depend on carrying on the trade, nor to

cease when that is left off, but is due out of the estate of Robinson. It is

not a necessary dilemma, that it must be either usury or partnership. It

may be, and probably was, a premium for the good will of the trade.
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Two thousand guineas i's no uncommon price for turning over the proﬁts

of s trade so beneﬁcial that it appears to have been rated at £1,000 to each

partner in the space of less than eight months. And whether that sum

is agreed to be paid at once, or by seven instalments, it is the same thing.

Besides, whether there be or be not a secret constructive partnership is a

question proper for a jury, who have here decided it on a consideration of

all the circumstances.

DE GREY, G. J. The only question is: VVl1at constitutes a

secret partner‘.' Every man who has a share of the proﬁts of

a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss. And if any

one takes part of the proﬁt he takes a part of that fund on

which the creditor of the trader relies for his payment. If any

flve per cent, which wu accordingly done. And it wu further agreed
that Brooke should pay to Pell £200 per annum for six years, if Brooke ao
· 1ong lived, as in lieu of the profits of the trade; and Brooke covenants that
Pell should have free liberty to inspect hie books. Brooke became a bankrupt before an7thing waa paid to Pell. And this action being brought for a
debt incurred by Brooke in the ooune or trade, Lord MANSFIELD held that.
Pell was a aeoret partDer. This was a device to make more than legal
intei;eet of money, and if it was not a partnership it \Vas a orime.. And it
shali not lie in the defendant Pell's mouth to say, 'It is usury and not
a partnership.' "
Grose and .Adair, for the defendant, argued that the present oase is very
distinguishable from that of Bloxham and Pell. Pell was to be paid out of
the profit.a of the trade, as appears from the covenant to inspect the books.
which else would be useleBB. His annuity was expreBSly given, as and in lieu
of those pro{lta. U waa contingent in another view, as it depended on the life
of Brooke, by whom those profits were to be made. In our case the annuity
is certain, not casual; it does not depend on carrying on the tradt, nor to
cease when that is left otf, but is due out of the estate of Robinson. It iJI
not a necessary dilemma, that it must be either usury or partnership. It
may be, and probably was, a premium for the good will or the trade.
Two thousand guineas is no uncommon price for turning over the profit.a
of a trade eo beneficial tbat it appears to have been rated at £1,000 to each
partner in the spaoe or less than eight months. And whether that sum
is agreed to be paid at once, or by seven instalments, it is the same thing.
· Beside&, whether there be or be not a seoret constructive partnership is a
question proper for a jury, who have here decided it on a oonsideration of
all the circumetanceL

one advances or lends money to a trader it is only lent on his

general personal security. It is no speciﬁc lien upon the proﬁts

of the trade, and yet the lender is generally interested in those

proﬁts; he relies on them for repayment. And there is no dif-

ferencewhether that money be lent de nova or left behind in trade

by one of the partners who retires. And whether the terms of

that loan be kind or harsh makes also no manner of difference.

I think the true criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed

to share the proﬁts of the trade with Robinson, or whether he

only relied on those proﬁts as a fund of payment; a distinction

not more nice than usually occurs in questions of trade or

usury. The jury have said that this is not payable out of the

proﬁts, and I think there is no foundation for granting a new

trial. ,

DF. GREY, C. J. The on1y question is: What constitutes n
secret partner? Every man who has a share of the profits oC'
a trade ought a]so to bear his share of the loss. And if uny ·
one takes part of the profit he takes a part of that fund on
whieh the creditor of the trader relies for his payment. If any
one advances or lends money to a trader it is onJy Jent on his
general persona] security. It is no specific Jien upon thf> profits
of the trade~ and yet the ]ender is genera1ly interested in those
profits; lie relies on them for rf>pnyment. And there is no dif- ·
ference wJwther that money be lent de novo or left behind in trade
by one of the partners who retires. And whetber the terms of
that lonn be kind or harsh makes a1so no manner of difference.
J think the true criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed
to share the profits of the trade with Hobinson~ or whether be
on1y relied on those profits as a fund of payment) a distinction
not more nice than nsual1y occurs in questions of trade or
usury. The jury have said that this is not payabte out of the
profits, and I think there is no foundation for granting a new
tria1.
•
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Govnn, J., same opinion.

BLACKSTONE, J., same opinion. I think the true criterion

(when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether

GouLD, J., same opinion.

the proﬁt or premium is certain and deﬁned, or casual, indeﬁ-

nite, and depending on the accidents of trade. In the former

case it is a. loan (whether usurious or not is not material to the

present question), in the latter a partnership. The hazard of

loss and proﬁt is not equal and reciprocal, if the lender can

receive only a limited sum for the proﬁts of his loan, and yet is

made liable to all the losses, all the debts contracted in the

trade, to any amount.

Nsnns, J., same opinion. Rule discharged. _

Norm: Compare with following cases. See also, Mechem's Elem. of

Partn., §§ 5, 6, et. seq.

’)

COOPE vs EYRE.

English Court of Common Pleas, 1778.

1 H. Bl. 37.

Action by Coope and others against Eyre, Atkinson. YVa1ton,

BLACKSTONE, J., same opinion. I think the true criterion
(when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether
the profit or premium is certain and defined, or casual, indefinite, and depending on the accidents of trade. In the forme1·
case it is a loan (whether usurious or not is not material to the
present question), in the latte~ a partner&hip. The hazard of
loss and profit is not equal and reciprocal, if the lender can
receive only a limited sum for the profits of his loan, and yet is
made liable to all the losses, all the debts contrncted in the
trade, to an.v amount.
NARES, J., same opinion. Rule discharged.

Hattersley, Stephens, and Pugh, to recover the purchase price
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for a shipload of oil, purchased in the name of Eyre & Co.

Eyre & Co., composed of Eyre, Atkinson 8: Walton, had become

NOTm: Compare with following cases. See alao, Meohem's Elem. of
Partn., §§ 5, 6, et. seq.

bankrupt, and did not defend, so that the real defendants were

Hattersley & Co. (Stephens) and Pugh & Co. (Pngh’s son).

These defendants contended that the contract of sale was

made by the plaintiffs with Eyre & Co. only, and that the con-

tract between these defendants and Eyre 8: Co. was not such

as to create a pirtnersliip. Verdict for defendants under

COOPE vs EYRE.

direction of the court (Lord Louonnonouon), and motion made

for a new trial on the ground of misdirection.

Adair, for the motion.

English Court of Common Pleas, 1"/';8.

Bond and Le Blane, contra.

1 H. Bl. 37.

Gouno, J. The facts of the present case are shortly these:

The defendants and Eyre & Co. order one Garforth, a broker,

{J buy quantities of oil. The defendants, Hattersley & Co.

Action by Coope and others against Eyre, Atkinson, Walton,
Hattersley, Stephens, and Pugh, to r('cover the purC'hase prl<'e
fot• a shipload of oil, purchased in the name of EyrC' & Co.
Eyre & Co., composed of Eyre, Atkinson & \Yalton, had become
bankrupt, and did not defend, so that the real defendants were
Hattersley & Co. (Stephens) and Pugh & Co. (Pugh's son).
These defendants contended that the conh."act of sale waii ·
made by the plaintiffs with Eyre & Co. only, :~nd that the contract between these defendants and Eyre & Co. was not such
as to create a :'l.rtnership. Verdkt for defendant~ under
direction of the court (Lord I~ouGHBOROUGH), and motion made
for a new trial on the ground of misdil'ection.
Adair, for the motion.

Bond and Le Blanc, contra.
GouLD, J. The facts of thC' present case are sl10rtly these:
rrhe defendants and Eyre & Co. order one Garforth, a br·oker,
L buy quantities of oil. The defendants, Hattersley & Co.

\

CooPE
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i.

Coors vs. Eras. 65

and Pugh & Co., were to have for their respective shares each

one-fourth. The broker buys divers shiploads; and to some of

the vendors, the defendants during the treaty declare it to be

a com-mon concern between them and Eyre & Co., in whose

name the purchases were made. But with respect to the plaint-

iff’s, the purchase was made singly in the name of Eyre & Co.,

without any notiﬁcation that the defendants had any concern

in it. These purchases were made on speculation, there being

a prospect that oil would rise in price; but it afterwards fell,

and then the defendants contend that they are not liable to

make good the diﬁerence, Eyre & Co. having failed. .

Upon these facts, two questions arise: 1st. Whether the

defendants are partners with Eyre & 00.? 2d. If not, whether

they are to be deemed joint contractors in the purchase for

Eyre & Co. and so liable for the whole?

As to the ﬁrst, I think they cannot be considered as partners

with Eyre & Co. in this purchase from the plaintiffs. Although
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there may be partnerships in many other instances besides

what are merely commercial, as in the case of farms rented

by several persons jointly, and of partnerships of attorneys,

and the like. yet I think the true criterion is as stated_ by Mr.

Justice B1..u'1<s'ro.\'i=:, in the case of Grace rs. Smith (ante, p. 61)

“whether they are concerned in proﬁt and loss," and the same

doctrine is in effect held by Chief Justice DE GREY, _in that

case. This is strongly illustrated by Blo.ra»m- vs. Pell, which

was cited in (lrar-c rs. Smith. [Here follows a statement of

these two cases] It was held in both the cases that the

inequality of the concern as to proﬁt and loss was im-material

to those who dealt with them, however, it might be a regula-

tion between themselves. lhit in the present case there was

no communication between the buyers as to. proﬁt or loss.

Each party was to have a distinct share of the whole, the one

to have no interference with the share of the other, but each

to manage his share as he judged best. The proﬁt or loss of

the one might be more or less than that of the other. In this

light I am of the opinion there is no foundation for the court

to adjudge the present case a partnership; and the jury having

found for the defendants, there is no reason to disturb the ve1'~

dict. [The second question was also answered in the

negative]

HEATII, J., said, among other things: This is a. sub-con-

l

I

I

l

l

1

/

9

and llugh & Co.~ were to have for their respective shares each
one-fourth. The broker buys divers shiploads; and to some of
the vendors, the defendants during the treaty declare it to be
a common cont-ern between them and Ey1·e & Co., in whose
name the purchases were made. Hut with re~pect to the plaint, itf's, the purchase was made singly in the name of Ey1·e & Co.,
without any notification that the defendants had any concern
in it. These purchases were made on speculation, tl1ere being
a pr;>spect that oil would rise in price; but it afterwards fell,
and then the defendants contend that they are not liable to
make good the difference, Eyre & Co. having failed.
l7"pon tllese facts, two questions arh1c: 1st. 'Vhethe1· the
defendants are partners with Eyre & Co.? ~d. If not, whether
they are to be deemed joint contractors in the purchase for.
Eyre & Co. and so liable for the whole?
As to the first, I think they cannot be considered as partners
with Eyre & Co. in thit-1 purchase from tlw plaintiffs. Although
there may be partnPrships in many other int-1tances besides
what are rnprely commercial, as in the case of farms rented
by several [Wl"8ons jointly, and of partnerships of attorneys,
and the lik(\ ~·pt I think the true crih•riou is as stated. by Mr.
Justice TI1.A<'K~TO.'.\'t:, in the case of Grace rs. ffo1ith (ante, p. 61)
"wbetlwr tlu\V are eonef:>rned in profit and los~,·· and the same
doctrhw is iu elfrct lu•ld by Chief .lustice DE GnEY, _in that
ease. This is st1·ongl~· illustrated by R1o:ram vs. Pell, which
was died in <Jnrc·c rs. Rmith. [Here follows a statement of
these two e:u.1es.] It was held in both the Ntses that the
inequality of the c-oneern as to profit and 101-1s was immaterial
to those who dealt with th<'m, howe\'n, it mi~ht be a regulation between then1~ln•s. Bnt in the 111·ei-;ent case there was .,
~ n<> communication betwc•pn the buy<•rs as to profit or loss. 1
Each party was to han· a db1tinet slwre of 1he whol<>, the one
to have no interference with the ~dwre of the otlwr~ but each
to manage his share as he judgPd lwsl. 'fhc profit or loss of ,
the one might be more or less than tlrnt of the other. In this /
light I am of the opinion there is no foundation for the eourt
to adjudge the present case a partne1·ship; and the jury having
found for the defendants, tlwre is no rt>asou to disturb the verdict. ['fhe second qtie8tion was also answered in the
negative.]
HEATH, J., said, among o1hPr things:
This is a sub-con·
9
1

•
1

1
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tract—by a. sub-contract I mean a contract subordinate to

CASES ON PAltTN ERl:iHIP.

another contract made or intended to be made between the

contracting parties on one part, or some of them, and :1

stranger. Eyre & Co. are the only purchasers known to the

plaintiffs; entire credit was given to them alone; Pugh, Hat-

tersley and Stephens can be liable only in the event of a con-

cealed partnership, on this principle, “that the act of one part-

ner binds all his copartnersgn account of a communion of

proﬁt and ‘losq In truth the were not partners, inasmuch

as they were on y interested in the purchase of the commodity

and not in the subsequent disposition of it.

Lord Louonnonouon. The ﬁrst impression on my mind was

against the defendants, but in the course of the trial my opin-

ion changed, and I thought they were not liable as partners; I

still continue to think so, and consequently that the verdict

was proper.

This being an action on a contract of sale, the vendor can

have no remedy against any person with whom he has not con-

tracted, unless there be a partnership, in which case all the

partners are liable as one individual. It has been justly
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observed that a secret partnership can be no consideration to

the vendor, though for reasons of policy and general expedi-

ence the law is positive with respect to the secret partner that

when discovered he shall be liable to the whole extent. In

many parts of Europe, limited partnerships are admitted, pro-

vided they be entered on a register, but the law of England is

otherwise, the rule being that if a partner shares in advan-

tages he also shares in all disadvantages. In order to consti-

tute a partnership a communion of proﬁts and loss is essential.

The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary they

should be equal. If the parties be jointly concerned in the

purchase, they must also be jointly concerned in the future

sale, otherwise they are not partners. ' " " Here Eyre

was a mere speculat-or, and the other defendants were to share

in the purchase, but were not jointly interested in any sub-

sequent disposition of the property. Though they may by

other purchases ha.ve concluded themselves as to some par-

ticular vendors, yet in the transaction in question there was

not that communion between them necessary to make them

partners; their agreement was a sub-contract which, as my

Brother Hnyrn observed, may be executory; it was to share

__4

"

tract-by a sub-contract I meQ.n a contract subordinate to
another contra.ct made or intended to be made between the
contracting parties on one part, or some of them, and :1
stranger. Eyre & Co. are the only purchasers known to the
plaintiffs; entire credit was given to them alone; Pugh, Hattersley and Stephens can be liable only in the event of a concealed partnership, on this principle, "that the act of one part·
ner binds all his copartnersf'On account of a com~union of
profit and loel':l In truth th~ were not partners, masmuch
p they were Oiily interested in the purchase of the commo<lity
and not in the subsequent disposition of it.
Lord LouoHBonouou. The first impression on my mind was
against the defendants, but in the course of the trial my opinion changed, and I thought they were not liable as partners; I
still continue to think so, and consequently that the verdict
was proper.
This being an action on a contract of sale, tlle vendor can
have no remedy against any person with whom be bas not con·
tre.cted, unless there be a partnership,
which case all the
partners are liable as one individual. It has been justly
ob~rved that a secret partnership can be no consideration to
the vendor, though for reasons of policy and general expedi·
ence the law is poeitive with respect to the secret partner that
when discovered he sha.11 be liable to the whole extent. In
many parts of Europe, limited partnerships a.re admitted, provided they be entered on a register, but the law of England is
otherwise, the rule being that if a partner shares in advnn·
tages he also shares in all disndvantages. In order to constitute a partnership a communion of profits and Joss is essential.
The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary they
should be equal. If the parties be jointly concerned in the
purchase, they must also be jointly con<>erned in the future
snle, otherwise• thf'y are not partners. • • * Here Eyre
was a mere speculator, and the other def PtHlants were to share
in the purchase, but were not jointly interest<id in any subsequent disposition of the property. Though they may by
other purchases have concluded thems(•ln~ as to some par·
ticular vendors, yet in the transaction in question there was
not that communion between them necessary to make them ·
partners; their agreement was a sub-contract which, as my
Brother HEATH observed, muy be executory; it was to share

in

Wauon vs. Canvas. 67

WAUGH VS. CARVER.

in a purchase to be made. The seller looked to no other

61

security but Eyre & Co.; to them the credit was given, and

they only were liable.

in a purchase to be made. The seller looked to no other
security but Eyre & Co.; to them the credit was given, and
they only were liable.
\VILSON, J., dissented.
New trial denied.

\ViLsoN, J., dissented.

New trial denied.

/

VVAUGH vs. CARVER.

English Court of Common Pleas, 1793.

2 ll. Bl. 235. -

Assumpsit by Waugh against Erasmus Carver, William Car-

ver and Archibald Giesler, as partners. It appeared that the

If

two Carvers‘ were in business at Gosport, and Giesler at

Plymouth as shipping agents. On February 24, 1790, these

/

parties entered into a written agreement which provided that

Giesler should remove to Cowes, and that thereafter the two

WAUGH vs. CARVER.

concerns should cooperate in the transaction of the ship agency

buiness. In consideration of the Carvers’ recommendation and

assistance to support the house at Cowes Giesler was to allow

the Carvers a moiety of the commission on ships putting into

English Oourt of Oom.mon Pleas, 1793.

that port, or remaining in the road to the westward, addressed

9 II. Bl.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to him, and a moiety of the discount on the tradesmen’s bills

23~.

employed on such ships; he also agreed to advise with the

Carvers, and to pursue such measures as might appear to them

to be to the interest of all concerned. On the other hand, the

Carvers agreed to pay Giesler three-ﬁfths of the proceeds from

all vessels which should come from Cowes to Portsmouth, and

put themselves under the direction of the Carvers uponthc

recommendation of Giesler, one-half per cent on all trademen's

bills, and a certain proportion of warehouse rent, etc. They

were to meet once a year at Gosport to" settle their accounts

and pay over the balance. It was expressly agreed also that

neither should in any way be liable for the losses of the other

or in any way accountable or responsible for the acts of the

other, but that each should “in his own proper person and with

his own goods and effects, respectively, be answerable and

accountable for his own losses, acts,‘ deeds and receipts.”

Assumpsit by Waugh against Erasmus Carver, William Car·
ver and Archibald Giesler, as partners. It appeared that the
two Carvers· were in business at Gosport, and Giesler at
Plymouth as shipping agents. On February 24, 1790, thP.se
parties entered into a written agreement which provided that
Giesler should remove to Cowes, and that thereafter the two
concerns should cooperate in the transacti-On of the ship agency
business. In consideration of the Carvers' recommendation and
assistance to support the house at Cowes Giesler was to allow
the Carvers a moiety of. the commission on ships putting into
that port, or remaining in the road to the westward, addressed
to him, and a moiety of the discount on the tradesmen's bills
employed on· such ships; he also agreed to advise with the
Carvers, and to pursue such measures as might appear to them
to be to the interest of all concerned. On the other hand, the
Carvers agreed to pay Giesler three-fifths of the proceeds from
all vessels which should come from Cowes to Portsmouth, and
put themselves under the direction of the Carvers upon the
recommendation of Giesler, one-half per cent on all trademen's
bills, and a certain proportion of warehouse rent, etc. They
were to meet once a year at Gosport to settle their accounts
and pay over the balance. It was expressly agreed also that
neither should in any way be liable for the losses of the other
or
. in anv wav accountable or responsible for the acts of the
other, but that each should "in his own proper pe1·son and with
his own goods and effects, respectively, be answerable and
accountable for his own losses, acts,· deeds and receipts."

. .
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Plaintiff sold goods, etc., to Giesler in his own name, but not

68

being paid he sued him and the Carvers as partners. The ques-

tion was whether they were partners on a true construction of

the articles. '

(‘lag/ton and LcBZanc, for the plaintiﬁ’.

Rooke and Lawrence, for the defendants.

Erna, Ch. J . This case has been extremely well argued, and

the discussion of it has enabled me to make up my mind, and

Plaintiff sold goods, etc., to (Hesler in his own name, but not
being paid he sued him and the Carvers as partners. The question was whether they were partnel's on a true construction of.
the articles.

removed the only difficulty I felt, which was whether, by con-

struing this to be a partnership, we should not determine that

Cla.! lton and LeBlanc, for the plaintiff.

if there was an annuity granted out of a banking house to the

widow, for instance, of a deceased partner, it would make her

Rooke and La·wrenee, for the defendants.

liable to the debts of the house, and involve her in a bank-

ruptcy. But I think this case will not lead to that conse-

quence.

The deﬁnition of a partnership cited from Puifendorf (Lib.

5, cap. 8) is good as between the parties themselves, but not

with respect to the world at large. If the question were

between A and B, whether they were partners or not, it would

be very well to inquire whether they had contributed, and in
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what proportions, stock or labor, and on what agreements they

were to divide the proﬁts of that contribution. But in all these

eases a very different question arises, in which the deﬁnition

is of little service. The question is, generally, not between

the parties as to what shares they shall divide, but respecting

creditors claiming a satisfaction out of the funds of a particu-

lar houe, who shall be deemed liable in regard to those funds.

Now, a case may be stated in which it is the clear sense of the

parties to the contract that they shall not be partners; that A

is to contribute neither labor nor _money, and, to go still

further, not to receive any profits. But if he will lend his name

as a partner, he becomes, as against all the rest of the world, a

partner, not upon the ground of the real transaction between

them, but upon principles of general policy, to prevent the

frauds to which creditors would be liable if they were to sup-

pose that they lent their money upon the apparent credit of

three or four persons, when in fact they lent it only to two of

them, to whom, without the others, they would have lent noth-

ing. The argument gone into, however proper for the discus-

I

Ch. J. 'rhis case has been extremely well argued, and
the discussion of it has enabled me to make up my mind, aJM1
removed the only difficulty I felt, which was whether, by construing this to be a partnership, we should not determine that
if there was an annuity granted out of a banking house to the
widow, for instance, of a deceased partner, it would make her
liable to the debts of the house, and involve her in a bankruptcy. But l think this case will not lead to that consequence.
The definition of a partnership cited from Puffendorf (Lib.
5, cap. 8) is good as between the parties themselves, but not
with respect to the wm·ld at large. If the question were
between A mid B, whether they were partners or not, it would
be very WPII to inquire whether they had contributed, and in
what proportions, stock or labor, and on what agreements they
were to divide the profits of that contribution. But in all thes~
cases a very different question arises, in which the definition
is of little service. The question is, generally, not between
the parties as to what shares they shall divide, but respecting
creditors claiming a satisfaction out of the funds of a particular house, who shall be deemed liable in regard t0 those funds.
Now, a case may be stated in which it is the clear sense of the
parties to the contrnct that they shall not be partners; that A
is to contrib11te neither labor nor ,money, and, to go still
further, not to receive any profits. Hut if he will lend his name
as a partner, he becomes~ as ngainst all the rest of the world, a
partner, not upon the ground of the real transaction between
them, but upon principlefl of general polic,v, to prevent the
frauds to which creditors would be liable if they were to suppose that the~' lent th<'ir money upon the apparent ('.redit of
three or four persons, when in fact ,they lent it only to two of
them, to whom~ without the others, they would have lent nothing. The arg11ment gone into, howeve1· proper for the discusEYRE,
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sion of the question, is irrele.vant to a great part _of the case.
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\\'hether these persons were to interfere more or less with their

advice and directions, and many small parts of the agreement,

I lay entirely out of the case; because it is plain upon the con-

struction of the agreement, if it be construed only between the ,

Carvers and Giesler, that they were not nor ever meant to be l

partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without [

risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though there

was a certain degree of control at one house, it was without

idea that either was to be involved in the consequences of the

failure of the other, a11d without understanding themselves

responsible for any circumstances that might happen to the

loss of either. That was the agreement between themselves.

But the question is, whether they have not, by parts of their

agreement, constituted themselves partners in respect to other

persons. The case therefore is reduced to a single point,

whether the Carvers did not entitle themselves, and did not

mean to take a moiety of the proﬁts of Giesler’s house gener-

ally and indeﬁnitely as they should arise, at certain times

agreed upon for the settlement of their accounts. That they
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have so done is clear upon the face of the agreement; and upon

the authority of Grace rs. Smith (nntc, p. til), he who takes a

moiety of all the profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law,

be made liable to losses, if losses arise. upon the principle that,

by taking a part of the proﬁts, he takes from the creditors a

part of that fund which is the proper security to them for the

payment of their debts. That was the foundation of the deci-

sion in Grace rs. Smith, and I think it stands upon the fair

ground of reason. I cannot agree that this was a mere agency,

in the sense contended for on the part of the defendants, for

there was a risk of proﬁts and loss. -\ ship agent employs

tradesmen to furnish necessaries for the ship; he contracts

with them and is liable to them; he also makes out their bills

in such a way as to determine the charge of commission to the

ship owners. \Vith respect to the commission, indeed, he may

be considered as a mere agent, but as to the agency itselt he

is as much a trader as any other man, and there is as much risk

of proﬁt and loss to the -person with whom he contracts in the

transactions with him as with an_v other trader. lt is true he

will gain nothing but his discount, but that is a proﬁt in the

trade, and there may be losses to him as well as to the owners.

I

EC!on of the queEition, is ir1·elevant to a great part .of the case.
\Yhethe1• these pt·rsons were to interfPre more 01· less with their
advice and directions, and many small 1m1-ts of the agreement,
I lay t>ntirely out of the case; because it js plain upon the con· '
i-;truction of the agreement, if it be con st med only between the )
Carvers and Giesler, that lht>y were not nor ever meant to bt! I
partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without (
risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though there .
was a certain degree of control at one house, it was without
idea that eithn was to be invoh·ed in the consequp1u·es of the
failure of the other, and without understanding themselves
re8poni.ihle for any circumstances th.at might bapJ!en to the
loss of either. That was the agrf'ement between themselves.
But the t]uestion is, whether they lune not, Ly pm·ts of their
agreement, constitut<>d themsL•lves partners in respect to other
perl'!oos. 'rlw t·nse therefore h~ red1wPd to a single point,
whether the Carv<'rs did not entitle th<•miwlveA, and did not
mean to take a moiE:>ty of the profits of Giesler's bom~e generally and indeflnitPly as tht·.v should arise, at certain tim<'s
agreed upon for the iwttlem<'nt of their accounts. That they
have so <lone i!i! clear upon the face of the ag1·ermt>nt; and upon
the authority of Grat'<' rs. Smith (a11ir', p. fil.), he who takes a
moiet.v of nll 1he profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law~
be made liable to losses, if losses aris<•. upon the prindple that.
by taking a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a.
pnrt of that fund whidt is the propt•r 1wemit_v to tlwm for tlw
paymt>nt of their dPbh~. That was th<' foundation of the dPd·
sion in Oracc t\<t. Smith, and I think it stands upon thP fair
ground of reaRon. I cannot agree that this was a mere ag<>ney,
in the Nense conten<lPd for on the part of tlw d<•ft>11tlanls, fol'
tlwre was a rh~k of profit8 and lo~s.
.\ ship agt•nt .-mploy:-1
tradeNmen to fur11iHh 1wcessaries fo1· tlw ship; he '·onfraet~
with them and is liable to th<:'m; h<> also makes out their hill:-1
in such a way as to determine the charge of commisHion to tlw
ship owners. \Yith respect to the co111mi:-1sion, indt>ed. hi' may
be considered as a mere agent, bnt as to the a~t·ney itsplf he
is as much a trader as any other man, and there is as muelt 1·i.~k
of profit and I08S to the pe1·son with whom he contrads in the
transactions with him as with :my olhP1· t1wl<·1·. It i8 true he
will gain nothing but his discount, but that is a 111·otit in the
trade, and there may be lossc>s to him as well as to the owm•rs.
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If. therefore, the principle be true that he who takes the gen-

Jf, therefore, the principle be true that he who takes the gen-

eral proﬁts of a partnership must of necessity be made liable

eral profits of a partnership must of necessity be made liable
to the losses in order that he may stand in a just situation with
regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a case clear of
all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these persons were not to be considered as partners, yet they have made
themselves such with regard to their transactions with the rest
of the world. I am therefor~ of opinion that there ought to be
judgment for the plaintiff.
The Other judges concurred.

to the losses in order that he may stand in a just situation with

regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a case clear of

all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these per-

sons were not to be considered as partners, yet they have made

themselves such with regard to their transactions with the rest

of the world. I am therefore of opinion that there ought to be

judgment for the plaintiff.

The other judges concurred.

, Nora: See Mschem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 5, 6, ct seq.
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NOT11: See Mechem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 5, 6, et 1tq,

bCOX vs. HICKMAN.

English House of Lords, 1860. -

8 H. of L. Cas. 268.

This was an action on three bills of exchange, given by one
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of the managers of the Stanton Iron Company, for goods sup-

plied to that company. The declaration contained a count in

/

the usual form as against acceptors on each bill, alleging it to

have been “directed to the defendants by and under the name

~'COX

vs. BICKMAN.

of the Stanton Iron Com any;” also counts for goods sold and

delivered, and the monk; ts. The defendants severed in

Englilh H ou.se of Lords, 1860• .

pleading, each denying the ceptapce of the bills, and, a to

the other counts, pleading never indebted.’ I’

For some time previously to the year 1849, henjamin Smith

8 H. of L. Cas. 268.

and Josiah Timmis Smith carried on business at the Stanton

Iron \\'orks, in l)erbyshire,as iron masters and corn merchants,

under the name of B. Smith & Son. In that year they became

embarrassed in their circumstances, and a meeting of their

creditors took place. Among these were Cox and W'heatcroft.

On the 13th November, 1849, a deed of arrangement was exe

cuted by more than six-sevenths in number and value of the

creditors. The parties to this deed were the Smiths, of the

ﬁrst part; Francis Sanders, John Thompson, James Haywood,

David Wheatcroft, and Samuel YValker Cox, all of whom were

creditors, of the second part; and the general creditors (includ-

Q

This was an action on three bills of exchange, given by one
of the managers of the Stanton Iron Company, for goods supplied to that compa:Qy. The declaration contained a count in
the 01mal form as against acceptors on each bill, alleging it to
have been "directed to the defendants by and under the name
of the Stanton Iron Coi)!nany ;" also counts for goods sold and
delivered, and the mon~y\cftpts. The defendants severed in
pleading, each denying the Wc.eptance of the bills, and, as to
the other counts, pleading never ind~ted.' ' 1
For some time previously to the year 1849, -Benjamin Smith
and Josiah Timmis Smith carried on business at the Stanton
Iron \Vorks, in Derbyshire, as iron masters and com merchants,
under the name of B. Smith & Son. In that year 1bey became
embar~ssed in their circumstances, and a meeting of their
creditors took place. Among these were Cox and Wheatcroft.
On the 13th November, 1849, a deed of arrangement was executed by more than six-sevenths in number and value of the
cr~ditors. The parties to this deed were the Smiths, of the
first part; Francis Sanders, John Thompson, James Haywood,
David Wheatcroft, and Samuel n~alker Cox, all of whom were
creditors, of the second part; and the general creditors (includ-

•
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•
Cox vs.

HrcKKA.N.

'11

ing those previously named as trustees), whose names were

also set forth in a schedule, of the third part. The deed

recited a lease from 1846 for twenty-one years to the Smiths;

that they were unable to pay their debts, and that it had been

agreed that there should be an assignment by them to the

parties of the second part, as trustees on behalf of the credit-

ors, to have and hold the premises for the term of the lease,

the machinery, etc., and all the estate,-etc., subject to the pow-

ers and provisions thereinafter contained. The trusts were

then enumerated, and, in substance, they were to carry on the

business under the name or style of “The Stanton Iron Com-

pany,” with power to do whatsoever was necessary for that

purpose, and to pay the net income, after answering all expen-

ses; which net income was always to be deemed the property

of the two Smiths, among the creditors of the Smiths. And

provision was made for the meeting of the creditors, and, at

any such meeting, a majority in value of the creditors present

was to have the power to make rules as to the mode of con-

ducting the business, or to order the discontinuance of it. And

when all the debts had been paid, the trustees were to hold
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the trust estates, etc., in trust for the two Smiths. The deed '

contained a covenant by the parties executing it, not to suc

the Smiths for existing debts. Cox never acted as trustee; and

Wheatcroft resigned six weeks after the execution of the deed,

and before the goods for which the bills were given had been

supplied; no new trustee was appointed in the room of either.

The business of the company was carried on by the three

other persons named as “parties of the second part.” In the

course of it goods were supplied by Hickman, who, in March,

April, and June, 1855, drew three bills of exchange in respect

thereof. The ﬁrst of these bills, which was the same in form

as those afterwards accepted, was in these words:

Q “Grafton Iron Ore Works,'Blisworth,

“£300, 10th March, 1855.

“Four months after date pay to my order, in London, three

hundred pounds, va.lue received. J OHN HICKMAN.”

“To the Stanton Iron Company, near Derby.”

The acceptance was in the following form: “At Messrs.

Smith, Payne & C0., London. Per proc. The Stanton Iron

Oompany..—JAM1=:s Harwoon.” The cause was tried in 1856,

before the late Lord Chief Justice J nnvls-, when a verdict was

ing those previously nam_ed as trustees), whose names were
also set forth in a schedule, of the third part. The deed
recited a lease from 1846 for twenty-one years to the Smiths;
that they were unable to pay their debts, and that it had been
agreed that there should be an assignment by them to the
parties of the second part, as trustees on behalf of the creditors, to have and hold the premises fo~ the term of the lease,
the machinery, etc., and all the estate, ·etc., subject to the pow·
ers and provisions t11ereinafter contained. The trusts were
then enumerated, and, in substance, they were to carry on th•?
business under the name or style of "The Stanton Iron Cc>mpa.ny," with power to do whatsoever was necessary for that
purpose, and tO pay the net income, after answering all expenses; which net inrome was always to be deemed the property
of the two Smiths, ~mong the creditors of the sfniths. And
provision was made for the meeting of the creditors, and, at
any such meeting, a majority in value of the creditors present
was to have the power to make rules as to the mode of COIJducting the business, or to order the discontinuance of it. Al}.d
when all the debts had been paid, the trustees were to hold
the trust estates, etc., in trust for the two Smiths. The deed •
contained a covenant by the parties executing it, not to su"
the Smiths for existing debts. Cox never acted as trustee; an1l
Wheatcroft resigned six weeks after the execution of the deed,
and before the goods for which the bills were given had beeu
supplied; no new trustee was appointed in the room of either.
The business of the company was carried on by the three
other persons named as "parties of the second part." In the
course of it goods were supplied by Hickman, who, in .March,
April, and June; 1855, drew three bills of exchange in respect
thereof. The first of these bills, which was the same in form
as those afterwards a.ccepted, was in these words:
"Grafton Iron Ore Works,· Blisworth,
10th March, 1855.
"£300.
"Four months after date pay to my order, in London, three
hundred pounds, value received.
JOHN HICKMAN."
"To the Stanton Iron Company, near Derby."
The acceptance was in the following form: "At Messr"I.
Smith, Payne & Cc>., L<>ndon. Per proc. The Stanton Iron
Company.:-JAMES HAYWOOD." The cause was tried in 1856,
before the late Lord Chief Justice JEnVIB; when a verdict was
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found for the defendants; but on motion on leave reserved,

the verdict was entered for the plaintiff (18 C. B. 617). ,

The case was taken to the Exchequer chamber, when three

judges, Justice COLERIDGE, I<]1u.1-1, and CROMPTON, were for

aﬂirming the judgment of the Com-mon Pleas, and three other

judges, Barons MAIiTIN, Bmuuwmm, and \VATSON, were for

reversing it. [3 C. B. N. S. 523.1 The judgment, therefore,

stood, and was afterwards brought up to this House.

The judges were summoned, and Lord Chief Baron Ponnocx,

Justice \V1onr.\ms, Mr. Justice \\'u.1.1.n1s, Mr. Justice

on Mr Baron CHANNELL, and Mr. Justice Bmcxnunx,

Tlu g al (Sir R. Bcthcll, Jlr. .l[ilIw-ard was with

him), for \V'h

Mr. Wclsby (ll 1'. Bodcn was with him) for Cox.

M1‘. R-olt (Mr. Field was with him) for the respondent in both

cases.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell) proposed the follow-

ing question for the judges: “Are the defendants in this case

found for the defendants; hut on motion on leave reserved,
the verdict was entered for the plaintiff (18 C. B. 617).
The case was taken to the Exche<Juer chamber, when three
judges, Justice COLE RIDGE, ERLE, and CROMPTON, were for
affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas, and three other
judges, Barons MARTIN, BRAMWELL, and WATSON, were for
reversing it. [3 C. B. N. S. 523.J 'l'lle judgment, therefore,
stood, a.nd was afterwards brought up to this House.
The judges were summoned, and Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK,
r Justice WIGHTMAN, Mr. Justice \\' 1LLIA:u s, Mr. Justi ce
1· o.·, Mr. Baron CHANNELL, and Mr. Justice BLACKBURN,
ded.

liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon?”

r al (Sir R. B etlt<'ll, Jlr. Millloard was with

Agreed to.
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-‘° BLAcKBuriN. J. The defendants in this case are liable as

acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. The ques-

tion entirely depends on the effect of the deed of arrangement.

Mr. lVelsby 11 r. Boden

wa~

with him) for Cox.

If the effect of that deed is such that creditors executing it

thereby give authority to those managing the Stanton Iron

Company. to bind them to third persons in the usual course

Mr. Rolt (Mr. Field was with him) for the respondent in both

cases.

of business by accepting bills, the defendants have given such

authority. If the effect of the deed is not such that creditors

executing that deed give authority to bind them as to third

persons, the defendants are not shown to have given any such

authority, for they have never acted as trustees; nor does it

appear that they have done any act beyond what was proper

to carry out the arrangement contained in that deed.

The principal object of the deed of arrangement is to divide

the property of the Smiths amongst the creditors according

to the rules observed in bankruptcy; and for this purpose their

property is assigned to trustees. The good will of the busi-

ness which had been carried on by the Smiths was part of

1

l

The Lord Chance llor (Lord Campbell) proposed the following question for the judges: "Are the defendants in this case
liable as acceptors of the bills of ex change declared upon?"
Agreed to.
r BLACKB UJlN , J. Th e defend·a nts in this case are liable as
ac;ceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. The question entirely depends on the effect of the deed of anangement.
If the effect of that deed is such that credi to rs executing it
thereby give authority to those mauaging the Stanton Iron
Company, to bind them to third persons in the usual course
of bus iness by accepting bills, t h e de fendants have given such
~.uthorH.v. If the C'ffect of the deed is not such that creditors
executing that deed give authority to bind them as to third
persons, the defendnnts are not shown to have given any su ch
nuthority, for they have n ever acted as trustees; nor does it
appear that they have done any act beyond what was proper
to ca rry out the arrangement contained in that deed.
The prin cipal object of tbP. deed of arrangement is to divide
the property of the Smiths amongst the creditors according
to the rules obsel.'ved in bankruptcy; and fol.' this purpose their
property is assigned to trustees. The good will of the business which had b een carried on by 1be Smiths was part of
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their joint estate, and those who had the making of the
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arrangement appear to have thought it a valuable part of the

joint estate. Instead of disposing of it to third persons, or

suffering it to be lost, the arrangement made was, that the

business should in the future be carried on under a new style,

that of “The Stanton Iron Company,” by the trustees, in the

manner stipulated for in the deed to which the creditors are

parties. The question is, whether the stipulations are such

as to render those creditors, who are parties to the deed, part-

ners in the Stanton Iron Company, so far, at least, as regards

liability to third persons.

Some of the judges in the court below have expressed an

opinion that there is a distinction between the present ques-

tion and that which would have arisen if the question had

been whether the defendants were liable for the considera-

tion ot these bills. I am, however, of opinion that no such

distinction exists. I apprehend that all‘cases as to liability

of partners to contracts are branches of the law of agency,

and that the question always is, évhether the contract entered

[into is within the scope of the authority conferred by those,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

who are sought to be charged, upon the persons actually mak-

ing the contracy But I take it that, as matter of law, those

who are partners in a trading ﬁrm, do confer upon those who

\are permitted to manage the concern authority to make all

contracts which, in the exigency of the business, are neces-

sary and proper and customary. The prima facile authority

may be restricted by express agreement, but unless those who

deal with the ﬁrm have notice of this restriction, they are enti-

tled to hold all who are partners bound by the prima facie

authority conferred on the manager, and that equally whether

the persons sought to be charged were persons to whom the

creditors gave credit, or dormant partners, of whose existence

they were unaware. I think the justice of this rule, as appli-

cable to dormant partners, very questionable, but I do not

think it open to question that it is the rule of law. I think

that where, as in the present case, the accepting of bills is a

necessary and customary part of the business, the authority to

accept them is conferred as much as the authority to contract

the debts for which they are given. It is true the authority is

limited to accepting the bills in the name of the ﬁrm, and binds

10

their joint estate, and those who bad the making of the
arrangement appear to have thought it a valuable part of the
joint estate. Instead of disposing of it to third persons, or
suffering it to be lost, the arrangement made was, that the
business should in the future be carried on under a new style,
that of "The Stanton Iron Company," by the trustees, in the
manner stipulated for in the deed to which the creditors a1·e
parties. The question is, whether the stipulations are such
as to render those creditors, who are parties to the deed, partners in the Stanton Iron Company, so far, at least, as regards
liability to third persons.
Some of the judges in the court below have exp1·essed an
opinion that there is a dh~tinction between the prei;1ent question and that which would have arisen if the question had
been w\ether the defendants were liable for the consideration Qf these bills. I am, however, of opinion that no such
di~tion exists. I apprehend that an· cases as to liability
of partners to contracts are branches of the law of agency,
~d that the question always is, f'bether the contract entered
into is within the scope of the authority conferred by those,
( who a1·e sought to be charged, upon the persons actually making the contracy But I take it that, as matter of law, those
who are partners in a trading firm, do confer upon those who
\are permitted to manage the concern authority to make all
~ontracts which, in the exigency of the business, are necessary and proper and customary. The p1·ima facie authority
may be restricted by express agreement, but unless those who
deal with the fi1•m have notice of this resfriction, they are entitled to hold all who are partners bound by the prima facie
authority conferred on the manager, and that equally whether
the persons sought to be charged were persons to whom the
creditors gave credit, or dormant partners, of whose existence
they were unaware. I think the justice of this rule, as applicable to d01mant partners, very questionable, but I do not
think it open to question that it is the rrtle of law. I think
that where, as in the present case, the accepting of bills is a
necessary and customary part of the business, the authority to
accept them is conferred as mnch as tbe authority to contract
the debts for which they are given. It is true the authority is
limited to accepting the bills in the name of the firm, and bind~
10
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only those included in that ﬁrm, but all who are partners

are included in the ﬁrm.

I think, therefore, as already said, that the question is,

whether the stipulations in the deed are such as to constitute

a partnership quoad third persons, and to determine that ques-

tion we must look to the terms of the deed. The material

stipulations, as it seem-s to me, are the following: [The pro-

visions of the deed are then quoted.] ‘

These, I think, are the whole of the material parts of the

deed. There is no stipulation in the deed, as to who i to pro-

vide for payment of the partnership liabilities in case the

losses should be so great as to exceed the sum of £4,000, which

the trustees were authorized to retain for the purpose of carry-

ing on the business. The parties seem not to have anticipated,

or at all events not to have provided for such a contingency,

which, though a probable one, is often overlooked by those

entering on a trade, but the rule of law is clear enough, that

those who are partners in the concern must bear such liabili-

ties; so that I once more repeat, the question comes round to

whether the stipulatipns are such as to constitute a partner-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ship amongst the creditors. _

Now, on looking at the provisions of the deed, it seems to

me that they are, in substance, such as would be proper if

the creditors constituted themselves a joint stock company,

such as it would have been at common law, and made the

trustees their managing directors, but agreed that the part-

nership should cease as soon as a certain sum, in this case

the amount of their debts, was realized. I ﬁnd that the busi-

ness is to be carried on by the trustees under the control of

the creditors, who may give what directiors they think ﬁt

as to the management of the business; that the creditors are

to have a voice in nominating fresh trustees in case they are

changed; and that the creditors are to have a right to inspect

the books. And, moreover, I ﬁnd that the creditors alone are

to have these powers, no similar powers being given to the

Smiths. Then I ﬁnd also that the trustees are bound to pay

over the net income, after paying all expenses of the concern,

ratably among the creditors. It was suggested at your Lord-

ship’s bar, that there was some distinction between the net

income, after paying all out-goings, and the net proﬁts, but I

am unable to understand what that distinction is.

only those included in that firm, but all who are partners
are included in the firm.
I think, therefore, as already said, that the question is,
wh~ther the stipulations in the deed are such as to constitute
a partnership quoad third persons, and to determine that question we must look to the terms of the deed. The material
stipulations, as it seems to me, are the following: [The provisions of the deed are then quoted.]
These, I think, are the whole of the material parts of the
deed. There is no stipulation in the deed, as to who is to pro·
vide for paym('>nt of the partnership liabilities in .case the
losses should be so great as to exceed the sum of £4,000, which
the trustees were a.uthorized to retain for the purpose of carrying on the business. The parties seem not to have anticipated,
or at all events not to have provided for such a contingency,
which, though a probable one, is often overlooked by those
entering on a trade, but the rule of law is clear enough, that
those who are partners in the concern must bear such liabilities; so that I once more repeat, the question comes round to
whether the stipulatipns are such as to constttute a partnership amongst 1he creditors.
·
Now, on looking at the provisions of the deed, it seems to
me that they are, in substance, such as would be proper if
the creditors constituted themselves a joint stock company,
such a.s it would have been at common law, and mnde the
trustees their managing directors, but agreed that the partnership should cease as soon as a certain sum, in this case
the aroount of their d~bts, was realized. I find that the business is to be earried on by the trustees under the control of
the creditors, who may give what directiors they think tit
as to the management of the business; that the creditors are
to have a voice in nominating fresh trustees in case they are
changed; and that the creditors are to have a right to inspect
the books. And, moreover, I find that the creditors alone are
to have these powers, no similar powers being given to the
Smiths. Then I find also that the trustees are bound to pay
over the net income, after paying all expenses of the concern,
ratably among the creditors. It was suggested at your Lord1!1hip's bar, that there was some distinction between the net
income, after paying all out-goings, and the net profits, but I'
:im unable to understand what that distinction is.
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Cox vs.

HICKMAN.

The arrangement is that the trading might terminate on the

creditors being paid, which perhaps was the termination which

the persons entering into the arrangement hoped for. In that

case, the deed provides that the property shall be made over

to the Smiths, but by so doing the trade of the Stanton Iron

Company ceases. Whoever the partners in that ﬂrm might be,

they are no longer to carry on the business after the property

is assigned to the Smiths. It might terminate by the concern

being stopped by the creditors whilst it was yet solvent; that

event is anticipated by the deed, and in that case it is provided

that the surplus, after paying all losses, should be divided

amongst the creditors. It might continue for an indeﬁnite

period, neither so productive as to pay the creditors in full,

nor so bad as to be stopped; and whilst it was so continued,

the creditors were to have the net income or proﬁts, and the

control of the management of the concern, and they were only

to have these powers. Does this make them interested in the

property or proﬁts so as to make them partners? That ques-

tion depends on the effect of the deed, and it will be answered

when we have determined the extent of their interest in the
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property of the ﬁrm. Suppose, a not impossible case, that the

trustees had, as individuals, contracted a joint debt for some

purpose unconnected with the Stanton Iron Company; could

the partnership property of the Stanton Iron Company have

been taken to pay the debt? Or, if the trustees had become

reduced to one person, and he had become a bankrupt, would

the assets of the Stanton Iron Company have passed to his

assignees? Or would the creditors, who are parties to the

deed of arrangement, have been entitled in either case to say

that the property was in equity theirs, and that the trustees,

except in so far as they were creditors, had no beneﬁcial inter-

est in it? That is a question that depends on the construction

of the deed. I think the construction of the deed is such, that

the creditors. parties to the deed, have bargained that they

shall have a hold pver the whole property of the ﬁrm, divided

or undivided, and I think this bargain i effectual, and, if so,

that the creditors do take the proﬁts of the concern, so as to

make them their property before they are divided.

The deed does not provide what is to be done in the case

which hasactually happened, viz.: That of the concern prov-

ing insolvent; but the law declares that those who take the

The arrangement is tllat the trading might terminate on the
creditors being paid, which perhaps was the termination which
the persons entering into the arrangement hoped for. In that
<'.Use~ the deed provides thnt the property shall be made over
to the Smiths, but by so doing the trade of the Stanton Iron
Company ceases. "r110~ver the partners in that firm might be,
they are no longer to carry on the business after the property
is assigned to the Smiths. It might terminate by the concem
being stopped by the creditors whilst it was yet solvent; that
event is anticipated by the deed, and in that case it is pr.-ovided
that the sm·plus, after.- paying all losses, should be divided
amongst the creditors. It might continue for an indefinite
period, neither so productive as to pay the creditors in full,
nor so bad as to be stopped; and whilst it was so continued,
the creditors were to have the net income or profits, and the
contr.-ol of the management of the concern, and they were only
to have these powers. Does this make them interested in the
property or profits so as to make them partners? That ques·
tion depends on the ~trcct of the deed, and it will be answered
when we have determined the extent of their interest in th.e
property of.the firm. Suppose, a not impossible case, that the
trustees had, as individuals, contracted a joint debt for som1~
purpose unconnected with the Stanton Ir.-on Company; could
the partnership property of the Stanton Iron Company have
been taken to pay the debt? Or, if the trustees had become
reduced to one person, and he had become a bankrupt, would
the assets of the 8tanton Iron Company have passed to his
assignees? Or would the creditors, who are parties to the
deed of arrao~em:.-nt, have been entitled in either case to say
that the property was in equity theirs, and that the trustees,
except in so far as they were creditors, had no beneficial inter·
est in it? That is a question that depends on the construction
of the deed. I think the construction of the deed is such, that
the creditors, parties to the deed, have bargained that they
shall have a bold ovP.r the whole property of the firm, divided
or undivided, and1 I think this bargain is effectual, and, if so,
that the creditors do take the {>routs of the concern, so as to
make th~m their property before they are divided.
The deP.d does not provide what is to be done in the case
which has ·actnally happened, viz.: That of the concern proving insolvent; hut the law declares that those who take the
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proﬁts of a trading_concern as such are liable to the losses,

even if they have stipulated to the contrary. Waugh vs. Career,

Sm-ith’s Lead. Cas. 786 (artte, p. 67), and the notes thereto.

The phrase, taking the proﬁts as such, is not a happy one,

and there is some diﬁiculty at times in deﬁning what it means,

but I think it means at all events this. It is not p0SSiblur.

according to the common law, to cause a trading concern to be

carried on, on the terms that the advantages of a partnership,

including the ‘participation in proﬁts, and tl1c partnership lien

and security over the assets of the ﬁrm, shall belong to those

who have but a limited liability. I am aware of no case or

authority inconsistent with the proposition thus guarded.

Now, it seems to me, that the present defendants have, by the

deed to which they are parties, stipulated that the business

shall bc carried on for their beneﬁt, and under their control;

that they shall be interested in all the property of the ﬁrm to

such an extent as to have a partnership lien upon it.

This shows that they are not merely persons permitting the

Smiths or the trustees to carry on the business and relying on

it as a fund for payment, but that they take the proﬁts as such,
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and having done so, they are partners as regards third persons.

I agree that the question is one of agency, viz., whether the

defendants authorized the managers of this ﬁrm to bind them;

but I think it is an incident attached by law to a participation

in the proﬁts to the above extent, that such authority is given

to those managing the concern. I think, for the reasons I have

given, that this arrangement deed does amount to a stipula-

tion for a participation in the proﬁts as such by the creditors.

For these reasons, I am of opinion that the defendants are

liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon.

K Lord Cn.-\.\‘won'rn. In this case the judges in the court of

exchequer chamber were equally divided, and unfortunately

the same difference of opinion has existed among the learned

judges who attended this house during the argument at your

lordships’ bar. Except, therefore, from an examination of the

grounds on which their opinions are founded, we can derive no

beneﬁt in this case from their assistance. \Ve cannot say

that in the opinions delivered in this house, there is more

authority in favor of one view of the case than of the other.

We must not, however, infer that your lordships have not

1

profits of a trading. concern as such are liable to the losses,
even if they have stipulated to the contrary. Waugh vs. Cart'er,
~moith's Lead. Cas. 786 (artte, p. 67), and the notes thereto.
The phrase, taking the profits as such, is not a happy one,
and there is some difficulty at timC'S in defining what it meanl',
but I think it means at all events this. It is not possiblP.
according to the common law, to cause a trading concern to be
carried on, on the terms thnt the advantages of a partnership,
mcluding the participation in profits, and the partnership lien
and security over the assets of the firm, shall belong to tboase
who have but a limited liability. I am aware of no case or
authority inconsistent with the pmposition thus guarded.
Now, it seems to me, that the present defendants have, by the
deed to which they are parties, stipulated that the business
aball be carried on for their benefit, and under their control;
that they shall be interested in all the property of the firm to
such an extent as to have a partnership lien upon it.
This sho~s that they are not merely persons permitting the
Smiths or the trustees to carry on the business and relying on
ft as a fund for pa~·ment, but that they take the profits as such,
and having done so, they are partnns as re-g1ll'ds third persons.
I agree that the question is one of agency, viz., whether the
defendants authorized the managers of this firm to bind them;
but I think it is an incident attached by law to a participation
in the profits to the above extent, that such authority is given
to thm~e managing the concern. I think, for the reasons I have
given, that this m·rangement deed does amount to a stipuln-.
tion for a participation in the profits as such by the creditorti.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the defendants are
liable as acct>ptors of the bills of exchange declared upon.
Lord Cn,\NWOH'l'H. In this case the judges in the court of
exchequer chamber were equally divided, and unfortunately
the same difference of opinion has existed among the learned
judges who attended this house during the argument at your
lordships' bar. Except, therefore, from an examination of the
grounds on which their opinions are founded, we can derin• no
benefit in this case from their assistance. We cannot say
that in the opinions delivered in this house, there is more
authority in favor of one view of th.e case than of the other.
We must not, howeYer, infer that your lordships have not

K.
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derived material aid from the opinions expressed by the judges.

Cox YS. Uw1n1AN.
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These opinions have stated the arguments on_ the one side and

the other with great clearness and force, and what.we have to

do now is to decide between them.

In the ﬁrst place let me say that I concur with those of the

learned judges who are of the opinion that no solid distinction

exists between the liability of either defendant, in an action

on the bills, and in action for goods sold and delivered. If he

would have been liable in an action for goods sold and deliv-

ered, it must be because those who were in fact carrying on the

business of the Stanton Iron Company were carrying it on as

his partners or agents; and, as the bills were accepted, accord-

ing to the usual course of business, for ore supplied by the

plaintiﬂf, I cannot doubt that if the trade was carried on by

those who managed it as partners or agents of the defendant,

he must be just as liable on the bills as he would have been in

an action for the price of the goods supplied. His partners or

agents would have the same authority to accept bills in the

ordinary course of tradc. as to purchase goods on credit.

The liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is
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in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent.

Where two or more persons are engaged, as partners in an

ordinary trade, each of them has an implied authority from the

others to bind all by contracts entered into according to the

usual course of business in that trade. Every partner in trade

is, for the ordinary purposes of the trade, the agent of his

copartners, and all are therefore liable for the ordinary trade

contracts of the others. 1’artners may stipulate among them-

selves that some one of them only shall enter into particular

contracts, or into any contracts, or that as to certain of their

contracts none shall be liable except those by whom they are

actually made; but with such private arrangements third per-

sons, dealing with the ﬁrm without notice, have no concern.

The public have a right to assume that every partner has

authority from his copartner to bind the whole ﬁrm in con-

tracts made according to the ordinary usages of trade.

This principle applies not only to persons acting openly and

avowedly as partners, but to others who, though not so acting,

are, by secret or private agreement, partners with those who

appear ostensibly to the world as the persons carrying on the

business.

\

dt•rived material aid from the opinions expressed by the judges.
These opinions have stated the arguments on the one side and
the other with great clearness and force, uud what.we have to
do now is to decide between them.
In the first place let me say that I concm· with those of the
learned judges who are of the opinion that no solid distinction
exists between the liability of either defendant, in an action
on the bills, and in action for goods sold and delivered. If he
would have been liable in an action for goods sold and deliv·
ered, it must be because those who were in fa.ct carrying on the
business of the Stanton Iron Company were carrying it on as
his partners or ag(•nts; and, as the bills were accepted, according to the usual course of bm1iness, for ore supplied by the
plaintiff, I cannot doubt that if the trade was carried on by
those who managed it as partners or agents of the defendant,
he must be just as liable on the bills as he would have been ht
an action for the price of the goods supJllied. His partners or
ag(•nts would have the same nnthority to accept bills in th('
ordinary courge of trnde, ns to purchase goods on credit.
The liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is
in truth the liability of a principnl for the acts of his agent.
Where two or more perMOUM arc engaged. as partners in an
ordinary trade, ea.ch of them has an implied authority from the
othf'rs to bind all by cont.rncts entered into according to the
usual course of business in that trade. En~ry paMner in trad~
is, for the ordinary pnrposf>s of the trad<', the agent of his
copartners, and all are thPrefore liable for the ordinary trade
contracts of the others. Partners may stipulate among themseh·es that some one of tlll'm only Rhall enter into particular
contracts, or into any contracts, or th.at as to ceMain of tl1eir
contracts none shall be liable except thoS<> b~· whom they are
actually made; but with sud1 pl'i vate arrang-ements third persons, dealing wi~h the firm without notice, have no concern.
The public have a right to assume that every partner has
authority from his copaMner to bind the whole firm in con·
tracts made according to the ordinary usages of trade.
This principle applies not only to persons acting openly and
avowedly as partners, but to others who, though not so acting,
are, by secret or private agreement, pal'tners with those who
appear ostensibly to the world as the persons carrying on the
business.
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In the case now before the house, the court of common pleas
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decided in favor of the respondent that the appellant, by his

execution of the deed of arrangement, became, together with

the other creditors who executed it, a partner with those who

conducted the business of the Stanton Iron Company. The

judges in the court of exchequer chamber were equally divided.

so that the judgment of the court of common pleas was

aﬂjrmed. The sole question for adjudication by your lordships

is, whether this judgment thus aiiirmed was right.

I do not propose to consider in detail all the provisions of

the deed. I think it suﬂicient to state them generally. In the

ﬁrst place there is an assignment by Messrs. Sm-ith to certain

trustees, of the mines and all the engines and machinery used

for working them, together with all the stock in trade, and

in fact all their property, upon trust, to carry on the business;

and, after paying its expenses, to divide the net income ratably

amongst the creditors of Messrs. Smith, as often as there shall

be funds in hand sufficient to pay one shilling in the pound;

and, after all the creditors are satisﬁed, then in trust for

Messrs. Smith.
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Up to this point the creditors, though they executed the

deed, are merely passive; and the ﬁrst question is, what would

have been the consequence to them of tlreir executing the deed

if the trusts had ended there? Would they have become part-

ners in the concern carried on by the trustees merely because

they passively assented to its being carried on upon the terms

that the net income, 11. e., the net proﬁts should be applied in

discharge of their demands? I think not ;' it was argued that

as they would be interested in the proﬁts, therefore they would

be partners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the

test, or one of the tests, whether a person not ostensibly a

partner, is nevertheless, in contemplation of law, a partner, is,

whether he is entitled to participate in the proﬁts. This, no

doubt, is, in general, a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to

participate in proﬁts affords cogent, often conclusive evidence,

that the trade in which the proﬁts have been made was carried

,on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a.

claim. But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade

has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. \Vhen

that is the case he is liable to the trade obligations, and

entitled to its proﬁts, or to a share of them. It is not strictly

In the case now· before the house, the court of common pleas
decitled in favor of the respondent that the appellant, by hh1
execution of the deed of arrangement, became, together with
the other creditors who executed 1t, a partner with those who
conducted the business of the Stanton Iron Company. Tht~
judges in the con rt of exchequer chamber were equally divided.
so that the judgment of the court of common pleas was
aft}rmed. The sole question for adjudication by your lordships
is, whether this judgment thus affirmed wn's right.
I do not propose to consider in detnil nil the provisions of
the deed. I think it suflicient to state them generalJy. In tlu~
first place there is an a.ssi~ment by Musrs. Smith to certain
trustees, of the mines and all the engines and machinery usc1J
for working them, together with a.II the stock in trade, and
in fact all their property, upon trust, to carry on the business;
and, after paying- its expenses, to divide the net income ratably
amongst the creditors of .Messrs. Smith, as often as there shall
be funds in h:md sufficient to pay one shilling in the pournl;
and, after all the creditors are satisfied, then in trust for
Messrs. Smith.
Up to this point the creditors, though they executed tlw
deed, are merely passive; and the first question is, what would
have been the consequence to them of t~ir executing the deed
if the trusts had ended there? Would they have become part·
ners in the concern carried on by the trustees merely becauf'e
they passively assented to its being carried on upon the terms
that the net income, i. e., the net profits shodd be applied in
discharge of their demands? I think n-0t ;'it was argued that
as they would he interested in the profits, therefore they would
be partners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the
test, or one of thP te~ts, whether a person not ostensibly a.
partner, is nevertl1C'less, in contemplation of law, a partner, iR,
whether he is entitled to partiripate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is, in general, a sutliciently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, of.ten conclusive evidenci>,
that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried
,on in part for or on behalf of the person ~ctting up such a
claim. But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade
ha's b<>en carried on by persons acting on his behalf. 'Vhen
that is the case he is liable to the trade obligations, and
entitled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not strictly
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correct to say that his right to share in the proﬁts makes him

H1cKHAN.
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liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating

the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles

him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact

that the trade.has been carried on on his behalf, it e., that he

stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting

ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been

incurred, and under whose management the proﬁts have been

made.

Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner, it

seems to me to follow that ‘the mere concurrence of creditors

in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or

trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the

proﬁts in discharge of their demands, does not make them

partners with their debtor, or the trustees. 'The debtor is still

the person solely interested in the proﬁts, save only that he

has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the beneﬁt

of the proﬁts a they accrue, though he has precluded himself

from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge

of his-debts. The trade is not carried on by or on account of
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the creditors; though their consent is necessary in such a case,

for without it all the property might be seized by them in exe-

cution. But the trade still remains the trade of the debtor or

his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by or

on behalf of whom it is carried on.

I have hitherto considered the case as it would have stood if

the creditors had been merely passively assenting parties to

‘the carrying on of the trade, on the terms that the proﬁts

should be applied in liquidation of their demand. But I am

aware that in this deed special powers are given to the cred-

itors, which, it was said, showed that they had become part-

ners, even if that had not been the consequence of their con-

currence in the previous trust. The powers may be described

brieﬂy as, ﬁrst, a power of determining by a majority in value

of their body, that the trade should be discontinued, or, if not

discontinued. then, secondly, a power of making rules and

orders as to its conduct and management.

These powers do not appear to me to alter the case. The

creditors might, by process of law, have obtained possession

of the whole of the property. By the earlier provisions of the

deed they consented to abandon that right, and to allow the

\
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correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating
the pronosition is to say that the same thing. which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact
that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, ~ e~, that he
stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting
ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made.
Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner, it
seems to me to follow that ·the mere concurrence of creditors
in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or
trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the
profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them
partners with their debtor, or the trustees. 'The debtor is still
the person solely interested in the profits, save only that be
has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit
of the profits as they accrue, though be has precluded himself
from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge
of bis ·debts. The trade is not carried <>n by or on account of
the creditors; thoug-b their consent is necessary in such a case,
for without it all the property might be seized by them in execution. But the trade still remains the trade of the debtor or
his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by or
on behalf of whom it is carried On.
I have hitherto considered the case as it would have stood tf
the creditors had been merely passively assenting parties to
lthe carrying on of the trade, on the terms that the profits
should be applied in liquidation of their demands. But I am
aware that in this deed special powers are given to the creditors, which, it was said, showed that they bad becoipe partners, even if that bad not been the consequence of their concurrence in the previous trust. The powers may be described
briefly as, first, a power of determining by a majority in value
of their body, that the trade should be discontinued, or, if not
discontinued, then, secondly, a power of making rules and
orders as to its conduct and management.
•
These powers do not appear to me to alter the case. The
creditors might, by process of law, have c:>btained possession
of the whole of the property. By the earlier provisions of the
deed they consented to abandon that right, and to allow the
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‘trade to be carried on by the trustees. The effect of these

powers is only to qualify their consent. They stipulate for a

right to withdraw it altogether; or, if not, then to impose terms

as to the mode in which the trust to which they had agreed

should be executed. I do not think that this alters the legal

condition of the creditors. The trade did not become a' trade

carried on for them as principals, because they might have

insisted on taking possession of the stock, and so compelling

the abandonment of the trade, or because they might have pre-

scribed terms on which alone it should be continued. Any

trustee might have refused to act if he considered the terms

prescribed by the creditors to be objectionable. Suppose the

deed had stipulated, not that the creditors might order the dis-

continuance of the trade, or impose terms as to its manage-

ment, but that some third person might do so, if, on inspect-

ing the accounts, he should deem it advisable; it could not be

contended that this would make the creditors partners, if they

were not so already; and I can see no difference between stip-

ulating for such a power to be reserved to a third person, and

reserving it to themselves.
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I have, on these grounds, come to the concludon that the

creditors did not. by executing this deed, make themselves

partners in the Stanton Iron Company, and I must add that a

contrary decision would be much to be deprecated. Deeds of

arrangement. like that now before us, are, I believe, of fre-

qucnt occurrence; and it is impossible to imagine that cred-

itors who execute them have any notion that by so doing they

are making themselves liable as partners.

This would be no reason for holding them not to be liable,

if. on strict principles of mercantile law, they are so; but the

very fact that such deeds are so common, and that no such

liability is supposed to attach to them, affords some argument

in favor of the appellant. The deed now before us was exe-

cuted by above a hundred joint creditors; and a mere glance

at their names is sutiicient to show that there was no intention

on their part of doing anything which should involve them in

the obligationsof a partnership. I do not rely on this; but,

at least, it shows the general opinion of the mercantile world

on the subject. I may remark that one of the creditors I see

is the Midland Railway Company, which is a creditor for a

sum only of £39. and to suppose that the directors could imag-

ine that they were making themselves partners is absurd.

'(

.::'.:

'trade to be carried on by the trustees. The effect of these
powers is only to qualify their consent. They stipulate for a
right to withdraw it altogether; or, if not, then to impose terms
at1 to the mode in which the trust to which they had agreed
should be executed. I do J!Ot think that this alters the legal
condition of the creditors. The trade did not become a· trade
curriPd on for them as principals, because they might have
insi8ted on taking possession of the stock, and so compelling
the abandonment of the trade, or because they might have prescri111•d terms on which alone it should be continued. Any
tru8h·e might have refused to act if he considered the terms
prescribed by the creditors to be objectionable. Suppose the
deed had stipulated, not that the creditors might order the discontinuance of the trade, or impose terms as to its management, but that some third person might do so, if, on inspecting the accounts, he should deem it advisable; it could not be
cont«i>nded that this would make the creditors partners, if they
were not so already; and I can see no difference between stipulu ting for such a power to be reser\'ed to a thh-d person, and
res1•rving it to themselves.
I have, on these grounds, come to the conclusion that the
crt>ditors did not, by executing this deed, make themselves
partners in the Stanton ll'on Company, and I must add that a
contrary decision would be much to be deprecated. Deeds of
arrangement, like that now before us, are, I believe, of fre-.
qtwnt occurrence; and it is impossible to imagine that cred·
itors who execute them have any notion that by so doing they
arP making thPmselves liable as partners.
This would be no reason for holding them not to be liablf',
if. on strict prinriples of mercantile law, they are so; but the
y{'r.v fact that imrh deeds are so common, and that no such
liability is 1rnpposed to attach to them, affords some argument
in favor of the appellant. The deed now before us was execnt(!d by above a hundred joint creditors; and a mere ~lance
at their names is sufficient to show that there was no intention
on their part of doing anything which should involve them in
tlw obligations · of a partnership. I do not rely on this; but,
nt lea~t, it showR the general opinion of the mercantile world
on the subject. I may remark that one of the creditors I see
is t be .Midland Railway Company, which is a creditor for a
t'lnm only of £3!1, and to suppose that the directors could imag·
ine that they were making themselves partners is absurd.

F
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. The authorities cited in argument did not throw much light

upon the subject. I can ﬁnd no case in which a person has

been made liable as a dormant or sleeping partner, where the

trade might not fairly be said to have been carried on for him,

together with those ostensibly conducting it, and when, there-

fore, he would stand in the position of principal towards the

ostensible members of the ﬁrm as his agents. This was cer-

tainly the case in Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (amte p. 67).

There Messrs. Carver, who were ship agents at Portsmouth,

agreed with Giesler, a ship agent at Plymouth, that if he

would establish himself as a ship agent at Cowes, they would

share between them the proﬁts of their respective agencies

in certain stipulated proportions. \Vhen, therefore, Geisler,

in pursuance of the agreement, did establish himself at Cowes,

and there carry on the business of a ship agent, he, in fact,

carried it on for the beneﬁt of Messrs. Carver as well as of

himself; and the court held that, in these circumstances, the

stipulation which they had entered into that neither party

to the agreement should be answerable for the acts of the
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other, was a stipulation which they could not make so as

thereby to affect third persons. Each ﬁrm was carrying on

business on account not only of itself but also of the other ﬁrm;

this, therefore, made each ﬁrm the agent of the other.

The case of Bond 1:8. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, could admit of

no doubt. The question was, whether G. H. Watts and P. H.

\Vatts could sue jointly for business transacted by them as

attorneys. They had agreed to become partners on a stipula-

tion that P. H. W'atts should always receive £300 yearly out

of the ﬁrst pro-ﬁts as his share, and should not be liable for any

losses. It was argued that this latter stipulation prevented

them from being partners; but the court held the contrary.

Each of them worked for the common beneﬁt of both, and

each of them, therefore, act:-d as agent of the other. The pro-

duce of the labor of each was to be brought into a common

fund, to be afterwards shared according to certain arrange-

ments between themselves. The case was really free from

doubt.

A similar principle explains and justiﬁes the decision of

the Court of Common Pleas in Barry vs. Ncsham, 3 C. B. 641.

The question was, whether the defendant was liable for goods

furnished to one Lowthin in the way of his business as the

11

The authorities cited in argument did not throw much light
upon the subject. I can find no case in which a person has
been made liable as a dormant or sleeping partner, where the
trade might not faiuly be said to have been carried on for him,
together with those ostensibly conducting it, and when, therefore, he would stand in the position of principal towards the
ostensible members of the firm as his agents. This was certainly the case in Wauoh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (cmte p. 67).
There Messrs. Carver, who were ship agents at Portsmouth,
agreed witb Giesler, a ship agent at Plymouth, that if he
would establish himself as a ship agent at Cowes, they would
share between them the profits of their respective agencies
in certain stipulated proportions. \Vhen, therefore, Geisler,
in pursuance of the agreement, did establish himself at Cowes,
nnd there ca1Ty on the business of a ship agent, he, in fact,
curried it on for the benefit of Messrs. Carver as well as of
himself; and the court held that, in these circumstances, the
stipulation which they had entered into that neither party
to the agreement should be answerable for the acts of the
other, was a stipulation which they could not make so as
thereby to affect third persons. Each firm was carrying on
business on account not only of itself but also of the other firm;
this, therefore, made each firm the agent of the other.
The case of Bond -vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, could admit of
no doubt. The question was, whether G. H. \Vatts and P. H.
\Vatts could sue jointly for business transacted by them as
attorneys. ThPy had agreed to become partners on a stipulation that P. H. Watts should always receive £300 yearly out
of the first profits as his sha1-e, and should not be liable for any
losses. It was argued that this latter stipulation prevented
them from being partners; but the court held the contrary.
Each of them worked for the common benefit of both, and
ea.ch of them, therefore, act~'d as agent of the other. The produce of the labor of each was to be brought into a common
fund, to be afterwards shared according to certain arrangements between themselves. The case was really free from
doubt.
A similar principle explains and justifies the decision of .
the Court of Common Pleas in BarnJ vs. Ncslia.m, 3 C. B. 641.
The question was, whether the 'defendant was liable for goods
furnished to one Lowthin in the wuy of his business as the
11
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printer and publisher of a newspaper. Nesham had sold the
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stock and good will of the paper to Lowthin, in consideration

printer and publisher of a newspaper. Nesham had sold the
stock and good will of the paper to Lowthin, ia considr-ration
of £1,500, and on a further stipulation, that for seven years
the profits were to be applied as follows: that is to say, Lowthin was to have the first £150 of the annual profits, then
Nesham was to have them to the extent of £500, if they made
so much, and Lowthin was to have all beyond. It is clear
that Lowthin was conducting the business for the common
benefit of both, subject to their private arrangements as to
the shares they should separately be entitled to; Lowtbin
was, the refore, clearly the agent of N es ham.
Owen vs. Body is at most a case in which a dictum may be
found. The Court of Queen's Bench was quite right in holding that the creditors were justified in refusing to execute
the deed tendered to them; and that is all which was decided.
None of the other cases cited carried the doctrine farther
than those I have referred to, and I therefore think that in
this oase the judgment appealed against ought to be reversed.

of £1,500, and on a further stipulation, that for seven years

the proﬁts were to be applied as follow: that is to say, Low-

thin was to have the ﬁrst £150 of the annual proﬁts, then

Nesham was to have them to the extent of £500, if they made

so much, and Lowthin was to have all beyond. It is clear

that Lowthin was conducting the business for the common

beneﬁt of both, subject to their private arrangements as to

the shares they should separately be entitled to; Lowthin

was, therefore, clearly the agent of Nesham.

Owen vs. Body is at most a case in which a dictum may be

found. The Court of Queen’s Bench was quite right in hold-

ing that the creditors were justiﬁed in refusing to execute

the deed tendered to them; and that is all which was decided.

None of the other cases cited carried the doctrine farther

than those I have referred to, and I therefore think that in

this case the judgment appealed against ought to be reversed.

'n

K Lord Wm\'sz.m'nALa. These two cases come before your
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lordships on appeal from the Exchequer chamber by which

court: a judgment of the court of ‘common pleas was affirmed.

They both involve the same question. The court of common

pleas was unanimous in favor of the plaintiif below. The

court of exchequer chamber, consisting of six learned judges,

and the six learned judges who have given their advice to

your Lordships, have been equally divided. I am of opinion

that the judgment of the court of common pleas was wrong,

and that it ought to be reversed. ~-

' The question is, whether either of the defendants, Cox pr

Wheatcroft, was liable as acceptor of certain bills of exchange,

dated in March, April, and June, 1855, drawn by the plaintiﬂ’

below on the Stanton Iron Company, and accepted by one

James Haywood as per pron that company. And the simple

question will be this, whether Haywood was authorized by

either of the defendants, as a partner in that company, to bind

him by those acceptances.

Haywood must be taken to have been authorized to accept

for them by those who actually carried on business under that

ﬁrm. Were the appellants partners in it? The case will depend

entirely on the construction of the deed of the 13th Novem-ber,

Lord WENSI,EYDALE. These two cases come before your
lordships on appeal from the Exchequer chamber by which
court n judgment of the court of ·common pleas was affirmed.
They both involve the same question. The court of common
pleas was unanimous in favor of the plaintiff below. The
court of exchequer chamber, consisting of six learned judges,
and the six learned judges who have given their advice to
your Lordships, have been equally divided. I am of opinion
that the judgment of the court of common pleas wa.s wmng,
and that it ought to be reversed.
· The question is, whether either of the defendants, Cox ,or
Wheatcroft, was liable as acceptor of ce1·tain bills of exchange,
dated in March, April, and June, 1855, drawn by tbe plaintiff
below on the Stanton Iron Company, and ac~ept<'d by one
James Haywood as per proc that company. And the simple
question will be this, whether Haywood was authorfaed by
either of the defendants, as a partner in that company, to bind
him by those acceptances.
Haywo~d must be taken to have b<>en authorized to accept
for them by those who actually carried on business under that
ftrm. Were the a.ppellants partn<>rs in it? The case will depend
entirely on the constructioh of the deed of the 13tb November,

1\
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1849. There is no other evidence affecting either of them. And

HICKMAN.

83

the question is, whether the subscription of both, as creditors

of- the Smiths, made them partners in the business carried on

by the trustees in the name of the Stanton Iron Company.

Wheatcroft could not be liable in the character of trustee,

for he had ceased to be such before the bills were drawn, and

the plaintiff knew it.

The terms of the deed have been so fully brought before

your lordships, that I do not consider it necessary to state

them at any length. One of the provisions in the deed was

this authority to the trustees to execute all contracts and

instruments in carrying on the business, which would cer-

/
tainly authorize the making or accepting bills of exchange.

The question then is, whether this deed makes the creditors

who sign it partners with the trustees, or, what is really the

same thing, agents, to bind them by acceptances on account

of the business.

The law as to partnership is undoubtedly a branch of the

law of principal and agent; and it would tend to simplify and

make more easy of solution the questions which arise on this
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subject, if this true principle were more constantly kept in

view. Mr. Justice STORY lays it down in the ﬁrst section of

his work on Partnership. He says: “Every partner is an

agent of the partnership, and his rights, powers, duties, and

obligations, are in many respects governed by the same rules

and principles as those of an agent; a partner virtually

embraces the character of both a principal and agent.” Pothier

says: “Contractus societatis non secus ac oontractus mandati."

Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2,'Intr0duction.

A man who allows another to carry on trade, whether in

his own name or not, to buy and sell, and to pay over all the

proﬁts to him, is undoubtedly the principal, and the person

so employed is the agent, and the principal is liable for the

agent’s contracts in the course of his employment. So if two

or more agree that they should carry on a trade, and share

the proﬁts of it, each is a principal, and each is an a.gent for

the other, and each is bound by the other’s contract in carry-

ing on the trade, as much as a single principal would be by

the act of an agent, who was to give the whole of the proﬁts

to his employer Hence it becomes a test of the liability of

{one for the contract of another, that he is to receive the whole

1849. There is no other evidence affecting either of them. And
the question is, whether the subscription of both, as creditors
of· the Smiths, made them partners in the business carried on
by the trustees in the name of the Stanton Iron Company.
Wheatcroft could not be liable in the clmracter of trustee,
for he had ceased to be such before the bills were drawn, and
the plaintiff knew it.
The terms of the deed have been so fully brought before
y<>ur lordships, that I do not consider it necessary to state
them at any length. One of the provisions in the deed was
this authority to the trustees to execute all contracts and
instruments in carrying on the business, which would certainly authorize the making or accepting bills of exchange.
The question then is, whether this deed makes the creditors
who sign it partners with the trustees, or, what is really the
same thing, agents, to bind them by acceptances on account
of the business.
The law as to partnership is undoubtedly a branch of the
law of principal and agent; and it would tend to simplify and
make more easy of BOlntion the questions which arise on this
subject, if this true principle were more constantly kept in
view. Mr. Justice STORY lays it down in the first section of
his work on Partnership. He says: "Every partner is an
agent of the partnership, and his rights, powers, duties, and
obligations, are in many respects governed by the same rules
and principles as those of an agent; a partner virtually
embraces the character of both a principal and agent." Pothier
says: "Cofl.tractus societatis non secus ac contractus mandati."
Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, 'Introduction.
A man who allows another to carry on trade, whether in
his own name or not, to buy and sell, and to pay over all the
profits to him, is undoubtedly the principal, and the person
eo employed is the agent, and the principal is liable for the
agent's contracts in the course of his employment. So if two
or more agree that they should carry on a trade, and shar..:?
the profits of it, ench is a principal, and each is an agent for
the other, and each is bound by the other's contract in carrying on the trade, as much as a single principal would be by
the act of an agent, who was to give the whole of the profits
~to bis employer. Hence it becomes a test of the liability of
tone for the contract of anotl,ler, that be is to receive the wbold
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‘for a part of the proﬁts arising from that contract by virtue of

the agreement made at the time of the employment. I believe

this is the true principle of partnership liability. Perhaps the

maxim that he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the

loss, often stated in the earlier cases on this subject, is only

the consequence, not the cause, why a man is made liable as

a partner. i

Can we then collect from the trust deed that each of the

subscribing creditors is a partner with the trustees, and by the

mere signature of the deed constitutes them his agents for

carrying on the business on the account of himself and the

rest of the creditors? 1 think not. It is true that by thisdeed

the creditors will gain an advantage by the trustees carrying

on the trade; for, if it is proﬁtable, they may get their debts

paid; but this is not that sharing of proﬁts which constitutes

the relation of principal, agent, and partner. -

If at creditor were to agree with his debtor to give the latter

time to pay his debt till he got money enough out of his trade

to pay it, I think no one‘ could reasonably contend that he
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thereby made him his agent to contract debts in the way of

his trade; nor do I think that it would make any difference

that he stipulated that the debtor should pay the debt out

of the proﬁts of the trade.

' The deed in this case is merely an arrangement by the Smiths

to pay their debts, partly out of the existing funds, and partly

out of the expected proﬁts of their trade; and all of their

effects are placed in the hands of the trustees, as middlemen

between them and their creditors, to effect the object of the

deed, the payment of their debts. These effects are placed

in the hands of the trustees as the property of the Smiths,

to be employed as the deed directs, and to be returned to them

when the trust are satisﬁed. I think it is impossible to say

that the agreement to receive this debt, so secured, partly out

of the existing assets, partly out of the trade, is such a par-

ticipation of proﬁts as to constitute the relation of principal

and agent between the creditors and trustees. The trustees

are certainly liable, because they actually contract by their

undoubted agent; but the creditors are not, because the

trustees are not their agents. The case of Owen vs. Body, 5

{A & E. 28, on which some reliance was placed, is really no

authority for holding that the creditors by subscription became

L __ ._. _.

?or a part of the profits arising from that contract by virtue of
Jthe agreement made at the time of the employment. I believe
this is the true principle of partnership liability. Perhaps the
maxim that he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the
loss, often stated in the earlier cases on this subject, is only
the consequence, not the cause, why a man is made liable as
a partner.
Can we then collect from the trust deed that each of the
subscribin~ creditors 'is a partner with the trustees, and by the
mere signature of the deed constitutes them his agents for
carrying on the busine.ss on the account of himself and the
rest of the creditors? I think not. It is true that by thi_~d
the creditors will gain an advantage by the trustees carrying
on the trade; for, if it is profitable, they may get their debts
paid; but this is not that sharing of profits which constituteat
the relation of principal, agent, and partner. ·
If a creditor were to agree with his debtor to give the latter
time to pay bis debt till he got mouey enough out of his trade
to pay it, I think no one· could reasonably contend that he
thereby made him his agent to contract debts in the way of
his trade; nor do I think that it would make any difference
that he stipulated that the debtor should pay the debt out
of the profits of the trade.
'The deed in this case is merely an arrangement by the Smiths
to pay their debts, partly out of the existing funds, and partly
out of the expected profits of their trade; and all of thefr
effects are placed in the bands of the trustees, as middlemen
between them and their creditors, to effect the object of the
deed, the payment of their debts. These effects are placed
in the hands of the trustees as the property of the Smiths,
to be employed as the deed directs, and to be returned to them
when the trusts are satisfied. I think it is impossible to sa7
that the agreement to receive this debt, so secured, partly out
of the existing assets, partly out of the trade, is such a pat•ticipation of profits as to constitute the relation of principal
and agent between the creditors and trustees. The trustees
are certainly liable, because they actually contract by theh·
undoubted agent; but the creditors are not, because the
(trustees are not their agents. The case of Owen tis. Body, a
J A. & E. 28, on which some reliance was placed, is really no
authority for holding that the creditors by subscription became

""-.....
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actually partners. In the short judgment of Lord Dr-muss,

the expression used is not that the deed imposed such con-

ditions as would have constituted a partnership amongst those

who subscribed it, but as might have had the effect, which is

a much more doubtful expression. It was quite enough for

the decision of that case, that the subscription exposed them

to the peril of being considered partners, of which peril the

opinions of a majority of the judges leave no doubt; and that

prevented the deed from being a fair deed, and good again-st

creditors. So did the provision that the effects which ought

to have been divided equally amongst the creditors, should

be put in peril by being employed in trade.

.The case of J ancs vs. Whitbrearl-, 20 Law J., N. S., C. P. 217,

which was distinguished as authorizing a trader to wind up,

can hardly be supported on the ground of that distinction. It

exposed the creditors signing to perils, though not in the

same degree.

The case of Bond cs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, cited on the

part of the plaintiff, turned entirely upon the special circum-
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stances, it being perfectly olear that both the two attorneys,

of whom the plaintiff was assignee, were the parties with

whom the contract was made, independent of the circumstance

of a payment of ﬁxed sums being made to one out of the

proﬁts. It was not that fact that was considered to make them

partners; it was not necessary to decide that point.

I, therefore, advise your lordships to reverse the judgment.

Cnourron and W1r.Lnms, J. J., gave opinions concurring

with BLACKBURN, J., in holding the defendants liable.

CHANNELL, B., YVIGHTMAN, J ., Ponnocx, Ch. B., Lord Chan-

cellor Caurnnnn, Lord Bnouonam and Lord Cnmnmsvonn gave

opinions holding the defendants not liable.

Judgment reversed.

Norm: See Mechanfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 58, 6?.

a<·tually partners. In the short judgment of Lord DENMAN,
the expression used is not that the deed imposed such conditions as would have constituted a partnership amongst those
who subscribed it, but as might have had the effect, which is
a much more doubtful expression. It was quite enough for
the decision of that case, that the subsc1iption exposed them
to the peril of be-ing considered partners, of which peril the
opinions of a majority of the judges leave no doubt; and that
prevented the deed from being a fair deed, and good against
creditors. So did the provision that the effects which ought
to have been divided equally amongst the creditors, should
be put in peril by be~ng employed in trade.
,The case of Janes t:s. Wllitbre.a<l, 20 Law J., N. S., C. P. 217,
which was distinguished as authorizing a trader to wind up,
can hardly be supported on the ground of that distinction. It
exposed the creditors signing to perils, though not in the
l1aJil e degree.
The ease of Bond vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, cited on the
pnrt of the plaintiff, turned entirely upon the special circumstances, it being perfectly clear that both the two attorney..,
of whom the plaintiff was assignee, were the parties with
whom the contract was mo.de, independent of the circumstance
of a payment of fixed sums being made to one out of the
profits. It was not that fact that was considered to make them
partners; it was not necessary to decide that point.
I, therefore, advise your lordships to reverse the judgment.
CROMPTON and -n'n,LIAMS, J. J., gave opinions concurring
with BLACKnunN, .J., in holding the defendants liable.
CHANNELL, B., "\VIGHTMAN, J., POLLOCK, Ch. B., Lord Chancellor CAMPBELL, Lord BnoUGHAM and Lord CHELMSFORD gave
opinions holding the defendants not liable.
Judgment reversed.
Nar.: See Mecbem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 58, ~
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Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881.

45 Mlch., 18s, 40 Am. Rep. 465, 7 N. W. Rep. 785.

Assumrsrr for goods sold and delivered. Defendant brings

BEECHER vs. BUSH.

error. The opinion states the facts.

H. M. Chem;-er, John Atkinson and J. P. Whittcmore, for

defendant. '

Supreme Cot1rt of Michigan, 1881.

W. B. Jackson and C. I. Walker, for plaintiff.

COOLEY, J. The purpose of the action in the court below

was to charge Beecher as partner with Williams for a bill of

4fi Mich., 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, 7 N. W. Rep.

7~

supplies purchased for the Biddle House in Detroit. Thefacts

are all found by special verdict, and are few and simple.

Beecher was owner of the Biddle House, and Williams pro-

for goods sold and delivered.
error. The opinion states the facts.
AssUMPSIT

Defendant brings

posed in writing to “hire the use” of it from day to day, and

open and keep it as a hotel. Beecher accepted his proposals

and Williams went into the house and began business, and in

the course of the business made this purchase. The proposals

H. M. Cheever, John Atlcinson and J. P. Whittemore, for
defendant

are set out in full in the special verdict.

The question is whether by accepting the proposals Beecher

W. B. Jackson and 0. I. Walker, for plaintiff.

made himself a partner with \Villiams in the hotel business;
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and this is to be determined on the face of the writing itself.

It is conceded that Beecher was never held out to the public

as a partner, and that the bill of supplies was purchased on

the sole credit of Williams and charged to him on the books of

the plantiffs below. The case, therefore, is in no way embar-

rassed by any questions of estoppel, for Beecher has done

nothing and suffered nothing to be done which can preclude

him from standing upon his exact legal rights as the contract

ﬁxed them.

Nor do we understand it to be claimed that the parties

intended to form a partnership in the hotel business, or that

they supposed they had done so, or that either has ever

claimed as against the other the rights of a partner. It is per-

fectly clear that many things which are commonly incident to

:1 partnership these parties meant should be wholly excluded

from their arrangement. Some of these were of primary

CoOl,EY, J. The purpose of the action in the court below
was to charge Beecher as partner with \Villiams for a bill of
supplies purchased for the Biddle Romie in Detroit. The facts
are all found by special verdict, and are few and simple.
Beecher was owner of the lliddle House, and Williams pro·
posed in writing to "hire the use" of it from day to day, and
open and keep it as a hotel. Beecher accepted his proposals
and \Yilliams went into the house and began business, and in
the course of the business made this purchase. The proposals
are set out in full in the special verdict.
The question is whether by accepting the proposals Beecher
made himself a partner with \Villiams in the hotel business;
and this is to be determined on the face of the writing itself.
It is conceded that Beecher was never held out to the public
as a partner, and that the bill of supplies was purchased on
the sole credit of Williams and charged to him on the books of
the plantiffs below. The case, therefoI"e, is in no way embarrassed by any questions of estoppel, for Rwrher has done>
nothing and suffered nothing to be done which can precludP
him from standing upon bis exact legal rights as the contrnct
:fixed them.
Nor do we understand it to be claimed that the parties
intended to form a partm~rship in the hotel business, or that
they supposed thc:>y had done so, or that either has ever
claimed as against the other the rig·hfa of a partner. It is perfc>ctly clear that man.r things which are commonly incident to
a partnership these parties nwant should be wholly excludell
from their arrangement. Some of these were of prima1-y
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importance. It is plain, for example, that Beecher did not

81

understand that his credit was to be in any way involved in

the business, or that he was to have any interest in the supplies

that should be bought, or any privilege to decide upon them, or

any legal control whatever until proceeds were to be divided,

or any liability to losses if losses were suffered. These are

among the most common incidents to a partnership; and while

some of them, and possibly all of them, may not be necessary

incidents, yet the abence of all is very conclusive that the

parties had no purpose whatever to form a partnership, or to

give to each other the rights and powers, and subject each

other to the obligations of partners. In general this should be

conclusive. If parties intend no partnership the courts should

give eﬂ’ect to their intent, unless omebody has been deceived

by their acting or assuming to act as partners; and any such

case must stand upon its peculiar facts, and upon special

equities.

It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partner-

ship and yet to form one. If they agree upon an arrangement.

which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they
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call it something else, or that they even expressly declare that

they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the

legal import of their agreements, and names go for nothing

when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be

inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor

of their intent; otherwise we should “carry the doctrine of con-

structive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the

unwaryz” KENT, C. J., in Post vs. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.)

470, 504.

We have then a case in which the party it is sought to

charge has not held himself out, or suﬂ"ered himself to be held

out as a partner either to the public at large or to the plaintiff,

and has not intended to form that relation. T He is not, there-

fore, a. partner by estoppel nor by intent; and if he is one at

all, it must be by construction of law. _

What then are the indicia of partnership in this case; the

marks which force that construction upon the court irrespect-

ive of the intent of the parties; that in fact control their intent.

and give to the parties bringing suit rights which they were

not aware of when they sold the supplies?

In the elaborate and able brief which has been presented

/

/

Importance. It is plain, for example, that Beecher did not
understand that his credit was to be in any way involved in
the business, or that he was to have any interest in the supplies
that should be bought, or any privilege to decide upon them, or
any legal control whatever until proceeds were to be divided,
or any liability to losses if losses were suffered. These are
among the most common incidents to a partnership; and while
some of them~ and possibly all pf them, may not be necessary
incidents, yet the absence of all is very conclusive that the
parties had no purpose whatever to form a partnership, or to
give to each other the rights and powers, and subject each
other to the obligations of partners. In general this should be
conclusive. If parties intend no partnership the courts should
give effect to their intent, unless somebody bas been deceived
by their acting or assuming to act as partners; and any such
case must stand upon its pecuJiar facts, and upon special
equities.
It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partner·
ship and yet to form one. 1f they agree upon an arrangement
which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they
call it something else, or that they even expressly declare thnt
they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the
legal import of their agreements, and names go for nothing
when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be
inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor
of their intent; otherwise we should "carry the doctrine of con·
strnctive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the
unwary:i' KENT, C. J., in Post vs. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.)
470, 504.

We have then a ca.se in which the party it is sought to
charge bas not held himself out, or suffered himself to be held
out as a partner either to the public at large or to the plaintiff,
and has not intended to form that relation. He is not, there·
fore, a partner by estoppel nor by intent; and if he is one at
all, it must be by construction of law.
What then are the indida of partnership in this case; thP.
marks which foree that construction upon the court irrespective of the intent of the parties; that in fact control their intent,
and give to the parties bringing suit rights which they wer 1 ~
not aware of when they sold the supplies?
In the elaborate and able brief which has been presented
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in behalf of the defendants in error, it is conceded that the

fact that Beecher was to receive each day a sum “equal to

one-third of the gross receipts and gross earnings” for the

day would not necessa.rily make him a partner. What is

claimed is that the fact is “cogent evidence” that Beecher

was to participate in the results of the business in a manner

that indicated he was a principal in it, and was not receiving

compensation for the use of property merely. The view of

the law here suggested is undoubtedly correct. There may

_be a participation in the gross returns that would make the

receiver a partner, and there may be one that would not. The

quetion is in what capacity i participation had. Gross returns

are not proﬁts, and may be large when there are no proﬁts,

but it cannot be predicated of either gross returns or proﬁts

that the right to participate is conclusive evidence of partner-

ship. This is settled law both in England and in this country

at this time, as is fully shown by the authorities cited for the

defendants in error. It was recognized in Hinman vs. Littcll,

23 Mich. 484; and in New York, where the doctrine that par-

ticipation in proﬁts proves partnership has been adhered to
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most closely, it is admitted there are exceptions: Eager vs.

Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97.

But we quite agree with counsel for defendants in error that

no case ought to turn upon the unimportant and mereverbal

distinction between the statement in the papers that Beecher

was to h-ave a sum “equal to” one-third of the gross receipts

and gross earnings, and a statement that he was to have one-

third of these receipts and earnings. It is perfectly manifest

it was intended he should have one-third of them; that they

should be apportioned to him regularly and daily, and not that

Williams was to appropriate the whole and pay a sum “equal

to” Beecher’s proportion when it should be convenient. VVe

can conceive of cases where the difference in phraseology

might be important, because it might give some insight into

the real intent and purpose of the parties, and throw light

upon the question wheth-er that which was to be received

was to be received’ as partner or only by way of compensa-

tion for something supplied to the other, but the intent in this

ease is too manifest to be put aside by any mere ingenuity in

the use of words: Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 79, 30 Am.

Dec. 596.

I-1

in behalf of the defendants in error, it is conceded that the
fa_ct that Beecher was to receive each day a sum "equal to
one-third of the gross receipts and gross earnings" for the
day would not necessa.rily make him a partner. What is
claimed is thnt the fact is "cogent evidence" that Beecher
was to participate in the results of the business in a manner
that indicated he was a principal in it, and was riot receiving
compensation for the use of property merely. The view of
the law here suggested is undoubtedly correct. There may
,be a participation in the gro$8 returns that would make the
receiver a partner, and there may be one that would not. The
question is in what capacity is participation bad. Gross returns
are not profits, and may be large when there are no profits,
but it cannot be predicated of either gross returns or profits
that the right to participate is conclusive evidence of partner&hip. i'his is settled law both in England and in this country
at this time, as is fully shown by the authorities cited .for the
defendants in error. It was recognized in Hin.man vs. Littell,
23 Mich. 484; and in New York, where the doctrine that participation in profits proves partnership has been adhered to
most closely, it is admitted there are exceptions: Eager vs.
Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97.
But we quite agree with counsel for defendants in error that
no case ought to turn upon the unimportant and mere. verbal
distinction between the statement in the papers that Beecher
was to have a sum "equal to" one-third of the gross receipts
and gross earnings, and a sta.tement that he was to have onethird of these receipts and earnings. It is perfectly manifest
it was intended be should have one-third of them; that they
should be apportioned to him regularly and daily, and not that
Williams was to appropriate the whole and pay a sum "equal
to" Beecher's proportion when it should be convenient. "\\r~
can conceive of cases where the difference in phraseology
might be important, because it might give some insight into
the real intent and purpose of the parties, and throw light
upon the questi<:m whether that which was to be ~eceived
was to be received as· partner or only by way of compensation for something supplied to the other, but the intent in this
eue is too manifest to be put aside by any mere ingenuity in
the use of words: Loomis vs. MMB1uJ.lZ, 12 Conn. 69, 79, 30 Am.

Dee. 596.
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ln Goa: vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268. 306 (ante P. 70), Lord

89

CRANWORTH stated very clearly his views of what should be

the test of partnership. “It is often said,” he says, “that the

test, or one of the tests whether a person not ostensibly a part-

ln Goa: ·vs. Hickman., 8 H. L. Cas. 2G8. 30G (ante p. 70), Lord
stated very clearly his views of what should be
the test of partnership. "It is often said," he says, "that th~
test, or one of the tests whether a person not ostensibly a partis nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is
whether he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidenee,
that the trade in which the profits have been ID.(lde was carried on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such
a claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade
bad been carlied on by persons acti.ng on his behqlf. When
that is the case, he is liable on the trade obligations, and
entitled to its profits, or to a sha,r e of them. It is not strictly
correct to say that his iight to s9are in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. l The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes hini liable to the other) namely, the
faet that the trade has been carried on in his behalf-i. e., that
be stood in the relation of principal toward the persons acting ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made."/ There is something understanda1b le by the common
mind in this test; there is nothing artificial or arbitrary about
it; it falls in with reason and enables every man to know when
he makes his business arrangements whether he runs the risk
of extraordinary lia1bilities oontracted ·without bis consent or
approval.
It is said, and we believe justly, in Bullen tJS. Sharp, L. R. 1
C. B. 86, that the decision in Goa: t:s. Hickma.n brought back
the law of England to what it should be, and :Mr. Baron BRAMWELL, referring to what was declared to be law in Waugh t's.
Garver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 9th Amer. ed. 1178,
(ante, p. 67) expressed the hope "that this notion is overruled,''
adding that it is "one which I believe has caused more injustice
and mischief than any bad law in our books:" p. 128. It is
certainly overruled very conclusively in Great Britain: Kilshaw
tJ3. Ju~a, 3 B. & S. 847, 113 Eng. Com.L. 846; Shaw va. Gault, 16
. Irish C. L. n. 357; Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218; E:c
parte Delhasse, 7 Ch. Div. 511. And though in New York, the
eonrts, hampered BOmewhat by early cases, have not felt themCRA.NWORTH

ner, is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is

whether he is entitled to participate in the proﬁts. This, no

doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to

participate in proﬁts affords cogent, often conclusive evidence,

that the trade in which the proﬁts have been made was car-

ried on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such

a claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade

had been ‘carried on by persons acting on his behalf. When

that is the case, he is liable on the trade obligations, and

entitled t-0 its proﬁts, or to a share of them. It is not strictly

correct to say that his right to s are in the proﬁts makes him

liable to the debts of the trade. %The correct mode of stating

the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles

him to the one makes him liable to the other) namely, the

fact that the trade has been carried on in his behalf—~i. e., that

he stood in the relation of principal toward the persons act-
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ing ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been

incurred, and under whose management the proﬁts have been

made”) There is something understandable by the common

In-ind in this test; there is nothing artiﬁcial or arbitrary about

it; it falls in with reason and enables every man to know when

he makes his business arrangements whether he runs the risk

of extraordinary liabilities contracted'without his consent or

approval.

It is said, and we believe justly, in Bnllen vs. Sharp, L. R. 1

0. B. 86, that the decision in Goa: cs. Hickman brought back

the law of England to what it should be, and Mr. Baron Bram-

WELL, referring to what was declared to be law in Waugh vs.

Ga/rver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 2 Smith’s Lead. Cases, 9th Amer. ed. 1178,

(ante, p. 67) expressed the hope “that this notion is overruled,”

adding that it is “one which I believe has caused more injustice

and mischief than any bad law in our books:” p. 128. It is

certainly overruled very conclusively in Great Britain: Kilshaw

vs. Juices, 3 B. & S. 847, 113 Eng. Com.L. 846; Shaw vs. Gault, 16

Irish C. L. R. 357; Holmc vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218; E1:

parte Delhasse, 7 oh. Div. 511. And though in New York, the

courts, hampered somewhat by early cases, have not felt them-
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CA.SES ON PABTN"BRSHIP.

selves at liberty to adopt and follow the decision in Cow vs.

Hickman to the full extent, it would be easy to show that the

American authorities in the main are in harmony with it.

Indeed, that is very well shown in Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H.

276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, where the authorities are collated. It

must be admitted, however, that the attempts at an application

of the test to the complicated facts of particular cases have not

been productive of harmonious results. A few cases may be

mentioned which, in their facts, have a resemblance, more or

less strong, to the one before us.

Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 VVend. 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376, was

a case where parties who were severally owners of horses and

stages on diﬁerent parts of one stage line made an arrange-

ment that the fares received by both should be divided between

them in proportions agreed upon. This was held to constitute

them partners, so that a third person injured by the careless-

ness of a driver employed by one might bring suit for the neg-

ligence of aill. But in the somewhat similar case of Eastman

vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, the conclusion of part-

nership or no partnership, it was said, must be drawn as one

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of fact. “The real and ultimate question,” says SMITH, J . (p.

289), “in all cases like the present, is one of agency. Did the

person sought to be charged stand in the relation of principal

to the person contracting the debt? Participation in the proﬁts

is not decisive of that question, ‘except so far as it is evidence

of the relation of principal and agent between the persons "ak-

ing the proﬁts and those actually carrying on the business.’

Wliether such relation existed is a question of fact. ‘ ‘ "

There is no sound foundation for an arbitrary rule of law

requiring courts or juries to regard participation in the proﬁts

as a decisive test which will, in all instances, necessitate the

conclusion that the participator is liable for the debts.”

In Farmers’ Ins. Co. vs. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, it appeared

that by arrangement one party furnished the ground and the

material for making brick, and also the fuel, and anotherwas

at the expense of burning the brick. The brick were then to

be divided, the former reoei-ving one-fourth and the latter three-

fourths, and the latter was also to pay the former ten dollars

on each one hundred thousand bricks. This was held to create

a partnership, and Musicr vs. Trumpbour, 5 Wend. 274, and

Flveritt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, were relied upon as

authority. i

selves at liberty to adopt and follow the decision in Oo:D "'·
Hickman to the full extent, it would be easy to show that the
American authorities in the main are in harmony with it.
Indeed, that is very well shown in Eastman t;B. Clark, 53 N. H.
276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, where the authorities are collated. It
must be admitted, however, that the attempts-at an application
of the test to the complicated fa~ts of particular cases have not
been productive of harmonious results. A few cases may be
mentioned which, in their facts, have a resemblance, more or
less strong, to the one before us.
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376, was
a case where parties who were severally owners of horses and
stages on different parts of one stage line made an arrangement that the fares received by both should be divided between
them in proportions agreed upon. This was held to constitute
them partners, so that a third person injured by the carelessness of a driver employed by one might bring suit for the negligence of aJI. But in the somewhat similar case of Eastman
vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, the conclusion of partnership or no partnership, it was said, must be drawn as one
of fact. "The real and ultimate question," says SMITH, J. (p.
289), "in all cases like the present, is one of agency. Did the
person sought to be charged stand in the relation of principal
to the person contracting the debt? Participation in the profits
is not decisive of that question, 'except so far as it is evidence
of the relation of principal and agent between the persons taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business.'
Whether such relation existed is a question of fact. • • •
There is no sound foundation for an arbitrary rule of law
requiring courts or juries to regard participation in the profits
as a decisive test which will, in all instances, necessitate the
conclusion that the participator is liable for the debts."
In Farmers' Ins. Co. vs. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, it appeared
that by arrangement one party furnished the ground and the
material for making brick, and also the fuel, and another .was
nt the expense of burning the brick. The brick were then to
b:> divided, the former recei-ving one-fourth and the latter tbreefourths, and the latter was also to pay the former ten dollars
on each one hundred thousand bricks. This was held to create
a partnership, and Musier vs. Trumpbour, 5 Wend. 274, and
E1;critt vs. Oltapman., 6 Conn. 347, were relied upon as
nnthority.

Bsscnsa vs. Buss. 91

The New York cases might support this decision, but the
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case of Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, can

hardly be considered in accord with it. The facts were these:

B had a cloth factory. A agreed with him to furnish a full

supply of wool for two years, B to devote the factory for two

years exclusively to manufacturing and the net proceeds, after

deducting the incidental expenses and costs of sale, were to be

divided in the proportion of 55 per centum to A and 45 per

centum to B, and the cost of manufacture was to be shared

in like proportion. This was held no partnership. Says Hum‘-

INGTON, J.: “This comm-unity of proﬁt is the test to deter»

mine whether the contract be one of partnership; and to con-

stitute it a partner must not only share in the proﬁts, but

share in them as a principal; for the rule is now well estab-

lished that a party who stipulates to receive a sum of money

in proportion to a. given quantum of the proﬁts, as a reward

for his labor, is not chargeable as a partner.” And of the share

set off to B he says it “is not expressed in terms to be for such

compensation; but this is its legal meaning :” pp. 77, 79. Moore

vs. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Bowman vs. Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Price
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vs. Alexander, 2 Greene (Ia.), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526, may be

referred to for similar views.-

One of Chief Justice G11-:so.\:’s short but very lucid opinions

is in point here. Between Bronson, a manufacturer, and Dun-

ham, a country merchant, there was an agreement that the

former should furnish wooden handles made to order to the

latter, at a tariff of prices to be paid out of the store, on the

proceeds of the handles; Bronson ﬁnding the labor and stuﬁ,

and receiving a further compensation for skill and the rent of

the torehouse, in the form of a commission of ﬁfty per centum

on the net proﬁts of the whole. It was sought to charge Dun-

ham as a partner with Bronson for the price of raw material

the latter had bought. Upon these facts it is said: “Now, it

has been so often and so invariably ruled in England and

America that a commission on proﬁts is not such an interest in

theconcern as constitutes partnership that the point is at rest.

¥Vhat staggers the mind in this instance is the apparent shal-

lowness of the distinction when it is considered that a commis-

sion of ﬁfty per cent is no more nor less than an equal division

of the proﬁts; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction

is an arbitrary one, resting on authority, not principle; and

'l'he New York cases might support this decision, but the
case of Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, ~an
bardly be oonsidered in accord with it. The facts were these:
B had a cloth factory. A agreed with him to furnish a full
supply of wool for two years, B to devote the factory for twet
years exclusively to manufacturing and the net proceeds, after
deducting the incidental expenses and costs of sale, were to be
divided in the proportion of 55 per centum to A and 45 per
centum to B, and the cost of manufacture was to be shared
in like proportion. This was held no partnership. Says Hmn··
INGToN, J.: "This community of profit is the test to determine whether the contract be one of partnership; and to constitute it a partner must not only share in the profits, but
share in them as a principal; for the rule is now well established that a party who stipulates to receive a sum of money
in proportion to a given quantum of the profits, as a reward
for his labor, is not chargeable as a partner." And of the share
set oft' to B he says it "is not expressed in terms to be for such
compensation; but this is its legal meaning:" pp. 77, 79. Moore
vB. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Bowman vs. Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Price
VB. Alexander, 2 Greene (Ia.), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526, may be
referred to for similar views.,
One of Chief Justice GrnsoN's short but very lucid opinions
is in point here. Between Bronson, a manufacturer, and Dunham, a country merchant: there was an agreement that the
former should furnish wooden handles made to order to the
latter, at a tariff of prices to be paid out of the store, on the
proceeds of the handles; Bronson finding the labor and stuff,
and receiving a further compensation for skill and the rent of
the storehouse, in the form of a commission of fifty per centum
on the net profits of the whole. It was sought to charge Dunham as a partner with Bronson for the price of raw material
the latter had bought. Upon these factR it is said: "Now, it
has been so often and so invariably ruled in England awl
America that a commission on profits is not such an interest in
the concern as constitutes partnership that the point is at rest.
\Vhat staggers the mind in this instance is the apparent shal·
lowness of the distinction when it is considered that a commisNion of fifty per cent is no more nor less than an equal division
of the profits; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction
is an arbitra.r y one, resting on nutbority, not principle; and
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that, whatever be the proportion, the relation produced by a

compensation in the form of a commission is in every instance

the same. But by the terms of the contract Bronson and not

Dunham was to procure and pay for the stud; and they were

not to be partners in that part of the business. This provision,

I admit, would be inoperative against strangers, if the parties

had held themselves out to the public as partners, both in buy-

ing and selling; but assuming for the moment that there was

indeed a partnership in the handles when furnished, and in the

store when stocked with goods, yet it is to be borne in mind

that the handles, as well as the store goods, were to be put into

the concern as separate contributions to the joint stock; and

that, as the stuff for the handles was to be procured by Bron-

son it was consequently to be paid for by him, just as the store

goods were to be procured and paid for by 1)unham, having

been purchased on separate account. There may be a partner-

ship for selling and not for buying; or for buying and not for

selling; or for both buying and selling_,which is the most usual:

as if several put separate quantities of wheat into a common

stock to be ground into flour and sold on joint account; or
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agree to buy jointly and divide the article when bought; or

agree to buy and sell on joint account. In the ﬁrt case each

would be liable for his own purchases only; but in the second

and third cases, each would be liable for the whole. Now if

there were any partnership in this instance it would be of the

ﬁrst class; and in any view of the case the defendant would not

be liable:” Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 Pa. St. 255, 262.

Not dissimilar to this is the case of Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met.

82, which was also a case in which one party supplied the raw

materal and another manufactured it, and was to receive one-

third part of the net proﬁts. This proportion, it was found,

was to be received by the manufacturer only as a compensation

for his labor and services; and it was held perfectly competent

to provide for making compensation by such a standard with-

out constituting a partnership. Perrinc vs. H ankinson, 11 N. J.

181, is relied upon as authority, among other cases. The same

doctrine was reiterated in Holmes vs. Old Colony R. R. Co., 5

Gray 58; Bradley vs. White. 10 Met. 303, 43 Am. Dec. 435; and

by DAY, J.., in a careful opinion in Harvey vs. Childs, 28 Ohio

Ht. 319 (post, p. 97) already referred to.

It is needless to cite other cases. 'l‘he_v cannot all be recon-

that, whatever be the. proportion, the relation produced by a
compensation in the form of a commission is in every instauce
the same. But by the terms of the contract Bronson and not
Dunham was to ·procure and pay for the stuff; and they were
not to be partners in that part of the busineHs. This provision,
I admit, would be inoperative against strange1"S, if the parti~·s .
hn.d held themselves out to the public as partners, both in bu.r-.
ing and selling; but assuming for the moment that there was
indeed a partnership in the handles when furnished, and in tli•~
store when stocked with goods, yet it is to be borne in mind
that the handles, as well as the store goods, were to be put into
the concern as E\fparate contributions to the joint stock; and
that, as the stuff for the handles was to be procUI"ed by Bron&t>n it was consequently to be paid for by him, just as the store
goods were to be procured aild paid for by Dunham, having \
been purchasea on separate account. '!'here may be a partnc.•r·
ship for selling and not for buying; or for buying and not for
selling; or for both buying and selling, which is the most usuul:
as if seve1·al put separate quantities of wheat into a common
stock to be ground into flour and sold on joint account; or
agree to buy jointly and divide the article when bought; 01·
agree to buy and sell on joint account. In the first case each
would be liable for bis own purchases only; but in the second
and third cases, each would be liable for the whole. Now if
there were any partl!ership in this instance it would be of the
ftrst class; and in any view of the case the defendant wouJd not
be liable:" Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 fa. St. 255, 262.
Not i:lissimilar to this is the case of Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met.
82, which was a1so a case in which one party suppJied the raw
materal and another manufactured it, and was to receiYe onethird part of the net profits. This proportion, it wa.s found,
was to be receivffi by the manufacturer only as a compensation
for his labor and services; and it was held perfectly competent
to provide for making compensation by such a standard withcmt constitutinfl a partnership. Perrine vs. Hankinson, 11 N ..J.
181, is relied upon as authority, among other cases. The same
doctrine was reiterated in Holmes vs. Old Colony R. R. Co., 0
Gray 58; Bradley/ vs. White, 10 Met. 303, 43 Am. D<'~. 435; and
by DAY, J .. , in a careful opinion in Harvey vs. Oltilds, 28 Ohio
St. 319 (post, p. 97) already ref erred to.
It is needles~ to dtf' Other c·nsf's. 1'h<>y cnnnot all be recon-
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ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question of part

nership or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests

ciled, but enough are cited to show that in so far as the notion‘\

it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper corrective

had been applied. Except when one allows the public or indi-

vidual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partner-

ship when none exist, he is never to be charged as a partner l

unless by contract and with intent he has formed a relation

in which the elements of partnership are to be found. And

what are these? At the very least the following: Community

of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the con-

duct of which the parties are mutually principals of and agents

for each other, with general powers within the scope of the

business, which powers, however, by agreement between the

parties themselves, may he restricted at option, to the extent

even of making one the sole agent of the other and of the

business.

In this case we have the lawful commerce or business,

namely, the keeping of the hotel. We have also in some sense

a community of interest in the proceeds of the business, though
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these are so divided that all the proﬁts and all the losses are to

be received and home by one only. But where in the mutual

arrangement does it appear that either of the parties clothed

the other with an agency to act on his behalf in this business?

We speak now of intent merely, and not of any arbitrary impli-

cation of intent which the law, according to some authorities,

may raise irrespective of and perhaps contrary to the intent.

Could Beecher buy for the business a dollar’s worth of provi-

sions? Could he hire a porter or a waiter? Could he discharge

one? Could he say the house shall be kept for fastidious

guests exclusively and charges made in proportion to what they

demand, or on the other hand that the tables shall be plain. and

cheap so as to attract a greater number? Could he persist in

lighting with gas if \Villiams chose something different, or

reject oil if Williams saw fit to use it? Was a servant in the

rhouse at his beck or disposal, or could he turn off a guest that

WVilliams saw ﬁt to receive, or receive one that Williams

.1-ejected as unﬁt? In short, what one act might he do or

authority exercise which properly pertains to the business of

keeping hotel, except merely the supervision of accounts, and

this for the purpose of accounting only? And how could he be

ciled, but enough are cited to show that in so far as the notion~
ever took hold of the judicial mind that the qne.stion of part
nership or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests
it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper corrective ·
had been applied. Except when one allows the public or indi- )
vidual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partner- 1
ship when none exist, he is never to be charged as a partner \
unless by contract and with intent he has formed a relation ;
in which the elements of partnership are to be found. And ·.
what are these? At the very least the following: Community
of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the conduct of which the parties are mutually principals of and agents
for each other, with general powers within the scope of the
business, which powers, however, by agreement between the ,
parties themselves, may be restricted at option, to the extent ·
even of making one the sole agent of the other and of the ·
business.
In this case we have the lawful commerce or business,
namely, the kPPping of the hotel. We have also in some sense
a community of interest in the proceeds of the business, though
these are so divided that all the profits and all the losses are to
be receh·ed and borne by om• only. But where in the mutual
arrangement does it appear that either of the parties clothed
.:the other with an agency to net on his behalf in this business?
We speak now of intent merely, and not of nny arbitrary implication of intent which thP law, according to some authoritieii,
may raise irrespective of and perhaps contrary to the intent.
Could Beecher buy for thf> business a dollar's worth of provisions? Could he hire a portPr or a waiter'? Could he discharge~
one? Could hf> say thP house shall be kept for fastidioue
gursts exclusively and charges made in proportion to what they
demand, or on the other hand that the tables shall be plain and
cheap so as to attract n greater number? Could he persist in
lighting with gas if 'Villiams chose somPthing different, or
eject oil if "Willtams saw fit to use it? Was a servant in the
ousP at his beck or disposal, or could he turn off a guest that
'\Villiams saw fit to receive, or receive one that Williams
. l'ejected as unfit? In short. what one act might he do or
;authority exercise which properly pertains to the business of
keeping hotel, except merely the supervision of accounts, and
! this for the purpose of accounting only? And how could he be
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principal in a business over which he had absolutely no con-

trol? Nor must we forget that this is not a case in which

powers which might otherwise be supposed to exist are taken

away or excluded by express stipulation; but they are powers

which it is plain from their contract the parties did not suppose

would exist, and, therefore, have not deemed it necessary to

exclude.

' On the other hand, what single act are we warranted in

inferring the parties understood Williams was to do for, and

as the agent of, Beecher? Not to furnish supplies surely, for

these it was expressly agreed should be furnished by \Villiams

and paid for daily. Not to contract debts for water and gas

bills and other running expenses, for by the agreement there

were to be no such debts. Nor was this an agreement merely

that expenses incurred for both were to be met without the use

of credit, but it was expressly provided that they were to be the

expenses of one party only, and to be met by him from his own

nieans. There was to be no employment of credit, but it was

the credit of Williams alone that was in the minds of the

parties.
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It is diﬁcult to understand how the element of agency could

be more perfectly eliminated from their arrangements than it

actually was. Beecher furnished the use of the hotel and a

clerk to supervise the accounts, and received for so doing onc-

third the gross returns.‘ It was not understood that he was

to intermeddle in any way with the conduct of the business

so long as Williams adhered to the terms of his contract. If

the business was managed badly Beecher might be a loser, but

how could he help himself? He had reserved no right to cor-

rect the mistakes of \Villiams, supply his deﬁciencies, or over-

rule his judgments. He did, indeed, agree to take and account

for whatever furniture should be brought into the house by

Williams, but the bringing any in was voluntary and so far

was Beecher from undertaking to pay to the sellers the pur-

chase price, that on the contrary the value was to be offset

against the deterioration of that which Beecher supplied; and

it was quite possible that, as between himself and Williams,

there might be nothing to pay. And while Williams was not

compellable to put any in, Beecher, on the other hand, had no

authority to put any in at the cost of Williams.

It is plain, therefore, that if there is any agency in this case

principal in a business over which he had absolutely no control? Nor must we forget that this is not a case in which
powers which might otherwise be supposed to exist are taken
away or excluded by exprt'SS stipulation; but they are powers
which it is plain from their contract the parties did not suppoi.:.<...
would exist, and, therefore, have not deemed it necessary to
exclude.
· On the other hand, what single act are we warranted in
inferring the parties understood \Villinms wa.s to do for, and
as the agent of, Beecher? Not to furnish supplies surely, for
these it was expressly agreed should be furnished by \Villiamli
and paid for daily. Not to contract debts for water and ga.s
bills and other running expenses, for by the agreement there
were to be no such debts. Nor was this an agreement merely
that expenses incurred for both were to be met without th~ use
of credit, but it was expressly provided that they were to be the
expenses of one party only, and to be met by him from his own
u1enns. There was to be no employment of credit, but it was
the credit of \Villiams alone that was in the minds of tht'
parties.
It is difficult to undf'rstand how the element of agency could
be more perfectly eliminated from their arrangements than it
actually was. Beecher furnished the use of the hotel and n
clerk to supervise the accounts, and received for so doing on1•third the gross ret\]rns. · It was not understood that be waH
to intermeddle in any way with the conduct of the businesli
so long as Williams adhered to the terms of his contract. If
the business was managed badly Beecher might be a loser, but
·how could he help himself? He bad reserved no right to correct the mistakes of 'Villiams, supply his deficiencies, or overrule his judgments. Ile did, indeed, agree to take and account
for whatever furniture should be brought into tbe house by
Williams, but the bringing any in was voluntary and so far
was Beecher from undertaking to pay to the sellers the plll"chase price, that on the contrary the value was to be offset
against the deterioration of that which Beechl'r supplied; and
it was quite possible that, as between himself and William~,
there might be nothing to pay. And while Williams was not
compeIJable to put any in, Beecher, on the other hand, had no
authority to put any in at the cost of 'Williams.
It is plain, therefore, that if there is any agency in this case
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for Beecher to act for Williams, or Williams to act for Beecher,

it is an agency implied by law, not only without having

expressed a purpose that an agency shall exist, but in spite of

their plain intent that none shall exist. If, therefore, we shall K

say that agency of each to act for the other, or agency of one

to act for both in the common business, is to be the test of

.partnership, or to be one of the tests, but that the law may l

imply the agency irrespective of the intent, and then imply the

partnership from the agency, we see at once that the test dis- /

appears from all our calculations. To imply something in

order that that something may be the foundation whereupon

to erect an implication of something else is a. mere absurdity.

The test of par; ship must be found in the intent of the

parties themselves. They may say they intend none when

their contract plainly shows the contrary; and in that case the

intent shall control the contradictory assertion; but here the

intent is plain.

We have not overlooked anyone of the circumstances which

on the argument were pointed out as peculiar to this case.

None of them is inconsistent with the intent that Beecher was
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to be paid for the use of his building and furniture merely. He

retained possession; but a reason for this appears in the power

he reserved to terminate the arrangement whenever the con-

tract was broken by VVilliams. Being in possession he might

suppose he could eject Williams without suit. He might also

think it important to the reputation of the hotel that no land-

lord should be in debt for supplies or for servants’ wages; and

for that reason require cash payments. It is easy to see that

as lessor he might have had an interest in all the stipulations to

which William’s assent was required.

There is another view of this case that seems to us conclu-

sive. lt is urged on behalf of defendants in error that Beecher

was a dormant partner. Now a- dormant partner is a secret

partner; one who becomes such by aseciet arrangement, while

his associate is held out to the world as sole proprietor and

manager of the business. Was this the case here? Nothing

in the record indicates it. Beecher was in possession of the

hotel, and we must suppose had his clerk there. These were

facts open and patent to the whole world who had occasion to

go there or to deal with Williams. They naturally suggested

the inquiry what was the arrangement between the parties;

/

\_

for Beecher to act for 'Williams, or \Vi Ilia ms to act for Beecher,
it is an agency implied by law, not only without having
expressed a purpose that an agency shall exist, but in spite or
their plain intent that none shall exist. If, therefore, we shall {
say that agency of each to act for the other, or agency of one \
to act for both in the common business, is to be the test of .
,partnership, or to be one of the tests, but that the law may f
imply the agency irrespective of the intent, and then imply the
partnership from the agency, we see at once that the test dis- /
/
appears from all our calculations. To imply something in
order that that something may be the foundation whereupon
to erect an implieation of something else is a mere absurdity.
The test of par: ·ship must be found in the intent of the
parties themselves. They may say they intend none when
their contract plainly shows the contrary; and in that case the
intent sbia,)] control the contradictory assertion; but here the
intent is plain.
We have not overlooked anyone of the circumstances which
on the argument were pointed out as peculiar to this case.
None of them is inconsistent with the intent that Beecher was
to be paid for the use of his building and furniture meFely. He
retained possession; but a reason for this appears in the power
he reserved to terminate the arrangement whenever the contract was broken by 'Villiams. Being in possession he might
suppose he could eject \Villiams without suit. He might also
think it important to the reputation of the hotel that no landlord should be in debt for supplies or for servants' wages; and
for that reason require cash payments. It is easy to see that
as lessor be might have had an interest in all the stipulations to
which 'W illiam's assent was required.
There is another view of this case that seems to us conclusive. It is urged on behalf of defendants in error that Beecher
was a dormant partner. Now a dormant partner is a secret
partner; one who becomes such by a secret arrangement, while
his associate is held out to the world as sole proprietor and
manager of the business. Was this the case here? Nothing
in the record indicates it. Be€cher wa-s in possession of the
hotel, and we must suppose ha.d his clerk there. 'fbese were
· facts open and patent to the whole world who had occasion to
go there or to deal with Williams. They naturally suggested
the inquiry what was the arrangement between the pa.rties;
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and there is nothing in the case to indicate that plaintiffs in

error would not have learned all the details of the arrangement

had they made the necessary inquiries. There is no indication

anywhere of intended secrecy. If, therefore, there was any

partnership at all, it existed because the contract and the

open and public conduct of business under it created one, and

the right of the defendants in error to recover must depend

upon whether they had a right, with the contract before them,

to understand that they were furnishing supplies on the credit

of Beecher. \Vould they have had this right ?. If so, no inter-

ference of Beecher, and no notice to them not to sell to

Williams relying on Beecher’s credit, would have been

of the least avail. If he had said to them, “Gen-

tlemen, by our contract, Mr. Williams furnishes all

the supplies; I do not and cannot control in respect to quality,

quantity, or cost; he alone, by our understanding, is to pay for

them, and I forbid you to sell on my credit;” it would all have

been useless. On their view of the case he was bound by an

iron rule of the law, from which it would have been impossible

to recue his credit until the arrangement with Williams

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

should in some manner be terminated. And this would have

been the case also even if the arrangement with Williams had

been a secret one, and Beecher had attempted to protect him-

self by disclosing its terms. This is as much as to say that

parties are not at liberty to contract as they please, even when

they propose nothing ~ong and do nothing unfair to any one.

But we cannot bring our minds to this result.

Our conclusion is that Beecher and \Villiams, having never

intended to constitute a partnership, are not as between them-

selves partners. There was to be no common property, no

agency of either to act for the other or for both, no participa-

tion in proﬁts, no sharing of losses. If either had failed to per-

form his part of the agreement, the remedy of the other would

have been a suit at law, and not a bill for an accounting in

equity. If either had died, the obligations he had assumed

would have continued against his representatives. \Ve also

{think there can be no such thing as a partnership as to third

persons when as between the parties themselves there is no

par tnerslnp and the third persons hawe not been misled by con-

L cealment of facts or by deceptive appearances.

‘\

\
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and there is nothing in the case to indicate that plnlntitfa In
error would not have lenrned all the details of the arrangement
bad they made the necessary inquiries. There is no indication
anywhere of intended secrec·y. If, therefore, there was any
pnrtlwrsbip at all, it existed because the contract and the
01wn and public conduct of business under it created one, and
the right of the defendants in error to recover must dep~nd
upon whether tbPy ~ad a right, with the contract before them,
to understand that thPy were furnishing supplies on the credit
of Beecher. \Vould they have had this l'ight'!. If so, no interference of Beecher, and no notice to them not to sell to
'Villialll.9 relying on Beecher's credit, would have been
of the least avail. If he had said to tlwm, "GentlemPn, by our contract, Mr. Williams furnishes all
the supplies; I do not nnd cannot control in respect to quality,
quantity, or cost; he alone, by our understanding, is to pay for
them, and I forbid ;rou to Hell on my credit;" it would all have
been useless. On their view of the case he was bound by an
iron rule of the law, from which it would have been impm1siblc
to rescue his credit until the arrangement with \Villiams
should in some manner be terminated. And this would have
bec>n the case also even if the arrangement with \Villiams had
been a secret one, nnd Beecher had attempted to protect himself by disclosing its terms. This is as much as to say that
parties are not at libPrly to contract as th.-.v please, even wlwn
they propose nothing ·on~ and do nothing unfair to any one.
But we cannot bring our minds to this rei;mlt.
Our conclusion is that nec>ther and "'illiams, having never
hit<>ndPd to constitute a pm·tnership, are not as betwPPn themseh·es partners. There was to be no common property, no
ng<'ncy of either to act for the other or for both, no participation in profits, no sharing of losses. If eitlwr bad failed to perform his part of the agreement, the rem('dy of thP other would
have been a suit at law, and not a bill for an accounting in
equity. If either had died, the obligations he had assumed_
would have continued against his repr('Sl'ntatives. We also ·.
(think there can be no such thing as a partnership as to third "
p1•rsons when as between the partit>s thPmseh-es there is no
pa1-tnership and the third persons have not been misled by con(
cealment of facts or by deceptive appearanc~s.
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The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial

ordered.

Nora: See Meohenfs Elem. of Pa/rt.n., § 63.

w

The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new, trial
ordered.

HARVEY vs. CHI LDS.

Supreme Court of Ohio, 1876..

NOTK: See .14eohem'• Elem. of Partn., § 63.

28 Ohio St. 319; 22 Am. Rep. 387.

Action for money. The case is sufficiently stated in the

opinion of the court.

Maison 1.6 D-irlam, for plaintiff in error.

•

Brinkerhoﬁ at Diclcqz/, for defendants in error.

DAY, J. The original action was brought by Harvey against

HARVEY vs. CHILDS.

Childs and Potter, to recover $158.40, for seventeen hogs sold

by Harvey to Potter.

Supreme Court of Ohio, 1816. ,

Potter is in default. Childs denies his liability. His liability

is claimed solely on the ground that he was a partner of Pot-

28 Ohio St. 31!>, 22 Am. Rep. 38T.

ter in the adventure for which the hogs were purchased.

The partnership claimed rests on the following state of

facts: Potter went to Childs, and told him that he had con-
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tracted for about two car loads of hogs, to be delivered at

Loudonville the next day, and had not the money to pay for

Action for money.
opinion of the court.

The case is sufficiently stated in the

them. He asked Childs to advance the money and take an

interest in the hogs. Childs refused. Thereupon Potter pro-

Matson &; D·i rlam, for plaintiff in error.

posed that if he would let him have the money to enable him

to pay for the hogs he had bought, and others he might have

Brinkerhoff & Dickey, for defendants in error.

to buy to make the two car loads, he (Childs) should take

possession of the hogs when carred at Loudonville, as security,

for the money, take them to Pittsburg, sell them, and take his

pay from the proceeds of the sale; that he might have one-

half the net proﬁts of the adventure, and that in no event

should Childs sustain any loss,‘ but the money advanced by

him should be fully paid by Potter in case the amount realized

from the sale of the hogs was insuﬁicient. Childs accepted the

proposition, and, it being agreed that $2,500 would be enough

13

DAY, J. The original action was brought by Harvey against
Childs and Potter, to recover $158.40, for sev~nteen hogs sold,
by Harvey to Potter.
Potter is in default. Childs denies bis liability. His liability
is claimed solely on the ground that he was a partner of Potter in the adventure for "~hich the hogs were purchased.
The partnership claimed rests on the following state of
facts: Potter went to Childs, and told him that he had contracted for about two car loads of hogs, to be delivered at
Loudonville the next day, and had not the money to pay for
them. He asked Child!!! to a.dvance the money and take au
interest in the hogs. Childs refused. Thereupon Potter proposed that if he would let him have the money to enable him
to pay for the hogs be bad bought, and others he might have
to buy to make the two car loads, he (Childs) should take
possession of the hogs when carrPd at Loudonville, as security
for the money, take them to Pittsburg, sell them, and take his
pay from the proceeds of the sale; that he might have one-half th~ pet profits of the adventure, and that in no event
should Childs sustain any loss,- but the money advanced by. ,
bim should be fully paid by Potter in case the amount realized
from the sa"le of the bogs was insufficient. Childs accepted the
proposition, and, it being agreed that $2,500 would be enough
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to pay for the two car loads he advanced that sum to Potter.

Afterward, without the knowledge of Childs, Potter bought

the hogs in question of Harvey, on his own credit, and they

made part of the two car loads of hogs which were taken pos-

session of by Childs, sold in Pittsburg, and the avails of the

sale were appropriated in payment of the money advanced to

him. No proﬂtswere made. The avails of the sale were

insuﬂicient to pay the amount advanced by-Childs, and Potter

paid him the deﬁciency, and for his time and expense in the

transaction. _

The question to be considered, then, is, are the defendants,

by co-nstruction of law, to be regarded partners as to the

plaintiff, being a. third person, in the debt incurred to him

by‘ Potter in his own name?

What shall he regarded, as to third persons, a. test of part-

nership between parties who did not consider themselves to

be partners, and who have done nothing to estop them from

denying that they are such has been much discussed by

courts and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be

one of diﬁicult solution. It is needless to review here the
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numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results

is suﬂlcient.

N0 little diﬁiculty has been experienced in determining the

meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized as

tests of a partnership in such cases, and in their application

to the varying cases that arise.

The eﬁort has been to draw a distinct line between cases

where one has a community of interest in the proﬁts of a.

business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled

to receive a sum of money out of the proﬁts as a creditor, or a

sum proportioned to a quantum of proﬁts, or a. share of the

proﬁts as a compensation for services or labor.

Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the idea

of a communion of proﬁts, nevertheless the foundation of the

liability of one partner for the acts of another is the relation

they sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent.

That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes the true test of a

partnership liability, and rests upon the just foundation that

the joint liability was incurred on the express or implied

authority of the party sought to be charged.

But if the relation of principal and agent be regarded as

to pay for the two car loads he advanced that sum to Potter.
Afterward, without the knowledge of Childs, Potter bought
the hogs in question of Harvey, on his own credit, and they
made part of the two car loads of hogs which were taken podsession of by Childs, sold in Pittsburg, and the avails of the
sale were appropriated in payment of the money advanced to
him. No profits. were made. The avails of the sale were
insufficient to pay the am<>unt advanced by·Childs, and Potter
paid him the deficiency, and for his time and expense in the
transaction.
The question to be considered, then, ls, are the defendants,·
by construction of law, to be regarded partners as to the
plaintiff, being a third person, in the debt incurred to him
by Potter in his own name?
Wha.t shall be regarded, as to third persons, a test of partnership between parties who did not consider themselves to
be partners, and who have done nothing to estop them from
denying that they are such has been much discussed by
courts and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be
one of difficult solution. It is needless to review here the
numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results
ls sufficient.
No little difficulty has been experienced in determining the ·
meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized as
tests of a partnership in such cases, and in their application
to the varying cases that arise.
The effort has been to draw a distinct line between cases
where one has a community of inte1·est in the pro.fits of a
business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled.
to receive a sum of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a
sum proportioned to a quantum of profits, or a share of the
profits as a compensation for services or labor.
Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the idea.
of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation of the
liability of <>ne partner for the acts of another is the relation
they sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent.
That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes the true test of a
partnership liability, and rests upon the just foundation that
the joint liability was incurred on the express or implied
authority of the party sought to be charged.
But if the relation of principal and agent be regarded as
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the test of a partnership and coneqnent joint liability, the

question still remains, what shall be deemed sufficient evi-

dence of that relation, or to raise the implication of authority

to incur the liability in question?

To this end numerous tests have been supposed to exist

..;

but the best considered and least objectionable is that of am

community of interest in the proﬁts of a business or transac-

tion as a principal or proprietor. Pars. on Part. 71, and note;

(‘oll. on Part, secs. 25, 44. See, also, Story on Part., secs. 36,

38, 60; Berthold cs. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536.

But this test is valuable as a rule chieﬂy because it evinces

a relation between the parties, where each may reasonably be

presumed to act for himself and as agent for the others, and

to that extent establishes the fact that the liability was in-

curred on the authority of all so participating in the proﬁts.

Participation in the proﬁts of a business, however, cannot be

regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to be
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unjustly applied to a case where a debt is incurred by one

who cannot ‘be said to be acting, in the particular transac-

lion, as the agent or on behalf of the party sought to be

charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test of a partner-

ship, at last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties

as principal a-nd agent, to be proved by any competent evi-

dence; for when they sustain that relation, a joint liability may

be said to have been incurred by the authority, or on behalf of

each of the parties so related. The tendency of the more

modern authorities, both English and American, is to this

conclusion.

The case of Cow vs. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords

in 1860, has become a leading case on the subject. 99 E. C. L.

,_,,-17; 8 House of Lords Cases, 268. It is summarized in the sub-

_ sequent case of Bullen vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86, by BLACK-

BURN, J., as follows: “I think that the ratio decidendi is

{that the proposition laid down in Waugh cs. Carver, viz., that

pa participation in the proﬁts of a business does of- itself, by

,operation of l£IW,‘00I1Sﬁilli8 a partnership, is not a correct

statement of the law of England; but that the true question

zis, as stated by Lord Cmmwonrn, whether the trade is carried

,on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner,

_,*the participation in the proﬁt being a most important.ele-

iment in determining the question, but not being in itself deci-

the test of a partnership and consequent joint liability, the
question still remains, what shall be deemed sufficient evidence of that relation, or to raise the implication of authority
to incur the liability in question?
To this end numerous tests have been supposed to exist;./!
but the best considered and least objectionable is that of a
community of interest in the profits of a busilwss or transaction as a principal or proprietor. Pars. on Part. 71, and note;
('oil. on Part., secs. 25, 44. See, also, Story on Part., secs. 36,
38, 60; Berthold -vs. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536.
But this test is valuable as a rule chiefly because it evincesa relation between the parties, where each may reasonably be
presumed to act for himself and as agent for the others, and
to that extent establishes the fact that the liability was incurred on the authority of an so participating in the profits.
Participation in the profits of a business, however, cannot be
regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to bu
unjustly applied to a case where a debt is incurred by one
who cannot ·be said to be acting, in the particular transaction, as the agent or on behalf of the party sought to be
charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test of a partnertoihip, at last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties
as principal and agent, to be proved by any competent evidence; for when they sustain that relation, a joint liability may
be said to have been incurred by the authority, or on behalf of
each of the parties so related. The tendency of the more
modern authorities, both English and American, is to this
eoncluslon.
The case of CoaJ vs. Bickman, decided by the House of Lords
in 1860, has become a leading case ou the subject. !)9 E. C. L.
,.,141; 8 Honse of J..ords Cases, 268. It is summarized in the sub. sequent case of Bullen vs. Sharp, J,,. R. 1 C. P. 86, by BLACKBURN, J., as fo1lows: "I think th.Ht the ratio decidendi is
\that the proposition laid down in Waugh vs. Carver, viz., that
. a participation in the profits of H businf'sR does of itself, by
, operation of law, ·constitute a partnership, is not a correct
t statement of the law of England; but that the true question
.·is, as stated by Lord CRANWORTH, whether the trade is carried
>on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner,
_.'the participation in the profits being a most impoM:nnt. ele1ment in determining the question, but not being in itself deci-
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whether it is such a. participation in the proﬁts as to consti-

tute the relation of principal and agent between the persons

taking the proﬁts and those actually carrying on the business.“

Add. on Cont. 163.

These cases were decided before the passage of the act of

parliament in relation to pa-rtnerships. But, so far as relates

to this question, in a subsequent case, BRAMWELL, J., declared,

in effect, that the act was only declaratory of the common law,

as held in Cow vs. Hickman. Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Ex.

218.

The question was much considered in Eastman vs. Clark, 53

N. H. 276, where the authorities are fully collated and ably

reviewed. The case was decided in 1872. The conclusion

arrived at is stated by Suns, J., as follows: “The real ulti-

mate question in all cases like the present is one of agency.

Did the person sought to be charged stand in the relation of

principal to the person contracting the debt? Participation

in the proﬁts is not decisive of the question; except so far as

it is evidence of the relation of principal and agent between
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the persons, taking the proﬁts and'those actually carrying on

the business. Whether such relation actually exists is a que 1.-

ticn of fact. Upon the trial 'of that question, proof of a right

to participate in the proﬁts would be a cogent and often practi-

cally conclusive piece of evidence to establish the existence of

that relation, but there is no sound foundation for an arbitrary-

rule of law requiring courts or jurors to regard participa-

tion in the proﬁts as a decisive test which will in all instances;

necessitate the conclusion that the participator is liable for the

debts.”

In the absence of any known stipulation to the contrary,

every party of a trading ﬁrm, within the scope of the joint

busines in contemplation of law, is clothed with implied

authority to enter into simple contracts on behalf of the ﬁrm

in furtherance of the business of the partnership, and thereby-

bind each member of the ﬁrm. Where, therefore, as in the.

case of Wood vs. Valletta, 7 Ohio St. 172, and in the later case

of Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, money is advanced, to be

used in a trading business, and returned in a year with a

share of the proﬁts made during that time, it may well be

implied that the business was conducted on behalf and by the

sive; the test being, in the language of Lorcl WEss1,ETDALID',
whether it is such a participation in the proftls as to constitute the relation of p1"incipal and agent between the penmnf4
taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business.""
Add. on Cont. 163.
These cases were decided before the passage of the act of
parliament in relation to pa.rtnerships. But, so far as relates
to this question, in a subsequent case, BRAMWELL, J., declared,_
in effect, that the act was only declaratory of the common law;
as held in Coz vs. Hickman. Holme VB. Hammond, L. R. T Ex.
218.
The question was much considered in Eastman VB. Clark, 5:l'
N. H. 276, where the authorities are fully collated and abl1
reviewed. The· case was decided in 1872. The conclusion
arrived at is stated by SMITH, J., as follows: "The real ultimate question in all cases like the present is one of agency.
Did the person eought to be charged stand in the relation of ·
principal to the person contracting the dPbt? Participation ·
in the profits is not decisive of the question; except so far as
it is evidence of the relation of principal and agent between
the persons, taking the profits and' those actually carrying on
the business. Whether such relation actually exists is a que j ,
tion of fact. Upon the trial 'or that question, proof of a right
to participate in the profits would be a cogent and often practically conclusive piece of evidence to establish the existence of
that relation, but there is no sound foundation for an arbitrar;r
imle of law requiring courts or jurors to r<>gard participation in the profits as a decisive test which will in all instances:
necessitate the conclusion that the participator is liable for the
debts."
In the absence of any known stipulation to the contrary,
every party of a trading firm, within the scope of the joint
business in contemplation of law, is clothed with implied
authority to enter into simple contracts on behalf of the firm
in furtherance of the business of the partnership, and thereby
bind each member of the firm. \\'here, therefore, as in the.
case of Wood vs. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, and in the later case()f Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, money is advanced, to be
used in a trading business, and returned in a'. year with A
share
the profits made during that time, it may well be
implied that the business was conducted on behalf and by the

of
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authority of the person advancing the money and sharing the

101

proﬁts, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way,

that he looks for his proﬁts.

But such cases are plainly distinguishable from one where

money is advanced, to be embarked in a single transaction,

where no credit is contemplated. In such case there is no

ground for the implied authority to incur debts. such as exists

in regard to a general trading business. Add. on Cont. 161.

In the case before us it is obvious that it was not contem-

plated in the arrangement between Childs and Potter that

any indebtedness should be incurred in the purchase of hogs

for the contemplated adventure, to which the whole business

was to be conﬁned. There is, then, no ground for the implica-

tion of authority from Childs to incur the debt in question.

On the contrary, such implication is rebutted by the advance-

ment of money to pay for all the hogs that were to come to

his hands. *

Moreover, Childs had no legal interest in any of the hogs

until they were delivered to him at the cars, nor had he any

equitable interest in hogs, before such delivery, that were
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bought by Potter and not paid for by money received from

Childs. He had, then, no interest whatever in the hogs bought

of Harvey on credit, when the debt to him was incurred; and

Potter, before delivery to Ghilds, might have sold them- with-

out being liable to Childs. The fact is apparent that it was

the understanding of the parties that Potter had bought for

himself, and, if need be, was in like manner to buy enough

more hogs to make two car loads; and it cannot be doubted

that, until their delivery at least, all the hogs belonged to

Potter alone, and at most were only regarded as his contri-

bution to the enterprise. If so regarded, the case is like that

of ‘Wilson vs. Whitehead, 10 M. & \V. 503, where it was agreed

between three parties that one should edit, another print, and

the other publish a paper, and share equally in the net proﬁts.

The printer was to furnish the paper and charge the ﬁrm at

cost prices. It was held that the printer alone was liable to

the person of whom he bought the paper. PARKE, B., said:

“The question is, did the other defendants authorize Whit<--

head to purchase the paper on their account or on his own. It

appears to me, on the true construction of the contract, that

the latter was thecase. When the paper was in his possession

authority of the person advancing the mon:.iy and sharing the
profits, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way,
that he looks for his profits.
But snd1 eases are plainly distinguishable from one where
money is advanced, to be embarked in a single transaction,
where no credit is contemplated. In such case there is no
ground for the implied authorit_y to incur debts. sueb as exists
in regard to a general trading business. Add. on Cont. 161.
In the cai;;e before us it is obdon!ol that it was not contemplated in the arrangem<'nt bt•t wet'n Childs a.nd Potter that
any indebtedness should be incurred in the purchase of hogs
for the contemplated adventure, to which the whole business
was to be confined. There is, then, no ground for the implication of authority from Chihh; to inC'ur the debt in questiou.
On the contrary, such implication is rPbutted by the advancement of money to pay for all the hogs that were to come to
his bands.
Mo1"e0w•r, Childs had no legal interest in any of the hogs
until they were delin·red to him at the cars, nor bad be any
equitable interest in hogs, before such delivery, that were
bought by Potter and not paid for by money received from
Childs. He had, tlwn, no interest whatever in the bogs bought
of Harvt>y on credit, when the debt to him was incurred; and
Potter, before delivery to Childs, might hn\'e sold them• wituout being lia.ble to Childs. The fact is apparent that it was
the understunding of the pa1·ti<'s that Potter had bought for
himself, and, if n<-'ed be, was in like manner to buy enough
m-ore bogs to make two ear loads; and it cannot be doubtP rl
that, until their deliwry at least, all the hogs belonged to
Potter al-0ne, and at most were only rt.•garded as bis oontribution to the enterprise. If so regarded, the case is lil:e thnt
of Wilson vs. Wltitcllcad, 10 :M. & "'· uO:l, where it was agre<>•l
between three parties that one should <><lit, another print, and
the other publish a paper, and share equally in the net profits.
The printer was to furnish the paper and charge the firni at
cost prices. It wa.s held that the printer alone was liable to
the perB<>n of whom be bought the paper. PARKE, B., said:
·"The question is, did the other defendants autho1·ize Whit1·head to purchase the paper on their account or on his own. It
appeal"B to me, on the true ronstruction of the contract, th:: t
·the latter was the case. When the paper was in bis possession
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he was at liberty to have appropriated it to any other purpose.

But the truth is, Potter was the owner of the hogs until

they were sold by Childs, for Childs declined to take any inter-

est in the hogs other than as security for the money advanced

by him to Potter. Looking to the whole matter, it is clear

that the transaction was a loan of money by one party to the

other, on the security afforded by the possession of the hogs.

Childs, therefore, was the mere plcdgee of the hogs, with a.

power of sale by agreement of the parties, and, as such, had

only special property in the hogs. The general property in

the hogs, from ﬁrst to last, remained in Potter. He was the

owner, and if they had died on‘ the way to market, without

the fault of Childs, the loss would have fallen upon Potter.

both by the. positive agreement of the parties, and the legal

eﬁ’ect of the transaction between them as bailor and bailee.

There was, then, strictly speaking, no mutuality or com-

munity of interest between them in the hogs. Childs had no

interest in them other than as security for a debt, and to

ﬁnd in half the proﬁts of their sa.le the measure of his reward
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for the use of his money, to be paid out of Potter’s property.

(The relation of the parties was that of debtor and creditor,

of bailor and bailee, and not that of partners3 They had no

mutual interest in the hogs in common as principals or pro

prietors, nor was either acting as principal for himself and

agent for the other. If, however, that relation could be said to

exist after the hogs were delivered to Childs, there is no

ground for an inference that the debt to Harvey, previously

contracted by Potter, was incurred upon the authority of

Childs. On the contrary, the facts rebut any implication of

such authority, and are consistent only with the supposition

that the debt was incurred without authority from Childs, who

was doubtless no less surprised to learn of the debt than

Harvey was, after the failure of Potter, to ﬁnd the existence

of a rule of law under which he had unwittingly given credit

to another and responsible party. We may, in conclusion.

therefore, well adopt in this case the language of Judge Stronr

(Part, sec. 36): “Now, it is incumbent upon those who insist

that a partnership exists between the parties, as to third

persons, by mere operation of law, in opposition to their own

intention, _to establish that in the given case, under all the

_i_____ __

he was at liberty to have appropriated it to any other purpose."
But the truth is, Potte1· was the owner of the hogs until
1 hey were sold by Childs, for Childs declined to take any interest in the hogs other than as security for the money advanced
by him to Potter. Looking to the whole matter, it is clear
that the transaction was a loan of money by one party to the
other, on the security afforded by the possession of the bogs.
0hilds, therefore, was the mere pledgee of the bogs, with a
power of sale by agreement of the parties, and, as such, had
only special property in the hogs. The general property in
the bogs, from first to la.st,, remained in Potter. He was the
owner, and if they had died on· the way to market, without
the fault of Childs, the loss would have fallen upon Potter.
both by the positive agreement of t_he parties, and the legal
effect of the transaction between them as bailor and bailee.
There was, then, strictly speaking, no mutuality or community of interest between them in the bogs. Childs had no
intrrest in them other than as security for a debt, and to
find in half the profits of their sa.le the measure of his reward
for the use of his money, to be paid out of Potter's property.
(The relation of the parties was that of debtor and creditoT,
of bailor and bailee, and not that of partne~B) They bad no
mutual interest in the bogs in common as principals or proprietors, nor was either acting as principal for himself and
agent for the other. If, however, that relation could be said to
exist after the bogs were delivered to Childs, there is no
ground for an inference that the debt to Harvey, previously
contracted by Potter, was incurred upon the authority of
Childs. On the contrary, the facts rebut any implication of
such authority, and are consistent only with the supposition
that the debt was incurred without authority from Childs, who
was doubtless no less surprised to learn of the debt than
Harvey was, after the failure of Potter, to find the existence
of a rule of law under which he bad unwittingly given credit
to another and responsible party. We may, in conclusion,
·therefore, well adopt in this case the language of Judge STonY
(Part., sec. 36): "Now, it is incumbent upon those who Insist
that a partnership exists between the parties, as to third
persons, by mere operation of law, in opposition to their own
intention, .to establish that in the given case, under all the
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circumstances, there is such a rule, and that it is strictly

applicable.”

This disposes of the material questions made by the record.

The court of common pleas gave judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, against both Childs and Potter.

The District Court, on error reversed the judgment as to

Childs. It follows that the judgment of the District Court

must be affirmed.

Judgment accordingly.

NOTE: See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 64, 65.

Q3

MEEHAN vs. VALENTINE.

Supreme Court of the United States, 1892.

circumstances, there is such a rule, and that it ls stdctly
. applicable."
This disposes of the material questions made by the record.
The court of common pleas gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, against both Childs and Potter.
The District Court, on error reversed the judgment as to
Childs. It follows that the judgment of the District Court
must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.

145 U. s. 611, as L. ed. ass, 12 Sup. or. Rep. 972.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas J.

NOT.a: See Mechem'& Eltm. of Partn., §§ 64, 65.

Meehan, a citizen of Maryland, against John K: Valentine,

executor of \Villiam G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania,

alleging Perry to have been a partner with Lawrence XV. Coun-

selman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Coun-
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selman & Co., and counting on promissory notes of various

dates from August 10, 1883, to, November 25, 1884, signed by

that ﬁrm, indorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to

MEEHAN vs. VALENTINE.

about $10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry

was a partner in the ﬁrm.

Supreme Court of the United, States, 189!.

At the trial, the plaintiif put in evidence the following

agreement:

145 U. S. 611, 86 L. ed. 885, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972.

“L. W. Counselman, Albert L. Scott, Office of L. W. Coun-

selman & Co., Oyster and Fruit Packers, corner Philpot and

Will streets. Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880. For and in

consideration of loans made and to be made to us by Wm.

G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten

thousand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of

said loans, we agree to pay to said VVm. G. Perry, in addition

to the interest thereon, one-tenth of the net proﬁts over and

above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the

year commencing May lsi. 1880, and ending May 1st, 1881,—

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas J.
Meehan, a citizen of Maryland, against John K: Valentine,
executor of \Villiam G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania,
alleging Perry to have been a partner with Lawrence W. Coun·
selman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Coun~elman & Co., and counting on promissory notes of various
dates from August 10, 1883, to.November 25, 1884, signed by
that firm, indorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to
about $10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry
was a partner in the firm.
At the trial, the plaintiff put in evidence the following
agreement:
"L. W. Counselman, Albert L. Scott, Office of L. W. Counselman & Co., Oyster and Fruit Packers, corner Philpot and
Will streets. Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880. For and in
consideration of loans made and to be ma.de to us by Wm.
G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten
thomiand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of
eaill loans, we agree to pay to said \Vm. G. Perry, in addition
fo the interest thereon, one-tenth of the net protits over and
above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the
year comm-encing May bt. 1880, and ending May 1st, 1881,-
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i. e., if our net proﬁts for said year’s business exceeds the sum

of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G.

Perry one-tenth of said excess of proﬁts over and above the

said sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agreed

that if our net proﬁts do not exceed the sum of ten thousand

dollars, then he is not to be paid more than the interest on

said loan, the same being added to notes at the time they are

given, which are to date from the time of said loans, and

payable one year from date. L. \V. Counselman & Co.”

Also the following indorsement thereon: “March 2, 1881.

This contract and agreement is to continue one year longer

on the same basis,—~i. e., from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st,

1882. L. W. Counselman & Co.”

Also three further renewals of the agreement from year to

year, the ﬁrst of which was by letter, dated'March 18, 1882,

from L. W. Counselman & Co. to Perry, with the same head-

ing as the original agreement, and saying: “We hereby renew

the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the

effect that we will guarantee you ten per cent. interest upon

loans amounting to $10,000; and that if the net proﬁts of our
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business are over $10,000 for the year commencing May 1.

1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we will in lieu of the ten

per cent. interest give you ten per cent. o'f the proﬁts. We

have two propositions for partnership May lst, and if we

accept either we will then, if you desire, return your loan."

The other renewals, dated April 4, 1883, and March 15, 1884.

were substantially like the original agreement of March 15.

1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rate

of interest was speciﬁed as 6 per cent.

‘The plaintiff further offered in evidence six promissor_v

notes, amounting in the aggregate to $10,600, given by the

ﬁrm to Perry in the months of March, May, and June, 1884.

The plaintiff also called Scott as a witness, who testiﬁed that

the ﬁrm was composed of L. W. Couselman and himself; that

it was engaged in “the fruit and vegetable packing and oyster

business” in Baltimore; that Perry was in thestationery busi-

ness in Philadelphia; that the $10,000 mentioned in the agree-

ment was paid by him to the ﬁrm, receiving their notes for it.

and remained in the business throughout, no part of it having

been repaid; that from time to time he lent other sums to the

ﬁrm, which were repaid; that he was an intimate friend of the

i. e., if our n(>t profits for said year's business exceeds the sum
of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G.
Perry one-tenth of said excess of profits over and above the
said sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agrero
that if our net profits do not exceed the s.u m of ten thousand
dollars, then be is not to be paid more than the interest on
said loan, the same being added to notes at the time they are
given, which are to date from the time of said loans, and
payable one year from date. L. ,V, Counselman & Co."
Also the following indorsement thereon: "March 2, 1881.
This contract and agreement is to continue one year longer
on the same basis,-i. e., from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st,
1882. L. W. Counselman & Co."
Also three further renewals of the agreement from year to
year, the first of which was by letter, dated · March 18, 1882, ·
from L. W. Counselman & Co. to Pen-y, with the same heading as the original agreement, and saying: "We hereby renew
the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the
etrect that we will guarantee you ten per cent. interest upon
loans amounting to $10,000; and that if the net profits of our
business are over fl0,000 for the year commencing May l.
1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we will in lieu of the ten
per cent. interest give you ten per cent. o'f the profits. ·we
have two propositions for partnership May 1st, and if WP
accept either we will then, if you desire, return yo11r loan."
The other renewals, datc>d April 4, 1883, and March 15, 188-l.
were substantially like the original agre<>ment of March 15.
1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rah~
of interest wa.s specified as 6 per cent.
. The plaintiff further offered in evidence six promissor.v
notes, amounting in the aggrPgate to $10,600, given by the
ftrm to Perry in the months of March, l\iay, and June, 1884.
The plaintiff also called Hcott as a witness, who testified thnt
the firm was composed of L. W. Couselman and himself; that
it was engaged in "the fruit and vegetable packing and oysfor
tmsiness" in Raltimore; thnt Perry was in the stationery business in Philadelphia; that the $10,000 mentioned in the agree·
ment was paid by him to the firm, receiving their notes for it,
and remained in the business throughout, no pa.rt of it having
been repaid; that from time to time he lent other sums to th1~
Arm, which were repaid; that be was an intimate friend of the
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witness, and visited him every few weeks; that these visits

were not specially connected with the business, though on such

occasions Perry “usually went down to the place of business

and talked business;” that he annually asked and received

from the ﬁrm accounts of proﬁt and loss; that the accounts

showed an annual proﬁt, which varied from year to year,

amounting for the second year to $11,000 or $12,000; that, it

being then found difﬁcult to tell at the end of the year exactly

what the proﬁts would be, it was agreed with Perry that he

should thenceforth receive $1,000 each year, leaving the ﬁnal

settlement until the whole business was settled up; and that he

received under the agreement about $1,500 the ﬁrst year, and

$1,000 each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the wit-

ness stated that the ﬁrm made an assignment to the plaintiff

for the beneﬁt of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabili-
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ties were from $60,000 to $70,000, about half of which was with

collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been

paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than

$2,000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and,

‘in regard to the ‘$10,000 received from Perry, the witness testi-

ﬁed as follows: “Question, Mr. Counselman and yourself did

owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you? Answer.

They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it?

A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. We

owed it to him; of course we owed it to him, if we did not

lose it.”

At the close of the plaintiﬂ?’s evidence, the defendant moved

for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to show

that Perry was liable as a partner. The court so ruled, and

ordered a nonsuit. 29 Fed. Rep. 276. The plaintiff duly ex-

cepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error.

S. Shclabarger and J . M. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.

Samuel Dickson and R. 0. Dale, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered

't-he opinion of the court.

The granting of a nonsuit by the circuit court, because in its

opinion the plaintiff had given no evidence sutﬁcient to main-

tain his action, was in accordance with the law and practice of

Pennsylvania, prevailing in the courts of the United States
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witness, and visited him every few weeks; that these visits
were not specially connected with the business, though on such
occasions Perry "usually went down to the place of busines}}
and talked business;" that he annually asked and received
from the firm accounts of profit and loss; that the accounts
showed an annual profit, which varied from year to year,
amounting for the second year to ,11,000 or $12,000; that, it
being then found difficult to tell at the end of the year exactly
what the profits would be, it was agreed with Perry that be
should thenceforth receive $1,000 each year, leaving the final
settlement until the wlwle business was settled up; and that be
received under the agreement about $1,500 the fi.1·st year, and
fl,000 each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the witness stated that the firm made an assignment to the plaintiff
for the benefit of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabilities were from $60,000 to $70,000, about half of which was with
collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been
paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than
f2,000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and,
"in regard to the ·$10,000 received from Perry, the witness testified as follows: "Question, Mr. Counselman and yourself did
owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you? Answe1·.
They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it'?
A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. "'e
owed it to him; of course we owed it to him, if we did not
lose it."
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved
for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to show
that Perry was liable as a partner. The court so ruled, and
ordered a nonsuit. 29 Fed. Hep. 276. The plaintiff duly excepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error.

8. Shclabarger and J . .Jf. Wilson, f<>r plaintiff in error.
Samuel Dick.~on and R. C. Dale, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered
the opinion of th.e court.
The granting of a nonsuit by the circuit court, because in its
opinion the plaintiff hall gi vt>n no evidence sufficient to maintain his action, was in accordance with the law and practice of
Pennsylvania, prevailing in the courts of the United States
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held within that state, and is subject to the revision of this

court on writ of error. Central Trans. Co. vs. Pullman's Car

C0., 139 U. S. 24, 3840, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478. The real ques-

tion in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence introduced

by the plaintiﬂf would have been suﬂicient to sustain a verdict

in his favor.

f The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must

'* have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their

ycommon beneﬁt, each contributing property or services, and

I

l

having a community of interest in the proﬁts. Ward vs.

Thompson, 22 How. 330, 334.

Some of the principles applicable to the question of the lia-

bility of a partner to third persons were stated by Chief Justice

Msnsnsm. in a general way, as follows: “The power of an

agent is limited by the authority given him; and, if he tran-

scends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he

acts no longer as an agent. The same principle applies to part-

ners. One binds the others so far only as he is the agent of the
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others.” “A man who shares in the proﬁt, although his name

may not be in the ﬁrm, is responsible for all its debts.” “Stipu-

lations [restricting the powers of partners] may bind the part-

ners, but ought not to atfect those to whom they are unknown,

and who trust to the general and well-established commercial

law.” Winsh-ip vs. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 561., 562. And the chief

justice referred to Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (ante p. 67);

Ear part-c Ilamper, 17 Ves. 403, 412; and Gow. Partn. 17.

How far sharing in the proﬁts of a partnership shall make

one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial dis-

cussion, and the various deﬁnitions have been approximate

rather than exhaustive.

The rule formerly laid down and long acted on as estab-

lished, was that a man who received a certain share of the

proﬁts as proﬁts, with a lien on the whole proﬁts as security for

his share, was liable as a partner for the debts of the partner-

ship, even if it had been stipulated between him and his co-

partners that he should not be so liable; but that merely

receiving compensation for labor or services, estimated by

a certain proportion of the proﬁts, did not render one

liable as a partner. Story, Partn. c. 4; 3 Kent, Comm. 25, note,

32-34; Ea: pa-rtc Hamper, above cited; Pott vs. E3/ton, 3 O. B.

32, 40; Bostwick vs. Champion, 11 VVend. 571, and 18 Wend. 175,

held within that state, and is subject to the revision of this
court on writ of error. Central Tmns. Co. vs. Pullman's Car
Co., 139 U. S. 24, 38·40, 11 Sup. Ct. H€p. 478. The real question in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence introduced
by the plaintiff would have been sufficient to sustain a verdict
in his fayoi-.
{ The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must
i have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their
1 common benefit, each contributing property or services, and
: having a community of interest in th.e profits. Ward 'VB.
1
Thompson, 22 How. 3:10, 334.
Some of the principles applicable to the question of the liability of a partner to third persons were stated by Chief Justice
MARSHALL in a general way, as follows: "The power of an
agent is limited by the authority given him; and, if he transcends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he
acts no longer as an agent. The same principle applies to partners. One binds the others so far only as he is the agent of the
others." ''A man who shares in the profit, although his name
may not be in the firm, is responsible for all its debts." "Stipu~
lations [restricting the powers of partners] may bind the part·
ners, but ought not to atfec;t those to whom they are unknown,
and who trust to t~e general and well-established commercial
law." Winship vs. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 561., 562. And the chief
justice referred to Waugh 'VB. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (ante p. 67);
E:c pat·te Hamper, 17 Ves. 403, 412; and Gow. Partn. 17.
How far sharing in the profits of a partnership shall make
one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial discussion, and the various definitions have been approximate
1·athcr than exhaustive.
The rule formerly laid down and long acted on as established, was that a man who received a cer·tain share of the
profits as profits, with a lien on the whole profits as security for
his share, was liable as a partner for the debts of the partnership, even if it had been stipulated between him and his copartners that be should not be so liable; but that merely
receiving compensation for labor or services, estimated by
a certain proportion of the profits, did not render one
Iiahle as a partner. Story, Partn. c. 4.; 3 Kent, Comm. 25, note,
32-34; Em pa.1·tc Hamper, above cited; Pott vs. Eyton, 3 C. B.
a2, ·10; Bostu;ick 'VB. Champion, 11 \Vend. 571, and 18 Wend. 175,
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184, I85; Burckle vs. Eckart, 1 Denio 337, and 3 N. Y. 132; Denny
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vs. Cabot, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 82; Fitch vs. Harrington, 13 Gray 468,

474, 74 Am Dec. 641; Bru-ndred vs. Muzzy, 25 N. J. Law, 268,

279, 675. The test was often stated to be whether the person

sought to be charged as a partner took part of the proﬁts as a

principal, or only as an agent. Benjamin vs Porteus, 2 H. Bl.

590, 592; Coll. Partn. (1st Ed.) 14; Smith, Mere. Law, (1st Ed.)

4; Story, Partn. § 55; Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69,'78, 30

Am. Dec. 596; Burcklc vs. Eckhart, 1 Denio, 337, 341; Hallct vs.

Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529.

V Accordingly, this court, at December term, 1860, decided

that a person employed to sell goods under an agreement that

he should receive half the proﬁts, and that they should not be

less than a certain sum, was not a partner with his employer.

“Actual participation in the proﬁts as principal,” said Mr.

Justice CLIFFORD in delivering judgment, “creates a partner-

ship as between the parties and third persons, whatever may

be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dor-

mant partner was not expected to participate in the loss

beyond the amount of the proﬁts,” or “may have expressly
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stipulated with his associates against all the usual incidents

to that relation. That rule, however, has no application what-

ever to a case of service or special agency, where the employé

has no power as a partner in the ﬁrm and no interest in the

proﬁts, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or

special agent, and is to receive a given sum out of the proﬁts,

or a proportion of the same, as a compensation for his ser-

vices.” Berthold vs. G'oIdsm.i-th, 24 How. 536, 542, 543. See, also,

Seymour vs. Freer, 8 \Vall. 202, 215, 222, 226; Beckwith vs. Talbot,

95 U. S. 289, 293; Edzcarrls vs. Tracy, 62 Pa. St. 374; Burnett vs.

Snyder, s1 N. Y. 550, 555. (Post p_Ul-1.5..)

Mr. Justice Stony, at the beginning of his Commentaries on

Partnership, ﬁrst published in 1841, said: “Every partner is

an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties, and

obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules

and principles as those of an agent. A partner, indeed, virtu-

ally embraces the character both of a principal and of an agent.

So far as he acts for himself and his own interest in the com-

mon concerns of the partnership, he may properly be deemed

a principal; and so far as he acts for his partners, he may as

properly be deemed an agent. The principal distinction

184, 185; Burckle ·vs. Eckart, 1 Denio 337, and 3 N. Y. 132; Denny
vs. Cabot, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 82; Fitch vs. Harrington, 13 Gray 468,
474, 74 Am. Dec. 641; Brundred vs. Muzzy, 25 N. J. Law, 268,
279, 675. The test was often stated to be whether the person
sought to be charged as a partner took part of the profits as n
principal, or only as an agent. Benjamin vs PorteWJ, 2 H. BI.
590, 592; Coll. Partn. (1st Ed.) 14; Smith, Mere. Law, (1st Ed.)
4; Story, Partn. § 55; Loomis VB. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69,'78, 30
Am. Dec. 596; Burckle -vs. Eckhart, 1 Denio, 337, 341; H aUet VB.
De.aban, 14 La. Ann. 529.
Accordingly, this court, at December term, 1860, decided
that a person employed to sell goods under an agreement that
he should receive half the profits, and that they should not be
less than a certain sum, was not a partner with his employer.
"Actual participation in the profits as principal," said Mr.
Justice CLIFFORD in delivering judgment, "creates a partnership as between the parties and third persons, whatever mny
be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dormant partner was not expected to participate in the loss
'b eyond the amount of the profits," or "may have expressly
stipulated with his associates against all the usual incidents
to that relation. That rule, however, has no application what·
ever to a case of service or special agency, where the employe
has no power as a partner in the firm and no interest in the
profits, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or
special ngent, and is to receive a given sum out of the profits,
or a propo1-tion of the same, as a compensation for his services." Berthold VB. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536, 542, 543. See, also,
Reymour vs. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 215, 222, 226; Beckwith vs. Talbot,
95 U.S. 289, 293; Edzcards vs. Tra~t~Ja. St. 374; Burnett vs.
.)
Rnyder, 81 N. Y. 550, 5l'l5. (Post
Mr. Justice 1.15TORY, at the beginning of his Commentaries 011
Partnership, first published in 1841, said: "Every par1ner h~
an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties, a~d
obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules
nnd principles as those of an agent. A partner, indeed, virtually embraces the character both of a principal and of an a~ent.
'F.lo far as he acts for himself nnd his own interest in the com·
mon concerns of the pa1·tnership, he may properly be <ll'emed
a principal; and so far as he nets for his partners~ he may ns
properly be deemed an agent. The principal distinction
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between him and :1 mere agent is that he has a community of

interest with the other partners in the whole property and

business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an

agent, as such, has no interest in either. Pothier considers

partnership as but a species of mandate, saying contractus soci-

etatis, non germs ac contractus mandati.” Afterwards, in dis-

cussing the reasons and limits of the rule by which one may be

charged as a partner by reason of having received part of the

proﬁts of the partnership, Mr. Justice Sronv observed that the

rule was justiﬁed and the cases in which it had been applied

reconciled, by considering that “a participation in the proﬁts

will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership between

the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other

opposing circumstances ;” but that it is not “to be regarded as

anything more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and

therefore liable to be repelled and overcome by other circum-

stances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them ;”

and therefore that, “if the participation in the proﬁts can be

clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the pre-

sumption of partnership is repelled.” And again: “The true
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rule, cw arquo et bono, would seem to be that the agreement and

intention of the parties themselves should govern all the eases.

If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the

proﬁts, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in

favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown

to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were

intended between the parties, then‘ that there should be none

as to third persons, unless where the parties had held them-

selves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated

as a fraud or deceit upon third persons.” Story, Partn. §§ 1,

38, 49. '

Baron PARKE (afterwards Lord Wnnsnnrnnnn) appears to

have taken much the same view of the subject as Mr. Justice

STORY. Both» in the court of exchequer and in the house of

lords he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be

charged as a dormant partner for the acts of the active part-

ners as depending on the law of principal and agent. Beckham

vs. Drake, (1841), 9 Mccs. & \~V. 79, 98; Wilson vs. Whitehead,

(1842), 10 Mccs. & W. 503, 504; Ernest vs. Nicholls, (1857), 6

H. L. -Cas. 401, 417; Cow vs. Hickman, (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 268,

betwtaen him and a mere agent is that he has a community or
interest with the othE>r p.-irtners in the whole property and
business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an
agent, as such, has no interest in either. Pothier considers
partnership as but a species of mandate, saying contract-us soci,.
etatis, non ~e~ ac contractus mandati." Afterwards, in di~
<·ussing the reasons and limits of the rule by which one may be
l'hargf>d as a partner hJ' N>nson of having received part of the
profits of the partnership, Mr. Justice STORY observed that thP.
rule was justified and the cases in which it bad been applied
recondled, by consid<>ring that "a participation in the profits
will ordinarily estahlish the existence of a partnership between
the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other
opposing circumstances;" but that it is not "to be regarded as
anything more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and
therefore liable to be repelled and overcome by other circum•tances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them;:'
and therefore that: "if the participation in the profits can bP.
.clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the presumption of partnership is repelled." And again: "The true
rule, e:r mquo et bono, would seem to be that the agreement and
· intention of the parties themselves should govern all the cases.
If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the.'
profits, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in
favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown
to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were
intended between the parties, then· that there should be none
ns to third persons, unless where the parties had held them·
selves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated
as a fraud or deceit upon third persons." Story, Partn. §§ 1,
38, 49.
•
Baron PARKE (afterwards Lord WENSLEYDALE) appears to
have taken much the same view of the subject as :Mr. Justice
'STORY. Both in the court of exchequer and in the house of
lords he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be
charged as a dormant partner for the acts of the active partners as depending on the law of principal and agent. BeckJia1n
f1B. Drake, (1841), 9 Mees. & ,V. 79, 98; Wilson vs. Whitehead,
,(1842), 10 Mees. & ,V. 503, 504; Erne.<tt vs. Nicholls, (1857), 6
H. L. Cas. 401, 417; Co:c vs. Hickman, (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 268,
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int-nts_of Story and Pothier from Story, Partn. § 1,, above

cited.

ln that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming

embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their property:

to trustees, empowering them to carry on the business, and to

divide the net income ratably among their creditors, (all of

whom became parties to the deed), and to pay any residue

to the debtors, the majority of the creditors being authorized

to make rules for conducting the business or to put an end

to it altogether. The house of lords, differing from the major-

ity of the judges who delivered opinions at various stages of

the case, held that the creditors were not liable as partners:

for debts incurred by the trustees in carrying on the business

under the assignment. The decision was put upon the ground

that the liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner

is in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent;

that a right to participate in the proﬁts, though cogent, is

not conclusive, evidence that the buiness is carried on in

part for the person receiving them; and that the test of his
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liability as a partner is whether he has authorized the man»

agers of the business to carry it on in his behalf. C'o:z:'vs. H 12010;

man, 8 H. L. Gas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313, nom. Wheatcroft vs.

Hi-ckrnan, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99. .

This new form of stating the general rule did not at ﬁrst

prove easier of application than the old one; for in the ﬁrt

cae which arose afterwards one judge of three dissented,

(Kilshaw vs. Juices, 3 Best & S. 847;) and in the next case the

unanimous judgment of four judges in the common bench was

reversed by four judges against two in the exchequcr cham-

ber, (Bullen vs. Sharp, 18 G. B. [N. S.] 614, and L. R. 1 C. P.

86). And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the

reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate

and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results from partner-

ship rather than partnership from agency. Kelly, O. B., and

Cleasby, B., in Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218, 227, 233;

Jessel, M. R., in Pooley vs. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458, 476. Such

a test seems to give a. synonym, rather than a deﬁnition;

another name for the conclusion, rather than a tatement of

the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. To

say that a person is liable as a partner, who stands in the rela-

312, (ante. p. 1or. And in Oo:r1 ""· Hie-km.an h.e qu.-O'ted. the--statemcn ts. of t:;tory and Pothier from Story, Partn. § 1,. altove
cited.
Jn that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their propert,t
to trustees, empowering them to carry on the busin.ess, and to
divide the net income ratably among their creditors, (all of
whom became parties to the deed), and to pay any residueto the debtors, the majority of the creditors being authorized
to make rnJes for conducting the business or to put an end
1o it altogether. The house of lords, differing from the major•
ity of the judges who del.ivered opinions at various stages ef
the case, held that the creditors were not liable as partnera
for debts incurred by the trustees in carrying on the busineu
under the assignment. The decision was put upon the ground
that the lfobility of one partner for the acts of his copartner
is in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent;
that a right to participate in too profits, though cogent, HI.
not conclusive, evidence that the business is carried on iin
part for the person receiving them; and that the test of hisliability as a partner is whether he has authorized the man·
agers of the business to carry it on in bis behalf. Ooar't7s. Hi.<:'°7
ma?t, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313, nom. Wheatcroft "8•
Hickman, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99.
This new form of stating the general rule did not at inst
prove easier of application than the old one; for in the first
case which arose afh•rwards one judge of three dissented,.
(Kilshaw vs. Jukes, 3 Best & S. 847;) and in the next case the
unanimous judgment of four judges in the common bench was
reversed by four judges against two in the exchequer chamber, (Bullen vs. Sliat·p, 18 C. B. [N. S.] 614, and L. R. l C. P.
86). And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the
reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate
and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results from partnership rather than ·partnership from agency. Kelly, C. B., and
CJeasby, B., in Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218, 227, 23.'3;
Jessel, M. R., in Pooley vs. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458, 476. Such
a test seems to give a synonym, rather than a definition;
another name for the conclusion, rather than a statement of
the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. To
say that a person is liable as a partner, who stands in the rela~
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tion of principal to those by whom the business is actually

carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idea

of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent.

In the case last above cited, Sir George Jessel said: “You

cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless

you grasp the notion of the existence of the ﬁrm as a separate

entity from the existence of the partners,—~a notion which was

well grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly

understood in the courts of equity.” And in a very recent case

the court of appeals of New York, than which no court has

more steadfastly adhered to the old form of stating the rule,

has held that a partnership, though not strictly a legal entity

a distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly

so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in inter-

preting a commercial contract, Bank vs. Thompson, 121 N. Y.

2S0, 24 N. E. Rep. 473. I

In other respects, however, the rule laid down in Goa: as.

Hick-man has been unhesitatingly accepted in England, as

explaining and modifying the earlier rule. In re English 8.:

Irish Society, 1 Hem. & M. 85, 106, 107; Mollwo vs. Court of
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Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435; Ross vs. Pa~rIc_1/ns, L. R. 20 Eq. 331,

335; Ear: pm-te Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Em parte Delhasse, 7_

Ch. Div. 511; Badcley vs. Bank, 38 Ch. Div. 238. See, also,

Davis vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 151, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102;

Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Wild rs.

Dwvcnport, 48 N. J . Law, 129, 7 Atl. Rep. 205, 57 Am. Rep. 552;

Scabury vs. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 16 Atl. Rep. 54, and 52

N. J. Law, 413, 21 Atl. Rep. 952; Morgan vs. Farrell, 58 Conn.

413, 20 Atl. Rep. 614. (Post pl-94.)

In the present state of the law upon this subject, it may,

perhaps, be doubted whether any more precise general rule

can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this

opinion, that those persons are partners who contribute either

property or money to carry on a joint business for their com-

mon beneﬁt, and who own and share the proﬁts thereof in cer-

tain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences

follow that the acts of one in conducting the partnership busi-

ness are the acts of all; that each is agent for the ﬁrm and for

the other partners; that each receives part of the proﬁts as

proﬁts, and takes part of the fund to which the creditor of

the partnership have a right to look for the payment of their

tion of principal to those by whom the business is actually
carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idec.t.
of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent.
In the case last above cited, Sir George Jessel said: "You
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless
you grasp the notion of the existence of the firm as a separate
entity from the existence of the partners,-a notion which was
well grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly
u~derstood in the courts of equity." And in a very recent case
the court of appeals of New York, than which no court has
more steadfastly adhered to the old form of stating the rule,
has held that a partnership, though not strictly a legal entity
as distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly
so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in interpreting a commercial co-ntract, Bank us. Tltompson, 121 N. Y.
2SO, 24 ~. E. RPp. 473. In other respects, however, the rule laid down in Oo:c
Hickman has been unhesitatingly accepted in England, as
explaining and modifying the earlier rule. In re English &
lrrsh Society, 1 Hem. & ?ti. 85, 106, 107; Mollwo vs. Court of
lVards, L. R. 4 P. C. 4 rn, 4:15; Ross vs. l'arkyns, L. R. 20 Eq. 3:31 ~
335; Ex partc Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Ex parte Delhasse, 7.
Ch. Div. 511; Badelc11 vs. Bank, 38 Cb. Div. 238. See, also,
Dat:is vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 151, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102;
Ea.<ttman vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Wild -rs.
DQtrenport, 48 N. J. Law, 129, 7 Atl. Rep. 295, 57 Am. E.ep. 552;
Seabury vs. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 16 Atl. Rep. 54, and 52
N. J. Law, 413, 21 Atl. Rep. 952; Morgan vs. J?arrcll, 58 Conn.
413; 20 Atl. Rep. 614. (Post~-)
In the pre>sent state of the law upon this subject, it may,
perhaps, be doubted whether any more precise general rule
can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this
opinion, that those persons are partners who contribute either
property or money to carry on a joint business for their common benefit, and who own and share the profits thereof in cer·
tain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences
follow that the acts of one in conducting the partnership business are the acts of all; that each is agent for the firm and for
the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as
profits, and takes part of the fund to which the creditors of
the partnerl!lhip have a right to look for the payment of their
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debts; that all are liable as partners upon contracts made by
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any of them with third persons within the scope of the part-

nership business; and that even an express stipulation between

them that one shall not be so liable, though good between

themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And par-

ticipating in proﬁts is presumptive, but not conclusive, evi-

dence of partnership. .

In whatever form the rule is expressed, it is universally held

that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by

a certain proportion of the proﬁts of the partnership business,

is not thereby made a partner, in any sense. So an agreement

that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a certain portion of the

proﬁts thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner

with the lessee. Perrinc vs. Hanlcinson, 11 N. J. Law, 215;

H olmcs rs. Railroad (70., 5 Gray, 58; Beecher vs. Bush, 45 Mich.

188, 7 N. VV. Rep. 785; (ante p. 86). And it is now equally well

settled that the receiving of part of the proﬁts of a commer-

cial partnership, in lieu of or in addition to interest, by way

of compensation for a loan of money, has of itself no greater

effect. Wilson vs. Edmonds, 130 U. S. 472, 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.
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563; Richardson vs. Hnghitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267;

Curry vs. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41 Am. Rep. 343; Cassidy vs. Hall,

97 N. Y. 159; Smith cs. Km‘-yht, 71 Ill. 1-.18, 22 Am. Rep. 94;

Williams vs. Scatter, 7 Iowa 435, 446; Smelting Co. vs. Smith,

13 R. I. 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Mollwo as. Court of Wards, and

Badeley vs. Bank, above cited.

In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the per-

son held liable as a partner furnished the whole capital on

which the business was carried on by another, or else con-

tributed part of the capital and took an active part in the man-

agement of the business. Beauregard vs. Case, 91 U. S. 134;

Hackett vs. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 627, 628, 633, 22 N. E. Rep.

-745; Pratt vs. Langdon, 12 Allen, 544, and 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.

Dec. 61; Rowland vs. Long, 45 Md. 439. And in Mollwo cs. Court

of Wards, above cited, after speaking of a contract of loan and

security, in which no partnership was intended, it was justly

observed: “If cases should occur where any persons, under

the guise of such an arrangement, are really trading as prin-

cipals, and putting forward, as ostensible traders, others who

are really their agents, they must not hope by such devices

to escape liability; for the law, in cases of this kind, will look

debts; that all are liable as partners upon contracts made by
any of them with third persons within the scope of the partnership business; and that even an exp1-ess stipulation between
them tllat one shall not be so lia hie, thougb good between
themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And participating in pr-0tlts is presumptiYe, but not conclusive, evidence of pa'r tnership.
In whatever form the rule is expressed, it is universally held
that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by
a certain proportion of the profits of the partnership business,
ts not thereby made a partner, in any !'ense. So an agreement
that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a certain portion of tlH~
profits thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner
with the lessee. Perrine VB. Hankinson~ 11 N. J. Law, 215;
Holmes t:s. Railroad Co., 5 Gray, 58; Beecher vs. Bush, 45 ~fich .
188, 7 N.
Rep. 785; (ante p. 86). And it is now equull.v well
Eiettled that the receiving of part of the profits of a commercial partllership, in lien of or in addition to interest, by way
of compensation for a loan of money, has of itself no greater
effect. ·wuson t:a. Edmonds, 130 U. S. 472, 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.
563; Richa~·d.<Jon vs. H1tghitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267;
Curry vs. Fo1£ler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41 Am. Rep. :l4:l; Cassidy vs. Hall,
97 N. Y. 159; Smith vs. Kniyht, 71 Ill. U8, 22 Am. Rep. 94;
Williams vs. So11tter, 7 Iowa 435, 446; Smelting Co. t's. Smith,
13 R. I. 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Mollwo VB. Court of Wards, and
Badeley vs. Bank, above cited.
In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the person held liable as a partner furnished the whole capital on
which the business was carried on by another, or else contributed part of the capital and took an active part in the management of the business. Beauregard vs. Case, 91 U. S. 134;
Hackett VB. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 627, 628, 633, 22 N. E. Rep.
745.: Pratt rs. Langdhn, 12 Allen, 5H, and 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.
Dec. 61; Rowland vs. Long, 45 .Md. 439. And in M ollzco vs. Court
of Wm·ds, above cited, after speaking of a contract of loan and
security, in which no partnership was intended, it was justl.v
observed: "If cases should occur where any persons, under
the guise of such an arrangement, are really trading as prin- ·
cipals, and putting forward, as ostensible traders, others who
are really their agents, they must not hope by such devict>~
to escape liability; for the law, in cases of this kind, will look
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at the body and substance of the arrangements. and fasten

responsibility on the parties according to their true and real

character.” L. R. 4 P. C. 438. But in the case at bar no such

clement is found.

Throughout the original agreement, and the renewals there-

of, the sum of $10,000 paid by Perry to the partnership, and

for which they gave him their promissory notes, is spoken of

as a loan, for which the partnership was to pay him legal inter-

est at all events, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly

profits of the partnership business, if those proﬁts should

exceed the sum of $10,000. The manifest intention of the

parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreement, was to

create the relation of debtor and creditor, and not that of part-

ners. Perry’s demanding and receiving accounts and payments

yearly was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There

is nothing in the agreement itself, or in the conduct of the par-

ties, to show that he assumed any other relation. He never

exercised any control over the business. The legal etfect of

the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one

of the partners to his opinion that “it was capital he had in
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the business the same as ours; we owed it to him; of course,

we owed it to him if we did not lose it.”

I'pon the whole evidence, a jury would not be justified in

inferring, on the part of Perry, either “actual participation in

the proﬁts as principal,” within the rule as laid down by this

court in Berthold vs. Goldsmith, or that he authorized the busi-

ness to be carried on in part for him or on his behalf, within

the rule as stated in Cow vs. Hickman and the later English

cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perry

never having held himself out as :1 partner to the plaintiff or

to those under whom he claimed, the circuit court rightly

ruled that the action could not be maintained. Pleasants vs.

Font, 22 Wall. 116; Thompson vs. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 689.

Judgment atiirmed.

Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court

when this case was argued, took no. part in its decision.

Norm: See Mecham‘s Elem. ot Partn., §§ 66, 67, 68.

at the body nnd substance of the arrangements, o.nd fute.B
responsibility on the parties according to their true and real
diaracter." L. R. 4: P. C. 438. But in the case at bar no •u.da
clem<"nt is fou11d.
Through-0ut th.e original agreement, and the renewals thereof, the sum of $10,000 paid by Perry to the partnership, aad
for which they gaYe him their promissory notes, is spoken ef
as a loan, for which the partnership was to pay him legal inter~st at all events, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly
profits of the partnership business, if those profits should
exceed the sum of $10,000. The manifest intention <>f ~
parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreement, was to
create the relation of debtor and creditor, and not that of partners. Perry's demanding and receiving accoonts and payments
yearly was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There
is nothing in the agreement itself, or in the conduct of the parties, to show that he aBSumed any other relation. He never
exerdsed any control over the business. 'fbe legal effect of
the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one
of the partners to his opinion that "it was capital he had in
the business the same as ours; we owed it to him; of course,
we owed it to him if we did not lose it."
l"pon the whole evidence, a jury would not be justified ln
inferring, on the part of l'erry, either "actual participation in
the profits as principal,'' within the rule as laid down by this
court in Bertltold vs. Goldsmith, OI" that he authorized the busiDf.'SS to be carried on in part for him or on his behalf, within
the rule as stated in Oen vs. Hickman. and the later English
cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perr.r
never having held himself out as a partnl'r to the plaintiff or
to those unde1• whom he claimed, the circuit court rightly
ruled that the action could not be maintained. Pleasants va.
Pant, 22 'Vall. 116; Thompson vs. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4 Sup.
Ct. Rep. m:m.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court
when this case was argued, took no part in it& decision.
N<Yr&: See Mechem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 661 67, 68.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1892.

150 Pa. 466, 30 Am. St. Rep. 823, 24 Atl. Rep. 665.

ASSUMPSIT by the First National Bank of 'Waverly against

Charles L. Crandall, Stephen C. Hall, and George F. Lyon,

copartners doing business as Hall & Lyon, William L. \Vat-

WAVERLY NATIONAL BANK vs. HALL.

rous and J. B. Floyd, all late copartners doing business as O.

M. Crandall. Defendants obtained judgment. Plaintiff

Supreme Court of Pennsyfrania, 1892.

appeals.

Rodney A. Mcrcur and Edward Overton, for appellant.

150 Pa. 466, HO Am. St. Rep. 823, 21 Atl. Rep. 665.

D’A. Overton and John 0'. I ngham, for appellees.

HEYDRICK, J . The plaintiff sues upon notes made by C. M.

Crandall, one of the defendants, in his own name, and seeks

to charge the other defendants as partners of br-a.ndall in a

business in which the proceeds of certain other notes,_of which

these were renewals, were used. The evidence relied upon to

establish the alleged partnership is a contract in writing

between Crandall of the one part and the other defendants of

the other part, dated February 24, 1885. If this contract does

not create a partnership as to creditors, it cannot be success-

AssuMPSIT by the First National Dank of Waverly against
Charles L. Crandall, Stephen C. Hall, and George F. Lyon,
copartners doing business
Hall & Lyon, William L. \Vatrous and J. U. Floyd, all late copartners doing business as 0.
M. Crandall.
Defendants obtained judgment. Plaintift
appeals.

as
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fully contended that all the evidence in the cause, taken

together, tends to charge anybody but Crandall; and, inasmuch

as all the assignments of error are predicated upon the assump-

tion that such partnership was created by that contract, it is

evident that, if that assumption was unfounded, the plaintiffs

Rodney A. Mercur and Edward Overton, for appellant.
v~.A..

Overton and John 0. Ingham, for appellees.

could not have been injured by the rulings complained of; and

hence, though there may have been technical error therein,

the judgment ought not to be disturbed. It is therefore per-

tinent to inquire what were the rightsland liabilities of the

parties under that contract, although the question is not

directly raised by any of the assignments of error.

The whole scope of the contract indicates that a loan of

money to Crandall by the other parties in consideration of a

share of the proﬁts of a business in which he was to embark

was intended, and not a contribution to the capital of a part-

15-

HEYDRICK, J. The plaintiff sues upon notes made by 0. M.
Crandall, one of the defendants, in his own name, and seeks
to charge the other defendants as partners of (,randall in a
business in which the proceeds of certain other notes,.of which
these were renewals, were used. The evidence relied upon to
E>Rtablish the alleged partnership is a contract in writing
between Cr·andall of the one part and the other defendants of
the other part, dated February 24, 1885. If this contract doeR
not create a partnership as to creditors, it cannot be succe88fully contended that all the evidence in the cause, taken
together, tends to charge anybody but Crandall; and, inasmuch
as all the assignments of error are predicated upon the assumption that such partnership was created by that contract, it is
evident that, if that assumption was unfounded, the plaintiffK
could not have been injnl'('d by the rulings complained of; aml
hence, though there may have been technical error therein,
the judgment ought not to be disturbed. It is therefore pertinent to inquire what were the rights and liabilities of the
parties under that contract, although the question is not
directly raised by any of the assignments of error.
The whole scope of the contract indicates that a loan or
money to Crandall by the other parties in consideration of a
share of the profits of a business in which he was to embark
was intended, and not a contribution to the capital of a part,
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nership of which the parties were to be the members. The

parties of the second part covenanted to furnish $8,000 to

Crandall, and not to a ﬁrm. They were to furnish it to him-

from time to time, as he might require it, and its payment to

them was to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon the tools,

machinery, furniture. and ﬁxtures of every kind and nature

belonging to or connected with the business in which it was

to be used. Crandall might repay it, at his option, before the

expiration of the full term for which he had the right to

demand it; and, although it was stipulated that the money so

to be furnished should be used in the business contemplated,

the right of entire control of that business was recognized to

be in, and was expressly conceded to, Crandall. And it was

further stipulated that nothing in the writing contained should

be construed to create a partnership between the parties

thereto except as to the proﬁts of the business. These provi-

sions are all consistent with the relation of borrower and

lender, and some of them are inconsistent with any other rela-

tion. It is, therefore, manifest that that relation was intended

to be established; and the next question is whether, in spite of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the intention of the parties, the community of interest in the

proﬁts constituted them a partnership as to creditors. If this

were a Pennsylvania contract, the question would he answered

in the negative by the act of April 6, 1870, (P. L. 56), and by

Hart vs. Kcl-Icy, S3 Pa. St. 286. But, although it was made in

this State, it was to be executed in the state of New York.

Such cases are stated by approved text writers to be an excep-

tion to the general rule that the lea: loci applies in respect to

the nature, obligation, and construction of contracts. That

exception is thus stated by Judge STORY: “But where the con-

tract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other

place, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed inten-

tion of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature,

obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of

the place of performance." Conﬂ. Laws, § 280. Chancellor

Knxr, after stating the exception in substantially the same

terms, adds that it “is more embarrassed than any other branch

of the subject [the lc.r loci-] by distinctions and jarring decis-

ions.” 2 Comm. 459. But, whatever conﬂict of authority there

may be in respect to the exception, all agree that matters con-

nected with the performance of a contract are regulated by

·'

nership of which the parties were to be the members. The
parties of the second part covenanted to furnish $3,000 to
Crandall, and not to a firm. They wer~ to furnish it to him
from time to time, as he might require it, and its payment to
them was to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon the tools,
machinery, furniture. and fixtures of every kind and nature
belonging to 01· connected with the business in wh ich it was
to be used. Crandall might repay it, at his option, before the
-expiration of the full term for which he had the right to
demand it; and, although it was stipulated that the money so
to be furnished should be used in the lmsiness contemplated,
the right of entire control of that business was recognized to
be in, and was expressly conced~d to, Crandall. And it was
further stipulated that nothing in the writing contained should
be construed to create a partnership between the parti~s
thereto except as to the profits of the business. These provisions are all consistent with the relation of borrower and
lender, and some of them are inconsistent with any other relation. It is, therefore, manifest that that relation was intended
to be established; and the next question is whether, in spite of
the intention of the parties, the community of interest in the
profits constituted them a partnership as to creditors. If this
were a Pennsylvania contract, the question would be answered
tn the ne~ative by the act of April 6, 1870, (P. L. 56), and by
Bart 1:s. Kelley, 83 Pa. St. 28G. llut, although it was made in
this Rtate, it was to be executed in th(' stnte of New York.
Such cases are stated by approved text writers to be an exception to the general rule that the lex loci applies in respect to
the nature, obligation, and construction of contracts. That
excrption is thus stated by Judge 8TORY: "But where the contra et is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other
place, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the rontract, as to its validity, nature,
obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of
the place of performance."' Confl. Laws, § 280. Chancellor
KENT, after stating the exception in substantially th:! same
terms, adds that it "is more embarrassed than any other branch
of the subject [the lrJJ loci] by distinctions and jarring decisions." 2 Comm. 4!'i9. But, whatever conflict of authol'ity there
may be in respect to the exc<>ption, all agree that matters connectPd with thr performance of a contract are regulated by
1

..
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the law prevailing at the place of performance. Brown vs.

Ra-ilroatl 00., 83 Pa. St. 316; Scudder 1:8. Bank, 91 U. S. 406.

Under the present contract it is clear there could be no liability

to third persons without a performance as between the parties

to it, and therefore the question of such liability would neces-

sarily be connected with or grow out of such performance, _and

be determinable by the law of New York.

More than a century ago Chief Justice DEGREY, in Grace vs.

Smith, 2 1Vm. Bl. 998, (ante p. 61) laid down the proposition

that “every man that has a share of the proﬁts of a trade ought

also to bear his share of the loss.” In a few years the principle

thus stated became recognized a a part of the law of England}

and so continued until 1.860, when it was overthrown by the

house of lords in Goa: vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Gas. 208, (ante p. 70).

On this side of the Atlantic, and especially in the state of New

York, it was accepted Without question, so far as I ha \'e

observed, as to the soundness of the reasons put forth in sup-

port of it, until it was exploded in England. As early as 1819,

Srnxonn, J ., delivering the opinion of the court in Walden rs.
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Sherlmrne, 15 Johns. 409, said: “No principle is better estab-

lished than that every person is deemed to be in partnership

if he is interested in the proﬁts of a trade, and if the advantages

which he derives from the trade are casual and indeﬁnite,

depending on the accidents of trade.” And, although the judg-

ment of the house of lords in Goa: vs. Hickman was soon fol-

lowed by many American courts, the New York court of

appeals declared as late as 1874, in Lcggctt vs. Hg/dc, 58 N. Y.

272, 17 Am. Rep. 244, that the rule remained in that state -is

it had long been. But, while the judgment of the court sus-

tained the rule, the opinion of the learned judge who pro-

nounced it betrayed dissatisfaction with it, and attempted to

‘depend-it on no other principle than that of stare decisis, and

the chief justice dissented from the judgment itself. The ques-

tion came before the court of appeals again in Richardson rs.

Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267. In that case the defend-

ant had entered into a contract in writing with a ﬁrm engaged

in the business of manufacturing wagons, by the terms of

which they were to manufacture and deliver wagons to him,

and use their best effort to sell them. He was to advance'$50

on each wagon, to be paid on the ﬁrst day of each month, and

at the time of each advance the ﬁrm was to render him an

the law prevailing at the place of performance. Brou;n vs.
Ra4lroad Co., 83 Pa. St. 316; Scudder n. Bank, 91 U. S. 406.
Under the present contract it is clear there could be no liability
to third persons without a performance as between the partiea
to it, and therefore the questi-On of such liability would necessarily be connected with or grow out of such performance, .and
be determinable by the law of New York.
More than a century ~go Chief Justice DEGREY, in Grace ·vs.
Smith, 2 \Vm. Bl. 998, (a.nte p. 61) laid dowu the proposition
that "every man that bas a share of the profits of a trade ought
also to bear his share of the loss.:' In a few yem·s the principl · ~
thus stated became recognized as a part of the law of England~
and so continued until l8ti0, when it was over1hrown by the
house of lords in CoJJ vs. Hickman., 8 H. L. Cas. 2G8, (ante p. 70)_
On this side of the Atlantic, anti. especially
in the state of NPw
I
York, it was accepted without question, so far as I hn \·e
observed, as to the soundness of the reasons put forth in st~p
port of it, until it was exploded in England. As early as 1819,
SPENCER, J., delivering t'he opinion of the court in lr'aldcn rs.
Sherburne, 15 Johns. 409, said: "No principle is better estr. ulisbed than that every person is deemed to be in partnership
if he is interested in the profits of a trade, and if the advantages
which he derives from the trade are casual and indefinite,
depending on the accidents of trade." And, although the jud~
mcnt of the house of lords in Cox vs. Hi<:kman was soon followed by many American courts, the New York court of
appeals declared as late as 1874, in Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. y_
272, 17 Am. Rep. 244, that the rule remained in that state ·1s
it had long been. Dut, while the judgment of the court suHtained the rule, the opinion of the learned judge who pronounced it betrayed dissatisfaction with it, and attempted to
·depend- it on no other principle than that of stare dccisis, and
the chief justice difssented from the judgment itself. The qm·.~
tion came b<>fore the court of appeals again in Richardson f"i'I.
Hugkitt, 76 N. Y. 55, :J2 Am. Rep. 267. In that case the defen·lant had entered into a contract in ,\rriting with a firm engagerl
in the business of manufacturing wagons, by the terms or
which they were to manufacture and deliver wagons to him,
and use their best (•ffort to sell them. He was to advancc'$ti()
on each wagon, to be paid on the first day of each month, an;)
at the time of each advance the firm was to render him an
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pay him one quarter of the net proﬁts thereon, with interest

on the advances. This instrument was construed to be a con-

tract for the loan of money, and not to constitute a partner-

ship. This was followed by Curr_1/ rs. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41

Am. Rep. 343, in which it appeared that certain persons hav-

ing purchased vacant ground in the city of New York, and

being about to erect buildings thereon, entered into a written

contract with Fowler, by the terms of which he was to advance

$50,000 towards the purchase and erection of the buildings,

in consideration of which they “agreed to share the proﬁts of

the said purchase and buildings with the said Fowler;” and

he wa to be allowed interest on his advances, and be secured

by bond and mortgage on the premises. This contract was

held not to create any other relation than that of borrower

and lender; the same judge who delivered the opinion of the

court in the case last cited saying: “In Richardson cs. H ugh-itl-,

76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267, it was held by this court that a

person who has no interest in the business of a ﬁrm, or in the

capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of the proﬁts
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as a compensation for services, or for money loaned for the

beneﬁt of the business, is not a .partner, and cannot be held

liable as such by a creditor of the ﬁrm.” This language was

repeated with approval in Cassidy cs. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159. It

is aid, however, in Hackett vs. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625. 22 N. E.

Rep. 745, that these cases, and others in harmony with them,

do not overrule Lcggctt vs. Hg/dc and its predecessors. But,

while this is aﬂirmed, it is said in the same case that “excep-

tions to the rule [that participation in proﬁts of a business

renders the participant liable‘ to creditors] are, however, found

in cases where a share in proﬁts is contracted to be paid as

a measure of compensation to employés for services rendered

in the business, or for the use of moneys loaned in aid of the

enterprise." It is not material to inquire how much more of

the rule is left by this exception than was left by Com vs. Hick-

man. It is enough that the present case comes within the let-

ter and the spirit of the exception. The parties who made the

loan, and who are now sought to be hold liable as partners,

had no voice or part in the prosecution of the business, either

as principals or otherwise; nor had they an irrevocable right

to demand a share of the profits, as was the case in Hackctt v-9.

account of sales of wagons during the previous month, and
pay him one quarter of the net profits thereon, with interest
on the advances. This instrument was e<>ostrued to be a con·
tract for the loan of money, and not to constitute a partnership. This was followed by C1trr11 rs. Jr'o1cler, 87 ::s'. Y. 33, 41
Am. Uep. 343, in which it appeared that certain persons having purdmsed vacant ~round in the city of New York, an1l
being about to ered buildings thereon, entered into a written
contrnet with Fowln, h~· the terms of which he was to advance
f50,000 towards the purchase and erection of the buildings,
in consideration of which they "agreed to share the profits of
the said purchase and buiJding-s with the said Fowler;" and
he was to be allowed interest on his ad,·anceR, and be secured
by bond and mortgage on the premises. This contract was
held not to create any other rPlntion than that of borrower
and lender; the same judge who delivered the opinion of the
court In the case last cited saying: ''In Richardson t:s. Hugh·i tt,
76 N. Y. 55, !l2 Am. Rep. 267, it was hc>ld by this court that a
person who has no interest in the business of a firm, or in the
capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of the profits
as a compensation for services, or for money loaned for thP.
benefit of thf'! business, is not a .partner, and cannot be held
liable as such by a creditor of the firm." This language was
repeated with approval in Cassifl]/ vs. Hall, 91 N. Y. 159. It
is said~ however, in Hackett vs. StanleJI, 115 N. Y. G25, 22 N. E.
Rep. 745, that these cases, and others in harmony with them,
do not overrule Leggett vs. H11de and its predecessors. But,
while this is affirmed, it is said in the same case that "excep·
tions to the rule [that participation in profits of a business
renders the participant liable to creditors] are, however, found
in cases where a sh.are in profits is contracted to be paid as
a measure of comJ)(lnsation to employ~s for services rendered
in the bmiiness, or for the use of mone~·s loaned in aid of the
enterprisP.'' It is not material to inquire how much more of
the rule is left by this excPption than was left by Cox vs. Hickman. It is enon~h that the present case comes within the let·
ter and the spirit of thc> exception. 1'he parties who made the
loan, and who are now sought to be held liable as partners,
had no voice or part in the prosecution of the business, either
as principals or othc>rwisc; nor had they an irrevocable right
to n<·nunHl a ~hnr<' of the profits, as was the case in Hackett v.s.
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S.'unlcy. The right of control, or any voice in the control,-

an incident of proprietorship,—was denied to them. And the

implication of partnership from community of interest in the

b~

proﬁts was excluded by an express stipulation, the absence of

which in Hackett vs. Stanley was thought to be worthy of notice;

II.

s:anley. The right of co.ntrol, or any voice in the control,an incident of proprietorship,-was denied to them. And the
implication of partnership from community of interest in the
profits was excluded by an express stipulation, the absence of
which in Hackett VB. Stanley was thought to be wo11:hy of notice;
und their right to demand a share of th.c profits was to terminate upon repayment of the money advanced at the end of
ftve years, or sooner, at the option of Crandall. In all ifa
material provisions the contract under consideration is not
distinguishable from that in Curry vs. Fowler, or from those
provisions of the contract in Hackett vs. Stanley, which it i~
there conceded would create no other relation than that of
borrower and lender. For these reasons the defendants as to
whom issue was joined .are not liable to the plaintiff, and
therefore the judgment must be affirmed.
NarB: Bee also cases cited in notes to § 50, Mechem'1 Elem. of Parln.

and their right to demand a share of the proﬁts was to ter-

minate upon repayment of the money advanced at the end of

--------

ﬁve years, or sooner, at the option of Crandall. In all its

material provisions the contract under consideration is not

distinguishable from that in Curry vs. Fowler, or from those

provisions of the contract in Hackctt vs. Stanley, which it is

SPAULDING vs. STUBBINGS.

there conceded would create no other relation than that of

borrower and lender. For these reasons the defendants as to

Supreme Court of Wfaconsin, 1893.

whom issue was joined are not liable to -the plaintiﬁ, and

therefore the judgment must be atﬁrmed.

86 Wis. 255, 39 Am. St. Rep. 888, 56 N. W. Rep. 409.

Norm: See also cases cited in notes to § 50, Mechem’s Elem. of Psrtn.
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SPAULDING vs. STUBBING S.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1893.

86 Wis. 255, 39 Am. St. Rep. 888, 56 N. W. Rep. 469.

On August S, 1888, \Vilson H. Stubbings, who lived at Evans-

ton, Ill., but had a store at Marenisco, Mich., entered into

a contract with one John O'Connor, who was engaged in busi-

ness at Eagle River, \Vis., by which Stubbings was to advance

money to O’Connor for use in his business. O’Connor was to

give security for the money, pay Stubbings 10 per cent interest

upon it, and also give him one-half of the proﬁts. Stubbings

supplied money under the contract, and also turned in the

stock of goods a.t Marenisco. On April 10, 1889, the goods

and money so advanced amounted to $14.611.50, and on that day

a new contract was entered into between the parties on sub-

stantially the same terms as the former. O’Connor carried

on the business in his own name until his death in July, 1889,

when his son and administrator, George O’Connor, took charge

of it. Stubbings knew of and assented to this and continued

On August S, 1888, 'Vilson H. Stubbings, who lived at Evanston, Ill., but bad a store at 'Marenisco, Mich., entered into
a contract with one .John O'Connor, who was engaged in business at Eagle River, 'Vis., by which Stabbings was to advanc1~
money to O'Connor for use in his business. O'Connor was to
give security for the money, pay Stabbings 10 per cent interest
upon it, and also give him one-half of the profits. Stabbings
supplied mone>y under the contract, llild also turned in thP
stock of goods at Marenisco. On April 10, 1889, the goods
and money so advanced nmounted to $14.611.50, and on that day
a new contract was entered into between the pa11:ies on substantially the same terms as the former. O'Connor carried
on the business in his own name until his death in ,July, 188!),
when bis son and administrator, George O'Connor, took charge
of it. Stnbbings knew of and assented to this and continued

•
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to advance money for the business. Plaintiff sold goods to

John O'Connor and to George O’Connor for use in the business.

George gave a note for part of these goods. The action was

upon the note and the account, and was brought against

George O'Connor and Stubbings, on the ground that the latter

was a partner.

Plaintiff recovered below and Stubbings appealed.

Other facts appear in the opinion.

Alban ¢€ Barnes (Gabe Bouck, of counsel), for appellant.

Levi J. Billings (M-illcr (£1 1lIcC'ormick, of counsel for

respondent.

Lyon, C. J . (after stating the facts). If defendant Stubbings

is liable in this action, he is so liable because he was a partner

to advance money for the business. Plaintiff sold goods to
.John O'Connor and to George O'Connor for use in the business.
George gave a note for part of these goods. The action was
upon the note and the account, and was brought against
George O'Connor nnd Stubbiugs, on the ground that the latter
was a partner.
PJaintiff recovered below and Stubbings appealed.
Other facts appear in the opinion.

with John 0’Connor, during his lifetime, in the Eagle River

business, and allowed the business to be continued on the same

Alban & Barnes (Gabe Bouck, of counsel), for appellant.

basis by the administrators of John O’Connor’s estate after

his death. We have no case here for the application of the doc-

trine of estoppel against Stubbings, because he held himself

Levi J.

Billings (Millffr & McCorm-ick, of counsel for

respondent.

out to plaintiff as a partner in the business. The plaintiff tes-

tiﬁed he was told by John O’Connor, just before his death, that
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Stubbings had an interest in the business, and that was all.

If plaintiff was a competent witness to give his testimony

(which counsel for Stubbings den_v), it fails to prove that Stub-

bings held himself out to plaintiff as a partner with O‘Connm-

in the Eagle River business. It does not appear that plaintilf

took the trouble to inquire of Stubbings or any other person

what that interest was, if it existed, or to ascertain whether

the business was continued on the same basis after the death

of John O'Connor; and there is no satisfactory proof that

plaintiff relied upon the fact that Stubbings was a partner

in the business when he gave credit to John O-‘Connor, and,

after his death, to his administrators. Hence, the ﬁrst and

principal question is, were John O’Connor and Stubbings part-

ners inter so in the Eagle River business before and at the time

of the death of John ()’Connor? Among the numerous deﬁni-

tions of a “partnership” to be found in the treatises on that

subject, many of which definitions are collected in 1 Lindl.

Partn. p. 2, and in 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 828, we think

the deﬁnition formulated by Mr. Bates in his late work on

LYON, C. J. (after stating the facts). If d~fendant Stubbings
is liable in this action, be is so liable because he was a partner
with John O'Connor, during his lifetime, in the EagJe River
business~ and allowed the business to be continued on the same
basis by the administrators of John O'Connor's estate after
hisdPath. \Ve have no case here for the application of the doC'trine of efitoppel against Stubbings, because he held himself
ont to plaintiff as a partner in the business. T11e plaintiff testified he was told by John O'Connor, just before his death, that
Btubbings had an interest in the business, and that was all.
If plaintiff was a competent witness to give bis testimony
(whic;h counsel for Stubbings deny), it fails to prove that Stuhbings held himself out to plaintiff as a partner with O'Connnl'
'in the Engle Hiver business. It does not appear that pJaintilI
took the trouble to inquire of Stubbings or any other pe1·son
what that interest was, if it existed, or to nscertain whether
the business was continued on the same basis after the death
<>f .John O'Connor; and there is no satisfactory proof that
plaintiff relied upon the fact that Stubbings was a partner
in the business when he gave credit to John O'Connor, and,
nf$er his death, to his administrators. Hence, the first aml
pri'ncipal question is, were John O'Connor and Stubbings partners inter sc in the Eagle River business before and at the time
of the death of John O'Connor? Among the numerous definitions of a "partnership'~ to be found in the treatises on that
-subject, many of which definitions are collected in 1 Lindi.
Partn. p. 2, and in 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 828, we think
the definition formulated by Mr. nates in his late work on
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that subject is as accurate and satisfactory as any we have

seen. This deﬁnition seems to be preferred by the learned

writer of the article entitled “Partnership” in such encyclo-

pedia. It is as follows: “A partnership is the contract relation

subsisting between persons who have combined their property,

labor, and skill in an enterprise or business, as principals, for

the purpose of joint proﬁt.” 1 Bates, Partn. § 1. It is said by

Mr. Lindley that “ ‘partnership,’ although often called a ‘con-

tract,’ is in truth the result of a contract; the relations which

subsist between persons who have agreed to share the proﬁts

of some business, rather than the agreement to share such

proﬁts.” 1 Lindl. Partn. p. 2. Hence it is not essential to the

existence of a partnership that it be so denominated in the con-

tract of the parties; nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the

parties declare in such contract that they do not intend to

become partners. The real inquiry always is, have the parties

by their contract combined their property, labor, or skill in an

enterprise or business, as principals, for the purpose of joint

proﬁt? If they have done so, they are partners i_n that business

or enterprise, no matter how earnestly they may protest they
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are not, or how distant the formation of a partnership was

from their minds. The terms of their contract given, the law

steps in, and declares what their relations are to the enter-

prise or business and to each other.

The learned counsel for Stubbings contends that only the

agreement of April 10, 1889, can be considered in determining

the question of partnership. This alone of the two agreements

above mentioned is set out and relied upon in the complaint

to establish a partnership between Stubbings and John O’Con-

nor. \Vhilc we think the same eﬁfect should be given to both

contracts, construed together, that should be given to the cou-

tract of April 10, 1889, excluding the other, we are willing to

adopt the view of counsel, and conﬁne ourselves to giving con-

struction to the latest contract. That instrument in form fixes

the amount of money loaned by Stubbings to John O’Connor

at the sum of $14,611.50, and binds the latter to repay it in

ﬁve years, with 10 per cent interest, payable annually. The

instrument recites that O’Connor is engaged in carrying on a

general merchandise business in Eagle River, and provides

that he shall pay Stubbingsone-half of the net proﬁts of such

business; that O’Connor shall keep correct account books of

I

•

thnt subject is as accurate and satisfactory as any we have
seen. This definition seems to be preferred by the learned
writer of the article entitled "Partnership" in such encyclo·
pedia. It is us follows: ''A partnership is the contract relation
subsisting between persons who have combined their property,
labor, and skill in an enterprise or business, as principals, for.
the purpose of joint profit/' 1 Bates, Partn. § 1. It is said by
Mr. Lindley that "'partnership,' although often called a 'con·
tract,' is in truth the result of a contract; the relations which
subsist between persons who have agreed to share the profits
of some business, rather than the agreement to share such
profits." 1 Lindi. Partu. p. 2. Hence it is not essential to thP
existence of a partnership that it be so denominated in the con·
tract of the parties; nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the
parties declare in such contract that they do not intend to
become partners. The real inquiry always is, have the parties
by their contract combined their property, labor, or skill in an
enterpri8e or business, as principals, for the purpose of joint
profit? Jf they have done so, they are partners \n that busiµess
or enterprise, no matter bow eamestl.v they may protest they
nre not, or how diRtant the formation of a partnership was
from their minds. The terms of their contract given, the law
steps in, and declares what their relations are to the enterprise or business and to <:acl1 other.
'fhe learned counsel for Stubbings contends that only the
agreement of April 10, 1889, can be considered in determining
the question of partnership. This alone of the two agreements
above mentioned is set out and relied upon in the complaint
to establish a partnership between Stubbings and John O'Connor. 'Vhile we think the same effect should be given to both
contracts, con$trued together, that should be given to the con-·
tract of April 10, 1889, excluding the other, we are willing to
adopt the view of counsel, and confine ourselves to giving construction to the latest contract. 'l'hat instrument in form fixe~
the amount of money loaned by ~tubbing-s to John O'Connor
at the sum of $14,611.50, and binds the latter to repay it in
five years, with 10 per cent interest, payable annually. The
instrument recites that O'Connor is engaged in carrying on a
general merchandise business in Eagle Hiver, and provides
that he shall pay Stubbings" one-half of the net profits of such
business; that O'Connor shall keep correct account books of
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the business, which shall be open at all times to the inspection

of Stubbings or his agent; and that during ﬁve years the stock

of goods in the business shall not be sold in bulk without the

consent of both parties thereto. It will be observed that this

agreement does not specify what Q’Connor. had done or should

do with the $14,611.50, nor the consideration for the stipula-

tion to give Stubbings one-half of the net proﬁts of the busi-

ness. Such share of the proﬁts could not have been given as

additional interest, because the agreement provided for pay-

ing him the highest legal rate of interest in this State, _inde-

pendently of the proﬁts. Neither was it for services in the busi-

ness, for Stubbings did not stipulate to perform services

therein. The conclusion is almost irresistible that it wa

inserted to ﬁx the proportionate share of Stubbings -in the

business. It will also be observed that in the contract

of April 10, Stubbings did not agree to make any-further

loans or advances to O’Connor, neither does it contain

any provision that O’Connor should be responsible therefor

should any fu_rther advances be made. Stubbings made

further advances, however, for the beneﬁt of the busi-
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ness, and it does not appear that any time was ﬁxed

for repayment thereof, or that he demanded any voucher

or security therefor. It is not reasonable to believe

that he would thus have parted with his money if he was not

interested with O’Connor in the business, as a principal. More-

over, the letters of Stubbings in evidence show that the propo-

sition to start the business at Eagle River was ﬁrst made by

him; that he purchased much stock for the store; that he

advised, if he did not dictate, of whom O’Connor should make

purchases, as well as prices and terms; that he arranged for

credits; and that he carefully watched and freely interfered

with all the details of the business, so far as he could obtain

knowledge of those details by persistent requests to the O’Con-

nors to furnish him detailed information thereof. In short,

he exercised an inﬂuence in, and assumed a control over, the

management of the business, (which was acquiesced in by the

O’C0nnors) entirely incompatible with the idea that he was

merely a creditor of O’Connor for the amount of his advances

and interest thereon, which can only be atisfactorily

accounted for on the theory that he was handling and directing

his own business. The foregoing considerations impel our

the business, which shall be open at all times to the inspection
of Stubbings or his agent; and that during five years the stock
of goods in the business shall not be sold in bulk without the
consent of both parties thereto. It will be observed that this
agreement does not specify what O'Connor.bad done or should
do with the $14,611.50, nor the c~nsideration for the stipulation to give Stubbings one-half of the net profits of the business. Such share of the profits could not have been given as
additional interest, because the agreement provided for pa:ying him the highest legal rate of interest in this State, ,independently of the profits. Neither was it for services in the business, for Stubbings did not stipulate to perform services
therein. The conclusion is almost irresistible that it was
inserted to fix the proportionate share of Stubbings .in the
business. It will also be observed that in the contract
ef April 10, Stubbings did not agree to make any · further
loans or advances to O'Connor, neither does it oontain
any provision that O'Connor should be responsible therefor
should any fu_rther advances be made. Stubbings made
further advances, however, for the benefit of the business, and it does not appear that any time was fixed
for repayment thereof, or that be demanded any voucher
or security therefor. It is not reasonable to believe
that he would thus have parted with his money if he was not
interested with O'Connor in the business, as a p1incipal. l\foreover, the letters of Stubbings in evidence show that the proposition to start the business at Eagle Rh·er was first made by
him; that he purchased much stock for the store; that he
advised, if he did not dictate, of whom O'Connor should mak~
purchases, as well as prices and terms; that be arranged for
credits; and that he carefully watched and freely interfert><l
with all the details of the business, so far as he could obtain
knowledge of those details by persistent requests to the O'Connors to fumish him detailed information thereof. In short,
he exercisc>d an influence in, nnd assumed a control over, the
management of the business, (which was acquiesced in by the
O'Connors) entirely incompatible with the idea that he wal:!
merely a creditor of O'Connor for the amount of his advanet'!ol
and interest thereon, which can only be satisfactorily
accounted for on the theory that
wns handling and directin::r
hie own business. 'fhe foregoing considerations impel our

he

Smutnxxo vs. Srusnmcs. 121

SPAULDING VS. STUDDINGS.

minds to the conclusion that, under the contract of April 10,

121

Stubbings and John O’Connor combined their property, labor,

and skill in the Eagle River business as principals, and of

course they did so for their joint proﬁt, for the contract gives

each one-half the net proﬁts, This makes them partners in

the business, within the rule above stated. The contract is

strikingly like that under consideration in Roscnﬁeld vs. H aight,

53 Wis. 260, 40 Am. Rep. 770, which this court held created

a partnership relation between the parties to it. The fact that

the business was conducted in the name of John O’Connor, and,

after his death, in the name of the administrator of his estate,

and the further fact that in Stubbings’ letters to each of them

the business was usually referred to as “your business,” are

not signiﬁcant, for it appears that, for reasons satisfactory to

himself, Stubbings desired that his connection with the busi-

ness should be kept secret. The ﬁnding that the business was

continued after the death of John O’Connor in the name of

his administrators, or one of them, with full knowledge and

permission of Stubbings, and was conducted in all respects

as before, without any notice to the contrary or adjustment
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of the partnership business, and that Stubbings continued to

make advances to carry it on, are fully ustained by the proofs.

It requires no argument to show that in such case the liability

of Stubbings as a partner is continued. .

The ﬁndings of the court are- criticised because they ignore

the note sued upon, and go upon the open account of plaintiff

alone. The note was given for a part of such account, but it

is not a payment thereof. The note was brought into court,

and the defendants are not prejudiced because the ﬁndings and

judgment rest upon the original account rather than upon the

note. A computation shows that no interest was allowed on

the account; hence the judgment is more favorable to defend-

ants than it would have been had it been upon the note. The

judgment of the circuit court must be aﬂirmed.

Nora: See also cases cited, Mechem’s Elem. of Pan-tn., §§ 48, 50, notes.

16

minds to the conclusion that, under the contract of April 10,
Stubbings and Jahn O'Connor combined their property, labor,
and skill in the Eagle River business as principals, and of
course they did so for their joint profit, for the contract gives
each one-half the net profits. This makes them partners in
the business, within the rule above stated. The contract is
strikingly like that under consideration in RosenfieW, vs. Haight,
53 Wis. 260, 40 Am. Rep. 770, which this court held created
a partnership relation between the parties to it. The fact that
the business was conducted in the name of John O'Connor, and,
after his death, in the name of the administrator of his estate,
and the further fact that in Stubbings' letters to each of them
the business was usualJy referred to as "your business," are
not sigriificant, for it appears that, for reasons satisfactory tu
himself, Stubbings desired that his connection with the business should be kept secret. The finding that the business was
continued after the death of John O'Connor in the name of
his administrators, or one of them, with full knowledge and
permissi-0n of Stubbings, and was conducted in all respects
as before, without any notice to the contrary or adjustment
of the partnership business, and that Stubbings continued to
make advances to carry it on, are fully sustained by the proof~.
It requires no argument to show that in such case the liability
of Stubbings as a partner is continued.
The findings of the court are. criticised because they ignore
the note sued upon, and go upon the open account of plaintiff
alone. The note was given for a part of such account, but it
is not a payment thereof. The note was brought into court,
and the defendants are not prejudiced because the findings and
judgment rest upon the original account rather than upon the
note. A computation shows that no interest was allowed on
the account; hence the judgment is more favorable to defendants than it would have been had it been upon the note. 'rhe
judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
~OTE:

Ree also cases cited, M11chem'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 48, 50, notes.
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MAGOVERN vs. ROBERTSON.

' Court of Appeals of New York, 1889.

116 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589.

This is an action for goods sold and delivered, brought b_v

John P. Mag-overn and others against Mo-nroe Mattison and

others. On the report of a referee, judgment ‘was entered dis-

MAGOVERN vs. ROBERTSON.

missing the complaint on the merits, which judgment was

aﬁirmed by the general term. The plaintiffs appeal. The

facts are as follows: On April 30, 1881, the defendants entered

Court of Appeals of New York, 1889.

in_to the following contract: “Memoranda of an agreement

made and entered into this 30th day of April, 1881, by and

llCS N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589.

between Evolin B. Robertson, of the village of Mayville, Chau-

tauqua county, N. Y., of the ﬁrst part, and M. Mattison, W. B.

Martin, C. H. Johnson, Oren Stoddard, James Moon, \V. Holt,

A. C. Packard, R. D. Bush, H. D. Stoddard, W. Northrop,'Jr.,

D. H. Matthews, John Northrop, A. M. Rinehart, Jackson A’:

Hollenbeck, XV. H. \Vhite, A. W. Smith, Mark Jones, J. H.

\Vood, J. W. Broadhead, of the town of Busti, said county,

of the second part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration

of the covenants hereinafter expressed the said party of the
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ﬁrst part hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said

parties of the second part to put a stock of dry goods, groceries,

hats, caps, boots and shoes. etc., in what is known as the ‘John

R. Robertson Store Building,’ situated in Busti village, said

stock to be at least of the value of three thousand dollars, to

be replenished from time to time as it runs below that amount;

the said party of the ﬁrst part to procure the services of John

R. Robertson to manage said store, and devote his time thereto,

to the interests of the business. The parties of the second

part agree to indorse the paper of the said party of the ﬁrst

part to the amount of $2,000, which sum is to go into the busi-

ness, and the said parties of the second part are to have an

interest at all times in the goods in said store to the amount of

their indorsenient; subject, however, to no liability except such

indorsement. At the end of one year the party of the ﬁrst part

is to cause an invoice of the goods on hand to be taken in the

presence, if so required, of two of the parties of the second

This is an action for goods sold and delivered, brought by
John P. Magovern and others against Monroe Mattison and
others. On the report of a referee, judgment 'w as entered dismissing the complaint on the merits, which judgment was
affirmed by th~ general term. The plaintiffs appeal. The
facts are as follows: On Ap1•il 30, 18Sl, the defendants entered
~to the following contract: "Memoranda of an agreement
made and entered into this 30th day of April, 1881, by and
between Evolin B. Uobertson, of the village of Mayville, Chautauqua county, N. Y., of the fiI"St part, and M. Mattison, W. B.
Martin, C. H. Johnson~ Oren 8toddard, .James Moon, W. Holt,
A. C. Packard, R. D. Bush~ H. D. Stoddar:d, W. Northrop; Jr.,
D. H. Matthews, ,John :Northrop, A. M. Rinehart, Jackson &
Hollenbeck, ·w. II. \Vhite, A. W. Smithi Mark Jones, J. H.
\Yood, J. ,V, Broadhead, of the town of Busti, said county,
of the second part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration
of the coYenants hereinafter expressed the said party of the
.first part hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said
parties of the second part to put a stock of dry goods, groceries,
hats, caps, boots and shoes, etc., in what is known as the 'Johu
R Robertson Store Building,' situated in Busti village, said
stock to be at least of the value of three thousand dollars, to
be replenished from time to time as it runs below that amount;
the said pm1y of the first part to procure the services of John
R. Robertson to manage said store, and devote his time thereto,
to the interests of the business. The pa11:ies of the second
part agi·ee to indorse the paper of the said party of the fir1:1t
part to the amount of $2,000, which sum is to go into the business, and the said parties of the sPcond part are to bave an
interest at all times in the goods in said store to the amount of
their indorsement; subject, however, to no liability except such
indorscment. At the end of one year the party of the first part
is to cause an invoice of the goods on hand to be taken in th~
presence, if so required, of two of the parties of the second

Mxuovmm vs. Ron sarson. 123

part; and the net proﬁt of said busine, including all com-

MAGOYEllN VS. ROBEllTSON.

123

missions received for buying hides, butter, cheese, wool, and

other produce," received by said manager, and after deducting

insurance on goods, fuel, lights, additional clerk hire, freights,

and other necessary expenses of the business, to be divided

as follows: Two-thirds of said net proﬁts to belong to the party

of the ﬁrst part, in consideration of her capital and manage-

ment of said busines through said J. R. Robertson, and the

use of said store building; and the other one-third of said net

proﬁts are to be paid to the said parties of the second part

pro ram, in consideration of their said indorsement and their

general interest in the business. It is further stipulated by

and between the said parties that at any time previous to the

expiration of said year, when a majority of the parties of the

second part shall make a request in writing to that effect, the

party of the ﬁrst part shall cause an invoice of the stock of

goods on hand to be taken in the presence of two of the parties

of the second part; and if it be ascertained that the business

is sustaining any considerable loss,.and the said parties of the

second part so demand, the party of the ﬁrst part shall turn

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

over sufficient amount of said goods to secure said parties of

the second part against any liability on account of said

indorsement, or relieve said parties of the second part from

said indorsement, by causing said indorsed paper to be can-

celed. And it is further agreed by and between the parties

that if, at the end of one year, it be ascertained that there

has been a proﬁt in said business, and the party of the

ﬁrst part_ so require, the provisions of this agreement

shall extend another year; but if the party of the

ﬁrst part desires to continue said business without the aid of

said indorsement, then this contract from and after that date

becomes abrogated. Said parties to this contract are to do

what they reasonably can to make said business a success. In

witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals

this 29th day of April, 1881.” Pursuant to this contract, on

the 7th day of May. 1881, Evolin B. Robertson made her prom-

issory note for $2,000, payable to the order of J . R. Robertson

at the First National Bank of Jamestown, which was indorsed

by allof the defendants except David H. Matthews. This note

was discounted by said bank, and the avails thereof credited to

the “Bnsti Union Store.” The note was twice renewed, the

part; and the net profits of said business, including all commissions received for buying hides, butter, cheese, wool, and
other produce; received by said manager, and after deducting
insumnce on goods, fuel, lights, additional clerk hire, freights,
and other necessary expenses of the business, to be divided
as follows: Two-thirds of Eaid net p1·ofits to belong to the party
of the first part, in consideration of her capital and management of said business through said J. R. Robertson, and the
use of said store building; and the other one-third of said net
profits are to be paid to the said parties of the second part
pro rata, in consideration of their said indorsement and their
general interest in the business. It is further stipulated by
and between the said parties that at any time previous to the
. €Xpiration of said year, when a majority of the parties of the
second part shall make a request in writing to that effect, the
party of the first part shall cause an invoice of the stock of
good~ on hand to be taken in the presence of two of the parties
of the second part; and if it be ascertained that the business
is sustaining any considerable loss,.and the said parties of the
second part so demand, the party of the first part shall turn
over sufficient amount of said goods to secure said pa1·ties of
the second part against any liability on account of said
indorsement, or relieve said partiPs of the second part from
said indorsement, by causing said indorsed paper to be can<'eled. And it is further agreed by and between the parties
that if, at the end of one year, it be ascertained that there
has been a profit in said business, and the party of the
first part. so require, the provisions of this agreement
shall extend another year; but if the party of the
first part desires to continue said business without the aid of
flaid indorsement, tlu•n this contract from and after that date
becomes abrogated. Said parties to this contract are to do
what they reasonably can to make said business a success. In
witness wherrof we have hereunto set our hands and seals
this 29th day of April, 18~1." Pursuant to this contract, on
tl~e 7th day of May. 1881, Rvolin n. Hobertson made her prom·
issory note for $~,000, payable to the order of J. R. Robertson
at the First National Bank of Jamestown, which was indorsed
by all.of the defendants except David H. Matthews. This note
was discounted by said bank, and the avails thereof credited to
the "Busti Union Store." The note was twice renewed, tho
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renewals being indorsed by most of the defendants. Between

May 7, 1881, and December 16, 1881, the business established

by the contract was carried on under the name of the “Busti

Union Store,” at the place and under the management as stipu-

lated in the contract. From time to time, goods were pur-

chased with the avails of the discounts, and upon credit. Dur-

ing this time, the plaintiﬂs, who were merchants doing busi-

ness in the city of New York, sold upon credit and delivered to

the Busti Union Store goods of the value and at the agreed

price of $1,217.62, to recover which this action was brought

against the signers of the contract.

Will-iam H. Henderson, for appellants.

A. O. Picka/rd, for respondents.

FOLLETT, C. J . (after stating the facts.) Persons having a.

proprietary interest in a business and in its proﬁts are liable,

as partners, to creditors. .’lIantu.facturi.n-g Co. 1,-s Sears, 45 N. Y.

797; Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 278; Mason vs. Partridge, -1»

renewals being indorsed by most of the defendants. Between
May 7, 1881, and December 16, 1881, the business established
by the contract was carried on under the name of the "Busti
Union Store," at the place and under the management as stipulated in the contract. From time to time, goods were pm·chased with the avails of the discounts, and upon credit. Dur·
ing this time, the plaintiffs, who were merchants doing busi·
ness in the city of New York, sold upon credit and delivered to
the Busti Union Store goods of the value and at the agreed
price of ,1,217.62, to recover which this action was brought
against the signers of the contract.

Hun-, 621, aﬁirmed, 66 N. Y. 633; Burnett vs. Snyder, 81 N. Y.

550, 555; Bank vs. H enneesy, 48 N. Y. 545; Berthold v. Goldsmith.

24 How. 536, 541; Haas rs. Root, 16 Hun, 526. 26 Hun, 63".’;

William H. Henderson, for appellantL
A. 0. Pickard, for respondents.
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Rosenﬁeld vs. Haight, 53 Wis. 260, 1.0 N. VV. Rep. 378. It is

stipulated in the contract that the parties thereto should (In

what they reasonably could to make the business a success;

that the defendants should have an interest in the goods in the

store equal to the amount of their indorsement; and that at the

end of the year an inventory should be taken in the presence of

two of the defendants, the net proﬁts ascertained, and One-

third of them paid to the defendants, “in consideration of their

said indorsement and their general interest in the business.”

Every one of the signers had a right to require that the assets

of the business should be applied in payment (1) of the debts of

the business; (2) of the sums contributed by each; (3) of the

sum due each for proﬁts earned. An execution creditor of

Mrs. Robertson (the debt not having been contracted in the

business) could not, by a levy upon the goods, have acquired a

lien prior to the equitable lien of the defendants to have had

them applied in payment of the debts of the business, and of

the amount put into the business directly, or by way of their

indorsements. Such being the rights of the parties to the con-

tract, they had a proprietary interest in the business and in its

__ ~1 A __ m.

FOLLETT, C. J. (after stating the facts.) Persons having a
proprietary interest in a bnsines~ and in its profits are liable,
as partners, to creditors. ]fanufactttring Oo. vs Bears, 45 N. Y.
797; Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 278; .llason vs. Partridge, ..t. .
Hun, 621, affirmed, 66 N. Y. 633; Burt1ett es. Snyder, 81 N. Y.
550~ 555; Bank vs. Hennessy, 4S N. Y. 545; Bertholilv. Goldsmith,
24 How. 536, 541; Haas t·s. Root, 16 Hun, 526, 26 Hun, 63:'!;
Roaenfield vs. Haight, 53 Wis. 260, 10 N. W. Rep. 378. It is
stipulated in the contract that the parties thereto should do
what they reasonably could to make the business a succesH;
that th.e defendants should have an interest in the goods in the
store equal to the amount of their indorsement; and that at the
end of the year an im·entory should be taken in the presence of
two of the defendants, the net profits ascertained, and onethird of them paid to the defendants, "in consideration of their
said indorsement and their general interest in the business."
Every one of the signers had a right to require that the assets
of the business should be applied in payment (1) of the debts of
the business; (2) of the sums contributl>d by ench; (3) of the
sum due each for profits earned. An execution creditor of
Mrs. Robet·tson (the debt not having been contracted in th•~
business) could not, by a levy upon the goods, have acquired a
lien prior to the e1Jt1itable lien of the defendants to have hnd
them applied in payment of the debts of the business, and or
the amount put into the busirn:ss directly, or by way of thl•ir
indorsements. Such being- the rights of the parties to the contract, they bad a proprietary interest in the business and in its

BURNETT vs. Ssvusn. 125

Bu&NEIT vs. SNYDER.

proﬁts, and are liable for the amount due the plaintiﬁs. The

cases holding that a person entitled to a share of the proﬁts of

a business in payment for services rendered, or as a compensa-

tion for money advanced cannot be charged as a partner,

are not in point. The distinction between "the rights and

liabilities of persons so situated, and the rights and lia-

bilities of persons having a proprietary interest in the

assets and proﬁts of a business, has been clearly drawn

by the cases decided in the courts of this state. _ The

case at bar cannot be distinguished, in principle, from Mason

rs. Partridge, supra.

The stipulation in the contract that the defendants should

not be liable beyond their indorsements limits their liability as

between them and Mrs. Robertson; but, under the ﬁndings, it

does not exempt the defendants from liability for the plain-

tiff’s claim. It is quite apparent that the defendants knew

that the business which they initiated was conducted under the

name of the “Busti Union Store,” and not under the name and

on the credit of Mrs. Robertson. The judgment should be

reversed, and a new trial granted, with cost to abide the event.
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All concur, except BRADLEY and HAIGHT, JJ., not sitting.

Norm: See also cases cited in notes to Mecbem's Elem. of Part:n., § 50.

BURNETT vs. SNYDER.

Court of Appeals of N cw York, 1880.

BIN. Y. 550, 37 Am. Rep. 527.

Action on account. The opinion states the facts. The plain-

tiff had judgment below.

William G. Wilson, for appellant.

Aaron Pennington Whitehead, for respondent.

i Asnnnws, J . The case of Burnett vs. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344,

profits, and are liable for the amount due the plaintiffs. The
cases holding that a person entitled to a share of the profits of
a business in payment for services rendered, or as a compensa.·
tion for money advanced cannot be charged as a partner,
are not in point. The distinction between ·the rights and
liabilities of persons so situated, and the rights and lia~
bilities of persons having a proprietary interest in the
assets and profits of a business, has been clearly drawn
by the cases decided in the courts of this state.. The
case at bar cannot be distinguished, in principle, from .Mason
t~s. Partridge, supra.
'l'he stipulation in t~e contract that the defendants should
not be Jiable beyond their indorsements limits their liability as
between them and Mrs. Robertson; but, under the findings, it
does not exempt the defendants from liability for the plaintiff's claim. It is quite apparent that the defendants knew
that the business which they initiated was conducted under the
name of the "Busti Union Rtore," and not under the name and
on the credit of Mrs. Robertson.
The judgment should be
re\'ersed, an9 a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concur, except BRADLEY and HAIGHT, JJ., not sitting.

was an action brought to recover a debt owing by the ﬁrm of

.i~‘-trang, Platt & Co., to the plaintiff, and Snyder was made a

defendant upon the allegation that he was a copartner with

Norn: See alao caeea cited in notes to Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., § 50.

BURNETT vs. SNYDER.
Court of Appeah of New York, 1880.
81 N. Y. 550, 87 Am. Rep. 527.

Action on account. The opinion states the facts. The plaintiff had judgment below.
William G. Wilson, for appellant.
Aaron. Pennington Whitehead, for respondent.
ANDREWS, J. The case of Burnett vs. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344:,
was an action brought to recover a debt owing by the firm of
. ~trang, Platt & Co., to the plaintiff; and Snyder was made a
defendant upon the allegation that he was a copartner with

126 CASES ox PAlt'l'XEIlSHIP.

the other defendants in that firm. In that case the plaintiﬁ’, to

126

CA.SES OY
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sustain the averment that Snyder was a partner, relied upon a

written agreement, made December 31, 1869, between Snyder

and Peter O. Strang and Ammon Platt, two of the members of

the ﬁrm of Strung, Platt & Co., executed concurrently with the

creation of the partnership, which recited that it was deemed

expedient that Snyder should have an interest in and become a

copartner in the ﬁrm, and which contained a stipulation that

Snyder should be entitled to receive one-third of the proﬁts

earned and received by Peter O. Strang and Ammon Platt from

their interest in the ﬁrm of Strang, Platt & Co., and become

liable for and pay to them an amount equal to one-third of any

losses they, or either of them, might sustain by reason of their

connection as copartners, or otherwise with the ﬁrm of Strang,

Platt & Co. It was claimed on the part of the plaintiﬁ that

Snyder was a partner by the express terms of the agreement.

and also, that if as between himself and the other members of

the ﬁrm of Strang, Platt & Co., he was not a partner, he was

a partner to creditors by reason of a right under his agree-

ment to a participation in the proﬁts. The court decided
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against the plaintiff upon both propositions, and held that

an agreement between one of several members of a ﬁrm and

a third person, that the latter should be a copartner in the

ﬁrm did not in law make him a copartner, and that an agree-

ment between one member of a ﬁrm and a third person tha-t

the latter should be entitled to a share of the proﬁts received

by the ﬁrm, and pay an equivalent share of his losses, was

not such a participation in the profits as to constitute the

person receiving such share a partner as to third persons, or

make him liable for the ﬁrm debts.

This ‘action is one of a series of actions ‘commenced by the

plaintiffagainst the successive ﬁrms of Strang, Platt Co.,

which ﬁrm was ﬁrst organized in 1863, and reorg:i11i'4i~d',Dc'eem-

‘her 31, 1869, and again in May, 1870, to recover debts icon-

tracted by the several ﬁrms to the plaintiff. The debt sought

to be recovered in this action was contracted by the original

ﬁrm, which remained as originally constituted until the reor-

,ganiza.tion in Deceniber, 1869, except that Ryley, one-of the

original partners, died in 1867, and his interest was c011-

tinued by his administrators. The case above referred to was

the other defendants in that firm. In that case the pin in tiff, to
sustain the averment that Snyder was a partner, relied upon a
written agreenwnt, made December 31, 1869, between Snyder
and Peter 0. Strang and Ammon 1•1att, two of the members of
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., executed concurrently with tht~
creation of the partner~hip, which recited that it was deemed
expedi<>nt that i;;nyder should han~ an interest in and become a
copartner in the firm~ and which contained a stipulation that
Rn;\·dE>r should be entitled to receive one-third of the profits
eamed and receh·ed by Peter O. ~trang and Ammon Platt from
their intereBt in the flnn of Strang, Platt & Co., and become
liable for and pay to them an amount equal to one·third of any
lossc>s they1 or either of them, might sustain by reason of their
t>onneetion as copartners, or otherwise with the firm of Strang,
Platt & Co. It was claimed on the part of the plaintiff that
Snyder was a partner by the express terms of the agreement.
und al~o, that if as between himself and the otl1er members of
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., he was not a partner, he was
a partner to creditors by reason of a right under his agr::.·<~
ment to a participation in the profits. The C<1nrl decided
against the plaintiff upon both propositions, and held that
an agreement between one of several members of a firm and
a third person, that the latter Elhould be a copartner in the
.firm did not in law make liim a copartner, and that an agreement between one member of a firm and a third person tha.t
the lattC'r should be entitled to n share of the profits receiv1~d
by the firm, and pay an equivah>nt share of his losses, was
not such a participation in the profits as to constitute the
person rect'iving such share a partner as to third persons, or
make him liable for the firm debts.
'rl1is .action is one of a series of actions commenced by the
plaintiff. against the successiYe firms of Strang, Platt
. . .. !!- . Co.,
.
which firm was first or~:mized in 1SG3, and reorganize!l .Deeem'ber :n, 18G9, and again in May, 1870, to recover <lebts contracted by the several firms to the plaintiff. The d('bt sm1gl1t
to be recovered in .this action was contracted by the original
firm, which remained as originally constituted until the reo1•,gnniza.tion in December, 1869, except that Ryley, one <>f the
original partne,·s, died in 1SG7, and his interest was ..:ontinued by his administmtors. The case above referred to was
)
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brought to recover the debt to the plaintiff contracted by the

ﬁrmof December, 1869. ,

The referee in this case found as a fact that the defendant

Snyder was a partner in the original ﬁrm of Strang, Platt 8

Co. If this ﬁnding is not sustained by the evidence, it becomes

the duty of the court to reverse the judgment.

It is not claimed that the judgment can be sustained on

any theory of estoppel. Snyder did not hold himself out as a

partner. The plaintiff, while the debt for which this action

is brought was accruing, was a clerk in the employment of

Strang, Platt & Co., but he did not know, nor did he suppose

during this time that Snyder was a member of the ﬁrm, nor

was he informed that he was a partner until 1874, several years

after the ﬁnal dissolution of the ﬁrm. His ignorauce, of course,

is immaterial, if in fact or law Snyder was a partner, but the

duty of establishing that relation, inthe absence of any hold-

ing out by Snyder that he was a partner, is upon the plaintiff.

The original ﬁrm of Strang, Platt & Go. was constituted by

written articles of copartnership between Peter O. Strang,

Ammon Platt and George W. Ryley. By this instrument
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these persons constituted the ﬁrm. Snyder was not a party

to it, and so"far as the written agreement of copartnership

indicates, he was not a partner in the concern. The ﬁnding

that Snyder was a partner is based upon the fact, that con-

currently with the formation of the copartnership it was

arranged that Snyder should be jointly interested with Ryley

in his interest in the ﬁrm, that is to say, that Snyder should

be entitled to receive one-half of R_vley’s proﬁts, and should

be liable for one-half of his losses. This arrangement, so far

as appears, was not evidenced by any writing executed by the

parties. The draft of an agreement was prepared between

Ryley and Snyder, conforming to the terms of the oral arrange-

ment, but was not produced, and it does not appear to have

been signed. While the negotiation for forming the partner-

ship was going on, Strang, Platt and Ryley expressed a desire

that Snyder should become interested in the proposed busi-

ness. The business contemplated was the wool brokerage and

commission business, and Snyder was a large dealer in Wool

on his own account, and as purchasing agent for mills with

which he was connected. It was at ﬁrst proposed to Snyder

that he should become la. copartner in the ﬁrm. For pru-

brought to recover the debt to the plaintiff contracted by the
firm .of December, 1869.
The referee in this case found as a fact that the defendant
Snydf'r was a partner in the original firm of Strang, Platt &
Co. If this finding is not sustained by the evidence, it become9
the duty of the court to reverse the judgment.
It is not claimed that the judgment can be sustained on
any theory of estoppel. Snyder did not hold himself out as a
partner. The plaintiff, while the debt for which this action
is brought was accruing, was a clerk in the employment of
Strang, Platt & Co., but he did not know, nor did he suppose
during this time that Snyder was a member of the firm, nor
was he informed that he was a partner until 1874, several years
after the final dissolution of the firm. His ignorance, of course,
is immaterial, if in fact or law Snyder was a partner, but the
duty of establishing thut relati~n, in .the absence of any holding out by Snyder that he was a partner, is upon the plaintiff.
The original 1il-m of 8trang, Platt & Co. was constituted by
written articles of copartnership b.etw(>en Peter 0. Strang,
Ammon l'latt nnd George ,V. Ryley. By this instrument
these persons constituted the ftnn. Snyder was not a party
to it, and so· far as the written agreement of copartne1·ship
indicates, he was not a partner in the roncern. The finding
that 8nyder was a partner is based upon the fact, that concurrently with the formation of the copartne1·ship it was
arranged that Snyder shoi.Ild be jointly interested with Ryley
in bis interest in the firm, that is to say, that Snyder should
be entitled to receive one-half of Ryley's profits, and shoultl
be liable for one-half of his losses. This arrangement, so fai·
RB appears, was not evidenced by any writing <'Xecuted by the
parti(>s. 'l'he draft of an agreement was prepared between
R~rle~· nnd Snyder, conforming to the terms of the oral arrangement, but was not produced, and it does not appear to have
been signed. \VhiJP the negotiation for forming the partne1·ship was going on, Strang, Platt and Ryley expressed a desil-e
that Snyder should become interested in the proposed bu;.;i.
nE>ss. The business contemplated was the wool brokerage and
commission business, and Snyder was a large dealer in wu«I
on bis own account, and as purchasing agent for mills wiih
which he wns connected. It was at first proposed to Snyd(•rthat he should become a copartner in the firm. For pm-
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dential reasons, growing out of his rela-tions with third par-

ties, Snyder declined the proposition to become a partner. His

refusal to become a partner had no connection with the ques-

tion of the liability which he would incur to creditors by

becoming a partner. It was then proposed that he should

take a share of ]{yle_v’s interest, and the arrangement was

concluded on that basis. The evidence shows that the agree-

ment ﬁnally made, so far as Snyder was concerned, was an

agreement between him and Ryley, made with the knowledge

and concurrence of Strang and Platt, the other members of

the ﬁrm, and in this respect the case differs from the former

one. The business of the ﬁrm did not require the contribution

of capital and none was contributed by any of the partners.

Snyder aided the ﬁrm by purchases and consignments of wool,

but, so far as appears, took no part in the management of the

business. The question arises upon these facts, whether Sny-

der was a. pa.rtner in the ﬁrm, or if not a partner as between

himself and the other persons interested, was he such as to

creditors.

In G4-ace vs. Smith, 2 NV. Bl. 998, and Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H.
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Bl. 235, the doctrine was declared, and was deemed to be set-

tled by these cases, that a participation in the proﬁts of a

trade made one liable as a partner to third persons by opera-

tion of law, although he was not ostensibly a partner, and

although the partnership relation was excluded by the terms

of the agreement between him and his associates. This doc-

trine was followed in England, and was regarded as the true

test of partnership as to third persons until the case of Cow vs.

HicIcman,8 H. of L. Gas. 301, in which the doctrine was strongly

impugned if not wholly overthrown. It was held in that case

that partnership was a branch of the law of principal and

agent, and that persons who shared the proﬁts of a business»

do not incur the liabilities of partners unless the business is

carried on by them personally, or by others as their real or

ostensible agents. The defendants in that case, who were

creditors of an insolvent ﬁrm carrying on business as the

Stanton Iron VVorks, became parties to a deed of assignments

executed by them, and by their debtors, whereb__v the latter

conveyed their property to trustees in trust to carry on the

business theretofore carried on by the debtors in the name of

the Stanton Iron Company, with power to the trustees to enter

\

dential reasons, growing out of his rela.tions with third parties, Snyder declined the proposition to become a partner. Hie
refusal to become a partner had no connection with the quet1tion of the lia.bility which he would incur to creditors by
beeorning a partner. It was then proposed that he should
tuke a share of Uyley's interest, and the arrangement was
concluded on that basis. 'l'hc evidence shows that the agreement finally made, so far as Snyder was concerned~ was au
agreement between him and Uyley, made with the knowledge
and concurrence of Strang and Platt, the other members Clf
the firm, and in this resp~ct the case ditfers from the former
one. The business of the firm did not require the contribution
of capital :md none was contributed by any of the partners.
Snyder aided the firm by purchases and consignments of wool,
but, so far as appears, took no part in the management of the
business. The question arises upon these facts, whether Snyder was a partner in the firm, or if not a partner as between
himself and the other persons interested, was he such as to
creditors.
In Grace vs. Smith, 2 \V. Bl. 998, and Waugh vs. Caner, 2 H.
Bl. 235, the doctrine was declared, and was deemed to be settled by these cases, that a pa1·ticipation in the profits of a
trade made one liable as a partner to third persons by operation of law, although he was not ostensibly a partner, and
although the partnership relation was excluded by the terms
of the agreement between him and his associates. This doctrine was followed in England, and was regarded as the true
test of partnersl1ip as to third persons until the case of Oo:c vs.
Riekman,8 H. of L. Cas. ilOl, in which the doctrine was strongly
impugned if not wbo11y overthrown. It was held in that case
that partnership was a branch of the law of principal and
agent~ nnd that persons who shared the profits of a business.
do not incur the liabilities of partners unless the business is
carrit>d on by them personally, or by others as their real or
ostensible agents. The defendants in that case, who were
creditors of an insolvent firm carr·ying on business as the
Stanton Iron Work~, became parties ton deed of assignments
~xc•cnted b;v them~ and by their debtors, whereb.v the lattel'
"onve,ved their property to trustees in trust to carry on the
business theretofore carried on by the debtors in the name of
the Stanton. Iron Company, with power to the trustees to enter.

..
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into contracts relating to the business, and to divide the
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net income among the creditors in ratable proportions, and
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SNYDER.

it was held ‘that the creditors who executed the deed were

not partners in the business, and were not liable on bills

of exchange accepted by one of the trustees in the nam-e

of the company for iron ore purchased and used by them

in the business. But we have in this state adhered

to the general doctrine established by the earlier Eng-

lish cases, and although it proceeds upon reasons which

have not been considered entirely satisfactory, it was

applied by this court in the recent case of Leg;/ett vs. Hyde,

("'18 N. Y. 272; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 244.‘ But the participation

in the proﬁts of a trade which makes a person a partner as

to third persons is a participation in the proﬁts as such under

circumstances which give him a proprietary interest in the

proﬁts before division as principal trader, Em parte, Hamper,

17 Ves. -104; Story on Part., sec. 49; Pars. on Part. 74, and the

right to an account as partner, and a lien on the partnership

assets in preference to individual creditors of the partner.

Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 VVcnd. 175, 3 Kent Com. 25; 1
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Smith Lead. Gas. 984. It is not every participation in the

proﬁts which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptions

to the rule have been established. See Vanderburgh vs. Hull, 20

\Vend. 70; Burckle vs. Eckhart, 3 Comst. 132; Richardson vs".

Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55; s. c., 32 Am. Rep. 267. The contract of

sub-partnership, which is a contract between one of two part-

ners and a third person by which the latter is to share the

proﬁts, or the proﬁts and losses of the partner with whom the

contract is made, in the ﬁrm business, does not constitm e such

a participation in the proﬁts as will make the person con-

tracting with the partner, a partner in the ﬁrm, or liable for

the partnership debts. In Em parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252, Lord

Ennox said: “I take it to have been long settled that a man

may become a partner of A, when A and B are partners,

and yet not be a member of that partnership which existed

between A and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a

banker in the city, a Mr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles

Raymond that he should be interested so far as to receive a

share of the proﬁts of the business, and which share he had

a right to draw out of the ﬁrm of Raymond & Co. But it wa

held that he was no partner in. that partnership: had no

17

Into contracts relating to the business, and to divide the
net income among the creditors in ratable proportions, and
it was held that the creditors who executed the deed were
not partners in the business, and were not liable on bills
of exchange accepted by one of the trustees in the name
of the company for iron ore purchased and used by them
In the business.
But we have in this state adhered
to the general doctrine established by the earlier English cases, tind 'although it proceeds upon reasons which
have not been considered entirely satisfacfory, it was
applied by this court in the recent case of Leggett vs. Hyde,
58 N. Y. 272; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 244.' But the participation
in the profits of a trade which makes a person a partner as
to third p~rsons is a participation in the profits as such under
circumst:mces which give him a proprietary interest in the
profits before division as principal trader, E:c parte, Hamper,
17 Ves. 4-04; Story on Part., sec. 49; Pars. on Part. 74, and the
right to an account as partner, and a lien on the partnership
assets in preferPnce to individual creditors of the partner.
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 "\Vend. 175, 3 Kent Com. 25; 1
E;mith Lead. Cas. 984. It is not every participation in the
profits which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptions
to the rule have hee>n established. See Vandel"burgh vs. Hull, !.!O
\Vend. 70; Burckle vs. Ecklimi, 3 Comet. 132; Richardson 118.
Huglzitt, 7G N. Y. 55; s. c., 32 Am. RPp. 267. The contract of
sub-partnrrship, which is a contract between one
two partners and a third person by which the latter is to share the
profits, or thl' profits an~ losses of the partner with whom tlle
contract is made, in the firm business, does not eonstitut e such
a participation in the profits as will make the person contrarting with the partner, a partner in the firm, or liable for
the partnership debts. In E:v parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252, Lord
ELDO:i said: "I take it to have been long settled that a man
may become a partner of A, wh.en A and B are partners,
and yet not be a member of that partnership which existt;d
between A and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a
bankE'r in the city, a Mr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles
Raymond that he should be interested so far as to receive n
ahnre of the profits of the business, and which share he had
a right to draw out of the firm of Raymond & Co. But it was
held that he was no partner in_ that partnership: Jwd no

of
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demand against it; had no account in it; and that he must be

satisﬁed with a share of the proﬁts arising and given to Sir

Charles Raymond.” See, also, Bray vs. Fremont, 6 Madd. Ii;

Killock vs. Greg, 4 Russ. 285; Frost vs. Moulto-n, 21 Beav. 596;

Coll. on Part., sec. 27 (6th ed).

It has been said that the English cases only show, that as

between the members of the ﬁrm inter sese, the party contract-

ing for the proﬁts of one of the parties is not a partner, and

Mr. Lindley, referring to the subject, remarks, that before

the decision of the house of lords, in Com vs. Hi-ckrnan, a sub-

partner might, perhaps, have been liable to the creditors of the

principal ﬁrm, by reason of his participation in the proﬁts.

Lindley on Part., 55. The doubt expressed by this author was

resolved in this court by our former decision.

Applying in this case, to the ostensible agreement made

between Snyder and Ryley, the test of partnership adopted

in Grace vs. Snu'th, as explained in the subsequent cases, Sny-

der did not become, by virtue of that agreement, a partner in

the ﬁrm of Strang, Platt & Co. He had no interest in the

proﬁts of the ﬁrm as proﬁts, but a right simply to demand
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of Ryley that he should account to him for one-third of his

proﬁts, accompanied with an obligation to pay one-third of

his losses. He had no joint proprietorship with the members

of the ﬁrm in the proﬁts before division; was not entitled to

an account as partner, and had no lien on the partnership

assets. Tested by the rule in Cox vs. Hickman, Snyder’s posi-

tion is still stronger. Strang, Platt & Co. were not his agents

for carrying on the business of the ﬁrm, and he had no power

or right to interfere in its management.

It is claimed that whatever was the form of the arrange-

ment, the intention was that Snyder should be interested as

a partner in the ﬁrm, and we are referred to the principle

that courts will look to the substance and not merely to the

form of a transaction to determine its real character. But

form may be substance. It is undisputed that Snyder refused

to become a partner in the ﬁrm. The substituted arrange-

ment was one which the law permitted him to make without

involving him in the consequences, or subjecting him to the

responsibilities which flow from a partnership. If the osten-

sible agreement was not the real one, and the secret agree-

ment was that he was to be a partner, clothed with a part-

..

,..

demnnd against it; had no account in it; and that he must be
satisfied with a share of the profits arising and given to Sir
Charles Raymond." See, also, Bray vs. Frnmont, 6 Madd. :; ;
Killock vs. Greg, 4 Russ. 2S5; Frost vs. Moulton, 21 Beav. 596;
Coll. on Part., sec. 27 (6th ed).
It has been said that the English cases only show, that ns
between the members of the firm inter sese, the party contract·
ing for the profits of one of the parties is not a partner, and
Mr. Lindley, referring to the subject, remtlt·ks, that before
the decision of the house of lords, in Cox t:s. Hickman, a subpartner might, perhaps, have been liable to the creditors of the
principal firm, by reason of his participation in the profits.
Lindley on Part., 55. The doubt expressed by this author was
resolved in this court by our former decision.
Applying in this case, to the ostensible agreement made
between Snyder and Ryley, the test of partnership adopted
in Grace vs. Smith, as explained in the subsequent cases, Snyder did not become, by virtue of that agreement, a partner in
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co. He had no interest in th(>
profits of the firm as profits, but a right simply to demand
of R~·Iey that he should account to him for one-third of his
profits, accompanied with an obligation to pay one-third of
his losses. He had no joint proprietorsl.ip with the members
of the firm in the profits before division; was not entitled to
an account as partner, and had no lien on the partnership
assets. Tested by the rule in Co:v i·s. Hickman, Snyder's position is still stronger. f.itrang, Platt & Co. were not his agents
. for carrying on the business of the firm, and he had no power
or right to interfere in its management.
It is claimed that whatever was the form of the arrangement, the intention was that Snyder should be interested as
a partnE>r in the firm, nnd we are referred to the principlt~
that courts will look to the substance and not mert>ly to the
form of a transaction to determine its real character. But
form may be substance. It is undisputed that Snyder refus~d
to become a partner in the firm. 'fhe substituted arran~e
ment was one which the law permitted him to make without
invoking bim in the consequences, or subjecting him to the
responsibilities which flow from a partnership. If the ostensible agreement was not the real one, and the secret aJ,rrf'ement was that he was to be a partner, clothed with a part-_
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ner‘s rights, he could not escape from the responsibilities of
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that relation, by showing the ostensible contract. The law

would not countenance the evasion, or permit him, under

cover of the written agreement, to escape from liability as

a general partner. But there is no evidence to show, or from

which it can be inferred, that the ostensible agreement was not

the real one. It may very well be, that the objection which

would naturally exist on the part of the parties for whom Sny-

der was acting as purchasing agent, to his becoming a part-

ner in a concern from which purchases might be made, would

apply to the arrangement actually made, but no question arises

here between Snyder and his principals. The motive which

induced Snyder, by indirection, to become interested in the

business of Strang, Platt & Co., so long as the arrangement

made did not operate as a fraud upon the creditors of the ﬁrm,

is not a material circumstance.

The only point here is, whether the actual transaction made

Snyder, in law, a member of the ﬁrm or liable for its debts.

We think it did not, and the judgment should be reversed and a

new trial granted.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Judgment reversed.

All concur.

Norm: For other cases bearing upon sub-partnerships, see Mochem’s

Elem. of P8.l'1;n., § 30.

JACOBS vs. SHOREY.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1868.

48 N. H. 100. 97 Am. Dec. 586.

Action by Jacobs & Co. against Shorey and one Mathes to

recover upon notes given by Shorey for goods bought of Jacobs

who, at the time, supposed he was selling to Shorey alone.

It was claimed, however,tl1at Shorey and Mathes were partners,

. and that there was a fraudulent understanding between them

ner's rights, he could not escape from the responsibilities of
that relation, by showing the ostensible contract. The law
wonld not countenance the evasion, or permit him, unde1•
cover of the written agreement, to escape from liability as
a general partner. But there is no evidence to show, or from
which it can be inferred, that the ostensible agreement was not
the real one. It may very well be, that the objection which
would naturally exist on the part of the parties fo1· whom Snyder was acting as purrhasing agent, to his becoming a partner in a concern from which purchases might be made, would
apply to the arrangement actually made, but no question arises
here between Snyder and bis principals. The motive which
induced Snyder, by indirection, to become interested in the
busineRs of Strang, Platt & Co., so long as the arrangement
made did not operate as a fraud upon the creditors of the firm,
is not a material circumstance.
'l'he only point here is, whether the actual transaction made
Snyder, in law, a member of the firm or liable for its d2bts.
We think it did not, and the judgment should be reversed and a
new trial granted.
Judgment reversed.
All concur.

that the goods, when obtained, should be disposed of without

paying for them. Matlies had written to one Townsend and

others a letter recommending Shorey to credit, and this letter

L““\

NoTe:: For other cases bearing up:>n sub-partnerships, see Mochem's
Elem. ol Partn., § 30.

JACOBS

Vll.

SIIOHEY.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1868.
48 N. H. 100, 97 Am. Dec. 586.

Action by Jacobs & Co. agninst Shorey and one l\lathes to
recover upon notes given by Shorey for goods bought of Jacobs
who, at the time, supposed he was selling to Shorey alonl'.
It was claimed, however, that Sl!orey and Mathes were partners,
• nnd that there was a fraudul ent understanding bC>tween them
that the goods, when obtained, should be disposed of witbont
paying for them. Mathes had written to one TownsC'nd and
others a letter recommending Shorey to credit, and this h'tter
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was claimed to be a part of the fraudulent design. There was
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judgment below for plaintiffs.

was claimed to be a part of the fraudulent desilfn. There wns
judgment below for plaintiffs.

Hatch, for plaintiff.

Wheeler, Frink (G Haclsctt, for defendants.

Nesurrn, J. To maintain this action it becomes necessary

for the plaintiffs to establish the fact that Mathes shared in

Hatch, for plaintiff.

the proﬁts of the sale of the goods from them to Shorey, or

that Mathes and Shorey were partners in that transaction,

Wheeler, Frink ~ Hacl~ctt, for defend~nts.

upon the ground that where goods are obtained for the use

of a ﬁrm by means of the fraud of one of its members, the

other partner, by receiving and participating in the use or

sale of the goods, will be held to have adopted the fraudulent

act of him who obtained them, and will be placed in the same

ii; situation in reference to the rights of the vendors of the goods

as if he had directed his partner to procure the property, or

{had originally concurred with him in the transaction.

In this way partnerships may grow out of transactions or

relations in which the word “partnership” has not been

uttered. If there be such a joinder or union of interest and

action as the law considers as the equivalent of partnership,
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or as constituting it, it will give to the persons engaged in it

all the rights, and lay upon them all the responsibilities, and

also give to third parties dealing with them all the remedies

which belong to a partnership: Parsons on Partnership, 9;

Hawkins vs. Appleby, 2 Sand. 421. ' '

In general, conversations, assertions, or admissions, and

acts tending to show that parties are partners, and have that

joint interest in the particular business which makes them

liable as partners, will often have that effect, although such

evidence might be quite insuﬂicient to prove a partnership, as

between themselves, when no third persons are interested in

the question: Parsons on Part., 122.

, \Vhere there is doubt whether a party purchasing goods

lbought them for himself alone or for the beneﬁt of another

as partner, to prove the latter point evidence may be offered

of acts and declarations subsequent to the sale and delivery

of the property: Hillard on Sales, 82.

So evidence as to the character of the goods purchased, the

ability or insolvency of the purchaser at the time, or whether

I-A L

1

J. To maintain this action it becomes necessary
for the plaintiffs to establish the fact that Mathes shared in
the profits of the sale of the goods from them to Shorey, or
that Mathes and Shorey were partners in that transaction,
upon the ground that where goods are obtained for the nee
of a firm by means of the fraud of one of its members, the
other partner, by receiving and participating in the use or
sale of th.e goods, will be held to have adopted the f.raadnlenl
act of him who obtained them, and will be placed in the same
j; situation in reference to the rights of the vendors of the goods
I
.
:\ ns if he had directed his partner to procure the property, or
~had originally concurred with him in the transaction.
In this way partnerships may grow out of transactions or
relations in which the word "partnership" has not been
uttered. If there be such a joinder or union bf interest and
action as the law considers as the equfvalent of partnership,
or as constituting it, it will give to the persons engag~d in it
nll the rights, and lay upon them all the responsibilities, and
ulso give to third 1mrties dealing with them all the remedies
which belong to a partnerahip: Parsons on Partnership, 9;
Hawkins vs. Appleby, 2 Sand. 421.
•
In general, conversations, assertions, or admissions, and
acts tending to show that parties are partners, and have thnt
joint interest in the particular business which makes them
liable as partners, will often have that effect, although such
evidence might be quite insufficient to prove a partnership, ns
between themlilelves, when no third persons are interested in
the question: Parsons on Part., 122.
. \Vhere there is doubt whether a party purchasing goods
\bought them for himself nlone or for the benefit of another
as partner, to prove the lattt.'r point evidence may be offered
of arts and declarations subsequent to the sale and delivery
of the property: Hillard on Sales, 82.
So evidence as to the clrnracter of the goods purchased, the
ability or insolYency of the purchaser at the time, or whether
NESMITH,

~
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an inordinately large quantity of goods was purchased in pro-

va.

SHOREY.

133

portion to the party’s apparent means of payment, or the

credit given, or whether forced sales are made at inadequate

prices, before the expiration of the credit given, or whether

there may have been any secret or fraudulent transfer of the

goods, are all open and legitimate subjects of inquiry, as bear-

ing upon the sale, and the probable intent of the parties there-

to: State vs. Johnson, 33 N. H. 457; Parsons on Part, 128.

Upon -the question whether a. purchase was fraudulently

made by a. vendee in anticipation of his insolvency, evidence

tending to show that he fraudulently purchased other and

similar goods about the same time, by means of similar false

pretenses, may be admitted, having the tendency to show the

fraudulent intent or conspiracy in the case under consid-

eration. Acts and declarations showing a fraudulent purpose,

if connected in point of time, are admissible as throwing light

upon the general object of the party, though they do not relate

to the property or transaction in question: Hills vs. Hart, 18

N. H. 605; Lee vs. Lamprcy, 43 Id. 15; Blake vs. White, 13 Id.

267; An!/ier vs. Ash, 20 1a. 109.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

In this case, the main question is, whether the acts of Shorey

were within the scope of a general design to share the proﬁts

of the enterprise with Mathes, or whether the goods were

obtained on his own credit, or for his own private use or pur-

poses, and we think the jury might properly weigh the fact

wh.ether the letter of credit to Townsend and others might

not have been designed as means in obtaining money from the

plaintiff in prosecution of their general -fraudulent purposes.

The false pretense alluded .to in Lee vs. Lamprcy, supra, was

a letter addressed by one of the partners to another, tending

to show fraud and collusion between the parties. Upon the

aforesaid legal principles, the facts stated in the case appear

to be sullicient, with or without the letter, to show a fraudu-

lent purpose in both Mathes and Shorey in procuring the goods

in question, so as to render them liable. as partners: Bradley

vs. Obcur, 10 N. H. 477; Allison rs. Ellattlzew, 3 Johns. The

letter in question may also beproperly used as evidence before

the jury as an act or declaration of one member of a ﬁrm. and

properly within the scope of the partnership business, and to

charge the ﬁrm, whether honestly or dishonestly transacted

or said: Peirce vs. Wood, 23 N. H. 519; Webster vs. Stcarns, 44

an inordinately large quantity of goods was purchased in proportion to the party's apparent means of payment, or the
credit given, or whether forced sales are made at inadequate ·
prices, before the expiration of the credit given, or whether
there may have been any secret or fraudulent transfer of the
goods, are all open and legitimate subjects of inquiry, as bearhig npon the sale, and the probable intent of the parties thereto: State vs. Johnson, 33 N. H. 457; Parsons on Part., 128.
"l'pon the question whetlwr a purchase was fraudulently
made by a vendee in anticipation of his insolvency, evidence
tending to show that he fraudulently purchased other and
similar goods about Ow same time, by means of similar false
pretenses, may be admitted, b.avin~ the tendency to sllow the
fraudulent intent or conspiracy in tlle case under consideration. Acts and declarations showing a fraudulent purpose,
if connected in point of time, nre admiHHible as throwing light
upon the general objeet of the party, though tlwy do not relafo
to the property or transactipn in {]Uestion: Hills ·rs. Hart, lS
N. H. 605; Lee vs. Lamprey, 43 Id. 15; Blake i~s. White, 13 Id.
267; Anr1ier
Ash, 2G Id. 109.
In this case, the main question is, whether the acts of Shorey
were within thC' scope of a general design to share the profits
of the enterprise with Mathes, or whether the gooc.ls were
obtained on his own credit, or for his own private use or purposes, and we think the jury might properly weigh tlie fad
whether the leltPr of credit to 'l'ownsend and others might
not have been designed as means in obtaining mom·j· from tile
plaintiff in prosecution of their g{-nernl .fraudulent purpost>s.
The false pretc•n1ie alludPd .to in Lee i:s. Lamprey, supra., was
a letter addt·<•ssPcl by one of the partners to another, tendi11~
to sh<nv fr<_rnd and collusion bctw(_•en the parties. Upon tlte
aforesaid ]('gal principles, the facts stated in the case nppea i·
to be sullicient, with or without the lett<'r, to show a fraudulent purpose in both "'.\In thPs and Rho1·ey in pro cu ring the goods
in questi-0n, so as to render them lia hie as partners: Bracllcy
1~8. Obcar, 10 N. H. 477; Allison ·rs. Jfatthcu:, =~ ,Jollns. 2:l5. The
letter in question may also be properly used as evidence before
the jury as an act or declaration of one member of a firm. and
properly within the scope of the partnership business, and to
charge the firm, whether honestly or dishonc>stly transad(•(l
or said: Peirce vs. Wood, 23 N. H. 519; Webster vs. Stearn.-;, 44

vs.
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Id. 502. Such evidence may be received as one of a series of
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acts, which, all together, indicate a fraudulent design to obtain

the goods without paying for them.

(Residue of opinion omitted.)

Plaintiffs took judgment for the amount of their ﬁrst note.

Non: See also Mechem's Elem. of Pal-tn., § 204.

FLETCHER vs. PULLEN.

Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1889.

' 70 Md. 205, 16 Atl. Rep 881. 14 Am. st. Rep. 355.

Id. 502. Such evidence may be received as one of a series of
acts, which, all together, indicate a fraudulent design to obtaiu
the goods without paying for them..
(Residue of opinion omitted.)
l'luintitrs took judgment for the amount of their first note.

Appeal from circuit court, Dorchester county.

Argued before 1\[ILLER, Ronmsox, I nvmo, Srosn, Burns and

Non:: See also Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., § 201.

McSmannx', JJ.

S. T. M ilbourne, for appellant.

Daniel M. He-nary, Jr., for appellee.

l\l1I.LEn, J . The plaintiffs, who are nurserymen in Milford,

Del., sued Bramble 8: Fletcher, as partners in the same busi-

ness at Cambridge, in this state, for fruit trees sold and deliv-

ered to them in the autumn of 1886. Bramble died before the

FLETCHER vs. PULLEN.

trial, and Fletcher defended upon the ground that he was not

a partner. The exceptions relate mainly to the admissibility

Oourt of Appca'ts of

Afaryland,

1889.
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of evidence upon the question, not whether Fletcher & Bram-

ble were actually partners inter scse, but whether Fletcher

70 :Md. 205, 16 Atl. Rep 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 8515.

had held himself out, or had permitted himself to be held out,

as a partner, so as to become responsible to third parties. The

law on this subject, well established by authority, may be

stated thus: “The ground of liability of a person as partner

who is not so in fact is that‘he has held himself out to the

Appeal from circuit c-0urt, Dorchester county.
Argued before MILLER, ROBINSO~, IRVING, STONE,
MCSHERRY, JJ.

IlnYAN

and

world as such, or has permitted others to do so, and by rea-

son thereof is estopped from denying that he is one as against

S. T. Milbou,rne, for appellant.

those who have in good faith dealt with the ﬁrm, or with him

as a member of it. But it must appear that the person dealing

Daniel M. Henry, Jr., for appellee.

with the ﬁrm believed, and had a reasonable right to believe,

that the party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member

J.-

M11.LER, J. The plaintiffs, who are nurserymen in Milford,
Del., sued Bramble & Fletcher, as partners in the same bmi!iness at Cambridge, in tl1is state, for fruit trees sold and delivered to tlwm in the autumn of 188G. Bramble died before the
trial, and Fletcher defended upon the ground that he was not
a partner. The exceptions relntP. mainly to the admissibility
of evidence upon the question, not whether Fletcher & Bramble were actually partners inter scse, but whether Fletcher
had held himself out, or had permitted himself to be held out,
ns a partner, so :is to become responsible to third parties. Tha
Jaw on this subject, well establif.ihed by authority, mny be
stated thus: "The ground of liability of a person as partner
who is not so in fact is that11e has held himself out to the
worfd as such, or has permitted others to do so, and by reason thereof is estopped from denying that he is one as against
those who have in good faith dealt with the firm, or with him
as a member of it. But it must appear that the person dealing
with the firm believed, and had a reitsonable right to beJiev<',
that the party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member

I
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of the ﬁrm, and that the credit was to some extent induced

by this belief. It must also appear that the holding out was

by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or with

his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the direct act

of the party, may be inferred from circumstances, such as

from advertisements, shop bills, signs, or cards, and from vari-

ous other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that the

holding out was with his authority, knowledge, or assent; and

whether a defendant has so held himself out, or permitted it

to be done, is in every case a question of fact, and not of law :”

Thomas vs. Green, 30 Md. 1; 1 Lindl. Partn. 45; Thompson vs.

Bank, 111 U. S. 536, 537, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; 5 ¥Vait, Act. &

Def. 113, 114. These general rules apply to the present case.

The evidence shows that there was, in or near Cambridge,

a fruit farm and nursery on about 15 acres of Fletcher’s land,

which Bramble had occupied and managed from the year 1881

to 1887. The plaintiffs then proved that in October and

November, 1886, they received several letters, postal cards,

telegrams, and circulars from Cambridge, signed, “Fletcher &
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Bramble,” representing them to be partners, and the envelopes

in which the letters were enclosed were stamped with the same

ﬁrm name. These letters contained orders for fruit trees, and

the ﬁrst of them gave a reference to a Mr. Van Horst, formerly

of Milford, but then residing in Cambridge. The plaintiffs not

knowing the ﬁrm, nor by whom the letters were written, wrote

to Van Horst and others, inquiring as to its credit and stand-

ing, and in reply received information to the eﬂ’ect that

Fletcher was entirely responsible, but that Bramble was worth

nothing. Upon this information, and receiving no intimation

.that Fletcher was not a partner, they ﬁlled the orders and

delivered the trees, relying upon his credit. Each item of this

testimony was excepted to as it was offered, upon the ground

_ that these letters, circulars,iand envelopes were written and

gotten up by Bramble without Fletcher-’s knowledge or con-

sent. \Ve think, however, they were all admissible, not because

‘the acts and declarations of Bramble would bind Fletcher,

‘as of course they would not, unless he was an actual partner,

lbut for the purpose of showing that the plaintiffs believed,

' and had good reason to believe, that he was a partner, and

that they trusted the supposed ﬁrm upon the faith of his

i responsibility. To prove this was an important link in the

of the firm, and that the credit was to some extent induced
by this belief. It must also nppear that the holding out was
by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or with
his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the direct act
of the party, may be inferred from circumstances, such as
from advertisements, shop bills, signs, or cards, and from various other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that the
holding out was with his authority, knowledge, or assent; and
whether a defendant has so held himself out, or permitted it
to be done, is in every case ai question of fact, an~ not of law:"
Thomas vB. Green, 30 l\1d. 1; 1 Lindi. Partn. 45; Thompson VB.
Bank, 111 U. S. 536, 537, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; 5 \'Vait, Act. &
Def. 113, 114. These general rules apply to the present case.
The evidence shows that there was, in or near Cambridge,
a fruit farm and nursery on about 15 acres of Fletcher's land,
which Bramble had occupied and managed from the year 1881
to 1887. The plaintiffs then proved that in October and
November, 1886, they received several letters, postal cards,
telegrams, and circulars from Cambridge, signed, "Fletcher &
Bramble," representing them to be partners, and the envelopes
in which the letters were enclosed were stamped with the sam~
firm name. These letters contained ordei·s for fruit trees, and
the first of them gave a reference to a Mr. Van Horst, formerly
of .~!ilford, but then residing in Cambridge. The plaintiffs not
knowing the firm, nor by whom the letters were wlitten, wrofo
to Van Horst and others, inquiring as to its credit and stanclin~, and in reply received information to the effect that
FJetcher was entirely responsible, but that Bramble was worth
nothing. Upon this information, and receiving no intimation
.that Fletcher was not a partner, they filled the orders and
delivered the trees, relying upon his credit. Each item of th.is
tPstimony was excepted to as it was offered, upon the groun<l
. thn t these letters, circulai·s, and envelopes were written and
gotten up by Bmmble with-0ut Fletcher's knowledge or consent. 'Ve think, however, they were all admissible, not because
the nct8 and declarations of Bramble would bind Fletcher,
'j as of course they would not, unless he was an actual partner,
I but for the pm·pose of showing that the plaintiffs believed,
I and had good reason to believe, that be was a partner, and
: that they trusted the supposed firm upon the faith of his
j responsibility. To prove this was an important link in the
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plaintiffs’ case, and evidence tending to prove it was, in our

opinion, admissible.

The plaintiffs then proved that an advertisement signed,

“Fletcher 8: Bramble,” calling attention to their nursery, offer-

ing their trees for sale, and soliciting from the public continu-

ance of conﬁdence and orders, was published in two weekly

.newspapers of Cambridge, where Fletcher lived, for three

months during the year 1884. In one of these papers there

was also a local notice of the advertisement. These were also

prepared, inserted, and paid for by Bramble, without Fletch-

er’s knowledge; but it was proved that during the time of their

publication he was a subscriber to both papers, and they were

regularly sent him. There is also clear proof that he actually

knew of them while they were being published, and never

inserted in either of the papers any denial of the partnership.

held out to the public by Bramble as a partner, with his knowl-

( From all this it was competent for a jury to infer that he was

edge and assent; and we are of opinion the plaintiffs were

' entitled to prove this, thopgh they never saw the_advertise-

r meats, and were not i'nfluen‘c-_edT>y >tliem'in—trusting the ﬁrmt
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‘ They had already proved they had so trusted it in good faith,

‘and upon good grounds, and we think they had the right to

I resort to these antecedent advertisements, and to this proof,

_for the purpose of showing that Fletcher had been so held

_out to the public with his knowledge and assent. It was evi-

dence to go to the jury upon that subject, and, if unt-o_n;__

tradicted, would have made him a partner, at least as to all

third parties who had trusted the ﬁrm in good faith upon thatj

supposition. Having knowledge of these advertisements, it

was his duty to deny the partnership, if he wished to escape

liability. But what was he to do, and how much? \Ve do not

say he was under a legal obligation to publish a repudiation

of the partnership in the same newspapers, or in any other,

though this would seem to be a very obvious and the most

efficient mode of proclaiming such denial, and the fact that

he failed so to do was a circumstance to go to the jury. But

we take it that the rule upon this subject, stated by a very

eminent jurist, is reasonable and just: “If one is held out as

a partner, and he knows it, he is chargeable as one, unless

he docs all that a reasonable and honest man should do, under

similar circumstances, to assert and manifest his refusal, and

/ plai~tift's' case, nnd evide~ce tending to prove it was, in our
\ opinion, admissible.
1'he plaintiffs then proved that an advertisement signed,
"Fletcher & Bramble," calling attention to their .nursery, offel'·
ing their trees for sale, and soliciting from the public continuance of confidence and orders, was published in two weekly
.newspapers of Cambridge, where Fletcher lived, for three
months during the year 1884. In one of these papers thet'e
was also a local notice of the advertisement. These were also
prepared, inserted, and paid for by Bramble, without Fletch·
er's knowledge; but it was proved that during the time of theh·
publication he was a subscriber to both papers, and they wne
regularly sent him. There is also clear proof that be actuaJly
knew of them while they were being published, and never
inserted in either of the papers any denial of the partnership.
From all this it was com1wt..•ut for a jury to infer that he wa~
( held out to the public by Bramble as a partner, with his knowledge and assent; and we are of opinion the plaintiffs were
' entitled to prove this, though they never saw the advertiser
-- - - - - - --- - • - . - - .
-- - - --m,ents, and were not inflm nl'ed by them in trusting the firm~' They had already proved they had so trusted it in good faith.
: and upon good grounds, and we think they had the right to
; resort to these antecedent advertisements, and to this proof,
. for the purpose of showing that Fletcher hau been so held
, out to the public with his knowledge and assent. It was evi""dence to go to the jury upon that subject, and, if_ UD£~~= _
tradicted, would have made him a partner, at least as to all
third parties who had trusted the firm in good faith upon that-supposition. Having knowledge of these adYertisc~ments, it
was his duty to d<:>ny the partnership, if he wished to escape
liability. But what was he to do, and how much? 'Ve do not
say he was under a leg-al obligation to publish a repudiation
of the partnership in the same newspapers, or in any other,
though this would srem to be a very obYious and the most
efficient mode of proclaiming such denial, and the fact tliat
he failed so to do was a circumstance to go to the jury. But
we take it that the rule upon this subject, stated by a very
eminent jurist, is rea1mnable and just: "If one is held out as
a partner, and be knows it, he is chargeable as one, unless
be does all that a reasonable and honest man should do, under
similar circumstances, to assert and man ifest bis refusal, and
1
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FLETOHER VB. PULLEN.
thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled.” Pars.

13'7

Partn. '134. It follows that the court below was right in

admitting all the evidence otTered_by the plaintiffs, and in

rejecting the defendant’s ﬁrst prayers. In regard to his sec-

ond, third, and fourth prayers, all that need be said is that the

propositions they contain are all embraced in his ﬁfth prayer.

which the court granted with a single modiﬁcation, to which

we see no valid objection.

“'0 come now to the rulings excluding certain evidence

offered by the defendant to show and sustain-his denial and

repudiation of the partnership. His own testimony was to

the effect that Bramble was simply his tenant of the land for

the term of six years from 1881; that Bramble had a fruit tree

nursery on the land, but he himself had nothing to do with it,

and never entered into a contract of partnership with Bram-

ble, either written or verbal, in the nursery business, or any

never lent his name, or autho-rized the use of it by Bramble,

with reference to this business, or any other, that he never

gather; that he never held himself out as such partner, and

knew of the letters, circulars, and envelopes written and used
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by Bramble until they were produced in court at the trial; that

the advertisements and local notice were inserted without his

knowledge or consent, and he never knew anything about

them until they appeared in the papers; that he never put

himself to the trouble and expense of publishing in these

papers, or in any others, a contradiction of the advertisements,\

but had, on all occasions, to town people and country people,

when the subject was mentioned to him, and often when it

was not, denied the existence of any partnership, and repudi-

ated the advertisements as unauthorized by him. All this was

allowed to go in without objection, but it is to be observed

that he admits he knew of the advertisements wh.ic_h clearly

and publicly proclaimed the partnership, and never published

in any newspaper any denial of it. \Ve have said he was under

no legal obligation to make publication, but that it was his

duty to do all that a reasonable and honest man should do,

under similar circumstances, to manifest his denial. This is

the important question in the case, and it was one solely for

the jury to _determine. On this issue of fact he was entitled to

adduce all the evidence he could, leaving it for the jury to

decide whether, upon the whole of it, they thought he had done

18

thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled." Para.
Partn. *134. It follows that the court below was right in
admitting all the evidence offered. by the plaintiffs, and in
rejecting the defendant's first prayers. In regard to his second, third, and fourth prayers, all that need be said is that th•~
propositions they contain are all embraced in his fifth prayer.
'which the court granted with a single modification, to which
we see no valid objection.
We come now to the rulings excluding certain evidence
offered by the d«:>fendant t-0 show and sustain. his denial anll
re1mdiation of the partnership. His own testimony was to
the effect that Bramble was simply his tenant of the land fo1·
the term of six years from 1881; that Bramble had a fruit tree
nursery on the land, but he himself had nothing to do with it,
and never entered into a contract of partnership with Bramble, either written or verbal, in the nursery business, or any
ther; that be never held himself out as such partner, and
ever lent bis name, or authorized the use of it by Bramble~
with .refeN.•nre to this business, or any other, that he never
knew of the letters, circulars, and envelopes written and used
by Bramble until they were pt·oduced in court at the trial; that
the advertisements and local notice were inserted without his
knowledge or consent, and he never knew anything abont
them until they nppeared in the papers; that he never put
himself to the trouLJe and expense of publishing in tlH•se
papers, or in any others, a contradiction of the advertisements,'
but had, on all occasions, to town people nnd co1mtry peopJe,
when the subjC'ct was mentioned to him, and often when it
was not, denied the existence of any partnership, and r<>pmliatcd the ad\'ertiscments as unauthorized by him. All this was
allowed to go in without objection, but it is to be obst>rvcd
that he admits he knew of the advertisements which clcal'ly
and publicly proclaimed the partnership, and never pnblislwd
in any newspaper any denial of it. "~e have said be was unde1•
no legal obligation to make publication, but that it was hi8
duty to do all that a reasonable and honest man should do,
under similar ci1·cumstances, to manifest his denial. This is
the important question in the case, and it was one solely for
the jury to .determine. On this issue of fact he was entitled to
adduce all the evidence he could, leaving it for the jury to
decide whether, upon the whole of it, they thought he had done
18
0
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all that a reasonable and honest man ought to have done.
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Under this rule, he was entitled to the beneﬁt of any evidence

in corroboration of his own testimony which tended to prove

the publicity of his denial. Now, in addition to his own gen-

eral evidence on this subject, he offered to prove, (1) by the

editor of one of the papers in which the advertisement and

notice appeared, that, when the witness called upon him to

pay for the same, he refused to do so, repudiated all partner-

ship with Bramble, declared he had nothing to do with Bram-

ble's business, and would have nothing to do with his bills.

(2) By the postmaster of Cambridge, that soon after the pub-

lication of the advertisements witness delivered to Fletcher

certain mail matter addressed to “Fletcher & Bramble,” but

he returned it unopened, and refused to accept the same,-

telling witness he had nothing to do with Bramble’s business,

and was no partner of his. (3) Th.at in July, 1885, he and Bram

ble were sued as partners by the steamboat company before

a magistrate in Cambridge, on a bill for freight; that there

was a crowd at the trial, and he resisted the suit, and refused

to pay the account, on the ground that he had nothing to do
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with Bramble’s business; that the magistrate gave judgment

in his favor, and the case was much discussed in the com»

munity, especially by the steamboat agent, who made great

complaint because the. magistrate had decided in his favor.

In our opinion, these items of evidence should have been

admitted. It is not for this court to pass upon their weight

or effect, no matter how slight or inadequate, as a denial of

the partnership publicly proclaimed in the newspapers, we

may deem them to be. This is a matter solely for the jury.

Our duty is simply to determine the question of their admis-

sibility as evidencc, and we think the court erred in rejecting

them. We are also of the opinion that the agreement, or

“lease,” as it is called, between Fletcher and Bramble, for the

land upon which the nursery was carried on, should have been

admitted. lt‘was part of the defendant’s case, to prove that

he was not an actual partner with Bramble. This agreement

was admissible for that purpose, if he could show that by its

true construction it merely created the relation of landlord

and tenant between them. The error in rejecting the items

of evidence referred to requires us to reverse the judgment,

and award a new trial. But in view of the fact that the court

all that a reasonable and honest man ought to have done.
Under this rule, he was entitled to the benefit of any evidence
in corroboration of his own testimony wllith tended to prove
the publicity of his denial. Now, in addition to his own general evidence on this subjt:>ct, he offered to prm·e, (1) by the
editor of one of the papers in which the advertisement and
notice appeared, that, when the witness called upon him to
pay for the same, he refused to do so, repudiated all partnership with Bramble, declared he had nothing to do with Bram·
ble's business, and would have nothing to do with bis bills.
(2) By the postmaster of Cambridge, that soon after the publication of the advertisements witness delivered to Fletcher
certain mail lnatter addressed to "Fletcher & Bramble," but
he returned it unopened, and refused to accept the same,telling wit.ness he had nothing to do with Bramble's business.
and was no partner of his. (3) Th.at in .July, 1885, he and Bram
ble were sued as partn~rs by the steamboat company before
a magistrate in Cambridge, on a bill for freight; that there
was a crowd at the trial, and he resisted the suit, and refused
to pay the arcount, on the ground that he had nothing to do
with Bramble's business; that the magistrate gave judgment
in his favor, and the case was much discussed in the community, especially by tlJe steamboat agent, who made greut
complaint becnuse the. magistrate had decided in his fa_vor.
In our opinion, these items of evidence should have been
admitted. It is not for this court to pass upon their weight
or effeCt, no matter how slight or inadequate, ns a denial of
the partnership publicly proclaimed in the newspapers, we
may deem them to be. This is a matter solely for the jury.
Our duty is simply to determine the question of their admissibility as evidence, and we think the court erred in rejecting
them. 'Ye are also of the opinion that the agreement, or
"lease," as it is called, between Fletcher and Bramble, for the
land upon which the nursery was carried on, should have been
admitted. It was part of the defendant's case, to prove that
he was not
actual partner with Bramble. This agreement
was admissible for that purpose, ff be could show that by its
true construction it merely created the relation of landlord
nnd tenant between them. The error in rejecting the itema
of evidence referred to requires us to reverse the judgment,
and award a new trial. But in view of the fact that the court
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below acting as a jury found for the plaintiff, notwithstand-
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ing they had granted the defendant’s ﬁfth prayer, in which

all his own testimony in denial of the partnership was

expressly submitted to the consideration of the judges, we

think each party should be required to pay his own costs,

both in this court and in the court below.

Judgment reversed, each party to pay his own costs in this

court and in the court below, and new trial awarded.

Norm: See also Mechem‘s Elem. of Pai-tu., §§ TO, 71, 72, and cases there

cited. Compare also with the following case.

_\J >.__ i 5;‘

_-___ (~~,.~;,*,.t. ,~.

\ 7, ®IIyo

below acting as a jury found for the plainti1f, .notwithstanding they had granted the defendant's fifth prayer, w which
all his own testimony in denial of the partn~rsbip was
expressly submitted to the consideration of the judges, we
think each party should be required to pay his own costs,
both in this court and in the court below.
Judgment reversed, each party to pay bis own costs in this
court and in the court below, and new trial awarded.

‘QM’/K

MORGAN vs. FARREL.

Suprmnc Court of Connecticut, 1890.

NOTE: See also Mechem's Elem. of Parto., §§ iO, 71, 72, and cues there
cited. Compare also with the following case.

58 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282, 20 Atl. Rep. 614.

Action on two promissory notes. The opinion states the

facts.

C. S. Hamilton, for appellant.
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J . W. Ailing and W. H. Williams, for appellee.

Axnnsws, G. J. On the 1st day of March, 1880, William M.

Babbott made and delivered to the ﬁrm of Morgan & Herrick,

MORGAN vs. FARREL.

merchants, then doing business in New York, a note for the

sum of $1,004.56, expressed to be for value received, and pay-

Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1890.

able in 30 days; and on the 8th day of the same month another

note for the sum of $2,205.60, payable in 30 days at the Ansonia

68 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282, 20 Atl. Rep. 614.

National Bank, Ansonia, Conn. These notes were signed by

Babbott in the name of “Franklin Farrel & Company,” and

were delivered to Morgan & Herrick in payment for certain

goods sold and delivered by them to Babbott on his order there-

Action on two promissory notes.
facts.

The opinion states the

for. The plaintiﬁ is now the owner of the notes, and brings

this suit to recover their amount. The complaint alleges that

at the time .the notes bear date Franklin Farrel and the said

0. B. Hamilton, for appellant.
J. lV. Alling nnd lV. H. Williams, for appellee.

William M. Babbott were partners in business under the ﬁrm

name of Franklin Farrel & Co. Farrel alone makes defense.

No service of the complaint was made on Babbott. The answer

is a general denial. Upon the trial evidence was offered from

ANnnEws, C. J. On the 1st day of March, 1880, William M.
Babbott made and delivered to the firm of Morgan & Herrick,
merchants, then doing business in New York, a note for the
sum of fl,004.56, expressed to be for value received, and payable in 30 days; and on the 8th day of the same month another
note for the sum of $2,205.GO, payable in 30 days at the Ansonia
National Bank, Ansonia, Conn. These notes were signed by
Bnbbott in the name of "Franklin Farrel & Company," and
were delivered to Morgan & Herrick in payment for certain
~oods sold and deliyered by them to Babbott on his order therefor. The plaintiff is now the owner of the notes, and brings
tllis suit to recover their amount. 'l'he complaint alleges that
at the time .the notes bear date Franklin Farrel and the saiu
\Villiam 1\:1. Bnbbott were partners in business under the firm
name of Franklin Farrel & Co. Farrel alone makes defense.
No service of the complaint was made on Babbott. The answer
is a general denial. Upon the trial evidence was offered from

lff
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which the plaintiff claimed to have proved that Farrel and

CASES ON PAHTNE~HlP.

Babbott were partners as between themselves, or at least that

they were partners as to all third persons, or that Farrel was

liable as a partner to Morgan 8: Herrick, for the reason that

he had permitted Babbott to hold out that Farrel and himself

were partners under such circumstances that he was estopped

to deny that he was a partner. Farrel denied that he was a

partner in either way. The superior court rendered judgment

for the defendant, and the plaintitf has appealed.

An exhaustive deﬁnition of partnership is not easy. So far

as the facts in the case present the uestion of partnership,

lit is suﬂiciently accurate to say tha%1ere is a partnership

ibetwecn two or more persons whenever such a relation exists

ﬁbetween them that each is as to all the others, in respect to

some business, both principal and agenﬂ If such a relation

exists, they are partners; otherwise not. They a.re partners in

that business in respect to which there is this relation, and

as to any other business they are not partners. Partnership

is but a name for this reciprocalrelation. Story, Partn. § 1;

Lord \Vn.\'sr.nvnAI.n in Cow vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 311; (ante
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p. 70;) Bullen rs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86; Holme rs. H ammaml,

L. R. 7 Exch. 230; Harvey rs. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319; (ante

p. 97;) Eastman rs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276; 16 Am. Rep. 192;

Golly. Partn. §§ 139, 412; Stillman vs. Harvey, 47 Conn. 26.

Between the parties themselves this relation of principal and

agent cannot exist, except by their voluntary agreement.

Hazard vs. Hazard, 1 Story 371; Golly. Partn. § 2. In the pres-

ent case, the ﬁnding is as explicit as language can make it that

Farrel and Babbott did not intend to become partners. It

says: “No paper was ever signed by or between Farrel and

Babbott alone. N0 conversation ever took place in which it

was stated in words that Farrel and Babbott were partners,

or were to form a partnership. No ﬁrm name was ever men-

tioned. No suggestion that either had used, or could use, the

name or the credit of the other. Neither ever understood,

intended, or thought that a partnership existed, or should

exist.” And, in addition to this, there is the express declara-

tion of Babbott to his counsel—apparently after Farrel had

written to him that he, Farrel,-had stopped all work on the

machine—that he did not believe there was any partnership

between them. This part of the case is not pressed, and we

which the plaintiff claimed to have proved that Farrel anti
Babbott were partners as between themselves, or at least tha[
they were partners as to all third persons, or that Farrel was
liable as a partner to Morgan & Herrick, for the reason that
he had permitted Babbott to hold out that Farrel and himself
were partners under such circumstances that he was estopped
to deny that he was a partner. Farrel denied that be was a
partner in either way. The supe1·ior court rendered judgment
for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.
An exhaustive definition of partnership is not easy. So fur
as the facts in the case present the -®stion of partnership,
\it is sufficiently accurate to say tha there is a partnership
l between two 01· more persons whenever such a relation exists
between them that each is as to all the others, in respect to
some business, both principal and agenjJ If such a relation
exists, they are partners; otherwise not. They are partners in
that business in respect to which there is this relation, am]
as to any other business they are not partners. Partnership
is but a name for this reciprocal' relation. Story, Partn. § 1;
Lord 'VF.~sr-EYDAI.E in Oo:r i:s. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 311; (ante
p. 70;) Bullen t'S. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86; Holme i·s. Hamm<md,
L. R. 7 Exch. 2:30; Hart:cy i·s. Cltilds, 28 Ohio St. 319; (ante
p. 97;) Eastman i:s. Clark, 53 N. II. 276; 1G Am. Rep. 19:!;
Colly. Partn. §§ 139, 412; Stillman t:s. HatTcy, 47 Conn. 2U.
Between the parties tbemsel \·.es this relation of principal arnl
ngent cannot exist, except by their voluntary agreement.
Ha::m·d vs. Hazard, 1 Story 371; Colly. Partn. § 2. In the present casP., the finding is as explicit as language can make it that
Farrel and Babbott did not intend to become partners. It
says: "Xo paper was ever signed by or between Farrel anJ
Babbott alone. No conversation e>er took plaee in which it
was stated in words that Farrel an<l nabbott were partnerl",
or were to form a partnership. No firm name was ever mentioned. No sugg<•stion that either bad used, or could use, the
name or the credit of the other. Nc>ither ever undei:stood,
intended, or thought that a partnership existed, or should
exist." And, in addition to this, there is the express declaration of Babbott to his counsel-apparently after Farrel had
written to him that he, FarreJ,.had stopped all work on the
machine-that he did not believe there was any partnership
between them. This part of the case is not pressed, and we

i
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need not pursue it. A partnership as to third persons some-
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times arises by operation of laweven against the intention ofthe

parties;and this happens either because the contract which the

parties have entered into in law makes each the principal and

agent of the other, or because by a course of dealing they have

shown that such was the real relation between them. Such

were the cases of Parker vs. Ganﬁeld, 37 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep.

317 ; and Bank vs. Hine, 49 Conn. 236. It is laid down in Ever-

itt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, that, where the terms of the agree-

ment and the facts are all admitted, whether or not a partner-

ship existed is a question of law for the court to decide. The

plaintiﬁ claims that from the facts found by the superior court

it does appear that Farrel and Babbott were partners

quorul third persons, notwithstanding their intent not to be

partners. The facts from which the partnership is claimed

to arise are mainly the exhibits 1, 2, and 3; and of these exhibit

L’ is the only one important. All the other facts derive their

signiﬁcance solely from the construction that is to be put on

this exhibit.

Exhibit 2 purports to be no more than an agreement between
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(1 he Cook Ice & Refrigerating Company, party of the ﬁrst part,

gs .-»~

and Franklin Farrel and William M. Babbott, party of the

second part, by which the party of the ﬁrst part, being the

owner of patents therefor, grants to the party of the second

part the exclusive right to manufacture and sell refrigerating

machines and apparatus for refrigerating, as described in the

patents, throughout the United States for the full term for

which the patents were granted. And, in consideration of

that grant, the party of the second part undertakes and agrees,

with all diligence and dispatch, and without expense or charge

to the party of the ﬁrst part, to manufacture a refrigerating

machine under the patents, and for the purpose of aiding and

beneﬁting the business intended in the agreement, to run the

machine for at least two months subsequent to its completion.

The party of the second part also agrees to use its best endeav-

ors to create a public demand for the machines, and to mann-

facture machines to supply any bona ﬁde order therefor; and

agree to pay to the party of the ﬁrst part an amount equal

to one-half of the gross proﬁts accruing therefrom. There are

other provisions in the agreement, but all having reference

to the duties and obligations of the parties thereto. That such

Q“-:'...l“"-""

need not pursue it. A partnership as to third persons sometimes arises by operation of lawevenagainst the intention of the
parties;and this happens either because the contract which the
parties have entered into in law makes each the principal and
agent of the other, or because by a course of dealing they have
~hown that such was the real relation between them. Such
were the cases of Parker vs. Canfield, 37 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep.
:n7; and Bank t:s. Hine, 49 Conn. 236. It is laid down in Everitt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, that, where the terms of the agre~
ment and the facts are all admitted, whether or not a p:ll'tner~bjp existed is a question of law for the court to decide. The
plaintiff claims that from the facts found by the superior court
it does appear that Farrel and Babbott were partners
quoad third persons, notwithstanding their intent not to be
i,artners. The facts from which the partnership is claimed
'to arise are mainly the exhibits 1, 2, and 3; and of these exhibit
:! is the only one important. All the other facts derive tht!ir
~ignificance solely from the construction that is to be put on
this exhibit.
( Exhibit 2 purports to be no more than an agreement between
the Cook Ice & Refrigerating Company, party of the first part,
and Franklin Farrel and \Villiam M. Babbott, party of the
Necond part, by which the party of the first part, being the
owner of patents the>refor, grants to the party of the secoutl
J>art the exclusive rig-ht to manufacture and sell refrigerating
machines and apparatus for refrigerating-, as described in the
patents, throughout the l:nited States for the full term for
which the patents were granted. And, in consideration of
that grant, the party of the second part undertakes and agrees,
with all diligence and dispntch, a.nd without expense or charge
to the party of the first part, to manufacture a refrigerating
machine under the pat<•nts, and for the purpose of aiding and
benefiting the businrss intended in the agreement, to run the
machine for at least two months snbseqn<'nt to ~ts completion.
The party of the second part also agrees to use its best endeavors to create a public demand for the machines, and to man 11facture machines to supply any bona fide ortler therefor; and
agrees to pay to the party of the first part an amount eqnal
to one-half of the gross profits accruing therefrom. There are
other provisions in the agreement, but all having reference
to the duties and obligations of the parties thereto. That snch
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a contract as this does not make the parties—that is, the party

of the ﬁrst part and the party of the second part—partners,

is settled by abundant authority. It only provides a way in

which the party doing the work is to be paid for its services.

Chase vs. Barrett, 4 Paige 148. The only relation of Farrel and

Babbott that appears by this agreement is that of joint con-

tractors to manufacture refrigerating machines for the Cook

Company. There is no suggestion in it that either is, or is to

be, the agent of the other. It does not attempt to provide in

what way Farrel and Babbott, as between themselves, are to

carry out their joint undertaking. (A community of interest

does not make a partnership) Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn.

77 ; 30 Am. Dec. 596; Porter vs. McClure, 15 Wend. 187. Thus

tenants in common of land are not partners. Calvert vs. Ald-

rich, 99 Mass. 7-1; 96 Am. Dec. 693. In Oliver vs. Gray, 4 Ark.

425, it was holden that two persons, joint owners of a horse,

were not partners in respect to a contract for its keeping.

French vs. Sig/ring, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 357, was a case where two

men owned a race horse, which they entered in a race and

won a. prize. It was held that they were not partners as to
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that money. In Hawkins vs. Mclntyre, 45 Vt. 496, the defend-

ant contracted to ﬁnish oﬁf a church for the sum of $4,500.

Afterwards he agreed with the plaintiff that they should work

together in doing the job, each working himself, the work of

each. to oﬂ'set that of the other, and the expense of materials

and of other work tobe deducted from the amount, and the

balance to be divided between them. It was held that they

were not partners. In the case above cited (Lomnis vs. Mar-

shall, 12 Conn. 77), B was the owner of a satinet factory. A

agreed with B to furnish all the wool that should be needed at

the factory for two years, which B agreed to manufacture into

cloth, the net proceeds of the cloth, after deducting the inci-

dental charges of sale, to be divided, so that A should have 55

per cent and B 45 per cent. It was held that there was not

a partnership as to third persons. It probably could be in-

ferred that Farrel and Babbott were to divide between them-

selves whatever was left, if anything, after paying the Cook

Company. But a partnership, even as to third persons, is not

constituted by the mere fact that two or more persons partici-

pate or are interested in the net proceeds of a business. 1

Lindl. Partn. 24; Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exeh. 230; Loomis

~\

a contract as this does not mnke the parties-that is, the party
of the first part and the party of the second part-partners,
is settled by abundant authority. It only provides a way in
which the party doing the work is to be paid for its services.
Ohase i·s. Barrett, 4 Paige 148. The only relation of Farrel and
Babbott that appears by this agreement is that of joint contractors to manufacture refrigerating machines for the Cook
Company. There is no suggestion in it that either is, or is to
be, the agent of the other. It does not attempt to provide in
what way Farrel and Babbott, as between themselves, are to
carry out their joint undertaking.
community of inte1·est
docs not make a partnership) Loomis vs. .Marshall, 12 Conn.
77; 30 Am. Dec. 596; Porter fJS. McClure, 15 'Vend. 187. Thus
tenants in common of land are not partners. Calvert vs. Ald·
t"ich, 99 Mas~. 74; 96 Am. Dec. 693. In Olircr 1:8. Gray, 4 Ark.
425, it was holden that two persons, joint owners of a horse,
were not partners in respect to a contract for its keeping.
French vs. Styring, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 357, was a case where two
men owned a race horse, which they entered in a race arnl
won a prize. It was held that they were not partners as to
that money. In Haickins cs. Mcintyre, 45 Vt. 496, the defendant contracted to finish off a church for the sum of $4,500.
Afterwards he agreed with the plaintiff that they should work
together io doing the job, each working himself, the work of
ca.ch. to offset that of the other, and the expeitse of materials
and of other work to be deducted from the amonn t, and the
balance to be divided between them. It was held that they
were not partners. In the case above cited (Loomis vs. ~llar
slzall, 1~ Conn. 77), B was the owner of a satin~·t factory. A
agreed with B to furnish all the wool thnt should be needed at
th<> factory for two years, which B agreed to manufacture into
cl-0th, the net proceeds of tlw cloth, after deducting the incidental charges of sale, to be divided, so that A should have 35
per cent and B 45 per cent. It was held that there was not
a partnership as to third persons. It probably could be inferl'ed that Farrel and Babbott were to divide between themE:elves whatever was left, if anything, aftc>r paying the Cook
Company. But a partnPrship, even as to third persons, is not
constituted by the mere fact that two or more persons participate or are interested in the net procC'eds of a business. 1
Lindi. Partn. 24; Holrne nt. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 2!10; Loomi11
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vs. Marshall, supra; Ea: parte Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Bullen

vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86. -

Mr. Farrel was a manufacturer of machinery, of long an-J

wide experience. He was at the head of a company in Anso-

nia, in this state, engaged in manufacturing machinery, and

employing four or ﬁve hundred hands. \Vork on a refriger-

ating machine was begun promptly at the factory in Ansonia

under the supervision of Mr. Cook, the patentee, and with the

aid of one David Smith and of one Greene, but with no success.

“The machines broke down, and proved so faulty and imperfect

in their nature, and the business in all respects so unsatisfac-

tory, as not to justify or warrant proceeding. Not a dollar's

return in any form was ever received from the business or

venture.” In the language of the ﬁnding, it was “only failure

after failure.” On September 22, 1879, Farrel wrote Babbott

that he had stopped all work on the machine until he could see

him. Work did stop at Ansonia at that time, and was never

resumed. About November 1, 1879, the Cook Company gave

Farrel notice to annul the contract with them, as by its terms

they had a right to do, which notice Farrel at once communi-
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cated to Babbott. Prior to the stopping of the work on the

machines, no act had been done by Babbott or by Farrel in

which either had assumed to act for or to bind the other.

Everything they had done in carrying out their contract with

the Cook Company had been done by them jointly. There

was no writing, and there was no course of conduct prior to

that time from which any one could be led to believe that these

three men were partners. (It was subsequent to this time that

Babbott commenced and continued in New York the series

of acts from which the plaintiff claims “that the court erred

in not holding, ruling, and deciding that the defendant Farrel

was a partner with the said Babbott as to and ag inst third

parties, especially as to and against the plaintiff); A person

who holds himself out as a partner, or permits others to do

so, is liable as such to third persons, who have given credit

to the ﬁrm upon the faith of his connection with it, or who

knew of such holding out. The liability in such cases is pred-

icatcd upon the doctrine of estoppel, and, in order to. charge

a person on that ground, it is not enough to show that he was

represented by others to be a partner, or that his name

appeared in the ﬁrm; it must be shown that he knew that he

1'8.

Marshall, Bttpra; Ea: parte Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Bullen

-vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86.
Mr. Farrel wns a manufacturer of machinery, of long anJ
wide experience. He was at the head of a company in Ansonia, in this state, engaged in mJnufacturing machinery, and
employing four or five hundred hands. Work on a refrigerating machine was begun promptly at the factory in Ansoni:l
under the supervisioll of Mr. Cook, tl)e patentee, and with Ute
aid of one David Smith and of one Greene, but with no success.
"The machines broke down, and proved so faulty and imperfed
in their nature, and the business in all respects so unsatisfactory, as not to justify or warrant proceeding. Not a dollar's
return in any form was ever received from the business or
venture." In the language of the finding, it was "only fuilure
after. failure." On September 22, 1879, Far1·el wrote Babbott
that he had stopped all work on the machine until he could see
him. ·work did st<>p at Ansonia at that time, and was never
resumed. About Novemb~r 1, 1879, the Cook Company gan~
Farrel notice to annul the contract with them, as by its terms
they had a right to do, which notice Farrel at once communicated to Babbott. Prior to the stopping of the work on the
machines, no act had been d<?ne by Babbott or by Farrel iq
which either had assumed to act for or to bind the other_
Everything they had done in carrying out their contract with
the Cook Company had bet>n done by them jointly. There
was no writing, and there was no course of conduct prior to
that time from which any one could be led to believe that thes1•
three men were partners. {it was subsequent to this time that
Babbott commenced and continued in New York the seriPs
of acts from which the plaintiff claims "that the court errPd
in not holding, ruling, and deciding that the defendant Farrel
was a partner with the said Babbott as to and a~jinst third
parties, especially as to and against the plaintiff.'J A person
who holds himself out as a partner, or permits othe1·s to do
so, is liable as such to third persons, who have given credit
to the firm upon the faith of his connection with it, or who
knew of such holding out. The liability in such cases is predicated upon the doctrine of estoppel, and, in order to. charge
a person on that ground, it is not enough to show that he was
represented by others to be a partner, or that his name
appeared in the firm; it must be shown that he knew that he
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was being held'out as a partner, and that he assented thereto,

or facts frornvwhich assent can be fairly implied. McBride vs.

Insurance Co., 22 Conn. 259; Buckingham vs. Burgess, 3 McLean,

364. It is always a question of fact whether or not there has

been such a holding out as to estop a party from denying the

partnership. Wood vs. Duke of Argyll, 6 Man. & G. 928; Lake

vs. Same, 6 Q. B. 477. And so the decision of the superior court

is conclusive, unless there is some error in its proceedings.

Upon an examination of this part of the case, we are satisﬁed

that the result to which the court came was fully required by

the facts. In May, 1879, while the parties were at work at

Ansonia endeavoring to construct a refrigerating machine,

and also were seeking to ﬁnd or to create a demand for the

machines when they should be ready, one F. L. Babbott, a

brother of \V. M. Babbott, called on a Mr. Blackwell, of Black-

well & Co., warehousemen in Clarkson street, New York, with

reference to furnishing them with a machine, and on the 29th

day of July following, \V. M. Babbott entered into an arrange-

ment with Blackwell & Co., as shown by exhibit 4. It was

explained to Blackwell that the machine was to be built by
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Franklin Farrel, of the Farrel Foundry Company at Ansonia,

,Conn. At that time there was no machine or apparatus in

condition to be set up, and, as none was ever completed, noth-

ing was done under that arrangement. “The ﬁrstknowledge

that Mr. Farrel had that any use was being made of his name

or credit in any form was about January 1, 1880, when a three

months’ note, dated October 22, 1879, signed ‘Franklin Farrel

& Co.,’ payable at Ansonia National Bank, was brought to his

attention a few days before it fell due by the cashier, who

asked him what he knew about it. Up to that time he had

never learned that there was any claim to a partnership with

him made by Babbott. He knew nothing of Blackwell except

as above stated; never saw him until l-ong after; was never

at Clarkson street, and had no knowledge of any business done

there. IIe had no knowledge of any transaction with Morgan

& Ilerrick, and had never heard of that ﬁrm until the notes

in suit matured, and were demanded and protested. He did

not know that Smith was in New York, and could not ﬁnd or

meet Babbott there.” Such is the ﬁnding, and it is added that

he knew nothing of the Delamater Iron \Vog_lg§, or that Bab-

bott had any dealings with it. It appear, then, that the only

was being held·out as a partner, and that he aBSented thereto,
or facts from which assent can be fairly implied. McBride va.
111sumnce Co., 22 Conn. 259; Bucking"lt.am vs. Burgess, 3 McLean,
364. It is always a question of fact whether or not there has
been such a holding out as to estop a party from denying the
partnership. Wood vs. Duke of Argyll, 6 Man. & G. 928; Lak6
n. Same, 6 Q. B. 477. And so the decision of the superior court
is conclusive, unless there is some e1·ror in its proceedings.
Upon an examination of this part of the case, we are satisfied
that the result to which the court came was fully required by
the facts. In ~lay, 1879, while the parties were at work at
Ansonia endeavoring to construct a refrigerating machine,
and also were seeking to find or to create a demand for the
machines when they should be ready, one F. L. Babbott, a
b1·other of \V. M. Babbott, called on a Mr. Blackwell, of Blackwell & Co., warehousemen in Clarkson street, New York, with
reference to furnishing them with a machine, and on the 29th
day of July following, \V. M. Babbott entered into an arrangemc>nt with Blackwell & Co., as shown by exhibit 4. It was
explained to Blackwell that the machine was to be built by
Franklin Farrel, of the Farrel Foundry Company at Ansonia,
.Conn. At that time there wa!:J no machine or apparatus in
condition to be set up, and, as none was ever completed, noth·
ing was done under that arrangement. "The first. knowledge
that Mr. Farrel had that any use was being made of his name
or credit in any form was about January 1, 1880, when a three
months' note, dated October 22, 1879, signed 'Franklin Farrel
& Co.,' payable at Ansonia National Bank, was brought to his
attention a few days before it fell due by the cashier, who
asked him what he knew about it. Up to that time he had
m·Yer learned that there was any claim to a partnership with
him made by nabbott. He knew nothing of Blackwell except
ns above stated; neYer saw him until long after; was never
nt Clarkson street, and had no knowledge of any business done
tlwre. Ile had no knowledge of any transaction with l\Iorgan
& Herrick, and had nen•r henrd of that firm until the notes
in i:;uit matured, and were dc·manded and protested. He did
not know that 8mith was in New York, aml coulc.l not find or
mt>l't Rabbott there." Such is the finding, and it is added th.at
be knew nothing of the Delamater Iron Wqrl@, or that Babbott had any dealings with it. It appears, then, that the onl7

Moaoax \'s. }3‘.um|:r.. 145

MoBOAllJ ,·s. FABRE!..

fact which the defendant knew was that some one had wrong-

146

fully used his name on that note. It does not appear that at

fact which the defendant knew was that some one had wrong-

the time he knew that Babbott was the man. Inferentially

it would seem that he did not know, for it is stated that he

could not ﬁnd Babbott in the city. But without pausing to

remark on the dearth of knowledge the defendant had of Bab-

bott’s doings, we pass to another feature in this part of the

case.

A party setting up an estoppel by conduct is bound to the

exercise of good faith and due diligence to know' the truth.

Bigelow, Estop. 480; Moore 1:8. Bowman, 47 N.’H. 499; Odlin

rs. Gone, 41 N. H. 465. When Babbott began his operations

with Morgan & Herrick he showed them a copy of the contract

with the Cook Company, and also a letter from Farrel, in

which occurred the words, “I have concluded to go on with

the business,” accompanied with statements that he and Far-

rel were partners. They were told that the goods were to be

used in the manufacture of a refrigerating machine by Frank-

lin Farrel & Co., at Clarkson street, New York city. They

seem not to have been satisﬁed with the terms of that con-
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tract, nor with the statements that were made to them; for

they made inquiries of the Delamater Iron ‘V0-rks, of which

Farrel knew nothing. and of the mercantile agencies of Dun,

Barlow 8:. Co.. and of Bradstreet & Co. From these agencies

they were able to learn nothing as to any ﬁrm of Franklin

Farrel & Co., who composed it, or as to its responsibility, or

that there was any such ﬁrm at all. If Babbott and Farrel

had been partners. by virtue of the contract with the Cook

Fonipany, they had been such since the 22d day of March, 1879.

The absence of the name of any such ﬁrm from these mer-

cantile agencies was a most signiﬁcant circumstance. These

agencies made known to.1\Iorgan 8: Herrick all about Franklin

Farrel and his responsibility. These agencies could tell,

and presumably did tcll, where Farrel lived, and in what

business he was engaged; that he was a man of large means,

a large manufacturer of machinery, having a large factory

and employing many hands in that kind of work. From this

information, Morgan & Herrick would know that the manu-

facture of a refrigerating machine would be in the exact line

of work Farrel was doing at his own factory in Ansonia, Conn.

That such a man, having such facilities, was represented to

19

fully used his name on that note. It does not appear that at
the time he knew that Babbott was the man. Inferentially
it would seem that he did not know, for it is stated that he
could not find 13abbott in the city. But without pausing to
remark on the dearth of knowledge the defendant had of Babbott's doings, we pass to another feature in this part of the
case.
A party setting up an estoppel by conduct is bound to the
\ exercise of good faith and due diligence to know' the truth.
Bigelow, Estop. 480; Moore t'B. Bowman, 47 N. H. 499; Odliti
t·s. Gove, 41 N. H. 465. \Vhen Babbott began his operations
with Mcwg:m & Herrick he showed them a copy of the contract
with the Cook Company, and also a letter from Farrel, in
which occurred the words, "I have concluded to go on with
the business," accompanied with statements that he and Farrel we>re partners. Tlwy were told that the goods were to be
use<l in the manufacture of a refrigerating machine by Franklin Farrel & Co., at Clarkson st1·ept, New York city. They
seem not to haYc been satisfied with the terms of that contract, nor with the stat<'Tnents th.at were made to them; for
they made inq11iries of the Delama_ter Iron ·wor~~~, of which
Farrel knew nothing. and of the mercantile agencies of Dun,
Harlow & Co., and of Bradstreet & Co. From these agenci,~s
they wne able to learn nothing as to nny firm of Franklin
Farrel & Co., who comll08ed it, or ns to its responsibility, or
that there wns nny ~ueh firm at all. If Babbott and Farrel
had bee>n l>:utnC'rs, by Yirtue of the contract with the Cook
f'ompan,y, they had be<•n sud1 since the 22d day of l\Iarch, 1879.
'rhe absence of the name of any such firm from these mercantile agencies was a most significant circumstance. These
ngencies made known to .'!\lorgan & Herrick all about Franklin
Farrel and his respomdhility. These agencies could tell,
and presumably did it'll, where Farrel lh·ed, and in what
business he was eng.1gPd; that he was a man of large mPans,
n lar~e mnnufacturer of mnchinPry, haying a large factory
and employing many bands in that kind of work. F1·om this
information, l\Iorgan & He:Tick would know that the manufacture of a refrigerating machine would be in the exact lim•
of work Farrel was doing at his own factory in Ansonia, Conn.
That such a man, haying such facilities, was represented to
19
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be carrying on the manufacture of a refrigerating machine

in :1 warehouse in Clarkson street, in the city of New York,

and that he was doing it on credit, would be certain to excite

inquiry in the mind of any prudent man. \Vhy did not Mor-

gan & Herrick inquire further? Mr. Farrel was a manufac-

turer in Connecticut, not in the city of New York. In a\manu-

facturing partnership, the place where it was to be carried

on would be likely to be a controlling feature. For such work

there must be machinery to use, and power to run it, and men

to operate it. All these Mr. Farrel had in Connecticut, and

none of them in New York. The court had judicial knowledge

that Ansonia was easily accessible from New York city by

railway; that there was frequent communication by mail, or

that the telegraph might have been used, and a reply obtained

in half an hour and at triﬂing expense. 1 Whart. Ev. § 339.

\Vhen so many circumstances called for inquiry, and with all

these means by which inquiries could have been satisﬁed, and

when none of them were used, we cannot hold that the plaint-

iff’s assignors exercised good faith or due diligence to know

the truth.
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On the trial the plaintiff introduced a large number of let-

ters and postal cards which had passed between Farrel and

Babbott, for the purpose of showing that they were partners

in the refrigerating business. The defendant claimed that

these letters, or some of them, had reference to other matters

and not to the refrigerating business, and to show this oﬁered

other letters and postals that had passed between them. To

these the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted them solely

for the purpose named. That letters which had passed between

these men might tend to show that they were partners in any

business is very obvious, and that other letters on the same or

a kindred subject might modify or contradict the ﬁrst ones is

equally obvious. The real relation between the parties could

best be shownby the whole correspondence, not by par-1. of it.

There is no error in the judgment appealed from.

The other judges concurred.

Noni: See also Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 35, 50, 70, 71, 72. _

be carrying on the manufacture of a refrigerating machine
in a warehouse in Clarkson street, in the city of New York,
and that he was doing it on credit, would be certain to excite
inquiry in the mind of any prudent man. " 1 hy did not Morgan & Herrick inquire further? Mr. Parrel was a manufacturer in Connecticut, not in the city of New York. In a\Dlanu·
factoring partnership, the place where it was to be carried
on would be likely to be a controlling feature. For such work
there must be maehinery to use, and power to run it, and men
to operate jt. All these Mr. Farrel had in Connectrcut, and
none of them in New York. The court had judicial knowledge
that Ansonia was easily uccessible from New York city by
railway; that there was frequent communication by mail, or
that the telegraph might have been used, and a reply obtained
in half an hour and at trifling expense. 1 Whart. Ev. § rum.
\Vhen so many circumstances called for inquiry, and with nil
these means by which inquiries could have been satisfied, and
when none of them were used, we cannot hold that the plaintitf's assignors exercised good faith or due diligence tG know
the truth.
On the trial the plaintiff introduced a large number of letters and postal cards which had passed between Farrel and
Babbott, for the purpose of showing that they were partners
ln the refrigerating business. 'l'he defendant claimed that
these letters, or some of them, had reference to other matters
and not to the refrigerating business, and to show this offered
other letters and postals that had passed between them. To
these the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted them solely
for the purpose named. That letters which had passed between
these men might tend to show that they were partners in any
business is very obvious, and that otl1er letters on the same or
a kindred subject might modify or contradict the first ones i:i
equally obvious. 'l'hc real relation between the parties could
best be shown by the whoJe correspondence, not by part of it.
There is no error in the judgment appealed from.
The other judges concurred.
NOTE: See al&o Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 35, 50, 70, 71, 72.
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V.

NATURE OF PAR-TNER’S INTEREST IN

PROPERTY.

BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD.

United States Supreme Court, 1870.

11 Wall. 624, 20 L. Ed. 82.

Bill by the Fourth National Bank of New York against the

New Orleans and Carrollton R. R. 009; Beauregard, Hernan-

dez, Binder and Bonneval, to enforce the transfer claimed to

have been made to it by one Graham, under the circumstances

stated in the opinion. Beauregard had acquired a lease of

v.

the railroad, covenanting not to assign or sublet without the

consent of the directors. May and Graham signed the lease

as sureties for Beauregard. Immediately after obtaining the

lease, Beauregard, May and Graham entered into copartner-

NATURE OF PARTNER'S INTEREST
PROPER'l'Y.

m

ship for its equipment and management. About a year later

Graham assigned all his interest in the railroad and the part-

nership to complainant. Hernandez, Bender and Bonneval

claimed under a subsequent assignment from May, and denied

that when Graham assigned to complainanthe had anything
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to assign, being, as they claimed, merely a trustee for May.‘

BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD.

The court below dismissed the bill and the Bank appealed.

P. Phillips, for the appellant.

United States Supreme Court, 18'10.

J. A. ¢C- D. Campbell, for defendant.

S'ruo.\'(;, J. The effect of Graham’s assignment to the com-

11 Wall. 624, 20 L. Ed. 82.

plainant was, undoubtedly, to dissolve the partnership which

*See Case vs. Beauregard, post, -—, involving further litigation grow-

ing out of the same transactions.

Bill by the Fourtb National Bank of New York against the
New Orleans and Carrollton R. R. eo<?f Beauregard, Hernaltdez, Binder and Bonneval, to enforce the transfer claimed to
have been made to it by one Graham, under the circumstance:i
stated in the opinion. Beauregard bad acquired a lease of
the railroad, covenanting not to assign or soblet without the
consent of the directors. l\f ay and Graham signed the lease
as sureties for Beauregard. Immediately after obtaining the
lease, Beauregard, May and Graham entered into copartnersllip for its equipment and management. A bout a year later
Graham assigned all his interest in the railroad and the partnership to complainant. Ilernandez, Bender and Bonneval
claimed under a subsequent assignment from May, and denied
that when G1·abam assigned to complainant he bad anything
to assign, being, as they claimed, merely a trustee for l\lay. •
The court bel~w dismissed the bill and the llank appealed.

P. Phillips, for the appeJlant.
J. A. & D. Campbell, for defendants.
STno~G, J. The effect of Graham's assignment to the complainant was, undoubtedly, to dissolve the partnership which

•See Case tis. Beaur~gard, pmit, - , involvi11g further litigation ai;rowiDg out of the same transactions.

148 CASES on Pnrrrnnnsnrr.

148

7

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

\

?

had existed between Beauregard, May and himself, but it did

not make his assignee a tenant in com-mon with the other two

partners in the property of the ﬁrm. It seems to be assumed

on behalf of the complainant, that, in succeeding to Graham’s

rights, the bank acquired an ownership of the effects of the

ﬁrm jointly with Beauregard and May, and that, as Graham

had been an equal partner with them, his assignee, of course,

became the owner of one undivided third of the railroad lease

and other property of the ﬁrm. But this assumption is based

upon a misapprehension of the effect of the assignment. It

has repeatedly been determined, both in British and American

‘courts, that the property or eifects of a partnership belong to

the ﬁrm and not to the partners, each of whom is entitled only

to a share of what may remain after payment of the partner-

ship debts and after a settlement of the accounts between the

partners; consequently that no greater interest can be derived

from‘a voluntary sale of his interest by one partner, or by a
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sale of it under execution. West rs. Skip, 1 Ves. 239; Nicoll

rs. Zllumford, 4 Johns. Ch. 522; Doner vs. Stnuﬁcr, 1 Pa. 19$.

In Field rs. Taylor, 4 V es. J r. 396, it was said that “a party

coming into the right of partner” (in any mode, either by pur-

chase from such partner, or as a personal representative or

under an execution or commission of bankruptcy), “comes into

nothing more than an interest in the partnership, which can-

not be tangible, cannot be made available, or be delivered, but

under an account between the partnership and the partner,

and it is an item in the account that enough must be left for

the partnership debts.”

When, therefore, the Bank obtained from Graham the

assignment, which is the foundation of its claim in this suit,

it obtained thereby no ownership of the lease made by the

Railroad Company to Beauregard, and which he agreed to

hold for the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm, nor did it obtain any aliquot

part of it, or of any of the effects of the firm. The utmost.

extent of its acquisition was an interest in the surplus, if any,

which might remain after all the debts of the ﬁrm should be

paid, and after the liabilities of Graham to his copartners,

as such, should be discharged. It was not in the power of

Graham, by retiring from the ﬁrm in violation of the articles

of copartnership, either to introduce another partner or to

deprive the partners who remained of their right to have all

had existed between Beauregard, May and himsc>lf, but it did
uot make his assignee a tenant in common with the other two
partners in the property of the firm. It se(>ms to be assumed
on behalf of the complainant, that, in succe~ding to Graham's
rights~ tile bank acquired an ownerRhip of the efTt>cts of ~he
·firm jointly with Beauregard and )lay. and that, as Graham
had been an equal partner with them, his assignee, of course,
became the owner of one undivided third of the railroad lease
and other property of the firm. nut this assumption is based
upon a misappreh<>nsion of the effect of the assignment. It
has repeatedly been determined, both in British and American
·courts, that the property or effects of a partnership belong to
, 1he firm and not to the partners, each of whom is entitled only
~ to a share of whnt may N'main after payment of the partner·
~ ship debts and after a s<.'ttlement of the accounts between the
partners; consequPntly that no greater iute1·ei;;t can be derived
from· a voluntary sale of his inh>rest by one partner, or by a
' sale of it under execution. lf'rst rs. Skip, 1 Yes. 23!>; Nicoll
1·s. Mumforcl, 4 .Johns. Ch. 5:!2; Doner rs. Stauffer, 1 Pa. 198.
In Ffold i-.~. 'l'aylor, 4 Ves. Jr. 396, it was said that "a party
<'Oming into the right of partne1·" (hi any mode, either by pur·
chase from such partner, or as a personal representative 01·
under an execution or commission of bankruptcy), "comes into
nothing more than an interest in the partnership, which can·
not be tangible, cannot be made available, or be delivered, but
under an account between the partnership and the partner,
and it is an item in the account that enough must be left for
the partnership debts."
"'hen, therefore, the Ilank obtained from Graham the
assignment, which is the foundation of its claim in this suit,
it obtained thereby no ownership of the )case made by the
Railroad Company to Beauregard, and which he agreed t~>
hold for the benefit of the firm, nor did it obtain any aliquot
part of it, or of any of the c•fft•cts of the firm. The utmo~t
extent of its acquhdtion was an interest in the surplus, if any,
which might remain after nil the debts of the firm should be
paid, and after· the liabilities of Graham to his copartners,
as such, sl.10uld be diseharged. It was not in the power of
Graham, by rethfog from the firm in violation of the articles
of copartnership, either to introduce another partner or to
deprive the partners who remained of their right to have nil
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the partnership property held for partnership purposes. Inci-

dent to the right of the Bank to share in the surplus was a

order to ascertain if theie was any surplus It is true the

words of the assignment were very broad. It purported to

transfer all the estate, right, title and interest in the lease

made by the New Orleans and Carrollton Railro-ad Company

to Beauregard, to which the assignor might be entitled by

virtue of the articles of copartnei-ship, and also all his right

and interest in any _pr0perty and effects of the partnership, and

all debts to him from the partnership or any member thereof.

But no matter what its language, it is clear no more could

pass under it than the right of the assignor; and if, as we have

said, that was not a right to the speciﬁc articles of property

Qelonging to the ﬁrm, the Bank obtained no such right. \Vc

are not now speaking of the fact that, under his contract with

the Railroad Company, Beauregard had no right to transfer

the lease either to the partnership or to its members. The

Lright to enforce a settlement of the partnership accounts ll]

case does not require us to consider that inability. It is suf-'

ﬁcient that the complainant's right was only an equity to
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share in the surplus, if any, of the ﬁrm property after settle-

ment of the partnership accounts, and that this is a bill for

such settlement. Manifestly, then, it is incurably defective,

lbecause neither Graham nor May are made parties defendant

It is too plain for discussion that to such a bill all the men

\; 17‘

._,|

. . . 4' '1 '

bers of the ﬁrm are indispensable parties, for they are a ;"'t/,»:.':'~’¢

directly aiferted by any decree that can be made. w

How iitteily inipossible it is to ascertain what the Q(]l1ll_)

of the complainant is, with the present state of the record.

will appear more distinctly, if the provisions of the articles

of copartnership be coiisidercd. \\'hen it was formed, Beaii-

regard had obtained from the New Orleans and Carrollton

Railroad Company a lease of its railroad, with all of its rolling

stock and with its corporate privileges, for the term of twenty-

five years. Though the sole lessee, and prohibited by his con-

tract from assigning or underletting, it was, nevertheless.

agreed between him and his copartners that the lease should

be for their common beneﬁt; that May and Graham should

each advance $150,000 to carry on the enterprise of running thr-

road, and that Beauregard should take charge of, manage and

direct the undertaking for the mutual advantage of the parties,

x0 ‘T ,

-u

0/

/

the partnership property held for partnership purposes. Incij
dent to the right of the Bank to share in the surplus was a
right to enforce a settlement of the partnership accounts in
order to ascertain if there was any surplus. It is true the
words of the assignment were ve1·y broad. It purpo1·ted to
transfer all the estate, right, title and interest in the leas:•
made by the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company
to Beauregard, to which the assignor might be entitled b.v
virtue of the a11:icles of copartnership, and also all his right
and interest in any .property and dTeds of the partnership, ancl
all debts to him from the partnership or any member thereof . .
But no matter what its language, it is clear no more could
i pass under it than the right of the assignor; and if, as we haw
\said, that was not a right to the speeific articles of propert.v
belonging to the firm~ the Bank obtained no such right. 'V1~
'fire not now speaking of the !net that, under liis contract with
the Railroad Compan.v, Beauregard had no right to transfer
the lease Pither to the part11e1·1.:,hip or to its membe1·s. Th<'
case does not require us to consider that inabiliry. It is suf:
fici1'nt that the complainant's right was only nn equity to
share in the surplus, if any, of the firm pro1wrty after sc>ttle·
ment of the pat'tneri-;hip aeconnts, and that this is a bill for
such settlem~nt. Manifestly, then, it is incurably defediv~
lbecause 1with<'t' Graham nor -'fay are made parties dc>fendan..!J~t ---:-,~
It iR too plain for discussion that to such a bill all the men -l•t"'~ '~. . .;,, '.
hers of the firm are indi~pf'n~able parties, for they are a
"l-i;/~ • >0 '
~C'i(,:''"'
direct]~· afft><'t Ptl by any d(•c1·ee that can be made.
~ ~1 '
How nttt~rly imposs_ible it is to ascertain· what the eqnily
./
of the complainant h1, with the present state of the record.
will appenr more distindly, if the provisions of the article~
of copartnership be con~ide1·ed. ""hen it was formed, Bea111·egar<l had ohtained from the New Ol'leans and Carrollton
Railroad Company a lease of its railroad, with all of its rolling
i.tock and with its corporate priYilegPs, for the term of twentJfive years. Though the sole lessec.·, and prohibited by his contract from assigning or underletting, it was, nevertheles~.
agreed between him and his copa1·tners that the lease shonlc1
he for their c:ommon lJClnetit; that .May and Graham shoulcl
each advm1ce ~l :j0,000 to carry on the enterprise of running thr·
road, and that Beauregard should take charge of, manage an<)
direct the un<tf>rtaking for thC' mutual advantage of the parties,

l

,.
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at a ﬁxed annual salary, selecting and appointing his own

assistants. It was agreed that the money advanced, with

eight per cent, interest, should be repaid from the annual prof-

its of the enterprise, and that the remainder of the net proﬁts

should be equally divided between the partners, and that all

losses should be equally borne by them. The contract evi-

dently contemplated that the property of the ﬁrm and the

management of its affairs should be in the hands of Beaure-

gard. Books were to be kept, showing not only all money

received and expended, but also all purchases made on account

of the copartncrship; and monthly tatements of amounts

received and expended were required to be furnished by Beau-

regard to May and Graham. lt was also agreed that the part-

nership should continue twenty-ﬁve years from the date of the

lease, which was April 12, 1866. Now, it is quite possible

that on settlement of the accounts, Graham may be found

indebted to the ﬁrm, or to his copartners, and that the court

would be required thus to decree.

' How can such a decree be made when he is no party to the

record? ()r it might appear that May is a large debtor to the
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ﬁrm. How can any decree be made against him? How can

anydecree be made that will not prejudice one or the other of

these partners? And yet, whether the Bank complainant has

any interest or not—whether it acquired anything under

Graham‘s assignment—-can be determined only by a ﬁnal and

conclusive settlement of the partnership accounts between all

the partners, two of whom are not parties to this suit.

It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellant, that even

if May and Graham were necessary parties, the bill should not

have been dismissed, but that the complainant s_hould have

been allowed to bring in new parties by a supplemental bill.

It is, doubtless, the general rule that a bill in chancery will

not be dismissed for want of proper parties; but the rule is

not universally true. It rests upon the supposition that the

fault may be remedied, and the necessary parties supplied.

Vi/‘hen this is impossible, and whenever a decree cannot be

made without prejudice to one not a party, the bill must be

dismissed. Nothing is to be gained by retaining it, when it is

certain that the complainant can never be entitled to a decree

in his favor. Note 5. sec. 541, Story, Eq. I’l.; Shields rs. Bar-

row, 17 How. 130; [58 U. R. X. V. 138]. In the present case we

nt a fixed annual salary, selecting and appointing bis own
assistants. It was agre-ed that the money advanced, with
eight per cent, interest, should be repaid from the annual prof~
its of the enterprise, and that the remainder of the net profits
should be equal1y divided between the partners, and that all
losses should be equal1y borne by them. The contract evidently contemplated that the property of the firm and the
management of its affairs should be ill the hands of Beauregard. Books were to be kept, showing not only all money
received and expended, but also all purchases made on account
of the copartnership; and monthly statements of amounts
received and expended were required to be furnished by Beauregard to May and Graham. It was also agreed that the partnership should continue twenty-five years from the date of the
lease, which was April 12, 18GG. Now, it is quite possible
that on settlem~nt of the accounts, Graham may be found
indebted to the firm, or to his copartners, and that the court
would be re<1uired thus to decree.
· How can s11d1 a decree be made when be is no party to the
record? Or it might appear that .!\fay is a large debtor to the
firm. How can any decree be made against him? How can
any decree be made that will not prejudice one or the other of
these partners? And yet, whether the Bank complainant has
any interest or not-whether it acquired anything under
Graham·s assignment-can be determined only by a final and
conclusive settlement of the partnership accounts between all
the partners, two of whom are not parties to this suit.
It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellant, that even
if May and Graham were necessary parties, the bnI should not
have been dismissed, but that the complainant s!10uld have
been allowed to bring in new parties by a supplemental bill.
lt is, doubtless, the general rule that a bill in chancery will
not be dismissc>d for want of proper parties; but the rule is
not universally true. It rests upon the supposition that the
fault may be remedied, and the nc>cessary parties supplied.
When this is impoRRibJe, and wheneYer a decree cannot be
made without prejudice to one not a party, the bill must be
dismissed. Nothing is to be gained by retaining it, when it is
certain that the complainant can never be entitJc>d to a decree
"In his favor. Not" n. ~"'~- !>41, Story, Eq. PL; Shields vs. Bar1·ow, 17 llow. 130; [G~ TT. R. X. V. 1:-JS]. ln tlw prP~ent case we
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have seen that no decree for an account can be made, until
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CARROLLTON RAILROAD.
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all the partners are made parties. But if both May and Gra-

ham had been made parties defendant, the circuit court would

have had no jurisdiction of the case. It is said Graham might

have been made a coplaintiif. Perhaps he might and had

application been made in due season for such an amendment

of the bill, it might have been the duty of the circuit court

to grant it. But no such application was made. The com-

plainants chose to stand upon their case as they presented it.

Possibly they never would have sought to bring in the neces-

sary parties. The defendants could not bring them in. New

parties cannot be brought into a cause by a cross-bill (Shields

vs. Barrow, supra), and had the bill not been dismissed, it must

have been left at the option of the complainants whether the

case should ever be brought to a ﬁnal decree.

Under these circumstances, there was no reason for retain-

ing the bill.

It is insisted, however, that the court erred in dismissing

the bill, reserving only a right to sue Beauregard, May and

Graham, for a settlement of the partnership between them
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prior to the 1-tth and 16th of May, 1367. Yet if the right

acquired by Graham’s assignment was, as the authorities

show, not an ownership of the speciﬁc effects of the~partner-

ship, but only a right to share in the surplus remaining after

the settlement of the partnership accounts and the payment

of all debts, as well as the just claims of the several partners,

it is clear there can be in the complaint no equity against the

Railroad Company, or against Hernandez, Binder or Bonneval,

who have succeeded to May’s rights (not his obligations), if

they have not to Graham’s. No fraudulent confederacy is

charged in the bill. At most, according to the coinplainant’s

own showing, they are purchasers of property that belonged

to the ﬁrm. There was, therefore, not' only a want of indis-

pensable parties, a want which cannot be supplied without

ousting the jurisdiction of the court, but a misjoinder of the

defendants, a misjoinder apparent upon the face of the bill.

Hence the decree of the circuit court was correct.

The decree of the circuit court is aﬂirmed.

Nora: See Mechem‘s Elem. of Pal-tn., § 97, el seq.

have seen that no decree for an accoun~ can be made, until
all the partners are made parties. But if both May and Gra·
ham had been made parties defendant, the circuit court would
have had no jmisdiction of the case. It is said Graham might
have been made a coplaintiff. Perhaps he might and had
application been made in due season for such an amendment
of the bill, it might have been the duty of the circuit court
to grant it. Bnt no such application was made. The complainants chose to stand upon their case as they presented it.
Possibly they never woultl have sought to bring in the necessary parties. The defendants could not bring them in. New
i>arties cannot be brought into a cause by a cross-bill (Shields
n. Barrow, supra), and had the bill not been dismissed, it must
have been left at the option of the complainants whether the
ease should ever be brought to a final decree.
Under these circumshmees, there was no reason for retain·
ing the bill.
It is insisted, however, that the court erred in dismissing
the bill, reserving only a right to sue Beauregard, May and
(}raham, for a settlement of the partnership between them
prior to the Hth and 16th of l\Iay, 1867. Yet if the right
acquired by Graham's assignment was, as the authorities
show, not an ownership of the specific effects of the -partnership, but only a right to share in the surplus remaining after
the settlement of the partnership .accounts and the payment
of all debts, as well as the just claims of the several partners,
it is clear there can be in the co\nplaint no equity against the
Railroad Company, or against Hernandez, Binder or Bonneval,
who have sucreeded to May's rights (not his obligations), if
they have not to Graham's. No fraudulent confed~racy is
charged in the bill. At most, according to the complainant's·
own showing, they are purchasP.rs of property that belonged
to the firm. There was, therefore, not· only a want of indispensable parties1 a want which cannot be supplie.d without
ousting the jurisdiction of the court, but n misjoinder of the
defendants, n misjoinder apparent upon the face of the bill.
Hence the decree of the circuit court was correct.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.
NOT.I!:: See .Mechem'e Elem. or Partn., § 07, et acq.
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STA ATS vs. BRISTOW.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1878.

73 N. Y. 264.

Staats brought this action against Bristow, who was the

assignee of Stockbridge & Martin, to establish the title which

plaintiff claimed in the property of that ﬁrm now in defend-

ant’s possession. Plaintiﬁ‘ relied upon his purchase at a sher-

iif’s sale.

STAATS vs. BRISTOW.

Other facts appear in the opinion.

Defendant had judgment below.

Court of :Appeals of New 1·ork, 1878.

(7. H. B0-1‘l1lig(l7l and W. W. Niles, for appellant.

John E. Parsons, for respondent.

78 N. Y. 264.

Fonmm, J. The defendant had the possession of certain

personal property, to which the plaintiff claims that he was

entitled. It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to

show and establish his title. He showed that he was the pur-

chaser at a sheriffs sale. The certiﬁcate given by the sheriff

does not say that the plaintiff bought the property itself; it

says that he bought. only, all the right, title, and interest

which Joseph Stockbridge had in it on the 30th November,
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1874. The sheriﬂ"s return on the execution upon which he

sold is the same. The execution on which the sale took place

directed a sale of the property of the defendants therein

Staats brought this action against Bristow, who was the
assignee of Stockbridge & Martin, to establish the title whieh
plaintiff claimed in the prop<>rty of that firm now in defen<lant's possession. Plaintiff relied upon his purchase at a sheriff's sale.
Othc>r facts appear in the opinion.
Defendant had judgment below.

named, who were the Stockbridge above named, and his

copartner, Martin; but the properly pointed at was what they

C. H. Rannigan and W. W. Niles, for appellant.

owned, or either of them owned, on a day named, to wit: on

the 9th December, 1974; and before that day, to wit: on the

Jolin E. Parsons, for respondent.

fourth day of that‘ month, the defendants in the execution had

assigned the property to the defendant in this action in trust

for all of their creditors.

So it is apparent that the plaintiff did not buy the property

itself, speciﬁcally; but only the interest, right, and title which

Stockbridge had in it. Now the interest which he had in it

was that of one of two partners; as the property was part of

Fournn, J. The defendant had the possession of certain
personal prop<>rty, to which the plaintiff claims that he was
entitled. It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show and establish his title. He showed that be was the purchaser at a sheriff's sale. The certificate given by the sheriff
does not say that the plain1 iff bought the property itself; it
says that he bought, only, all the rig-ht, title, and interest
which Josc>ph Rtockhridge hncl in it on the 30th November,
1874. The sheriff's return on the execution upon which he
sold is the same. The execution on which the sale took place
directed a sale of the property of the defendants therein
named~ who were the Stockbridge above named, and his
copartn<"r, ~Jartin; but the' l'roperty pointed at was what th<'y
owned, or either of them ownr-<l, on a day named, to wit: ou
the !)th December, 1~74; and before that da,r, to wit: on tlu•
fourth day of that month, the defendants in the execution ha<l
assigned the property to the defendant in this action in trust
for all of their creditors.
So it is apparent that the plaintiff did not buy the propert.v
itself, specificnllJ'; but only the interest, right, and title whkh
Stockbridge bad in it. Now the interest which be had in :.t
was that of one of two partners; as the property was part of

r
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Suns vs. Bmsrow. 153

the assets of a copartnership ﬁrm of which he was a member.

The interest of a member of such a ﬁrm in the assets of it is

the share to which he is entitled by the terms of the copartner-

ship, in the surplus of those assets remaining after all partner-

ship debtsLa_x;e_tully paid. It appears in this case that the ﬁrm

was insolvent; that its debts much exceeded its assets; that

there never could arise a surplus. So the interest of Stork-

bridge, as an individual, in this property was nothing; and so

the plaintiff got nothing by his purchase.

The force of these views is resisted by the plaintiff thus:

It is claimed, and rightly, that one partner may sell and trans-

fer the entirety of any particular personal etfects and property

of the partnership for purposes within the scope of the busi-

ness, and can make sale to a creditor of the ﬁrm in payment

of a debt due, without the knowledge or consent of another

partner, though the ﬁrm be insolvent and thereby a preference

be given to the creditor vendee. Then, it is claimed that the
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law may do whatever one partner can do. Let it be granted

that it may, for this occasion, though we do not concede it as

a universal principle. The law has not in this case undertaken

to do that. The attachment, under which it is claimed that the

ﬁrst step was taken toward doing that, was not against this

property specifically, nor was it against the property of the

firm. It was against the property of Stockbridge. What was

the property of Stockbridge? It was what he owned in indi-

vidual right, and it was his interest in the property of his part-

nership. What that interest was /has already been shown.

So that the law did not undertake to do, nor has it done, more

than to sell for the beneﬁt of a ﬁrm creditor the property of

Stockbridge. We speak now of what was done by virtue of{

the attachment alone. The action was against both partners,

and both were brought into court. But if both had not been

brought into court, and judgment had been got, and execution

issued directed-to be levied upon the sole property of the one

served, and upon the joint property of both, the law would

have undertaken to do what we admit one partner can do; and

if this joint property had been levied upon before the assign-

ment to defendant, and had been sold to the plaintiffs in the

execution, or to one of them, and the avails paid over, the

law would have succeeded in doing just what one partner

could have done. The law must seek the end desired by the

20

the assets of a copartnership firm of which he was a member.
The interest of a member of such a firm in the assets of it is
the share to which he is entitled by the terms of the copartnership, in the surplus of those assets remaining after all partnei·~i.P deb!!_~~e }ully p~_!d. It appears in this case that the firm
was insolvent; that its debts much exceeded its assets; that
there never could arise a surplus. So the interest of Stockbridge, as an individual, in this property was nothing; and so
the plaintiff got nothing by his purchase.
The force of theRe views is resisted by the plain tiff thus:
It is claimed, and rightly, that one partner may sell and transfer the entirety of any pnrticular personal effects and property
of the partnership for purposes within the scope of the business, and can make sale to a creditor of the firm in payment
of a debt due, without the knowledge or consent of anotlw1·
partner, though the firm be insolvent and the1·eby a preference
be given to the creditor vendee. Then, it is claimed that the
law may do whatever one partner can do. Let it be granted
that it may, for this occasion, tl1-0ugh we do not concede it as
a universal principle. .'l'he law has not in this case undertaken
to do that. The attachment, under which it is claimed that the
first step was taken toward doing that, was not against this
property specifically, nor was it against the property of the
fjrm. It wns against the property of Stockbridge. 'Vhat was
the property of Stockbridge? It was what he owned in individual right, and it was his interest in the property of his partnership. What that int<'rest was })as akeady been show1i.
So that the law did not undertake t6' do, nor has it done, nto1·(•
{ than to sell for the benefit of a firm creditor the property of
Stockbridge. ·we speak now of what was done by virtue of(
the at. taclnnent alone. The action was against both partners,
and
both were broug-bt into court. But if both had not been
(
brought into court, and judgment had be<'n got, and execution
issued <lirected.to be leYied upon the sole property of the one
served, and upon the joint property of both, the law woultl
have undertaken to do what we admit one partner can do; and
if this joint property had been levied upon before the assign·
ment to defendant, and had been sold to the plaintiffs in the
execution, or to one of them, and the avails paid oYer, the
law would have succeeded in doing just what one partner
could have done. The law must seek the end desired by the
20
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legal path, just as the single partner must. That path was

not by an attachment against the property of one partner who,

by his personal situation, was obnoxious to that process. That

could issue, but not against joint property; only against indi-

vidual property; and individual property was only the interest

in 0. surplus.

These views do not conflict with Van Brunt vs. Applegate, 4-1

N. Y. 544,- on which the appellant much relies, and we do not

express any opinion upon what was there held.

The judgment appealed from should be aﬂirmed.

Non-2: For other cases, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 99, 100.

SINDELARE vs. \VALKER. _

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1891.

137 Ill. 43. 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 81 Am. Sis. Rep. 353.

The plaintiff Sindelare and one Hubka had been partners in

legal path, just as the single partner must. That path was
not by an attachment against the property of one partner who,
by his personal situation, was obnoxious to that process. That
could issue, but not against joint property; only against individual property; and individual property was only the interest
in a surplus.
These views do not conflict with Van Brunt vs ..4.pplegate, 44: ·
N. Y. 544, on which the appe11ant much relies, and we do nut
express any opinion upon what was there held.
'l'he judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

the dry goods business, and while so they gave a chattel mort-

gage on their stock to Walker. Sindelare brought this action

Nou: For other cases, see Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 00, 100.

against Walker and Hubka (though he discontinued as to the

latter), charging that by collusion between them there had been

0. fraudulent foreclosure of the mortgage by \Valker and a pur-
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chase of the stock by Hubka, and that thereby he, the plaintiff,

had been wrongfully deprived of his interest in the goods,

proﬁts and good will of the business.

BINDELARE vs. WALKER.

The court below sustained a demurrer to his declaration, and

he brought error.

Jones d3 Luslc, for plaintiff.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1891.

Trumbull, Willits, Robbins d3 Trumbull, for defendant.

“’1LK1>z, J . (After stating the facts.) There is no averment

137 Ill. 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 81 Am. St. Rep. 8j3.

that the copartnership between plaintiff and Hubka has been

dissolved, or any settlement whatever had of their partnership

affairs. The declaration, therefore, not only fails to show any

individual title or ownership in plaintiff to said property, part-

nership business, or the proﬁts or good will thereof, which

The plaintiff Sindelare and one Hubka bad been partners in
the dry goods business, and while so they gave a chattel mortgage on their stock to "'alker. Sindelare brought this action
against Walker and Hubka (though he discontinued as to the
latter), charging that by collusion between them there had been
a fraudulent foreclosure of the mortgage by \Valker and a purchase of the stock by Hubka, and that thereby he, the plaintiff,
bad been wrongfully dE>prived of his interest in the goods,
profits and good will of the business.
The court below sustained a demurrer to his decl~ration, and
be brought error.

Jones & Luslc, for plaintifJ.

'l'rmnbull, Willits, Robbins & Trumbull, for defendant.

"r

1r,mN, J. (After stating the facts.) There is no averment
that the copartnership between plaintiff nnd Hubka has been
dissolved, or any settlement wlrntever had of their partnership
affairs. The declaration, therefore, not only fails to show any
individual title or ownership in plaintiff to said property, partnership business, or the 1>rofits or good will thereof, which

ROBINSON BANK vs. Mi1.1.nn. 155

ROBINSON BANK VS. MILLER.

1.)5

he says he lost, but affirmatively discloses a state of facts

from which it appears that he had only a coniinunity of inter-

est therein with his partner, "ho consented to said transfer

and all that was done by defendant. A partner’s right to part-

nership property is an ownership of all the assets of the ﬁrm,

subject to the ownership of every other copartner, all the part-

ners holding all of the ﬁrm assets subject to the payment of

the partnership debts and liabilities: Parsons on Partnership,

350. Qt is clear, therefore, that the individual interest of one

partner in the ﬁrm property and business can only be ascer-

tained by a settlement of the partnership} Bopp vs. F037, 63

Ill. 540; Chandler vs. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 77; Jlcnagh vs. Whitwell,

52 N. Y. 146 ; 11 Am. Rep. 683. This rule applies to the interest

of a partner in the proﬁts or good will of the partnership busi-

ness, as well as to the tangible assets of the ﬁrm. Until plaint-

iff’s actual interest in the partnership has been determined,

there can be no ascertainment of his damages: Buckmastor

cs. Gozccn, 81 Ill. 153; Sweet vs. Morrison, 103 N. Y. 235.

\Ve are clearly of the opinion that, on the facts stated in his

declaration, plaintiff has no standing in a court of law. ' '
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Allirmed.

Nona: See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., §§ 07, 99, 226.

/

ROBINSON BANK vs. MILLER.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1894.

153 Ill. 244, 46 Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449, 38 N. E. Rep. 1078.

This was an action by the Robinson Bank to set aside three

mortgages. The defendants by cross-bill asked for a fore-

closure of these mortgages. The court below set aside one

mortgage and foreclosed the others. John S. Emmons, Frank

he says he lost, but affirmatively discloses a state of facts
from which it appears that he had only a comi;g_!!_l!ity _of inter- _
est therein with his partne.1', ~·ho consented to said transfer
and all that was done by defendant. A partner's right to partnership property is an ownership of all the assets of the fh'ru,
subject to the ownership of every other copartner, all the partners holding all of the firm assets subje.ct to the payment of
the partnership debts and liabilities: Parsons on Partnership,
::mo. (It is clear, therefore, that the individual interest of one
partner in the firm property and business ean only be aecer- .
tained by a settlement of the partnership:) Bopp VB. Fo{IJ, G3
111. 540; Chandler vB. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 77; Jfenagh i:B. Whitwell,
52 N. Y.146; 11 Am. Hep. 683. 1'his rule applies to the interest
of a partner in the profits or good will of the partnership busi·
ness, as well as to the tangible assets of the firm. Until plaintiff's actual interest in the partnership has been determine<l,
there can be no ascertainment of his damages: Buckmaster
1:8. Gowen, 81 Ill. 153; Succt vs. Morrison, 103 N. Y. 235.
'Ve are clearly or the opinion that, on the facts stated in his
declaration, plaintiff has no standing in a court of law. • •
Aftirmed.

O. Miller and John Newton owned undivided interests in a

milling property of four acres. They afterwards, by oral

No-rE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ D7, D9, ~().

agreement, entered into partnership to operate the mill under

the ﬁrm name of Newton, Emmons & Miller. John S. Enimons

borrowed $1,800 of the Robinson Bank on a note endorsed by

ROBINSON BANK vs. MILLER.
Supreme Courl of Illinois, 1894.
1~3

Ill. 244, 46 Am. St. Rep. 8S3, 27 L. R. A. 449, 88 N. E. Re-p. 10i8.

This was an action by the Robinson Bank to set aside three
mo1-tgages. The defendants by cross-bill asked for a foreclosure of these mortgages. The court below set ruiide one
mortgage and forecloHl'<l the others. John S. Emmons, Frauk
0. Miller and John Newton owned undivided interests in n
milling property of four acres. They afterwards, by oral
ngreement, entered into partnership to operate the mill under
the firm name of Newton, Emmons & 'Miller. John S. Emmons
borrow~d tl ,800 of the Uobinson Bank on a n.ote endorsed by
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his father and father-in-law, Wiley S. Emmons, and William

W. Walter. The latter had to pay the note and John S.

Emmons gave them a mortgage on his interest in the property

to secure them. John S. Emmons had also previously given a

note for $1,500 for part of the purchase price of his interest,

endorsed by his brother Willis Emmons. The latter had to

pay this note and John S. gave him a mortgage at the same

time that he gave the one to his father and father-in-law. Mil-

ler had also? about the same time given a mortgage upon his

interest to is brother-in-law, Lamport, to secure a note for

$5,500, given to the latter. The ﬁrm of Newton, Emmons &

Miller became indebted to the Bank for $21,585.32, and was

insolvent. The Bank desired to obtain the milling property in

part payment, and offered to allow $16.0()0 for it. Newton and

Miller conveyed their interests to the Bank “subject to incum-

brances.-" Emmons also conveyed his interest, and all con-

fessed judgment to the Bank. The Bank claimed precedence

over the three mortgages.

The two given by Emmons were sustained, and the one given

by Miller was defeated by the court below.
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The Bank and Lamport appealed.

Callaghan, Jones (6 Lowe, for appellants.

Parker, Crowley ¢t- Bogard, for appellees.

liisonnnrcn, J. The Robinson Bank, one of the appellants

herein, claims that the mill property, including the four acres

of land upon which the mill was located, was partnership prop-

erty belonging to the ﬁrm of Newton, Emmons & Miller; that

as such it was ﬁrst liable to be subjected to the payment of the

partnership creditors, including the Bank; that the mort-

gagees, Lamport, \Valtcr, and \Villis and Wiley S. Emmons,

bis father and father-in-law, Wiley B. Emmons, and William
\V. \\'alter. The latter hnd to pay the note and John 8.
Emmons gave them a mortgage on his interest in the property
to secure them. John 8. Emmons had also previously given a
note for fl,500 for part of the purchase price of bis interest,
endorsed by his brother \Villis Emmons. The latter bad to
pay this note and .John 8. gave him a mortgage at the same
time that he gave the one to his father and father-in-law. .:Miller had also fl{ nbout the same time given a mortgage upon hi~
interest to 'his brother-in-law, Lamport, to secure a note for
,!'>,500, given to the latter. 'l,he firm of Newton, Emmons &
Miller became indebted to the Bank for $21,585.32, and was
insolvent. The Bank d~sired to obtain the milling property in
part payment, nod offered to allow $16.000 for it. Newton and
Miller conveyed their interests to the Bank "subject to incumbrances/' Emmons also conveyed his interest, and all oonfessed judgment to the Bank. The Bank claimed precedence
over the three mortgages.
The two given by Emmons were sustained, and the one given
by Miller was d(>feated by the court below.
The Bank and Lamport appealed.

were individual creditors of Miller and John S. Emmons, and

only entitled to such surplus as might arise out of the mill

Callaghan, Jones & Lowe, for appellants.

property after the payment therefrom of the ﬁrm debts.

\Vhether real estate upon which a partnership transacts its

Parker, Orozrlcy & Bogard, for appelleee.

business is ﬁrm property or the property of the individual

members of the ﬁrm is oftentimes a difficult question to deter-

mine, and one upon which the authorities are not altogether

uniform. The mere fact of the use of land by a ﬁrm does not

make it partnership property. Gocpper vs. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio

l\IAGnuo1m, J. The HobinS<>n Bank, one of the appellants
herein, claims that the mill property~ including the four acres
of land upon which the mill was located, was partne1·ship property bc>longing to the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller; that
as such it was first liable to be subjected to the payment of the
partnership creditors, including the Hank; tl\a t the mortgagees, I~amport, 'Valter, and "~illis and 'Vill'Y S. Emmons,
were individual crf>ditors of Miller and John S. Emmons, and
only entitled to such surplus as might arise out of the miU
property after the paym(_•nt therefrom of the firm debts.
\Vhether real estate upon which a partnership transacts it~
business is firm property or the property of the individual
members of the firm is oftentimes a difficult question to determine, and one upon which the autbo1·ities are not altogethe1•
uniform. The mere fact of the use of land by a firm does not
make it partnership p1·operty. Gocpper vs. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio

Ronnrson Bum vs. MILLER. - 157

BOBUISON BANK.
St. 429; Hatchett vs. Blanton, 72 Ala. 423. Nor is real estate

vs.

MILLER.

16'1

necessarily the individual property of the members of a ﬁrm

because the title is held by one member, or by the several mem-

bers in undivided interests. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280. Whether

real estate is partnership or individual property depends

largely upon the intention of the partners. That intention

may be expressed in the deed conveying the land, or in the

articles of partnership; but when it is not so expressed the

circumstances usually relied upon to determine the question

are the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to

which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered in the

accounts upon the books of the ﬁrm. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280;

2 Lindl. Partn. marg. p. 649; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 945,

and cases in note. Where real estate is bought with partner-

ship funds for partnership purposes, and is applied to part-

nership uses, or entered and carried in the accounts of

/the ﬁrm as a partnership asset, it is deemed to be ﬁrm

I

K

property; and in such case it makes no difference, ll] a
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court of equity, whether the title is vested in all the partners,

as tenants in common, or in one of themt, or in a stranger.

T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) § 265; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281; Johnson

vs. Clark, 18 Kan. 157; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 948, and

cases cited. If the real estate is purchased with partnership

funds, the party holding the legal title will be regarded as

holding it subject to a resulting trust in favor of the ﬁrm fur-

nishing the money. In such case no agreement is necessary,

and the statute of frauds has no application. Parker vs.

Bowles, 57 N. H. 491; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281.

In the case at bar the land was not purchased with partner-

ship funds. The undivided onelthird interest bought by John

S. Emmons was paid for by him with his own individual

money. Miller also paid for the one undivided one-third inter-

est, purchased by him with his individual funds. None of the

money of the ﬁrm of Newton, Emmons & Miller was contribu-

ted towards the purchase of the one-third interest held by

Newton. Indeed, the proof shows that the ﬁrm of Newton,

Emmons & Miller was formed by an oral agreement after

Emmons and Miller had bought their interests. Each partner

here held the title to an undivided one-third part of the prop-

erty. No entries were made upon the books of the ﬁrm show-

ing that the real estate was treated as ﬁrm assets. The evi-

St. 429; Hatchett vs. Blanton, 72 Ala. ~3. Nor is real estate
necessarily the individual property of the members of a firm
because the title is held by one member, or by the several members in undivided interests. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280. 'Vhether
real estate is partnership or indi\'idual property depends
largely upon the in"tention of the partners. That intention
may be expressed in the deed com·eying the land, or in the
articles of purtnership; but when it is not so expressed the
circumstances usually relied upon to determine the questioµ
are the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to
which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered in the
accounts upon the books of the firm. l Hates, I>artn. § 280;
2 Lindi. J>artn. marg. p. 649; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 94;),
and cases in note. Where real estate is bought with partnership funds for partnership purposes, and is applied to partner~hip uses, or entered and carried in the accounts of
)
the firm as a partnership aEset, it is deemed to be firm
/ property; and in such case it makes no difference, in a
court of equity, whether the title is n•sted in all the partners,
as tenants in common, or in one of them~ or in a stranger.
T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) § 2(i5; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281; Johnson.
t'B. Clark, 18 Kan. 157; 17 Am. & Eng. Em;. Law, p. 948, antl
cases cited. If the real estate is purchased with partnership
funds, the party holding the legal title will be regarded as
holding it subject to a resulti6g trust in favor of the firm furnh~hing the mon••y. In such case no agrePment is necessary,
and the statute of frauds has no application. Parker vs.
Botcles, 57 N. H. 491; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281.
In the case at bar the land was not purchased with partner(
ship funds."' The undivided one"-third interest bought by John
S. Emmons was paid for by him with his own individual
money. Miller also paicl for the one undivided one-third interest, purchased by him with his individual funds. None of the
money of the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller was contribnted towards the purchase of the one-third interest held by
Xewton. Indeed, the proof shows that the firm of Newton,
Emmons & Miller was · formed by an oral agreement after
Emmons and ~filler had bou~ht their interests. Each partner
here held the title to an undivirled one-third part of the property. No entries were made upon the books of the firm showing that the real estate was treated as firm assets. The evi-
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deuce, however, does show that the property was bought for

the purpose of being used in the milling business, and that

after its purchase it was used for ﬁrm purposes, and that the

ﬁrm gave its notes to pay for repairs, and for placing new

machinery in the mill upon the premises. Under these circum-

stances, was the land partnership property, or the individual

property of the partners, holding as tenants in common? lt

cannot be said that the land is ﬁrm property, upon the theory

of a resulting trust, because the ‘money of the ﬁrm was not

used to buy the property. Such a trust might exist in favor of

the ﬁrm. regarding it as a person, if the partners had taken the

legal title, and the ﬁrm had advanced the purchase money.

The trust must arise at the time of the execution of the con-

veyance, and when the title vests in the grantee. Such could

not have been the case here, under the fact stated. Van Bus-

kirk rs. Van Baskirk, 148 lll. 9, 35 N. E. 383. In view of the

fact that the land was bought with individual, and not partner-

ship, funds, and was conveyed in undivided interests to the

several partners, and in the absence of any agreement that it
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should be regarded as ﬁrm property, docs the conduct of the

parties in afteryvards fogmingma _}1<'1!jt[_1_€j_I'§l1_,ip",j;1ng1L using the

property for partnershmB1l'pose~mpro\'-

ing the mill at the expen the ﬁrm, make the land ﬁllll

. se of ' -

p~ pet-ty,inacouofequity_? A.i<’:.‘;ﬂ-tire answer to jgs

f

uestion is ound'1TFmany of the authorit_i§s,_as will bepseen by

;~eT)W)\\'ingi Alca-andcr vs. Kim-bro, 49 Miss.

,‘ 529; ~a. Ann. 107; Reynolds vs. Ruckman,

215 Mich. 80; Parker vs. Bowles, 57 N. H. -191; Thompson cs. Bow-

man, 6 \Vall. 316; Frink rs. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Wlmatlcg/'8

Heirs vs. Calho1m,]2 Leigh 264, 37 Am. Dec. 654;Sikcs rs. Work,

ti Gray, 433; Gordon rs. Gordon, 49 Mich. 501, 13 N. IV. 834;

lfoody rs. Ratlilmrn, 7 Minn. 89 (Gil. 58); Paige vs. Paige, 71

Iowa, 818, 32 N. W. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 799 (post, p. 170). T. Pars.

Partn. (4th Ed.) § 266; Hatclzctt rs. Blanton, supra.

I The general doctrine of all these cases is that a purchase

l of the land with partnership funds is necessary to make it

l ﬁrm property. T. Parsons, in his work on Partnership (4th

1-1d,), says: “Although it [real estate] be held in the joint

name of two or more persons, if there be no proof that it was

purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes,

it will be considered as held by them as joint tenants or ten-

\

deuce, however, does show that the property was bought for
the purpose of being used in the milling business, and that
after its purchase it was used for firm purposes, and that the
firm gave its notes to pay for repairs, and for placing new
machinery in the mill upon the premises. Under these circumstances, was the land partnership pl'operty, or the individuul
property of the partners, holding as tenants in common? It
cannot br. said that the land is firm propel'ty, upon the theory
of a resulting trust, because the ·money of the firm was not
used to boy the property. Such a trust might exist in favor of
the firm, regarding it as a person, if the p~ll'tners had taken the
legal title, and the firm had advanced the purchase money.
The trust must arise at the time of the execution of the couve~·ance, and when the title yests in the grantee. Such could
not have been the case hE're, under the facts stated. Van Buskirk t'B. Van Buskirk, 148 Jll. 9, 35 N. E. a83. In view of the
fact that the land was bought with individual, and not partnership, funds, and was conveyed in undivided interests to the
several partners, and in the absence of any agreement that it
should be regarded as firm property, docs the con<!~~~ of the
~rties in aft~wards forn:i_i!!g__~_J!!'H'.t!l_~!~-~ ~11nL~sing th<.:
\ £!Operty for partnership purposes a
·rin and improYing the mill at the expense of the firm, make the Jancffirn1
~rty, in a court of e~? A negativ_e-a~swer to _t!!..i_s
. ~tion is found m many of the authoritiesl as wi111>~-~~~n by
; .r.tl~e to the l'ollowmg: AlcJ'ander t;S. J(i1i;b1-:o, 49 Miss.
: 529; 'l'heriot vr. llIicl1ct, 28 La. Ann. 107; Reynolds t;s. Ruckman,
;15 Mich. 80; Parker ·r.;s. Rou:lcs, 57 N. H. 4!)1; Tl!om.pson 1:8. Bour
rnari, G 'Vall. 316; Frink vs. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Wlleatley's
fl cirs vs. Callwun, 12 Leigh 2fi4, 37 Am. Dec. 654; Sikes t-.~. lVark,
Ii Gray, 433; Gorclon t:s. Gordon, 49 Mich. 501, 13 N.
834;
lfoodv 1:8. Rathburn, 7 l\finn. 89 (Gil. 58); Paige vs. Pa£gc, 71
Iowa, 318, 32 N. W. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 7!>9 (post, p. 170). T. Pars.
Partn. (4th Ed.) § 266; Hatcllctt 1:8. Blanton, supra.
{ The general doctrine of all these cases is that a purchase
I of the land with partnership funds is necesl'ary to make it
\ firm property. T. Parsons, in his work on PartnerRhip (4th
· Ed.), says: "Although it [real estate] be lwld in the joint
name of two or more persons, if the.re be no proof that it wns
purchased with partnership funds for partnership purpos<'~.
it will be considered as held by them as joint tenants or ten-
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ants in common. ' ' ' So, if not paid for by partnership

funds, then it is probably his property who does pay for it,

whatever use he permits to be made of it.” Sections 265, 266.

In Hatchctt vs. Blanton, supra, the supreme court of Alabama

says: “Steering clear of all "cases of fraud, or of the use by one

partner, without the approbation of his associates, of partner-

ship funds in the acquisition of real estate, the two facts must

concur to constitute real estate partnership property—acqui-

ants in common. • • • So, if not paid for by partnersh:1.>
funds, then it is probably llis property who does pay for H,
whatever use he permits to be made of it." Sections 265~ 2C>G.
In Hatchett vs. Blanton, supra, the supreme court of Alabama
says: "Steering clE>ar of all ·cases of fraud, or of the use by one
partner, without the approbation of his associates, of partnership funds in the acquisition of real estate, the two facts must
concur to constitute real estate partnership property-acquisition with partnership funds, or on partnership credit, anll
for the uses of the partnership." In Thompson vs. Botcma11, -1
supra, the supreme court of the United States say: "In thD
absence of proof of its purchase with partnership funds for
partnership purposes, real property standing in the names of
several persons is deemed to be held by them as joint tenants
or as tenants in common." B11.chan vs. Smnncr, 2 Barb.
Ch. 165, 47 Am. Dec. 350. The theory of some of the
cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not
partnership, funds, cannot be converted into firm property by a verbal agreement between the partners, b2cause
no trust can be created in lands, unless by writing,
in view of the statute of frauds, except such as results by impli·
cation of law. Parker vs. Boicles, supra. 1.'here are cases which
hold that, even though the lnnd was originally bought by the
several pa1·tners with their individual funds, and deeded to
them as tenants in common, yet it will be regarded in equity
ns firm property where it is improved out of partnership funds
for firm purposes, nnd actually used for such purposes,
or where the firm puts valuable and permanent improvements upon it for firm purposes, and which are essential
to the firm. In some instanc2s the land is held to be
the property of the partners, nnd the improvements to be the ·
property of the firm. 1 Bates, Pnrtn. §§ 281, 282. The use of 1
the property is not conclusive of its character as real estate I
or personality, but is only evidence of the intention of the
parties. Id. § 285. \Vhen the intention of the partners to convert
the land into firm property is iiiferred from circumstances,
(
the circumstances must be such as do not admit of any other
\ eqnalJy reasonable and satisfactory explanation. T. Puri;.
1 Partn. § 2117. And, where it ia sought to show a conversion of
I the land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such
\ agreement must be clear and explicit. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc.
1

sition with partnership funds, or on partnership credit, and

for the uses of the partnership.” In Thompson vs. Bowman,

absence of proof of its purchase with partnership funds for

partnership purposes, real property standing in the names of
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several persons is deemed to be held by them as joint tenants

or as tenants in common.” Bachan vs. Sumner, 2 Barb.

Ch. 165, 47 Am. Dec. 350. The theory of some of the

cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not

partnership, funds, cannot be converted into ﬁrm prop-

erty by a verbal agreement between the partners, because

no trust can be created in lands, unless by writing,

in view of the statute of frauds, except such as results by impli-

cation of law. Parker vs. Bowles, supra. There are cases which

hold that, even though the land was originally bought by the

several partners with their individual funds, and deeded to

them as tenants in common, yet it will be regarded in equity

as ﬁrm property where it is improved out of partnership funds

for ﬁrm purposes, and actually used for such purposes,

or where the ﬁrm puts valuable and permanent improve-

ments upon it for ﬁrm purposes, and which are essential

to the ﬁrm. In some instances the land is held to be

the property of the partners, and the improvements to be the:

property of the ﬁrm. 1 Bates, Partn. §§ 2s1, 2s2. The use of l

the property is not conclusive of its character as real estate I

or personality, but is only evidence of the intention of the

parties. Id. § 285. \Vhen the intention of the partners to con-

vert the land into ﬁrm property is inferred from circumstances,

the circumstances must be such as do not admit of any other

equally reasonable and satisfactory explanation. T. Pars.

Partn. § 267. And, where it is sought to show a conversion of

the land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such

agreement must be clear and explicit. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc.

supra, the supreme court of the United States ay: “In u1e)"i

•
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Law, p. 954, and cases cited. In Alkire vs. Kahle, 123 lll. 496,

17 N. E. 693, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540, land was conveyed during the

existence of the partnership to “Cato Abbott and Henry Rob-

inson, composing the ﬁrm of Abbott & Robinson”; and it was

held not to be partnership-‘property, because it was not shown

to have been either purchased with partnership funds, or used

for partnership purposes; but we do not regard that case as

holding that the mere use of the land for partnership purposes

constitutes it ﬁrm property. In Mauck 1:3. Mauclc, 54 Ill. 281,

land which had been bought and held for ﬁrm purposes was

said to be ﬁrm property, and to partake of the character of

personalty; but in that case a part of the business of the ﬁrm

was to buy and sell real estate, and, although the land was

said to belong to the ﬁrm, it does not appear that it was not

purchased with partnership funds. In Faulds vs. Yates, 57 Ill.

416, 11 Am. Rep. 24, the land was bought for the use of the

partnership, but after the partnership was formed, and with

the money of two of the partners. In Bopp rs. Fox, 63 Ill. 540,

land, bought by four partners with their individual funds, and

conveyed to them in their individual names, was held to be
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partnership property, because, two weeks before the purchase,

the four purchasers made, not a mere executory agreement to

form a partnership at a future time, but a “present, verbal

agreement of partnership,” and then afterwards bought the

land, and began the erection of a mill for the purpose of carry-

ing on the milling business as a ﬁrm “already formed under

the verbal agreement.” It was there held that the essential

question was whether the purchase money “was paid as part-

nership money for a partnership purpose,” and we said, “W1:

consider this was essentially a purchase with partnership

funds for partnership purposes.”

The weight of authority seems to us to upport the position

that where persons who afterwards become partners buy land

in their individual names and with their individual funds,

before the making of a partnership agreement, the land

will be regarded as the individual property of the part-

ners, in the absence of a clear and explicit agreement I

subsequently entered into by them to make it ﬁrm property, |

or in the absence of controlling circumstances which indi-

cate an intention to convert it into ﬁrm» assets. \Ve do not

think that an application of this rule to the facts of the present I

J,nw, p. 954, and cases cited. In Alkire vs. Kah.le, 123 Ill. 400,
l 7 N. E. fj!);l, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540, land was conveyed during the
existence of the partnership to "Cato Abbott and Henry Robinson, composing the firm of Abbott & Robinson"; and it was
hPld not to be partnf"rship:property, because it was not shown
to have been either purchnsed with partnership funds, or used
for partnership purposes; but we do not regard that case as
holding that tlw mere use of the land for partnership purposes
constitutes it firm property. In Mauck t:8. !Jlauck, 54 Ill. 281,
land which had been bought and held for firm purposes was
said to be firm property, and to partake of the character of
personalty; but in that case a part of the business of the firm
was to buy and sell real estate, and, although the land was
said to belong to 1he firm, it does not appear that it was not
purchased with partnership funds. In Faulds t'8. Yates, 57 Ill.
4Hi, 11 Am. HPp. 24, tlfe land was bought for the use of the
partnPrship, but after the partnership was formed, and with
the money of two of the partners. In Bopp i·s. Fox, 63 Ill. 540,
land, bought by four partners with their individual funds, and
conn•yed to them in tlieir individual names, was held to be
partnership property, because, two weeks before the purchasP.,
th<> four purchasers made, not a mere executory agreement to
form a partnership at a future time, but a "present, verbal
ngr<>ement of partnership," and then afterwards bought the
land, and began the erection of a mill for the purpose of carrying on the milling business as a firm "already formed under
the verbal agr<'ement." It was there held that the essential
qnPstion was whether the purchase money "was paid as partnership money for a partnership purpose," and we said, "We
consider this was -essentially a pu~chase with partnership
funds. for partnership purposes."
The weight of authority seems to us to support the position
that where persons who afterwards become partners buy land
in their individual names and with their individual funds,
before the making of a partnership agreement, the land
will be regardpd as the · indivi<luul property of the partners, in the absC'nce of a clear and explicit agreement
snh~equently entc•red into by them to make it firm prop~rty,
1 or in the absence of controlling circumstances which indiI' cate an intention to convert it into firm assets. 'Ve do not
t llink that an application of this rule to the facts of the present ,

'
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case shows the real estate here in controversy to be ﬁrm prop-

erty. The testimony proves affirmatively that there was no
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I cnse shows the real estate here in controversy to be firm prop\ erty. 'l'h.e testimony proves affirmatively that there was no

agreement, written or verbal, to put the land into the ﬁrm as a

ﬁrm asset, and that it was treated by the parties as individual

property. John S. Emmons insured his interest separately.

\Vhen he gave his note for $1,500, signed by his brother as

surety, in part payment of the purchase money for the land, he

promised his brother that he would give him a mortgage on his

one-third interest -when the master’s certiﬁcate, issued to him

at the sale, should ripen into a deed; and the mortgage after-

wards made was given as soon as the master‘s deed was ob-

tained. Four months after the purchase, when he borrowed

$1,800 of the bank upon his note, signed by his father and

father-in-law as sureties. he stated to the bank that he intended

‘to mortgage his interest to his siireties to secure them. About

lthis time, Newton, Emmons 8: Miller paid $5,400 in cash for im-

proving the mill; but this amount was contributed by the part-

ners, not out of partnership funds, but by the contribution of
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Vlll€‘ll'l11(ll\'ldll£ll moneys, each. paying one-third. The one-third

so paid by John S. Emmons was the $1,800 borrowed on his

note. The bank itself, in procuring deeds from the partners in

September, 1884. dealt with them as owners of separate inter-

ests. Each member of a partnership has a superior lien on the

partiiership property for the payment of the ﬁrm debts. This

equitable lien of the partners is worked out for the beneﬁt of

the ﬁrm creditors. Hapgood vs. Oornircll, 48 Ill. 65, 05 Am.

Dec. 516. Hence, partnership property must be ﬁrst applied to

the payment of partnership debts; and the true interest of each

partner in such property is the balance found to be due to hiin

after the payment of the ﬁrm debts, and the settlement of ac-

counts between the partners. Bopp rs. For, supra. In equity,

real estate stands on the same footing in this respect as per-

sonal property. Alkire rs. Kalilc, supra. It results that there

can be no dower interest in real estate owned by a partnership

until all the partnership debts are paid and the partnership

accounts are adjusted. Troirbi-id_qc rs. Cross, 117 Ill. 109, 7

N. E. 347. If the land in controversy was ﬁrm property in Sep-

wives of Newton, Emmons, and Miller; and yet their wives

were required by the bank to sign the deeds to its trustee,

itember, 1884, there were no dower interests at that time in the

\Voo4iwoi-th, and one of them was paid $200 for her signature.

. JP ~
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agreement, written or ve1·bal, to put the land into the firm as a
firm asset, and that it was treated by the parlies as individual
property. John S. Emmons insured his interest separately.
\Vhen he gave his note for $1,500, signed by bis brother as
surety, in part payrnE>nt of the purch.ase money for the land, be
promised his brother that he would give him a mortgage on his
one-third interest when the master's certificate, issued to him
at the sale, should ripen into a deed; and the mortgage afterwards made was given as soon as the master's deed was obtnined. Four months after the purchase, when he borrowed
$1,800 of the bank upon his note, signed by his father antl
father-in-law as sureties, he stated to the bank that he inknded
to mortga~e his interest to his sureties to secure them. About
\
\this time, Newton, Emmons & l\liller paid $5,400 in cash for impl'oving the mill; but this amount was contl'ibuted by the partners, not ont of partnership funds, but by the contribution of
their incliYidual moneys, each paying one-third. 'fhe one-third
' so paid by John S. Emmons was the $1,800 borrowed on his
note. The bnnk itself, in pl'ocuring deeds from the pa1·tners in
Heptembel', 1S84, dealt with them ns owners of separate inter<•sts. Each member of a partnership has a i,:iuperior li<'n on the
pnrtnership property for the payment of the Ihm dPbts. This
<•quitnb1e lien of the partners is worked out for the benefit of
the fit'm creditors.
Hapgood vs. Con11rcll, 48 Ill. (if>, !)5 Am.
Dec. ilHL Henee, partiwrship property must be first applied to
thl' payment of partnership dPhts; :rnd the true interest of each
partner in such property is the balance found to be due to him
aftel' the payment of the firm debts, and the sPttlement of accounts between the partners. Bopp rs. Fo.v, supra. In equity,
real estate stands on the same footing in this respect as personal property. Alkire rs. Kaltlc, supra. It rf'sults that there
can be no down interc>st in real estate owned by a partnership
until all the partrwrship debts are paid nnd the partnership
accounts are adjusted. 1'rou:bdd.'fc i·s. Cro.r~s, 117 Ill. 10!), 7
N. E. ~47. If the land in contl'on~ rsy was firm property in Rl·ptember, 1884, there w<>re no dower. interests at that time in the
wives of Newton, Emmons, nnd ~liller; and yet their wives
w<'re f'pquired by the hunk to sign the deeds to its trustc>e,
\Voo..'lworth, and one of them was paid $~00 fol' her signature.
21
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There is no question about the bona ﬁde character of the mort-

gages to Willis Emmons and ‘Wiley S. Emmons and W. W’.

Walter. They paid the judgments upon the notes of John S.

Emmons, upon which they were sureties, and those notes were

given for borrowed money expended in the purchase and im-

provement of the mill property. We think the mortgages have

been properly sustained as resting upon an undivided one-third

interest in the land, which must be regarded, under all the cir-

mill

cumstances of this case, as the separate property of John S.

Emmons.

But, even if the interest held by John S. Emmons was ﬁrm

property, there is nothing to show that the holders of the mort-

gages thereon had notice, or reasonable ground for believing,

that it was ﬁrm property. The record title was in John S.

Emmons, and all the circumstances coming to their knowledge,

as heretofore stated, were calculated to create the impression

that his real interest was that indicated by the record. Facts

showing a partnership in the milling and grain business were

/' not necessarily notice of a partnership in the land. Now, it is

well settled that a bona ﬁde purchaser or mortgagee of ﬁrm

I
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\property, from one of the partners holding the legal title, with-

out notice of its partnership character, w1ll hold 1t free from

partnership claims. T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) §§ 277, 278; 1

Bates, Partn. § 291; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Metc. (Mass) 562; Colly.

Partn. (Perk. Ed.) § 135. When a ﬁrm and its members are

insolvent, and the ﬁrm has been dissolved, an equity exists in

favor of the creditors of the ﬁrm in respect of the lands pur-

/

chased with partncrship funds, which is superior to that of the

{ creditors of the individual partners; but there may be cases

' where an equal or superior equity may be created in favor of a

creditor of an individual member of the ﬁrm, as where one has

There is no question about the bona fide character of the mortgages to \Villis Emmons and \Viley S. Emmons and W. W.
Walter. They paid the judgments upon the notes of John S.
Emmons, upon which they were sureties, and those notes were
given for borrowed money expended in the purchase and improvement of the
property. We think the mortgages have
been properly sustained as resting upon an undivided one-third
Interest in the land, which mast be regarqed, under all the circumstances of this case, as the separate property of John S.
Emmons.
But, even if the interost held by John S. Emmons was firm
property, thel'e is nothing to show that the holders of the m01-tgages thereon had notice, or reasonable ground for believing,
that it was firm property. The record title was in John S.
Emmons, and all the circumstances coming to their knowledge,
as heretofore stated, W<'re calculated to create the impression
that his real interest was tliat indicated by the record. Facts
showing a partnership in the milling and grain business were
not necessarily notice of a partner~hip in the land. Now, it is
well settled that a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of firm
property, from one of the partners holding the legal title, without notice of its partnership character, will hold it free from
partnership claims. T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) §§ 277~ 278; 1
Bates, Partn. § 291; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 562; Colly.
Partn. (Perk. Ed.) § 135. '\\''hen a firm and its members arc
lnsoln>nt, and the firm has been dissolved, an equity exists in
favor of the creditors of the firm in respect of the lands purchased with partnership funds, which is superior to that of the
creditors of the individual partners; but there may be cases
where an equal or i!uperior equity may be created in favor of a
creditor of an individual member of the firm, as where one has
furnished to one of the members the capital upon which tlu~
bm~iness was commenced.
Reeves t:s. Ayers, 38 JJI. 418. By
signing the note for $1,500 as surdy, Willis Emmons enabled
John S. Emmons to purchas~ an interest in the mill property,
and, if that interest was a partnership asset, he thereby aided
in procuring a part of the firm capital. In addition to what
has been said, we think the evidence shows that the offirers of
the bank, if they did not actually make an agreement to that
effect, gave .Jolm S. Emmons to understand that the· bank
would protect the morlgages on bis interest if he and his wife

\
\

furnished to one of the members the capital upon which the

business was commenced. Reeves vs. Ayers, 38 lll. 418. By

signing the note for $1,500 as surety, Willis Emmons enabled

John S. Emmons to purchase an interest in the mill property,

and, if that interest was a partnership asset, he thereby aided

in procuring a part of the ﬁrm capital. In addition to what

has been said, we think the evidence shows that the officers of

the bank, if they did not actually make an agreement to that

effect, gave John S. Emmons to understand that the’ hank

would protect the mortgages on his interest if he and his wife

•
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would sign the deed to the bank. The consideration of that

deed was just the amount of the "two mortgages, and four wit-

nesses swear that one of the oﬁicers of the bank promised to

take care of the mortgages. \Vhen a person, by his words or

{ conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the existence

of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that

belief so as to change his previous position, the former will be

estopped to aver against the latter a different state of things.

Casler vs. Byers, 129 Ill. 657, 22 N. E. 507.

As to the mortgage made by the appellant Miller to Lani-

port, the lower courts have found that that mortgage was not

made in good faith, and was not given to secure a bona. ﬁde

indebtedness. It is claimed that the note for $5,500, secured

thereby, was given for money loaned to Miller by his wife and

by his brother-in-law, Lamport. It is true, that the fact of the

relationship between the parties is no proof of fraud, although

it may be a circumstance to excite suspicion. W/ightman rs.

Hart, 37 Ill. 123. But we are not satisﬁed from the evidence

that the money alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Miller was not
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the money of Miller himself. If any funds were loaned to him

by Lamport, it is not possible to ﬁx their exact amount separ-

ately from those alleged to have been borrowed of Mrs. Miller.

' The witnesses contradict each other as to amounts, and a to

the times and places of payment. There is refusal to answer

questions, and failure to explain matters needing explanation.

VVe have examined all the testimony, a contained in the origi-

nal record, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in

the conclusion reached by it in regard to this mortgage, or that

the appellate court has erred in agreeing with the circuit court.

It is true that the deed from Miller and Newton to the bank

contains the words, “subject to incumbrances,” but we think

the reference here is to incumbrances which are made in good

faith. The facts about the mortgage were not known when

the deed was executed. There is some conﬂict in the evidence

as to whether the parties intended to refer to the Lamport

mortgage, or to certain liens claimed to exist in favor of cred-

itors who had furnished machinery for the mill. But even if

the words refer to the Lamport mortgage alone, it is not certain

from the testimony that the amount of that mortgage was a

part of the consideration for the execution of the deed. The

grantee in a deed, who purchases subject to an incumbrance to

i

would sign the deed to the bank. The consideration of that
deed was just the amount of the two mortgages, and four witnesses swear that one of the officers of the bank promised to
take care of the mortgages. \Vhen a person, by his words or
conduct, voluntarily causes another to beli.e ve in th.e existence
1 of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that
I belief so as to change his previous positi<>n, the former will be
estopped to aver ngainst the latter a different state of tl.ingts.
Caslervs. JJyers, 129 111. 657, 22 N. E. 507.
As to the mortgage made by the appellant Miller to Lamport, the lower courts have found that that mortgage was not
made in aood faith, and was not given to secure a bona fide
indebtedness. Jt is claimed that the note for $5,500, secured
thereby, was given for money loaned to Miller by his wife and
by his brother-in-Jaw, Lamport. It is true, that the fact cf the
relationship between the parties is no proof of fraud, although
it may be a circumstance to excite suspicion. W ·iglttman t"d.
Hart, 37 Ill. 123. But we are not satisfied from the evidence
that the money alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Miller was not
the money of Miller himself. If any funds were loaned to him
by T..amport, it is not possible to fix their exact amount scpar·
ately from those alleged to have been borrowed of Mrs. ~tiller.
- The witnesses contradict each other as to amounts, and ruJ to
the times and places of payment. There is refusal t<> answer
queetions, and failure to explain matters needing explanation.
\Ve have examined all the testimony, as contained in the original record, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in
the conclusion reached by it in regard to this mortgage, or that
the appellate court bas erred in agreeing with the circuit court.
It is true that the deed from Miller and Newton to tl1e bank
contains the words, "subject to incumbrances," but we think
the reference here is to incumbrances which are made in good
faith. The facts about the mortgage were not known when
the deed was executed. There is some conflict in the evidence
os to whether the parties intended to refer to the Lamport
mortgage, or to certain liens claimed to exist in favor of creditors who had furnished mn<'hinery for the mill. But even 1f
the words refer to the Lamport mortgage alone, it is not certain
from the testimony that the amount of that mortgage was a
part of the consideration for the execution of the deed. The
grantee in a deed, who plll·chases subject to an incumbrance to
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secure indebtedness, may not be under obligations to pay such

indebtedness, if its amount is not included in, and does not

form a part of, the consideration of the conveyance. Drury vs.

Holden, 121 Ill. 130, 13 N. E. 547. The amount named as the

consideration in the deed was simply the agreed value of New-

ton’s interest, and did not include any part of this mortgage.

The amount of the actual consideration agreed to be paid by

the bank for the deed of l\Iiller‘s interest, to wit, $5,333.33 (one-

third of $10,000), was paid by a credit of that amount on the

ﬁrm indebtedness of $21,585.23 due from Newton, Emmons &:

‘Miller to the bank. The judgment of the appellate court and

the decree of the circuit court are affirmed. Aﬂirmed.

NOTE: See also l\1echem's Elem. of Pa.rt.n., 55 106, 107, 109; also the ex-

haustive note in 27 L. R. A. 449.

SHANKS vs. KLEIN.

Supreme Court of the United States, 1881.

secure indebtedness, may not be under obligations to pay such
indebtedness, if its amount is not included in, and does not
form a part of, the consideration of the conveyance. Drury vs.
Holden, 121 111. 130, 13 N. E. 547. The amount named as the
consideration in the deed was simply the agreed value of Newton's interest and did not include any part of this mortgage.
The amount of the actual consideration agreed to be paid by
the bank for the deed of :Miller's intPrest, to wit, $ti,333.33 (onethird of $Hi,OOO), was paid by a credit of that amount on the
fl.rm indebtedness of $21,585.23 due from Newton, Emmons &
·MiHer to the bank. The judgment of the appelJate court and
the decree of the circuit court are affirmed. Affirmed.

104 U. S. 18, 26 L. Ed. 635.

This was a bill in chancery ﬁled by John A. Klein and others

against David C. Shanks, executor of the last will and testa-
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ment of Joseph H. Johnston.

NOTE: See also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ff 106, 107, 109; also the exhaustive note in 27 L. R. A. 44.9,

The substance of the bill is that in the lifetime of Johnston

there existed between him and Shepperd Brown a partnership,

the style of which was Brown & Johnston; that their principal

place of business was at Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi,

where they had a banking house; that they had branches and

connections with other men in business at other places. among

which was New Orleans; that the_v dealt largely in the pur-

SHANKS

vs.

KLEIN.

chase and sale of real estate, of which they had a large amount

in value on hand at the outbreak of the recent civil war; that

Supreme Court of the T,'nitcd States, 1881.

this real estate was in different parcels and localities, and was

bought and paid for by partnership money, and held as part-

104 U. S. 18, 26 I,. Ed. 635.

nership property for the general uses of the partnership busi-

ness; and that early in the war, namely, in 1863, Johnston died

in the State of Virginia, where he then resided, leaving a will

by which all his property, including his interest in the part-

——~\1r—-=4

This was a biJl in chancery ft led by John A. Klein and others
against David C. Shanks, exPcutor of the last will and testament of Joseph H. Johnston.
The substancf.' of the bill is that in the lifetime of Johnston
there existed betwe<>n him and Shepperd B1·own a partnership.
the style of wh!ch was Brown & Johnston; that their principal
place of business was at Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi,
where they had a banking house; that they had branches and
connections with other men in business at other places, among
which waA Kew Orleans; that they dealt largely in the purchase and sale of real estate, of which they had a large amount
in Yalue on hand at the outbr<>ak of the recent civil war; that
1his real estnte was in differPnt parcels and localities, and was
bought and paid for by partnership money, and lwld as partnership propf.'rty for the general usf's of the partnership bnsim~ss; and that early in the war, namely, in lRG~. Johnston died
in the State of Virginia, where he then resined, leaving a will
by which all his property, including his interest in the part-
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norship, became vested in Shanks, who was appointed his

executor. '

It seems that both Brown and Johnston were absent from

Mississippi and from New Orleans during the war—the one

being in Virginia and the other in Georgia. Upon the cessa-

tion of hostilities, Brown returned to New‘ Orleans, and visited

Vicksburg to look after the business of the ﬁrm of Brown &

Johnston, and the other ﬁrms with which that was connected.

Finding that suits had been commenced by creditors of the ﬁrm

against him as surviving partner, and, in some instances,

attachments levied, he became satisﬁed that unless he adopted

some mode of disposing of the partnership property and apply-

ing its proceeds to the payment of the debts in their just order,

the whole would be wasted or a few active creditors would

absorb it all. Under these circumstances, acting by advice of

counsel, he executed a deed conveying all the property of the
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ﬁrm of Brown & Johnston to John A. Klein, in trust for the

creditors of that partnership, and providing that the surplus,

if any, should be for the use of the partners and their heirs or

devisees. Klein accepted the trust, and pursuant thereto paid

debts with the lands, or with the pI'uC68dS of the sale of them.

There is an allegation that Shanks, while acting as executor,

and about the time the deed of trust was made, had an inter-

view with Brown, and, being fully informed of the condition

of the atfairs of the partnership, expressed his approval of

what Brown intended to do. This is denied in the answer.

and some testimony is taken on the subject. Other questions

of had faith on the part of Brown are raised. But in the view

which we take of the case the record establishes that Brown

acted in good faith, and did the best that could be done for

the creditors of the paI'tn(>1'ship and for those interested in

its property.

It appears that after all this property had been sold to pur-

chasers in good faith. Shanks, as executor of Jol1nston’s will,

instituted actions of ejectment against them. They thereupon

ﬁled this bill to enjoin him from further prosecuting the

actions, and compel him to convey the legal title to the real

estate which came to him by the will of his testator. A

decree was rendered in conformity with the prayer of the bill,

and Shanks appealed.

n<·rship, became vested in Shanks, who was appoint~d Qis
executor.
It seems that both Br~wn and J ohm1ton were absent from
.Mississippi and from New Orleans dur-ing the war-the one
being in Virginia and the other in Georgia. Upon the cessation of hostilities, llrown returned to .New, Orleans, and visited
Vicksburg to look aft(~r the busiiwss of the firm of Ilrown &
Johnston, and the other firms with whicli that was connC'cted.
Finding that suits had been commenced by creditors of the firm
against llim as surviving partne1·, and, in some instancl's,
nttachm<:nts levied, he becnme satisfied that unless he adoptt!d
some mode of di~posing of the partnership property and applying its proceeds to the payment of the debts in their just order,
the whole would be wasted or a few active creditors would
absorb it all. Fnder tlu-'SP ei1·cumstancfls, acting by advice of
. <-otmsel, he exN·uted a deed conYeying all the prope1·ty of the
firm of Brown & Johnston to .John A. Klc>in, in trust for the
credito1·s of that partnership, and providing tltat the surplus,
if any, should be for the use of the partm•rs and their heirs or
devisees. Kl(-'in accepted the trust, and pursuant thereto pai1l
debts with the lands, or with the pr\1Ceeds of the sale of them.
Ther<> is an allegation that Shanks, while acting as executor,
and about th<-' time the d(•ed of trust was madl>, had an intm··
view with Brown, and, being fully inform('d of the condition
of the affairs of the partn('t·ship, ('XJW(•ss(•d his approval of
what Brown intended to do. This is denie<l· in the answer.
Hnrl some testimony is taken on the subject. Other questionl'l
of bad faith on the part of Brown are raised. But in the view
which we tak1._• of the case the rt>1«>rd establishes that Brown
acted in good faith, and did the best that could be done for
the creditors of the partlwrship and for those interested iD
its property.
It appears that after all this property had bec>n sold to purchasers in good faith, ~lrnnks, as <>xecntor of ;Johnston's will,
instituted a<'tions of ejectnwnt against tlu-'m. They thereupon
filed this bill to C'njoin him from further prosecuting the
actions, aud compel him to convey the legal title to the real
t>state which <'ame to him by the will of his testator. A
deeree was l'E>nd<-'red in conformity with the prayer of the l>ill,
and Shanks appPalrd.
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W. B. Pitt-man, and J. Z. George, for appellant.
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E. D. Clark, for appellees.

Mn.1.nn, J. (After stating the facts as above). Being satis-

lV. B. Pittman, and J. Z. George, for appellant.

ﬁed, as already stated, of the fairness and honesty of the pro-

ceedings of Brown and Klein and of the purchasers from

E. D. Ola·,.k, for appellees.

them, and waiving as of no consequence, in regard to the

principal point in the case, the allegation of Shank’s concur-

ence in or ratiﬁcation of Brown’s action, we proceed to con-

sider the question as to the power or authority of Brown, the

surviving partner, to bind Shanks by the conveyance to Klein,

and by the sales thereunder made.

There is no doubt that in the present case all the real estate

which is the subject of this controversy is to be treated as

partnership property, bought and held for partnership pur-

poses within the rule of equity on that subject. Nor is it denied

by the counsel who have so ably argued the case for the appel-

lant that the equity of the creditors of the partnership to have

their debts paid out of this property is superior to that of the

devisee, Johnston. Their contention is that this right could

only be ‘enforced by proceedings in a court of justice, and that
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no power existed in Brown, the surviving partner, to convey

the legal title vested in Shanks by the will of Johnston, nor

even to make a contract for the sale of the real estate which a

court will enforce against Shanks as the holder of that title.

Counsel for the appellees, while conceding that neither the

deed of Brown to Klein, nor of Klein to his vendees, conveyed

the legal title of the undivided moiety which was originally in

Johnston, maintain that Brown, as surviving partner, had, for

the purpose of paying the debts of the partnership, power to

sell and transfer the equitable interest or right of the partner-

ship, and of both partners, in the real estate, that the trust

deed which he made to Klein was effectual for that purpose,

and that by Kit-in’s sales to the other appellees they became

invested with this equitable title and the right to compel

Shanks to convey the legal title.

One of the learned counsel for the appellant concedes that

at the present day the doctrine of the English court of chan-

cery “extends to the treating of the realty as personalty for

all purposes, and gives the personal representatives of the

mi

Mn.LEn, J. (After stating the facts as above). Being sntil!'fted, as alr~ady stated, of the fairness and honesty of the proceedings of Brown and Klein and of the purchasers from
them, and wafring as of no consequence, in regard to the
principal point in the case, the allegation of Shank's concurence in or ratiVcation of Brown's action, we proceed to consider the queRtion as to the power or authority of Brown, the
surviving partner, to bind Shanks by the conveyance to Klein,
and by the sales thereunder made.
There is no doubt that in the presC'nt case all the real estate
which is the subject of this coutl'oversy is to be treated as
partnership prope1·ty, bought and held for partnership pur·
pol'es within the rnl<' of equity on that subject. Nor is it denied
by the counsel who have so ably argued the case for the appellant that the <'qnity of the creditors of the partnership to have
their d<.•bts paid out of this property is superior to that of the
de,·isee, Johnston. 'rheir contention is that this right could
onl,v be enfor~ed by proce<.>dings in a court of justice, and that
-no power exist<>d in Brown, the surviving partner, to convey
the> k·gnl title vested in Shanks by the will of Johnston, nor
even to make a contract for the sale of the real estate which a
court will enfo1:ee against Shanks as the holder of that title.
Counsel for the appe11ees, while conceding that neither the
deed of Brown to Klein, nor of Klein to his vendees, conveyed
the l<.>gal title of the undividl'd moiety which was originally in
.T ohnston, maintain that Brown, as surviving partner, had, for
the purpose of pa~·ing the debts of the partnership, power to
sell and transft'l' the equitable interest or right of the partnership, and of both partners, in the real estate, that the trust
deed which he made to Klein was effectual for that purpose,
nnd that by Klt-in's sales to the other appellees they became
invested with this ecp1itahlc title and the right to compel
Shanks to convc>y the lPgnJ title.
One of the learned coun~el for the appellant concedes that
at the present day the doctrine of the English court of chnn·
( cery "extends to the treating of the realty as personalty for
all purposes, and gives the personal representatives of the
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deceased partner the land as personalty, to the exclusion of

the heir,” and that the principle has “acquired a ﬁrm foot-

hold in English equity jurisprudence, that partneship real

estate is in fact in all cases, and to all intents and purposes,

personalty.” He maintains, however, that the principle has

not been carried so far in the courts of America; that the

extent of the doctrine is that the creditors of the partnership

and the surviving partner have a lien on the real estate of

the partnership for debts due by the ﬁrm, and for any balance

found due to either partner on a ﬁnal settlement of the part-

nership transactions; and that the right of the surviving

partner, and of the creditors through him, is no more than a

lien, which cannot be asserted by a sale, as if the property were

personal, but to the enforcement of which a resort to a court

of equity is necessary.

We think that the error which lies at the foundation of this

argument is in the assumption that the equitable right of the

surviving partner and the creditors is nothing but a lien.

It is not necessary to decide here that it is not a lien in the
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strict sense of that word, for if it be a lien in any sense it is

also something more.

It is an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. It

is an interest in the property which courts of chancery will

recognize and support. What is that right? Not only that

the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so~

situated is appropriated to the satisfaction of the partnership

debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be

treated as personal property of the partnership, and like other

personal property pass under the control of the surviving part-

ner. This control extends to the right to sell it, or so much of

it as may be necessary to pay the partnership debts, or to

satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner.

It is beyond question that such is the doctrine of the Eng-

lish court of chancery, as stated by counsel for appellant.

As this result was reached in that court without the aid of any

statute, it is authority of very great weight in the inquiryas

to the true equity doctrine on the subject.

\Ve think, also, that the preponderance of authority in the

American courts is on the same side of the question.

In the case of D yer vs. Clark, 5 Metc. (Mass) 562, 39 Am. Dec.

(297, that eminent jurist, Chief Justice SHAW, while using the

deceased partner the land as personalty, to the exclusion of
the heir," and that the principle has "acquired a firm foothold in English equity jurisprudence, that partnesbip real
estate is in fact in all cases, and to all intents and purposes,
personalty." He maintains, however, that the principle baa
not been carried so far in the courts of America; that the
. extent of the doctrine is that the creditors of the partnership
und the surviving partner have a lien on the real estate of
the partnership for debts rlue by the firm, and for any balance
found due to either partner on a final settlement of the partnership transactions; and that the right of the surviving
partner, and of the creditors through him, is no more than a
lien, which cannot be asserted by a sale, as if the property were
personal, but to the enforcement of which a resort to a court
of equity is necessary.
We think that the error which lies at the foundation of this
argument is in the assumption that the equitable right of the
surYiving partner and the creditors is nothing but a lien.
It is not necessary to decide here that it is not a lien in the
strict sense of that word, for if it be a lien in any sense it is
also something more.
It is an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. lt
is an interest in tlte property which courts of chancery will
recognize and support. 'Vhat is that right? Not only that
the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so·
situated is appropriritC'd to the satisfaction of the partnership
debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be
trc>ated as personal property of the partnership, and like other
personal property pass under the control of the surviving partner. This control extends to the right to sell it, or so much of
it as may be necessary to pay the partnership debts, or to
satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner.
It is beyond question that such is the doctrine of the EngliE1h ·court of chancery, ns stated by counsel for appellant.
As this result was reached in that court without the aid of any
statute, it is nutbority of very great weight in the inquiry as
to the true equity doctrine on the subject.
'Ye think, also, that the preponderance of authority in the
American courts is on the same side of the question.
In the case of Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Mete. {Mass.) 5G2, 30 Am. Dec.
697, that eminent jurist, ChiP.f Justice SHAW, while using the

1

!

168 Casns on PAR'l‘.\'l-Jltslllll.

word “lien” in reference to the rights now in controversy, asks,

“\Vhat are the true equitable rights of the partners as result-

ing from their presumed intentions in such real estate? Is

not the share of each pledged to the other, and has not each

an equitable lien on the estate, requiring that it shall be held

and appropriated, ﬁrst, to pay the joint debts, then to repay

the partner who advanced the capital, before it shall be

applied to the separate use of either of the partners? The

creditors have an interest indirectly in the same appropriation;

not because they have any lien, legal or equitable (2 Story, Eq.,

§ 1253), upon the property itself; but on the equitable principle

that the real estate so held shall be deemed to constitute a

part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid before it

can be legally or honestly diverted to the private use of the

parties. Suppose this trust is not implied, what would be the

condition of the parties?” etc. “But treating it as a trust, the

rights of all the parties will be preserved.” It is clear that in

the view thus announced the right of the creditors is something

more than an ordinary lien.

In Delmonico vs. Guillaume, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 366, where
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the precise question arose which we have in the present case,

the vice-chancellor held that “Peter A. Delmonico, as the sur-

viving partner, became entitled to the Brooklyn farm, and as

between himself and the heir of John he had an absolute right

to dispose of it, for the payment of the debts of the ﬁrm, in the

same manner as if it had been personal estate.”

In so deciding he followed the English authorities, and cited

Fereday rs. Wi_l/htiriek, 1 Russ. & M. 45; Phillips vs. Phillips, 1

Myl. & K. 649; Broom vs. Broom, 3 Ib. 443; Cookson vs. Cookson,

8 Sim. 529; Torrnshend vs. Dcra]/nes, 11 Ib. 493, note.

In ztndrrirs’ Heirs vs. Brozrn’s Adm’r, 21 Ala. 437, the

supreme court said that, “inasmuch as the real estate is con-

sidered as personal for the purpose of paying the debts of the

ﬁrm, and the surviving partner is charged with the duty of

paying these debts, it must of necessity follow that he has the

right in equity to dispose of the real estate for this purpose,

ft ? it would never do to charge him with the duty of paying

the debts and at the same time take from him the means of

doing it. Therefore, although he cannot by his deed pass the

legal title which descended to the heir of the deceased partner,

yet as the heir holds the title in trust to pay the debts and the
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word "lien" in reference to the rights now in controversy, asks,
"'Vhnt are the true equitable rights of the partners a~ resulting from their presumed intentions in such real estate? Is
not the share of each pledgl'd to the other, and has not eac11
an equitable lien on tlw ei:;iate, requiring thnt it shall be held
and appropriated, first, to pay the joint debts, tlien to repay
the partner who adrnn{'cd the capital, before it shall be
upplied to the separate u~e of eith<>r of the partners? The
creditors have an interC'st indirectly in the same appropriation;
not because th(·y have any lien, legal or equitable t!! Story, Eq.,
I 1:!53), upon the property its(' If; but on the equitable principli~
that the real estate so held shall be deemed to constitute a
part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid before i't
can be le~ally 01· honestly diverted to the pl'ivate use of the
parties. ~uppose this trust is not implied, what would be the
condition of the partiC's?" etc. ''But treating it as a trust, the
rights of all the parties will be preserYed." It is dear that in
the view thus announced the right of the creditors is something
more than an ordinary lien.
In Delmonico vs. Guillaume, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 366, where
the precise question arose which we have in the present case,
the vice-chancl•llor held that "Peter A. Dc>lmonko, as the sur·
viving partner, became t'ntitled to the Brooklyn farm, and as
between himself and the heir of John he had an absolute right
to dispose of it, for the payment of the debts of the firm, in the
same manner as if it had been personal eRtate."
In so decicl!ni:r be followed the English authorities, and cited
Fereday 1:s. lViyht1rick, 1 Rm~s. & :M. 45; Phillips vs. Phillips, 1
Myl. & K. 649; Broom vs. Brnom, 3 lb. 44~; Cookson vs. Cookson,
8 Sim. 5:.!9; Townshend vs. Dcra!fne.'I, 11 lb. 4HR, note.
In .1ndrcirs' Hr:ir.'t i:s. Rrown's Adin'r, 21 Ala. 437, tbt~
supreme> court said that, "inn~mnch as the real estate is considered as personal for the purpose of paying the debts of the
firm, and the survivitig 1iartner is ('barged with the duty '>f
paying these dt>bts, it must of necesRity follow that he has the
right in equity to dispose of the real estate for this purpos4> 7
fc ~ it would never do to chargl' him with the duty of paying
the debts nnd at the s::m~, time take from him the me:ms of
doing it. Tllerpfore, although he rannot by his deed pass the
legal title which d<'Rcend<'d to the heir of the deceased partner,
yet as the heir holds tlw tiiJn in truf:t to pay the debts and the
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equity to the purchaser, and through it he may call on the

heir for the legal title and compel him to convey it.”

In Dupuy vs. Learemcorth, 17 Cal. 262, Chief Justice FIELD,

in the name of the court, said: “In the view of equity it is

immaterial in whose name the legal title of the property

stands-—whether in the individual name of the copartner,

or in the joint names of all; it is ﬁrst subject to the payment

of the partnership debts, and is then to be distributed among

the copartners according to their respective rights. The

possessor of the legal title in such case holds the property in

trust for the purposes of the copartnership. Each partner has

an equitable interest in the property until such purposes are

accomplished. Upon dissolution of the copartnership by the

death of one of its members, the surviving partner, who is

charged with the duty of paying the debts, can dispose of this

equitable interest, and the purchaser can compel the heirs-at-

law of the deceased partner to perfect the purchase by

conveyance of the legal title.”

If the case could be held to be one which should be governed

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

by the decisions of the courts of Mississippi, because the prin-

ciple is to be regarded as a rule of property, which we neither

admit or deny, the result would still be the same.

In one of the earliest cases on that subject in the high court

of errors and appeals of that state, Markham vs. Merritt, 8

Miss. 437, 40 Am. Dec. 76, Chief Justice SHARKEY, in delivering

the opinion of the court, concurs in the general doctrine that

“when land is held by a ﬁrm, and is essential to the purposes

and objects of the partnership, then it is regarded a a part of

the joint stock, and will be regarded in equity as a chattel.” A

careful examination of the Mississippi cases cited by counsel

has disclosed nothing in contravention of this doctrine, or in

denial of the authority of the surviving partner to dispose of

such property for the payment of the debts of the partnership.

‘Ne are of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers from

, Klein acquired the equitable title of the real estate conveyed to

him by Brown, that they had a right to the aid of a court oi’

chancery to compel Shanks to convey the legal title to the undi-

l vided half of the land, vested in him by the will of Johnston.

Decree affirmed.

NO'I'E—See also Mechem’s Elem. of Pa.rtn., _S§ 105, 111.
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survivor is charged with this duty, his deed will convey the
equity to the purchaser, and through it he may call on the
heir for the legal title and compel him to convey it."
In Dupuy vs. Leai·entc01·th, 17 Cal. 2G2, Chief Justice F1Er.D,
in the name of thE! court, said: "In the view of equity it is
immaterial in whose name the legal title of the property
stands-whether in the individual name of the copartner~
or in the joint names of all; it is first subject to the payment
of the partnership debts, and is then to be distributed among
the copartners nccordin~ to their respective rights. The
possf'ssor of the legal title in such case holds the property in
trust fo.r the purposes of the copartnership. Each partner has
nn equitable intrrest in the property until such purposes are
accomplished. Upon dissolution of the copartnership by the
death of one of i1s memb('rs, the survi\'ing partner, who is
charged with the duty of paying the debts, can dispose of this
equitable interest, and the purchaser can compel the heirs-atIaw of the dt>ceased partner to perfect the purchase by
conveyance of the legal title/'
If the case could be held to be one which should be governed
by the decisions of the courts of Mississippi, because the principle is to be regarded as a rule of property, which we neither
admit or deny, the result would still be the same.
In one of the earliest cases on that subject in the high court
of errors and appf'als of that statE>, Marklta11i vs. Merritt, 8
Miss. 437, 40 .Am. Dec. 76, Chi<."f Justice SHARKEY, in delivering
the opinion of the court, concurs in the general doctrine that
"when land is held by a firm, and is es~ential to the purposes
and objects of the partnership, then it is regarded as a part of
the joint stock, and will be regarded in equity as a chattel." A
careful examination of the Mississippi cases cited by counsel
has disclosed nothing in contravention of this doctrine, or in
denial of the authority of the surviving partner to dispose of
such property for the payment of the debts of the partnership.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers from
Klein acquired the equitable title of the real estate conveved to
him by Brown, that they had a right to the aid of a court of
. <'hancery to compel ShankEI to convey the legal title to the undi\ vided half of the land, vested in him by the will of Johnston.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE-See also Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., ~§ 105, 111.
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PAIGE vs. PAIGE. '

Supreme Court of Iowa-, 1887.

71 Iowa 818, 32 N. W. Rep. 360, so Am. Rep. 799.

On February 2, 1880, Simon B. and John A. Paige, being in

partnership, under the ﬁrm name of S. B. & J. A. Paige, bought

certain mill property with partnership funds but took the title

PAIGE vs. PAIGE.

in their individual names. On February 6, 1880, they united

with R. F. Paige and E. W. Dixon to form a new ﬁrm to be

Supreme Court of Iowa., 1887.

known as Paige, Dixon & Go. The partnership articles pro-

vided that one-fourth interest in the milling property should

'71 Iowa 818, 82 N. W. Rep. 860, 60 Am. Rep. 799.

be conveyed to each of the new partners upon their paying an

agreed sum. The new ﬁrm took possession of the property,

operated and improved it. In August, 1881, R. F. Paige died

and S. B. and J. A. Paige acquired his interest in the property,

the business being continued under the former name. until the

death of S. B. Paige. At his death, the ﬁrm and all members

thereof were insolvent. The widow of S. B. Paige claimed

dower in the milling property. The heirs of S. B. Paige, his

administrator, J . A. Paige, Dixon, and Brown, a creditor, were

all made parties. The widow’s claim being denied, she and the
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administrator appealed.

Bills di’- Block, for appellant.

Dacison <(- Lane and Stewart ct? White, for appellees.

Rornnocx, J. (After stating the facts.) The parol evidence

in the case shows quite conclusively that, at the time the con-

veyance of the property was made, S. B. Paige stated that the

purchase was made by the partnership of S. B. & J. A. Paige,

and the property belonged to the partnership, and he desired

the deed to be made in the name of the partnership; but that,

under the advice of counsel, it was made in the individual

names of the members of the ﬁrm, so that, if the property

should be subsequently sold. it would not be necessary to prove

who were the proper parties to join in a conveyance.

This evidence, and all of the other parol evidence tending to

show that the property was purchased and paid for by the part-

_

On February 2, 1880, Simon B. and John A. Paige, being in
partnership, under the firm name of S. B. & J. A. Paige, bought
certain mill property with partnership funds but took the title
in their individual names. On February G, 1880, they united
with R. F. Paige nnd E. ,V. Dixon to form a new firm to be
known ns Paige, Dixon & Co. 'l'he partnership articles provided that one·fourth interest in the milling property should
be conveyed to each of the new partners upon their paying an
agreed sum. The new firm took possession of the property,
operated and improved it. In August, 1881, R. F. Paige died
and S. B. and ~T. A. Paige acquired his interest in the property,
the business being continued under the former name, until tho
death of S. B. Paige. At his death, the firm and all members
thereof Wf're iusol'Verit. The widow of S. B. Paige claimed
dower in the milling proper1y. Tbe heirs of S. B. Paige, his
administrator, J. A. Paige, Dixon, and Brown, a creditor, were
all made partiPs. The widow's claim beii:ig denied, she and the
administrator appealed.
Bills & Block, for appellant.
Dadson & Lane and Stewart & White, for nppellees.
RoTanocK, .J. (After stating the facts.) The parol evidence
in the case shows quite conclusively that, at the time the conveyance of the property was made, S. B. Paige stated that the
purchase was made by the partnership of S. B. & J. A. Paige,
and the property belonged to the partnership, and be desired
the deed to be made in the name of the partnership; but that,
under the ndvice of counsel, it was made in the individual
names of the members of the firm, so that, if the property
Rhould be 1ubsequently sold, it would not be necessary to prove
who were the prop2r parties to join in a conveyance.
This evidence, and all of the other parol evidence tending to
~how tltat the property was purchased and paid for by the part·
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ground that a written conveyance of real estate cannot be

varied by parol. It is insisted that such evidence is incom-

petent, under the statute, which provides that “conveyances to

two or more, in their own right, create a tenancy in common,

unless a contrary intent is expressed.” Code, § 1939. And

the following provisions of the code are also relied upon: Sec-

tion 1934: “Declarations or creations of trust or power, in

relation to real estate, must be executed in the same manner

as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to

trusts resulting from the operation or construction of law.”

Sections 3663 and 3664 provide that no evidence of any con-

tract for the creation or transfer of any interest in lands

(except leases for a term not exceeding one year) shall be com-

petent, “unless in writing, signed by the party to be charged.”

Appellant concedes that, if the property had been paid for

with partnership money, and one of the partners had taken the

title to the whole, there would be a resulting trust for the

beneﬁt of the ﬁrm. But it is claimed that, as each received the

legal title to just the share he was equitably entitled to, there
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can be no resulting trust. The evidence in the case shows

quite satisfactorily that payment for the property was made,

not with the money of each individual partner, but with the

undivided money of the partnership. It seems to us it is

wholly immaterial whether the conveyance was made to one or

both the partners. The law recognize the partnership as a

person distinct from the individual members of the ﬁrm, and,

this person or partnership, having paid its money for the prop-

erty, there" was a resulting trust in its favor, no matter in

whose name the title was taken.

In the notes to Coics rs. Coles. 1 Amer. Lead. Cas. (Hare & \V.)

487, it is said: “If land is bought with partnership funds,and is

brought into the business of the ﬁrm and used for its purposes,

it will be considered as partnership stock, in whose name soever

the legal title may he unless there be distinct evidence of an inten-

tion to hold it separately, such as an express agreement in the

articles of copartnership, or at the time of the purchase, or the

fact that the price is charged to the partners respectively in

their several accounts with the ﬁrm; for such arrangements

would operate as a division and distribution of so much of the

funds, and each would take his share divested of any implied

nership, is objected to by counsel for the plaintiff upon the
ground that a written conveyance of real estate cannot be
varied by parol. Jt is insisted that such evidence is incompetent, under the statute, which provides that "conveyances to
two or more, in their own right, create a tenancy in common.•
unless a contrary intent is expressed." Code, § 1939. And
the following provisions of the code are also relied upon: Section 1934: "Declarations or creations of tru~t or power, in
relation to real estate, must be executed in the same manner
as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to
trusts resulting from the operation or construction of la.w."
Sections 3663 nnd 3664 provide that no evidence of any contract for the creation or tt:msfer of any interest in lands
(except leases for n term not exceeding one year) shall be com"
pctent, "unless in writing, signed by the party to be charged."
Appellant concedes that, if the property had been paid for
with partnership money, and one of the partners had taken the
title to the whole, there would be a resulting trust for the
benefit of the firm. Uut it is claimed that, as each received the
legal title to jnst the share he was equitably entitled to, there
can be no resulting trust. The evidence in the case shows
quite satisfactorily that payment for the property was made,
not with the money of each individual partner, but with the
\ undivided money of the partnership. It seems to us it is
wholly immaterial whether the conveyance was made to one or
both the partners. The law recognizes the partnership as u
person distinct from the individual members of the firm, and,
this person or partnership, liaving paid its money for the property, there· was a resulting trust in its favor, no matter in
whose name the title was ta ken.
In the notes to Cnlcs 1:s. Coles, 1 Amer. Lead. Cas. (Ilare & ,V.)
487, it is said: "If land is bought with partnership funds, and is
brought into the business of the firm and used for its purposes,
It will be considered as partnership stock, in whose name ,<Joevcr
tlze legal title may be unless tltere be distinct evidence of an intc1it fon to Tiold it separately, such as an express agreement in the
articles of copartnership, or at the time of the purchase, or the
fa.ct that the price is charged to the partners respectively in
their several accounts with the firm; for such arrangements
would operate as a divi~ion and distribution of so much of the
funds, and each would take his share divested of any im:plicd
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trust; but the mere circumstances that the conveyance was to
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them expressly as tenants in common, would not, of itself, be

suﬂicient to rebut the trust.”

In 2 Story, Eq. § 1207, it is said: “Where real estate is pur-

rhased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account,

it is wholly immaterial, in view of a court of equity, in whose

name or names the purchase is made and the conveyance taken—-

whether in the name of one partner, or of all partners; whether

in the name of a stranger alone, or a stranger jointly with one

partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in

Whom it may, it is in equity deemed partnership property, not

subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the

ccstuis que trust -therefor.”

This court has frequently held that where land is purchased

with partnership funds, and intended to be used for partner-

ship purposes, it is to be treated as personal assets of the part-

nership. Evans es. Hawlcy, 35 Iowa 83; Hewitt vs. Rankin, 41

Iowa 35; and other cases. In such case the trust is not an

express one, but is implied or results from the operation or con-

struction of the law, and is within the exception named in sec-
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tion 1934 of the code, and such a trust may be shown by parol

evidence. York vs. Clemens, 4-1 Iowa. 95; Cotton vs. Wood, 25

Iowa 43; Fairchild rs. Fair-child, 64 N. Y. 471.

The cases of Hale vs. Henrie, 2 VVatts, 143, 27 Am. Dec. 289;

Kramer es. Arthurs, 7 Pa. St. 165, and Itidgwarg/’s Appeal, 15 Pa.

St. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586, hold that, “where partners intend

to bring real estate into the partnership, their intention must

be manifested by deed or writing placed on record, that pur-

chasers and creditors may not be deceived. This rule is doubt-

less correct, so far as the rights of innocent purchasers without

notice are involved; but this court is committed to the doctrine

above announced, that a purchase of real property with part-

nership funds, and investing the title in a person or persons

other than the partnership, creates a resulting trust in favor of

the partnership, and the facts necessary to establish the trust

may be shown by parol.

The evidence that the property involved in this case was paid

for by the ﬁrm of S. B. & J. A. Paige is clear and satisfactory.

It consists of the declaration of S. B. Paige, made when the

deed was executed, and the recitals in the articles of partner-

ship entered into within a few days after the deed was made,

tru.st; but the mere circumstances that the conveyance was to
them e:r.pressly as tenants in common, would not, of itself, be
sufficient to rebut the trust."
In 2 Story, Eq. § 1~07, it is said: "Where real estate is pur':hased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account,
· It is wholly immaterial, in view of a court of equity, in who.~c
name or names tTte purchase is made and the com:eyance takenwhether in the name of one partner, or of all partners; whethn
in the name of a stranger alone, or a stranger jointly with ODf'
partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in
whom it may, it is in E>quity deemed partnership property, not
subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the
cestuis que trust therefor."
This court has frequently held that where land is purchased
with partnership funds, and intended to be used for partnership purposes, it is to be treated as personal assets of the partnership. Bvans 1;s. Hawley, 35 Iowa 83; Hewitt vs. Rankin, 41
Iowa 35; and other cases. In such case the trust is not an
express one, but is implied or results from the operation or construction of the law, and is within the exception named in section l!l3! of the code, and such a trust may be shown by parol
evidence. York vs. Clemens, 41 Iowa 95; Cotton vs. Wood, 25
Iowa 43; Fairchild n. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471.
The cases of llale vs. Henrie, 2 'Vatts, 143, 27 Am. Dec. 289;
ilramer 1.1s. Arthurs, 7 Pa. St. 165, and Ridgwffy's Appeal, 15 Pa.
St. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586, hold that, "where partners intend
to bring l'(~al estnt~ into the partnership, their intention must
be manifested by deed or writing placed on ree-0rd, that purchasers and creditors may not be deceived. This rule is doubtless corred, so far as the rights of innocent purchasers without
notice are in>olved.; but this court is committed to the doctrine
obove announced, that a purrhase of rc.>al property with partnership funds, and investing the title in a person or persons
other than the partnership, creates a resulting trust in favor of
the partnership, and the facts necessary to establish the trust
may be shown by parol.
The evid<>nce that the property involved in this case was paid
for by the firm of S. H. & .J. A. Paige is clear and satisfactory.
It consists of the declarn t ion of S. B. Paige, made when the
deed was executed, and the rPcitals in the articles of partnership entered into within a few days after the deed was made,
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and the subsequent acts of both of the grantees in the deed in

173

the management and use made of the property.

2. The defendant Brown is a creditor of the ﬁrm of Paige,

Dixon & Co., and attached the property in controversy in an

action upon his claim. His counsel submitted an argument in

the cause, the drift of which seems to be a claim. that he, as a

creditor of that ﬁrm, is entitled to a preference over the cred-

itors of the ﬁrm of S. B. & J . A. Paige in the property in contro-

versy. It would be improper to determine that question in

this appeal.

3. The administrator of S. B. Paige appealed, and claims

that the debts against the estate were contracted while the

title to the property was in decedent, and on the faith and

credit of the same. He insists that the equities of these indi-

vidual creditors should not be ignored for the beneﬁt of the

ﬁrm creditors. But, as the property in controversy is assets

of the partnership, it is ﬁrst liable to the payment of the part-

nership debts, and a creditor of one of the ﬁrm has no claim

thereon until such debts are paid. Evans vs. H awley, 35

Iowa 83.
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_ We unite in the conclusion that, as it is conceded that both

of the partnerships and all of the surviving members thereof

are insolvent, the plaintiff is not entitled to a dower interest

in the property in dispute. Aﬂirmed.

Nora.-See also Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 105, I09.

and the subsequent acts of both of the grantees in the deed in
the management and use made of the property.
2. The defendant Brown is a creditor of the firm of Paige,
Dixon & Co., and attached the property in controversy in an
action upon his claim. His counsel submitted an argument in
the cause, the drift of which seems to be a claim. that he, as a
creditor of that firm, is entitled to a preference over the creditors of the firm of S. B. & J. A. Paige in the property in controversy. It would be improper to determine that question in
this appeal.
3. The administrator of S. B. Paige appealed, and claims
that the debts against the estate were contracted while the
title to the property was in decedent, and on the faith and
credit of the same. He insists that the equities of these individual creditors should not be ignored for the benefit of the
firm creditors. But, as the property in controversy is assets
of the partnership, it is first liable to the payment of the partnership debts, and a creditor of one of the firm has no clainJ
thereon until such debts are paid. Evans vs. Hawley, 3!i
Iowa 83.
We unite in the conclusion that, as it is conceded that both
of the partnerships and all of the surviving members thereof
are insolvent, the plaintiff is not entitled to a dower interest
in the property in dispute. Affirmed.

I

Nom-Bee also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ~§ 105, 109.
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VI.

THE FIRM NAME AND GOOD WILL.

“'ILLlAl\IS vs. FARRAND._

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1891.

SS Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.

Bill by VVm. C. Williams, Alanson Sheley, and Alanson

Sheley Brooks, against Jacob S. Farrand, Richard P. Williams.

Harvey S. Clark, and Jacob S. Farrand, Jr., to restrain defend-

VI.

ants from using any combination of the names Farrand and

\Villiams, as a part of the ﬁrm name of defendants, and from-

in any way interfering with the complainants’ use and enjoy-

TIIE FIRM NAME AND GOOD WILL.

ment of the business formerly belonging to “Farrand, Williams

& Co.,” of which ﬁrm complainants claim to be the successors.

The facts appear in the opinion.

The court below dismissed the bill, and complainants appeal.

William H. Wells (Bowen, Douglas 4? Whiting and Ashley

Pond, of counsel), for appellants.

WILLIAMS vs. FARRAND.

Moore £5 Canﬁcld (H cnry H. Swan and F. H. Ca-nﬁeld, of coun-

sol), for appellees.

McGnA'rn, J. Complainants and defendants had been for

Supreme Courl of Michigan, 1891.
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some years engaged as wholesale druggists on Larned street

east, in the city of Detroit, as copartners, under the name and

88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.

style of Farrand, Williams 8: Co. There were no articles of

copartnership, and no term ﬁxed for which the partnership

was to continue. Prior to the taking of the annual inventory

in January, 1890, defendant, Jacob S. Farrand, expressed to

com-plainant Sheley a desire to dissolve the copartncrship. Mr.

Sheley declined to say anything until the annual inventory

nm

by Wm. C. Williams, Alanson Sheley, and Alanson
Sheley Brooks, against Jacob S. Farrand, Richard P. WilJiams.
Harvey S. Clark, and Jarob S. Farrand, Jr., to restrain defendants from using any combination of tlle names Farrand and
\ViJliams, as a. part of the firm name of defendants, and from
in any way interfering with the complainants' use and enjoyment of the business formerly belonging to "Farrand, 'VilliamR
& Co.," of which firm complainants claim to be the successors.
The facts appear in the opinion.
1.'he court below dismissed the bill, and complainants appeal.
William H. Wells (Bou;en, Douglas & Whiting and Aslzky
Pond, of counsel), for appellants.
Moore & Canfield (Hcni·y H. Swan and F. H. Ca.nficld, of coun-

sel); for appellees.
1\lcGRATII, J. Complainants and defendants had been for
F.ome years engaged as wholesale druggists on Lamed street
east, in the city of Detroit, as copartncrs, under the name and
style of Farrand, Williams & Co. There were no articles of
copartnership, and no term fixed for which the partnership
was to continue. Prior to the taking of the annual inventory
in January, 1890, defendant, Jacob S. Farrand, expressed to
complainant Sheley a desire to dissolve the copartnership. Mr.
Sheley declined to say anything uBtil the annual inventory

WILLIAMS vs. Fannxnn. 175

should be taken, and the business of the year settled up. On

the 25th of January, 1890, after the completion of the inven-

tory, defendants made a proposition in writing to “pay Messrs.

Sheley & Brooks, for their interest in the ﬁrm of Farrand, Wil-

liams & Co., the amount of their interest being ﬁfty thou-

sand dollars ($50,000), the sum- of sixty thousand dollars

($60,000), or they will take for their interest, the amount being

one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the sum of one hun-

dred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), the same to be

paid in cash, or in notes acceptable to the parties who sell, one

week from today, Saturday, the ﬁrst day of February next.

The store to be leased to the party purchasing for a term of

ﬁve years, at a rent of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) a year,

and the warehouse to be rented to the party purchasing, at a

net rental of 6 per cent a year on the cost of their interest

therein.” On the following Monday Mr. Sheley accepted

defendants’ offer to sell, and on the ﬁrst day of February fol-

lowing a bill of sale was prepared, reciting, among other

things, that defendants, in consideration of the sum of $120,-

000, paid to them by Alanson Sheley, party of the second part,
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“have bargained and sold unto the said party of the second

part all our right, title, and interest to the within-mentioned

resources of said ﬁrm, including the good will attendant upon

the business.” This bill of sale was not executed, objection

being made to the clause, “including the good will attendant

upon the business;” and a new instrum-ent was prepared,

reciting that defendants, parties of the ﬁrst part, “for and in

consideration of the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand

dollars, to them paid by Alanson Sheley, of the second part,

have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant and

convey, unto the said party of the second part, his executors,

administrators, or assigns, all our right, title, and interest in

the ﬁrm of Farrand, Williams & Company.” This instrument

was executed, the insurance policies were assigned by Far-

rand, “’illiams & Co. to \Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, and an

agreement to assume and pay all the debts of the old ﬁrm was

executed by Williams, Sheley & Brooks, and delivered to

defendants. Defendants afterwards formed a copartnership

under the ﬁrm name of Farrand, Williams & Clark, and opened

a wholesale drug establishment at No. 32 \Voodward avenue.

Complainants adopted the name and style of W'illiams, Sheley

'7
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,.

should be taken, and the business of the year settled op. On ·
the 25th of Janu.ary, 1890, after the completion of the inventory, defendants made a proposition in writing to "pay Messrs.
Sheley & Brooks, for their interest in the firm of Farrand, \Villiams & Co., the amount of their interest being fifty thousnnd dollars ($50,000), the sum of sixty thousand dollars
(f60,000), or they will take for their interest, the amount being
one hundred thousand dollars ('100,000), the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), the same to be
paid in cash, or in notes acceptable to the parties who sell, one
week from today, Saturday, the first day of Febi-uary next.
The store to be leased to the party purchasing for a term of
five years, at a rent of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) a year,
and the warehouse to be rented to the party purchasing, at a
net rental <>f 6 per cent a year on the cost of their interest
therein." On the foJlowing Monday Mr. Sheley accepted
defendants' offer to sell, and on the first day of February following a bill of sale was prepared, reciting, among other
things, that defendants, in consideration of the sum of $120,000, paid to them by Alanson Sheley, party of the second part,
"have bargained and sold unto the said party of the second
part all our right, title, and interest to the within-m:.>ntioned
resources of said firm, including the good will attendant upon
the business." This bill of sale was not executed, objection
being made to the clause, "including the good will attendant
upon the business;" and a new instrument was prepared,
reciting that defendants, parties of the first part, "for and in
consideration of the sum of one hundred and twenty thopsand
dolJars, to them paid by Alanson Sheley, of the second part,
have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant and
convey, unto the said party of the second part, his executors,
administrators, or assig-ns, all our right, title, and interest in
the firm of Farrand, Williams & Company." This instrument
wa3 executed, the insurance policies were assigned by Farrand, ·w miams & Co. to 'Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, and an
agreement to assume and pay all the debts of the old firm wa~
executed by ·wmiams, Sheley & Brooks, and delivered to
defendants. Defendants afterwards formed a copartnership
under the firm name of Fari-and, 'Villiams & Clark, and opened
a wholesale drug establishment at No. 32 Woodward avenue.
Complainants adopted the name and style of Williams, Sheley
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& Brooks, posted their ﬁrm name, as successor to Farrand,

\Villiams & Co., over their place of business; had the words

“\Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, Successors to” printed in red ink

over the words “Farrand, Williams & Co.” wherever the latter

appeared upon letter heads, bill heads, labels, and on other

stationery; advertised themselves in the newspapers and trade

journals as Williams, Sheley & Brooks, successors to Farrand,

\Villiams & Co.; and sent out circulars to the trade containing

not only their ﬁrm name, but the names of the individual mem-

bers of the new ﬁrm. Defendants also extensively advertised

the new enterprise through the same mediums, calling special

attention to the names of the members of the new ﬁrm, their

long connection with the drug business, and the dissolution of

the old ﬁrm, and soliciting trade.

The complainants contend that the asignment by defend-

ants of all interest in the business carried with it the good

will of the business, and, having purchased the good will of

that business, they are entitled to the exclusive use of the old

ﬁrm name; that, while defendants have the right to engage in

the same line of business, they have not the right to such a
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collocation of their own names as will produce confusion,

attract customers, and secure orders, letters, and goods

intended for the old ﬁrm; that defendants have no right to

simulate their labels, to solicit their customers, or entice away

their employés. “Good will” has been deﬁned by this court

to be “the favor which the management of a business has won

from the public, and the probability that old customers will

continue their patronage.” Chittcndcn vs. Whitbcck, 50 Mich.

401, 15 N. \V. Rep. 526. Lord ELDON, in Cruttwcll rs. Lye, 17

Vcs. 335, deﬁned it as simply the probability that old custom-

1-rs will resort to the old place.

The following propositions must be regarded as established

by the clear weight of authority:

1. Though a retiring partner may have assigned his interest

in the partnership business, including the good will thereof,

to his copartner, he may, in the absence of an express agree-

ment to the contrary, engage in the same line of business in

the same locality, and in his own name.

2. He may, by newspaper advertisements, cards, and gen-

eral circulars, invite the general public to trade with him, and

through the same mediums advertise his long connection with

the old business, and his retirement therefrom.

& Drooks, posted their firm name, as successor to Farrand,
Williams & Co., over their place of business; had the words
"'Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, Successors to" printed in red ink
over the words ''Farrand, \Villiams & Co." wherever the latter
appeared upon letter heads, bill heads, labels, and on other
tttationery; advertised themselves in the newspapers and trade ·
journals as \Villiams, ShelPy & Brooks, successors to Farrand,
\Vil Iiams & Co.; and sent out circulars to the trade containing
not only their firm name, but the names of the individual members of the new firm. Defendants also extensively advertised
the new enterprise through the same mediums, calling special
attention to the names of the ml'mbers of the new firm, their
long connection with the drug business, and the dissolution of
the old firm, and soliciting trade.
'l'he complainants contend that the assignment by defend·
ants of nil interest in the business carried with it the good
will of the business, and, having purchased the good will of
that business, they are entitled to the exclush•e use of the old
firm name; that, while defpndants have the right to engage in
the same line of business, they have not the right to such a
<'ollocation of their own names as will produce confusion,
nttract customers, and secure orders, letters, and goods
intended for the old firm; that defendants have no right to
simulate their labpls, to solicit their customers, or entice away
thPir emplo.n~s. "Good will" has been defined by this court
to be "the favor which the management of a business bas won
from the public, and the probability that old customers will
<·ontinue their patronage." Chittenden vs. Whitbeck, 50 Mich.
401, 15 N. \V. Rep. 526. Lord ELDON, in Cruttlccll -r:s. Lye, 17
Ves. 335, defined it as simply the probability that old customNS will resort to the old place.
The following propositions must be regarded as established
hy the clear weight of authority:
1. Though a retiring partner may have assigned his interest
in the partnership business, including the good will therwf,
to bis copartner, he may, in the nbsenct~ of an express ntreenwnt to the contrary, engage in the same line of business in
the same locality, and in his own name.
2. He may, by newspaper advertisements, cards, and gen·
cral circulars, invite the gen2ral 1rnblic to trade with him, and
1hrough the same mc>diums advertise his long connection with
the old business, and his retirement therefrom.

\\'ILL1Ans vs. Fannuvo. 1‘? 7
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3. He will not be allowed, however, to use his own name,

or to advertise his business, in such a way as to lead the pub-

lic to suppose that he is continuing the old business; hence,

will not be allowed to advertise himself as its successor.

4. The purchaser will not, in the absence of an express agree-

ment, be allowed to continue the business in the name of the

old ﬁrm.

5. That no man has a right to sell or advertise his own busi-

nes or goods.as those of another, and so mislead the public,

and injure such other person.

In .lI_1/ers vs. Buggy 00., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and

‘Z0 N. W. Rep. 545, A, B and C had been carrying on business

as copartners at Kalamazoo, under the name and style of “The

Kalamazoo YVagon Company.” A, B and C sold to complain-

ant “all their interest in the property, money, assets, and good

will,” etc., in and to their business. After such sale complain-

ant’s assignors formed a corporation under the name of “The

Kalamazoo Buggy Com-pany;” pitched their plant in the same

locality; commenced the manufacture of the same class of

goods; issued circulars to the trade, with descriptive cuts of
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the same character and appearance as those contained in com-

plainant’s circulars, and advertised their place of business as

being in the same locality. In that case the name of “The

Kalamazoo \Vagon Company” was an assumed name. The

only distinctive feature in the name adopted by defendants was

the use of a word of similar meaning to that for which it had

been substituted. The defendants were not using their own

names. It was a pure case of piracy, and the facts clearly

indicated an intention to deceive the public. As was said in

Burgess es. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896: “Where a person

is selling goods under a particular name, and another person,

not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that

he so uses it to represent the goods sold by him as the goods

of the person whose name he uses; but where the defendant

sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plain-

tiff has the same name, it does not follow that defendant is sell-

ing his goods as the goods of the plaintiff.” In Lee vs. Haley,

L. R. 5 Ch. App. 155, plaintiff had been doing business at No.

22 Pall Mall, under the artiﬁcial name of “Guinea Coal Com-

pany.” Defendant, who had been their manager, set up a.

rival business under the name of “Pall Mall Guinea Coal Com-

8
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3. He will not be allowed, however, to use his o'Yn name,
Qr to advertise his business, in such a way as to lead the public to suppose that be is continuing the old businefls; hence,
will not be allowed to advertise himself as its successor.
4. The purchaser will not, in the absence of an express agreement, be allowed to continue the business in the name of the
old firm.
5. That no man bas a right to sell or advertise his own business or goods.as those of another, and so mislead the public,
and injure such other iw.rson.
In Myers vs. Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. \V. Uep. 961, and
!!o N. \V. Rep. 54u, A, Band Chad been carrying on business
ns copartners at Kalamazoo, under the name and style of "The
Kalamazoo "'agon Company." A, B and C sold to complainant "all their int<>rest in the property, money, assets, and good
will," etc., in and to their business. After such sale complainant's assignors formed a corporation under the name of "The
Kalamazoo Buggy Company;" pitched their plant in the same
locality; commPnet>d the manufacture of the same class of
goods; issued circulars to the trade, with descriptive cuts of
the same character and nppearance as those contained in complainant's cireulars, and advertised their place of business as
being in the samP lotality. In that case the name of "The
Kalamazoo "'agon Company" was an assnmPd name. The
only distinctive frntnre in the name adopted by defendants wa~
the usP of a word of i;iirnilar meaning to that for wltieh it had
been suh~tituted. The def(•ndants WPI'(' not u1:1ing their own
nanws. It was a pure case of piracy, and the facts clearly
indicated an intention to cle'<'eive the pnhlic. As was said in
Burgess vs. Burgrs.~. :l D:> O<>x, M. & G. 8!)6: "\Vhere a person
is selling goods under a particular name, and another person,
not having that namP, is using it, it mny be presumed that
be so m~es it to l'PJH'PRC>nt the goods l'lold by him as the goods
of the p?rson whose name he uses; but wh<•re the defendant
sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plain·
tiff has the same name, it doc>s not follow that defendant is selling bis goods as the goods of the plaintiff." In /,,ee vs. Haley,
L. R. 5 Cb. App. 155, plaintiff had been doing businpss at No.
22 Pall Mall, und<>r the artifieinl name of "Guinea Coal Company." Defendant, who had been their manager, set up a
rival bmiliness under the name of "Pall Mall Guinea Coal Com-
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pany,” at 46 Pall Mall. His envelopes and business cards were
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printed in such a way as to resemble the plaintiﬂf’. In Glenny

vs. Smith, 2 Drew & S. 476, defendant had been in plaintiff's

employ, and started in business on his own account. Over his

shop he had his own name, Frank P. Smith, printed in large,

black letters on a white ground, but on the brass plates in the

windows of his shop he had engraved the word “from,” in

small letters, and the words “Thrasher & Glenny” (the name

of plaintiff’s ﬁrm) in large letters. He had an awning, also,

in front of his shop, which, when let down, would cover his

own name, and expose only the name of plaintiﬁ’s ﬁrm. The

court held that defendant was deceiving the public, and an

injunction was issued. Croft vs. Day, 7 Bcav. 84; Levy vs.

Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 438; Turton vs. Turton, 42 Ch. Div. 128;

Hookham vs. Pottage, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91; Mcneely vs. Mcncely,

62 N. Y. 431; Fullwood vs. Fullwood, 9 Ch. Div. 176.

6. That when an express contract has been made to remain

out of business, or for the use by a purchaser of _a ﬁctitious

name, or a trade name, or a trade mark, the courts will enjoin

the continued violation of suchpagreement. In G-row vs. Selig-
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man, 47 Mich. 607, 11 N. W. Rep. 404, defendant had carried

on the clothing business at Bay City, under the name and style

of “Little Jake,” and sold out to complainant, and expressly

conveyed the right to use the name and style of “Little Jake,”

and agreed that he would not again engage in that business

at Bay City, and defendant was enjoined from violating his

agreement. In Shackle vs. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, defendant agreed

that he would not, for the space of 10 years, carry on or per-

mit any other person to carry on the same business in Middle-

sex, London; or \Vestminster, and that he would use his best

endeavors to assist plaintiﬂ’, and procure customers for him.

In Hitchcock vs. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, Coker had agreed to

enter the services of the plaintiﬁ’, and that he would not at

any time thereafter engage in the business in which his

employer was engaged. To the same effect are Bcal vs. Chase,

31 Mich. 490; Doty vs. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Burckhardt 1:3,

Burckhardt, 36 Ohio St. 261; Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div.

752; Tode vs. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N’. E. Rep. 469.

7. That an assignment of all the stock, property, and eﬂ’eets

of a business, or the exclusive right to manufacture a given

article, carries with it the exclusive right to use a ﬁctitious

1

m A. _______»_,

pany," at 46 Pall Mall. His envelopes and business cards were
printed in such a way as to resemble the plaintiff's. In Glenny
vs. Smith, 2 Drew & S. 476, defondant had been in plaintiff's
employ, and started in business on his own account. Over his
shop he had his own name, F1·ank P. Smith, printed in large,
black letters on a white ground, but on the brass plates in the
windows of bis shop he had engraved the word "from," in
small letters, and the words "Thrasher & Glenny" (the name
of plaintiff's firm) in large letters. He bad an awning, also,
in front of bis shop, which, when let down, would cover his
own name, and expose only the name of plaintiff's firm. The
•
court held that defendant was deceiving the public, and an
injunction was issued. Croft vs. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Levy vs.
Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 438; Tu1"ton vs. 7'urton, 42 Ch. Div. 128;
Hookltam vs. Pottage, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91; Mcneely vs. Mcneely,
62 N. Y. 431; Fttllwood vs. Fulltcood, 9 Ch. Div. 176.
6. That when an express contract has been made to remain
out of business, or for the use by a purchaser of .a fictitious
name, or a trade name, or a trade mark, the courts will enjoin
the continued violation of such. agreement. In Grow vs. Selig·
man, 47 Mich. 607, 11 N. W. Rep. 404, defendant had carried
on the clothing business at Bay City, und2r the name and style
of "Little Jake," and sold out to complainant, and expressly
conveyed the right to use the name and style of "Little Jake,"
and agreed that he would not again engage in that business
at Bay City, and defendant was enjoined from violating his
agreement. In Shackle vs. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, defendant agreed
that he would not, for the space of 10 years, carry on or permit any other person to carry on the same business in l\!iddlesex, London; or "~estminster, and that he would use his best
endeavors to assist plaintiff, and procure customers for him.
In Hitcltcock i·s. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, Coker had agreed to
enter the services of the plaintiff, and that he would not at
eny time thereafter engage in the business in which his
employer was engaged. To the same effect are Beal vs. Cllasc,
81 Mich. 490; Doty vs..Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Burcklia.rdt n.
Burckhardt, 36 Ohio St. 261; "Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div.
752; Tode vs. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N. E. Rep. 4C9.
7. That an assignment of all the stock, property, and effects
of a business, or the exclush·e right to manufacture a giYeu
article, carries with it the e.Kclusive right to use a fictitious
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name in which such business has been carried on, and such

trade marks and trade names as have been in use in such
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business. These incidents attach to the business or right of

manufacture, and pass with it. Courts have uniformly held

that a trade mark has no separate existence; that there is

no property in words, as detached from the thing to which

they are applied; and that a conveyance of the thing to which

it is attached carries with it the name. Diwon Co. rs. Guggen-

heim, 2 Brewst. 321; Lockwood vs. Bostwiek, 2 Daly 521; Dor-

ingcr rs. Plate, 29 Cal. 292. In Gage vs. Publishing Co., 11 Ont.

App. 402, Gage and Beatty were copartners, and, among other

things, were engaged in publishing “Beatty’s Headline Copy

Books.” Beatty sold out to Gage all his interest in the busi-

ness, and engaged in the drug business. Gage continued for

some years the sale of the copy books, when Beatty licensed

defendant to publish “Beatty’s New and Improved Headline

Copy Books.” In Howie rs. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592, 10 N. E.

Rep. 713, Hoxie and Chaney were copartners, engaged in the

manufacture of soaps, two brands of which were known a

“Hoxie’s Mineral Soap” and “Hoxie’s Pumice Soap.” These
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were simply trade names, by whichlthe articles were known,

and the right to use them passed with the right to manufacture

the articles. In Cement Co. vs. Le Page, 147 Mass. 206, 17 N.

E. Rep. 304, Brooks and Le Page, as copartners, sold to plain-

tiﬂf the good will of their business, and the right to use their

trade marks. They were engaged in the manufacture of glues.

Their light glues they named “Le Page’s Liquid Glues.” The

court held that the right to use the name by which the articles

were known to the trade passed with the right to manufacture

the articles. In Merry rs. H oopes, 111 N. Y. 415, 18 N. E. Rep.

714, the parties were formerly partners. Hoopes sold to Merry,

but afterwards undertook to use, certain trade marks, viz., the

“Lion Brand and “Phoenix Brand,” but the court held that

these trade marks passed to the assignee. In Hall rs. Barrows,

4 De Gex, J. & S. 150, the ﬁrm had marked the chief part of

their output of iron with the initial letters of their partner-

ship name, “B., B. & H.,” surmounted by a crown, and the

court held the letters and crown had become a trade mark,

and, as such, should be included as a subject of value. Brown

Trade Marks, 358; Millingfon rs. Farr, 3 Mylne & C. 338-352;

Myers vs. Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and 20

name in which such Qusiness has been carried on, and such
trade marks and trade names as have been in use in such
business. These incidents attach t<> the business or right of
manufacture, and pass with it. Courts have uniformly. held
that a trade mark bas nQ separate existence; that thPre is
no property in words, as detached from the thing to which
they are applied; and that a conveyance of the thing to which
it is attached carries with it the name. Di.J:on Co. i·s. Guygcnlicim, 2 Brewst. 321; Locku;ood 1:s. Boshcick, 2 Daly 521; Dcrlnger vs. l'latc, 29 CaJ. 2!.>2. In Gage vs. fublislting Co., 11 Ont.
'App. 402, Gage and Beatty were copartners~ and, among other
things, were engaged in publishing "Beatty's Headline Copy
nooks." Beatty sold out to Gage all his interest in the business, and engaged in the drug business. Gage continued for
som~ years the sale of the copy books, when Beatty licensed
defendant to publish "Beatty's New and Improved Headline
Copy Books." In Hoxie t·s. Chancy, 143 M.ass. 592, 10 N. E.
Rep. 713, Hoxie and Chaney were copartners, engaged in the
manufacture of soaps, two brands of which were known as
"Roxie's Mineral Soap" and "Roxie's Pumice Soap." These
were simply trade names, by which ,the articles were known,
and the right to use them passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Ccnicnt Co. vs. Le Page, 147 Mass. 206, 17 N.
E. Rep. 304, Brooks and Le Page, as copartners, sold to plaintiff the good will of their business, and the right to use ·their
trade marks. They were engaged in the manufacture of glues.
Their light glues they named "Le Page's Liquid Glues." The
court held that the right to use the name by which the articles
were known to the trade passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Me1·ry vs. Hoopes, 111 N. Y. 415, 18 N. E. Rep.
714, the parties wr.re formerly partners. Hoopes sold to Merry,
but afterwards underto-ok to use, certain trade marks, viz., the
"Lion Brand and "Pba>nix Brand," but the court held tha.t these trade marks passed to the assignee. In Hall i·s. Barroics,
4 De Gex, J. & S. 150, the firm had marked the chief part of
their output of iron with tlie initial letters of their partnership name, "B., B. & H.," surmounted by a crown, and the
court held the letters and crown had become a trnde mark,
and, as such, should be included as a subject of value. Broron
Trade Marks, 358; Millington t"S. Fo:r, 3 Mylne & C. 338-352;
J(yers vs. B-uggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and 20
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N. W. Rep. 545; Sohicr vs. Johnson, 111 Mass. 242; Sh ipwright
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vs. Clements, 19 Wkly Rep. 599 ; Rogers vs. Ta-intor, 97 Mass. 291.

8. A corporate name is regarded as in the nature of a trade

mark. even though composed of individual names, and its simu-

lation may be restrained. After adoption it follows the cor-

poration. Statutes providing for the organization of corpora-

tions usually prohibit the adoption of the same name by two

companies. Holmes vs. .-‘Manufacturing Co., 37 Conn. 278.

These propositions are sustained by a long line of authorities,

but in none of the cases cited does the question hinge upon a

grant of good will. Complainants insist, however, that a grant

of good will may be implied, and, when express or implied, it

imposes certain restraints upon the vendors, viz.: (1) That

they cannot afterwards personally solicit customers of the old

ﬁrm, and (2) that they are restricted in the use that may be

made of their own names.

I. The doctrine that a retiring partner who has conveyed his

interest in an established business, whether the good will be

‘included or not, cannot personally solicit the customers of the

;old ﬁrm, has no support in principle. A retiring partner con-
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lveys, in addition to his interest in the tangible effects, simply

,the advantages that an established business possesses over a.

new enterprise. The old business is an assured success, the

‘new an experiment. The old business is a going business, and

produces its accustomed proﬁts on the day after the transfer.

It is capital already invested and earning proﬁts. The continu-

ing partner gets these advantages. The new business must be

‘built up. The capital taken out of the old concern will earn

nothing for months, and in all probability the ﬁrst year’s busi-

ness will show loss instead of proﬁt. For a time at least it is

capital awaiting investment, or invested but earning noth-

ing. The retiring partner takes these chances or disad-

vantages. He does not agree that the beneﬁt derived from his

connection with that business shall continue. He does not

agree that the old business shall continue to have the beneﬁt

of his name, reputation, or service; nor does he guaranty the

continuance of that patronage which may have been attracted

by his name or reputation. He does not pledge a continuance

of conditions. He takes out of the business an element that

has contributed to the success of that business. He sells only

those advantages and incidents which attach to the property

N. W. Rep. 545; Sohicr vs. Johnson, 111 Mass. 242; Shipwrighl
vs. Clements, 19 'Vkly Rep. 5!)!); Rogers vs. Ta.intor, 97 Mass. 291.
8. A corporate name is regarded as in the nature of a trade
mark~ even though composed of individual names, and its simu·
lntion may be restrained. After adoption it follows the corporation. Statutes providing for the organization of corporations usually prohibit the adoption of the same name by two
companies. Holmes vs. Manufacturing Oo., 37 Conn. 278.
These propositions are sustained by a long line of authorities,
but in nont~ of the cases cited does the question hinge upon a
grant of good will. Complainants insist, however, that a grant
of good will may be implied, and, when express or implied, it
imposes certain restraints upon the vendors, viz.: (1) That
they cannot afterwards personally solicit customers of the old
firm, and (2) that they are restricted in the use that may be
made of their own names.
I. The doctrine that n rt>tiring partner who has conveyed his
interest in an established bnsinei,is, whether the good will be
included or not, cannot personally solicit the customers of the
;old firm, has no support in principle. A retiring partner conj veys, in addition to his interPst in the tangible effects, simply
the advantages that an established business possesses over n
1
new enterprise. 'l'he old bmdness is an assured success, the
:new an experiment. The old business is a going business, and
'produces its nccustomed profits on the day after the transfer.
It is capital already in•ested and earning profits. 'fhe continuing partner ~ets these advantages. The new business must be
·built up. 'l'he capital taken out of the old concern will earn
nothing for months, and in all probability the first year's business will show loss instead of profit. For a time at least it is
capital awaiting investment, or invested but earning nothing. The retiring partner takes these chances or disad. vantages. He does not agree that the bt>nefit derived from bis
connection with that business shall continue. He does not
agree that the old business shall continue to have the benefit
of his name, 1·pputation, or service; nor does he guaranty the
contimrnn<'<' of that patronage which may have been attracted
by his name or reputation. Tfo do<'s not pledge a continuance
of conditions. Ile takes out of the business an element that
has contributed to the success of that business. He sells only
those advantages and incidents which attach to the property
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and location, rather than those which attach to the person of

the vendor. T. Pars. Partn. 409. He sells only so much of the

custom as will continue in spite of his retirement and activity.

He sells probabilities, not assurances. It is urged that by the

solicitation of the customers of the old ﬁrm he is endeavoring

to impair the value of that which he has sold, but every act of

his in the direction of the establishment of the new business

tends to divert the customers of the old ﬁrm. The right to

enter into the same line of business in the same locality—next

door, if you please—to advertise his former connection with

the old business, and to solicit generally the patronage of the.

public, is conceded by the clear weight of authority. The exer-

cise of these rights necessarily involves the diversion of cus-

tom to the new ﬁrm. Does not the right to again engage in the

same line of business include all of the incidents of that right?

Upon what principle is the line arbitrarily drawn at the per-

sonal solicitation of the customers of the old ﬁrm? - The right

to engage in business in his own name attaches to the retiring

partner, and, unless expressly so agreed, there is no restraint

upon that right. ln the present case, Jacob S. Farrand had
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been at the head of the old house for half a century. IIis

name could not be subsequently used in the same line of busi-

ness without attracting the attention of the entire trade, nor

without affecting the probabilities of a. continuance of the

patronage of the old house. He gave no hint that he did not

intend to again engage in business. All of the circumstances

pointed in the direction of a new business. The retirement

was not of Jacob S. Farrand alone, but of his son-in-law and

Mr. Clark also. The proposition made to complainants was

not only to sell but to buy. In Ginesi vs. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div.

596, the court went so far as to insist that a retiring partner

had no right to deal with the customers of the old ﬁrm; but

that rule would operate as a restriction upon the public, and

the case is without support in that respect. In Lalmucherc vs.

Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, the court say that a. retiring partner

who sells the good-will of a business is entitled to engage in a

similar business, may publish any advertisement he pleases in

the papers, stating that he is carrying on such a business; he

may publish circulars to all the world, and say that he is carry-

ing on such a business; but he is not entitled, by private letter,

or by visit by himself or agent, to solicit the customers of the

and location, rather than those which attach to the person of
the vendor. T. Pars. Partn. 409. He sells only so much of the
custom as will continue in spite of his retirement and activity.
He sells probabilities, not aisimranees. It is urged that by the
solicitation of the customers of the old firm he is endeavoring
to impair the vnlue of that whieh he has sold, but C\"ery act ()f
bis in the dirl'Clion of the establi~hnwnt of the new business
tends to diYert the customers of the old firm. The right to
enter into the same line of bui-:inPS8 in the same locality-next
door, if you please-to adve1·tise his former connection with
the old lrnsinC'ss, and to goJicit generally the patronage of the
public, is conceded by the clt•ar weight of authority. The exel'·
cise of these rights Iiecessal'ily involves the diversion of enstom to the new firm. Does not the right to again engage in the
)
1.mrne line of bn8iJH·~s include all of tlw inddents of that right?
Upon what principle is the line arbitrarily drawn at the per·
sonal solidtation of the customers of the old firm? . The right
to engage in but;iness in his own name attaclll's to the retiring
partner, and, unless expr<'"sl.v so agreed, there is no restraint
upon that right. Jn the present case, Jacob S. Farrand h:Hl
been at the head of the old house for half a C<'ntury. His
name could not be snbsequt·ntl~· used in the same line of business without attracting the attention of tile entire trade, nor
without affecting the probabilities of a continuance of the
patronnge of the old house. He gave no hint that lw did not
intend to again ''ngage in businl'ss. A II of the circurnstanct~~
pointed in the dirt•etion of a new business. The retirement
was not of Jacob R Fai·rand nlone, but of bis son-in-law and
Mr. Clark also. The proposition made to complainants was
not only to sell hut to buy. In Ginesi tw. Cooper, 14 Ch. DiL
596, the court went so fat• as to insist that a retiring partner
had no right to deal with the custonwrs of the old firm; but
that rule would op<>rate as a rl'stridion upon the public, and
the case is without support in that respect. In Labouclierc !:.~.
Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 822, the court say that a retiring partner
who sells the good-will of a business is entitled to engage in a
similar business, may publish any advertisement he pleases in
the papers, stating that he is carrying on such a business; he
may publish circulars to all the world, and say that he is carr,f·
Ing on such a business; but he is not entitled, by private lettt~r,
or by visit by himself or agent, to solicit the custouwrs or the
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old ﬁrm. But in Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. Div. 145, Labou-

rlwrc cs. Dawson is expressly overruled. The court say: “The

case of the plaintiff is founded on contract, and the question is,

what are his rights under the contract? There is no express

covenant not to solicit the customers of the old business, but

it is said that such a covenant is to be implied. I have a great

objection to straining words so as to make them imply a con-

tract as to a point upon which the parties have said nothing,

particularly when it is a point which was in their contempla-

tion. It is said that there was a sale of good will. I think

that there was, taking good-will as deﬁned by Lord Euaox in

O'ruttu:cll vs. Lye, 17 Ves. 335. The purchaser has a right to the

place and a right to get in the old bills; so the purchaser gets

the good will as deﬁned by Lord Ennox. But the term ‘good

will’ is not used; and when a contract is sought to be implied

we must not substitute one word for another.. But suppose

the word did occur, what is the effect of the sale of ‘good-will.‘

It does not, per se, prevent the vendor from carrying on the

same class of business.” Vernon rs. H allam, 34 Ch. Div. 752,

held that a covenant by a vendor of a business, including the
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good-will thereof, that he would not for a term of years carry

on the business of a manufacturer, either by himself or jointly

with any other person, under the name or style of J. II. or H.

Bros. (the name of the business which he had sold), is not a

convenant that the vendor would not carry on business as a.

manufacturer, but against using a particular name or style in

trade, and the injunction was granted to restrain a breach of

that covenant. The court say: “\'Vhere a vendor sells his

business, and commences a similar business in the same

locality, and solicits customers of the old house to deal with

him, the court, following the decision in Pearson vs. Pearson»,

and being of the opinion that the case of Labouchcrc rs. Dawson

had been overruled by the decision in that case, refused to

grant an injunction to restrain such solicitation.” Lcggott vs.

Barrett, 15 Ch. Div. 306, Gincsi rs. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div. 596. and a

number of other cases cited, follow Labouchcrc rs. Dawson.

The correct rule is, we think, laid down in Cottrell rs. Mann-

facturing Co., 54 Conn. 138, 6 Atl. Rep. 791. The court say:

“Cottrell did not require Babcock to agree, and the latter did

not agree, to abstain from the manufacture of printing-presses.

By purchasing the good-will merely Cottrell secured the right

\

old firm. Dnt In Pearson. vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. Div. 145, La1Joud1crc 1:s. Dau;son is expressly overruled. The court say: "The
case of the plaintiff is founded on contract, and the question is,
what are his rights under the contract? There h no express
covenant not to solicit the customers of the old business, bnt
it is said that such a covenant is to be implied. I have a great
objection to straining words so as to make them imply a contract as to a point upon which the parties ht. rn said nothing,
particularly when it is a point which was in their contemplation. It is said that there was a sale of good will. I think
that there was, taking good-will as defined by Lord ELDO~ b
Orutticell vs. Lye, 17 Ves. 335. The purclwser has a right to the
place and n ri~ht to get in the old bills; so the purchaser gets
the good will as defint•d by Lord ELoo~. But the t~nn 'good
will' is not used; and when a contract is sought to be implied
we must not substitute one word for another.. But suppose
the word did occur, what is the effect of the sale of 'good-will.'
It docs not, per se, prevent the vendor from carrying on the
same class of business." Vernon 1:8. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div. 752~
held that a covenant by a vendor of a business, including the
good-will thereof~ that he would not for n term of years carry
on the business of a manufacturer, either by himself or jointly
with any other person, under the name or style of J. II. or H.
Bros. (the name of the business which he had sold), is not a
convenant that the vendor would not carry on business ns a.
manufacturer, but against using n particular name or style in
trade~ and the injunction was granted to restrain n breach of
that covenant. The court say: "Wh2re a Yendor sells his
business~ and commences a similar business in the same
locality, and solicits customers of the old house to deal with
him, the court, following the decision in Pca1·son 'VS. Pearson,
nnd being of the opinion that the case of Labo1tcllcrc i·s. Dau;son
had been overruled by the decision in that case, refused to
grant an injunction to restrain such solicitation." Lcr!!Jott t:JJ.
Barrett, 15 Ch. Div. 300, Gincsi t'8. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div. {)!)(),and a
numb_e-r of other cases cited, follow Laboucl1crc i·s. Dau:son.
The correct rule is, we think, laid down in Cottrell rs . .Mmmfacturing Co., 54 Conn. 138, G Atl. Rep. 7!>1. The court sa.r:
"Cottrell did not require Babcock to agree, and the latter did
not agree, to abstain from the manufacture of printing-presses.
By purchasing the good-will merely Cottrell secured the right
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to conduct the old business at the old stand, with the proba-

bility in his favor that old customers would continue to go

there. If he desired more, he should have secured it by posi-

tive agreement. The matter of good will was in his .mind.

Presumptively he obtained all that he desired. At any rate,

the express contract is the measure of his right; and since that

conveys a good will in terms, but says no more, the court will

not upon inference deny to the vendor the possibility of suc-

cessful competition by all lawful means with the vendee in

the s_ame business. No restraint upon trade may rest upon

inference. Therefore, in the absence of any express stipulation

to the contrary, Babcock might lawfully establish a similar

business at the next door, and by advertisement, circular, card,

and personal solicitation invite all the world, including the old

customers of Cottrell & Babcock, to come there and purchase

of him; being very careful always when addressing individuals

or the public, either through the eye or the ear, not to lead

any one to believe that the presses which he offered for sale

were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or that he was the suc-

cessor to the business of Cottrell & Babcock, or that Cottrell
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was not carrying on the business formerly conducted by that

ﬁrm. That he may do this by advertisements and general cir-

culars courts are substantially agreed, we think. But some

have drawn the line here and barred personal solicitation.

They permit the vendor of a good will to establish a like

business at the next door, and by the potential instrumen-

talities of the newspapers and general circulars ask old cus-

tomers to buy at the new place, and withhold from him only

the instrumentality of highest power, viz., personal solicita-

tion. To deny him the use of the newspapers and gen-

eral circulars is to make successful business impossible, and

therefore is to impose an absolute restraint upon the right

to trade. This the courts could not do, except upon express

agreement. But possibly the old customers might not sec

these; and in some cases, the courts have undertaken to pre-

serve this possibility for the advantage of the vendor, and

found a legal principle upon it. Other courts have been of

the opinion that no legal principle can be made to rest upon

this distinction; that to deny the vendor personal access to old

customers even would put him at such disadvantage in com-

petition as to-endanger his success; that they ought not

to conduct the old business at the old stand, with the probability in his favor that old customers would continue to go
there. If he desired more, he should have secured it by positive agr~ment. The matter of good will was in bis .mind.
Presumptively be obtai~ed all that be desired. At any rate,
the express contract is the measure of bis right; and since that
conveys a good will in terms, but says no more, the court will
not upon inference deny to the vendor the possibility of successful competition by all lawful means with the vendee in
the same business. No restraint upon trade may rest up<>n
infer~nce. Therefore, in the absence of any express stipulation
to the contrary, Babcock might lawfully establish a similar
business at tbe next door, and by advertisement, circular, card,
and personal solicitation invite all the world, including the old
customers of Cottrell & Babcock, to come there and purchase
of him; being very careful always when addre2sing individuals
or the public, either through the eye or the ear, not to lead
any one to believe that the presses which he offered for sale
were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or that he was the successor to the business of Cottrell & Babcock, or that Cottrell
was not carrying on the business formerly conducted by that
firm. That he may do this by advertisements and general circulars courts are substantially agreed, we think. But some
have drawn the line here and barred p<:'rsonal solicitation.
They permit the vendor of a good will to establish a like
business at the next door, and by the potential instrumentalities of the newspapers and general circulars ask· old cus·
tomers to buy at the new place, and withhold from him only
the instrumentality of highest power, viz., personal solicitation. To deny him the use of the newspnpers and general circulars is to make succe~sful business impossible, and
therefore is to impose an absolute restraint upon the right
to trade. This the courts could not do, except upon express
a~reement.
llut possibly the old customers might . not sec
these; and in some cases, the courts have undertaken to preserve this possibility for the advantage of the vendor, and
founcl a legal principle upon it. Other courts have been df
the opinion that no legal principle can be made to rest upon
this distinction; that to deny the vendor personal access to old
customers even would put him at such disadvantage in competition as to ·endanger bis success; that they ought not
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upon inference to bar him from trade, either totally or par-

tially; and that all restraint of that nature must come from

his positive agreement. And such, we think, is the present

tendency of the law.”

Good will may be said to be those intangible advantages

or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is

concerned, and attach to the thing conveyed. \Vhere it con-

sists of the advantages of location, it follows an assignment

of the lease of that location. Again, it may not depend

at all upon location, as in the case of a newspaper, and it

would follow an assignment of all interest in the plant, prop-

erty, effects, and business. A partnership name may become

impersonal, after the death of the partners, and it is then

treated like a ﬁctitious or corporate name. A surname may

become impersonal when it is attachcdto an article of manu-

facture, and becomes the name by which such article is known

in the market, and the right to use the name may in conse

quencc follow a grant of the right to manufacture that article,

or a sale of the business of manufacturing such article;
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and where the right to manufacture is exclusive, the right to

the use of the name as applied to that article becomes likewise

exclusive. It appears, however, that in the ﬁrst bill of sale

which was prepared the words, “including the good-will

attendant upon said business,” were inserted, but were

objected to, stricken out, and a new bill of sale prepared,

omitting any reference to good will. But it is sa.id that this

clause was objected to because, in the opinion of the objector,

it might preclude him from engaging in the same business,

whereas, under the law, he would have such a right had the

clause remained. The only use, however, which complain-

ants now propose to make of the clause, treated as a

part of the instrument, is to restrict that right to engage in

business by taking away one of its incidents. Adopting the

language used in Churton vs. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, with

reference to the right of plaintiff to continue the use of the old

ﬁrm name, “I think the defendant is fully entitled to the beneﬁt

of the observation that it was proposed to him to insert such a

provision, and that he refused it. I think, therefore, that this

case goes a step higher than the authorities, and the defendant

is entitled to put his case in the highest possible form with

regard to his right” to engage in the same line of business

m
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upon inference to bar him from trade, eitber totally or partially; and that all restraint of that nature must come from
his positive agreement. And such, we think, is the present
tendency of the law."
Good will may be said to be those intangible advantages
or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is
concerned, and attach to the thing conveyed. 'Vhere it consists of the advantages of lO<'ation, it follows an assignment
of the lease of that location. Again, it may not depend
at all upon location, as in the r.ase of a newspaper, and it
would follow an assi~nment of all interest in the plant, prop·
erty, effects, and business. A partnership name may become
impe1•sonal, after the death of the partners, and it is then
treated like a fictitious or corporate name. A surname may
become impersonal when it is attached. to an article of manufacture, and becomes the name by which such article is known
in the market, and the right to use the name may in consequence follow a grant of the right to manufacture that artirle,
or a sale of the business of manufacturing such article;
and where the right to manufacture is exclusive, the right to
the use of the name as applied to that article becomes likewise
exclusive. It appears, however, that iii the first bill of sale
which was prepared the words, "including the ·good-will
attendant upon said business," were inserted, but were
objected to, stricken out, and a new bill of sale prepared,
omitting any reference to good will. But it is said that this
clause was obj«:>cted to because, in the opinion of the objector,
it might preclude him from engaging in the same business,
whereasi under the law, be would have such a right had the
clause remained. The only use, however, which complainants now propose to make of the clause, treated as a
part of the instrument, is to restrict that right to engage in
business by taking away one of its incidents. Adopting the
language used in Olmrton vs. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Cb. 174, with
reference to the right of plaintiff to continue the use of the old
firm name, "I think the defendant is fully entitled to the benefit
of the obsC'rvation that it was proposed to him to insert such a
provision, and that be refused it. I think, therefore, tbat this
case goes a step higher than the authorities, and the defendant
is entitled to put his <'ase in the highest possible form with
r<'gard to his right" to engage in the same line of business
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II. The next question relates to the use by defendants of the

ﬁrm name of Farrand, \Yillia.ms & Clark. It is clear that

complainants have no right to continue their busines under

the old ﬁrm name. The rule that upon a dissolution of a ﬁrm

neither partner has the right to use the ﬁrm name, as well as

the other rule that a retiring partner has no right to use the old ,

ﬁrm name, are both subject to the exception that a person has,

the right to use his own name unless he has expressly cove- I

nanted otherwise. In case A B should sell out his business

to C D, in the absence of a grant to C D of the right to use

the name of A B, or an agreement to the contrary, is there

any doubt but that A B would have the right to engage in the

same line of business in his own name? In that case, such at

probability would naturally suggest itself to C D, and, if he

desired to get the advantage of A B’s abstinence from busi-

ness, he would insist upon an agreement to that effect. In the

present case, Mr. Farrand’s name had been at the head ‘of the
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ﬁrm name for nearly half a century and the name of another of

the retiring members corresponded with. the only other sur-

name used in the old ﬁrm name. It must have been evident to

complainants that in any event the name of the new ﬁrm would

be similar to that of the old ﬁrm. If complainants desired any

protection against such a use of the names of the retiring mem-

bers, they should have inserted a provision to that effect in the

bill of sale. The right to continue the use of a ﬁrm name, as

well as a restriction upon the use by a retiring partner of his

own name, are proper subjects of bargain, sale, and agreement.

Here neither have been purchased. Complainants have pur-

chased the business of the old ﬁrm. They have the right to

advertise themselves as succeeding to and continuing that

business. The exercise of such a_ right does not conﬂict with

any right reserved by defendants. Complainants, by such a

holding out, commit no fraud, misrepresentation, or deception.

They publish the truth only. Defendants have the right to use

their own names, or any collocation of their own names. They

have not adopted the old ﬁrm name, although it would have

been appropriate. They have adopted no ﬁctitious name.

There is no‘ deception in the use of the name adopted by them.

The business of the old ﬁrm is a separate and distinct business.

Defendants have no right to advertise their business as a con-

tinuation of the old ﬁrm business. They are subject to the

24

II. The next question relates to the use by defendants of the
firm name of Ii'arrand, 'Villiams & Clark. It is clear that
complainants have no right to continue their business under
the old flrm name. The rule that upon a dissolution of a firm
neither partner has the right to use the firm name, as well as
the other rule that a retiring partner has no right to use the old .
firm name, are both subject to the exception that a person bas 1
the right to use his own name unless he has expressly con•- I
nanted otherwise. Jn case A B should sell out his business
to C D, i:p the absence of a grant to C D of the right to use
the name of A B, or an agrePment to the contrary, is there
any doubt but that AB would have the right to engage in the
samP line of business in his own name? In that case, such :t
probability would naturally suggest itself to C D, and, if he
desired to get the advantage of .:\ B's abstinence from business, he would insist upon an agreement to that effect. In the
present case, l\Ir. Farrand's name bad been at the head ·of the
firm name for nc>arly half a century and the name of another of
the retiring members corl'esponded with the only other surname used in the old firm name. It must have been evident to
complainants that in any eYent the name of the new firm would
. be similar to that of the old firm. If complainants desir'ed any
\ protection against such a use of the names of the retiring mem. bers, they should luive inserted a provision to that effect in the
) bill of sale. The right to continue the use of a firm name, ~s
well us a restriction upon the use by a retiring partner of his
own name, nre proper subjects of bargain, sale, and agreement.
Here neitl1er han~ been purchased. Complainants have purchased the businC'ss of the old firm. They have the right to
advertise themselvc>s as succeeding to and continuing that
business. The exel'eise of such a. right doe-s not eontlict with
any right reserved by defendants. Complainants, by such a.
holding out~ commit no fraud, misrepresentation, or deception.
They publish the truth only. Defendants haYe the right to use their own names, or any collocation of their own names. The.v ,
have not adopte4 the old firm name, although it would have
heen appropriate. They have adopted no fictitious name.
There is no deception in the use of the name adopted by them.
The business of the old firn1 is a separate and distinct bnsirwss.
Defendants hnve no right to advel'tise their business as a con·
tinuation of the old firm business. They are subject to the
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rule already laid down, that no man has the right to sell or

advertise his own goods or business as that of another, and so

mislead the public and injure such other person. In Lathrop

rs. Lathrop, 47 How. Pr. 532, after dissolution J. Lathrop

formed a copartnership with one Tisdale, and adopted the

name of J. Lathrop & Co., which was the style of the old

ﬁrm. Held that, in the absence of any covenant with his late

partner, he might legally do so. In Reeves vs. Dcnicke, 12 Abb.

Pr. (N. S.) 92, the court say: “In this case, the ﬁrm name was

not sold or transferred to defendants as constituting a partof

the partnership property; nor did the sale, in terms or by neces-

sary implication, include the good will; and it is therefore

unnecessary to determine whether the partnership name was

a. part of such good will. There was no restraint upon a retir-

ing partner holding him from engaging in a imiliar business,

and he violated no obligation by forming a new ﬁrm under his

own name, and transacting a business in all respects like that

he had released to them. It is quite clear that defendants

acquired no right to continue the use of the p'artnership name

of the old ﬁrm. If the good reputation of that ﬁrm was
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'\ intended to pass and become a part of defendant’s new ﬁrm, it

lshould have been provided for in the conveyance. That it was

inot intended it should pass is evident from the omission to

include it.” Seed Co. cs. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N. VV. Rep. 866;

Bassctt vs. Percival, 5 Allen 345; Machine Co. vs. McGowan, 22

Ohio St. 370. In Tm-ton rs. Turrton, 42 Ch. Div. 128, although

there were no contract relations between the parties, the court

say: “No man can have the right to represent his goods as the

goods of another; therefore, if a man uses his own name, that_

is no prima facic case, but if he, besides using his own name,

does other things which show that he is intending to represent,

and is in point of fact making his goods represent, the goods of

another, then he is to be prohibited; but not otherwise.” In

H ookhaan cs. Pottagc, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91, plaintiff and defend-

ant had been copartners as Hookham & Pottage. Plaintiff

succeeded to the business, and defendant afterwards set up

a shop only a few doors away, and printed over the door the

words, “Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage.” The court

held that “defendant had a right to state that he was formerly

manager, and afterwards a partner, in the ﬁrm of Hookham 8:

i‘otta_r:e, and that he had a right to avail himself by the state-

rule already laid down, that no man has the right to eelJ or
advertise his own goods or business as that of another, and so
mislead the public and injure such othc>r person. In Lathrop
n. Lathrop, 47 How. Pr. 532, after dissolution J. Lathrop
formed a. capartnership with one Tisdale, and adopted th"
nnmc of .T. Lathrop & Co., which was the style of the oltl
firm. Held that, in the absence of any covenant with his late
partner, he might legally do so. In Rcer;es vs. Denicke, 12 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) !l2, the court say: "In this case, the firm name was
not sold or transferred to defendants as constituting a part.of
the partnership property; nor did the sale, in terms or by neces·
sary implication, include the good will; and it is therefore
unnecessary to determine whether the partnership name was
a part of such good will. There was no restraint upon a retiring partner holding him from engaging in a similiar business,
and he violated no obligation by forming a new firm under his
own name, and transacting a business in all respects like that
he had released to them. It is quite clear that defendants
acquired no right to continue the use of the partnership namf>
, of the old firm. If the good reputation of that firm was
•1 intended to pass and become a part of defendant's new firm, it
lshould have been proYided for in the conveyance. That it was
, not intended it should pass is evident from the omission to
include it." Seed Co. vs. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N. W. Rep. 866;
Bassett vs. Pcrcii:al, 5 Allen 345; Machine Co. i:s. McGowan, 22
Ohio St. 370. In Turton i·s. 'Turton, 42 Ch. Div. 128, although
there were no contract relations between the parties, the court
say: "No man can have the ri~ht to represent bis goods as the
goods of another; tJi.erefore, if a man uses his own name, that.
is no prima facie c.'lse, but if he, besides using his own name,
does other things which show that he is intending to represent,
ond is in point of fact making his goods represent, the goods of
another, then he is to be prohibited; but not otherwise." In
H ookl!aan t:s. J>ottaue, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91, plaintiff and defend·
nnt had been copartners as Hookham & Pottage. Plaintiff
succeeded to the business, and defendant afterwards set up
a shop only a few doors away, and printed over the door the
words, "Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage." The court
held that '"defendant had a right to state that he was formerly
manag-er, and afterwards a. partner, in the fl.rm of Hookbam &
Potiag-c>, and that he had a right to avail himself by the state-
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ment of that fact of the reputation whichl he had so acquired,

but that he had no right to make that statement, or to avail

himself of that reputation, in such a way as was calculated to

represent to the world that the business which he was carry-

ing on was the business of Hookham 8: Pottage, or that Hook-

ham had any interest in it.” In Mcnecly vs. Men-cel_1/, (52 N. Y.

431, the court say: “lf defendants were using the name with

the intention of holding themselves out as the successors of

Andrew Meenely, and as the proprietors of the old established

foundry which was being conducted by plaintiffs, and thus

enticing away customers, and if with that intention they used

the namein a such a way as to make it appear that of the

plaintiﬁ°'s ﬁrm, or resorted to any artiﬁce to induce the belief

that defendants’ establishment was the same as that of plain-

tiﬁs, and, perhaps if without any fraudulent intent, they had

done acts calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of

the establishment, and produce injury beyond that which

resulted from similarity in name, then the court would enjoin

them, not from the use of the name, but from using it in such a
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way as would deceive the public. “ ' ' Every man has the

absolute right to use his own name in his own business, even

though he may thereby interfere with or injure the business

of another, bearing the same name, provided he does not resort

to any artiﬁce or contrivance for the purpose of producing the

impression that the establishments are identical, or do any-

thing calculated to mislead.” In Fullwood vs. Fullwood, 9 Ch.

Div. 176, R. J . Fullwood carried on business as manufacturer

of annatto at 24 Somerset place, Hoxton, from 1785 to 1832.

Plaintiff and three brothers, one of whom was the defendant,

succeeded to the business, but ultimately the right to carry on

the business vested in the plaintiff. Defendants, -Mathew

Fullwood, and another brother formed a copartnership in the

name of E. Fullwood & Co., and issued and distributed in vari-

ous ways cards containing the following: “Established over

85 years. E. Fullwood & Co. (late of Somerset place, Hoxton).

Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto.” They

also placed around the bottles containing the annatto a wrap-

per rescmbling that which plaintiff used. The court say:

“Defendants are entitled to carry on their business under the

ﬁrm name which they have adopted, if they are so minded, pro-

vided they do not represent themselves to be carrying on the

ment of that fact of the reputation which he had so acquired,
but that he had no right to make that statement, or to avail
himself of that reputation, in such a way as was calculated to
re.present to the world that the business which he was carry·
ing on was the business of Hookham & Pottage, or that Hookham had any interest in it." In Meneely vs. Meneely, 62 N. Y.
431, the court say: "If defendants were using the name with
the intention of holding themselves out as the successors of
Andrew Meenely, and as the proprietors of the old established
found1·y which was being conducted by plaintiffs, and thus
enticing away customers, and if with that intention they used
the nnme .in a such n way as to make it appear tllat of the
plaintiff's firm, or resorted to any artifice to induce the belief
that defendants' establishment was the same as that of plaintiffs, and, perhaps if without any fraudulent intent, they had
done acts calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of
the establishment, and produce injury beyond that which
resulted from simiJarity in name, then the court would enjoin
them, not from the use of the name, but from using it in such a
way as would deceive the public. • • • Every man has the
absolute right to use his own name in his e>wn business, even
though he may thereby interfere with or injure the business
of another, bearing the same name, provided he does not resort
to any artitice 01· contrivance for the purpose of producing the
impression that the establish1:llents are identical, or do anything calculated to mislead." In Fullrrood i;s. Fullwood, !} Ch.
Div. 176, R. J. Fullwood carrie.d on business as manufacturer
of annatto at 24 Somerset place, Roxton, from 1785 to 1832.
Plaintiff and three· brothers,- one of whom was the defendant,
succeeded to the business, but ultimntely the right to carry on
the business vested in the plaintiff. Defendants, Mathew
}l,ullwood, and another brother formed a copartnership in the
nam~ of E. Fullwood & Co., and issued and distributed in various ways cards containing the following : "Established over
85 years. E. Fullwood & Co. (late of Somerset place, Hoxton).
Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto." They
also placed around the bottles containing the annatto a. wrapper resembling that which plaintiff used. The court say:
"Defendants are entitled to carry on their business under the
firm name which they have adopted, if they are so miiufrd, provided they do not represent themsel \'es to be carrying on th~
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business which has descended to plaintiff.” In Blninger rs.

Clark, 60 Barb. 113, the defendant wrongfully advertised him-

self as successor to the old ﬁrm, and made such a use of his own

name as to indicate a. fraudulent intent. Hegeman vs. Hege-

man, 8 Daly 1; Levy vs. Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 436. In Churton rs.

Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 887, plaintiff and

defendant had carried on the business as stuff manufacturers

at Bradford, in a building owned by defendant, and known as

“Hall Ings,” under the name and style of John Douglas & Co.

Defendant sold out to plaintiff all his share, right, and title in

the business, including the good will, and executed to plaintiﬂf

a seven-years lease of the premises occupied by .the ﬁrm.

VVithin a short period defendant set up in the same line of

business, next door to plaintiff, in a part of the same building,

known as “Hall Ings,” adopting the old ﬁrm name of John

Douglas & Go. The court held that defendant, by the use of

the old ﬂrm name, and the surroundings, would be

obtaining the custom of the old ﬁrm, by inducing the belief

that his was a continuation of the old establishment. The

court say: “The authorities, I think, are conclusive upon
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this point that the mere expression of parting with or selling

the good will, does not imply a contract on the part of the per-

son parting with that good will not to set up again in a

similar business; but I use the expression ‘similar’ to avoid

including the case of the vendor seeking to carry on the identi-

cal business. He does not contract that he will not carry on

an exactly similar business, with all the advantage which he

might acquire from his industry and labor, and from the regard

people may have for him, and that in a place next door, if you

like, to the very place where the former business was carried

on. It is settled that it is the fault of those who wish any pro-

tection against such a class that they do not take care to insert

the provision to that effect in the deed.”

The same principle obtains with reference to trade marks.

One may have a right in his own name as a trade mark, but he

cannot have such a right as against another person of the same

name, unless the defendant use a form of stamp or label so like

that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant’s

goods are of the plaintiffs manufacture. Sykes rs. Sykes, 3

Barn. & C. 541; Holloway rs. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Rogers

es. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291; Gilmarn rs. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139;

business which has descended to plaintiff."

In Bininger n.

Clark, 60 Barb. 113, the defendant wrongfully adve1·tised him-

self as successor to the old firm, and made such a use of his own
name as to indicate a fraudulent intent. Hegeman vs. Hegeman, 8 Daly 1; Levy vs. Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 436. In Clturton i:11.
Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 887, plaintiff and
defendant had carriecl on the business as stuff manufacturt"rs
at Bradford, in a building owned by defendant, and known as
"Hall lngs," under the name and style of John Douglas & Co.
Defendant sold out to plaintiff all his share, right, and title in
the business, including the good will, and executed to plaintiff
a seyen-years lease of the p1·emises occupiecl by . the fi.1·m.
Within a sb.ort period defendant set up in the same line of
business, next door to p1aintiff, in a part of the same building,
known as "Hall Ings," adopting the old firm name of John
Douglas & Co. The court held that defendant, by the use of
the old firm name, and the surroundings, would be
obtaining the custom of the old firm, by inducing the belief
that his was a continuation of the old establishment. The
court say: "The authorities, I think, are conclusive upon
this point that the mere expression of parting with or selling
the good will, does not imply a contract on the part of the person parting with that good will not to set up again in a
similar business; but I use the expression 'similar' to avoid
including the case of the vendor seeking to carry on the identical business. He does not contract that he will not carry on
an exactly similar business, with all the advantage wh.ic:h h.-.
might acquire from his industry and labor, and from the regartl
people may have for him, and that in a place next door, if you
like, to the very place where the former business was carried
on. It is settled tllat it is the fault of those who wish any protection against such a c]ass that they do not take care to insert
the provision to that effect in the deed."
The same principle obtains with reference to trade marks.
One may have a right in his own name as a trade mark, but he
cannot have such a right as against another person of the same
name, unless the defendant use a form of stamp or label so like
that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant's
goods are of the plaintiff's manufacture. S!Jkes 1·s. S;11kcs, 3
Barn. & C. 541; H ollou:a11 vs. H ollowa!J, 13 Beav. 209; Rogers
vs. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291; Gilmain vs. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139;
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Good;/ear’s India Rubber Glove .l[anuf’g C0. vs. Goodyear Rubber

00., 128 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. The tests applied by

all the authorities in this class of cases are: Is a corporate

or trade or ﬁctitious name simulated? Is the name assumed

or adopted false in fact? Is it used in connection with locality

or other representations, so as to convey the impression that

the business is a continuation of the old business? Defend-

ants are not responsible for the blunders made by clerks, postal

clerks, mail carriers, telephone employés, or newspaper report-

ers. In Meneely vs. Menecly, the court say: “Where the only

confusion created is that which results from the similarity

of names, the court will not interfere.” In Turton vs. Turton

it is said that “defendants are not responsible for the blunders

made by the business communityin not distinguishing between

John Turton & Sons and Thomas Turton & Sons.” See, also,

Richardson <5 Boynton Co. vs. Richardson di Morgan C0., 8 N. Y.

Supp. 52; Good;/ear’s India Rubber Glove Manufg O0. vs. Good-

year Rubber 00., 128 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. 166.

Any collocation of the names of Farrand and W'illiams
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would create some confusion. Defendant Clark had been con-

nected with the old business for thirty years, and Williams,

the son-in-law of Mr. Farrand, for twenty-one years. Defend-

ants are using their own names only. They went into busi-

ness on \Voodward avenue, several blocks from the old stand.

In every letter-head, bill-head, card, or advertisement in which

their ﬁrm name appears they give the individual names of the

members of the ﬁrm, the new place of business, and in no case

have they represented that they are successors to the old ﬁrm.

The bill-heads used by the old ﬁrm had a cut of the old stand

on the left-hand upper corner, about three inches square.

Those of the new ﬁrm contain no cut, and less than half of_the

amount of matter. It would be exceedingly difficult to pre-

pare two bill-heads more unlike. The letter-heads of the old

ﬁrm contained two cuts,—one of the old stand, at the left

hand, and one of the Peninsular White Lead & Color ¥Vorks,

on the right. The dissimilarity is marked. The envelopes

used by the old ﬁrm contain eight printed lines on the upper

left-hand corner, occupying an inch and three-quarters of

space. Those used by the new ﬁrm contain ﬁve lines, occupy-

ing about three-quarters of an inch in space. There has been

no attempt at imitation in words or type. On March 15th

Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Jlanuf'g Co. vs. Goodyear Rubber
Co., 1~8 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. The tests applied by
all the authorities in this class of cases are: Is a corporate
or trade or fictitious name simulated? Is the name assumed
or adopted false in fact? Is it used in connection with locality
or other representations, so as to convey the impression that
the business is a continuation of the old business? Defendants are not responsible for the blunders made by clerks, postal
clerks, mail carriers, telephone employes, or newspaper reporters. In Meneely vs. Meneely, the court say: "\Vbere the only
confusion crPated is that which results from the similarity
of names, the court will not interfere." In Turton vs. Tw·to~
it is said that "defendants are not responsible for the blunders made by the business communityin not di~tin~uishing between
John Turton & Sons anrl Tboma.s Turton & Sons." See, also,
Ricltat·dson & Boynton Co. vs. Ricltardson cf Jforgan Co., 8 N. Y.
Supp. 52; Goodyear's India Rub1wr Glove ,l/anuf'g Co. vs. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. R 598, !) Sup. Ct. 166.
Any coJloeation of the names of Farrand and Williams
would create some confm~ion. Defendant Clark had been connected with the old business for thirty years, and Williams,
the son-in-law of Mr. Farrand, for twenty-one years. Defendants are using their own names only. They went into busine~R on "\Voodward avenue, several blocks from the old stand.
In c•very letter-head, bill-Jwad, card, or advertisement in which
their firm name appears they give the indh·idual names of the
members of the firm, the new place of business, and in no ca,se
have they represented that thl'y are stH'Cl'ssors to the old firm.
The bill-beads used by the old firm had a cut of the old stand
on the left-hand upper corner, about three inchc>s square.
Those of the new firm contain no cut, and Jess than half of .the
amount of matter. It would be exceedingly difficult to prepare two bill-beads more unlike. The letter-heads of the old
firm contained two cuts,-one of the old stand, at the left
band, and one of the Peninsular 'White J ..ead & Color '\Yorks,
on the right. The dissimila.r ity is marked. The envelopes
used by the old firm contnin eight p1inted lines on the upper
left-hand corner, occupying an ineh and three-quarters of
space. Those used by the new firm contain five lines, occupying about three-quarters of an inch in Kpace. There bas been
no attempt at imitation in words or type. On March 15th
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they announced, through circulars distributed generally, that
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they had engaged in business at 32 and 34 Woodward avenue;

that they expected to have their new store ready for occu-

pancy in a few days; and that the work of getting a new stock

of goods would be pushed as fast as possible. On April 7th

they issued another circular, announcing that they were now

prepared to ﬁll orders, and hoping that the friendly acquaint-

ance of many years would be continued. An advertisement

is produced, wherein defendants say: “Though it may seem

paradoxical, it is nevertheless true, that the wholesale drug-

house of Farrand, Williams & Clark is both the oldest and the

newest representative of this important commercial industry

in Detroit.” But in the same advertisement they announce

the dissolution of the old ﬁrm, their retirement from said ﬁrm,

and the formation and business location of the new ﬁrm. It

is difficult to imagine how such an advertisement would mis-

lead the public. It contains no false colors. Bo-th parties

advertised extensively in the city and State papers and in the

itrade journals; complainants giving the names _of their indi-

vidual members, and their new ﬁrm name, and advertising
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themselves as the successors to Farrand, Williams & Co.; and

ldefendants giving the names of their individual members, and

‘the name and business location of the new ﬁrm. Co-mplain-

ants sent out circulars to the trade generally, informing it of

lithe dissolution of the old ﬁrm, the fact that they were the suc-

jcessors, and giving their ﬁrm name; and defendants sent out

‘circulars announcing their withdrawal and the formation of

a new ﬁrm. There is no doubt but that the dissolution of this

ﬁrm, the fact that complainants had bought out the interests

of defendants, the name adopted by complainants, the forma-

tion of the new ﬁrm, the names of itsmembers, and the defend-

ants’ ﬁrm name, have been most extensively advertised by both

parties, not only in the city, but throughout the State and

Union. Nearly ﬁfty letter have been received by the old ﬁrm,

since the dissolution, addressed to Farrand & Williams; Far-

rand & \Villiams Paint Co.; Farrand & Williams Drug Co.;

Farrand, Sheley & Brooks; Farrand, \Villiams & Sheley; Far-

rand, YVilliams, Sheley & Co.; Farrand, Williams & Brooks;

Farrand & Co.; Williams, Farrand & Co.; Farrand, Sheley &

Brooks; Williams & Farrand; YVilliams, Farrand 8:. Co.; and

Williams & Co. It cannot be said that any act of defendants

_~

they announced, through circulars distributed generally, that
they had engaged in business at 32 and 34 Woodward avenue;
that they exp~cted to have their new store ready for occupancy in a few days; and that the work of getting a new stock
of goods would be pushed as fast as possible. On Apl'il 7th
they issued another circular, announcing that they were now
prepared to fill orders, and hoping that the friendly acquaintance o.f many years would be continued. An advertisement
is produced, wherein defendants say: ''Though it may seem
paradoxical, it is nevertheless true, that the wholesale drnghouse of Farrand, Williams & Clark is both the oldest and the
newest representative of this important commercial industry
in Detroit." But in the same advertisement .they announce
the dissolution of the old firm, their retirement from said firm,
and the formation and business location of the new firm. It
is difficult to imagine bow such an advertisement would mislead the public. It contains no false colors. Bo.th parties
ndverlised extensively in the city and State papers and in the
;trade journals; complainants giving the names .of their individual members, and their new firm name, and advertising
themselves as t°he successors to Farrand, Williams & Co.; and
!defendants giving the names of their individual members, a.nd
·the name and business location of the new firm. Complainjants sent out circulars to the trade generally, informing it of
,the
di!isolution of the old firm, the fact that they were the suc1
;cessors, and giving their firm name; and defendants sent out
'circulars announcing their withdrawal and the formation of
a new firm. There is no doubt but that the dissolution of this
firm, the fact that complainants had bought out the interests
(if defendants, the name adopted by complainants, the formation of the new firm, the names of its 'members, and the defendants' firm name, have been most extensively advertised by both
parties, not only in the city, but throughout the State antl
Union. Nearly fifty letter have been received by the old firm,
since the dissolution, addressed to Farrand & 'Villiams; Farrand & 'Villiams Paint Co.; Farrand & \Villiams Drug Co.;
Farrand, Sheley & Brooks; Farrand, 'Villiams & Sheley; Farrand, Williams, Sheley & Co.; Farrand, l\'illia.ms & Brooks;
Ji"arrand & Co.; Williams, J.i"'arrand & Co.; Farr.Ind, Sheley &
}kooks; "rmiams & Farrand; Williams, Farrand & Co.; and
Williams & Co. It cannot be said that any a.ct of defendan.ts
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is responsible for these blunders. Confusion is inseparable
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from the dissolution of an old ﬁrm and the composition of two

ﬁrms from its membership,especiallywhen the name of but one

of those who remained has appeared in the ﬁrm name, and the

new ﬁrm is composed of one whose name for nearly half a cen-

tury has stood at the head of the ﬁrm name, and the surname

of another retiring member is the same as the only other name

used in the old ﬁrm name. It appears that at the outset

defendant Clark, by mistake opened two or three letters

addressed “Farrand, Williams & Co.,” but in every other

instance defendants refused to receive mail directed to Far-

rand, Williams & Co., unless directed to defendants’ street and

number; that in a single instance Clark inadvertently signed

a letter “Farrand, Williams & Co.;” that two checks were sent

to defendants in payment for good bought from them, which

were payable to the order of Farrand, Williams & Co., and Mr.

Farrand indorsed them Farrand, YVillia1ns & Co., and guaran-

teed the indorsement; that in four instances merchandise or

articles not marked, but intended for defendants, were deliv-

ered to complainants, and afterwards taken away; that in two
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instances complainants were notiﬁed by freight agents that

freight awaited delivery; that in both the goods were mani-

fested to Farrand, Williams 8:. Co., but marked, and were. after-

wards delivered, to Farrand, Williams & Clark, for whom they

were intended; that complainants were notiﬁed that a sample

box of glassware had been shipped to them, but they had not

received it; that defendants received a sample box of glass-

ware from the same house, which was billed to Farrand, Wil-

liams & Clark, and the latter were notiﬁed of the shipment by

the assignors; that imilar boxes of samples had been sent to

other drug-houses at Detroit; that in one or two instances

merchandise had been delivered to defendants which was

intended for complainants; that in a single instance a customer

at Port Huron, who knew of the dissolution, intending to call

up the old house by telephone, asked for Farrand & Williams,

was given Farrand, Williams & Clark, and told that it was

Farrand, Williams & Clark, asked the price of oil, and ordered

one barrel; that 112 letters, telegrams, receipts, or bills were

received by complainants directed to Farrand, Williams & Co.,

which were intended for defendants; that of these thirty-ﬁve

were directed on the inside to Farrand, Williams & Clark; that

Is responsible for these blunders. Confusion is inseparable
from the dissolution of an old firm and the composition of two
ftrms from its membership,especiallywhen the name of but one
of those who remafaed has appeared in the firm n.ame, and the
new firm is composed of one whose name for nearly half a century has stood at the head of the firm name, and the surname
of another retiring member is the same as the only other name
used in the old firm name. It appears that at the outset
defendant Clark, by mistake opened two or tb!"ee letters
addressed "Farrand, Williams & Co.," but in every other
instance defendants refused to receive mail directed to Farrand, Williams & Co., unless directed to defendants' street and
number; that in a single instance Clark inadvertently signed
a letter "Farrand, 'Williams & Co.;" that two checks were sent
to defendants in payment for goods bought from them, which
were payable to the order of Farrand, "\Villiams & Co., and Mr.
Farrand indorsed them Farrand, Williams & Co., and guaranteed the indorsement; that in four instances merchandise or
articles not marked, but intended for defendants, were delivered to complainants, and afterwards taken away; that in two
instances complainants were notified by freight agents that
freight awaited delivery; that in both the goods were manifested to Farrand, Williams & Co., but marked, and were. afterwards delivered, to Farrand, \Villiarus & Clark, for whom they
were intended; that complainants were notified that a sample
box of glassware had been shipped to them, but they had n<>t
received it; that defendants received a sample box of glassware from the same house, which was billed to Farrand, Williams & Clark, and the latter were notified of the shipment by
the assignors; that similar boxes of samples had been sent to
other drug-houses at Detroit; that in one or two instances
merchandise had been delivered to defendants which was
intended for complainants; that in a single instance a customer
nt Port Huron, who knew of the dissolution, intending to call
up the old house by telephone, asked for Farrand & Williams,
was given Farrand, 'Villiams & Clark, and told that it was
Farrand, Williams & Clark, asked the price of oil, and ordered
one barrel; that 112 letters, telegrams, receipts, or bills were
received by complainants directed to Farrand, Williams & Co.,
which were intended for defendants; that of these thirty-five
were directed on the inside to Farrand, 'Villiams & Clark; that
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all of the letters so received were from business houses from

which defendants were buying goods, and none were from

customers of either house. These proofs do not tend to show

any appropriation by defendants of the old ﬁrm name, or any

attempt to secure the correspondence addressed to the old

ﬁrm, or that the customers have been deceived or misled, or

that defendants have practiced any fraud, concealment, or

deception. .

Complaint is made in the bill that defendants have enticed

away certain of complainants’ salesmen, but this charge is

not made out by the proofs. It is also charged that defend-

ants have simulated certain trade marks and labels used by

the old ﬁrm, but no instance of piracy has been established.

Complainants have, under the authorities cited, an undoubted

right to protection in the proprietary rights acquired by the

old ﬁrm, and in the use of such trade marks as were in use by

the old ﬁrm, and defendants have no right to so imitate the

labels in use by the old ﬁrm as to convey the belief that the

goods labeled are from the old house. The use, however, of

the words, “Sold by Farrand, Williams & Co.,” or “Prepared

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

by Farrand, Williams & Co.,” upon a label, will not be pro-

tected as a trade mark or trade-name, and the right to use that

name in that connection did not pass under the bill of sale.

The decree of the court below must be aﬂirmed as of February

27, 1891, and the bill dismissed, with costs to defendants.

Monsn and GRANT, JJ., concurred with MCGRATH, J.

Loxc, J., did not sit.

CnAmrI.1.\z, C. J . dissented.

\'

No"rs.—For other cases, see Mechem’s Elem. of Pa:tn., §§ 86, 87, 88,

69.

Compare also with the two cases following.

jam

SNYDER MANUFACTURING CO. vs. SNYDER.

S1é€1‘C11l6 Court of Ohio, 1896.

5|; Ohio si.i=Q=h3 N. E. Rep. 32:», 31 L. R. A. 657.

The action below was brought by Andrew G. Snyder and

\Villiam A. Snyder, against the Snyder Manufacturing Com-

all of the letters so received were from business houses from
which defendants were buying goods, and none were from
customers of either house. These proofs do not tend to show
any appropriation by defendants of the old firm name, or any
attempt to secure the correspondence addressed to the old
firm., or that the customers have been deceived ~r misled, or
that defendants have practiced any fraud, concealment, or
deception.
Complaint is made in the bill that defendant~ have enticed
away certain of complainants' salesmen, but this charge is
not made out by the proofs. It is also charged that defendants have simulated certain trade marks and labels used by
the old firm, but no instance of piracy bas been established.
Complainants have, under the authorities cited, an undoubted
right to protection in the proprietary rights acquired by the
old firm, and in the use of such trade marks as were in use by
the old firm, and defendants have no right to so imitate the
labels in use by the old firm as to convey the belief that the
goods labeled are from the old house. The use, however, of
the words, "Sold by Farrand, Williams & Co.," or "Prepared
by Farrand, Williams & Co.," upon a label, will not be protected as a trade mark or trade-name, and the right to use that
name in that connection did not pass under the bill of sale.
The decree of the court below must be affirmed as of February
27, 1891, and the bill dismissed, with costs to defendants.
MORSE and GRANT, JJ., concurred with McGRATH, J.
Lmm, J., did not sit.
CHAMPJ.IY, c. J. dissented.
t

Nom.-Fo'i' other cases, eQe Mechem's Elem. of Pa:tn.,
89.
Compare also with the two cases following.

~

86, 87, 88,

SNYDER MANUFACTURI~G CO. vs. SNYDER.

sw::eme Coztrt of Ohio, 1896.
S'fOhio St.~3 N. E. Rep. 325, 31 L. R. A. 657.

The action below was brought by Andrew G. Snyder and
William A. Snyder, against the Snyder Manufacturing Com-
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pany, to enjoin the use by the defendant of the name “Snyder

8.NYDEB MANUFACTURING

Co.
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Manufacturing Company,” and especially the use of the word

“Snyder” in that name. The plaintiffs, who are now, and for

several years past have been, engaged in business as manufac-

turers of certain kinds of goods at the city of Piqua, in this

state, for many years before carried on the same kind of a busi-

ness at Ashtabula, also in this state, and by their skill and

attention to business established a valuable reputation in their

business, which was carried on under the name of Snyder 8;

Son. Then, on the 7th day of September, 1887, they and two

other persons formed-a copartnership with \V. H. Bradley, who

was the owner of a manufactory at Ashtabula, employed in

the manufacture of goods similar to those made by the plain-

tiﬂ's, for the purpose of combining the business of-the parties,

and thereafter continuing the same as one concern. By the

terms of the partnership agreement, Bradley was to, and did,

contribute one-half of the capital, and, in addition thereto,

furnish the use of his manufactory without charge, and expend

at least $3,000 in putting the same in repair, as an oﬁset to

which the plaintiffs were to, and did, put in the good will of
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their business, and they and their two associates were to, and

did, contribute the other half of the capital, and devote their

time and skill to the manufacture of goods and the general

management of the business of the partnership; Bradley not

being required to give any time_or attention thereto. This

copartnership, which carried on its business under the ﬁrm

name of Snyder Manufacturing Company, continued for a

period of three years, acquiring under that name an extensive

and proﬁtable business, and a good reputation; and at its

termination, the parties being unable to effect a satisfactory

settlement, the plaintiffs, to obtain a settlement of its affairs,

commenced an action, in which a receiver was appointed at

their instance. who took possession of the partnership effects.

and afterwards, under an order of the court so directing him,

sold the same, with the good will of the ﬁrm, at public sale.

The order of sale contained an express provision that the pur-

chaser should have the right to carry on the business as the

successor of the ﬁrm, and was so made without objection

from any of the partners, all of whom were parties to the

action. The plaintiffs and Bradley were competing bidders

at the sale, when the latter, bidding more than his com-

25

pany, to enjoin the use by the defendant of the name "Snyder
Manufacturing Compan·y," and especially the use of the word
"Snyder" in that name. The plaintiffs, who are now, and for
several years past have been, engaged in business as manufacturers of certain kinds of go-0ds at the city of Piqua, in this
state, for many years before carried on tbe same kind of a business at Ashtabula, also in this state, and by their skill and
attention to business established a valuable reputation in their
business, whiGh was carried on under the name of Snyder &
Son. Then, on the 7th day of September, 1887, they and two
othe1· persons formed·a copartnership with \V. H. Bradley, who
was the owner of a manufactory at Ashtabula, employed in
the manµfactnre of goods similar to those made by the plaintiffs, for the purpose of combining the business of the parties,
and thereafter continuing the same as one concern. Dy the
tt•1·ms of the partnership agreement, Bradley was to, and did,
contribute one-half of the capital, and, in addition thereto,
furnish the use of his manufactory without charge, and expend
at least $3,000 in putting the same in repair, as an offset to
which the plaintiffs were to, and did, put in the good will of
their business, and the.v and their two associa trs were to, and
did, contribute th!.> other half of the capital, and devote their
time and skill to the manufacture of goods and the general
management of the hushwss of the partnership; Bradley not
being required to give any time. or attention thereto. This
copal'tnership, whkh carried on its hnsiness under the firm
nnme of 8n~·der ~fnnufaeturing Company, continued for u
period of thrPe years, acquiring under that name aTh extensive
nnd profitable business, and a good reputation; :llld at its
termination, the pnrties bein:.t unable to effect a satisfactory
settlement~ the pl:.iintiffs, to obtain a s£>ttlement of its affairs,
commenced an action, in which a receiver was appoint<'d at
11H~ir instance. who took pos:;;ession of the partnership effectR,
and afterwards, under an order of the court so directing him,
sold the same, wHh the good will of the firm , at public sale.
The order of sale contaim•d an Pxpress provision that the purclinser should have the ri~ht to carry on the business as the
successor of the firm, and was so made wi1 hout ohjeetion
from any of the partners. all of whom were parties to the
nction. The pJaintiffs and BrndlPy were compPtin~ bidders
a.t the saJe, when the latter, bidding more than his com-

25
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petitors for the assets and good will of the ﬁrm, and being the

highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser. The sale was

duly conﬁrmed by the court, and the property transferred to

Bradley, who shortly thereafter, with other persons, organized

a. corporation under the laws of this state, with the name of the

“Snyder Manufacturing Company,” for the purpose of con-

tinuing the business at the manufactory which had been oper-

ated by the ﬁrm; and the partnership effects and good will

that Bradley "had purchased were transferred, with the manu-

facturing plant, to the corporation, which. ha since, in its

corporate name, been doing business of like character to that

formerly done by the copartnership, and claiming to be its

successor. That manner of conducting it business by the

corporation was enjoined by the judgment which it is sought

here to have reversed; and whether there should be a reversal

or not, it is conceded, depends on the effect of Bradley’s pur-

chase of the assets, including the good-will of the partnership,

and their transfer by him to the defendant corporation. Did
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the defendant in that way acquire the right to carry on a busi-

ness in the name adopted by it, like that which had been done

by the previously existing partnership, and as its successor?

Burke <£ Ingersolls and A. A. Thayer, for plaintiff in error.

Theodore Hall and Dickey, Carr xﬁ Goff, for defendants in

error.

W1LLIAMs, J . (after stating the facts.) \Vithout attempting

an accurate or exhaustive deﬁnition of the good will of a busi-

ness, it may be said that it practically consists of that favor-

petitors for the assets and good will of the firm, and being the
highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser. The sale was
duly confirmed by the court, and the property transferred to
Bradley, who shortly thereafter, with other persons, organized
a corporation under the laws of this state, with the name of the
"Snyder Manufacturing Company," for the purpose of continuing the business at the manufactory which had been operated by the firm; and the partnership effects and good will
that Bradley had purchased were transferred, with the manufacturing plant, to the corporation, which. bas since, in its
corporate name, been doing business of like character to that
formerly done by the copartnership, and claiming to be its
successor. That manner of conducting its business by the
corporation was enjoined by the judgment which it is sought
here to have reversed; and whether there should be a reversal
or not, it is c-Ollceded, depends on the effect of Bradley's purchase of the assets, including the good-will of the partnership,
and their transfer by him to the defendant corporation. Did
the defendant in that way acquire the right to carry on a business in the name adopted by it, like that which had been done
by the previously existing partnership, and as its successor?

able disposition or inclination of persons to extend their

patronage to the business on account of the reputation it has

established; and, as the business is always associated with

Burke~

Ingersolls and A. A. Thayer, for plaintiff in error.

the name under which it is conducted, the name becomes a.

part, and often an important part, of its good will. The good

will of a copartnership is regarded in law as property, consti-

tuting a part of its assets, and having a salable value in con-

Theodore Hall and Dickey, Carr
error.

~

Goff, for defendants in

nection with its tangible property, sometimes exceeding all

its other assets, because of the advantages aﬁ'orded a pur-

chaser of retaining an established custom, and enlarging

it. As a general rule, when it become necessary to sell the

partnership effects, the good will should be valued and sold

WILLIAMS, J. (after stating the facts.) 'Vitbout attempting
un accurate or exhaustive definition of the good will of a business, it may be said that it practically consists of that favor·
able disposition or inclination of persons to extend their
patronage to the business on account of the reputation it has
established; and, as the business is always associated with
1 the name under which it is conducted, the name becomes n.
\ part, and often an important part, of its good will. The good
\will of a copartnership is regarded in law as property, consti'tuting a part of its assets, and having a salable value in connection with its tangible property, sometimes exceeding all
its other assets, because of the advantages afforded a purchaser of retaining an established custom, and enlarging
it. As a general rule, when it herome necessary to sell the
partnership effects, the good will sh<>uld be valued a.nd sold

__ __ __~
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with, and as a part of, them, and ordinarily it passes by a

sale of them, though not expressly mentioned. It is well set-

tled that, when a partner sells his interest in the business to a

copartner, without a reservation or exception of the good will,

the purchaser is entitled, not only to continue the business in

the name of the ﬁrm, and as its successor, but he may prevent

the selling partner or other person from carrying on business

in that way; and no good reason -is apparent why the same

result should not attend a purchase of the entire assets and

good will of the ﬁrm, by one of the partners, at a sale thereof,

made under an order of court, in a proceeding to which the

partners were parties, especially if the sale be so made at their

instance and for their beneﬁt. Indeed, the authorities appear

to go further, and maintain that, upon the dissolution of a

copartnership, there b-cing no agreement betwcenits members
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to the contrary, the court, having the parties before it, may

order the good will to be sold or disposed of as may be deemed

most advantageous to the partners; and that the purchaser at

such sale, though a stranger to the ﬁrm, may lawfully continue

the use of the ﬁrm name in carrying on the business thereafter.

And that seems but the lo-gical result of the rule that the rights

mentioned belong to a partner who becomes a purchaser at

such sale; for, in order to insure a fair sale, all bidders should

stand upon an equality, which -would not be so if the rights

acquired at the sale were to.be varied or made to depend upon

the relation which the purchaser had sustained to the partner-

ship, or other individual circumstance. The salable value of

the good will is whatever it is worth in the market when open

to untrammeled competition; and when brought to that test

for the beneﬁt of the partners, it is not for them to assert that

the purchaser obtained less than they authorized to be sold or

induced him to believe he was buying. _

It is contended that Bradley did not become the owner of

the good will of the late ﬁrm of which he was a member, by

his purchase at the receiver’s sale, because (1) the good will of

the plaintiffs was put into the ﬁrm as an offset to the use of

Bradley’s manufactory, and only for the period agreed upon for

the duration of the partnership, and therefore, at the expira-

tion of that period, the plaintiffs were reinvested with their

good will, as was Bradley with the possession of his property;

(2) the order of the court under which the sale was made

with, and as n part of, them, and ordinarily it passes by a
t>ale of them, though not expressly mentioned. It is well set·
tied that, when a partner sells his interest hi the business to a
copartner, without a reservation or exception of the good will,
the purchaser is entitled, not only to continue the business in
the name of the firm, and as
Emcc-E>ssor, but he may prevent
the selling partner or other person from carrying on business
in that way; and no good reason is appa.rent why the same
result should not attend a purchl!se of the entire a.ssets and
good will of the fl.rm, by one of the partners, at a sale thereof,
made under an order of court, in a proceeding to which the
partners were parties, especially if the sale be so made at their
instance and for their benefit. Indeed, the authorities appear
to go further, and maintain that, upon the dissolution of a
c<>partnership, there being no agreement between .its members
to the contrary, the court, having the parties before it, may
order the good will to be sold or disposed of as may be deemed
most advantageous to the partners; and that the purchaser at
such sale, though a stranger to the firm, may lawfully continue
the use of the firm name in carrying on the business thereafter.
And that seems but the logical result of the rule that the rights
menti-Oned belong to a partner who becomes a purchaser at
such sale; for, in order to insure a fair sale, all bidders should
stand upon an equality, which ·would not be so if the rights .
acquired at the sale were to.be varied or made to depend upon
the relation which the purchaser had sustained to the partnership, or other individual circumstance. The salable value of
the good will is whatever it is worth in the market when open
to untramm~led comp<'tition; and when brought to that test
for the benefit of the partners~ it is not for them to assert that
the purchaser obtained less than they authorized to be sold or
induced him to believe be was buying.
It is contended that Bradley did not become the owner Df
the good will of the late firm of which he was a member, by
ltis purchase at the receiver's sale, because (1) the good will of
the plaintiffs was put into the firm as an offset to the use of
Rradley's manufactory, and only for the period agreed upon for
the duration of the partnership, and therefore, at the expitation of that period, the plaintiffs were reinvested with their
good will, as was Bradley with the possession of his property;
(2) the order of the court under which the sale was made

its
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expressly excludes any right on the part of the purchaser to

make use of the ﬁrm name; and (3) the good will ceased upon

the termination of the partnership, and consequently could

not be sold.

1. With respect to the ﬁrst of these propositions, it may be

observed that what the order of the court directed to be sold,

and what the receiver, under its authority, ‘in fact sold, was,

not the good will or property of the plaintiffs, but those belong-

ing to the ﬁrm. The plaintiffs’ business and its good will, as

they existed at the formation of the partnership, were absorbed

and merged into those of the ﬁrm, and went to make up its

assets, and, in so far as they did so, became the property of the

ﬁrm, subject to sale under the order with its other effects, and

with them vested in the purchaser. Conceding, however, that

the plaintiffs, at the expiration of the partnership into which

they h-ad entered with Bradley, were restored to the good will

‘which belonged to their business when the partnership was

iformed, and were entitled to resume that business under the

name they had formerly used, it is not perceived how that

could operate to vest in them any part of the good will of the

sale.
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Iﬁrm, or prevent its vesting in Bradley under the receiver’s

2. The order under which the sale was made, directs the

receiver to sell all of the property of the ﬁrm “as a whole,

‘including the good will,” and provides that “the purchaser

shall have the right to carry on the business as successor to

the Snyder Manufacturing Company,” but states that “the

court does not pass upon or make any order whatever as to

what name said purchaser would have the right to use in car-

rying on said business.” The last clause of the order is relied

upon a.s excluding any right, on the part of the purchaser

under it, to employ the name of the ﬁrm in any business he

might choose to carry on after the purchase, and as further

excluding any authority to do such business -as the successor

of the ﬁrm. But it is obvious the clause has not that operation.

Instead of being an adjudication abridging the rights of the

purchaser with regard to the use of the ﬁrm name, its design

was to leave the determination of those rights, in any contro-

versy that in-ight thereafter arise concerning them, unaileeted

by the order. And, as a partner who purchases the property

and good will of the copartnership becomes entitled to the use

t'xprc-ssly excludes any right on the part of the purchaser to
m:tke use of the firm name; and (3) the good will ceased upon
the termination of the partnership, and consequently could
not be sold.
1. ·with rPspect to the first of th<>se propositions, it may be
obsern"Cl that what the order of the court directed to be sold,
and what the receiver, under its authority, in fact sold, was,
not the good will or property of the plaintiffs, but those belong·
ing to th.e firm. The plaintiffs' business and its good will, as
they existed at the formation of the partnership, were absorbed
and merged into those of the firm, and went to make up its
nssets, and, in so far as they did so, became the property of the
firm, subject to sale und·e r the order with its other effects, and
with them Yested in the purchaser. Conceding, however, that
1 he plaintiffs, at the expiration of the partn<>rsbip into which
they had entered with Bradlc>y, were restored to the good will
.which belonged to their business when the partnersl1ip was
1formed, and were entitll"d to resume that business under the
name they had formerly used, it is not perceivl"d bow that
could operate to vest in them any pnrt of the good will of the
1ftrm, or preYent its vesting in Bradley under the receiver's
sale.
2. The orcler under which the sale was made, directs the
recei11er to sell all of the property of the firm "as a whole,
•including the good will," and provides that "the purchaser
shall have the right to carry on the business as succC>ssor to
the Snyder l\lanufacturing Company," but states that "the
court d-0es not pass upon or make any order· whateYer as to
what name said purchaser would lrnve the right to use in carrying on said business." The last clause of the oruer is relied
upon as excluding any right, on the part of the purcl:aser
under it, to employ the name of the firm in any busim•ss he
might choo~e to carry on after the purchasc>, and as further
excluding any authority to do such business tl1S the succ~ssor
of the firm. But it is obvious the clause has not that operation.
Instead of bPing an adjudication abridging the rig-hts of the
purchaser with rPgnrd to the use of the firm name. its design
was to leave the det<>rmination of thoi;;e rights, in any contI'O·
versy that rr..ight thereafter ari:"e concl'rning them, unaffected
by the order. And, as a partner who purchases the property
and good will of the coparlner~d1ip bceom~s entitled to the use
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of the ﬁrm name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it,
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an express provision in the sale, or the order of the court

under which it was made, that the purchaser should have that

right, was unnecessary.

3. The proposition mainly urged in support of the judgment

below is that the good will of a copartnership can exist only

so long as it is a going concern, and, ceasing upon the termi-

nation of the partnership, is not thereafter a subject of sale.

It may be that, when a ﬁrm is dissolved, its effects distributed,

or sold in parcels to purclrnser not wishing to embark in a

similar business, and its affairs are wound up, its go-od will is

dissipated and lost; but that results from the acts of the part-

ners themselves in making such a disposition of the assets as

renders the good will unavailable as a salable article, for it is

not a distinctive article of property, which may be sold sep-

arate from the tangible effects of the partnership, and in "that

sense it may be said to cease when the partnership is so wound

up. That, in substance, is the scope and purport of the rule

declared in the cases cited in the brief of the defendant in

error. In neither of the cases was the question here presented
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involved. But the doctrine maintained, both in England and

this country, where the copartnership is wound up in the man-

ner indicated, is that the good will remains the undivided

property of the members of the ﬁrm, either or any of whom

may thereafter lawfully use the ﬁrm name if they desire to

continue in business, although the name of the partner so

using it does not appear in that of.the ﬁrm. Banks vs. Gibson,

34 Beav. 566; Bradbury vs. Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Caswcll rs.

‘Hazard, 121 N. Y. 484, 24‘ N. E. Rep. 707; Dou_r/herty vs. Van Nos-

trand, Hoﬁ. Ch. 58. The proposition contended for, if sus-

tained, would practically destroy the value of the good will

as an asset of the partnership, and entail upon its members,

in many instances, serious loss. As partnerships rest upon

the agreement of the parties, express or implied, a dissolution

occurs, and a new partnership is formed, whenever a partner

retires or a new one is admitted; and if, when that occurs, the

good will of the dissolved ﬁrm should cease, and could neither

be acquired by the new ﬁrm nor transferred by any sale made

by the members of the old 0-ne,though expressly included in

the sale of its eﬁocts, its value as an asset of the ﬁrm would

disappear. Yet, it is commonly known that the good will con-

stitutes an important, and sometimes a controlling, parfof the

of the firm name, in the abs€nce of u stipulation for·bidding it,
an express provision in tlte sale, or the order of the court
under which it was made, that the purchaser should have that
right, wa.s unneces1mry.
3. The proposition mainly urged in support of the judgment
below is that the good will of a copartm•rship can exist only
so long as it is a going concern, and, ceasing upon the termination of the partnership, is not thereafter a subject of sale.
It may be that, when a finn is dii-;solved, its efTects distributed,
or sold in parcels to purdrasers not wishing to embark in a
similar business, and its affairs are wound up, its good will is
dissipated nnd Jost; but that results from the acts of the partners themseln~s in making such a dispo-sition of the assets as
renders the good will unavailable a.s a salable article, for it is
not a distinctive article of property, which may be sold separate from the tangible effects of the partnership, and in -that
sense it may be said to cease when the partnership is so wound
up. That, in substance, is the scope and purport of the rule
declared in the cases cited in the brief of the defendant in
error. In neither of the cases was the question here presented
involved. But the doctrine maintained, both in Englan·d and
this country, where the copartnership is wound up in the manner indicated, is that the good will remains the undivided
property of the members of the firm, either or any of ~horn
may therea.fter lawfully use the firm name if they desire to
continue in business, although the name of the partner so
using it does not appear in that of. the firm. Banks t:s. Gi1Json,
34 Beav. 566; Bra<lbur11 t)s. Dickens, 27 Beav. 5!1; Caswell n~.
·Hazard, 121 N. Y. 484, 2.f N. E. Rep. 707; Dour11terty rs. Van No~
frand, Hoff. Ch. 58. '.rhe proposition contended for, if sustained, would practically destroy the value of the good ~ill
as an asset of the pai·tnership, and entall upon its members,
in many instances, serious loss. As partnerships rest upon
the agreement of the parties, express or implied, a dissolution
occurs, and a new partnership is formed, whenever a partnn
retires or a new one is adm:itted; and if, when that occurs, the
good will of the dissolved finn should c<>ase, and could neither
be acquired by the new firm nor transferred by any sale made
by the members of the old one,though expressly included in
the sale of its effects, its value as an asset of the firm would
disappear. Yet, it is rommonly known that the goo~ wilf constitutes an important, and sonwt ilnes a controlling, part' of the
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haw, that, in cases of the kind mentioned, the purchaser obtains

'the good will, including the right to the use of the ﬁrm name

in the continued prosecution of the business. In so holding,

'-the courts give effect to the intention of the parties as dis-

fclosed by the transaction. Where the partners themselves

jmake a sale of the ﬁrm effects, including the good will, the

lintention and understanding is manifest that the purchaser

shall acquire and enjoy every advantage and beneﬁt which the

‘ﬁrm had, so far as the parties are capable of transferring the

-same; and, when a sale is made under an order of court, in

a proceeding to which the partners are parties, that intention

is not less plainly inferable. The object to be accomplished

tin making the sale, in either mode, of the go-od will, with the

-other partnership effects, is to enhance the value of the assets

lby inducing persons to bid more for them than they otherwise

!WOI1l(1, under the belief that the purchaser will obtain all the

‘beneﬁts of the good will; and, when the sale is made and con-

-summated on that basis, it would be neither just nor equitable

‘to permit the vendors to deprive the purchaser of anything
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they undertook to sell, and for which they have been paid.

‘The good will being thus sold as a thing of value, and paid

ifor by the purchaser as such, to deny him the beneﬁt of it

~would operate as a fraud, which the law will not sanction.

We are not reluctant, therefore, in holding that, upon the

dissolution of a trading copartnership, its assets, including

the good will of the business, may be sold as a whole, either

=by the partners directly, or through a receiver, under an order

made by a court in a ease to which they are parties; and that

Ia purchaser thereof under either method of sale is entitled to

continue the business as the successor of the ﬁrm, and make

mse of the ﬁrm name for that purpose; and, further, that, where

ithe purchaser transfers the property so acquired by him to

Ia corporation of which he is a member, organized to succeed

to the business, it may eairry on the business, in the same man-

ner, under a corporate name including the name which had

been used by the ﬁrm. Iron Works Co. es. Payne-, 50 Ohio St.

115, 33 N. E. Rep. SS. 1!) L. R. A. 82. If it is desired to limit the

right of the purchaser or his vcndee in thie use of the ﬁrm

name, or exclude such right altogether, it should be done by

stipulation in the contract when the sale is made by the part-

ners, or by a provision to that effect in the order, when the

iconsideration for the purchase, nnd it bas long been the settled
~aw, that, in cases of the kind mentioned, the purchaser obtains
'the good will, including the right to the use of the firm name
'in the oontinued prosecution of the business. In so holding,
~he courts give effect to the intention of the parties as dis'.closed by the transaction. \Vherc the partners tllemselves
;nake a. saJe of the firm effects, including the good will, the
~ntention nnd understanding is manifest that the purchaser
t1hall acquire and enjoy every advnntage and benefit which the
lfi.rm bad, so fnr as the parties al'e capable of transferl'ing the
isame; and, when a. sale is made under an order o-f court, in
a proceeding to which the partners are parties, that intention
is not less plainly inferable. The object to be accomplished
tin ma.king the Rale, in eitht>r mode, of the good will, with the
·other partnership effects, is to enhance the value of the assets ·
.'by inducing persons to bid more for them than they otberwis~
1would, under the belief that the purchaser will obtain nll the
\benefits of the good will; and, when the sale is mad~ and con·summated on that basis, it would be neither just nor equitable
'to permit the vendors to deprive the purchaser of anything
they undertook to sell, and for which they have been paid.
'The good will being thus sold as a thing of value, and paid
1for by the purchaser as such, to deny him the benefit of it
•would operate as a. fraud, which the law will not sanction:
We are not reluctant, therefore, in holding that, upon the
dissolution of a trading copartnership, its assets, including
the good will of the business, may be sold as a. whole, either
:by the partnel'S directly, or through a receiver, under an order
made by a court in a case to which they ar~ parties; and that
ta purchaser thereof under either method of sale is entitled to
.continue the business as the successor of the firm., and make
1use of the firm name for that purpose; and, further, that, where
rt he purchaser transfers the property so ncquired by him to
•a corporation of which he is a member, organized to succeed
to the business, it may ca1rry on the business, in the same manne>r, under a corporate name including the name which had
lH~en usc>d by the firm. Iron Worlcs Co. t·s. Payne, 50 Ohio St.
115, 33 N. R. IlPp. ~8. rn LR. A. 8~. If it is dc:sii'~d to limit the
right of the purch:rner or his vc>mke in th:e use of the firm
name, or exe1ude surh ri~ht alto~ether, it should be done by
stipulation in the contract wh:'n the i;;aJe is made by the partners, or by a provision to that cITPct in the <Jrder, when the
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sale is made through the court. In the ca.se of Horton M anu-
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facturing Co. cs. Horton Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816,

cited by counsel for the defendant in error, a copartnership,

without any consideration, obtained the consent of a person

not a member to use his name in, and as part of, the ﬁrm name.

That consent, the court held, amounted to a mere license,

revocable at pleasure, and the partnership so obtaining it

could not, without the consent of such person, “transfer the

right to another company or corporation to make a like use

of the name.” But that case cannot be regarded as an author-

ity against the claim made by the plaintilf in error in this

case; for, where-the partners themselves make a sale of their

ﬁrm’s good will, which carries with it the right to use the ﬁrm

name, or authorize such sale'to be made, it cannot be said

that the use of the name, either by the purchaser, or those suc-

ceeding to the business, is without their consent. As said by

the court in the case just cited, on page 819: “If one has made

of his own name a trade mark, and then transfers to another

his business, in which his name has been so used, the right

to continue such use of the name will doubtless follow the
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business as often as it may be transferred.” '

Upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the judgment of

the circuit court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for

the plaintiff in error.

Judgment accordingly.

No'rE.—See l\Iechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ S6, 67. 88, 89.

Compare also with preceding and following cases.

TREGO vs. HUNT.’

English House of Lords, 18.95.

[1890] A. 0. '1.

For some years prior to 1876 \Villiam Henry Trego, the hus-

band of the appellant, Anna Trego, had carried on business

as a varnish and japan manufacturer at Bow and in London,

under'the name of Tabor, Trego & Co. In 1876 he took the

respondent into partnership, but upon the terms that the good

sale is made through t~e court. In the ca.se of Horton Manu- .
facturing Co. vs. Horton Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816,
cited by counsel for the defendant in error, a copartnership,
without any consideration, obtained the consent of n pers<>n
not a member to use his name in, and as part of, the firm name.
That consent, the court held, amounted to a mere license,
revocable at pleasure, and the partnership so obtaining it
could not, without the consent of such person, "transfer the
right to another company or corporation to make a like use
of the name." But that case cannot he regarded as an authority against the claim made by the plaintiff in error in this
case; for, where the partners themselves make a sale of their ·
firm's good will, which carries with it the right to use the firm
name, or authorize such sale 'to be made, it cannot be said
that the use of the name, either by the purchaiser, or those succeeding to the business, is without their consent. As said by
the c~urt in the case just cited, on pnge 819: "If one has made
of his own name a trade mttrk, and th~n transfers to another
his business, in which his name has been so used, the right
to continue such use of the name will doubtles~ follow the
business as often as it may be transferred."
Upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the judgment of
the circuit court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for
the plaintiff in error.
Judgment accordingly.
NOTE.-See l\Iechem's Elem. or Pnrtn., §~so, 67. 88, SD.
Cowpare also with prece~g and followiug cases.

TREGO vs. HUNT:
English House of Lords, 1895.
(1806] A. C. 7.

For some years prior to 1876 'Yi11iam Henry Trego, the husbnnd of the appellant, Anna Trego, Irnd carriecl on business
as a varnish .and japan man~f.acturer at now and in London)
under'the nnme of Tabor, Trego & Co. In 1876 be took the
respondent into partnership, but upon t11e terms that the good
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will of the business should be and remain the sole property

of “’illiam Henry Trego. The partnership continued until

his death, in 1888. In February, 1889, a partnership agree-

ment was made between the appellants and the respondent

that they should carry on the business under the old style of

Tabor, Trego 8: Co., for a term of seven years, computed from

January 1, 1889. The agreement provided that the good will

should nevertheless be and remain the sole property of Anna

Trego. In December, 1894, the appellants found that the

respondent had employed a clerk of the ﬁrm, out of oﬁice

hours, to copy for him the names, addresses, and businesses

of all the ﬁrm's customers. The respondent admitted that his

object in having the list made was to acquire information

which would enable him,‘ when the partnership expired, to can-

vass these persons, and to endeavor to obtain their custom for

himself. The appellants accordingly brought this action, and

moved for an injunction to restrain the respondent from mak-

ing any copy of or extract from the partnership books for any

purpose other than the purpose of the partnership business.

S'rmr.1_\'o, J. made no order, and this decision was affirmed

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

by the court of appeal. ‘(Lord Hsnsnunr, Lmnnm and A. L.

SMITH, L. J .J.) [1895] 1 Ch., 462.

H astlngs, Q. 0., and C'ozens—Hardy, Q. 0'. (Leigh Clare, with

them), for the appellants.

Sir R. E. Webster, Q. 0., and Buckley, Q. 0'. (George Hender-

son with them.)

Lord Hnnscnnnn. My Lords, a very impo-rtant question

which has given rise to much difference of judicial opinion

presents itself for decision in the present case. [His lord-

shi stated the facts set forth above and c nt'u

~.,km °"""“ ' f" nu: ' “ 4‘-J

will of the business should be and remain the sole property
of "rilliam Henry Trego. The partnership continued until
bis death, in 1888. In February, 1889, a partnership agreement was made between the appt>llants and the respondent
that they should carry on the bu~iiwss under the old style of
Tab<>r, Treg-o & Co., for a term of seven years, computed from
January 1, 1889. The agreement provided that the good will
should nevertheless be and remain the sole proprrty of Anna
Trego. In Dc>rember, 18!>4, the appellants found that the
respondent had employed a clerk of the firm, out of oflire
hours, to copy for him the names, ndJresses, and bnsinesses
of all the firm·s customers. The> r<'spoudent admitted that bis
object in h:n·ing tb.e list made was to acquire infoi·mation
which would <>nable him,, when the partnersllip expired, to can·
vass these persons, and to endeavor to obtain their custom for
himself. The appPllants accordingly brought this action, and
moved for an injunction to restrain the respondent from making any copy of or extract from the partnership books for any
purpose otb~r than the purpose of the partner1d1ip business.
RTmL1:-;o, J. made no order, and this decision was affirmed
by the court of appeal. . (J..ord HALSBURY, LINDLEY and A. L.
SMITH, L. J.J.)
[18!}5] 1 Ch., 462.

been admitted in the argument, and for the purposes of it, that

the defendant intends, in the event of the partnership coming

to an end at the beginning of next year, to use this list for

the purpose of soliciting the customers of the present ﬁrm.

He proposes then to engage in a business of a similar nature

to that carried on by the ﬁrm, and the question which I have

to decide is whether he is entitled to make such a use of

the list.” .

It seems clear, therefore, that the point in contest before

Hastings, Q. C., and Cozens-Hardy, Q. 0. (Leigh Clare, with
them), for the appellants.
Sir R. E. Webster, Q. C., and Buckley, Q. 0. (George Hcnder1on with them.)

.

Lord HERSCHELL. My Lords, a very impo·rtant question '
which has given rise to much difference of judicial opinion
presents itself for decision in the prC'sent ca.se. fllis lordship stated thE; facts set forth.= and ~q,ntln~t
S'l'tftt5Hl8' 1J., il.':'9:-U-~r''l
i~@isi~R wa& &ftiPIBed
been admitted in the argument, and for the purposes of it, that
the defendant intends, in the event of the partnership coming
to an end at the beginning of next year, to use this list for
the purpose of soliciting the customers <>f the present firm.
He proposes then to engage in a business of a similar nature
to that carded on by the firm, and th<: question which I have
to decide is whether he is entitled to make such a use of
the list."
It seems clear, therefore, that the point in contest before
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TnEoo vs.

the learned judge who heard this-motion was whether the

HUNT.
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respondent was entitled to make use of the list of the custom-

ers of the ﬁrm which he had obtained in order to canvassthem

when he started business on his own account. I mention this

because it may have been open to contention on behalf of the

respondent that he was at all events entitled, whilst he

remained a) partner, to make copies of the partnership books,

and that it was premature to come to the court to restrain the

use of these copies even if he were not entitled when he ceased

to be a partner to canvass the customers of the ﬁrm-; but in

view of the fact that the respondent threatened to use the list

for the purpose of canvassing the persons named therein, and

having regard to the course taken before the learned judge,

I think it would have been open to him to grant an injunction,

though not in the terms prayed for, if the canvassing of those

customers would be a wrongful act on the part of the

respondent. -

STIRLING, J., and the court of appeals had, I think, no alter-

native but to refuse to grant any injunction. They were bound

by the decision of the court of appeal in the case of Pearson vs.
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Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, that, even though the good will belongs

to one of the partners, it is lawful for the other, on the termi-

nation of the partnership, to canvass the customers of the

ﬁrm. Consistently with that decision, I think it would have

been impossible to hold that the appellants were entitled to

an injunction. That case is, however, open to review by your

lordships, and the real question in the present case is whether

it was well decided.

The question whether a. person who had sold the good will

of his business was entitled afterwards to canvass the cus-

tomers of that business came ﬁrst before the courts for deci-

sion in the case of Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322. Lord

ROMILLY, M. R., answered in the negative._ He was of opinion

that the principles of equity must prevail, and that persons

are not at liberty to depreciate the thing which they have sold.

He considered that the defendant was not entitled personally,

or by letter, or by his agent or traveler, to go to anyone who

was a customer of the ﬁrm and to solicit him not to continue

business with the old ﬁrm but to transfer it to him; that this

was not a fair and reasonable thing to do after he had sold the

good will. 'He accordingly granted an injunction to restrain

26

the learned judge who heard this motion was whether the
respondent was entitled to make use of the list of the customers of the firm which be had obtained in order to canvass.tllt•m
when he started business on his own account. I mention thi~
because it may have been open to contention on behalf of the
respondenttthat he was at all events entitled, whilst he
remained apartner, to make oopies of the partnership books,
and that it was premature to come to the court to restrain the
use of these copies even if he were not entitled when he ceased
to be a partner to canvass the customers of the firm; but in
view of the fact that the respondent threatened to use the list
for the purpose of canvassing the persons named therein, and
having regard to the course taken before the learned judge,
l think it would have been open to him to grant an injunction,
though not in the terms prayed for, if the canvassing of those
customers would be a wrongful act on the part of the
respondent.
S·.rmLING, J., and the court of appeals had, I think, no alternative but to refuse to grant any injunction. Tltey weI"e bound
by the decision of the court of appeal in the case of Pearson vs.
Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, that, even though the good will belongs
to one of the partners, it is lawful for the other, on the tem1ination of the partnership, to canvass the customers of the
firm. Consistently with that decision, I think it would have
been impossible to hold that the appellants were entitled to
an injunction. That case is, however, open to review by your
lordships, and the real question in the present case is whether
it was well decided.
The question whether a person who had sold the good will
of his business was entitled afterwards to canvass the customers of that business came .first before the courts for decision in the case of Labouchere 1;s. Dau:son, L. R. 13 Eq. 3~~. Lord
RoMILLY, M. R, answered in the negative. _ Ile was of opinion
that the principles of equity must prevail, and that persons
are not at liberty to depreciate the thing which they have sold.
He considered that the defendant was not entitled personally,
or by letter, or by his agent or traveler, to go to anyone who
was a customer of the firm and to solicit him not to oontinue
business with the old firm but to transfer it to him; that this
was not a fair and reasonable thing to do after he bad sold the
good will. He accordingly granted an injunction to restrain

26
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the defendant, his partners, servants, or agents from applying
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to any person who was a customer of the old ﬁrm prior to the

date of the sale, privately, by letter, personally or by a trav-

eler, asking such customers to continue to deal with the

defendant'or not to deal with the plaintiffs.

In the ease of Ginesi vs. Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, Sir George

Jnssnn, M. R., followed the decision in Labouchcrc rs. Dawson,

L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and expressed in very strong terms his con-

currence with it. He granted an injunction restraining the

defendants, their clerks, servants, agents, workmen, or others,

from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the cus-

tom of or orders for goods similar in character to those dealt

in by the old ﬁrm from such of the customers as were custom-

ers of the old ﬁrm, or from attempting to take away any por-

tion of the business bought by the plaintiff. This was all that

the plaintiff in that case asked for; but the learned judge went

further, and expressed a strong opinion that a man who sold

the good will of his business must not only refrain from solicit-

ing the old customers to deal with him, but must not deal with

them. It was not, he said, necessary to decide it on that
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occasion; but he stated it because he thought what the mean-

ing of selling the good will of a trade or business is should be

thoroughly understood.

In the case of Lcggott vs. Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, which came

before the same learned judge shortly afterwards, he acted

upon the same view, and extended the injunction to restrain

the defendant from dealing with the customers of the old ﬁrm.

From this judgment there was an appeal; but the appellant

conﬁned his appeal to that part of the order which restrained

him from dealing with the customers of the old ﬁrm». He made

no objection to the injunction so far as it restrained him from

canvassing those customers. The court of appeal dissolved

that part of the injunction of which the appellant complained.

They thought they could not on any just principle prevent the

defendant from supplying a man with goods if he applied for

them; that there was no implied obligation upon him, either

legal or moral, to shut his door against a customer who came

to him of his own free will; that a sale of good will did no-t

involve an implied contract not to deal with any customers

of the old business the good will of which was sold. The case

is chieﬂy important for present purposes, in so far as it dis-

the defendant, his partners, servants, or agents from applying
to any p~rson who was a cµstomer of the old firm prior to the
date of the sale, privately, by letter, personally or by a traveler, asking such customers to continue to deal with the
defendant· or not to deal with the plaintiffs.
In the case of Ginesi t:s. Cooper, U Ch. D. 596, Sir George
JESSEI,, M. R., followed the d?dsion in Labouchere t:s. Dawson,
L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and expressed in very strong terms his concurrence with it. He granted an injunction restraining the
defendants, their cl2'rks, servants, agents, workmen, or others,
from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the custom of or orders for goods similar in character to those dealt
in by the old firm from such. of the customers as were customers of the old firm, or from attempting to take away any portion of the business bought by the plaintiff. This was all that
the plaintiff in that case asked for; but the learned judge went
further, and expressed a strong opinion that a man who sold
the good will of .h is business must not only refrain from soliciting the old customers to deal with him, but must not deal with
them. It was not, he said, necessary to decide it on that
occasion; but he stated it because he thought what the meaning of selling the good will of a trade or business is should be
thoroughly understood.
In the case of Leggott vs. Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, which came
before the same learned judge shortly afterwards, he a.eted
upon the same view, and extended the injunction to restrain
the defendant from dealing with the customers of the old firm.
From this judgment there was an appeal; but the appellant
confined his appeal to that part of the order which restrained
him from dealing with the customers of the old firm. He made
no objection to the injunction so far as it restrained him from
canvassing those customers. The court of appeal dissolved
that part of the injunction of which the appellant complained~
They thought they could not on any just principle prevent the
defendant from supplying a man with goods if he applied for.
them; that there was no implied obligation upon him, either
legal or moral, to shut his door against a customer who came
to hi.m of his own free will; that a sale of good will did not
involve an implied contract not to deal with any customers·
of the old business the good will of which was sold. The case .
is chiefly impon:ant for present purposes, in so far as it dis-
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closes the view taken by the learned judges, who, on that

occasion, constituted the court of appeal, on the point now
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under consideration.

In the case of Pearson rs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 to which

I shall have occasion to refer immediately, Co'r'roN, L. J ., stated

that the decision in Laboucherc vs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322,

was doubted in Lcggott as Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, by J AMES,,L.

J ., and himself. This is no doubt correct so far as Co1"ro.\1, L. J .,

is concerned; but I am unable to ﬁnd any clear indication that

this was the view of JAMES, L. J. It is quite true that in an

early part of his judgment he said: “I do not like going much

into the case, because what I should say might perhaps be

considered to mean that the injunction which is submitted

to is too wide.” But in a. later part of the judgment he says:

“At ﬁrst it did not appear to me that we might, from the

equitable view of the case, say that the defendant shall be pre-

vented from dealing with_any customer or customers whom

he had solicited; but it appeared to me that that was too vague

and too wide.” He pointed out that a man might give the

order afterwards without any reference to previous solicita-
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tion. Further on, when discussing the effect of the agree-

ment, and showing that there was no implied obligation not

to deal with the customer, he says: “It means that you are

not to solicit customers.” The impression produced upon my

mind by the whole of the judgment is that the learned judge

had not arrived at the conclusion that Labouchcrc vs. Dawson,

L. R. 13 Eq. 322 was wrong. l3nn1"r, L. J ., expressed a decided

approval of that decision. He was of opinion that, on the sale

of a good will for a valuable consideration, there was an

implied contract that the vendor would not solicit former cus-

tomers, who were really the people who formed the good will.

The next case in which the matter was brought under the

consideration of the court of appeal was that of Walker vs.

Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355. In that case the good will of the busi-

ness carried on by a bankrupt had been sold by his trusteesin

bankruptcy. It was sought afterwards to restrain the bank-

rupt from soliciting the customers of that business. Sir

Gnoncn Jnssnn, M. R., refused tojgrant an injunction on the

ground that the doctrine laid down in Labouclmrc vs. Dawson,

L. B., 13 Eq. 322, did not apply to the case of a bankrupt whose

business had been sold by his trustees. This judgment was

closes the view taken by the learned judges, who, on that
occasion, constituted the court of appeal, on the point now
under consideration.
In the case of Pearson -r:s. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 to which
I shall have occasion to refer immediately, CoTTO)J, L. J., stated
that the decision in Labouchcre vs. Daicson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322,
was doubted in Lcg,qott vs Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, by J A:\rns,. L.
J ., and himself. This is no doubt correct so far as COTTON, L. J.,
is concerned; but I am unable to find any clear indication that
thh~ was the view of JA!lms, L. J. It is quite true that in an
early part of his judgment he said: "I do not like going much
into the case, because ·what I should say might perhaps be
considered to mean that the injunction whic3. is submitted
to is too wide." But in a later part of the judgment he says:
"At first it did not appear to me that we might, from the
(>quitable view of the cas~, say that the defendant shall be prevented from dealing with.any customer or customers whom
he bad solicited; but it appeared to me that that was too vague
and too wide." He pointed out that a man might give tlle
order afterwards without any reference to previous solicitation. Further on, when discussing the effect of the agree·
ment, and showing that there was no implied obligation not
to deal with the customer, he says: "It means that you are
not to solicit customers." The impression produced upon my
mind by the whole of the judgment is that the learned judge
bad not arrived at the conclusion thnt Laboucltcrc -vs. Dawson,
L. R. 13 Eq. 322 was wrong. BnETT, l.1. J., expressed a decided
approval of that decision. He was of opinion that, on the sale
of a good will for a valuable consideration, there was an
implied contract that the vendor would not solicit former CURtomers, who were really the pe-0ple who formed the good will.
The next case in which the matter was brought under tbe
consideration of the court of appeal was that of Walker t:.'l.
Mottram., 19 Ch. D. 3ri5. In that case the good will of th~ business carried on by a bankrupt bad been sold by his trustees in
bankruptcy. It wa.s sought afterwards to restrain the bankrupt from soliciting the customPrs of that business. Sir
GEORGE JESSEL, 1\1. R., refused to grnnt an injunction on the
ground that the doctrine laid down in Labouclwrc -rs. Dazc.<Jon,
TJ. R., 13 Eq. 322, did not apply to the case of a bankrupt wbosP.
bm;iness bad been sold by his trustees. This judgment was
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aﬂirmed by the court of appeal. Of the lord justices who then

constituted the court, BAGGALLAY, L. J., expressed a strong

doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Labouchere vs.

Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322. He said that it appeared to him, as

at present advised, that it went far beyond what any of the pre-

vious decisions would have sanctioned. Lcsn and Lmnuar,

L. JJ., the other members of the court, said that the rule laid

down in Labouchcre vs. Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322, had, it was

believed, been recognized and acted upon in practice, and,

whatever else might be said of it, the rule was in accordance

with the general opinion of what was fair and right, and was

easily applied.

In the case of Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, the question

came again before the court of appeal. The facts were there

less favorable to the plaintiff than in the case of Labouchere

vs. Dawson, and BAGGALLAY and Lmnnnr, L. JJ., both consid-

ered that, even if Labouchere vs. Dawson was rightly decided,

the case then before them was not’ governed by it. Bacon.-

LAY and Co1"roz~:, L. JJ., however, distinctly rested their judg-

ments on the ground that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

was wrong and ought to be overruled. LINDLEY, L. J., on the

other hand, was of opinion that it was rightly decided. The

reason of BAGGALLAY, L. J., for dissenting from Labouchere vs.

Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the report of his judgment,

appears to be that it went beyond a number of decision of a

higher court, and, as he thought, without sufficient reason.

Even assuming that the decision in Labouchere rs. Dawson

went beyond previous decisions, this does not seem to me to

afford any indication that it was wrong, unless it can be shown

that it was in conﬂict with the principles involved in those

earlier decisions. COTTON, L. J., examined the earlier deci-

sions and arrived at the conclusion that Lord Ennos was

against the notion that the vendor of the good will of a busi-

ness was, in the absence of express contract, to be restrained

from carrying on a similar business in the way in which he

might lawfully carry it on if there had been no sale of the good

will. The learned lord justice pointed out that Lord Romnnx

rested his decision in Labouchere rs. Dawson on the principle

that a man could not derogate from his grant. “But,” he said,

“it is admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his

business may et up a similar business next door and ay that

affirmed by the rourt of appeal. Of the lord justices who then
constituted the court, BAGGALLAY, L. J., expressed a strong
doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Labouchere vs.
Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322. He said that it appeared to him, as
at present advised, that it went far beyond what any of the pre·
vious decisions would have sanctioned. Ll:'SII and LrnDLEY,
L. J,J., the other members of the court, said that the rule laid
clown in Labouchcre i·s. Datcson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322, had, it was
ht>lieved, been recognized and acted upon in practice, and,
whatever else might be said of it, the rule was in accordanc<>
with the general opinion of what was fair and right, and was
easily a.pplied.
In the case of Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, the question
came again before the court of appeal. The facts were thl'r(•
less favorable to the plaintiff than in the case of Labouchere
t'B. Dairson, and BAGGAJ..LAY and LINDLEY, L. JJ., both consid·
ered that, eve~ if Labouchere vs. Daicson was rightly decided,
the case then before them was not" governed by it. BAGGALL.A.Y and CoTTON, L. JJ., however, distinctly rested their judgments on the ground that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson.
was wrong and ought to be overruled. LI:SDLEY, L. J., on the
other hand, was of opinion that it was rightly decided. The
reason of BAGGALL.&.Y, L. J., for dissenting from La.bouchere i·s.
Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the report of his judgment,
appears to be that it went beyond a number of decisions of a
higher court, and, as he thought, with<>ut sufficient reason.
Even assuming that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson
went beyond previous decisions, this does not seem to me to
afford any indication that it was wrong, unless it can be shown
that it was in conflict with the principles involved in those
earlier decisions. COTTON, L. J., examined the earlier decisions and arrived at the conclusion that Lord ELDON was
against the n<>tion that the vendor of the good will of a business was, in the absence of express contract, to be restrained
from carrying on a similar business in the way in which be
might lawfully carry it on if there bad been no sale of the good
will. The learned lord justice pointed out that Lord RoMILLY
rested his decision in Laboucltere i·s. Dau;son on the principle
that a man could not derogate from his grant. "But," he said,
"it is admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his
business may set up a similar business next door and say that
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proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customer from

going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. If

he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with him

and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to them and

ask them to do so? I think it would be wrong to put such a

meaning on ‘good will’ as would give a right to such an injunc-

tion as has been granted in the present case.”

I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state

at once, however, that I'can ﬁnd nothing in them inconsistent

with the decision in'Labouchere vs. Dawson. It no doubt went

beyond them, inasmuch a it dealt with a question not deter-

mined by them; but this seems to me to be no demerit, nor to

afford any indication that it was wrong. The earliest case

which has any bearing upon the point is that of Cruttwell vs.

Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, before Lord Ennox. The business of a

bankrupt, who was a carrier between Bristol and London, had

been sold by his assignees in bankruptcy. He afterwards com-

menced carrying on the trade of a carrier between Bristol,

Bath and London; but though the termini were the same the
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route employed was different. He addressed direct solicita-

tion to the public for the carriage of their goods, stating that

he had been reinstated in his business; and there was further,

in the opinion of the lord chancellor, so much probability of

direct solicitation to the customers of the old concern, in some

few instances that the fact might fairly be assumed. Under

these circumstances the purchaser of the bankrupt’s business

applied for an -injunction. The case was therefore the same

as Walker vs. Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355, w=here Sir Gnonon Jas-

snn—than whom no one has more strongly insisted upon the

propriety of the decision in Laboucherc vs. Da-wson—was of

opinion that no injunction should be granted. The bankrupt

was no party to the contract of sale; there could therefore be

no implied contract on his part to be derived from it. It is

most material also to observe what was the nature of the

injunction then in question. It was whether the bankrupt

was to be restrained from carrying on the trade which he was

pursuing of carrying goods between Bristol, Bath and London.

The lord chancellor held that he could not be so restrained;

and I think it must now be taken as settled that the sale of the

good will of a business, even when the vendor himself is a

I3
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be is the person who carried on the old business; yet such
proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customer from
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. If
he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with him
and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to them and
• ask them to do so? I think it would be wrong to put such a
meaning on 'good will' as would give a right to such an injunction as has been granted in the present case."
I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state
at once, however, that I can find nothing in them inconsistent
with the decision in Laboucnere -vs. Dawson. It no doubt went
bc>yond them, inasmuch as it dealt with a question not deter·
mined by them; but this seems to me to be no demerit, nor to
~tfford any indication that it was wrong.
The earliest case
which has any bearing upon the point is that of Cruttmell vs.
Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, before Lord ELoo~. The business of a
bankrupt, who was a carrier between Bristol and London, had
been sold by his assignees in bankruptcy. Ile afterwards commenced carrying on the trade of a carrier between Bristol>Bath and London; but though the termini were tile same the
route employed was different. Ile addressed direct solicitation to the public for the carriage of their goods, stating that
he had been reinstated in his business; and there was further,
in the opinion of the lord chancellor, so much p1·obability of
direct solicitation to the customers of the old concern, in some
few instances that the fact might fairly be assumed. Under
these circumstances the purchaser of the bankrupt's business
applied for an injunction. The case was therefore the same
· as Walker vs . .Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355, where Sir GEORGE JESSEL-than whom no one has more strongly insisted upon the
propriety of the decision in Laboucltere t:s. Daicson-was of
opinion that no injunction should be granted. The bankrupt
was no party to the contract of sale; there could the1·efore be
no implied contract on his part to be derived from it. It is
most material also to observe what was the nature of the
injunction then in question. It was whether the bankrupt
was to be restrained from carrying on the trade which be waa
pursuing of carrying goods between R1·istol, B:ith and London.
'l'he lord chancellor held that he could not be so restrained;
and I think it must now be taken as settled that the sale of the
~ood will of a business, even when 1be vendor himself is a
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party to the contract, does not impose upon him any obliga-

tion to refrain from carrying on a trade of the same nature as

before. But Lord ELDON certainly did not decide that such a

vendor was entitled to solicit the customers of the old-ﬁrm.

He was not asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant

from so doing. It was suﬂicient for the decision of that case-

that, in the opinion of the lord chancellor, there was no prin-

ciple arising out of the provisions of the bankruptcy law upon

which the court could hold that the bankrupt ought not to

engage in the same trade and by the same road as before;

though I think that, so far, the opinion of the lord chancellor

would have been the same if the sale o-f the business had been

effected by the bankrupt himself and not by his assignees.

The importance of the case consists in the deﬁnition which

Lord ELDON gave of the good will there sold. He said: “The

good will which has been the subject of sale is nothing more

than the probability that the old customers will resort to the

old place. Fraud would form a different consideration; but if

that effect was prevented by no other means than those which

belong to the fair course of improving a trade in which it was
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lawful to engage, I should, by interposing carry the effect of

injunction to a much greater length than any decision has

authorized or imagination ever suggested.’/? These observa-

tions were much reliedon by COTTON, L. J ., in Pedrson vs. Pear-

son, 27 Ch. D. 145. If the language of Lord Ennox is to be

taken as a deﬁnition of good will of general application, I think

it is far too narrow, and I am not satisﬁed that it was intended

by Lord Ennox as -an exhaustive deﬁnition.

“ ‘Good will,’ I apprehend,” said Wool), V. 0., in Ohurton vs.

Douglas, Joh. 174, 188, “must mean every advantage—every

positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with

the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the

business hirnself—that has been acquired by the old ﬁrm in

carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises

in which the business was previously carried on, or with the

name of the late ﬁrm, or with any other matter carrying with

it the beneﬁt of the business.” The learned vice chancellor

pointed out in this connection that it would be absurd to say

that when a large wholesale business is conducted the public

are mindful whether it is carried on in Fleet street or in the

Strand._ '

party to the contract, does not impose upon him any obligation to refrain from carrying on a trade of the same nature as
before. But Lord ELDON certainly did not decide that such a
vendor was entitled to solicit the customers of the old· firm.
He was not asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from so doing. It was sufficient for the decision of that case• .
that, in the opinion of the lord chancellor, there was no principle arising out of the provisions of the bankruptcy law upon
which the court could hold that the bankrupt ought not to
engage in the same trade and by the same road as before;
though I think that, so far, the opinion of the lord chancellor
would have been the same if the sale of the business had been
effected by the bankrupt himself and not by his assignees.
The importance of the case consists in the definition which
Lord ELDON gave of the good will there sold. He said: ''The
good will which bas been the subject of sale is nothing more
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the
old place. Fraud would form a different consideraition; but if
that effect was prevented by no other means than those which
belong to the fair course of improving a trade in which it was
lawful to engage, I should, by interposing carry the effect of
injunction to a much greater length than any decision baa
authorized or imagination ever suggested~ These observations were much relied on by COTTON, L. J., in Petit-son vs. Pea.rson, 27 Ch. D. 145. If the language of Lord ELDON is to be
taken as a definition of good will of general application, I think
it is far too narrow, and I am not satisfied that it was intended
by Lord ELDON as an exhaustive definition.
"'Good will,' I apprehend," said 'Vooo, V. C., in Ohurton t:B.
Douglas, Job. 174, 188, "must mean every advantage-every
positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with
the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the
business himself-that has been acquired by the old firm in
carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises
in which the business was previously carried on, or with the
name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with
it the benefit of the business." The learned vice chancellor
pointed out in this connection that it would be absu:rd to say
that when a la:rge wholesale business is conducted the public
are mindful whether it is carried on in Fleet street or in the
Strand..
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The question, what is meant by “good will,” is, no doubt, a

critical one. Sir GEORGE J nssnn, discussing in Ginesi rs.

Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, the language of WOOD, V. C., which I

have just quoted, said: “Attracting customers to the business

is a matter connected with the carryingtof ityog. It is the

formation of that connection which has made the value of the

thing that the late ﬁrm sold, and they really had nothing else

to sell in the shape of good will.” ' He pointed out that, in the

case before him, the connection had been formed by years of

work. The members of the ﬁrm knew where to sell the stone,

and he asked: “Is it to be supposed that they did not sell

that personal connection when they sold the trade or business

and the good will thereof?”

The present master of the rolls took much the same_view as

to what constitutes the good will of a business. I cannot

myself doubt that they were right. It is the connection thus

formed together with the circumstances, whether of habit or

otherwise, which tend to make it permanent, that constitutes

the good will of a business. It is this which constitutes the

difference between a business just started, which has no good
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will attached to it, and one which has acquired a good will.

The former trader has to seek out his customers from among

the community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready

made. He knows what members of the community are pur-

chasers of the articles in which he deals, and are not attached

by custom to any other establishment. What obligations then

does the sale of the good will of a business impose upon the

vendor? I do not think they would necessarily be the same

under all circumstances.

In Cook vs. Collingridge, Collyer on Partnership, 2d Ed. 215,

27 Beav. 456, Lord Chancellor Ennos had to determine what

orders were to be given where a partnership had expired by

eﬁiuxion of time, and where the good will had to be valued.

He declared that there existed no obligation upon the part-

ners to restrain them from carrying on the same trade, or any

of them wanting to do so; that a claim to have an estimated

value put upon any subject that could be considered as

described by the term “good will” could not be supported upon

the same grounds or principles as those upon which a value

was received from a partner buying the share of the partner

going out of the business and retiring from the trade alto-

The question, what is meant by "good will," is, no doubt, a
critical one. Sir GEORGE JESSEL, discussing in Ginesi -i;s.
Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, the language of Wooo, V. C., which I
have just quoted, said: "Attra<..1:ing customers to the business
is a matter connected with the carrying (~f it ·~ It is the
formation of that connection which has made the value of the
thing that the late firm sold, and they really had nothing else
to sell in the shape of good will." · He poi.n ted out that, in the
case before him, the connection had been formed by years of
work. The members of the firm knew where to sell the stone,
and he asked: "Is it to be supposed that they did not sell
·that personal connection when they sold the trade or business
and the good will thereof?"
The present master of the rolls took much the same. view as
to what constitutes the good will of a business. I cannot
myself doubt that they were right. It is the connection thus
formed together with the circumstances, whether of habit or
otherwise, which tend to make it permanent, that constitutes
the good will of a business. It is this which constitutes the
difference between a business just started, which has no good
will attached to it, and one which has acquired a good will.
The former trader has to seek out his customers from among
the community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready
made. He knows what memt>ers of the community are purchasers of the articles in which be deals, and are not attached
by custom to any other establishment. ·what obligations then
does the sale of the good will of a business impose upon the
vendor? I do not think they would necessarily be the same
under all circumstances.
In Cook vs. Collingridge, Collyer on Partnership, 2d Ed. 215,
27 Beav. 456, Lord Chancellor ELDON bad to determine what
orders were to be given where a partnership bad expired by
effluxion of time, and where the good will had to be valued.
He declared that there existed no obligation upon the partners to restrain them from carrying on th~ same trade, or any
of them wanting to do so; that a claim to have an estimated
value put upon any subject that could be considered as
described by the term "good will" could not be supported upon
the same grounds or principles as those upon which a. value
was received from a partner buying the share of the partner
going out of the business and retiring from the trade alto-
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gether. He thought that all that could be valued was the

chance of the customers adhering to the old establishment,

notwithstanding that the previous partners or any of them

carried on a similar business elsewhere.

In Johnson vs. Hcllcley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, a bill was ﬁled by

the surviving partner to wind up the business of the partner-

ship. The usual decree was made. The chief clerk certiﬁed

that it was most beneﬁcial that the business should be sold

as a going concern. The master of the rolls ordered it to be

stated in the advertisement and particulars that the surviving

partner would be at liberty to continue carrying on the busi-

ness of a wine merchant in the same town and place. This

judgment was aﬂirmcd by the Lord Justices. In Hall vs. Bar-

rows, 4 D. J. & S. 150, Lord Chancellor WI-zsrnunv said: “I

think the direction to value the good will should be accom-

panied by a declaration deﬁning what is meant by it, at least

negatively; that is to say, a declaration that the good will is

not to be valued upon the principle that the surviving part-

ner, if he were not the purchaser, will be restrained from set-

ting up the same description of business.” In cases of this
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description, where a partnership has been dissolved by etllux-

ion of time or death, the good will is regarded as a part of the

assets, and subject therefore to realization on winding up the

partnership; but it would obviously be absurd that because a

partnership becomes thus dissolved those who formerly con-

stituted the ﬁrm, or the survivors thereof, where the dissolu-

tion has been due to death, should thereafter be restrained

from carrying on what trade they pleased. \Vhatever restric-

tion the sale of the good will may im-pose, it is clear that in

this class of cases it could not extend to prevent the former

partners carrying on a similar trade to that in which they

were previously engaged. It is noteworthy that in Johnson vs.

Hcl-IcIe_1/, 2 D. J. & S. 446, it was thought necessary to warn

intending purchasers that, though the good will was being

sold, one of the persons who had previously carried on the

bnsiness might continue to trade in the same town; and Lord

\\'r:s'rni:nY thought it necessary to give the same warning to

the person who was to value the good will in Hall vs. Barrows,

4 D. J. & S. 151). _

These circumstances appear to me to afford an indication

that the courts recognized that their view of what was meant

by “good will” and the etfect of a sale of it differed from the

gether. He thought that all that could be valued was th~
chance of the customers adhering to the old establishment,
notwithstanding that the previous partners or any of them
carried on a similar business elsewhere.
In Johnson i·s. Hellcley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, a bill was filed by
the surviving pa~tner to wind up the business of the partnership. The usual dt>cree was made. The chief clerk certified
that it was most beneficial that the business should be sold
as a going conc<>rn. The master of the rolls ordered it to be
stated in the adverti~ment and particulars that the survh·ing
partner would be at liberty to c<Jntinue carrying on the business of a wine merchant in the same town and pince. This
judgment was affirnwd by the Lord Justices. In Hall -z:s. Barroirs, 4 D. J. & S. 150, L<Jrd Chancellor \VESTBURY said: "I
think the dirPetion to value the good will should be accompanied by a declai·ation defining what is meant by it, at least
negatively; that is to say, a declaration that the good will is
not to be valued upon the principle that the sur\"iving partner, if he were not the purchaser, will be restrained from setting up the same description of business." Jn cases of this
deseription, where a partnership has been dissolved by efiluxion of time or death, the go-0d will is regarded as a part of the
assets, and subject therefore to ri:•alization on winding up the
partnership; but it would obviously be absurd that because n.
partnership b<'comes thus dissolved those who formerly constituted the firm, or the survi\'ors th::-1·eof, where the dissolution has been due to dc>ath, should thereafter be restrained
from carrying on what tl'ade thry pleased. \Vhutevt•r restriction the sale of the good will may imposc>, it is clear that in
this class of cases it could not extend to prevent the former
partners carr,vin~ on a similar trad ~ to that in which they
were pre,·iously engag<'d. It is notewo11by that in Johnson t'S.
Hr1lclcy, 2 D . .J. & S. 44G, it was thought necessary to warn
intending pnrehni;:C'rs that, though the good will was being
sol<l, one of thC' persons who had previously carried on the
bu:--iness might eo11tinue to trade in the same town; and Lord
"'1·:sTin:nY thought it necessary to give the same warning to
the person who was to value th~ good will in Hall vs. Barroics,
4 D. J. & S. l:JO.
'l'hese <"ircumstances appear to me to afford an indication
tliat the courts rC'co~nized that th<'ir view of what was meant
by "good will" and the effect of a sale of it ditiercd from the
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popular conception. Vv'here the good will of a business is not
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sold under circumstances such as I have been discussing, but

the sale is the voluntary act of the vendors, I am by no means

satisﬁed that a different effect might not have been given to

the sale and the obligations which it imposed. It might have

been held that the vendor was not entitled to derogate from

his grant by seeking in any manner'to withdraw from the pur-

chaser the customers of the old business, as he would do by

setting up a business in such a place or under such circum-

stances that it would immediately compete for the old custom~

1-rs. It is now, however, too late to make any such distinction.

I think it must be treated as settled that whenever the good

will of a business is sold the vendor does not, by reason only

of that sale, come under a restriction not to carry on a com-

peting business. This is really the strong point in the posi-

tion of those who maintain that Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R.

13 Eq. 322, was wrongly decided. Co'r'ros, L. J., says: “It is

admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his busi-

ness may set up a similar business next door and say that he

is the person who carried on the old business. Yet such pro-
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ceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customers from

going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line.

If he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with

him and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to

them and ask them to do so?” I quite feel the force of this

argument, but it does not strike me as conclusive. It is often

impossible to draw the line and yet possibly to be perfectly

certain that particular acts are on one side of it or the other.

It does not seem to me to follow that because a man may, by

his acts, invite all men to deal with him, and so, amongst the

rest of mankind, invite the former customers of the ﬁrm, he

may use the knowledge which he has acquired of what per-

sons were customers of the old ﬁrm in order, by an appeal

to them, to eek to weaken their habit of dealing where they

have dealt before, or whatever else binds them to the old busi-

ness, and so to secure their custom for himself.’ This seems

to me to be a direct and intentional dealing with the good

will and endeavor to destroy it. If a person who has pre

viously been a partner in a ﬁrm sets up in a business on his

own account and appeals generally for custom, he only does

that which any member of the public may do, and which those

27

popular conception. Where the good will of a business is not
sold under circumstances such as I have been discussing, but
the sale is the voluntary act of the vendors, I am by no means
satisfied that a different effect might iiot have been given to
the sale and the obligations which it imposed. It might have
been held that the vendor was not entitled to derogate from
his grant by seeking in any manner'to withdraw from the pur<'haser the customers of the old business, as be would do by
~ctting up a business in such a place or under such circum.-tances that it would immediately compete for the old custom-<•rs. It is now, however, too la.te to make any such distinction.
I think it must be treated as settled that wbeneve1· the
will of a business is sold the vendor does not, by reason only
of that sale, come under a restriction not to carry on a comJ>eting bnsin~ss. This· is really the strong point in the position of those who maintain that Laboucltere vs. Dawson, L. R.
13 Eq. 322, was wrongly decided. CoTTON, L. J., says: "It ia
admitted that a person who bas sold the good will of bis business may set up a similar business next door and say that be
is the person who carried on the old business. Yet such pro("eedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customers from
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line.
If he ~y, by bis acts, invite the old customers to deal with
him and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to
them and ask them to do so?" I quite feel the force of this
argument, but it does not strike me as conclusive. It is often
impo~sible to dra.w the line and yet possibly to be perfectly
certain that particular acts are on one side of it or the other.
It does not seem to me to follow that because a man may, by
his acts, invite all men to deal with him, and so, amongst the
rest of mankind, invite the former customers of the firm, he
may use the knowledge which be bas acquired of what persons were customers of the old firm in order, by an appeal
to them, to seek to weaken their habit of dealing where they
have dealt before, or whatever else binds them to the old business, and so to secure their custom for himself., This seems
to me to be a direct and intentional dealing with the good
will and endeavor to destroy it. If a person who has previously been a partner in a firm sets up in a business on his
own account and appeals generally for custom, he only does
that which any member of the public may do, and which those

good
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carrying on the same trade are already doing. It is true that
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those who were former customers of the ﬁrm to which he

=belonged may of their own accord transfer their custom to

.him; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable, and does

not result from any act of his. He only conducts his busi-

ness in precisely the same way as he would if he had never

been a member of the ﬁrm to which he previously belonged.

~But when he speciﬁcally and directly appeals to those who

were customers of the previous ﬁrm he seeks to take advan-

tage of the connection previously formed by his old ﬁrm, and

of the knowledge of that connection which he has previously

acquired, to take that which constitutes the good will away

-from the persons to whom it has been sold and to restore

it to himself. It is said, indeed, that he may not represent

himself as a successor of the old ﬁrm, or as carrying on a

continuation of their business, but this in many cases appears

to me of little importance, and of small practical advantage.

if canvaing the customers of the old ﬁrm were allowed with-

out restraint. I do not think that in cases where an injunc-

tion was granted in the terms employed in Labouchere vs. Daw-
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son, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, there would be any real diﬂiculty in

drawing the line and determining whether there had been a

breach of it or not. In several cases such injunctions were

granted. and there i nothing to show that any practical dif-

ﬂculty arose in enforcing them. It is not material to consider

whether, on the sale of a good will, the obligation on the part

of the vendor to refrain from canvassing the customers is to

be regarded as based upon the principle that he is not entitled

-to depreciate that which he has sold, or as arising from an

implied contract to abstain from any act intended to deprive

the purchaser of that which has been sold to him and to

restore it to the vendor. I am satisﬁed that the obligation

'exists, and ought to be enforced by a court of equity. I have

so far dealt with the case as if the good will had been sold,

but I think the rights and obligations must be precisely the

same for present purposes when, on the creation of a partner-

ship, it has been agreed that the good will shall belong

exclusively to one of the partners.

For these reasons I think the judgment must be reversed

and that an injunction should he granted in the form adopted

in Labouchere cs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, with the modiﬁca-

carrying on the same trade are already doing. It is true that
those who were former customers of the firm to which he
:belonged may of their own accord transfer their custom to
.him; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable, and does
not result from any act of his. He only conducts bis busiReSB in precisely the same way as he would if he had never
been a member of the firm to which he previously belonged.
·But when he specifically and directly appeals to tboRe who
were cm~tomers of the previous firm he seeks to take advantage of the connection previously formed by bis old firm, and
of the knowledie of that connection which he has previously
acquired, to take that which constitutes the good will away
·from the persons to whom it has been sold and to restore
it to hi111.tSelf. It is said, indeed, that he may not represent
himself as a successor of the old firm, or as Qarrying on a
contilrnation of their business, but this in many cases appears
to me of little importance, and of small practical adV'antage.
if canvassiag the customers of the old firm were allowed without restraint. I do not think that in cases where an injunction was granted in the terms employed in Labouc11cre vs. Dau:son, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, there would be any real difficulty in
drawi11g the line and determining whether there had been a
breach of it or not. In several cases such injunctions were
•granted, and there is nothing to show that any practical difficulty arose in enforcing them. It is not material to consider
whether, on the sale of a good will, the obligation on the part
·of the vendor to refrain froll) canvassing the customers is to
'he regarded as based upon the principle that he is not entitled
to depreciate that which he has sold, or as arising from an
implied contract to abstain from any act intended to deprive
the purcba~er of that which has been sold to him and to
restore it to the vendor. I am satisfied that the obligation
'exists, and ought to be enforced by a court of equity. I have
so far dealt with the case as if the good will had been sold,
but I think the rights and obligations must be precisely the
same for present purposes when, on the creation of a partnership, it has been agreed that the good will shall belong
exclusively to one of the partners.
For th£'!5e reasons I think the judgment must be reversed
and thut an injunction i.-;hould he granted in the form adopted
in Labouchere i:s. Dairsun, L. R. ta Eq. 322, with the modifica-
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tion rendered necessary by the circumstance that here the
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partnership has not yet expired.

Under the very peculiar circumstances I think that_no costs

should be given here or in the court of appeal. -

Lords MACNAGHTEN, DAVEY and Asnnocnxn, concurred.

Order of the court of appeal reversed, with a declaration

that the appellants are entitled to an injunction restraining

the respondent, his partners, servants, or agents, from apply-

ing privately, by letter, personally, or by a traveler, to any

person who was, prior to the dissolution of the partnership,

a customer of the ﬁrm of Tabor, T1-ego & Co., asking such cus-

tomer to continue after the dissolution to deal with him, the

respondent, or not to deal with the appellant; the respond-

ent to repay to the appellants the costs in the court of appeal

paid by them to him. 1

Cause remitted to the chancery division.

z
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tion rendered necessary by the circumstance that here the
partnership has not yet expired.
Under the very peculiar circumstances I think that.no costs
should be given here or i,i the court of appeal.
Lords MACNAGHTEN, DA VEY and ASHBOt:RXE, concurred.
Order of the court of appeal reversed, with a declaration
that the appellants are entitled to an injunction restraining
_the ~spondent, his partners, servants, or agents, from applying privately, by ·Jetter; per8onally, or by a traveler, to any
person who was, prior to the dissolution of the partnership,
a customer of the ftrm of Tabor, Trego & Co., asking such customer to continue after the dissolution to deal with him, the
respondent, or not to deal with the appellants; the respondent to repay to the appellants the costs in the court of appeal
paid by them to him.
A
Cause remitted to the chancery division.
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VII.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARD

-~·
\

EACH OTHER.

LATTA vs. KILBOURN.

United States Supreme Court, 1893.

150 U. S. 524, 37 L. Ed. 1169.

Action by Kilbourn and Olmstead against Latta for an

account of proﬁts made by the latter in transactions which

the former claimed were partnership transactions and the

beneﬁt of which therefore enured to the ﬁrm, of which all

VII.

three had been members but which was now dissolved. Latta

and Kilbourn had been partners as “real estate brokers and

auctioneers” under the ﬁrm name of Kilbourn & Latta. After-

wards Olmstead was taken into the ﬁrm, the name remaining

the same. During the continuance of the ﬁrm, Latta entered

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARD
EACH OTHER.

into real estate speculations with one Dr. Stearns, which

resulted in large proﬁts, and it was to secure a share in these

that this action was chieﬂy instituted. The court below

decreed that Latta should account to his former partners for

these proﬁts, and Latta appealed. It was claimed by com-
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plainants that, when Olmstead was taken into the ﬁrm, a new

tATTA vs. KILBOURN.

arrangement was made to the effect that if either member

heard of a piece of property for sale and saw an opportunity

United States Supreme Court,

189~.

for speculation, or was going into any speculation, it should be

communicated to the ﬁrm, so that the other partners also

might have an opportunity of going into the speculation.

150 U. 8. 524, 87 L. Ed. 1169.

Other facts appear in the opinion.

W. D. Dazvidgc, for appellant.

Enoch Toltcn and W. F. .-llattingtw/, for appellees.

\
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Action by Kilbourn and Olmstead against Lattll for an
account of profits made by the latter in transactions which
the former claimed were pa1·tnership transactions and the
heneftt of which therefore enured fo the firm, of which all
three had been membel"B but which was now dissolved. Latta
and Kilbourn had been partners as "real estate brokers and
auctioneers" under the firm name of Kilbourn & Latta. Afterwards Olmstead was taken into the firm, the na~ rema.i ning
the sauie. During the continuance of the ftrm, Latta entered
into real eetate speculations with one Dr. Stearns, which
resulted in large priofits, and it was to secure a share in these
that this action was chiefly instituted. · The court below
decreed that Latta should account to his former partners for
these profits, and IALtta appealed. It was claimed by complainants that, when Olmstead was taken into the firm, a new
arrangement was made to the effect that if either member
heard of a piece of property for sale and ea w an opportunity
for speculation, or was going into any speculation, it should bP
communicated to the firm, so that the other partners also
might have an opportunity of going into the speculation.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
W. D. nat,i<lgc, for appellant.
Enoch Tolfcn and W. F. Jlatti11gl,11, for appellees.
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Jacxson, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of other
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matters.) The court below based opinion upon two grounds:

First, that the scope of the cop nership business and agree-

ment, as alleged in the third paragraph of the bill, was estab-

lished, and that the appellant could not engage in purchases

of real estate on his own account or in connection with others

except by the consent of his copartners, without violating the

duty and obligation which he owed to his ﬁrm; and, se{:p_1_1ﬂQ,

that, even if the copartnership did not include the business of

buying and selling real estate on partnership account, still the

appellant could not employ the knowledge and information

acquired in the course of the partnership business in respect

to the real estate market, in making purchases or transactions

for his own beneﬁt.

The general principles on which the court proceeded admit

of no question, it being settled that one- partner cannot,

directly or indirectly, use partnership assets for his own bene-

ﬁt; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partner-

ship, take any proﬁt clandestinely for himself; that he cannot

carry on the business of the partnership for his private advan-
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tage; that he cannot carry on another business in competition

or rivalry with that of the ﬁrm, thereby depriving it of the

beneﬁt of his time, skill, and ﬁdelity without being account-

able to his copartners for any proﬁt that may accrue to him

therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself

that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the ﬁrm of

which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge

or information, which may be properly regarded as the prop-

erty of the partnership, in the sen-se that it is available or

useful to the ﬁrm for any purpose within the scope of the

partnership business.

It therefore becomes necessary, in testing the liability of the

appellant to account for the proﬁts realized from the trans-

actions with Stearns, to consider and ascertain what was the

scope of the partnership agreement in reference to the pur-

essential fact on which rests the proper determination of the

question whether the appellant, in engaging in the joint enter-

prise with Stearns, violated any duty or obligation which he

owed to the ﬁrm of Kilbourn & Latta. In other words, the

{ihase and sale of real estate. This is the underlying and

uestion on this branch of the case depends entirely upon this:

JACKSON, J. (After stating the facts &nd disposing of other
matters.) The court below ba~ its opinion upon two grounds:
First, that the scope of the cop~nership business and agreement, as alleged in the third paragraph of the bill, was estab•
Itshed, and that the appellant could not engage in purchases
of real estate on his own account or in oonnection with otherH
except by the consent of his copartne1·s, without violating t'he
duty and obligation which he owed to his firm; and, ~omllJ,
that, even if the copartnership did not include the business of
buying and selling real estate on partnership account, still the
appellant oould not employ the knowledge and information
acquired in the course of the partn~rship business in respect
to the real estate market, in making purchases or transactions
for his own benefit.
The general principles on which the court proceeded admit
of no question, it being settled that one. partner cannot,
directly or indirectly, use partnership a~sets for his own benPftt; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partnership, take any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot
carry on the business of the partnership for his private advantage; that he cannot carry on another business in competition
or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the
benefit of his time, skill, and fidelity without being accountabJ.e to his copartners for any profit that may accrue to him
therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself
that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of
which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge
or information, which may be properly regarded as the property of the partnership, in the sense that it is available ot'.
useful to the firm for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business.
It therefore beoomes necessary, in testin~ thf' liability of tl11!
appellant t-0 account for the profits realized from the transactions with Stearns, to consider and asce1·tain what was the
scope of the partnership agreement in reference to the purchase and sale of real estate. This is the underlying and
essential fact on which rests the proper d~termination of the
question whether the appellant, in engaging in the joint entnprise with Stearns, violated any duty or obligation which he
owed to the firm of Kilbourn & Latta. In other words, the
ue&tion <>n this branch of the caf'e de-pends entirely upon this:
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.VVere or were not those transactions within the scope of the
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ﬁrm business, in respect to which Latta owed a duty to his

ﬁrm, or in respect to which he could properly be said to be

the agent of the ﬁrm?

In his answer, which was called for under oath, Latta posi-

tively and in direct terms denied the allegation of the bill that

it was ever agreed that the ﬁrm should carryton the busi-

ness of buying and selling real estate, and that at no time was

such transaction within the scope of the partnership business.

Under the well-settled rules of equity pleading and practice.

this answer must be overcome by the testimony of at least two

witnesses, or of one witness with corroborating circumstances.

The proofs in the present case not only fail to break down

his denial on this point. but on the contrary aﬂirmatively estab-

lish that neither under the ﬁrst nor the second ﬁrm of Kil-

bourn & Latta did the partnership agreement extend to the

business of buying and selling real estate either for invest-

ment or for speculation on ﬁrm account. The appellee Kil-

bourn. when pressed upon the question, evaded a reply thereto,

and Olmstead, in his sworn testimony, failed to support the
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allegation of the bill as made on that particular subject. O11

the other hand. the testimony of the appellant fully supported

the denial of his answer. and he is corroborated by all the

facts and circumstances in the ease, such as the character of

the business as advertised and as actually conducted. The

well-known characteristics of “real estate and note brokers,"

indicating as the words imply, those engaged in negotiating

the sale and purchase of real property for the account of

others, aﬁ'ord a presumptive limitation upon the scope of the

business, such as the appellant asserted and testiﬁed to in

this case. His sworn answer and testimony on this point has

not been overcome by the vague and equivocal testimony of

the appellees. The court below was in error in ﬁnding as a

matter of fact that the partnership extended to the buying

and selling of real estate for the account of the ﬁrm. There is,

therefore, no right on the part of the complainants to relief

in this cause. based upon the consideration that the scope and

character of the partnership business embraced the purchase

and sale of real estate. either for the ﬁrm alone, or jointly with

others.

The further allegation of the bill, “that all proﬁts result-

ing from operations in real estate by any memberof the ﬁrm

:\Vere or were not those h'ansactions within the scope of the
{ firm business, in re1o1pect to which Latta owed a duty to his.
fl.rm, or in respect to which he could properly be said to be
the agent of the fl rm?
In bis answer, which wns called for under oath, Latta poKitively and in direct terms denied the allegation of the bill that
it was ever agreed that the firm should carry. on the business of buying and selling l'{'-31 estate, and that at no time waR
such trammction within the scope of the partne1•ship businesi,;.
'VndN the well-settled rules of t>quity pleading and practice,
)
~his answ••r must be ovt:'rcome b~· the tN1timony of at least two
witnesses, or of one witness with corroborating circumstances.
Th(· proof1o1 in t.he present case not only fail to break down
his dPuial on t11is point, but on thP eontrnry affirmatively estabJi!olh that nPithPr und<•1· the first nor the second finu of Kilbourn & Latta did the partnership ag1-eement extend to the
busiiwss of bu~·ing and selling real estate eitl1er for inv~t
ment or for s1weulation on firm ac('ount. The appellee Kil·
bourn. wlwn pressed upon the question, evaded a reply thereto,
and Olmi;1tead, in his Kworn t<•stimony, failed to support the
allegation of the bill a.s made on that particular subject. On
the otlwr hand. tlw tPstimony of the appellant fully supported
the denial of his answer, and he is corroborated by all tht~
facts and circumstance-s in thl:' ruse, i;mch as the character of
the business as advertised and us actually conducted. The
w<>ll-known charactt~1:istics of "rt>al estate and note brokers,''
indic,ating as the words imply, those engaged in negotiating
the sale and purchase of real property for the account of
others, afford a presumptive limitation upon the scope of the
bn8iness, such as the appPllant a.sserted and testified to in
this ea~. His swom answe1· and testimony on this point has
not be<>n on•rcome by the vague and equivocal testimony of
the appelle(•R. The court below w:u; in error in finding as a
mattPr of fact that the partnership exfrrnled to the buying
and selling of real Psta.te for the account of the firm. There is,
thPrefore, no right on the part of the complainants to relief
in this cuut'lt'. based upon the consi<lf'ration that the Rcope and
character of the partnership business embraced the purchase
and sale of real estate, either for the firm alone, or jointly with
others.
The further allegation of thP bill, "that all profits resulting from operations in real c>8tate by any member·of the firm
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should belong to said ﬁrm and be entered upon the books of

the ﬁrm and be paid into the partnership account, and that no

member of said ﬁrm should engage in the business of buy-V

ing and selling real estate in the said district on.his own,

account, or with any other person or persons, except in cases,

where the proposed transaction had been explained to the said

ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm had declined to take any part therein,” was

also positively denied by the answer of the appellant under

oath. There is no testimony in the cause to overcome that

denial. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that there

was no such restriction or limitation im-posed upon the indi-l

vidual members. So that the complainants were entitled to,

no relief on that ground. .

But aside from the foregoing questions of fact, how stands

the case on the assumption that there was a new stipulation

or agreement when Olmstead was taken into the ﬁrm (as

claimed by Kilbourn and Olmstead, and as set out above) that

knowledge and information obtained by any member of the

ﬁrm as to bargains in real estate should be ﬁrst communi-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cated to the ﬁrm, with the view of giving the ﬁrm, or the mem-

bers thereof, the ﬁrst opportunity of purchasing, before any

individual member thereof could act upon such knowledge or.

information for his own beneﬁt? Can the agreement to fur-_

nish information as to bargains in real estate and give copart-

ners the option of taking beneﬁt of such bargains, be consid-

cred as so enlarging the scope of the partnership business as

to include therein the purchase and sale of real estate on

joint account? It would be a perversion of language and a

confusion of ideas to treat such a stipulation, if it were clearly

establihed, as creating a partnership in future options to buy

what did not already, by the terms of the copartnership, come

within the scope and character of the partnership business.

That alleged stipulation, instead of enlarging the partnership

business, was manifestly a restriction and limitation upon the

power and authority of the copartners to bind the ﬁrm, or the

members thereof, in any real estate transaction, until each

member had expressly consented or agreed to join in the par-

ticular purchae, specially submitted for consideration.

By the well-settled law of partnership each member of the‘

ﬁrm is both a principal and an agent to represent and bind‘

the ﬁrm and his associate partners in dealings and transactions‘

of Kilbourn & Latta during the existence of said partnership.
should belong to said firm and be entered upon the books of
the firm and be paid into the partnership account, and that no.
member of said firm should engage in the business of buying and selling real estate in the said district on. his own.
account, or with any other person or persons, except in cases
where the proposed transaction had been t>xplained to the said
firm, and the firm had declined to take any part therein," was
also positively denied by the answer of the .appellant under
oath. There is no testimony in the cause to overcome that
denial. On the contrary, the evidt:>nce establishes that taere
was no such restriction or limitation imposPd upon the individual members. So that the complainants were entitled to.
no relief on that ground.
But aside from the foregoing quest.ions of fact, how standR
the case on the assumption that there was a new stipulation
or agreement when Olmstead was taken into the firm (aB
claimed by Kilbourn and Olmstead, and as set out above) th-at
knowledge and information obtainf'il by any member of the
firm as to bargains in real estate should be fil"St communicated to the firm, with the view of giving the firm, or the mem bers thereof, the first opportunity of purchasing, before any
individual member thereof could .act upon such knowledge or
information for his own benefit? Can the agreement to fur-.
nish information as to bargains in real estate and give copartners the option of taking benefit of such bargains, be considered as so enlarging the scope of tlle partnership business as
to include therein the purchase and sale of real estate on
joint account? It would be a perversion of language and a
confusion of ideas to treat such a stipulation, if it were clearly
t>stablished, as creating a partnership in future options to buy
what did not already, by the terms of the copartnership, come
within the -scope and character of the partnership business.
That alleged stipulation. instead of Pnlarging the partnershjp
business, was manifestly a restriction and limitation upon the
power and authority of the copartners to bind the firm, or the
members thereof, in any real estate transaction, until each
member had expressly consented or agreed to join in the p:tr·
ticular purchase, spPeially submitted for consideration.
By the well-settled law of µartnPrship ea.eh member of the·
firm is both a principal and an agPnt to represent and bind ·
the firm and his associate partnt'rs in dt>alings and transactions;

216 Gases on Pxarsnnsmr.

within the scope of the copartnership. No express authority
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is necessary to confer this agency or ﬁduciary relation in

respect to the business of the ﬁrm. If the buying and elling

of real estate was a part of the business of Kilbourn & Latta,

the alleged stipulation about giving an option to the ﬁrm and

the members thereof to accept special bargains would have

been an idle arrangement. But under the alleged stipulation

each and every purchase of real estate was a special and indi-

vidual transaction or enterprise, requiring the special assent

and agreement of each partner thereto, before it bec-ame a sub-

ject of partnership, or was brought within the scope of the

partnership buiness. Under the operation of the agreement,

a partner who purchased real estate, either on joint or partner-

ship account, did so not under or by virtue of the partnership

articles, or under authority derived from the partnership busi-

ness and his implied agency to represent the ﬁrm therein, but

solely and exclusively from the special assent or agreement of

his associates to engage in that particular purchase. So that

each parcel of real estate to be acquired, as well as the agree-

ment to purchase the same, was ﬁrst made the subject of a
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special arrangement. It is difficult to understand how, under

such circumstances and conditions, a copartnership could prop-

erly be said to include or extend to the business of purchasing

and selling real estate.

The special subject of each purchase, as admitted by Kil-

bourn,—like the purchase of bonds and other securities,—did

not and could not come within the operation of the copartner-

sh-ip, or become a part of the partnership agreement, until each

particular piece of property had been selected and agreed upon.

It is undoubtedly true that, under this alleged agreement, if a

partner had submitted to the ﬁrm or his associates the

question of buying a particular parcel of land, and they had

agreed to make that purchase, he would thereafter have occu-

pied an agency or ﬁduciary relation in respect to that particu-

lar piece of property. But the question here is whether his

failure to give the ﬁrm, or his copartners, the opportunity of

making an election to buy certain real estate, and his making

the purchase thereof for his own account, or jointly with

another, is such a violation of his ﬁduciary relations to the

ﬁrm and his associates in respect to copartnership business as

to entitle the latter to call him to account f-or proﬁts realized

within the scope of the copartnersbip. No express authority
ls necessary to confer this agency or fiduciary relation in
respect to the business of the firm. If the buying and selling
of real estate was a pa.rt of the business of Kilbourn & Ldtta,
the alleged stipulation about giving an option to the firm and
the members thereof t-0 accept specia.l bargains would have
been an idle arrangement. But under the alleged stipulation
each and every purchase of real estate was a special and individual transaction or enterprise, requiring the special assent
and ag1-eement of each partner thereto, before it became a subject of partnership, or was brought within the scope of thE"
partnership business. Under the operation of the agreement,
a partner who purchased real estate, either on joint or partnet·ship account, did so not under or by virtue of the partnership
articles, or under authority derived from the partnership business and his implied agency to represent the firm therein, but
solely and exclusively from the special assent or agreement of
his associates to engage in that particular purchase. So that
each parcel of real estate to be acquired, as well as the agree·
ment to purchase the same, was first made the subject of a
special atrangement. It is difficult to understand how, under
such circumstances and conditions, a copartnership could properly be said to include or extend to the business of purchasing
and selling real estate.
The special subject of each purchase, as admitted by Kilbourn,-like the purchase of bonds and other securities,-did
n<>t and could not come within the operation of the copartnership, or become a part of the partnership.agreement, until each
particular piece of property had been selected and agreed upon.
It is undoubtedly true that, under this alleged agreement, if a
partner had submitted to the firm or his associates the
question of buying a particular parcel of land, and they had
agreed to make that purchase, he would thereafter have occupied an agency or fiduciary relation in respect to that particular piece of property. But the question here is whether bis
failure to give the firm, or his copartners, the opportunity of
making an election to buy certain real estate, and his making
the purchase thereof for bis own account, or jointly with
another, is such a violation of his fiduciary relations to the
tlrm and his associates in respect to copartnership business as
to entitle the latter to call him to account f.or profits ~alized
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in such transactions. In other words, will the violation of his

217

undertaking to give to the ﬁrm, or his associates, the oppor-

tunity or option to engage in any particular transaction, not

within the scope of the ﬁrm’s business, entitle the copartners

to convert him into a constructive trustee in respect to the

proﬁts realized therefrom?

That the members of the ﬁrm, prior to 1871, or after that

date, by special agreement, made purchases of particular par-

cels of real estate on speculation or for investment, did not

make such speculative transactions a part of the partnership

business so as to invest either partner with the implied author-

ity to engage therein on account of the ﬁrm. The name of the

ﬁrm w-as never, in fact, used in such special ventures, which

no partner had authority to enter into except, and until, the

consent of the others had been speciﬁcally obtained so to do-

each instance of buying on ﬁrm or joint account being the sub-

ject of a separate, special, and distinct agreement.

It may be said of any and every partnership, irrespective of

its regular business, that by consent of all the members, other

matters beyond the scope of the partnership may become the
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subject of investment or speculation on joint account, but such

special transactions cannot properly be said to come within

the scope of the partnership. The very fact that the express

consent of each partner was required in order to engage in such

special ventures goes clearly to show that the transactions

were not within the scope of the partnership, for, if they were,

special consent could not be required as a condition precedent

for engaging therein.

Matters within the scope of the partnership are regulated

and controlled by a majority of the partners, but by the alleged

stipulation under consideration a single member of the ﬁrm

could control the ﬁrm’s action in respect to purchases of real

estate. This is inconsistent with the idea that the business

of the ﬁrm extended to such purchases.

Again, the alleged agreement does not provide how such

future acquisitions as might be specially elected or agreed

upon for speculation or for investment were to be paid for,

or in what proportion the several partners should be inter-

ested therein. Neither does it distinctly appear from the alle-

gations of the bill, nor from the testimony of the appellees,

whether, in acting upon information given, the special pur-

28
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in such transactions. In other words, will the violation of his
undertaking to give t<> the firm, or his associates, the opportunity or option to engage in any particular transaction, not
within the scope of the fh·m's businetJs, entitle the copartners
to convert him int<? a constructive trustee in respect to the
profits realized therefrom?
That the members of the firm, prior t<> 1871, or after that
date, by special agreement, made purchases of particular parrels of real estate on speculation or for investment, did not
make such speculative transactions a part of the partnership
business so as to invest either partner with the implied autbority to engage therein on account of the firm. The name e>f the
ft.rm w.as never, in fact, m~ed in such special ventures, which
no partner had authority to enter into except, and until, the
consent of the others had been specifioolly obtained BO to doeach instance of buying on firm or joint account being the subject of a separate, special, and distinct agreement.
It may be «aid of any and every partnership, irre.spective of
its regular business, that by consent of all the members, other
matters bey-0nd the scope of the partnership may become tha
subject of investment or speculation on joint aceoun·t, but such
special transactions cannot properly be sai~ to come within
the scope of the partnership. The very fact that the express
oonsent of each partner was required in order to engage in such
special ventures goes clearly to show that the transactions
were not within the scope of the partnership, for, if they were,
special consent could not be required as a condition pr~edent
for engaging therein.
Matters within the scope of the partnership are regulated
and controlled by a majority of the partners, but by the alleged
stipulation under consideration a single member ot the firm
could control the firm's action in respect to purchases of real
estate. This is inconsistent with the idea that the business
of the firm ext.endw to such purchases.
Again, the alleged agreement does not provide h<>w such
future acquisitions as might be specially selected or agreed
upon for speculation or for investment we1•e to be paid for,
or in what proportion the several partneN should be interested therein. Neither doetJ it distinctly appear from the allegations of the bill, nor from the testimony of the appellees,
whether, in acting upon information given, the special pur28
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chases were to be made for the account of the partnership or

for the account of the several members of the ﬁrm. The meth-

ods of keeping the accounts of such transactions in t-he name

of the individual members rather than in the name of the ﬁrm,

would indicate that such purchases were for the beneﬁt of the

separate partners rather than for the ﬁrm.’

There is no allegation in the bill, nor any direct statement

in the testimony of the appellees, that if the information had

been given as to the Stearns’ transactions, either t-he ﬁrm or

themselves would have exercised the option of engaging

therein upon the conditions of allowing Stearns to determine

“when, at what price, and on what terms any portion of the

real estate might be sold.” Neither is it alleged in the bill,

nor shown by the proofs, that the appellant in any way neg-

lected the partnership business, nor that the ﬁrm and his

copartners sustained any damage whatever from the trans-

action. On the contrary, it is shown that from the purchases

and ales of the property bought on joint account with Stearns

the ﬁrm derived its regular commissions.

This alleged new stipulatio-n amounts, if it has any legal
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force and operation, simply to an agreement for a future part-

nership, or the joint acquisition of such special properties as

might by mutual and unanimous consent be considered as hold-

ing out a prospect of proﬁtable speculation; and at most could

only be regarded as an agreement for a future partnership in

respect to such properties as might be specially selected for

speculation. It is well settled in such case that no partnership

takes place until the contemplated event actually occurs. It

stands upon the same principle as an option to become a part-

ner, which creates no partnership until the option i actually

exercised.

If the stipulation in question could be construed into an

agreement that no partner should engage in the buying and

selling of real estate on his own account, would that entitle

the other members of the ﬁrm to share in the proﬁts that

Latta. made in real estate speculation without having ﬁrst

secured the consent of his copartners to his engaging therein?

No such proposition can be sustained.

In Murrcll vs. Murrell, 33 La. Ann. 1233, it was held that a

partner who, in violation of the act of partnership, enters

into another ﬁrm, does not thereby give the right to his origi-i

chases were to be made for the account of the partnership or
for the account of the seve1·al members of the firm. The methods of keeping the accounts of such transaetions in the name
of the individual members rather than in the name of the firm,
would indicate that such purchases were for the benefit of the
~parate partners rather than for the firm.'
There is no allegation in the bill, nor any direct statement
in the tE>stimony of the appellees, that if the information had
heen given as to the Strorns' transactions, either t·be firm or
themselves would have exercised the option of engaging
therein upon the conditions of allowing Stearns to determine
"when, at what price, and on wh~t terms any portion of the
real estate might be sold." :Neither is it alleged in the bill,
nor shown by the proofs, that the appellant in any way neglected the partnership business, nor that the firm and bis
copartners '1!\1J81:ained any damage whatever from the .transaction. On the contrary, it is shown that from the purchases
and sales of the property bought on joint account with Stearns
the firm derived its regular commissions.
This alleged new stipulation amounts, if it has any legal
force and operation, simply to an agreement for a future partn~rship, or the joint acquLsition of such special properties a8
might by mutual and unanimous consent be considered as holding out a prospect of profitable speculation; and at most could
only be regarded as an agreement for a future partnership in
respect to such properties .as might be specially selected for
speculation. It is well settled in such case that no partnership
takes place until the contemplated event actualiy occurs. It
stands upon the same prindple as an option to become a partner, which creates no partnership until the option is actually
exercised.
If the stipulation in question could be QOnstrued into an
agreement that no partner should engage in the buying .and
selling of real estate on his own account, would that entitle
the other "members of the firm to share in the profits that
Latta made in real estate speculation without hav'ing first
secured the consent of bis copartners to his engaging therein!
No such proposition can be sustained.
In Murrell vs. Murrell, 3:3 La. Ann. 1233, it was held that a
partner who, in violation of the act of partnership, ente1·l'l
into another firm, does not thereby give the right to his origi~'
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nal copartner to claim a share in the proﬁts of the new ﬁx-,m.
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The violation of the agreement may give rise to an action for

damages, but inasmuch as the original copartner could not

be held, without his consent, for the debts of the new ﬁrm,

he cannot claim to be made a partner therein.

In Dean vs. McDowell, 8 Ch. D. 345, one of the stipulations

in the articles of copartnership was that “said C. A. McDowell

should diligently -and faithfully employ himself in'and about

the business of the partnership, and carry on and conduct the

same to the greatest advantage of the partnership,” and by

another article it was tipulated that neither partner should

“either alone or with -another person, either directly or indi-

rectly, engage in any trade or business except upon the account

and for the beneﬁt of the partnership.” The business of the

ﬁrm was to deal as merchants and brokers in selling the pro-

duce of salt works on commission, and during its existence

McDowell clandestinely purchased a share in aﬁrm of salt

manufacturers. A bill was ﬁled by the other partner for an

account of the proﬁts realized in the new business, and it was

held by the master of the rolls that the bill could not be sus-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tained. On appeal this judgment was aﬂirmed. Lord Justice

James, after stating the general principles of partnership

law, said: “The business which the defendant has entered

into was that of manufacturing salt, which was to be the sub-

ject-matter of the trade of the ﬁrst ﬁrm. If in that he had

in any way deprived the ﬁrm of any proﬁts they otherwise

would have made—if by his joining in the partnership for the

manufacture he had diverted the goods from the ﬁrm in which

he was a partner to some other ﬁrm, I can see that that would

be a breach of his duty; but it is not pretended or alleged

that any alteration took place in the business of the ﬁrm by

reason of his having become a shareholder in the other busi-

ness. It is not pretended that there was any alteration in the

commission or anything else. Everything remained exactly

as it was, so that it cannot be suggested that there was a

farthing’s worth of actual damage done to the original ﬁrm

by reason of his having become a shareholder in the works

which produced the thing in which the ﬁrm traded. Under

these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot say his

proﬁts fromthe new business was a beneﬁt arising out of his

partnership with the plaintiﬁs. It was not a beneﬁt derived

I

nal copartner to claim a share in the profits of the new fi1;m.
The violation of \he agrPement may gh·e rise to an action for
damages, but inasmuch as the original copartner oould not
be held, without bis consent, for the debts of the new firm,
he cannot claim to be made a partner therein.
In Dean vs. JicDoicell, 8 Ch. D. 345, one of the stipulations
in t11e articles of copartnership was that "said C. A. McDowell
should diligently and faithfully employ himself in" and about
the business of the partnership, and carry on and conduct thP
ea.me to the greatest advantage of the partnership," and by
another article it was stipulated that neither partner should
"either alone or with another person, either directly or indirectly, engage in any trade or business except upon the account
and for the benPfit of the partnership." The business of the
firm was to deal as merchants and brokers in selling the pro·
duce of salt works on commission, and during its existence
McDowell clandestinely purchased a share in a· firm of salt
manufacturers. A bill was filed by the other partner for an
account of the profits realized in the new business, and it was
held by the master of the rolls that the bill could not be sustained. On appeal this judgment was affirmed. Lord JustiL't'
JAMES, after stating the general principles of partnership
law, said: "The business which the defendant bas entered
into was that of manufacturing salt, which was to be the subject-matter of the trade of the first firm. If in that he bad
in any way deprived the firm of any profits they otherwise
would have made-if by bis joining in the partnership for the
manufacture he had diverted the goods from the firm in which
he was a partner to some other firm, I can see that that would
be a breach of his duty; but it is not pretended or alleged
that any alteration took place in the business of the firm by
reason of his having become a shareholder in the other business. It is not pretended that there was any alteration in the
commission or anything else. Everything remained exactly
as it was, so that it cannot be suggested that there was a
farthing's worth of actual damage done to the original firm
by reason of bis having become a sh.areholder in the works
which produced the thing in which the firm traded. Under
these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot say his
profits from the new business was a benefit arising out of his
partnership with the plaintiffs. It was not a benefit derived
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from his connection with the partnership, or a beneﬁt in

respect of which he was in a ﬁduciary relation to the partner-

ship. His relations to the partnership in this respect was

the same as an ordinary oovenantor to a covenantee in respect

of any other covenant which is broken. It was a covenant

by a partner with a copartner, a covenant that he would

not do something which might result in damage. But

it was not a covenant, in my view, which was in any way con-

nected with the ﬁduciary relations between the parties. That

being so, it seems to me that the master of the rolls was

right in saying that you cannot extend the cases with regard

to a share in the proﬁts to a case in which, as between the

parties, there really was nothing but a breach of covenant,

which in truth did not result, and could not have resulted, in

the slightest loss to the partnership, unless it could have been

shown that it led to the covenantor neglecting the business

of the partnership, and devoting himself to other business,

and diverting his time and attention from the business to

which it was his duty to attend.” These views,.which were

concurred in by the/other members of the court, are directly
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in point in the present case, which, in principle, cannot be

distinguished from the case there under consideration.

VVe are clearly of the opinion that the alleged new stipula-

tion that each copartner should furnish to the ﬁrm, or to the

members thereof, information as to bargains in real estate,

and give it or them the option to engage in the acquisition

thereof before acting upon such information for his own benc-

ﬁﬁt, neither enlarged the scope of the partnership so as to make

i it include the purchases and sales of real estate, nor precluded

any member of the ﬁrm from making purchases on his own

3 account or jointly with others; and that the act of the appel-

, lant in purchasing property with Stearns was not such a vio-

lation of his duty and obligation to the ﬁrm of Kilbourn 8:

Latta, or to the mom-hers thereof, as to entitle the appellees

to share in the proﬁts which he realized therefrom.

In respect to the second ground, on which the court below

rested its judgment, that the appellant could not take advan-

tage of the skill, knowledge, and information as to the real

estate market acquired in the course of his connection with

I thepartnership of Kilbourn & Latta so as to gain any proﬁt

individually therefrom, but was bound to share with his

frem his connection with the partnership, or a benefit in
respect of which he was in a fiduciary relation to the partnership. His relations to the partnership in this respect was
the same as an ordinary oovenantor to a oovenantee in respect
of any other covenant which is broken. It was a covenant
by a partner with a copartner, a oovenant that he would
n.ot do something which might result in damage. But
it was not covenant, in my view, which was in any way connected with the fiduciary relations between the parties. Tl1at
being eo, it seems to me that the master of the rolls. was
right in saying that you cannot extend the cases with regard
te a share in the profits to a case in which, as between the
parties, there really was nothing but a breach of covenant,
which in truth did not result, and could not have resulted, in
the slightest loss to the partnership, unless it could hav~ been
shown that it led to the covenantor neglecting the business
of the partnership, and devoting himself to other business,
and diverting his time and attention from the business to
which it was his duty to attend." These views,. which were
concurred in by the ,other members of the court, are directly
in point in the present case, which, in principle, cannot be
distinguished from the case there under consideration.
We are clearly of the Qpinion that the alleged new stipulation that each copartner should furnish to the firm, or to the
members thereof, information as to bargains in real estate:
and give it or them the option to engage in the acquisition
I thereof before acting upon such information for his own bent•(\ flt, neither enlarged the scope of the partnership so as-to make
I it include the purchases and sales of real estate, nor precluded
· any member of the firm from ma king purchases on his own
l account or jointly with others; and that the act of the appel1 lant in purchasing property with Stearns was not such a violation of his duty and obligation to the firm of Kilbourn &
Latta, or to the men11bers thereof, as to entitle the appellees
to share in the profits which he realized therefrom.
In respect to the second ground, on which the court below
rested its judgment, that the appellant could not take advantage of the skill, knowledge, and infonnation as to the real
estate market acquh-ed in the course of his connection with
the partnership of Kilbourn & I.-atta so aa to gain any profit
individuaBy therefrom, but was bound to share with his

a
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from his knowledge or information on that subject, we need

not do more than to say that this proposition is wholly unsup-

ported either by the authorities or by any legal principle appli-

cable to partnership law.

lt is well settled that a partner may traﬁic outside of the

scope of the ﬁrm’s business for his own beneﬁt and advantage,

and without going into the authorities it is suﬂicient to cite the

thoroughly considered case of AS-s vs. Benham, 2 Ch. D. (1891)

244, 255, in which it was sought to make one partner account-

able for proﬁts realized from another busines, on the ground

that he availed himself of information obtained by him in the

course of his partnership business, or by reason of his con-

nection with the ﬁrm, to secure individual advantage in the

new enterprise. It was there laid down by Lord Justice Lisb-

LEY that if a member of a partnership ﬁrm avails himself of

information obtained by ‘him in the course of the transactions

of the partnership business, or by reason of his con-

nection with the ﬁrm-, for any purpose within the scope of the

partnership business, or for any purpose which would compete
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with the partnership business. he is liable to account to the ﬁrm

for any beneﬁt he may have obtained from the use of such infor-

mation; but if he uses the information for purposes which are

wholl/_y without the scope of the partnership business and not

competing with it, the ﬁrm is not entitled to an account of such

beneﬁts. ,

It was further laid down in that case, in explanation of

what was said by Lord Justice Co'r'ro.\' in Dean cs. .-l!cDowell,

ubi supra, that£“it is not the source of the information, but

the use to which it is applied, which is important in such

m-attersi To hold that a partner can never derive any per-

sonal b‘ eﬁts from information which he obtains as a part-

ner would be manifestly absurd;” and it was said by Lord

Justice Bownm that the character of information acquired

from the partnership transaction, or from connection with the

ﬁrm, which the partner might not use for his private advan-

tage, is such information as belongs to the partnership in the

sense of property which is valuable to the partnership, and in

which it has a vested right.

Tested by these principles, it cannot be properly said that

Latta used any information which was partnership property

copartners all the beneficial results which• oould be derived
from his knowledge or information on that subject, we need
not do more than to say that this proposition is wholly unsupported either by the authorities or by any legal principle applicable to partnership law.
It is well settled that a partner may traffic outside of the
scope of the firm's husiness for his own benefit and advantage,
and without going into the authoriti<>s it is sufficient to cite the
thoroughly considered case of ...-..t&s vs. Benham, 2 Ch. D. (1891)
244~ 255, in which it was sought to makP one partner accountable for profits realized from another bu"ioess, on tbe ground
that he avajled himself of information obtained by him in the
course of his partnership business, or by reason of bis connection with the firm, to secure individual advantage in the
new enterprise. It was there laid clown by J...ord Justice J_,INDJ,EY that if a member of a partnership fir·m avails himself of
information obtained by him in the conl'Se of the transactions
of the partnP1"8hip bnsinefls, or by reason of his connection with the firm, for an!J purpo..~e wit11in the scope of the
partnership busi11ess, or for any pw·vo.~c lchich icould
1cith the pof'tners11ip b-usincss. he is liable to account to

compete
the firm
for nny benefit lie ma11 hai•e obtaim.xl from the use of such i11format·ion; but if 1rn uses the. informo.tion f01- purposes wh iC'h are
tohol'ty witho'llt the scope of the partnership business and not
com 1>eting icith it, the finn is not entitled to an account of such
benefits.
It was furthe1· laid down in that case, in explanation of
what was said by IA>rd .Tustice CoT'rO:" in Dean vs. JIcD01oell,
ubi supra, that~'it is not the souree of tbe information, but
thP use to which it is ~d, which is important in such
matters. ) To holrl that a partner can never dt'rive any personal be~efits from information whk.h he obtains as a partner would be manifestly absurd;" and it was said by Lord
Justice BowEN that the character of information acquired
from the partnership h"llnsaction, or from connection with the
firm, which the partner might not use for his private advantage, is such information as belongs to the partnership in the
sense of property which is valuable to the partnership, and in
which it has a vested rig-ht.
Tested by these principles, it cannot be properly said that
Latta used any information whid1 wai:; pal'tnel'ship property
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so as to render him chargeable with the proﬁts made there-

fr-om. His knowledge of the real estate market, or in respect

to proﬁtable investments therein, was not used in competition

with the business of the ﬁrm, nor in any manner so as to come

within the scope of the flrm’s business.

The points already considered being suﬁicient to dispose

nf the case, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other

question discussed as to whether a. parol partnership, in

respect to purchasing and selling real estate, or an agreement

between copartners to give each other the option of engaging

in such purchases, would come within the operation of the

statute of frauds.

We are clearly of opinion, upon the whole case, that the

decree should be '

Reversed, and the causc remanded to the court below with direc-

tions to tlismiss the bill at the cost of the appellccs.

Non‘-:.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 112, 118.

~-

INSLEY vs. SHIRE.

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1895.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

54 Kan. 793, 39 Pac. Rep. 713, 45 Am. St. Rep. 308.

Insley and Shire were equal partners in carrying on banking

and other business at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1882, Shire

died, leaving a will, under which Ann M. Shire (his widow),

J. W. Graw (his brother-in-law), and Levi Wilson, were

so· as to render bim chargeable with the profits made thereHis knowledge of the real estate market, or in respect
to profitable investmt>nts therein, was not used in competition
with the business of the firm, nor in any manner so as to come
within the scope of the firm's business.
The points already ~onsidel'l'<I being sufficient to dispost»f the c·ase, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other
question discussed as to whether a parol partnership, in
reRpect to pur<',hasing and selling real estate, or an agreement
between copartners to give each other the option of engaging
in such pul'cbases, would come within the operation of the
statute of frauds.
'Ye are clearly of opinion, upon the whole case, that the
· decree should be
Re·versed, and the cause remanded to the court below 1cith direcltf)ns to dismiss tlie bill at the cost of the a.ppell.ees.
fl'-0m.

NoTR.-See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 112, 118.

appointed executors and were authorized to continue the busi-

-ness of the ﬁrm. This was done, and no steps were taken to

ascertain S*hire‘s interest nor did Insley assume the position

or rights of a surviving partner. Insley and Shire’s executors

continued to cam-_v on the business, Gaw taking the active

management on the part of the executors, until 1887, when

the ﬁrm was found to be insolvent. It appeared also that one

Milligan, who had been employed by Gaw to serve in the Bank,

INSLEY vs. SHIRE.

had fraudulently appropriated a large part of the assets. Mrs.

Shire brought this action against Insley, Gaw, Milligan and

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1895.

others, to recover damages for what was alleged to be their

54 Kan. 793, !l9 Pac. Rep. 713, 45 Am. St. Rep. 308.
Insle.v and Shire were equal partners in caITying on banking
and other business at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1882, Shire
died, leaving a will, under which Ann M. Shire (his widpw),
J. ,V. Gaw (his brother-in-law), and Levi Wilson, were
appointed executors and were authorized to continue the busi·ness of the firm. This was done, and no steps were taken to
ascertain S'hire'R intf'rest nor did Insley assume the position
or rights of a surviving partner. Insley and Shire's exerutorH
continued to carr.'' on the business, Gaw taking the active
management on the part of the executors, until 1887, whf'n
the firm was found to be insolvent. It appeared also that one
Milligan, who had bel·n employed by Gaw to serve in the Bank,
had fraudulently appropriated a large part of the assets. Mrs.
~hire brought this action against Insley, Gaw, Milligan and
others, to recover damages fol' what was alleged to be their
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negligent mismanagement of the business resulting in insol-

223

vency and the loss of the assets. -

llegligent mismanagement of the business resulting in insol·
vency and the loss of the assets.
The court below found that Insley and Gaw bad been
guilty of such negligent mismanagement, and rendered jndgmE>nt against them, from which this appeal was taken.

The court below found that Insley and Gaw had been

guilty of such negligent mismanagement, and rendered judg-

ment against them, from which this appeal was taken.

W. O‘. Hook and D. M. Valentine, for appellant.

E. Hagan, Hag/den é Hayden, T. A. Hurd. and L. B. <£ S. E.

Wheat, for appellees.

Jonnsrox, J . (After disposing of the question of Gaw’s lia-

bility as an executor, and of Insley’s liability as a coexecutor.)

W. 0. Hook and D. M. Valentine, for appellant.

There is the further contention that the plaintiff could not

E. Hagan, Hayden & .Hayden, T • .A. Hurd, and L.B. & 8. E.
lVheat, for appellees.

maintain an action against Insley for the purpose of obtain-

ing an accounting of the partnership business. This conten-

tion is based upon the idea that all of the executors represent

the Shire interest in the partnership, and, as the estate is joint

JoBNSTON,

and entire, the executors are to be considered in law as one

person, and all of them m-ust join as plaintiffs. This is the

correct rule, and all three of the representatives of the estate

should have joined in bringing the action for an accounting

with Insley. 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 360, and cases

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cited; 11 Amer. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1033. No proper objec-

tion, however, was made on account of the nonjoinder of Gaw

and \Vilson, and, as they were made defendants in the action

in their representative capacity, and remained in the court

throughout the proceeding, while the accounting was being

made, the failure to name them as plaintiifs cannot be

regarded as a fatal objection. Treating the proceedings, then,

as one in which all of the representatives of the estate had

joined in asking an accounting of the partnership business,

the question remains as to the liability of Insley. Insley and

Shire, as we have seen, were equal partners. When Shire

died Insley did not give a bond and take possession of the

partnership property as surviving partner, as he might have

done under t-he statute‘. The death of Shire operated to dis-

solve the partnership, but it appears that by a mutual arrange-

ment, and in accordance with the provisions of the will, the

business was continued by the executors upon the same terms

as it was during the lifetime of Daniel Shire. This arrange-

ment had the eﬂ’ect of creating a new partnership, composed of

the executors on one side and Insley on the other.

' ‘See Shattuck ‘Us. Chandler, ante.

~

J. (After disposing of the question of Gaw's lia-

bility as an executor, and of Insley's liability as a coexecutor.)
There ls the further contention that the plaintiff could not •
maintain an action again,st Insley for the purpose of obtaining an accounting of the partnership business. This contention is based upon the idea that all of the executors represent
·the Shire interest in the partnership, and, as the estate is joint
and entire, the executors are to be considered in law as one
person, and all of them must join as plaintiffs. This is the
correct rule, and all three of the representatives of the estate
should have joined in bringing the action for an accounting
with Insley. 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 360, and cases
cited; 11 Amer. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1033. No proper objection, however, was made on account of the nonjoinder of Gaw
and 'Vil son, and, as they were made defendants in the action
in their representative capacity, and remained in the court
throughout the proceeding, while the accounting was being
made, the failure to name them as plaintiffs cannot be
regarded as a fatal objection. Treating the proceedings, then,
us one in which all of the representatives of the estate had
joined in asking an accounting of the partnership business,
the question remains as to the liability of Insley. Insley and
Hhire, as we have seen, were equal partners. When Shire
<lied Insley did not give a bond and take possession of the
partnership property as surviving partner, as be might have
done under t.be statute1 • The death of Shire ()perated to dissolve the partnership, but it appears that by a mutual arrangement, and in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
business was continued by the executors upon the same terms
as it was during the lifetime of Daniel Shire. This arrangement had the effect of creating a new partnership, composed of
the executors on one side and Insley on the other.
1 See Shattuck v,,, Chandler, ante.
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Some attempt is made torhold Insley to the liability of a

surviving partner under the law, but, from the testimony, it is

clear that he was not so regarded or treated by any of the

parties. He did not assume title and control as surviving

partner. No bond was given by him; no inventory of the part-

nership estate was made; and he did not take the manage-

ment of the partnership estate as sprviving partner. On the

contrary, all the parties united in the control and possession

of the property; the executors, representing the Shire interest,

and Insley, representing his own, they joined together in car-

rying on the business until it was discontinued. They were

partners to all intent and purposes, and all alike equally

owed the duties of pa.rtners to each other. There was no

agreement for a division of labor between the executors on one

side and Insley upon the other. Insley was not employed

to represent the executors or to attend to the business

of the partnership for the estate. It i.s true that he

devoted most of his time and attention to the partnership

business, but, from 1885, Gaw was employed on behalf of the

estate to attend to the Shire interest in the partnership, and
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he received an annual salary of $1,000 as compensation for his

services. There is a ﬁnding by the referee that he undertook

to represent the Shire interest in the partnership, and was

continuously so engaged down to the close of the bank. l

The claim that Insley was general manager for the ﬁrm,

and liable as such, is not sustained by the record. While he

was active in the management of the affairs of the ﬁrm, he

was not appointed nor employed as manager, nor did he hold

any bfﬁcial position which made him the representative of the

estate in the ﬁrm business. There was no agreement that he

should receive compensation as manager or agent for the ﬁrm,

and none was allowed or paid. It is true that, when the con-

troversy arose between the parties, a credit was entered and

a claim for extra services made, but, as there was no such

agreement, it was not allowed and it appears to have been

abandoned. So far as the partnership -accounting is concerned

lnsley is to be treated as a one-half owner and the Shire estate

as the owner of the other half interest. The three executors

are to be regarded as one‘ person, and together they sustain

the same relation to lnsley that Shire did in his lifetime.

Insley owed them. as partners, no higher duty or any greater

diligence than he would have owed to Shire under similar cir-

cumstances if he had been alive. It was the duty of the

u

- _.i__ -*4 --1.; ~—4-<_

•

Some attempt ls made to . hold Insley to the liability <>f a
surviving partner under the law, but, from the testimony, it is
clear that he was not so regarded or treated by any of the
parties. He did not assume title and control as $Urviving
partner. No bond was given by him; no inventory of the partnership estate was made; and he did not take the management of the partnership estate as sµrviving partner. On the
contrary, all the parties united in the control and possession
•
of the property; the executors, reprPst•nting the Shire interest,
and Insley, representing bis own, the~· joined together in carrying on the business until it was discontinued. They were
partners to all intents and purposes, and all alike equally
owed the du1ies of pa.rtners to each other. There was no
agreement for a division of la.bor between the executors on <>ne
side BDd Insley upon tihe other. Insley waa not employed
to represent the executors or to attend t-0 the business
of the partm>rship for the estate.
H is true that be
devoted most of his time and attention to the partnership
business, but, from 1885, Gaw was employed on behalf of the
Pstate to attend to the Rhire interest in the partnership, and
he received an annual salary of fl,000 as rompem1ation for bis
1-1ervices. There is a finding by thr referee that he undertoo~
1o represent the Shire interest in the partnership, and was
t·ontinuously so engagrd down to the close of the bank. ·
The claim that lnslry was gent->ral manager for the firm,
and liable as such, is not sustained by the record. While he
was active in the management of the affairs of the firm, be
was not appointed nor employed as manager, nor did he bold
nny official position which made him the l'C'presentath·e of the
f>state in the firm business. There was AO agreement that be
should receive compensation as manager or agent for the firm,
nnd none was allowed or paid. It is true that, when the controversy arose between the partiPR, a credit was entered and
a claim for extra services made, but, as there was no such
agrPement, it was not allowed and it appears to have been
abandoned. So far as the partnership accounting is concerned
Insley is to be tre-at<'d as a one-half owner and the Shire estate
as the owner of the other half interest. The thr(~e executors
are to be regnrd<>d as one· person, nnd together tlley sustain
the same relation to lnsl<'y that Shire did in his lifetime.
Insley owed them, as partners, no higher duty or any greater
diligence than he would have owed to Shire under similar circumstances if be bad been alive. It was the duty of the
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partners to devote their time and best endeavors to carry on

INSLEY

vs.

SHIBB.

the business, and promote the prosperity of the partnership.

In the absence of any special agreement between them as to

the division of labor, each should give time and attention to

the conduct of business without compensation, and without

regard to the relative value of the services of the several

parties: Parsons on Partnership, 3d Ed. 244; 17 Amer. &

Eng. Ency. of Law 1056. Scrupulous good faith and reason-

able diligence is required from each to the other, and all losses

caused by culpable neglect of duty or bad faith on the part of

a partner are chargeable against him in favor of the ﬁrm.

“A fair degree of care only, however, is required. An honest

mistake of judgment, or a trivial departure from the partner-

ship agreement in cases of emergency, will not impose the

burden of the losses of the ﬁrm on the deviating partner."

17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1219.

A partner of equal responsibility, and who himself is indif-

ferent to his own interest or guilty of negligence, is hardly in

a position to claim and recover for the entire losses resulting

from the negligence of both. In this case the duty of
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carefully selecting employés and supervising the business

of the partnership rested equally upon Insley and the

representatives of the estate; and yet we ﬁnd that the

entire loss resulting from the fraud and defalcation of

employés was placed upon a single partner. The principal

losses resulted from the action of Milligan in abstract-

ing and purloining money from the bank. Gaw, who

was giving special attention to the interests of the Shire

estate, procured the employment of Milligan, who was a rela-

tive, and there is testimony that Milligan was employed and

placed on the working force of the bank as a representative of

the Shire estate. It was as much the duty of those representing

-the estate to exercise a watchful care over the conduct of Milli-

gan and the other employés as it was of Insley. The accounts

which he fraudulently manipulated and the books which he

falsiﬁed were under the eyes and supervision of the partners.

Why, then, should Insley account for all these losses? If

Shire had been alive, and had selected Milligan as an

employé, and he had been guilty of frauds similar to those

charged against him, and if there had been no other division

of labor or responsibility between Insley and Shire than did

29

partners to devote their time and best endeavors to carry 011
the business, and prom-0te the prosperity of the partnership.
In the absence of any special agreement between them as to
the division of labor, each s~ould give time and attention to
the conduct of business without compensation, and without
regard to the relative value of the services of the several
parties: Parsons on Partnership, 3d Ed. 244; 17 Amer. &
Eng. Ency. of Law 1056. Scrupulous good faith and reasonable diligence is required from each to the other, and all losses //'
caused by culpable neglect of duty or bad faith on the part of
a partner are chargeable against him in favor of the firm.
"A fair degree of care only, however, is required. An honest
mistake of judgment, or a trivial departure from the partnership agreement in cases of emergency, will not impose the
burden of the losses of the firm on the deviating partner.,,
17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1219.
A partner of equal responsibility, and who himself is indifferent to his own interest or guilty of negligence, is hardly in
a position to claim and recover for the entire losses resulting
from the negligence of both.
In this case the duty of
carefully selecting employee and supervising the business
of the p:utnersbip rested equally upon Insley and the
representatives of the estate; and yet we find that the
entire Joss resulting from the fraud and defalcation of
<~mployes was plac<'d upon a single partner.
The principal
losses resulted from the action of Milligan in abstract•
ing and purloining money from the bank. Gaw, whc>
w-ae giving special attention to the interests of the Shire
estate, procured the employment of MilJigan, who was a relath'e, and there is testimony that Mi11igan was employed and
placed on the working force of the bank ae a representative of
the Shire estate. It was as much the duty of those representing
the estate to exercise a watchful care over1:he conduct of Milli·
gan and the ooher employee ns it was of Insley. The accounbt
which be fraudulently manipulated and the books which he
falsified were under the eyes and supervision of the partners.
Why, then, should Insley account for all these losses? It
Shire had been alive, and bad selected MiJJigan as an
employe, and be had been guilty of frauds similar to those
charged against him, and if there had been no other division
of labor or responsibility between Insley and Shire than did
29
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exist while they were partners, how could Shire have claimed

that Insley should bear all the losses resulting from the frauds

and peculations of Milligan?

It appears that the methods by which Milligan abstracted

and purloined the money of the 'ﬁrm were so ingenious as to

almost baﬁle the skill of expert accountants, and several weeks

were consumed before they were able to uncover the fraud

and determine by whom the money was taken. Insley was

not a bookkeeper nor an expert accountant, and no reason is

seen why he should be held to a higher degree of care with

respect to the books than those representing the other inter-

ests. Where the partners share alike in the control and labor

of business one of them cannot sit passively by, indifferent to

the interests of the ﬁrm, and after neglecting to use reason-

able diligence himself, hold the other responsible to the ﬁrm

for a like indifference or negligence. lt does not appear that

Insley had any special skill as a banker, and as a partner

he cannot be held for thelack of skill in that respect. His

partners had a right to expect reasonable care and diligence

from him in assisting to carry on the business, but they knew
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what his capabilities were when they entered into business

with him, and therefore have no right to complain of a lack of

ability or skill. The charge of bad faith and of conspiracy

with Gaw was not sustained because there was an express

ﬁnding that Insley did not participate in any fraudulent trans-

action of the employés or in any of the fruits thereof, and,

more than that, that he had no knowledge of the same. lt

is clear that the accounting was made upon an incorrect

theory. The liability of Insley was extended beyond what

was warranted by the evidence or the law, and hence the

judgment cannot be sustained.

Reversed.

NCm':.—See Mechenfs Elem. of I’al'tn., § 114.

emat while they were partners, how could Shire baTe elaimed
that Insley should bear all the losses resulting from the frauds
ud peculations of Milligan?
It appears that the methods by which Milligan abstracted
and purloined the money of the ·ftrm were so ingenious as to
almost baftle the skill of expert accountants, and sevel"'81 weeks
were consumed before they were able to uncover the fraud
and determine by whom the money was taken. Insley was
not a bookkeeper nor an expert accountant, and no reason is
seen why be should be held to a higher degree of care with
respect to the books than those representing the other intert>Sts. 'Vhere the partners share alike in the control and labor
of business one of them cannot sit passively by, indifferent to
the interests of the firm, and after neglecting to use reasonable diligence himself, hold the other responsible to the firm
for a like indifference o~ negligence. It does not appear that
Insley bad any special skill as a banker, and as a partner
he cannot be held for the lack of. skill in that respect. His
partners bad a right to expect reasonable care a.nd diligence
from him in assisting to carry on the business, but they knew
what his capabilities were when they entered into business
with him, and therefore have no right to complain of a lack of
ability or skill. The charge of bad faith and of conspiracy
with Gaw was not sustained becam~e there was an express
finding that Insley did not participate in any franduJt.>nt tl'ansaction of the employes or in any of the fruits thereof, and,
more than that, that be had no knowledgP of the same. It
le clear that the aC'connting was made upon an incorrect
theory. The liability of Jnslry was extended beyond what
was warranted by the evidence or the law, and hence the
judgment cannot be snstainrit.
Reversed.
NOTE.-StM! Mechem'11 Elem. of Partn., § 114.
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MURPHY vs CRAFTS.

.HVRPHY VB. 0RA.P'l'8.

127

Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1858.

13 La. Ann. 519, 71 Am. Dec. 519.

Plaintiff and defendant were commercial partners, transact-

ing a general commission business under the name and style

of Murphy & Crafts, in the city of New Orleans. Their con-

tract of partnership was in writing, and the third article

MURPHY vs CRAFTS.

thereof was in these wordszl “We will not indorse any note, -

draft, or give our signatures separately or collectively, except

Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1858.

for our legitimate business purposes.”| Crafts, in violation

of this article, accepted in the partnership name, for the accom-

18 La. Ann. 619, 71 Am. Dec. :il9.

modation of his brother-in-law, John C. Robertson, of the city

of Boston, bills of exchange to the amount of $12,500. Robert-

son failed in business, and the ﬁrm of Murphy & Crafts lost,

by these acceptances, the sum of $5,592.90. The action was

by Murphy against Crafts to recover indemnity for this loss.

Judgment below for plaintiff, and defendant appeals,

Singleton tﬁ Clack, for plaintiﬁ. '

Game (E Breaum, for defendant.

LAND, J . (After stating the facts.) The principal question
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in this case is, whether Crafts is liable to his partner for the

loss. (Omitting references to the code). Judge STORY, in his

Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, says: “One of the

most obvious duties and obligations of all the partners is

strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations eon-

tained in the partnership articles, and also to keep within the

bounds and limitations of the rights, powers, authorities, and

acts‘ belonging and appropriate to the due discharge of the

partnership trade or business. Of course every known devi-

ation from and every excess in the exercise of such rights,

powers, authorities and acts, which produce any loss or injury

Plaintiff and defendant were commercial partners, transacting a general commission business under the name and style
of Murphy & Crafts, in the city of New Orleans. Their contract of partnership was in writing, and the third .article
thereof was in these words: I "We will not indorse any note, ·
draft, or give our signatures separately or collectively; except
for our legitimate business purposes."• Crafts, in violation
of this article, accepted in the partne1·ship name, for the accommodation of his brother-in-law, John C. Robertson, of the city
of Boston, bills of exchange to the amount of $12,500. Robertson failed in business, and the firm of Murphy & Crafts lost,
by these acceptances, the sum of $5,592.90. The action was
by Murphy against Crafts to recover indemnity for this loss.
Judgment below for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

to the partnership, are to that extent to be borne by the part-

ner who causes or occasions the loss or injury, and he is bound

to indemnify the other partners therefor. The same doctrine

is recognized by Pothier as existing in the French law; and it

Singleton & <Jlack, for plaintiff.

Co:re & Breau:c, for defendant.
LAND, J. (After stating the facts.) The principal question
in tllis case is, whether Crafts is liable to his. partner for tlw
loss. (Omitting references to the code). Judge STORY, in his
Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, says: "One of the
most obvious duties and obligations of all the partners is
strictly to conform themselves to all tbe stipulations contained in the partnership articles, and also to keep within the
bounds and limitations of the rights, powers, authorities, and
acts· belonging and appropriate to the due discharge of tlle
partnership trade or business. Of course every known de\'iation from and every excess in the exercise of such righb~,
powers, authorities and acts, which produce any loss or injury
to the partnership, are t<> that extent to be borne by the partner who causes or occasions the loss or injury, and he is bournl
t-o indemnify the other partners therefor. The same doctrine
ta recognized by Pothier as existing in the French law; and it
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seems, indeed, so clearly the result of natural justice as to
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require no particular exposition.” Sec. 173. .

According to these rules, the defendant is clearly bound to

indemnify the plaintiff for the loss resulting from his breach

of the third article of their contract of partnership, unless the

same was superseded or waived in the course of their busi-

ness, with the assent of the plaintiff. And this is the defense

made by the defendant to the action; but we concur with the

district judge that the evidence is insuﬂicient to show that

the partners came to a new arrangement, in the course of their

business, and thereby superseded article third of their con-

tract, or that the plaintiff ratiﬁed the acceptances in favor

of Robertson. ' ' '

Aﬁirmed.

NOTE.—See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn . § H5.

YVEBB vs. FORDYCE.

Supreme Court of Iowa, 1880.

55 Iowa 11.

The parties to this action had been partners, and, having

dissolved and not being able to adjust their accounts, each
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had brought an action against the other. The ease was tried

seems, indeed, so clearly the result of natural justice as to
require no particular exposition." Sec. 173.
According to these rules, the defendant is clearly bound to
indemnify the plaintiff for the loss resulting from bis breach
of the third article of their contract of partner·sbip, unless the
same was superseded <>r wah·ed in the course of their business, with the assent of tbe plaintiff. And this is the defense
made by the defendant to the action; but we concur with the
district judgt> tliat the e,·idence is insufficient to show that
the partners came to a new arrangement, in the course ·of their
business, and thereby superseded article tliird of their contract, or that thf' plaintiff ratified the acceptances in favor
of Ro bert son-. • • •
Affirmed.

before a referee, who found that defendant had drawn out

of the partnership funds the sum of $11,187.74, and that he

NOTB.-See .Mechem'a Elem. of Partn , § 115.

had accounted for $8,404.72, leaving a balance due from him

of $2,783.02. As to this, defendant testiﬁed that all of the

money he had drawn out had been properly applied to part-

nership uses, but he was unable to make any statement of

his disbursements, having no account whatever of many of

his transactions.

Judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed.

WEBB vs. FORDYCE.

L. Evans, for appellant. -

Gram ¢€ Flick, and Whi/ﬁn (E Brown, -for appellee.

Supreme Court of Iowa,

1~80.

Rornnoox, J. (After stating the facts.) The sole question

presented by appellant in this appeal is whether the defend-

55 Iowa 11.

The parties to this action had been partners, and, having
disS<>lved .and not being able to adjust their accounts, each
bad brought an action against the other. The case was tried
before a referee, who fouJ?.d that defend11nt bad dr-dwn out
of the partnership funds the sum of ,11,187.74, and that be
bad accounted for f8,404.72, leaving a balance due from him
of f2,783.02. As to this, defendant testified that aJJ of the
money he had drawn out had been properly applied to partnership uses, but be was unable to make any statement of
bis disbursements, having no account whatever of many of
his transactions.
Judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed.

L. Evans, for appellant.
Crum cE Flick, and Whitfin cE Brown, for appellee.
RoTsnocK, J. (After stating the facts.) The sole question
presented by appellant in this appeal is whether the defend-

WEBB vs. Fomnrcz. 229

ant should be held liable for such of the partnership funds

WEBB VS. FORDYCE.

as came into his hands, and for which he could render no

account and as to which he could but testify generally that he

did not convert the same to his own use.

It is contended that the question presented is the same as

that determined in Davenport vs. Sehutt, 46 Iowa, 510. But

we think the cases are quite different. In that case Daven-

port delivered to Schutt promissory notes, for the purpose of

effecting loans by discounting the notes. Schutt, as the agent

of Davenport, sold the notes and paid the proceeds to Daven-

port. lt was held that there was no more obligation upon

one party to keep books of account than the other, and that

Schutt was not liable merely because he could not show an

itemized statement of the transactions between the parties,

and that being a credible person, and having testiﬁed posi-

tively that he had paid and disposed of all sums realized by

him from plaintiff’s notes as directed by the plaintiff, this, in

the absence of some account or showing by Davenport that

the proceeds of the notes were not accounted for, was a suf-

ﬁcient defense. In that case no conﬁdence nor trust as to
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the disposition of the proceeds of the notes was reposed in

Schutt. He was to pay to Davenport, who could well have

kept a correct account of all the notes deposited and pay-

ments made.

Here the relation of the parties is quite different. Each

checked out the funds of the partnership at will, upon his

own check, and it was the duty of each to account to the ﬁrm

for what he drew out. If the defendant drew checks and

obtained the money thereon its expenditure was a matter

peculiarly within his own knowledge. The plaintilf was

entitled to some showing more than a general statement that

the proceeds of the checks were used for partnership purposes.

“All partners having any charge of the business of the ﬁrm

are bound to keep constantly, regular, intelligible and accurate

accounts of all the business, and to give all the partners at

all times access to them and to the means of verifying them."

Parsons on Partnership, p. 527.

Aﬂirmed.

Norm —See llieehenfs Elem of Partn., § 116.

ant should be held liable for such of the partnership funds
as came into his hands, and for which he oould render no
account and as to w~ich he coul~ but testify generally that he
did not convert the same to his own use.
It is contended that the question presented is the same as
that determined in Davenport vs. Schutt, 46 Iowa, 510. But
we think the cases are quite different. In that case Davenport delivered to Schutt promissory notes, for the purpose of
effecting loans by discounting the note~. Schutt, as the agent
of Davenport, sold the n()tes and paid the proceeds to Davenport. It was held that there was no more o·b ligation upon
one pa1·ty to keep books of account than the othPr, and that
Schutt was not liable merely becam;p he could not show an
itemized statement of the transactionN between the J>arties,
and that being a credible person, and having testified positively that be had paid and disposed of an sums realized by
him from plaintiff's notes as directed by the plaintiff, this, in
the absence of some account or showing by D:ivenport that
the proceeds of the notes were not accounted for, was a sufficient defense. In that case no confidence nor trust as to
the disposition of the proceeds of the notes was l'l'posed in
Schutt. He was to pay to Dnvenport, wbo could well have
kept a correct account of all the notes deposited and payments made.
Here the relation of the parties is quite different. Each
checked out the funds of the partnership at will, U})()n his
own check, and it was the duty of each to account to the firm
for what he drew out. If tlle defendant drew checks and
obtained the money thereon its expenditure was a matter
peculiarly within his own knowledge. The plaintiff was
entitled to some showing more than a general statement that
the p1·oceeds of the checks were used for partnership purposes.
"All partners having any chai·ge of the business of the firm
are bound to lrnep constantly, regular, intelligible and accurate
accounts of n11 the business, and to give all the partners at
all times access to them and to the means of verifying them."
Parsons on Pnrtnnship, p. u~7.
AffirmPd.
NOTE -See Mecht>m"s Elem of Partn., ~ 118.
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YORKS vs. TOZER.

Suprenw Court of Jllinnesota, 1894.

59 Minn. 78, 60 N. W. Rep. 846, 28 L. R. A. B6.

Plaintiff and defendant were partners in rcspect to one par-

cel of land, the title to which was taken in defendant’s name.

Defendant negotiated a sale of the land, without the plaintiﬂ"s

YORKS vs. TOZER.

knowledge, but, on obtaining an abstract, the title appeared

defective in la-cking one conveyance. The title was, however,

Sttpr~

Court of Minnesota, 189.f.

perfect, and the fault was in the abstract. Plaintiff could

have informed defendant of this error, but, without consulting

plaintiff, defendant paid $526, to procure a conveyance to sup-

G9 .Minn. 78, 60 N. W. Rep. 846, 28 L. R. A. 88.

pl_v the supposed deﬁciency. The action was by plaintiff for

an accounting for the proceeds of the sale, and the defendant

sought to be allowed the $526 so paid.

Disallowed and defendant appeals.

Glapp é 1|-!cO'artne_1/, for appellant.

Henry N. Sctzcr, for appellee.

C.-u\"rY, J. (After stating the facts.) The court [below] ea

ﬁnds that defendant acted in good faith in the sale of the land.

and in expending said sum of $526 in attempting to cure the
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supposed defect in his title, but holds that he -cannot compel

plaintiﬁ to stand one-half or any part of such expense. \Ve

are of the same opinion. If defendant did not act in bad faith,

he was, to say the least, gpgsslyneglig cnt. It does not appear

that plaintiff was not accessibleand could not be communi-

cated with in a reasonable time. This land was the only part-

nership property, and its purchase and sale was the only part-

nership business. It was not an act in the usual course of

Plaintiff and defendant were partners in respect to one parcel of land, the title to which was taken in defendant's name.
Ddendant negotiated a sale of the land, without the plaintiff's
knowledge, but, on obtaining an abstract, the title appeared
defective in lacking one conveyance. The title was, h<>wever,
perfect, and the fault was in the abstract. Plaintiff could
lmve informed defendant of this error, but, without consulting
plaintiff, defendant paid $526, to procure a conveyance to supply the supposed deficiency. The action was by plaintiff for
an aroounting for the proceeds of the sale, and the defendant
flonght to be allowed the f526 so paid.
•
I
Disallowed and defendant appeals.·

the partnership business, but one which went to the very foun-

dation of the partnership. It is found by the court that the

.

Clapp tE McCartney, for appellant.

plaintiff, and not the defendant, conducted the negotiations

for the purchase of this land, and procured the conveyance to

Henry N. Setzer, for appellee.

defendant; and he should be presumed to have had some

knowledge of the state of the title. No reason is given by

defendant w\hy all negotiations for the sale of the land and

the purchase of this supposed title by him were kept secret

CANTY, J.
(After stating the facts.) The court [below]..,,
finds that defendant acted in good faith in the sale of the land~
and in expending said sum of $526 in attempting t-0 cure the
supposed defect in his title, but holds that he -cannot compel
plaintiff to stand one-half or any part of sucih expense. We
are of the same opinion. If defendant did not act in bad faith,
he was, to say the least, grosslj:. negligent. It does not appear
that plaintiff was not accessible ·and could n<>t be communicated with in a reaso.n able time. This land was the 01:11Y ~rt
nership property, and its purehase and sale was the only partnership business. It w as not an act in the mmal course of
the partnership business, but one which went to the very foundation of the partnership. It is found by the court that the
plaintiff, and not thP defe>ndant, conducted the negotiations
for the purchase of this land, and procured the conveyance to
defendant; and he should be pres~med to have had some
knowledge of the state of the title. No reason is given by
defendant why all negotiations for the sale of the land and
the purcllli.se of this supposed title by him were kept secret
I

0
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from plaintiﬁ. In every important exigency the partner about

LnrnsB'f vs.

STRANAHAN.

ell

to act should consult the other partner, at least, if there are

no circumstances which excuse him from so doing.

Aﬁirmed.

No'rE.—See Mechem's Elem. of Pal-tn., 5 117.

LINDSEY vs. STRANAHAN.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1889.

from plaintiff. In every important exigency the· pa.rtner about
to act should consult the other partner, at least, if there a.re
no circumstances which excuse him from so doing.
Affirmed.

129 Pa. St. 685, 18 Atl. Rep. 524.

Action for accounting of partnership transactions. It

NOTB.-8ee Mechem'& Elem. of Partn.,

~

11'7.

appeared that J. A. Stranahan had carried on business alone

until 1876, when J. K. Lindsey bought a half interest in it and

the two united as partners under the ﬁrm name of J . K. Lind-

sey & Co. After the formation of the ﬁrm Stranalhan left the

entire management and control of the business to Lindsey.

On the settlement, Lindsey claimed compensation for thus

managing the business. The matter was referred to masters

l.1TNDSEY vs. STRANAHAN.

in ch-ancery to state an account, and they reported, among

other things, as follows: “No express agreement or contract

was made by said partners that either of them was to receive

Bupreme Ootirl of Penns-ylvania, 1889.

compensation for services rendered by either of them in the
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business of the partnership; but as Lindsey took credit for

129 Pa. St. 685, 18 Atl. Rep. 524.

his services from time to time on the books of the ﬁrm, and

such books were open to the inspection of Stranahan, he must

be presumed to have known the fact and to ha.ve assented

thereto; and, as it is not to be presumed that the said Lindsey

would render his services in managing the affairs of said part-

nership for nothing, we, therefore, ﬁnd as a fact, that there

was an implied contract that Lindsey should receive such

compensation for his services as they were reasonably worth.”

They therefore credited him with “salary, $3,700.” -

The court below disallowed this claim, and Lindsey

appealed.

S. and S. B. Griﬁith, for the appellant.

J. A. Stranahan, for appellee.

/“"'

Action for accounting of partnership transactions. It
appeared that J. A. Stranahan had carried on business alone
until 1876, when J. K. Lindsey bought a half interest in it and
the two united as partners under the firm name of J. K. Lindsey & Cio. After the formaition of the firm Stran.ruhan left the
entire management and control of the business to Lindsey.
On the settlement, Lindsey claimed compensation for thus
managing the business. The matter was referred to masters
in chancery to state an account, and they reported, among
other things, as follows: "No express agreement or contract
was made by said partners that either of them was to receive
compeneation for services rendered by either of them in the
business of the partnership; but as Lindsey took credit for
his services from time to time on the books of the firm, and
such books were open to the inspection of Stranahan, he must
be presumed to have known the fact and to have assented
thereto; and, as it is not to be presumed that the said Lindsey
would render bis services in man-a~ing the affairs of said partnership for nothing, we, therefor~, find as a fact, that there
was an impliPd oontract that Lindsey should receive such
compensation for his services as they were reasonably worth.''
They therefore credited him with "salary, f3,700."
The court below disallowed this claim, and Lindsey
appealed.

8. and S. B. Griffith, for the appellant.
J. A.. Stranahan, for appellee.

____.......
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PER Cunmu. There is but a single question in this case:

182

CA.SES ON

PARTNERSHIP.

ls J. K. Lindsey, the plaintiff, entitled to compensation for his

services as a partner? It is conceded that there was no

express contract that he should be paid for such services, and

there is no principle better settled than that the law will not

imply a contract in such cases. The reason is that the part-

ner is but attending to his own affairs. This rule is inexor-

able; as much so as that between parent and child. Were it

otherwise, we might have a contest between the partners upon

the settlement of every partnership account, as to the value

of their respective services. -It is true this principle may work

hardship in particular cases; almost every general rule does,

but that is a weak argument against the soundness of the

rule. When the copartnership agreement contemplates that

on'e partner shall manage the business, or do more than his

hare of the work, it is easy to provide for his compensation

in the agreement itself; and if no such stipulation is then

m-ade, as before said, the law will not imply one. Even where

a liquidating or surviving partner settles up the business, it

has been repeatedly held that he is not entitled to compensa-
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tion for doing so, although, in such case, he performs all the.

service; Beatty vs. Wrag/, 19 Pa. 516, 57 Am. Dec. 677; Brown

vs. McFarland, 41 Pa. 129, 80 Am. Dec. 598; G_vger’s Appeal,

62 Pa. 73, 1 Am-. Rep. 382; Brown’s Appeal, 89 Pa. 139.

Judgment affirmed.

N0'1's.—See also Meohenfs Elem. of Part:n., §§ 119, 120, for other cases to

the same effect. The same general rule ordinarily governs the allowance

of interest to one partner upon money advanced by him for partnership

purposes. See Mechem‘s Elem. of Pat-tn., § 121.

MoFADDEN vs. LEEKA.

Supreme Court of Ohio, 18.91.

. 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874.

McFadden, Leeka, and a large number of others organized

an unincorporated association known as The Union Pork

House Company, under a constitution and by-laws agreed

PER Cum.&M. There ia bot a single queBtion in this case:
Ta.J. K. Lindsey, the plaintiff, entitled to compensation for his
services as a partner? It is -conceded that there was no
expreRs contract that he should be paid for such services, and
there ia no principle better settled than that the law will not
imply a contract in such cases. The reason is that the partn~r is but attending to bis own affairs. This rule is inPxorable; as much so as that between parent and child. \Yere it
otherwise, we might have a contest between the partners upon
the settlement of every partnership account, as to the value
of their respective senices. ·It is true this principle may work
hardship in particular cases; almost every general rule does,
but that is a weak argument against the soundness of the
rule. \Vhen the copartnenhip agreement contemplates that
one partner shall manage the business, or do more than his
share of the work, it is easy to provide for bis compensation
in the agreement itself; and if no such stipulation is then
made, as before said, the law will not imply one. EYen where
a li<1uidating or surviving partner settles up the business, it
has been repeatedly held that he is not entitled to compensation for doing so, although, in such case, he performs all the.
service; Beatty vs. Wray, 19 Pa. 516, 57 Am. Dec. 677; Broten
'VB. AlcFarland, 41 Pa. 129, 80 Am. Dec. 598; Gyger's Appeal,
62 Pa. 73, 1 .\m. Ilep. 382; Brown'11 Appeal, 89 Pa. 139.
Judgment affirmed.

upon. The aifairs of the association were in charge of a board

ii?

NoTE.-See also Meohem'a Elem. of Partn., H 119, 120, for other cases to
the same effect. The same general rule ordinarily governs the allowance
of interest to one partner upo11 money advanced by him for partoerahip
purposea. See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 121.

McFADDEN vs. LEEKA.

Supreme Cottrt of Ohio, 1891.
48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874,

.McFadden, Leeka, and a large number of others organized
an unincorporated association known as The Union Pork
House Company, under a constitution and by-laws agreed
upon. The affairs of tlle association were in charge of a board

MOFADDEN vs. LEEKA. 233

McFADDEN VS. LEEK-".

of directors provided forby the by-laws, and elected from the

233

members. One of the purposes of the organization was the

erection of a packing house. By-law VIII provided that the

directors should not incur indebtedness beyond the available

capital of the company. In erecting the packing house, the

contributions from the members proved insufﬁcient, and the

directors borrowed large sums on their persona.l responsibility.

They then procured a mortgage upon the property to secure

them against this indebtedness, foreclosed the mortgage,

bought in the property, and, after applying the proceeds upon

this indebtedness, brought this action against all the stock-

holders to recover a large balance remaining unsatisﬁed.

Leeka was one of these directors and McFadden one of the

stockholders so sued. ' l

Judgment below against McFadden and others, and they

brought error. '

Alphonso Hart, for plaintiffs in error.

Steel ¢£~ Hough, and Uric Sloane, for defendant in error. _

DIIJKMAN, J. (After holding that the association was a

partnership and that the rights and liabilities of the members
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were to be determined as partners). When the directors,

ﬁnding they were able to oollect only eight thousand and

ﬁve hundred dollars of the stock, proceeded to contract an

of directors provided for by the ·by:laws, and elected ·from the
members. One of the purposes of the organization was the
erection of a packing house. By.Jaw VIII provided that the
directors should not incur indebtedness bPy-0nd the available
ca.pita} of the company. In erecting the packing house, the
contributions from the members proved insufficient, .and the
directors borrowed large sums on their personal responsibility.
They then procured a mortgnge up.on the property to secure
them against this indebtedness, foreclosed the mortgage,
bought in the property, and, after applying the proceeds upon
this indebtl'dncss, brought this action against all the stockholders to recover a large balance rc·nrniniug unsatisfied.
Leeka was one of these directors and McFadden one of the
stockholders so sued.
Judgment below against Mcl!"adden and others, and they
brought error.

indebtedness largely in excess of the available capital of the

company, and in disregard -of a. plain provision of an

unchanged by-law, their action, as between the partners, was

binding only upon those who eit'her assented beforehand to

Alphonso Hart, for plaintiffs in error.
Steel & Hough, and Uric Sl-Oane, for defendant in error.

the creation of the indebtedness or ratiﬁed it after it was

incurred. In general, the act of one or more partners in con-

travention of the partnership articles in a substantial point,

cannot, as among the members of the ﬁrm, bind the non-

assenting partners. .

One of the most obvious duties and obligations of all part-

ners is, strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations

contained in the partnership articles. In respect to the extent

of the partnership as stated in the articles, courts of equity

construe the articles -strictly, and do not permit the business

to be extended by any of the partners without the consent of

all of them. Story, Part., secs. 173, 193. In the management

of the interior concerns of the partnership among themselves,

30

DICKltAN, J.
(After holding that the association was a
partnership and that the rights and liabilities of the members
were to be determined as partners). lVhen the directol"S,
finding they were able to collect only eight thousand and
five hundred dollars of the stock, proceeded to contract an
indebtedness largely in excess of the available capital of the
company, and in disregard ·of a plain provision of an
unchanged by-law, their action, as between the partners, was .
binding only upon those who eit11er assented beforehand to
the creation of the indebtedness or ratified it after it was
incurred. In g(•neral, the act of one or more partners in contra\'ention of the padnersbip articles in a substantial point,
cannot, as am<>ng the mt.>mbers of the firm, bind the non·
assenting partners.
One of the most obvious duties and obligations of all partners is, strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations
contained in the partnership articles. In respect to the extent
of the p,artnership as stated in the articles, courts of equity
construe the articles ·Strictly, and do not permit the business
to be extended by any of the partners without the consent of
all of them. Story, Part., secs. 173, 193. Jn the management
of the interior concerns of the partnership among thE>mselves,

30
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234:

CASES ON

P ABTlrERBBIP.

the weight of authority is in favor of the power of a majority

of the ﬁrm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the

ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have

been consulted. 3 Kent’s Com., 45. But unless special pro-

visions in the articles of association be made to the contrary,

this’ right of the majority does not extend to the right to set

aside, or materially change any of the articles of the partner-

ship. In effecting such a change, or in substantially violating

any of the articles, it is essential that all should unite; other-

wise, it is not obligatory upon them. Golly. Part., 3d Am.

Ed., 182. In no case can the majority bind the minority inter

sese to anything expressly stipulated against in the contract,

or which is not fairly within the scope of the partnership

business, and that cannot be considered within its scope which

in any respect is subversive of the fundamental agreement.

Abbott vs. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; 1 Wood’s Colly. Part. sec. 155,

p. 285, N.

In Davies vs. H owkins, 3 Maule and Sel. 488, a company was

formed for brewing ale, and by deed they conﬁded the conduct

of the business to "two persons, who were to be trustees of the
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company. General quarterly meetings of the company were

to be held. It was resolved by the King’s Bench, that one per-

son only could not be appointed at a general quarterly meet-

ing in place of the two originally appointed under the deed,

unless such alteration was made with the consent of all the

subscribers. Lord E1.r.n>:nonouon said, that “a change had

been made in the constitution of this company, which could not

be made with-out the consent of the whole body of the sub-

scribers. It was such a substituted alteration in its constitu-

tion as required the consent of all.” _

The right oficontribution and indemnity between partners

grows, in a large measure, out of the agency of the partner

seeking reimbursement. Each member, as an agent of the

ﬁrm, is entitled to be indemniﬁed by the ﬁrm, against liabilities

bona ﬁde incurred by him while pursuing the authority con-

ferred upon him by the agreement entered into between him-

self and his copartners; but he has no right to claim con-

tribution from the other members of the ﬁrm, for liabilities

incurred in disregard of the authority thus reposed in him. It

devolves upon agents and trustees who seek indemnity from

their principals and cestuis q-ue trustcnt, to show that they have

the weight of auth'Ority is in favor of the power of a majority
of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the
ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have
been consulted. 3 Kent's Com., 45. But unless special provisions in the articles of association be made to the contrary,
thi!'/ right of the majority does not extend to the right to set
aside, or materially change any of the articles of the partner8hip. In effecting such a change, or in substantially violating
nny of the articles, it is essential that all should unite; otherwise, it is not obligatory upon them. Colly. Part., 3d Am.
Ed., 182. In no case can the majority bind the minority intM
aese to anything expressly stipulated against in the oontract,
or which is not fairly within the scope of the partnership
business, and that cannot be considered witbin its scope which ·
in any respect is subversive of the fundamental agreement.
Abbott vs. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; 1 Wood's Colly. Part. sec. 105,
p. 285, N.
In Datiies vs. Ha.wkins, 3 Maule and Sel. 488, a company was
f orm('d for brewing ale, and by deed they confided the conduct
of the business to two persons, who were to be trustees of the
company. General quarterly meetings of the company were
to be held. It waa resolved by the King's Bench, that one person only could not be appointed at a general quarterly meeting in place of the two originally appointed under the deed,
unless such alteration was made with the consent of all the
suhscr-ibers. Lord Er.r.ENBOROUGH said, that "a change had
been made in the constitution of this company, which could not
be made with-out the consent of the whole body of the sub1cribers. It was such a substituted alteration in its Constitution as required the consent of all."
'l'he right of contribution and indemnity between partners
grows, in a large measure, out of the agency of the partner
11eeking reimbursement. Each member, as an agent of the
firm, is entitled to be indemnified by the firm, against liabilities
bona fide incurred by him while pursuing the authority conferred upon him by the agreement entered into between himself and his copartners; but he has no right to claim contribution from the other members of the firm, for liabilities
incurred in disregard of the authority thus reposed in him. It
•levolves upon agents and trustees who seek indemnity from
their principals and ceat-uis que trustent, to show that they have

MCFA no an vs. Lnsxs. 235

not acted contrary to their instructions, for on principle they

McFADDE¥ vs. Lau.

!35

will not be entitled to any indemnity or reimbursement for

losses and expenses incurred while so acting. And this rule

has been applied to directors of companies. In The Worcester

Corn Exchange Company’s Case, 3 l)e Gex, Mac. & G. 180, a

company was organized for the purpose of building a corn

exchange. The deed of settlement of the company limited the

amount of each shareholder’s subscription, and authorized the

directors to create new shares, and to raise the money by bor-

rowing, under certain restrictions. The capital of the com-

pany being expended, and more money being required, the

directors advanced money themselves, and expended it in pay-

ment of debts of the company. They also, but in excess of

their powers, borrowed money of a bank which had notice

of the company’s deed. It was held that the directors were

not entitled to charge the shareholders, either in respect of

the advances, or in respect of the bank debt, beyond the

amount of the capital which each shareholder had_ agreed to

subscribe. And this decision is pronounced to be, “strictly

in conformity with the sensible rule that agents are not
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entitled to any indemnity from their principals in respect of

unauthorized expenditures.” 1 Wood’s Golly. Part., 495.

But we are reminded that the constitution and by-laws of

The Union Pork House Company provide, by article XI of

the one and article IX of the other, that either the constitu-

tion or by-laws “may be altered or amended at any regular

meeting by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders represented

at said meeting.” And it is urged in argument, that notwith-

standing article VIII of the by-laws restraining the action

of the directors has never been altered or amended, yet, the

shareholders, at certain extra but n-ot regular meetings, by a

vote suﬁicient to alter or amend that section, virtually

assented to and ratiﬁed the acts of the directors in creating

an indebtedness beyond the available capital of the company,

by authorizing them to borrow money and directing a mort-

gage on the company’s property to indemnify them against

loss. But the object of a change in the by-laws is not to be

attained by an indirect, irregular, and unauthorized method,

calculated to mislead the shareholders. The shareholders had

the right to rely upon the inviolability of the constitution

and by-laws, unless changed in the manner prescribed. Until

not acted contrary to their instructions, for on principle the7
will not be entitled to any indemnity or reimbursement for
losses and expenses incurred while so acting. And tbiit rule
hns been applied to directors of companies. In The Worcester
Corn Exchange Company's Case, 3 De Gex, Mac. & G. 180, a
company was organized for the purpose of building a corn
exchange. The deed of settlement of the company limited the
amount of each shareholder's subscriptlon, and authorized the
directors to create new shares, and to raise the money by borrowing, under certain restrictions. The capital of the company being expended, and more money being required, the
directors advanced money themselves, and expended it in payment of debts of the company. They also, but in excess of
their powers, borrowed money of a bank which had notice
of the company's deed. It was held that the directors were
not entitled to charge the shareholders, either in respect of
the advances, or in respect of the bank debt, beyond the
amount of the capital which each shareholder had. agreed to
Mubscribe. And tlds decision is pronounced to be, "strictly
in conformity with the sensible rule that agents are not
entitled to any indemnity from their principals in respect of
unauthorized expenditures." 1 Wood's Colly. Part., 495.
But we are reminded that the constitution and by-laws of
The Union Pork House Company provide, by article XI of
the one and article IX of the other, that either the constitution or by-laws "may be altered or amended at any regular
me>eting by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders represented
at said meeting." And it is urged in argument, that notwithstanding article VIII of the by-laws restraining the action
of the directors has never been altered or amended, yet, the
E1hareholders, at certain extra but not regular meetings, by a
vote sufficient to alter or amend that section, virtually
al'sented to and ratified the acts of the directors in creating
an indebtedness beyond the available capital of the company,
by authorizing them to borrow money and directing a mortgage on the company's property to indemnify them against
loss. But the object of a change in the by-laws is not to be
attained by an indirect, irregular, and unauthorized method,
calculated to mislead the shareholders. The shareholders had
the right to rely upon the inviolability of the constitution
and by-laws, unless changed in the manner prescribed. Until
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the by-laws to restrict the directors in the expenditure of

money should be changed in the mode provided, to wit: by

a two-thirds vote of all the stock represented at a regular meet"-

ing, of which due notice had been given, and held on the ﬁrst

Thursday of March or September, the directors would be con-

ﬁned within the bounds of the available capital of the com-

pany, and in transgressing those bounds, would, we think, be

entitled to no contribution or reimbursement from non-assent

ing shareholders or partners who had paid their subscriptions.

If it is proposed to make an alteration in the partnership arti-

cles by an agreement which shall be binding on all parties,

notice of the proposed change and of the time and place at

which it is to be taken into consideration ought to be given

to all partners. Const vs. Harris, 1 T. & R. 496. For, even

if the change is one which it is competent for a majority to

make against the assent of the minority, all are entitled to be

heard upon the subject; and unless all have an opportunity

of opposing the change, those who object to it will not be

bound by the others. 2 Lind. Part., 2d Am. Ed., 410.

Recurring, however, to the court’s ﬁndings of fact in refer-
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ence to the extra meeting of December 1, 1875, when a reso-

lution was adopted authorizing the directors to ﬁnish the

building and borrow money to pay off the indebtedness; and

the extra meeting of September 26, 187 6, when the matter of

paying oﬂ? the indebtedness, and completing the building was

considered; and the extra meeting of December 23, 1876, when

the trustee was authorized to execute and deliver a mortgage

to secure the di"<>.ctors from loss on account of their individual

liability on the indebtedness, it does not appear how many

shares of stock were represented at any one of those meetings,

or whether any resolution was adopted by a two-thirds vote,

or whether any notice was ever given to any shareholder,

informing him that an alteration or amendment of any of

the by-laws would be taken into consideration.

Furthermore, where a member of a ﬁrm materially violates

the articles of copartnership, and claims contribution and in-

demnity from his copartners for the losses and expenses to

which he has thereby been subjected, it will be incumbent

upon him to show assent or ratiﬁcation of his acts by his

copartners before he can recover of them. In the ﬁndings of

fact it is not disclosed that the plaintiffs in error, or any of

them, ever expressly assented to the creation or payment of

w — ~_

the by-Iaw·s 1o restrict tile directors in the expenditure of
money should be changed in the mode provided, to wit: by
a two-thirds VQte of all the stock represented at a regular meeting, of which due notice had been given, and held on the first
Thursday of March or September, the directors would be conftned within the bounds of the available capital of the company, and in transgressing those bounds, would, we think, be
entitled to no contribution or reimbursement from non-assenting shareholders or putners who had paid their subscriptions.
If it is proposed to make an alteration in the partnership articles by an agreement which shall be binding on all parties,
notice of the proposed change and of the time and place at
whi<.'h it is to be taken into consideration ought to be given
to all partners. Const tJB. Harris, 1 T. & R. 496. For, even
if the change is one which it is competent for a majority to
make against the assent of the minority, all are entitled to be
heard upon the subject; and unless all have an opportunity
of opposing the change, those who object to it will not be
bound by the others. 2 Lind. Part., 2d Am. Ed., 410.
Recurring, however, to the court's findings of fact in reference to the extra meeting of De~ember 1, 1875, when a resolution was adopted authorizing the directors to finish the
building and borrow mPney to pay off the indebtedness; and
the extra meMing of SPptember 26, 1876, when the matter of
paying off t:tie indebtPdness, and completing the building was
eonsidered; and the extra meeting of December 23, 1876, when
the trustee was authorized to execute and deliver a mortgage
to secure the di.··~cto1·s from Joss on account of their individual
liability on the indebtedn<.>ss, it does not appear how many
shares of stock were represented at any one of those meetings,
or whether any resolution was adopted by a fwo-thirds vote,
or whether any notice was ever given to any shareholder,
informing him that an alteration or amendment of any of
the bJ-laws would be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, where a member of a firm materially violates
the artirles of copartner1'1hip, and claims contribution and indemnity from his copartners for the losses and expenses to
which he has thereby been subjected, it wi_ll be incumbent
upon him to show ass<.>nt or ratification of his acts by his
copartners before he can r<>cover of tbPm. In the findings of
fact it is not disclosed that the plaintiffs in error, or any of
them, ever expressly assented to the creation or payment of

McF,i nor-:1»: vs. LEEKA. 237

any of the indebtedness contracted by the directors. Indeed,

?rlcFADDEN vs.

I~EEKA.

237

the court evidently did not regard such assent necessary to

bind the other shareholders. For, the court found, that a

stockholder who was never present at any meeting when the

indebtedness was made known or talked of, who never

attended any meeting after he heard of the indebtedness, and

who expressed his dissatisfaction at the creation of the debt;

that a stockholder who never attended any of the meetings,

never heard of the indebtedness until the commencement of

the original action, and never expressly assented to it; and

that a stockholder who attended a meeting when the indebted-

ness'was made known, but voted against paying it, and never

expressly assented to it, should each, nevertheless, be holden

to contribute toward the reimbursement of the directors.

'[‘he fact that the shareholders received notice of the meet-

ings and failed to attend, seems to have been deemed ade-

quate to bind them. But, the directors having disregarded

an important article of the by-laws, essential to the safety

and protection of the company, and thereby created an

indebtedness beyond the company’s available capital, at share-
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holder who did not see ﬁt, upon notice, to attend a meeting

called by those directors to consider their own neglect of duty,

should not therefore be concluded by the action of those stock-

holders present who ratiﬁed the unauthorized acts of the

directors.

In our view the conclusions of law, and the decree of the

circuit court are not altogether sustained by the facts as

found by the court; and those of the plaintitfs in error who

did not, in any other manner than by failure to attend the

meetings of the stockholders when notiﬁed, assent expressly

or by necessary implication, to the creation or payment 01

any of the indebtedness incurred by the directors, should not

be required to contribute toward the payment of such indebt-

ness, after paying the amount due upon their respective sub-

scriptions. YVe think, therefore, that a judgment should be

rendered for the plaintiffs in error upon the facts found, in

conformity with the foregoing opinion of the court.

Judgment accordingly.

Non: See Mechenfs Elem. of Part.n., ;;§ 125, 120.

any of the indebtedness contracted by the directors. Indeed,
the court evidently did not regard such assent necessary to
bind the other shareholders. For, the court found, that a
stockholder who was never present at any meeting when the
indebtedness was made known or talked of, who never
n ttended any meeting after he heard of the indebtedness, and
who expressed his dissatisfaction at the creation of the debt;
that a stockholder who never attended any of the meetings,
never heard of the indebtedness until the commencement of
the original action, and never expressly assented to it; and
that a stockholder who attended a meeting whea the indebtedness ·was made known, but voted against paying it, and never
PXpressly assented to it, should each, nevertheless, be holden
to contribute toward the reimbursement of the direocto1'8.
'rbe fact that the shareholders received notice of the meetings and failf'd to attend, seems to have been dee~ed adec1uate to bind them. But, the directors having disregarded
an important article of the by-laws, essential to the safety
and protection of the company, and thereby created an
irul<•btedness be~·ond the company's available capital, a shareholder who did not see fit, upon notice, to attend a meeting
called by those directors to consider their own neglect of duty,
should not therefore be concluded by the action of those stockholders present who ratified the unauthorized acts of the
directors.
In our view the conclusions of law, and the decree of the
circuit court are not nltogether sustained by the facts as
found by the court; and those of the plaintiffs in error who
did nott in any other manner than by failure to attend the
meetings of the stockholders when notified, assent expreBSly
or by neceseary implication, to the creation or payment ol
any of the indebtedDf'.SS incurred by the directors, should not
be required to contribute toward the payment of such indebtnese, after paying the amount due upon their re3pective subscriptions. We think, therefore, that a judgment should be
rendered for the plaintiffs in error upon the facts found,. in
conformity with the foregoing opinion of the court.
Judgment ac~or~ing-1y.
'
Non: See ){eohem's Elem.
of Parto., 5§ 125, 121.
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VIII.

ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

1. AT LAW.

WYCOFF vs. PURNELL.

r

Supreme Court of Iowa, 1860.

10 Ia. 332.

In February, 1857, plaintiff and defendant formed a copart-

nership in the grocery and provision busines in the city of

vrn.

Keokuk, each of said partners agreeing to furnish his share of

the capital stock and share equally in the profits of their ﬁrm

business. The copartnership thus formed was dissolved in

December, 1857. The stock in trade was sold and placed to

the credit of plaintiff on the partnership account. The plain-

ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

tiff in his petition avers that the defendant failed to furnish his

share of the capital for the said ﬁrm; that he drew out of the

said ﬁrm more than his just share of the proﬁts, and that upon

1. AT LAW.

a settlement and account stated between plaintiff and defend-

ant there was due from defendant to plaintiff the sum of $1,109,

for which sum the plaintiff sues. Defendant demurred to

plaintiff’s petition, which demurrer was sustained by the court
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and judgment entered thereon, from which plaintiff appeals.

Noble ct Strong, for appellant.

WYCOFF vs. PURNELL.

Rankin, Miller & Enster, for appellees.

BALDWIN, J. The defendant demurred to the petition of

Supreme Court of Iowa, 1860.

plaintiff, and assigned as cause of demurrer, that the petition

showed that it was a controversy for the settlement of partner-

10 Ia. 832.

In February, 1857, plaintiff and defendant formed a copa;·tnership in the grocery and provision business in the city of
Keokuk, ea~h of said partners agreeing to furnish bis share of
the capital stock and share equally in the 11rofits of their firm
busineBS. The oopartnersh.ip thus formed was- dissolved in
necember, 1857. The stock in trade was sold and placed to
the credit of plaintiff on the partnership accom1t. The plaintiff in bis petition avers that the defendant failed to furnish bis
share of th.e capital for the said firm; that he drew out of the
said firm more than his jnNt share of the profits, and that upon
a settlement and account i;itated between plaintiff and defendant there was due from defendant to plaintiff the sum of $1,109,
for which sum the plaintiff sues. Defendant demurred to
plaintiff's petition, which demurrer was sustained by the court
and judgment entered thereon, from which plaintiff appeals.

Noble & Strong, for appellant.

Rankin, Miller & Enster, for appellees.
J. The defendant demurred to the petition of
plaintiff, and assigned as cause of demurrer, that the petition
showed that it was a controversy for the settlement of partnerBALDWIN,

Wxcorr vs. Pununnn. 239

1J'YCOD VI. PUIUfBLL.

289

ship matters, and its subject-matter was one of exclusive

chancery cognizance; also that an action at common law

would not lie for the matters and things set_up in the petition.

It is contended by counsel for appellee that one partner

cannot sue another at law for an unsettled account, and that

chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters

between partners. Upon this point there is no controversy.

But it also claimed by appellant that the principle is full_v

and clearly settled that one partner can maintain an action at

law against his copartner upon an amount found to be due him

upon settlement and account stated. We think the current of

authorities show this to be the proper and settled rule. While

in some courts it has been held that upon a settlement of part-

nership accounts, an express promise to pay is essential to sup-

port an action, _vet in most of the states it has been held that

where there has been a settlement and balance ascertained, the

law itself will imply a. promise to pay: Collyer on Partner-

ship, §§ 278, 279, 280, and note; Story Eq. Jur., Q 644 and note.

“'hether this is a suit at law to recover upon a promise b_v

defendant, either express or implied to pay a balance ascer-
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tained to be due upon settlement, or a proceeding to recover an

amount unliquidated between partners, must be determined

by the language of the petition. It is averred in the petition

that the partnership has been dissolved; that the property of

the ﬁrm had been disposed of, and upon a settlement and

account stated, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff

the amount claimed in the petition.

VVe think that the plaintiff shows by his petition, under a

fair and natural construction, a cause of action properly main-

tainable in a court of law. That while the petition is defective

in not setting forth fully the character of the settlement of the

partnership business, yet it shows also that the partnership

was ended; that the account between the plaintiff and defend-

ant, as partners, was no longer a matter of controversy; that

the amount sued for had been agreed as due to plaintiﬂ’;

which, if established by evidence, the plaintiff had a. right to

recover. - ~

J udgmcnt reversed.

N0'1'E.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 180.

As stated by BALDWIN. J., there are some states in which it is said that

there must be an empress promise to pay. Thus, see Course vs. P. incc, 1

ltbip matters, and its subject-matter was one of exclusivt~
chancery cognizance; also that an action at common law
would not lie for the matters and things set. up in the petition.
It is contended by counsel for appellee that one partne1·
cannot sue another at law for an unsettled account, and that
chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters
between partners. Upon this point there is no controversy.
Bot it also claimed by nppellant that the principle is fully
\
and clearly settled that one partner can maintain an action at
law against his copartner upon an amount found to be due him
upon settlement and account stated. We think the current of
authorities show this to be the proper and settled rule. While
in some courts it has been held that upon a settlement of partnership accounts, an express promise to pay is essential to sup( port an action, yet in most of the states it has been held that
\ where there has been a settlement and balance ascertained, the
law itself will imply a promise to pny: Collyer on Partnership, §§ 278, 279, 2SO, and note; Story Eq. Jur.,' 644 and note.
Whether this is a suit at law to recover upon a promise by
df'fendant, either express or implied to pay a balance ascertained to be due upon settlement, or a proceeding to recover an
amount unliquidated between partners, must be determined
by the language of the petition. It is averred in the petition
that the partnership has been dissolved; that the property of
the firm had been disposed of, and upon a settlement and
account stated, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff
.the amount claimed in the petition.
We think tllat the plaintiff shows by his petition, under a
fair and natural construction, a cause of action properly maintainable in a court of law. That while the petition is defective
in not setting forth fully the character of the scttlemE'nt of the
partnership business, yet it shows also that the partnership
was ended; that the account between the plaintiff and defendant, as partners, was no J-0nger a matter of controversy; that
the amount sued for had been agreed as due to plaintiff;
which, if established by evidence, the plaintiff had a right to
recover.
Judgment reversed.

i

NOTE.-See Mechem'e Elem. of Pa.rtn., § 180.
Aa stated by BALDWIN, J., there are some states In which It Is eatd that
there must be an e:eprtRB promiae to pay. Thus, eee Courae va. p, ince, 1
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Mill, (S. Car.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649; Murray vs. Bogeri, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)

818, 7 Am. Dec. 466; Chadsey rs. Harrison, 11 Ill. 151: Burns vs. Notting-

ham, 60 Ill. 361: Nims rs. Bigelow, 44 N. H. 376. But the general rule is

that the promise may be implied. IV;/cojf vs. Purnell, supra; Holyoke vs.

Ma 0. 50 Me. 385; Spear vs. I\’eu'eIl, 13 Vt. 288, post, p-—-; Pope vs. Ran-

dolph, 18 Ala. 14; U'ray vs. Mileslone, 5 Mees vs. W ells, 21.

In Massaclmsetts, a. still more liberal rule prevails. See Williams vs.

Henslmw, 11 Pick. 79. 22 Am. Dec. 366; 12 Pick. 378, 23 Am. Dec. 614.

In Michigan, see lVheeler vs. Arnold, 30 Mich. 804.

ji-?i_L_i

BULLARD vs. KINNEY.

Mill, CS. Car.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649; Murray va. Bogert, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)
818, 7 Am. Dec. 466; Chadsey t·s. Harrison, 11 Ill. 151: Burn8 w. Nottingham, 60 Ill. 861; Nims t·s. Big~lOtD, « N. H. 376. But the jteneral rule is
that the promise may. be implied. Wycoff vs. Purnell, supra; Holyo~ w.
Ma· o, fiO Me. 885; Spear vs. Neu:ell, 13 Vt. 288, po11t, p - ; Pope w. Ran..
dolph, 18 Ala. 14: Wray va. Mik11tone, ts Me.ea v11. M-ell11, 21.
In l\l888&chusetta, a still more liberal rule prevails. See Williama w .
Henshaw, 11 Pick. 79, 22 Am. Dec. 866; 12 Pick. 878, 28 Am. Dec. 614.
In l\Iichlgan, see Wli.eeler w. Arnold, 80 ?rlicb. 804..

Supreme Court of C'al~if01'-nia, 1858.

10 Cal. 60.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff on

an account assigned to him by Sotzen and Goodnow, for goods,

wares, and merchandise sold to thedefendants. The defend-

ants composed a joint stock association, known as the “Colum-

bus Quartz Mining Company.” While Sotzen and Goodnow,

merchants and partners, were shareholders in the company,

BULLARD vs. KINNEY.
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they sold to the company goods, wares and merchandise to a.

large amount. They afterwards, and during the existence of

the company, sold their stock to one \Vhite, and assigned their

Supreme Courl of California, 1858.

account against the company to the plaintiff.

There was nothing in the constitution of the company whidh

10 Cal. 60.

regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between them-

selves. Nor was there any ﬁnal settlement of the partnership

accounts, or any balance struck, or promise on the part of the

shareholders to pay this account. The plaintiff commenced

his suit by attachment against the property of defendants.

The defendants had judgment in the court below, and the

plaintiﬁ appealed.

Sanderson and H ewes, for appellant

D. K. Ncwell, for respondent.

BURNETT, J . The only question arising in the case is, whether

the plaintiff can sue _in this form?

This was an a'Ction of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff Oil
an account assigned to him by Sotzen and Goodnow, for goods,
wares, and merchandise sold to the ·defendants. The defendants composed a joint stock association, known as the "Columbus Quartz Mining Company." While Sotzen and Goodnow,
merchants and partners, were shareholders in the company,
they sold to the company goods, wares and me1·chandise to a
large amount. They afterwards, and during the existence of
the company, sold their stock to one White, and assigned their
account against the company to the plaintiff.
There was nothing in the constitution of the company whidh
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, a~ between themselves. Nor was there any final settlement of the partnership
accounts, or any balance struck, or promise on the part of the
shareholders to pay this account. The plaintiff commenced
his suit by attachment against the property of defendants.
The defendants had judgment in the court below, and the
plaintiff appealed.

Sanderson and Hewes, for appellant.
D. K. Ncu;ell, for respondent.
BURNETT, J. The only question arising in the case is, whether
the plaintiff can sue .in this form?

BULLARD vs. KINNEY. 241
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There was nothing in the constitution of this company which

regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between them-

selves, and, therefore, the general law of partnership must

prevail (Coll. on Partn., Sec. 1115). There having been no

ﬁnal settlement of the partnership accounts, and no balance

struck, and no express promise on the part of the individual

members to pay their ascertained portion of this amount to

Sotzen and Goodnow, they could not maintain assumpsit. As

they could not sue, it is ditﬁcult to see how their assignee could

do so. To permit a partner, who has a claim against the ﬁrm,

and who cannot, therefore, sue the ﬁrm at law, to avoid this

disability by assignment of the debt, would defeat all the

substantial reasons upon which this rule is predicated. This

rule rests upon three grounds:

1. The technical ground, that a man cannot, at the same

time, in the same suit, be both a plaintiif and a defendant.

Because it would be useless for one partner to recover that

which, upon taking a general account, he might be compelled

to refund; and thus a multiplicity of suits be permitted, where

one would answer.
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3. The contrary rule would defeat the equitable right of the

other partners to set-off their advances against those of plain-

titf, and would force them to ﬁrst pay the amount, and then

rely upon the individual responsibility of the partner for a.

return "of his proportion. _

The ﬁrst ground, being merely technical, may be considered

as not so material under our system of pleading; but the other

two grounds are substantial in their character. ' * *

Afﬁrmeda

N0'rE.—See Mechems Elem. of Partn., §130, and cases there cited.
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There was nothing in the constitution of this company which
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between themselves, and, therefore, the general law of partnership must
prevail (Coll. on Partn., Sec. 1115). The1·e having been no
final settlement of the partnership accounts, a11d no balance
struck, and no express prnmise on the part of the individual
members to pay their ns<·<•1·tained portion of thh~ amount to
Sotzen and Goodnow, tlley could not maintain asimmpsit. As
they could not sue, it is difficult to see bow their assignee could
do so. To permit a partner, who ha8 a claim against the firm,
mid who cannot, therefore, sue the firm at law, to avoid this
dhmhility by assignment of the d<>l>t, would dPfeat all the
~ubstantial reasons upon which this rule is predieuted.
This
l'ule rests upon three grounds:
1. 'l'lie teelmical ground, that a man cannot, at the same
time, in the same suit, be both a plaintiff and a dt~fenclant.
:!. BC'eause it would be usell'SS for one partnPr to rec-0ver that
which, upon taking a genf'ral arcount, he might be compelled
to refund; and thus a multiplicity of suits be permitted, where
one would answPr.
3. The <·ont1·ary ml<' would defeat the equitable right of the
other pai·tn<•r:-: to Sl·l·off th<'il' advances against those of plaintiff, and wou Id fo1·1·1• tlwrn to first pay the amount, and then
rely upon the indiddnal rPsponsibility of the partner fo1• a
1·eturn of his proportion.
.
The first irround, bt>ing merely technical. may be considered
as not so matp1·ial undet· our system of pleading; hut the other
two grounds are snhstant ial in their ehnraeter. * * *
Affirmed.
NoTE.-See Mechem s Elem. of Partn., § 130, and cases there cited.
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CARPENTER V8. GREENOP.

Supreme Court of Michigan, -1889.

74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep. 276, 18 Am. St. Rep. 662.

Action by Charles D. Carpenter against John Greenop and

another upon a promissory note.

CARPEXTER vs. GREENOP.

Judgment was given for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Glidden tﬁ Bates, for appellant.

M. Brown and Frank Damon, for respondents.

Sup1·eme Court of Michi.gan, -1889.

CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiﬁ’ purchased in good faith, but after

maturity, a note of John Greenop & Co., payable to the order of

Robert A. Lavery, and indorsed by Lavery. Lavery was a mem-

74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep. 276, 16 Am. St. Rep. 669.

ber of the ﬁrm of John Greenop & Co., and made the note, with

Greenop’s consent, for money lent by Law-r_\' to the ﬁrm. The

note was dated January 21, 18:-<3, payable in six months. It

was transferred to plaintitf in 1884 while the ﬁrm was still in

business, and about a year before it ceased doing business.

Action by Charles D. Carpenter against John Greenop and
another upon a promissory note.
Judgment was given for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

There was no evidence of the state of-accounts, or that Lavery

was in any way a debtor to the ﬁrm when the transfer was

Glidden

~

Bates, for appellant.

made, or that there were any equities existing against him

which did not exist when the note was made. The court below

M. Brown and Frank Dumon, for respondents.
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held that plaintiff could not recover. The reason assigned

was that the note could not be transf_erred after maturity, so

as to enable the indorsee to sue upon it, if suit could not have

been brought by the assignor, and that Lavery could have

brought no suit on it. The decision also seems to have been

based partially on the idea that a partner can have no deal-

ings with his ﬁrm which are not subject to the ﬁnal account-

ing, and that the equities of such an accounting attach to such

claims as he may hold against the ﬁrm.

I do not think this doctrine is tenable. It certainly has not

been directed in this court. The only case that is seriously

claimed as bearing in that direction is Davis rs. .lIerriIl, 51

Mich. 480, 16 N. \V. Rep. 864. That case has no resemblance

to' this. One member of the ﬁrm, named Eastwood, received

from the ﬁrm in October, 1874, a note due in one month after

-71-

CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff purehased in ~ood faith, but after
maturity, a note of John Greenop & Co., payable to the order of
Robert A. Lavery, and indorsed by Lavery. Lavery was a member of the firm of .John G 1·eenop & Co., and made the note, with
Greeno1,'s com1ent, for money Jent by I~• n·ry to the firm. The
note was dated January ~1, l~~:l. pa~·ahlt> in six months. It
was transferred to plaintiff in 18~4 while the fil'm was still in
business, and about a year before it ceased doing business.
There was no evidence of the state of.accounts, or that Lavery
was in any way a debtor to the firm wh(•n the transfer was
made, or that there were any equities existing against him
which did not exist wh(•n the note was m.ade. The court below
held that plaintiff could not recover. '.rbe reason assigned
was that the note could not be trans~<·rred after maturity, ·so
as to enable the indorst•e to sue upon it, if suit could not have
been brought by the assignor, and that Lavery could have
brou~ht no suit on it. The dedsion also seems to have been
basl•d partially on tlw i«lea that a partner can have no dealings with his firm which are not subject to the final accounting, and that the equities of such an accounting attach to such
clainu~ as he may hold aµ-aimit the firm.
I do not think this doetrine is h'nable. It certainly has not
been directed in tllis court. The onlv case that is serionslv
claimed as bearing in that dirt•dion is Daris rs. Jlerrill, 51
Mich. 480, 16 N. "'· Rep. 8fi4. That case has no resemblaD<:e
to' this. One member of the firm, named Eastwood, receiw•d
from the firm in October, 1874, a note due in one month after
~

.

/
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vs.
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date. In 1875 the ﬁrm was dissolved, and the affairs were put

into the hands of George YV. Merrill, one of the partners, to

wind up. Merrill’s credit in the ﬁrm accounts was larger than

Eastwood’s, and Eastwood had been credited on the books

with the amount of the note, which had never been presented

or demanded during the period after dissolution. In May, 1881,

Eastwood, who had lost the note by accidental ﬁre in January

of the same year, assigned to the plaintiff in general terms

whatever claims he had against the ﬁrm, with no reference to

the note as such. It is plain enough that there could have

been no recovery in such a case. Even had the note been

described, the statute does not authorize the assignee of a

negotiable note, who is not an indorsee, to sue in his own

name on it. But. furthermore, there was no attempt to trans-

fer the note as such. The assignment was one which trans-

ferred nothing but Eastwood’s claims generally against the

company, and must therefore be subject to the partnership

settlement. There was no ﬁrm in existence for nearly six

years before the assignment. ‘In the present case the note
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was transferred by regular indorsement a considerable time

before the ﬁrm went out of business. It was due already as

an independent claim against the ﬁrm for money lent, and

not for money invested _in the. business. It was not by its

terms, or by the nature of the transaction, to be postponed‘

until the future dissolution of the concern, and there is no

accounting in advance of dissolution, unless by agreement.

VVhile there is a. difficulty in a suit at law in the name of

a party against himself, yet, if this is the only diﬂiculty, it

goes only to the form of the remedy, and not to its existence.

There never was any legal or equitable reason why a partner

should not have speciﬁc dealings with his ﬁrm'as well as any

other person; and unless those dealings. from their nature, are

intended to go into the general accounting. and wait for their

adjustment till dissolution, they give a right to have a remedy

according to their exigency, and can be dealt with like any

other claims. Theonly reason why they must. under the old

practice, be prosecuted at equity instead of at law, arose from

the necesity at law of having plaintiffs capable of suing the

defendants. In such a tease the failure of a rein-edy at law

justified a resort to equity. But equity could grant relief in

such case, and under our present rules there can be no dif-

\a

<late. In 1875 the firm was dissolved, and the affairs were put
into the bands of George W. Merrill. one of the partners, to
wind up. Merrill's credit in thP firm nceonnts was larger than
Eastwood's, and Eastwood had bei>n credited on the books
with the amount of the note, whfrh had never bef'n presented
or demandf'd during the period after dh11ml11tion. In May, 1881,
Eastwood, who had Jost the note by ac<"idt·ntal fire in January
of the sa·me year, assigned to the plaintiff in gPnt>ral terms
whatever claims be bad against the firm, with no reference to
the note as such. It is plain enough that there could have ·
been no recovery in such a case. Even had the note been
described, the statute does not authorize the assignee of a
negotiable note, who is not an indorsee, to sue in his own
name on it. Rut, fm·tlwrmot·t>, tllt're was no attern}lt to transfer the note as sneh. The assignment was one which tram~
ferred nothing but Eastwood's claims geuerall~· against the
company, and must therefore be subjt•ct to the partnership
settlement. There was no firm in existenee for nf'arly six
years before the assignnwnt. In the prel'wnt ease the note
was transferred by regular indorsement a com;iderable time
before the firm went out of business. It was due already as
an independent claim against the firm for money )('lit, and
not for money invested .in tlu~ bnsim's8. It was not by its
terms, or by the nature of the transa<'tion, to be postponed.
until the futm·e dissolution of the eonf'ern. and thp1·f• is no
accounting in advance of dissolution, unless by agrt·enwnt.
\Vhile there iR a diffkulty in a Emit at law in t111• name of
a party against himsp)f..ri·t, if this is th<> only diftieulty, it
g<>t's only to the form of the rPm('dy, and not to its existence.
There nevt>r was any Jpgal or e<ptitable rea1-1on why a partner
should not have s1weitic dt>nlings with his tt1·m ·as well as an.r
other person; and unless those dealings. from their natnt'l'. are
intended to go into the gent>ral accounting. and wait for their
adjustment till dissolntion, thP,\' give a 1·ight to han• a remed.f
according to their exigency, and can be dealt with like any
other claims. The only rc>m;on why they must. mu.let• the old
'
practice, be prospeufrd at equit,,· instPad of at law, arose from
the necessity at law of !mdng plaintiffs capable of suing the
defendants. In such a case the failure of a renwdy at Jaw
justified a resort to equity. But f'qnity could grant rPlief in
such cases, and under our prest>nt r11lf's tl11•1·t· 1·an be no dif·
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ﬁculty at law. Where partners have seen ﬁt to deal with each

other without reference to the ﬁnal accounting, the trans-

action is not subject to the necessity or delay of such an

accounting.

This note was by its terms negotiable. It is elementary doc-

trine that negotiability does not cease when paper matures.

It is only subject to such equities as exist against the paper

at the date when it-is negotiated. And the equities which

aﬂ’ect the indorsee are only such as attach directly to the note

itself, and do not include collateral matters. This is very old

doctrine, and is laid down without qualiﬁcation. Lord TEN-

TERDEN and his associates, speaking through Mr. Justice BAY-

LEY in Burrough rs. M ass, 10 Barn. & C. 558, refer to the sub-

ject in this way: “This was an action on a promissory note,

made by the defendant, payable to one Fearn, and by him

indorsed to the plaintiff after it became due. For the defend-

ant it was insisted that he had a right to set off against the

plaintiﬂ”s claim a debt due to him from Fearn, who held the

note at the time when it became due. On the other hand, it

was contended that this right of set-off, which rested on the
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statute of set-off, did not apply. The impression on my mind

was that the defendant was entitled to the set-off, but, on dis~

cussion of the matter with m-y Lord TE.\'TF.-RDE.\' and my

.learned brothers, I agree with them in thinking that the

indorsee of an overdue bill or note is liable to such equities

only as attach on the bill or note itself, and not to claims

arising out of collateral matters. The consequence is that the

rule for reducing the damages i11 this case must be discharged.”

See Chit. Bills, 244-246; Story, Bills. § 221); Lca'1'itt cs. Put-

nam, 3 N. Y. 494. 53 Ann. Dec. 322; Bazrter vs. Little, 6 Metc.

7, 39 Am. Dec. 707; and cases in note to page 275 of Bigelow’s

Leading (‘ases; 3 Kent Comm. 91, and notes.

It was 11ot shown, and cannot be claimed on this record,

that there was any unfairness or want of consideration, or

paylnent, or any other matter bearing on the note in this case,

when it was transferred, and in such case it can make no dif-

ference when it was transferred.» It continued to be a valid

note, and capable of transfer by indorsement. That a partner

himself may have a remedy of some kind, where the trans-

action is such as to be separated from the general partner-

ship accounting. does not seem to be questioned. Mr. Collyer

I

__/

*-vi

ftculty at law. "'here partners have seen fit to dpal with each
othrr without refc>rence to the final accounting, the transaction is not subject to the necessity or dt>lay of such an
accounting.
This note was by its t(•rms negotiable. It is elementary doctrine that negotiability does not cease when pap1•r matures.
It is only subjeet to such equities as exh;t againi-t the paper
at the date when it. is negotiated. And the equities which
affect the indori-;e<' nre onl.'· 1mch as attach directly to the note
itself, and do not indude collati>ral matters. This is very old
doctrine, and is laid down without qualifieation. Lord TEx'l'ERDEN and his associates, speaking through Mr. Justice BAYLEY in Burrough 1·s. Moss, 10 Ilam. & C. 558, refer to the subject in this way: "This was an action on a promissory note,
made by the deft>ndant, pa,yable to one Fearn, and by him
indorsE'd to the plaintiff after it becam(• due. For the defendant it was insh•ll•d that lw had a right to set off against the
plaintiff's daim a dl•bt clne to him from Fearn, who held the
note at the time whPn it be<·ame due. On the other hand, it
was eontended that this right of sPt-off, which rested on the
statute of s.-t-otf, did not apply. The imprPssion on my mind
was that 1h<> defendant was C'ntitlC'd to the set-off, but, on discussion of the mnt1er with my Lord TE:'.l'TBHDEX and m~·
.learned hrotlwrs, I agrc'<' with the>tn in thinking that tlw
indorse<' of an ovt>rd11e bill or not<> i~ liable to such equities
only as att:ich on tlw hill or note itsl•lf, and not to claims
arising ont of rollatPrnl 111att<>rs. The C'onseqnrnce is that the
rule for reducing thP da111a:r<•s in tliis <·asp mnRt he discharged.''
~ee Chit. flills, 244-24-fi; ~tor,Y, Rills. § 2:!0; J,earitt 1'8. Putwttn, 3 N. Y. 4!H, 5:l Am. De('. :l22; Haxter vs. Uttlr, 6 Mete.
7, 39 Am. l>Pc. 707; and ('USC'S in note to page 275 of Bigelow's
Leading ('ai-Ps; 3 Kent Comm. 91, and notrs.
It was not shown, and cannot be claimed on this record,
1hat thrre was an~· unfoirrwss or want of coni;;idl'ration, or
payment, or any o1 her matt Pl' lwa ring on the note in th is case,
when it was transferred, and in such casr it can make no difference whE:>n it was tranisfPrred. . It continuPd to be a valid
note, and ('apable of transft>r b,Y indorsernent. That a partner
himself ma,v have a remed,Y of some kind, whel'l' the transaction is such as to be l'!eparated from the general partnership accounting. doPs not s1•<>m to be qtwstioned. Mr. Collyer
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refers to several illustrations, in book 2, c. 3. Partn. (2d Ed.)

CARPENTER VS. GHEEXOP.

245

Judge Sromr, in his work on Partnership, § 222 ct scq., indicates

Very clearly the right of a partner to relief in the case of con-

tracts as a creditor or otherwise with his ﬁrm; and the fact

which is referred to in all the books, that an accounting can

only be had at the close of the business, indicates as clearly

as anything can that either a partner can make no separate

contract with his ﬁrm at all, or else there must be some means

of enforcing it. A contract which cannot be enforced is nuga-

tory. Partnerships are often made for long terms of years.

Members become managers on salaries which are payable at

regular intervals, and they frequently furnish articles for

which they a.re entitled to pay. No one doubts their right to

pay themselves out of moneys in their charge; but all do not

have this opportunity, and to hold that a person must, if his

copartners will not advance him what is due, wait the whole

term of business for payment, is not reasonable or maintain-

able. A very thorough discussion of the various questions is

found in the early case of Smith rs. Lll8Il(')‘, 5 (‘ow. 688, where

the judges of the supreme court, and the chancellor and other
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members of the court for the correction of errors dealt with

the subject in a very exhaustive way, with entire unanimity.

The cases of .\'erins rs. Tozrnscrzd, 6 Conn. 5, and Gray rs. Bank.

3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156, are also somewhat pertinent. I

have found no authority which sanctions the doctrine that

plaintiﬁ was precluded by the fact that the note was past due

from taking the title by indorsement, and none that allows a

note to be affected by collateral equities. \\'h_en this note was

indorsed there could be no accounting, because the ﬁrm con-

tinued its ordinary business. The debt was for a loan, and

not for investments in the capital. It was distinct from the

mutual relations among the partners, and stood as a separate

contract. I think there was nothing to bar recovery, and that

the judgment to the contrary should be reversed.

CHAMPLIN, Loxo, and Monsn, JJ., concurred.

Smmwooo, C. J ., dissented.

No'rs.—See also Mechems Elem. of Partn., 3'3‘ 130, 131, and cases there

referred O0.

refPrs to several illustrations, in book 2, <'. !l. Partn. (2d Ed.)
·Judge STORY, in his work on Partnership, § 222 ct seq., indicates
very clearly th~ right of a partner to reli<>f in the case of contracts as a creditor or otherwise with his fim1; and the fact
whieh is rt•ft•rr('() to in all the books, that an acl'onnting can
only be had at thl' dose of thP hnsin:•ss, indkatc•s as clt>arly
as anything can that either a p:irtJwr ran make no separate
contract with his firm at all, or else there must bt• some means
of enforcing it. A CQntract whi<'h f'annot ht> Pnforeed is nugator,,._ Partnen'lhips art• oftn1 made fot· long tt't·rns of years.
Members beeome manag-t>rs on salal'il'H whi<-h ar·t• payable at
regular intPrvals, and nwy frequently fumhih artich•s for
whieh they are entitlt•<l to pay. i\o one donhts their right to
pay tl!emselvps out of n11mPys in thPil' dutq{"; but all do not
hm·e this opportunity, and to hold that a pt•r·son must, if his
<·opartm•rs will not adrnnee him what is <lue, wait the whole
tPrm of bni-inefls for pa,vnwnt. is not rt>a~otiable or maintainable. A \'Pl',V thlH'OHl-{h disenssion of tlw vnrionR q1u•stions is
found in the early ca!'e of .~111ifh t".'I. Lusher, 5 <'ow. fJ88, where
the judges of the snprt>me court, and the chancellor and other
mem ht•t·s of the t·on rt fot• the corr(•ction of e1·r01·io; dPa It with
the 1rnhjeet in a wry t>xhanstive way, with entire nnanimily.
Thf' <'ll~t·1-1 of Xains n1. '1'011"1/!ff'lld, 6 Conn. 5, and Gra!I rs. Rank,
3 1\Inss. 364, 3 Am. Dec. H>G, are also Romewhat pertint>nt. J
ha,·e found no authority whieh sanctions the doctrine that
plaintiff was precluded hy the fact that thP note was past dm•
from taking the title hy in<101·1o1Pm('nt, and none that :tllows a
note to be affected by collateral equities. Wh_t>n this note wa:o1
imlo1·1-1ed tlwre could be no accounting, becam~e the firm eoHtinued its ordinary buHim•ss. The debt was for a loan, an<l
not for investments in the capital. It was distinct from tlu~
mutual relations among the partners, and 1-1tood as a separatP
contract. I think there was nothiHg to har r·ecovery, and that
the judgment to the cont1·ai·y should be i·eversed.
CHAMPLrn, Lo:sa, and ~loRsF., .J,J., conf'nrred.
SHERWOOD, c. J., dissentPd.
NOTE.-See also .Mechem'11 Elt!m. of Partn.,
referred to.

~~

130, 131, and cases there
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S‘upreme (Your! of Vermont, 1894.

as Vt. 114, 28 Atl. Rep. sso, 44 Am. st. Rep. s24.

The court below found the following facts: Prior to Octo-

ber 15, 1891, the plaintiff and one George were copartners,

under the ﬁrm name of George & Beede, in the business of

quarrying and selling granite at Barre, and the. defendants, as

copartners under the ﬁrm name of P. B. Fraser & Co., were

BEEDE vs.

FRA~ER.

engaged in manufacturing granite into monuments, etc. The

former partnership was dissolved about September 1, 1891.

Supremr Court of rermo11t, 189.f.

Prior to that time, it had sold and delivered to the defendants a

quantity of granite, for which the defendants owed George &.

66 Vt. 114, 28 Atl. Rep. 880, 44 Am. St. Rep. 82'9

Beede; and the debt, by the contract of dissolution, became the

property of Beede. The defendants were so notiﬁed before

this suit was brought, and thereupon promised to pay the

plaintilf the amount of said debt, and afterwards did pay him

$50, leaving a balance due of $4.62. October 15, 1891, the

plaintiff and defendants entered into copartnership under the

ﬁrm name of Beede & Co., and that ﬁrm carried on the busi-

ness of quarrying an_d selling granite, and prior to December
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4, 1891, sold the defendants granite to the amount of $90.

which was due from the defendant to Beede & Co. on that

date, when the ﬁrm of Beede 8: Co. was dissolved. The ﬁrm of

Fraser & Co., composed of Fraser and Smith, owed the $90 to

the other ﬁrm, which was composed of Beede, Fraser, and

Smith. The plaintiff was not a member‘ of the defendant

ﬁrm. The court found that as a part of this contract of disso-

lution the plaintiff became the owner of all debts dire to Beede

& Co., and that concurrently with the making of the contract

the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay him the demand of

$90, but it certiﬁes that these facts were found solely from

Paper A, which is as follows: “This is to certify that the

copartnership heretofore existing by and between F. A. Beede,

P. B. Fraser, and G. VV. Smith, all of Barre, in the county of

\Vashington, and state of Vermont, under the ﬁrm name and

style of Beede & Company, is hereby dissolved by mutual

iii“ m _

The court bt.->low found the following farts: Prior to Octo·
ber 15, 1891, the plaintiff and one George wPre copartners,
under the firm name of George & Beede, in the business of
quarrying and selling granite at Barre, and thP. defendants, as
t·opartners under the firm name of P. B. Fraser & Co., were
f•nguged in manufacturing g1·anite into monuments, etc. The
former partnership was dissol\"ed about Sept(-'mber 1, 1891.
Prior to that time, it had sold and delh·ered to the defendants a
quantity of granite, for which the defendants owed George &
Beede; and the debt, by the contract of dissolution, became the
pro1>erty of Bee4e. The defendants were so notified before
this suit was brought, and thereupon promised to pay the
plaintiff the amount of said debt, and afterward~ did pay him
f50, leaving a balance due of $4.62. October 15, 1891, the
plaintiff and defendants entered into copartnership under the
flrru name of llPede & Co.; and that firm ca1·riPd on the business of quarrying and selling granite, and prior to December
4; 18~1, sold the defendants granite to the amount of '90,
which was due from the defendants to Beede & Co. on rhat
date, when the firm of Beede & Co. was dissolved. The firm of
Fraser & Co., composed of Fraser and Smith, owed the f90 to
the other firm, which was composed of Beede, Fraser, and
Smith. The plaintiff was not a member of the defendant
firm. The court found that as a part of this contract of dissolution ti1e plaintiff became the owner of all debts du~ to Beede
& Co., and that concurrently with the making of the contract
the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay him the demand of
'90, but it certifies that these facts were found solely from
Paper A, which is as follows: "This is to certify that the
•·opartnership heretofore existing by and between F. A. Beede,
r. B. Fraser, and G. ,V. Smith, all of Barre, in the county of
'Vashington, and state of Vermont, under the firm name and
style of Beede & Company, is hereby dissolved by mutual

_ Bnnnn vs. FRASER. 247

BEEDE VS. FRASER.
agreement. And it is further agreed by and between said

Beede, Fraser, and~Smith that the said F. A. Beede is to, and

hereby agrees to assume and pay all of the debts of the said

ﬁrm, and to have and collect all of the debts due and owing

said ﬁrm. Witness our hands and seals, and dated at said

Barre this fourth‘day of December, 1891. F. A. Beede [L. S.],

P. B. Fraser [L. S.], G. W. Smith [L. S.].”

There was a judgment for the plaintiff -and defendants

appealed. I

Martin (1? Slack, for plaintiff.

J . W. Gordon and E. W. Bisbee, for defendants.

TYLER, J . Before the dissolution the defendants owned the

demand jointly with the plaintiff, and Beede & Co. could not

have maintained an action upon it against the defendants,

agreement. And it is further agreed by and between said
Beede, Fraser, and ·smith that the said F. A. Beede is to, and
hereby agrees to assume and pay all of the debts of the said
firm, and to have and collect all of the debts due and owing
said firm. 'Vitness our hands and seals, and dated at said
Bu.rre this fourth'day of December, 1891. F. A. Beede [L. 8.],
P. B. Fraser [L. 8.], G. ,V. Smith [L. S.]."
There was a judgment for the plaintiff ·and defendants
appealed.

because Fraser and Smith would have been both plaintiffs and

defendants, and “no one can be interested as a party on both

Marlin & Slack, for plaintiff.

sides of the record.” \Vhere two companies are composed in

part of the same individuals, no action at law can be main-

J. W. Gordon and E. W. B_isbee, for defendants.

tained by one against the other. Green vs. Chapman, 27 Vt.

236, citing Mainuwring vs. Newman, 2 Bos. & P. 120, and Boson-
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quet vs. Wray, 6 Taunt. 597; Dicey, Parties, rule 22. It is a gen-

eral rule that all the partners must join as plaintiffs in an

action at law to enforce a partnership claim, whether the

action is brought before or after the dissolution of the partner-

ship. Therefore, two partners cannot maintain a suit against

a third to recover for goods charged to him on the partnership

books, although by the contract of dissolution the two were to

have all the debts due the ﬁrm, there being no promise by him

to pay the other partners. Judd vs. Wilson, 6,Vt. 185. One

partner cannot recover of another an unliquidated and unset-

tled balance of a partnership buiness. Spear vs. Nowell, 13

Vt. 288. Butwhen, on the dissolution, one retained a portion

of the partnership assets suﬂicient to pay a particular partner-

ship debt, and agreed with his copartner to pay it, and the

copartner was afterwards obliged to pay it, it was held that he

could recover in assumpsit the amount so paid. Hicks vs.

Cottrill, 25 Vt. 80. As a rule, assumpsit will not lie by one

partner against his copartner, in respect to any matter con-

nected with the partnership transactions, or which would

TYL1rn, J. Before the dissolution the defendants owned the
df>mand jointly with the plaintitf, and Beede & Co. could not
have maintained an action upon it against the defendants,
because Fraser and Smith would have been both plaintiffs and
dt•fendants, and "no one can be interested as a party on both
sides of the rec9rd." \Vhere two companies are composed in
part of the same individuals~ no action at law can be main·
tained by one against the other. Green vs. Chapman, 27 Vt.
2!l6, Citing Main1cci.ring vs. Ne1rman, 2 Bos. & P. 120, and Bosariquet vs. lV-ray, 6 Taunt. 597; Dicey, Parties, rule 22. It is a general rule that all the partners must joi~ as plaintiffs in an
action at law to enforce a partnership claim, whether the
action is brought before or after the dis1mlution of the partnel'·
ship. Therefore, two partners cannot maintain a suit against
a third to recover for goods charged to him on the partnership
books, although by the contract of dissolution the two were to
have all the debts due the ftrm, there being no promise by him
to pay the other partners. Judd vs. Wilson, 6. Vt. 185. Om~
partner cannot recover of another an unliquidated and unset·
tied balance of a partnership business. Spear vs. Newell, l!l
Yt. 288. But when, on the dissolution, one retained a portion
of the partnership assets sufficient to pay a particular partner.
ship debt, and agreed with bis copartner to pay it, and the
copartner was afterwards obliged to pay it, it was held that he
could recover in assumpsit the amount so paid. Hicks vs.
Cottrill, 25 Vt. 80. As a rule, assumpsit will not lie by one
partner against his copartner, in respect to any matter connected with the partnership transactions, or which would
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involve the consideration of their partnership dealing. Yet

one may sustain an action against his copartner on an express

contract or covenant to do, or omit any particular act not

involving any question as to the general accounts. And when

the parties by an express agreement separate a distinct matter

from the partnership dealing, and one expressly agrees to pay

the other a speciﬁed sum for that matter, assumpsit will lie on

the agreement, though the matter arose from the partnership

dealing. Colla-mcr rs. Foster, 26 Vt. 754. “It is quite clear,” says

T. Parsons on Partnersliip (section 190), “that certain particu-

lar and distinct transactions maybe separated from the affairs

or business of the partnership, by the agreement of the partners.

Then, those persons who are concerned in this separated mat-

ter a.re not as partners to each other, although in all other

business relations they remain partners.” Where partners

agree to divide a partnership debt, and the debtor assents to it.

and promises one of the partners to pay him his moiety, such

partner may maintain an action for his moiety against the

debtor. 1 Lindl. Partn. 265, citing Blair vs. Snovcr, 10 N. J .

Law, 153. After a dissolution, and a balance has been struck
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and agreed upon by the partners, one may maintain assumpsit

against the other to recover his balance upon an implied

promise. Spear rs. Nowell, 13 Vt. 292, (post p. 257), Warren vs.

Wheelock, 21 Vt. 323; Gibson vs. Moore, ti N. H. 547; Wllby vs.

Phinmjr/, 15 Mass. 121; Wheeler vs. Wheeler, 111 Mass. 247.

Assumpsit lies where, after dissolution and settlement, one

partner received more than was his due. Bond rs. Hays, 12

Mass. 34; Clark vs. Dibble, 16 \Vend. 601.

(Omitting a discussion in which the court held that general

assumpsit was a proper action.)

Atﬁrmed.

Nom.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 184, 147.

involve the consideration of their partnership_ dealing. Yet
one may sustain an action against his copa rtner on an express
contract or covenant to do, or omit any particular act not
iBvolving any question as to the ge1wral accounts. And when
the parties by an express agreement separate a distinct matter
from the partnership dealing, and one expressly agrees to pa.v
the other a specified sum for that matter, assumpsit will lie on
the agreement, though the matter arose from the partnership
dealing. Collamcr i·s. Foster, 2G Yt. 754. "It is quite clear," says
T. Parsons on Partnership (section mo), "that certain particular and distinct tmnsactions ma.v l•e ~wparated from the affairs
or business of the partnership, by the agr<>ement of the partners.
Then, those pe1·sons who are concerned in this separated matter are not as partne1·s to each other, although in all othtr
business relations th<'y remain partners." \Vhere partners
agree to divide a pa1·tne1·="hip debt, and the debtor assE>nts to it.
and promises one of the partners to pay him his moi<•ty, such
partner may maintain an action for his moiety against the
debtor. 1 Lindi. Partn. 265, citing Blair vs. Snover, 10 N. J.
Law, 153. After a dissolution, and a balance hns been struck
and agreE>d upon by the partnerR, one may maintain assumpsit
again111t thP other to recover his balance Upon an implied
promise. Spea1· i·s. Ne1Cell, 13 Vt. 292, (po.'ft p. 257), Warren vs.
Wheelock, 21 Vt. 3:!3; Gibs<>n 1:s. Mo01·e, (; N. H. 547; Wilby vs.
Phin11e!/, 15 .Mass. 121; lVliecler vs. Wheeler, 111 ~fass. 247.
AssumpAit lies where, after dissolution and settlement, one
partner received more than was bis due. Bon<l us. Haya, 12
Mass. 34; Clark i:s. Dibble, 16 \Yend. fiOl.
(Omitting a diseussion in which the court held that general
assumpsit was a proper action.)
Affirmed.
Non.-See Mecheru'11 Elem. of Partn., § 134, 147.
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1882.

56 Wis. 123, 13 N. W. Rep. 20, 43 Am. Rep. 703.

Action for breach of a partnership agreement. The opinion

states the facts sufficiently. The defendant had judgment

below.

HILL vs. PALMER.

Bump, Hetzcl <€ Cannon and Pafchen tﬁ Weed, for a.ppellant.

Charles W. Fclker, for respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1882.

LYON, J. Counsel agree that the learned circuit judge sus-

tained the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that

the facts therein stated show that the parties were partners

li6 Wis. 123, 13 N. W. Rep. 20, 43 Am. Rep. 703.

in the contract with Cline, and in the execution thereof, and

that the only remedy of the plaintiffs is by an action in equity

for an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs.

The question to be determined is, does the complaint state

facts which constitute a cause of action at law for the recov-

Action for breach of a partnership agreement. The opinion
states the facts sufficiently. The defendant had judgment
below.

ery of damages, or must the plaintiffs resort to an equitable

action for relief? It is a fairly debatable question whether it

Bump, Hetzel & Cannon nnd Patcltcn & Weed, for appellant.

appears from the complaint that the agreement between the
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parties in respect to the copartncrship was anything more

Charles W. Pelker, for respondent.

than an executory agreement to enter into a partnership in the

future, which was never executed. The agreement alleged is

not in terms that the parties thereby formed a copartnership,

but that “it was agreed that the said parties should enter into

a copartnership” for the purposes therein speciﬁed. The breach

0f_ such agreement alleged in the complaint is that the defend-

ant “refused to comply with the conditions thereof by refusing

to enter into or carry out said partnership.” But, however this

may be, it seems clear that if any copartnership ever existed

between these parties it commenced when the agreement

between Cline and the defendant was executed. Giving to the

complaint the most favorable construction for the defendant

of which it will admit, we think that the agreement therein

alleged is, in substance and effect, that if the defendant should

succeed in making a contract with Cline which should be satis-

h

32

J. Coum;p} agrl•e that the h•m·n<•d circuit judge sustained the dPmurrer to the complaint on the ground that
the facts th£•rt.>in stated show that the parties were partners
in the contract with l'linP, and in the execution thereof, and
that the only remedy of the plaintiffs is by an action in equity
for an accounting and S('ttlcment of the partnership affair1-1.
The q1wstion to be detc>rmined is, dees the complaint state
facts wh:<'h <'Onstitute a cnnse of ndion at law for the recovery of damages, or must the plai11titt'io1 resort to nn equitnhle
action for relief? It is a fairly dl'hatable question whether it
appt'8l'B from tlie complaint that tlw agreement hetwPt-'n the
parties in respect to the copnrtnership was anything more
than an executory agn;l'uwnt to entl'r into a partnership in the
future, which was ne\°er exN·uted. The agrec>nwnt allPged is
not in tem1s that the partiPs thereby fom1ed a copartnPrship,
but that "it was agreed that the said parties should enter into
a copartner1:1hip" for the purposes therein speeifit~d. The brt>ach
of_such agrc>t•ment alleged in the complaint is t'hat the d(•fpndant "refused to comply with the conclitions the1·eof by refusing
to enter into or carry out said partnf'rship.'' But, however this
may be, it seems clear that if any copartnership ever existt-d
between these parties it commenct•d when the agreement
between Cline and the defendant was executed. Giving to the
complaint the most favorable construction for the defendant
of which it will admit, we think that the ngrf'ement thert•in
alleged is, in substance and effect, that if the defendant should
succeed in m~ing a contract with Cline which should be sntisLYON,

32
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factory to the plaintiﬁs, to cut, log and run Clines timber.

then the parties should become partners in that enterprise on

the terms and conditions stipulated between them.

In that view of the case there may have been a time when a

copartnership actually existed between the parties, but it was

immediately terminated by the wrongful act of the defendant

(so far as he could terminate it) and no business was trans-

acted—nothing whatever was done by the parties as partners.

The defendant excluded the plaintiffs from all participation

whatever in his contract with Cline as soon as it was made,

and they had no part in the performance thereof. By such

wrongful act the defendant refused to launch the partnership

business, and thus rendered the copartnership inoperative for

the purposes for which it was formed. There is no doubt what-

ever that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an

executory contract to form a future copartnership to recover

damages for a wrongful refusal by the other party to execute

such agreement. It is also well settled that the wrongful
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refusal by a party to a contract of copartnership to permit the

ﬁrm to commence business, or as it is sometimes termed, to

launch the partnership business, is ground for an action at law

by the injured partner to recover damages of the partner whose

wrongful act has defeated the purpose for which the copartner-

ship was formed. The cases which so hold, both in England

and this country, are very numerous. Indeed, the authorities

seem to be quite uniform in so holding. The following are a

few of the cases referred to: Venning vs. Lecktie, 13 East 7;

Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107; Ellannirrg vs. Wadsworth, 4 Md. 59;

Glover vs. Tuck, 24 VVend. (N. Y.) 153; Bagley vs. Smith, 10 N.

Y. 489 (post p. 251); Terrill vs. Richards, 1 Nott. & McC. (S. Gar.)

20; Ellison vs. Chapman", 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 224; Williams vs. Hen-

shaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79; 22 Am. Dec. 366; Adams vs. Totten,

39 Penn. St. 447; Vance vs. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467;

1 Story Eq. J nr. Sec. 665; Collyer on Part. Sec. 245; 2 Lindley

on Part. (4th Ed.), 1025, and cases cited in notes. The subject

is much discussed in some of the above cases and many other

cases asserting the same doctrine are cited in the opinions as

well as in the above text-books.

The test seems to be that if the damages resulting from a

breach of a. covenant or stipulation in the partnership agree-

ment by one partner belong exclusively to the other partner,

factory to the plaintift's, to cut, log and run Cline's timber,
then the parties should become partners in that enterprise on
the terms aqd conditions stipulafrd between them.
In that view of the case there may have been a time when a
copartnership actually existed betw~en the parti('Si but it was
immediately terminated by the wrongful act of the defendant
(so far as he could terminate it) and no busint>SS was transacted-nathing whatever was done by the parties as partners.
The defendant excluded the plaintiffs from all participation
whatever in his contract with Cline as soon as it was made,
and they had no part in the performance thereof. By such
wrongful act the defendant refused to launch the partnership
business, and thus rendered the copartnership inoperative for
the purposes for which it was formed. There is no doubt whatever that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an
executory conh·act to form a future copartnershlp to recove1·
damages for a wrongful refusal by the other party to execute
such agreement. It is also well settled that the wrongful
refusal by a party to a contract of copartnership to permit the
firm to oommence business, or as it is sometimes termed, to
launch the partnership business, is ground for an action at law
by the injured partner to recover damages of the partner whose
wrongful act has defeated the purpose for which the e<>partnership was formed. The cases which so hold, both in England
and this country, are very ll'Umerous. Indeed, the authorities
seem t<> be quite uniform in so holding. The following are a
few of the cases referred to: l"enning i1s. Leckie, 13 East 7;
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Rtark. 107; Jlamling vs. Wadsworth, 4 Md. 59;
Glover vs. Tuck, 24 'Vend. (N. Y.) 153; Bagley vs. Smith, 1.0 N.
Y. 489 (post p. 251); Terrill rs. Richards, 1 Nott. & McC. (8. Car.)
20; ElUson vs. Chapman, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 224; Williams vs. Henshaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79; 22 Am. Dec. 366; Adams vs. Totten,
3~J Penn. St. 447; Vance i:s. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467;
1 8tory Eq. Jnr. Sec. 665; Collyer on Part. Sec. 245; 2 Lindley
<>n Part. (4th Ed.), 1025, and ca.see cited in notes. The subject
is much discussed in some of the above cases and many <>ther
cases asserting the same doctrine are cited in the opinions as
well as in the above text-books.
The test seems to be that if the damages resulting from a
breach of a covenant or stipulation in the partnership agreement by one partner belong exclusively to the other partner,

Bsomzr vs. Snrrn. 251

and can be assessed without taking an account of the partner-

BAGLEY

vs. SmT11.

ship business, covenant or assumpsit may be maintained by

the injured partner against the other for such damages. Here

no partnership business was transacted; hence no account

could be taken, and the damages claimed belong to the plain-

tiﬁs. This principle was applied in Sprout rs. Crowley, 30 Wis.

187. Should it be conceded that by the alleged agreement of

September, 1877, the parties became partners, this action can

still be maintained under many of the cases cited above. This

court has frequently held that one partner has no claim against

his copartner individually (that is to say, he cannot maintain

an action at law against such copartner), on account of partner-

ship transactions, although a ﬁnal settlement of the atfairs of

the ﬁrm would show a balance in his favor. Tolford vs. Tol-

ford, 44 VVis. 547, and cases cited. But it has not held that if

one partner, immediately after the contract of copartnership

is made and before anything has been done under it, wrong-

fully repudiates the contract and prevents the ﬁrm from ever

doing any business under it, the injured party cannot main-

tain an action at law against his copartner and recover the
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damage which he has sutfered thereby.

In Tolford vs. Tolford, supra, and also in Lower vs. Denton, 9

\\'is. 268, an accounting was necessary in order to determine

the damages or compensation to which the plaintiﬁ was

entitled. These were actions at law. The same is true of

Wood vs. Bea-th, 23 Wis. 254, which was a suit’ in equity.

It follows from the foregoing views that the complaint

states a valid cause of action at law.

Judgment i an»-an--J~

Otrros, J., dissented.

Norm-See Mechenrfs Elem. of Partn., § 136.

BAGLEY vs. SMITH.

Court of Appeals of Z\*eu" York, I853.

10 N. Y. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 756.

Appeal from a judgment of the New York superior court

for damages for breach of articles of copartnership. The

agreement was in writing and under seal, and provided for a

and can be assessed without taking an account of the partnrrship business, covenant or assumpsit may be maintained by
the injured partner against the other for such damages. Here
no partnership business was transacted; hence n<> account
could be taken, and the damages claimed belong to the plain·
tHls. Tlli.s principle was applied in Sprout n. Orou'lcy, 30 Wis.
l~f. Should it be conceded that by the alleged agre<>ment of
~ptember, 1877, the parties became partners, this action can
atitt lte maintainf'd under· many of the cases cited above. This
court 1tas frequently held tbnt one partner bas no claim against
his capartner individually (that is to say, be cannot maintain
an action at law against such copartner), on account of partnership transactions, although a final settlement of the affairs of
the irm would show a balance in his favor. Tolford vs. Toi.
ford, 44: Wis. 547, and cases cited. But it has not held that if
one partner, immediately flfter the contract of copa.rtnership
is made and before anything has been done under it, wrongfully repudiates the contract and prevents the firm from ever
doing any business under it, the injured pa1-ty cannot main·
tain an action at law against bis copartner and recover the
damage which be bas suffered thereby.
la Tolford vs. Tolford, sitpra, and also in Lower vs. Denton, 9
'\Via. 268, an accounting was necessary in order to determine
the damages or compensation to which the plaintiff was
entitled. These were actions at law. The same is trne of
Wood vs. Beath, 23 \Vis. 254, which was a suit" in equity.
It follows from the foregoing views that the complaint
8tates a valid cause of action at law.
Judgment 7
I ~
ORTON, J., dissented.
Non-Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 188.

BAGLEY vs. SMITH.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1858.
10 N. Y. 489, 61 Am. Dec.

7~.

Appeal from a judgment of the New York superior court
for damages for breach of articles of copartnership. The
agreement was in writing and under seal, and provided for a
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continuance of the ﬁrm for a term of four years and one month

from December 1, 1846. Before two years had quite expired,

two of the partner, while the third was traveling in the west

on business of the ﬁrm, published a notice of dissolution of

the old ﬁrm, and of the formation of a new one in their own

names to continue the business. They took possession of the

stock, and commenced business, according to their announce-

ment. This suit was brought by the ousted partner for dam-

ages for this wrongful dissolution; and resulted in a verdict

and judgment for plaintiff, subject to exceptions taken by

defendant, which raised the quest-ions discussed in the follow-

ing opinion.

Dani-el. Lord, for the appellants, who had dissolved the ﬁrm-.

John Slosson, for the respondent, the ousted partner.

Jonxsox, J. The principal points presented by the excep-

tions in this case are: 1, \Vhether an action can be main-

tained for a breach of a covenant to continue a partnership

for a ﬁxed period, unless sooner dissolved in accordance with

oontinuance of tbe firm for a term of four years and one month
from December 1, 1846. Before two years bad quite expired~
two of the partners, while the third was traveling in the west
on business of the firm, published a notice of dissolution of
the old firm, and of the formation of a new one in their own
names to continue the business. They took posses1:1ion of the
stock, and commenced business, according to their announcement. This suit was brought by the ousted partner for damages for this wrongful dissolution; and resulted in a verdic·t
and judgment fo1· plaintiff, snhjec_·t to exceptions taken by
defendant, which raised the questions discussed in the following opinion.

the terms of the covenant; 2, \Vhether actual damages can

in such case be recovered; 3, Whether expected proﬁts can

D011iel L01·d, for t11e appellants, who had dissolved the firm.
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be regarded as ground for damages in such a case, and 4,

whether the amount of proﬁts made prior to the dissolution

John Slosson, for the respondent, the ousted partner.

could be considered by the jury as bearing, in any degree, upon

the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled.

Another objection was presented on the argument, that the

covenants of the defendants being several, no judgment for

joint damages could be given. This objection, not having been

presented at the trial, so far as the bill of exceptions informs

us, cannot be considered here.

There do not seem to be any special rules of law applicable

to covenants contained in partnership articles and not to other

covenants; and we may therefore say, without discussion, that

an action will lie for a breach of covenant, no matter in what

instrument the covenant be found. V\’e may further afﬁrm

that no rule of law declares that the breach of a covenant con-

tained in partnership articles shall be compensated only by

nominal damages. The measure of damages must depend on

the nature of the obligation, and the extent of the injury in

this as in all other cases of broken covenants.

~--I —li——-—— - i - ~ )

JoH~SoN,

J. The principal points JH'esented by the exc<'ptions in this case are: 1, 'Vhether an action can be maintained for a breach of a covenant to continue a partnership
for a fixed period, unless sooner dissolved in accordance with
the terms of the covenant; 2, \Vhether actual damages can
in surh case be recovered; 3, 'V~ether expected profits can
be regarded as ground for damages in such a case, and 4,
whether the amount of profits made prior to the dissolution
could be considered by the jury as bearing, in any degree, upon
the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled.
Another objection was presented on the argument, that the
covenants of the defendants being se\·eral, no judgment for
joint damag-es could be giyen. This objection, not having been
presented at the triul, so far as the bill of exceptions informs
us, cannot be conside1·ed here.
There do not seem to be any special rules of law ap1Jlicable
to covenants <>ontained in partnf>rship artirles and not to other
eovenants; and we ma,v therefort> say, without discussion, that
an action will lie for a breach of coYenant, no matter in what
instrument the covenant be found. 'Ve may further affirm
that no rule of law declares that the breach of a covenant contained in partnership articles shall be compensated onl,Y by
nominal damages. The measure of damages must depend on
the nature of the obligation, and the extent of the injury in
this as in all othn cases of broken covenants.

BAGLEY vs. SMITH. 253

No question was made at the trial as to the suﬂiciency of

BAGLEY

vs.

SMITH.

253

the proof that a. breach of the obligation to continue the part-

nership h-ad taken place, except only so far as a question of

that sort is raised by the objection of the defendants’ counsel,

that by the constitution of the partnership the partners have a

power of revocation whenever they lose conﬁdence in each

other. It is not quite clear whether this objection points to

the particular frame of this partnership, or is supposed to be

founded upon the general rules applicable to that relation. If

it relate to the provisions of the partnership agreement in

this case, then it is clear that the articles contain no clause

which warrants the defendants’ proposition, If, on the other

hand, the general law of partners-hip is referred to, while it

must be conceded thart some diﬂerence of opinion seems to

exist as to the power 0-f either partner in a partnership for

a ﬁxed term, contrary to his agreement, to put an end to the

continuance of the ﬁrm at his own mere will, it can be safely

affirmed that, conceding this power to exist in the broadest

form, it has never been pretended that a partner who should,

in contravention of his agrecme,-nt, put an end to the partner-
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ship would not be held responsible for the injury thus

coimnitted.

\\'e are left, then, to the only substantial question which this

case presents: \\'hether the loss of those proﬁts which the

plaintiff would have made during the stipulated term of the

partnership is a proper subject of compensation, and whether

the evidence of past proﬁts, during the period next preceding

the dissolution, can he considered as bea ring upon the question

of prospective proﬁts. The form o-f the exceptions taken concede

that the judge committed no error, unless in taking the proﬁts

into consideration at all; that if he was correct in this he has

annexed to his instructions all the proper qualiﬁcations to

prevent an excessive and erroneous estimate of the amount of

compensation for prospective proﬁts.

The object of commercial partnership is proﬁt. This is the

motive upon which men enter into the relation. The only

legitimate beneﬁcial consequence of continuing a partnership

is the making of proﬁts. The most‘ direct and legitimate

injurious consequence which can follow upon an unauthorized

dissolution of a partnership is the loss of proﬁts. Unless that

loss can be made up to the injured party. it is idle to say that

No question was made at the trial as to the sufficiency of
tht• proof that a breach of the obligation to continue the partnen-1hip had taken place, except only so far as a question of
that sort is raised by the objection of the defendants' counsel,
that by the constitution of the partnerl'hip the pa11ners have a
power of revocation whenever thc>y lol'le confidenee in each
other. It is not quite cl<>ar wlH•ther this objection points to
the particular frame of this parhwrship, or is suppm-1ed to be
founded upon the ~e11nal rules applicabl<> to that 1·pl11tion. If
it rplate to the pro\"isions of the partnership ag1·e<"ment in
this case, then it is cli:>a1· that the articles contain no clause
wl1il-h warrants the d<>fendants' proposition, If, on t·he e>ther
hand, the gen{'ral law of pai1ners·hip is referred to, while it
must be concedc·d thart some diff Prenre of opinion sec>nui to
exist as to the power of eilher partner in a partne1·ship for
a fixed tenn, C'ontrary to hi~ agr('(•meut, to put an end to the
continuance of t IH• ti1·rn at his own mere will, it ean be safely
affirmed that, eon1·Pdi11g this J>OW('l' to exist in 1he hrnadest
form, it haR ne,·er lw1. n prPt(•1ulPd that a partner who 8llould,
in f'onfravention of hi!'! ag1·p1·111ent, put an end to thl' 1ia1·tnersbip would not be held responsible for the injm·y thus
co111 mitted.
" ·e are left, tlwn, to the only suLstantial quest ion whkh this
ca!'!1• prf:s<•nti;: \Yltf'ther tlw loss of thost• profits whid1 the
plaintiff woul'1 liaw made dul'ing the stipulated term of the
pa1·tneri;hip i:-; a J.ll'l•(l('l' i:;ulijed of tompt•11:-1ation, and whether
the evidenee of past profits, during the 1wriod next p1·eceding
the dis1-ml11tion, ea11 ht· c·o11:-1id1•rpd as lwal'ini.: upon the question
of prospective profits. The form of the exet>plions taken concede
that the judge committf'd no f"l'ror, nnlt ss in taking the profits
into consideration af all; that if he was col'l'eet in this he ha.s
annexed to his instructions all the proper qualitications to
prevent an exePi-:sh·t· and ~n·o1wo11~ Pstirnnte of the amount of
compensation fo1· pl'Ospective pl'Otits.
The object of commercial partnership is profit. This is the
motive upon which men enter into the relation. The onl,v
legitimate beneficial conseqtwnee of continuing a partnership
is the making of profits. '!'he most direct and leg'itimate
injurious consequence whieh can follow ~lpon an unanthorhwtl
dissolution of a partnership is th{' lo!i!s of profit!'. l!nleRs that
loss can be made up to the injnrp<l party. it is idle to say that
1

1
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any obligation is imposed by a contract to continue a partner-

ship for a ﬁxed period. The loss of proﬁts is one of the com-

mon grounds, and the amount of the proﬁts lost one of the

common measures. of the damages to be given upon a breach of

contract. I neec only refer to Master-ton rs. Mayor, etc. of

1s'~rooI.'l_|/n, 7 Hill, 61 [42 Am. Dec. 38]. So, too, in Wilson. rs.

Martin, 1 Denio 602; Heekshcr -rs. .lIc(‘rea, 24 i\'end. 304; and

Shannon vs. Comstock, 21 Id. 457 [3-1 Am. Dec. 20:2], what the

party would have made, in other words, his prospective proﬁt,

from the performance of the contract was held to be the true

measure of damages. I refer also to two English cases on the

question, although the English courts do not seem so carefully

to have considered the rules by which, as matter of law,

damages are to be measured as the courts of this country.

Gale vs. Lcckie, 2 Stark. 107, was at -nisi prius before Lord

Ennnsnonouon. The defendant agreed, as author, to furnish

a manuscript work to plaintiffs, to be published at their

expense, and the proﬁts to be equally divided. The defendant

failed to fulﬁll, and this action was brought for damages.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH told the jury the plaintiffs were entitled to
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their expenses of paper and printing, and added, “the sum of

ninety pounds has been stated by the witnesses as the amount

of proﬁt which would probably have been derived from the ﬁrst

edition; and it is doubtful whether it would have reached a sec-

ond;” after suggesting that there might have been a loss

instead of proﬁt, which would have been wholly the plaintiffs‘

loss under the contract, he submitted the matter to the jury.

who found for the plaintiﬂ‘s ﬁfty pounds more than the expen-

ses, etc., for loss of proﬁt. The case does not appear to have

been moved afterwards.

1lIc.\~'eil rs. Reid. 0 Bing. 68, was an action upon a contract,

by the defendant, to take the plaintiff into a ﬁrm of which the

defendant was a member. It appeared, upon the trial, that

the plaintiff had been offered. upon certain terms, the coin

mand of_an East India ship for a double voyage; that the value

of such voyage to the captain was not less than one thousand

pounds; that the plaintiff had been induced by the defendant

to give up this voyage to enter into the promised partnership.

The jury found ﬁve hundred pounds for the plaintiff. It was

objected. among other things, that the jury were wrongfully

instructed as to the damages. On this point TINDAL, O. J.,

any obHgation is impostc>d by a contmct to continue a partnership for a fixed period. The loss of profits is one of the com. mon grounds, and the amount of the profits lost one of the
common measures~ of the damages to be giYen upon a breach of
eontra<:t. I neec only refer to Masterton t'S. Mayor, etc. of
Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61 [42 Am. Dec. 38). So, too, in Wilson r~.
Martin, 1 Denio 602; HeckJJher tw. McCrea, 24 ""end. 304; and
Sha1111011 us. Comstock, 21 Id. 457 [34 .Am. Dec. 26~], what the
party would have made, in other words, his prospective profit,
from the performance of the contract was held to be the true
measure of damages. I refer also to two English cases on the
question, although the English courts do not seem so carefully
to have considered the rules by which, as matter of law,
damages are to be measured as the courts of this country.
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107, was at nisi pril.ts before Lord
ELJ.ENBOHOUGH. 'l'he defendant agreed, as author, to furniE1b
a manuscript work to plaintiffs, to be published at tlwir
expense, and the profits to be equally divided. The defendant
failed to fulfill, and this action was brought for damairt>~.
Lord Er.LENBOROF«H told the jury the plaintiffs were entitled to
their expenses of paper and printing, and added, "the sum of
ninety pounds has been stated by the witnesses as the amomit
of profit whieh would probabl~· have been derived from the first
edition; and it is doubtful whether it would have rea('hed a St'l'·
ond;'' after snggPsting that there might have been a los1o1
instead of profit, whkh would have been wholly the plaintiffs'
loss under the eontract, he 1mbmitted tbe matter to the jury,
who found for tlw plaintiffs fifty pounds more than the expenses, ete., for lo8s of profit. The case does not appear to have
bet>n JllOVPd aft(•J'WUl'f18.
McNeil rs. Rrid, B Bing. 68, was an aetion upon a contraet,
by the defendant, to take the plaintiff into a firm of wbit-h the
defendnnt was a nwmuer. It appeart•d, upon thl' trial, that
the plaintiff ~ad been offt>rt>d, upon certain terms, thl• com
mand of_an East India ship for a double voyage; that the value
of such voyage to the eaptain was not less than one thousand
pounds; that the plaintiff bad l,}el•n induced by the dl~fendant
to give up this voyage to enter into the promised partnership.
The jury found five hundred pounds for tlw plaintiff. It was
objected. among otlwr things, that the jury were wrongfully
instrueted as to thl• damages. On this point TINDAL, C. J.,

~l —5 *' "'7
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says: “I told the jury that they might see that the plaintiff

considered the engagement equal to an Indian voyage, because

he would not otherwise have relinquished it, a.nd the defend-

ant could not have estimated it at less, because he made his

offer as a friend of the plaintiff.” It was the value of the

engagement as partner, therefore, which the jury were to esti-

mate; and Bosaxonrrr, J ., says: “The damages were estimated

according to what the jury thought was the value of the con-

tract. The value of the East India voyage has not been recov-

ered as special damage, but has been taken as an ingredient

for estimating the value which each party set on the proposed

contract of partnership.” In each of these cases the prospec-

tive proﬁts of a joint undertaking unperformed was made the

subject of compensation in damages in an action at law.

The next question relates to the admission of the evidence

of the amount of past proﬁts, to be considered by the jury as

bearing upon the future proﬁts. It will be observed that the

objection does not at all relate to the mode of proof, but only

to the competency of the fact. It seems to me quite obvious
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that, outside of a court of justice, no man would undertake

to form an opinion as to the prospective proﬁts of a business

without in the ﬁrst place informing himself as to its past

proﬁts, if that fact were accessible. As it is a fact in its nature

entirely capable of accurate ascertainment and proof, I can see

no more reason why it should be excluded from the consid-

eration of a tribunal called upon to determine conjecturally

the amount of prospective proﬁts than proof of the nature of

the business, or any other circumstance connected with its

transaction. It is very true that there is great diﬁiculty in

making an accurate estimate of future proﬁts, even with the

aid of knowing the amount of the past proﬁts. This difﬁculty

is inherent in the nature of the inquiry. \Ve shall not lessen

it by shutting our eyes to the light which the previous trans-

actions of the partnership throw upon it. Nor are we the more

inclined to refuse to make the inquiry by reason of its diffi-

culty, when we remember that it is the misconduct of the

defendants which has rendered it necessary.

Another question arises upon the defendant’s third request

to charge, viz.: “That supposing Bag]-ey to be accountable

through want of diligence, that should be taken into view in

diminution of the damages.” An issue had been formed upon

says: "I told the jury that they might see that the plaintiff
. considered the engagement equal to an Indian voyage, because
he would not otherwise have relinquished it, and the defendant could not have estimated it at less, because he made his
offer as a friend of the plaintiff." It was the value <>f the
engagement as partner, therefore, which the jury were to estimate; and BosAXQUET, J., says: "The damages were estimated
according to what the jury thought was the value of the contract. The value of the East India voyage bas not been recovered as special damage, but has been taken as an ingredient
for estimating the value which each party set on the pr<>posed
contract of partnership." In each of these cases the prospective profits of a joint undertaking unperformed was made the
subject of compensation in damages in an action at law.
The next question relates to the admission of the evidence
of the amount of past profits, to be considered by the jury as
bearing upon the future profits. It will be observed that the
objection does not at all relate to the mode of proof, but only
to the competency of the fact. It sec>ms to me quite obvious
that, outside of a court of justice, no man would undertake
to form an opinion as to the prospective profits of a business
without in the first place informing himself as to its past
profits, if that fact were accessible. As it is a fact in its nnture
entirely capable of accurate ascertainment and proof, I can see
no more reason why it should be excluded from the consideration of a tribunal called upon to determine conjecturally
the amount of prospective profits than proof of the nature of
the business, or a.ny other circumstance connected with its
transaction. It is very true that there is great difficulty in
making an accurate estimate of future profits, even with the
aid of knowing the amount of the past profits. This difficulty
is inherent in the nature of the inquiry. 'Ve shall not lessPn
it by shutting our eyes to the light whiC'h the previous tram;:.
actions of the partnership throw upon it. Nor are we the more
inclined to refuse to make the inquiry by reason of its difficulty, when we remember that it is the misconduct of the
defendants which bas rendt•red it necessary.
Another question arises upon the defendant's tbh·d requeRt
to charge, viz.: "That supposing Bagky to be accountable
through want of diligence, that should be taken into view in
diminution of the damages.~' An issue had been formed upon
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the pleadings, and tried, whether Bagley had fraudulently

abstracted a quantity of gold from the ﬁrm, and the judge had

instructed the jury that if they found this issue for the defend-

ants, then they were justiﬂed in dissolving the partnership,

and the plaintiff could not recover damages. No issue had

been made as to negligence on Bagley’s part, nor did the evi-

dence tend to the proof of such negligence; and on these

grounds, as well as because the request was not in such a

shape, even conceding it to have been well founded upon the

evidence, as to require the judge to compl_v with it, we think

the exception not well taken. A request must be in such form

that the judge may properly charge in the terms of the request

as made, without qualiﬁcation, or his refusal will not be ground

of error. If made, as requested here, the effect would have

been to submit to the jury to ﬁnd Whether Bagley was account-

able through want of diligence, without any instructions as

to what sort of diligence he was bound to exhibit, or what

sort of losses or other mishaps he was thus to be made account-

able for. In this refusal there was no error.

It may be proper to notice brieﬂy the proposition that the
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plaintiffs claim for proﬁts must be limited to the period

between the dissolution and his subsequent entry into busi-

ness. This is obviously unfounded. The only question which

could be made as to this part of the case is, whether the

defendants, in mitigation of damages, could show that the

plaintiﬁ either was or might have been as proﬁtably employed

in business on h-is own account as he would have been had

the ﬁrm business been continued. The plaintiff might, per-

haps, have disputed the competency of such evidence. But

surely the defendants can not be heard to say that the plain-

tiff was bound to remain idle at their expense, or lose his

claim upon them altogether from the moment when he engaged

in business. .

Judgment aﬁirmed.

NO'1‘E.—See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., 3' 137.

~+ _ g

the pleadings, and tried, whether Bagley had fraudulently
abstracted a quantity of gold from the firm, and the judge had
instructed the jury that if they found this issue for the defendants, then thPy were justified in dissolving the partnership,
and the plaintiff could not recover ?amages. 'Xo issue had
heen mode as to negligence on Bagley's part, nor did the evidence tend to the proof of such negligence; and on these
ground-a, as well as because the request was not in such a
shape, even conceding it to have been well founded upon the
evidence, as to require the judge to comply with it, we think
the exception not W(>ll taken. A request must be in such form
that the judge may prop<-t·ly charge in the tPrms of the request
as made, without qualification, or his refusal will not be ground
of error. If made, as requested here, the effect would have
bl'en to submit to the jur.v to find whetht>r Bagi(>.'' was accountable through want of diligence, without any instructions as
to what sort of diligence he was bound to exhibit, or what
sort of losses or other mishaps he was thus to be made account:i ble for. In this refusal there was no error.
It may be proper to notice briPliy the proposition that the
plaintiff's claim for profits must be limited to the period
between the dissolution and llis subsequent entry into business. This is obviously unfounded. The only question which
could be made as to this part of the case is, whether the
defendants, in mitigation of damages, could Rhow that the
plaintiff either was or might have been as profitably emplo.ved
in business on his own account as he would han> been had
the fir-m. business been continued. The plaintiff might, per·
haps, haYe disputed the competency of sueh evidt•nce. But
surely the defrndants can not be heard to say that the plain·
tiff was bound to remain idle at their expense, or loJe his
claim upon tlwm altogether from the moment when he engaged
in business.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.-See :Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,

5 137.
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2. Is EQUITY. !/

SPEAB vs. NE\VELL.

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1841.

13 Vt. 288.

Bill in equity, for accounting and settlement of a partner-

ship.

Spear, Carlton and Newell entered into partnership for the

!. IN

EQUITY.

manufacture and sale of paper. Spear and Carlton owned one

half interet and Newell the other half. Spear and Carlton

were to manage the business, sell the product, and collect the

receipts, and the proﬁts or losses were to be divided accord-

ing to their interests. The business resulted in a large loss,

SPEAR vs. NEWELL.

and Spear and Carlton brought an action of account against

Newell in the United States Circuit Court, to recover half of

the loss, but that court held that, as the defendant had never

B11pretne Court of Vermont, 1841.

received any of the partnership effects, no action of account

could be sustained against him, and that the only remedy was

18 Vt. 288.

by bill in equity. They then ﬁled the bill, but the court below

dismissed the bill. Complainants appeal.
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C’. Lin-slay and E. A. Ormsbec, for complainants.

R. Pierpoint and E. N. Br-i_r/gs, for defendant.

COLLAME-R, J. These parties were copartners, the orator:

being jointly interested in one-half of the partnership, and the

defendant in the other. The orators were the active part-

ners, the recipients of all the property and avails of the con-

cern; but, it being an unproﬁtable and losing concern, there is

a balance due the orators from the defendant, and to ascertain

this balance, which has not been done, and to close the concern

and recover this balance, this bill is ﬁled.‘

The articles of copa.rtnership were not under seal, and there-

fore no action of covenant can be maintained. That an action

of assumpsit cannot be maintained at law by one partner

33

Bill In equity, for accounting and settlement of a partnership.
Spear, Carlton and Newell entered into partnership for the
manufacture and sale of paper. Spear and Carlton owned onehalf interest and Newell the other half. Spear and Carlton
were to manage the business,
sell the product, and collect the
..
I't'ceipts, and the profits or losses were to be divided according to their interests. The business resulted in a large Joa,
nod Spear and Carlton brought an action of account against
N'ewell in th~ United States Circuit Court, to recover half of
the loss, but that court held that, as the defendant bad never
rPcC'ived any -0f the partnership effeets, no action of account
<·ould be sustnined against him, and that the only remedy was
by bill in equity. Th{·~- tll<'n filed the bill, but the court belc>w
dismissed the bill. Complainants appea.l.
0. Linsley and E. A.. Ormsbee, for complainants.
R. Pierpoint and E. N. Br·iffgs, for defendant.

CoLLAM&n, J. ThE>8e parties were copartners, the oraton
being jointly iu1Prested in one-half of the partnership, and the
defendant in tht• other. The orators were the active partners, the recipients of all the property and avails of the concern; but, it being an unprofitable and losing concern, there ht
a balance due the orators from the defendant, and to ascertain
this balance, which has not been done, and to close the concern
and recover this balance, this bill is filed.;
The articles of copa.rtnership were not under seal, and there·
fore no action of covenant can be maintained. That an action
of assumpsit cannot be maintujned at law by one partner
83
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against another to recover an unliquidated and unsettled bal-

ance of a copartnership business, has been too fully and fre-

quently decided to be considered open to discussion. Gow on

Partnership, 98; Collyer on Partnership, 143, 144. If, after a

dissolution, a balance is struck and agreed upon by the parties,

assumpsit may be maintained to recover it, on an implied

promise to pay. I Holt’s R. 368. Different rules have been

adopted in different states whether there must be an empress

promise to pay the balance; yet, all concur that it is only when

the ﬁnal balance has been adjusted that assumpsit can be main-

tained. Oollyer on Partn., 153, note 45. [See also W3/coﬁ‘ vs.

Purnell, ante, p. 238 and note.] To this_ rule, Massachusetts

tands alone an exception. There, in the absence of a chancery

jurisdiction, the court of law has gone further than other

court of mere common law jurisdiction; probably inﬂuenced

by the pressure of a necessity which does not here exist.

It has been fully settled in an action of account between

these parties that these orators, who were the active partners

and received the whole property and avails of the copartner-

ship, cannot maintain, at law, an action of account against the
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defendant to recover the balance of losses. It follows that the

orators are without remedy at law, and are therefore compelled

to resort to chancery to adjust the balance of the concern, and

to recover of the defendant his proportion of the loss when so

ascertained. The mere statement of the case shows the neces-

sity of the bill, and shows too that it is not a mere bill for an

account which could be sustained at law. It is true that, in

matters of account, generally, chancery has concurrent juris-

diction with the courts of law; and where the defendant is

pursued in chancery for an account in any capacity in which he

could be pursued at law, a bill will not be sustained where an

action would not be. But in this case the bill is not addressed

to the concurrent, but to the peculiar and exclusive, jurisdic-

tion of the court of chancery, in a case where the orators have

a just claim but are without a remedy at law. It is not a bill

calling on the defendant to account. He has received nothing,

and of course had no account to render. It is a bill to settle

and adjust a mutual account between the parties of a copart-

nership transaction, which the defendant will not settle and

which the law cannot.

against another to recover an unliquidated and unsettled balance of a C()partnership business, has been too fully and frequently decided to be considered open to discussion. Gow on
Partnership, 98; Collyer on Partnership, 143, 144. If, after a
dissolution, a balance is struck and agreed upon by the parties,
assumpsit may be maintained to recover it, on an implied
promise to pay. I Holt's R. 368. Different rules have been
adopted in different states whether there must be an express
promise to pay the balance; yet, all concur that it is only when
the final balance bas been adjusted that assumpsit can be maintained. Collyer on Partn., 153, note 45. [See also Wycoff vs.
Purnell, ante, p. 238 and note.] To this. rule, Massachusetts
stands alone an exception. There, in the absence of a chancery
jurisdiction, the court of law bas gone further than other
court of mere common law jurisdiction; probably inOuenced
by the pressure of a necessity which does not here exist.
It bas been fully settled in an action of account between
these parties that these orators, who were the active partners
and received the whole property and avails of the copartnership, cannot maintain~ at law, an action of account against the
defendant to recover the balance of losses. It follows that the
orators are without remedy at law, and are therefore compelled
to resort to chancery to adjust the balance of the concern, and
to recover of the defendant his proportion of the loss when so
ascertained. The mere statement of the case shows the necessity of the bill, and shows too that it is not a mere bill for an
account which could be sustained at law. It is true that, in
matters of account, generally, chancery has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law; and where the defendant is
pursued in chancery for an account in an.y capacity in which he
could be pursued at law, a bill will not be sustained where an
action would not be. But in this case the bill is not addressed
to the ooncurrent, but to the peculiar and exclusive, jurisdiction of the court of chancery, in a case where the orators have
a just claim but are without a remedy at law. It is not a bill
calling on the defendant to account. He has received nothing,
and of course had no account to render. It is a bill to settle
and adjust a mutual account between the parties of a copartnership transaction, which the defendant will not settle and
which the law cannot.

...

PIBTLE vs. PENN. 259

(Omitting the consideration of a plea of the statute of limi-

PIRTLE VS. PENN.

259

tations.)

Decree of the court of chancery reversed, plea disallowed,

and the cause ordered to pass to the court of chancery to take

an account, settle and adjust the same, and ascertain the bal-

ance, and decree the same to the party to whom it shall be

found due. ‘

No'rn.—See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 153, 154.

Compare with following cases.

PIRTLE vs. PENN.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1885.

8 Dana 247. 28 Am. Dec. 70.

(Omitting the consideration of a plea of the statute of limitations.)
Decree of the court of chancery reversed, plea disallowed,
and the cauee ordered to pass to the court of chancery to take
an account, settle and adjust the same, and ascertain the balance, and decree the same to the party to whom it shall be
found due.

Henry Pirtle ﬁled a bill in chancery against Shadrack Penn,

alleging that they were partners in the publication of “Pirtle’s

Digest ;” that Pirtle, as author, was to furnish the manuscript,

Non.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
Compare with following cases.

g~

153, 154.

and Penn, as mechanic, was to execute the printing and bind-

ing, and each to be entitled to half of the proceeds to be derived

from the sale of the books; that Penn was not bound to com-

mence the printing unless he should be satisﬁed that the public

patronage would be satisfactory and sufficient; that the state
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subscribed for ﬁve hundred copies, and individuals for two

hundred and ﬁfty copies, and that afterwards Penn had

PIRTLE vs. PENN.

printed two thousand copies and bound about half of them,

but that after dividing equally the gross sum paid by the

state for ﬁve hundred copies, he had refused to permit Pirtle

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 189.''i.

to have any control over the books, or any participation in

the sale of them—alleging, for the ﬁrst time, that he was

8 Dana 247, 28 Am. Dec. 70.

entitled only to one-half of the net proﬁts, after deducting

the cost of printing and binding, which had not yet been

wholly reimbursed; and lastly, that Penn was insolvent, and,

therefore, praying for an account of sales which had been

made, and for an injunction restraining further sales, and for

the appointment of a receiver.

Penn in his answer to the bill and amended bill, admitted the

partnership as alleged, with only one material qualiﬁcation,

Henry Pirtle filed a bill jn chancer.v against Shadrnck Penn,
alleging that they were partners in the publication of "Pirtle's
Digest;" that Pirtle, as author, was to furnish the manuscript,
and Penn, as mechanic, was to execute the printing and binding, and each to be entitled to half of the proceeds to be derivefl
from the sale of the books; that Penn was not bound to commence the printing unless he should be satisfied that the public
patronage would be satisfactory and sufficient; that the state
subscribed for five hundred copies, and individuals for two
hundred nnd fifty copies, and that afterwards Penn had
printed two thousand copies and bound about half of them,
but that after dividing equally the gross sum paid by the
state for five hundred copies, he had refused to permit Pirtle
to have any control over the books, or any participation in
the sale of them-alleging, for the fir.st thnP, that he was
entitled only to one-half of the net profits, after deducting
the cost of printing and binding, which had not yet been
wholly reimbursed; and lastly, that Penn was insolvent, and,
therefore, praying for an account of sales which had been
made, and for an injunction restraining further sales, and for
the appointment of a receiver.
Penn in his answer to the bill and amended bill, admitted the
partnership as alleged, with only one material qualification,
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and that is, that his personal supervision and the interest on

his capital expended in the publication were, by the agreement,

to be a set-otf against I‘irtle’s skill and labor in preparing the

manuscript, and that the net proﬁts only were to he divided,

after reimbursing the amount expended in the printing and

binding, and in the purchase of materials; denied that he was

insolvent, and after exhibiting a general account, insisted that

Pirtle had received about as much as he had himself received.

The circuit court having, on ﬁnal hearing, dismissed the bill,

this appeal is proecuted to reverse the decree.

(Trittende-n and Pirtle, for appellant.

.-llorehead & Brown, for appellee.

Rommrsos, Ch. J. (After stating the facts as above.) As

and that is, that his personal supervision and the interest on
his capital expended in the publication were, by the agreement,
ttl be a set-off aga.inst Pirtle's skill and labor in preparing the
manuscript, and that the net profits only were to be divided,
after reimbursing the amount expended in the printing and
binding, and in the purchase of materials; denied that he was
insolvent, and after exhibiting a general account, insisted that
Pirtle had rec·C'ived about as much as he had himself received.
The circuit court havin~, on final hearing, dismissed the bill,
this appeal is prosecuted to reverse the decree.

there was no prayer for a dissolution of the partnership,

interim management, by a receiver or otherwise, under the con-

trol or direction of the court, was not authorized by the estab-

lished rules and usages of courts of equity. Gow ou Part., 120,

139; Cary, 32. -

Crittenden and Pirtle, for appellant.
Morehead & Brnzon, for appellee.
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And it has been said, that without a prayer for dissolution,

a court of equity will not entertain a bill for an account,

because such bills might be annual, or of indeﬁnite recurrence.

But both principle and authority tend to the conclusion,

that a bill for an account between copartners may be main-

tained without a prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, if

there be any good reason for compelling an account and settle-

ment. (‘ar_v, 34; Gow, 120, 136.

A court of equity may, moreover, compel a speciﬁc execu-

tion of a partnership contract, and may sometimes enjoin a.

partner from persisting in improper conduct, jeopardizing the

rights or derogating from the power or authority of his copart-

ner, and when the latter, if he can be protected and secured

by injunction, does not desire a dissolution, but prefers a con-

tinuation of the partnership, according to the spirit and end of

the association.

In this case, though there is no prayer for dissolution, yet,

as Penn has been selling the books and does not deny that he

refuses to permit Pirtle to control or participate in the sale of

the residue, we think the circuit court had power to decree, and

ought to have decreed some relief, if the allegations of the bill

as to the terms of the partnership be true.

-_' — — —-— - --%,_!r...

Ch. J. (After stating the facts as above.) As
there was no prayer for a dissolution of the partnership,
interim management, by a receiver or otherwise, under the control or direction of the court, was not authorized by the established rules and usages of courts of equity. Gow on Part., 120,
139; Cary, 32.
And it hm1 been said, that without a prnyer for dissolution,
a court of <>quity will not entertain a bill for an account,
ber.ause surh bills might be annual, or of indefinite recurrence.
But both principle and authority tend to the conclusion,
that a bill for an account b<>t~een copartners may be maintained without a prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, if
there be any good reason for compelling an account and settlement. f'nry, :~.t; Gow, l~O, l!-16.
A court of equity may, moreover, compel a specific execution of a partn<>rship contract, and may sometinH'S enjoin a
partner from persisting in improper
conduct, jeopardizing the
I
.
'. rights or derogating from t~e power or authority of his coparti ner, and when the latter, if he can be protected and St>cured
by injunction, does not desire a dissolution, but Jll'l'fers a continuation of the partnership, according to the spirit and end of
the association.
In this case, though thei-e is no prayer for disRolution, yet,
as Penn has been sPlling the books and does not deny that he
refuses to permit Pirtle to control or participate in the sale of
the residut>, we think the circuit court had power to decree, and
ought to have decreed some relief, if the allegations of the bill
as to the terms of the partnership be true.
ROBERTSON,

~V , _ ___ _

PIRTLE

I

vs.

PENN.

2Gl

Purrm vs. PENN. 261

As there was no written memorial, nor any evidence aliundc,

of the contract of partnership, its terms must be settled as a

deduction of law from what the parties have agreed in their

pleadings. A A‘ V

The parties agree, that one was to furnish the manuscript,

and the other to print and bind it; but they disagree as to their

proportion of interest in the gross proceeds.

Upon these fact alone, the law decides that what each con-

tributed was his share of the joint capital, that their respective

contributions _were, by themselves, deemed equivalents, and

that therefore each of them is entitled to an equal interest in

the books, and in their gross vendible value. Gow, 9-10; 3

Kent’s Com., 28-9; H onore rs. Col-mcsnil, 1 J . J ._ Mar. 506. The

general conclusion of law, in the absence of any fact to the con-

trary, is that “the losses are to be equally borne and the proﬁts

equally divided.” Kent’s Com., supra.

But as proﬁts are only what remains of the avails of the con-

cern after defraying incidental expenses and reimbursing the
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capital, the counsel for Penn insists, that the rule of law

applied to the facts of this case will entitle Pirtle to only one

half of “the net proﬁts,” after deducting a jut compensation

for materials, printing and binding, and that, consequently,

Penn’s understanding of the express agreement, and the legal

interpretation of the character of the partnership a1-e the same.

This a_rgument would be sound if the fact which it presupposes

were admitted; but the assumed fact, to wit: That Penn's capi-

tal exceeded that of Pirtle, to the extent of the value of the

materials, printing and binding. has no existence in proof or in

presumption of law. If one partner contributes a thousand dol-

lars and another contributes ﬁve hundred, nothing else appear-

ing, equity would ﬁx a corresponding ratio of interest, and of

loss and gain between them.

But the production of genius or of knowledge are scarcely

appreciable, the value of writing a book must necessarily be

uncertain, before publication. But that Pirtlc’s manuscript

and copyright were of some value, and of considerable value

too, and were so considered by both parties, cannot be doubted.

The precise amount of the actual value was not only unknown,

but unascertainable when the contract was made. Perhaps it

exceeded the amount of all the cost of printing and binding;

and it is far from being improbable that it did. But it is saili-

Q

As there was no written mem<>ria 1, nor any evidence aliundc,
of ·the contract of partnership, its terms must be settled as a
deduction of law from what the parties have agreed in their
pleadings.
·
The parties agree, that one was to furnish the manuscript,
and the other to print and bind it; but they disagree as to their
proportion of interest in the gross proceeds.
Upon these facts alone, the Jaw d<>l"ides that what each con·
tributed was his share of the joint capital, that their respective
oontributions .were, by themselvPs, dN'med equivalents, and
that therefore each of them is entitlt>d to an equal inh'rest in
the books, and in their gross vPndiblc value. Gow, 9-10; 3
Kent's Com., 28-9; Honore 1:s. Col·nwsnil, 1 J. J .. :Mar. 506. The
I general conclusion of law, in the absPnce of any fact to the contrary, is that "the losses are to be equally borne and the profits
equally divided."
Kent's Com., supra.
But as profits are only what remains of the avails of the concern after defraying incidental expenses and reimbursing the
capita.1, the counsel for Penn insists, that the rule of law
upplied to the facts of this case will entitle Pirtle to only onebalf of "the net proflts," after deducting a just c-0mr><'nsation
for materials, printing and binding, and that, consequently,
Penn's understanding of the t•xprcss agreement, and the legal
interpretation of the churacte1· of the partnership are the same.
This ~rgument would be sound if the fact which it presupposes
were admitted; but the assumed fact, to wit: That Penn's capital exceeded that of Pirtlt', to tJw <·xtent of the value of the
materials, printing and binding. has no existence in proof or in
presumption of law. If one pnrtner contributes a thousand dollars and another contributes five hundred, nothing else appearing, equity would fix a corresponding ratio of intei:t>St, and of
loss and gain between them.
But the production of genius or of knowledge are scarcely
appreciable, the value of writing a book must ne("Pssarily be
uncertain, before publication. But that Pirtle's manuscript
and copyright w.ere of some value, and of considPrable value
too, and were so conside1·ed by both parties, cannot he doubted.
The precise amount of the actual value was not only unknown,
but unascertainable when the contract was made. Perhaps it
exceeded the amount of all the cost of printing and binding;
and it is far from being improbable that it did. But it is sum.
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cient only to observe, that the law cannot decide that the con-

tributions of each partner were not of equal value, or were not

estimated by themselves as equivalent. And therefore, in

estimating proﬁts, nothing is to be deducted in favor of the one

or the other party for capital or excess of contribution to the

joint stock.

This deduction of law is fortiﬁed, rather than weakened, by

extraneous facts. From the pleadings, it must be taken as

admitted, that by the contract of partnership, Penn was under

no obligation ever to commence the publication, unless the

patronage to be obtained should, in his judgment, be sufficient

to insure his indemnity. The state afterwards subscribed for

ﬁve hundred copies, which, added to two hundred and ﬁfty

copies subscribed for by individuals would, at eight dollars a

copy, bring the gross sum of six thousand dollars. But it seems

that the amount actually subscribed was six thousand three

hundred and eighty dollars; the half of which, to wit: three

thousand one hundred and ninety dollars, was, according to

any hypothesis, assured to Penn before he began the printing,

or was under any obligation to begin it; and which sum was,
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according to the proof, at least equal to the actual cost of print-

ing and binding two thousand copies, including the cost of

materials. A

Then, according to these facts, Penn, if he were entitled to

only one-half of the books or of their value, was sure.of being

reimbursed, and of then having left for his remaining interest

in the books,‘after supplying the subscribers, six hundred and

twenty-ﬁve copies, which, at eight dollars a set, would be worth

ﬁve thousand dollars, which, or whatever that number of copies

would sell for, would be clear proﬁt.

Thus, supposing the contract to be as Pirtle avers it was,

and as the law presumes it to have been, it appears that Penn

incurred no hazard, and had a sure prospect of proﬁt to a large

amount, and that the whole risk and loss were I’irtle’s.

It is intrinsically improbable, therefore, that Pirtle ever

agreed that Penn shouldx be entitled to more than one-half of

the gross proceeds of the publication. But it is enough that

there is no proof that Penn contributed more than Pirtle did

to the joint stock, or that he was to have more than an equal

joint interest; and, therefore, according to the proper deduc-

tions from the pleadings, the law will give him no more.

cient only fo observe, that the law cannot decide that the contributions of each partner were not of equal value, or were not
estimated by themselves as equivalents. And therefore, in
estimating profits, nothing is to be deducted in favor of the one
or the other party for capital or excess of contribution to the
joint stock.
This deduction of law is fortified, rather than weakened, by
extraneous facts. From the pleadings, it must be taken as
admitted, that by the contract of partnership, Penn was under
no obligation ever to commence the publication, unless the
patronage to be obtained should, in his judgment, be sufficient
to insure his indemnity. The state afterwards subscribed for
five hundred copies, which, added to two hundred and fifty
copies snbtH'rilwd for by indi ddnals would, at eight dollars a
copy, bring tbP g1·oss sum of six thousand dollars. But it seems
that the amount actually subscribed was six thousand three
hundred and eighty dollars; the half of which, to wit: three
thousand one hundred and ninety dollars, was, according to
any hypothesis, assured to Penn before he began the printing,
or was under any obligation to begin it; and which. sum was,
according to the proof, at least equal to the actual e<>st of printing and binding two thousand copies, including the cost of
materials.
Then, according to these facts, Penn, if he were entitled to
only one-half of th<> books or of their value, was sure ,of being
reimbursed, and of then having left for his remaining interest
in the books,' after supplying the subscribers, six hundred and
twenty-five copies, which, at eight dollars a set, would be worth
1lve thousand dollars, which, or whatever that number of copies
would sell for, would be clear profit.
'fhus, supposing the contmct to be as Pirtle avers it was,
and as the law presumes it to have been, it appears that Penn
incurred no hazard, and had a sure prospect of profit to a large
amount, and that the whole risk and loss were Pirtle's.
It is intrinsically improbable, therefore, that Pirtle ever
agreed that Penn should, be entitled to more than one-half of
the gross proceeds of the publication. But it is enough that
there is no proof that Penn contributed more than Pirtle did
to the joint stock, or that he was to have more than an equal
joint interest; and, therefore, according to the proper deductions from the pleadings, the law will give him no more.
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From this view of the case, it would seem that, under the

vs.

W.IUGJIT.
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circumstances of this case, Pirtle is entitled to a decree for

an account, and for securing to him his equal control over the

books, and correspondent participation in the sale or dispo-

sition of them, by a partial injunction, or otherwise, so as to

effect that end most securely and appropriately. And conse

quently the absolute dismission of the bill was improvident.

III

Wherefore, it is decreed and ordered that the decree of the

circuit court be reversed, and the cause remanded.

NOTE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 152, 153.

See also Howell v. Harvey, post, p. -.

_i*%_t_

NEW vs. W RIGHT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1870.

From this view of the case, it would seem that, under the
circumstances of this case, Pirtle is entitled to a decree for
an account, and for securing to him bis equal control over the
books, and correspondent participation in the sale or disposition of them, by a partial injunction, or <>therwise, so as to
effect that end most securely and appropriate1y. And consequently the absolute dismission of the bill was improvident.

• • •

Wherefore, it is decreed and ordered that the decree of the
circuit conrt be reversed, and the cause remanded.

44 Miss. 202.

New ﬁled a bill in equity against Wright, alleging that New

owned a tract of cypress timber, a mill site and part of the

machinery and material for the construction of a saw-mill;

Nom.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,
Bee a1ao HoweU v. Harvey, post, p. -

§~

152, lli3.

that he entered into partnership with \Vr_ight who was to
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supply the necessary materials and machinery to complete

the mill, and was to superintend the construction and manage

ment; that the timber was to be sawed into lum-ber, and the

proceeds divided equally after reimbursing each party for a

stipulated portion of his outlay on the mill; that New was

to supply the timber and Wright was to pay all the expenses

of sawing and selling. The bill further charged that \Vright

refused to account, alleging that the proceeds did not equal

the outlay by about $7,000, etc.; that YVright had ceased to

NEW vs. WRIGHT.

use complainant’s timber and wa procuring it elsewhere; that

Wright was so largely indebted to complainant that the latter

Supreme Court of Mi8sissipp-i, 1870.

could not be paid unless out of the proceeds of the timber

and lumber which Wright had about the mill; and the bill

44 'Miss. 202.

,___ ~__‘ . 1 ~r _~

New filed a bill in equity against \Vright, alleging that New
owned a tract of cypress timber, a mill site and part of the
machinery and material for the construction of a saw-mill;
that be entered into partnership with \Vright who was to
supply the necessary materia1s and machinery to complete
the mill, and was to superintend the construction and management; that the timber was to be sawed into lumber, and the
proceeds divided equally after reimbursing each party for a
stipulated portion of his outlny on the mm; that New was
to supply the timber and "'right wns to pay all the expenses
of sawing and selling. The bill further charged that \Vrigbt
refused to account, allf'ging that the procef'ds did not equal
the outlay by about $7,000, etc.; that "'right had ceased to
use complainant's timber and was procuring it elsewhere; that
Wright was so largely indebted to complainant that the latter
· could not be paid unless out of the proceeds of the timber
and lumber which Wright had about the mill; and the bill

264 Cases on Panrxsssnxr.

CASES ON PAHTXERSBIP.

prayed an injunction to prevent Wright from removing or sell-

ing the lumber or timber, that a receiver be appointed, the

partnership dissolved and an accounting had. A preliminary

injunction was issued, but the court subsequently dissolved

it and denied the application for a receiver. New thereupon

appealed.

G00. L. Potter, for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Pnwros, C. J. (After stating the facts.) The propriety

of the action of the court in dissolving the injunction is

prayed an injunction to prevent Wright from removing or selling the lumber or timber, that a receiver be appointed, the
partnership dissolved and an accounting had. A preliminary
injunction was issued, but the court subsequently dissolved
it and denied the application for a receiver. New thereupon
appealed.

impeached by the appellant, and presents the ﬁrst ques-

tion for our consideration. The bill of complaint charges

that neither party contemplated any use of the said

mill than to saw the cypress timber on the complainant’s said

Geo. L. Potter, for appP.llant.

No appearance for appellee.

tract of land, on which the mill wa erected, and for the saw-

ing of no other timber. and that the said defendant, in disre-

gard of the terms of the partnership, and without the consent

of the complainant, has ceased to procure cypress timber from

the said tract of land of the complainant, for the use of the

saw-mill thereon, and has been for some time heretofore, and
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now is, procuring other cypress from other persons to saw,

and is sawing the same into lumber on said mill, and thereby

defezéiang one of the objects the complainant had in view in

enter info the partnership, and that object was to turn his

own cypress timber into productive capital. And this alle-

gation is, to some extent, corroborated by the evidence of

the appellee, who testiﬁed that his wife bought saw log and

timber. This was using the mill in a. manner unauthorized

by the terms of the contract of partnership, and would justify

an injunction, and together with the loss of seven thousand

dollars in running the mill for more than three years, would

perhaps authorize a dissolution of the partnership. The

injunction, therefore, could not have been properly dissolved

for the want of equity on the face of the bill. “ * "

The remaining question for our decision is, did the court err

in ‘overruling the motion for the appointment of a receiver?

“It must be admitted,” said the master of the rolls, in Madg-

wtth vs. Wtmble, 6 Beavan, 495, “that when an application is

made for a receiver in partnership cases, the court is always

PmYToN, C. J. (After stating the facts.) The propriety
of the action of the court in dissolving the injunction is
impeached by the appellant, and presents the first question for our consideration. The bill of complaint charges
that neither party contemplated any use of the said
mill than to saw the cypress timber on the complainant's said
tract of land, on which the mill was erected, and for the sawing of no other timber. J.nd that the said defendant, in disrPgard of the terms of the partnership, and without the consent
of the complainant, has ceased to procure cypress timber from
the said tract of land of the complainant, for the use of thP
saw-mill thereon, and has been for some time heretofore, and
now is, procuring other cypress from other persons to saw,
and is sawing the same into lumber on said mill, and thereby
defe~~!i_ng one of the objects the complainant had in view in
enterM. i..rA"::'> the partnership, and that object was to tnrn his
own cypress tiraher into productive capital. And this allPgatiou is, to som~ extent, ~orroborated by the evidence of
the appellee, who testified that his wife bought saw logs and
timber. This was mdng the mill in a manner unauthorized
by the terms of the contract of partnership, and would justify
an injunction, and together with the loss of seven thousand
dollars in running the mill for more than three years, would
perhaps authorize a dissolution of the partnership. The
injunction, therefore, could not have been properly dissolved
for the want of equity on the face of the bill. • • •
The remaining question for our decision is, did the court err
in 'overruling the motion for the appointment of a receiver?
"It must be admitted," said the master of the rolls, in Madgwith vs. Wimble, 6 Beavan, 495, "that when an application is
made for a receiver in partnership cases, the court is always

i~
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placed in a position of very great difﬁeulty. On the one hand,

if it grants the motion, the effect of it is to put an end to the

partnership, which one of the parties claims a right to have

continued; and on the other hand, if it refuses the motion, it

leaves the defendant at liberty to go on with the partnership,

at the risk and probably at the great loss and prejudice of the

dissenting party. Between these diﬂiculties, it is not very

easy to select the course which is best to be taken, but the

court is under the necessity of adopting some mode of proceed-

ing to protect, according to the best view it can take of the mat-

ter, the interests of both parties.”

In order to justify the dissolution of a partnership, on the

ground of misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith of one of the parties,

it is not suﬁicient to show that there is a temptation to such

misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith, but there must be an unequivo-

cal demonstration, by overt acts or gross departures from duty,

that the danger is imminent, or the injury already accom-

plished: Story on Partnership, 464, § 288. ‘V here a concern

of any character or kind, covering a partnership, is broken up
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by controversial suits, and it is apparent that there can be no

agreement between the parties in interest for its continuance,

a receiver will be appointed: Williams vs. Wilson, 4 Sandf.

(N. Y.) Chan. 379; Edwards on Receivers, 330. And a. disso-

lution of a partnership may be granted and a receiver

appointed on account of the gross misconduct of one or more

of the parties: 1 Story‘s Eq. 635, § 672 a. To authorize the

appointment of a receiver there must be some breach of the

duty of a partner, or of the contract of partnershipf Harding

vs. Glover, 18 Ves. 281.

It was the duty of the appellee to take the timber used in the

mill, from the tract of land on which it was erected, belonging

to the appellant; and the getting timber elsewhere, as alleged

in the bill of complaint, was a breach of that duty and of the

contract of partnership. And if the mill sawed six thousand

feet of lumber per day, and the running of the mill from the

fall of 1865 to the commencement of this suit in the spring of

1369, brings the parties in debt seven thousand dollars, as

stated by the appellee in his testimony, it would seem to be a

business which neither party should desire to continue.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the case made by the

' '*" _ I T T —
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placed in a position of very great difficulty. On the one band,
if it grants the motion, the effect of it is to put an end to the
partnership, which one of the parties claims a right to have
oontinued; nnd on the other hand, if it refuses the motion, it
leaves the defendant at liberty to go on with the partnership,
at the risk and probably at the great loes and prejudice of the
dissenting party. Between these difficulties, it is not very
easy to select the course which is best to be taken, but the
court is under the necessity of adopting some mode of proceed- ·
ing to protect, according to the best view it can take of the matter, the interests of both parties."
In order to justify the dissolution of a partnership, on the
ground of misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith of one of the parties,
it is not sufficient to show that there is a temptation to such
misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith, but there must be an unequivocal demonstration, by overt acts or gross departures from duty,
that the dnnger is imminent, or the injury already accomplished: Story on Partnt>rship, 464, § 288. ·where a concern
ef any character or kind, covering a partnership, is broken up
by controversial suits, and it is apparent that there can be n~
agreement between the parties in interest for its coBtinuance,
a receiver will be appointed: Williams -vs. Wilson, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.) Chan. 379; Edwards on Receivers, 330. And a dissolution of a partnership may be granted and a receiver
appointed on uccount of the gross misconduct of one or more
of the parties: 1 Story's Eq. 635, § 672 a. To authorize the
appointment of a receiver there must be some breach of the
duty of a partner, or of the contract of partnership:· Harding
1'B. Glover, 18 Ves. 281.
It was the duty of the appellee to take the timber used in the
mill, from the tract of land on which it was erected, belonging
to the appellant; and the getting timber elsewhere, as alleged
in the bill of complaint, was a bre.nch of that duty and of the
contract of partnership. And if the mill sawed six thousand
feet of lumber per day, and the running of the mill from the
fall of 1865 to the commencement of this suit in the spring of
1369, brings the parties in debt seven thousand dollars, as
stated by the appellee in his testimony, it would seem to be a
business which neither party should desire to continue.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the case made by the
34
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bill authorizes the appointment of a receiver,~and that, there

fore, the court erred in overruling the application therefor.

For the reasons herein stated, the decrees of the court in dis-

solving the injunction and overruling the motion for the

appointment of a receiver, will be reversed, and the cause

remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion, with leave to the appellee to answer the bill within

sixty days from this date.

N0'l'E.—See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., § 152, 155.

For other cases of dissolution in courts of equity, see Gerard vs. Gateau,

post, p. -

BUCK vs. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1874.

bill authorizes the appointment of a receiver,· and that, therefore, the court erred in overruling the application therefor.
For the reasons herein stated, the decrees of the court in dissolving the injunction and overruling the motion for the
appointment of a receiver, will be reversed., and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion, with leave to the appellee tp answer the bill within
sixty days from this date.

29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. Rep. 84.

Bill in equity by Buck against Smith for speciﬁc perform-

ance of the agreement referred to below a11d more ‘speciﬁcally

set out in the opinion, and for an accounting and injunction.

NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 1~2. 155.
For other cases of cliasolution in courts of equity, see Gerard O& Gattati,
post, p. ._

The bill recited that G. W. Swan, J. R. McArt.hur, W.

McArthur and J. F. McDonald had been partners in the lum-

bering business, under the name of McArthur & Co., and had
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large and valuable property; that Smith agreed with complain-

ant Buck that Smith would buy the interest of Swan and

J. R. McArthur, in the ﬁrm’s real and personal property; con-

vey one-half of this interest to Buck to be paid for as rapidly

BUCK vs. SMITH.

as he could do so out of the proﬁts or otherwise; and that

Buck, Smith, XV. McArthur and McDonald should then go into

Supreme Gou.rt of Michigan, 1874-

partnership to manage and work the lumber property formerly

so belonging to McArthur & Co.; that Buck should have the

management of the business, give it his personal attention and

go to reside near the property; that Smith bought the interest

referred to, but went into partnership with the others, exclud-

ing complainant, and thereby deprived him of valuable gains

and property.

The court below dismissed his bill and Buck appealed.

29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. Rep. M.

,

Bill in equity by Buck against Smith for specific performance of the agreement referred to below and more "specifically
set out in the opinion, and for an accounting and injunction.
·The bill recited that G. W. Swan, J. R. McArthur, W.
McArthur and J. F. McDonald bad been pa1·tners in the lumbering business, under the name of McArthur & Co., and had
large and valuable property; that Smith agreed with complainant Buck that Smith would buy the interest of Swan and
J. R. McArthur, in the firm's real and personal property; convey one-half of this interest to Buck to be paid for as rapidly
as he could do so out of the profits or otherwise; and that
Huck, Smith, '\V. McArthur and McDonald should then go into
partnership to manage arid work the lumber property formerly
so t<>longing to McArthur & Co.; that Buck should have the
management of the business, give it his personal attention and
go to reside near the property; that Smith bought the interest
rPft>rred to, but went into partnership with the others, excluding co.mplain-ant, and thereby deprived. him of valuable gains
and property.
The court below dismissed. his bill and Buck appealed.

Bocx vs. Sn rrn. 267

BUCK VS. SMITH.

M. Buck, in person, and D. W. Perkins, for complainant. ‘ J

267

O. I. Walker, for defendant.

Gnsvns, C. J. (After stating the facts.) We consider it

'ill. ·B uck; in person, and D. W. Perkins, for complainant. ·

very clear that the case which the complainant makes by his

bill is not suitable for the jurisdiction invoked. The power

0. I. Walker, for defendant.

vested in courts of equity to compel the speciﬁc performance

of contracts, instead of leaving parties in all cases to obtain

C. J. (After stating the facts.) We consider it
very clear that the case which the complainant makes by bis
bill is not suitable for the jurisdiction invoked. The power
vested in courts of equity to compel the specific performance
of contracts, instead of leaving parties in all cases to obtain
common-law redress through actions for damages, is a very
useful one when legitimately exercised. It must, however, be
borne in mind that the jmisdiction has many necessary limits
and qualifications, and that it does not necessarily attach or
operate with imperative force wherever a contract relation
exists which the complainant has respected and the defendant
bas not. In each case the court must consider whether, iu
view of all the facts and those doctrines which are interwoven
with the very texture of equity jurisprudence, and in view of
the specific peculiarities presented, and the settled principles
and maxims of the court, it is right and proper to entertain
the case and administer relief. MoMurtie vs. Bennette, Har.
(Mich.) Oh. 124; S 111 ith vs. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Chambers vs.
Livermore 15 Mich. 381; Millard vs. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 557.
Among the primary conside1"3.tions is tbe question wbethl'r
the substantial sense and design of both parties can be worked
out by the decree of the court, since the real equity of the
proceeding, the spirit of the particular jurisdiction, means
performance on both sides and not a compulsory surrender by
one party to another without a present substantial and practi·
cal equivalent,-an equivalent susceptible of enforcement and
execution by the court.
Now, what is the real r-ssence of the case made by this bill?
What is the arrangement the court is asked to carry out? It is
an agreement, according to the representation of complainant,
between himself and the defendant, by which the latter agreed
to ·convey an undivided interest in real and personal proper1 .v
held by defendant in common with third persons, and that the
complainant should, for an indefinite time, become a partner
with the defendant and such third persons in operating the
property; that the defendant should advance from time to
time the complainant's quota of the funds necPssary for the
business and the improvement of the property; that the comGRAVES,

comm-on-law redress through actions for damages, is a very

useful one when legitimately exercised. It must, however, be

borne in mind that the jurisdiction has many necessary limits

and qualiﬁcations, and that it docs not necessarily attach or

operate with imperative force wherever a contract relation

exists which the complainant has respected and the defendant

has not. In each case the court must consider whether, in

view of all the facts and those doctrines which are interwoven

with the very texture of equity jurisprudence, and in view of

the speciﬁc peculiarities presented, and the settled principles

and maxims of the court, it is right and proper to entertain

the case and administer relief. 1l[0Murt1'e vs. Bennette, Har.

(Mich.) Oh. 124; Smith vs. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Chambers vs.
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Livermore 15 Mich. 381; Millard vs. Ta-yloe, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 557.

Among the primary considerations is the question whether

the substantial sense and design of both parties can be worked

out by the decree of the court, since the real equity of the

proceeding, the spirit of the particular jurisdiction, means

performance on both sides and not a compulsory surrender by

one party to another without a present substantial and practi-

cal equivalent,—an equivalent susceptible of enforcement and

execution by the court.

Now, what is the real essence of the case made by this bill?

What is the arrangement the-court is asked to carry out? It is

an agreement, according to the representation of complainant,

between himself and the defendant, by which the latter agreed

to convey an undivided interest in real and personal property

held by defendant in common with third persons, and that the

complainant should, for an indeﬁnite time, become a partner

with the defendant and such third persons in operating the

property; that the defendant should advance from time to

time the c0mplainant’s quota of the funds necessary for the

business and the improvement of the property; that the com-
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plainant should have the right to manage and direct the busi-

ness and the improvements; and that he would employ his

time, skill, judgment and experience in the direction and uper-

vision of the property and business, and that the purchase

price of his proprietary share, and the amount advanced for

his beneﬁt in carrying on the business, should be paid by his

skill and services in the concern, and the gains obtained in

the enterprise.

Waiving all objection founded on the circumstance that the

bill does not assert that McDonald and McArthur became in

any manner engaged with complainant to admit him to a part-

nership, or to clothe him with any right or power to manage

their interests, we ﬁrst encounter the rule, which is pretty well

recognized, that the court will not enter upon so vain an under-

taking as to compel a party to go into a partnership where the

agreement is silent as to its duraﬁon, and where, therefore, it

may be dissolved at the will of either as soon as formed.

But, secondly, we confront the inevitable and very formid-

able objection that the agreement by its very nature is practi-

cally not enforceable on both sides. It is extremely plain
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that the court cannotjssume to enforce the performance of

daily prospective ditties, or supervise or direct in advance

the course or conduct of one who is to control and manage

in the interest of a ﬁrm in which he is to stand as a member,

and where, too, the stipulated arrangement as plainly set forth

contemplates that his personal skill and judgment hall be

applied and govern according to the shifting needs of property

and business. No court is competent to execute such an

arrangement. The complainant’s portion of the executory

scheme, then, which relates to his introduction to the position

of partner and manager, to his rights and duties in that posi-

tion, and to the agreed method for working out the compen-

sation to be made by him for the beneﬁt he seeks, cannot be

speciﬁcally enforced. Looking at the case made by the bill,

the court is powerless to execute the equivalent the complain-

ant is bound to render. If a conveyance to the complainant

should be ordered, he would get at once the essence of what

he claims, whilst the defendant would fail in getting, through

a decree, any substantial consideration whatever.

A.s the court possesses no means by which to work out per-

formance on the part of complainant, he would become at once

invested with the beneﬁt for which he prosecutes, whilst the

plalnant should have the right to manage and direct the business a'nd the improvements; and that .he would employ .his
time, skill, judgment and experience in the direction and supervision of the property and business; and that the purchase
price of hie proprietary share, and the amount advanced for
his benefit in c~rrying on the business, should be paid by his
skill and services in the concern, and the gains obtained in
the enterprise.
Waiving all objection founded on the circumstance that thP
bill does not assert that McDonald and McArthur became in
any manner engaged with complainant to admit him t~ a partnership, or to cl-0the him with any right or power to manage
their interests, ~e first encounter the rule, which .is pretty well
recognized, that the court will not oo.ter upon so vain an undertaking as to compel a party to go into a partnership where the
agreement is silent as to its dura~on, and where, therefore, it
may be dissolved at the will of either as soon as formed.
But, seconclly, we confront the inevitable and very formidable objection that the agreement by its very nature is practically not enforceable on both sides. It is extremely plain
that the court cannot~ssume to enforce the performance of
daily prospective dJties, or supervise or direct in advance
the course or conduct of one who is to control and manage
in the interest of a firm in which he is to stand as a member,
and where, too, the stipulated a1·rangement as plainly set forth
cootemplates that his personal skill and judgment shall be
applied and govern according to the shifting needs of property
and business. No court is competent to execute such an
ariangement. The complainant's portion of the executory
scheme, then, which relates to his introduction to the position
of partner and manager, to his rights and duties in that position, and to the agreed Iru:!thod for working out the compensation to be made by him for the benefit be seeks, cannot be
specifically enforced. Looking at the case made by the bill,
the court is powerless to execute the equivalent the complainant is b-Ound to render. If a conveyance to the complainant
should be ordered, he would ~et at once the essence of what
he claims, whilst the defendant :would fail in getting, through
a decree, any substantial consideration whatever.
As the court possesses no means by which to work out performance on the part of complainant, he would become at once
invested with the benefit for which he prosecutes, whilst the
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defendant would be left standing upon a naked right to exact

BUCK

vs.

SMITH.

269

theconsideration through the future performance of duties

incapable of being speciﬁcally decreed. The doctrine of the

court will not sanction such one-sided relief; Blackett vs.

Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 117; Stacker vs. Brockclbank, 3 McN.

& G. 250, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; Johnson vs. Shrcwsbury ¢£ B. R.

W. 00., 3 DeGex. M. & G. 914, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 584; Pickeri/ng

vs. Bishop, 2 Y. & G01. Ch. 249; Kemble cs. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;

Kimberley vs. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Baldurin vs. Society, 9 Sim.

394; Gervais vs. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W. 80; Bozon vs. Farlow, 1

Mer. 459; Flight vs. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.

It is, then, very apparent, that, apart from other difﬁculties,

the case presented by the bill is wanting in mutuality, and is

not so constituted as to warrant the court in giving the relief

demanded. As a consequence, the decree below dismissing

the bill must be affirmed, with costs, but to preclude all ques-

tion as to the effect of it, it may be so varied as expressly to

he without prejudice to any proceedings at law the complain-

ant may think proper to take.

N0'1'E:—In Morris vs. Peclcham, 51 Conn. 128, it is said, “ It is a rule in
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equity that the court will not decree a speciﬁc performance where it has

no power to enforce the decree. Hence partnership articles will not be en-

forced, especially where no time is ﬁxed for its continuance, as either party

may dissolve it at pleasure. And even where a. time is ﬁxed it is diﬂicult

to see how the decree can be enforced. Take this case as an illustration;

is the court to keep its hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel

them to carry on this business?” In Pollock’s Dig. of Partn, 6, it is said:

" The remedy of speciﬁc performance is generally not applicable to an

defendant would be left standing upon a naked right to ex-a.et
the ·consideration through the future performance of duties
incapable of being epecifically decreed. The doctrine of the
court will n'Ot sanction such one-sided relief; Blackett 08.
Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 117; Stocker VB. Brockelbank, 3 McN.
& G. 250, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; ,Johnson VB. i~hrczcsbury <EB. R.
W. Co., 3 DeGex. M. & G. 914, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 584; Picker\.ng
vs. Bishop, 2 Y. & Ool. Ch. 249; Kem.ble t7R. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Kimberley f)B. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Ba.ldrcin vs. Soci,ety, 9 Sim.
:!94; Ge.rvais vs. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W. 80; Bozon vs. Farl&w, 1
Mer. 459; Flight vs. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.
It is, then, very apparent, t!iat, apart from other difficulties,
the ca:se presented by the bill is wanting in mutuality, and is
not so constituted as to warrant the court in giving the relief
demanded. As a consequence, the decree below dismissing
the bill must be affirmed, with costs, but to preclude all question as to the effect of it, it may be so varied as expressly to
he without prejudice to any proceedings at law the complainnnt may think prop~r to take.

agreement to enter into partnership, for ‘ it is impossible to make persons,

who will not concur, carry on a business jointly for their own common

advantage.’ ”

In Somerby vs. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459, it is said: “ Al-

though a. court of equity will not ordinarily decree speciﬁc performance of

an agreement to form a partnership which may be immediately dissolved

by either pal-ty, it will secure to a partner the interest in property to which

by the partnership agreement he is entitled, Buzlon vs. Lister, 3 Atk. 383."

See also England vs. Curling, 8 Beav. 129; Scott rs. Rayment, 7 Eq. 112.

See also Mschem's Elements of Partnership, § 81, 149-151, and notes.

/<
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NOTB:-ln Morria vs. Peckham, 51 Conn. 128, it is aaid, " It is a rule in
equity that the court will not decree a specific perrormanoe where it has
no power to enforce the decree. Hence partnership articles will not be enforced, espeoi&lly where no time is fixed for it.a continuance, as either party
may dissolve it at plea.sure. And even where a time is fixed it is difficult
to see bow the decree can be enforced. Take this case as an illustration;
is the court to keep it.a hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel
them to carry on this business?" In Pollock's Dig. of Partn, 6, it is said:
•· The remedy of specific performance is generally not applicable to an
agreement to enter into partnership, for it is impossible to make persons,
"who will not ooncur, carry on a busim;iss jointly for their own common
•dvantage.'"
In Some:r'b1J va. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459, it is aaid: " Although a court or equity will not ordinarily decree specific performance of
an agreement to form a partnership which msy be iiumediately diBSolved
by either patty, it will secure to a partner the interest in property to which
by the partnership agreement he is entitled, Bu.xton vs. Lister, 8 Atk. 883."
Bee also England va. Curling, 8 Beav. 12U; Scott 1:a. Raymmt, 7 Eq. 112.
See also Mechem's El111lldut:i ol P11ortu~r.s111p, S§ 81, 14D-l:il, and notes.
I
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IX.

POWERS OF PARTNERS.

SWEET vs. WOOD.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1893.

18 R. 1. ass, 2s Atl. Rep ass.

Assumpsit for the use of a horse let to'hire. Plaintiff had

judgment below. The opinion states the facts.

IX.

W. B. Tanner and E. L. Gannon, for plaintiff.

B’. B’. Stone and E. F. Lovejoy, for defendants.

MATTESON, C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial

on the ground of erroneous ruling, and also because the verdict

POWERS OF PARTNERS.

is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the

defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general

store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses

in carrying on their business. The plaintiff testiﬁes that

Frank W. \Vood, one of the defendants, came to him and stated

that they (thee defendants) were in need of a horse and would

SWEET vs. WOOD.

like to get hisAto use for a few days; that he consented to such

use; and that said Wood thereupon took the horse away. This,

however, was denied by Wood, who testiﬁed that he asked the

Supreme Court of Rlwde Island, 1893.
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plaintiff for the use of the horse for one Walden in his laundry

business, and that, with the plaintiff’s permission, he took the

18 R. I. 886, 28 A ti. Rep SS:>.

horse to Walden’s stable; that \Valden continued to use the

horse for several months, to the plaintili"s knowledge; that the

plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from Walden’s

stable and returned him there when he had done using him.

The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that,

if they found that the hiring of the horse was not necessary

for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary

-j~ -1-— __ __

Aesumpeit for the use of a horse let to·hire. Plaintiff had
judgment below.
,- The opinion states the facts.

W. B. Tanner and E. L. Gann.on, for plaintiff.
8. 8. Stone and E. F. Lovejoy, for defendants.
C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial
on the ground of erroneous ruling, and also because the verdict
is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the
defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general
store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses
in carrying on their business. The plaintiff testifies that
~,rank W. 'Vood, one of the defendants, came to him and stated
that they (th7· ~~~~ndants) were in need of a horse and would
like to get hisAto rise for a few days; that be consented to such
use; and that said \Vood tllereupon took the horse away. This,
however, was denied by 'Vood, who testified that he asked the
plaintiff for the use of the horse for one \Vaiden in bis laundry
business, and that, with the plaintiff's permission, be took the
horse to Walden's stable; that \Vaiden continued to use the
horse for several months, to the plaintiff's knowledge; that tlie
plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from Walden's
stable and returned him there when he bad done using him.
The defendants requested the court to instmct the jury that,
if they found that the hfring of the horse was not necessary
for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary
MATTESON,

~__.__ 5 . __ _ __._$=; _

SWEET vs. Woon. ' 271

SwKET vs. Woon.

271

way, the ﬁrm was not prima facie liable for the hiring by one

partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants

excepted.

We think the request was properly refused. As the use of

hores was necessary for carrying on the partnership business

in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was

clearly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule

is too well established to admit of question that the acts, admis-

sions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the

partnership, while engaged in the transaction of its business,

or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against

the ﬁrm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1077, and cases cited in

note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fact,

the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on

the business of the ﬁrm in the ordinary way; for being within

the scope of the partnership business, and therefore within the

authority of one partner to bind the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm would be

bound by the declaration of the partner that the ﬁrm needed

the horse for the transaction of its business, whatever the fact
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might be.

The defendants also requested the court to instruct the jury

that one partner could not, without authority from the other

members of the ﬁrm, bind the ﬁrm on an implied contract, not

in any way connected with its business, or for its beneﬁt. The

court gave the instruction, with the qualiﬁcation that, if the

partner declared when he hired the horse that it was for the

beneﬁt of the partnership, it would be responsible. To this

qualiﬁcation the defendants excepted. VVe think the instruc-

tion requested, in view of the testimony, was erroneous, and

that the qualiﬁcation of it was correct. The request was

erroneous, in that it assumed, contrary to the evidence, that

the hiring by one partner was unauthorized by the other. It

was not unauthorized by the other, because, as we have seen,

it was within the scope of the partnership business, and one

partner is the agent of his copartner in all matters within the

scope of the partnership business. -As such agent, his declara-

{ions are suﬂicient to bind his copartner, whether in accordance

with the fact or not. ‘

The verdict is supported by the testimony of the plaintiﬁ’.

Though this testimony is denied by that of the defendant,

Frank W. Wood, and though there are circumstances which

I

way, the firm was not pt"ima facie liable for the hiring by one
partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants
excepted..
We think the request was properly refused. As the use of
horses was necessary for carrying on the partnership business
in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was
clearly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule
is too wen established to admit of question that the acts, admissions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the
partnership, whlle engaged in the transaction of its business,
or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against
the firm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1077, and cases cited in
note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fa.ct,
the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on
the business of the firm in the ordinary way; for being within
the scope of the partnership business, and therefore within the
authority of one partner to bind the firm, the firm would be .
bound by the declaration of the partner that the firm needed
the horse for the transaction of its business, whatever the fact ·
might be.
The defendants also requested the court to instruct the jury
that one partner could not, without authority from the other
members of the firm, bind the ftrm on an implied contract, not
in any way connected with its business, or for its benefit. The
court gave the instruction, with t},le qualification that, if the
partner declared when he hired the horse that it was for the
benefit of the partnership, it would be responsible. To this
qualification the defendants excepted. 'Ve think the instruction requested, in view of the testimony, was erroneous, and
that the qualification of it was correct. The request was
erroneous, in that it assumed, contrary to the evidence, that
the hiring by one partner was unauthorized by the other. It
was not unauthorized by the other, because, as we have seen,
it was within the scope of the partnership business, and one
partner is the agent of bis copartner in all matters within the
acope of the partnership business. As such agent, his dec1arations are sutlicient to bind his copartner, whether in accordance
with the fact or not.
The verdict is supported by the testimony of the plaintiff.
Though this testimony is denied by that of the defendant,
Frank W. Wood, and though there are circumstances which
1
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may or may not, according to the view taken 6: them, tend to

corroborate the testimony of the latter, it is the province of

the jury to judge of the credibility of the testimony, and to

determine its weight. Unless it is clear that they have made

a mistake, or have been swayed by passion, partiality, corrup-

tion, prejudice, or sympathy, so that their verdict is strongly

against the evidence, the intervention of ‘the court is unwar-

ranted. Defendants’ petition for a new trial is denied and dis

missed.

NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Part;n., §§ 162, 181, 191 .

—~

BARNARD vs. PLANK ROAD CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1859.

6 Mich. 274.

may or may not, according to the view taken of them, tend to
corroborate the testimony of the latter, it is the province of
the jury to judge of the credibility of the testimony, and to
determine its weifht. Unless it is clear that they have made
a mistake, or have been swayed by passion, partiality, corruption, prejudice, or sympathy, so that their verdict is strongl7
against the evidence, the intervention of 'the court is unwarranted. Defendants' petition for a new trial is denied and diamiBSed.

This was anaction brought by the plank road company to

recover upon a subscription made to its stock by (Joe in the

Non: See Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., §§ 162, UU, 191. .

name of (Joe & Barnard. Barnard alone defended. One John-

son testiﬁed that a plank road was very necessary to enable

lumbering operations to be carried on in the vicinity in which

defendant’s lands were situated. Judgment for plaintiﬂf, and
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Barnard brings error.

Mitchell <6 McAIpinc, for Barnard, were stopped by the court.

Conger <£ H ar-ris, for the company.

BARNARD vs. PLANK ROAD CO.

Mnnrm, C. J. Barnard & Coe are admitted to have been

“partners in the lumbering business, owning lands in St. Clair

county as such partners, and manufacturing lumber there-

8upreme Court of Michigan, 1859.

from.” While such partners, (Joe subscribed the name of the

ﬁrm to the articles of association of the plank road company,

6 Mich. 274.

but without Barnard’s knowledge or consent. This subscrip-

tion, it is claimed, made Barnard a stockholder in the company.

(No rule is better settled than that one partner cannot bind

his copartner by any contract not within the immediate scope

of the partnership, unless with such copartner’s knowledge and

consent._) Each partner is an agent for all the members of the

This was an. action brought by the plank road company to
recover upon a subscription made to its stock by Coe in the
name of Coe & Barnard. Barnard alone defended. -One Johnson testified that a plank road was very necessary to enable
lumbering operations to be carried on in the vicinity in which
defendant's lands were sittiated. Judgment for plaintiff, and
Barnard brings error.
Mitchell & Mc.Alpine, for Barnard, were stopped by the court.
Conger & Harris, for the company.
MARTIN, C. J. Barnard & Coe are admitted to have been
"partners in the lumbering business, owning lands in ~t. Clair
county as such partners, and manufacturing lumber therefrom." While such partners; Coe subscribed the name of the
firm to the articles of association of the plank road company,
but without Barnard's knowledge or consent. This subscription, it is claimed, made Barnard a stockholder in the company.
(No rule is bett<.>r settl<.>d than that one partner cannot bind
liis copartner by any co~tract not within the immediate scope
of the partnership, unless with such copartner's knowledge and
<·onsent._) Each partner is an agent for all the members of the

5% 7 5~~ - ~4' ' 7'" —""’

BARNARD

Bxmunn vs. Pnanx Roan“ Co. 278

vs. PLANK Ro.&.i) Co.

ﬁrm, in the transaction of all business of such ﬁrm; but as to

matters foreign to such business, he is regarded as a

stranger. The general business of the ﬁrm being that of man-

ufacturing lumber, and the ownership of land as incident

thereto, the subscription to stock in a corporation, or to articles

of association for the creation of one, was not an incident of

such partnership. Incidental beneﬁts would not authorize one

partner to bind his fellow, and no authority so to bind him is

shown.

And the knowledge and assent required to bind the copart-

ner must be established by evidence aﬂirmatively showing it,

or from which it may be clearly inferred. This is sought to be

establihed from the fact that assessment were made, and

their payment demanded of the ﬁrm, which were unresponded

to; and it is urged that it was Barnard’s duty, upon such

demands, to repudiate any interest in the company, and that

his silence should be construed into a recognition of his rela-

tion as a stockholder. Now, a demand either through the

mail, or personal, is sufficient to bind a tockholder, but not to
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create one. If the person of whom the demand is made be not

one, it is not his duty to disclaim the character of tockholder;

it is enough that he does not respond to such demand. The

simple admission that demand was duly made of the ﬁrm, is

not one of a personal demand of Barnard, nor is it of anything

more than a fact—its etieet being a question of law. There is

no evidence, nor any admission, in the case, that knowledge

of the demand ever came to Barnard; and certainly none that

he ever, by any word or act, recognized any connection with

the company.

The liability of Barnard is also sought to be established from

the testimony of Johnson. This testimony is objected to, as

inadmissible under the case as presented, and for general

incompelcncy.

VVe do not regard the stipulation as the making of a case,

but only as an admission of facts for the purpose of obviating

the necessity of producing witnesses'to prove them. Any

other facts necessary for either party to show could still be

proven.

The testimony was competent as tending to show the inter-

est of the partnership in the road, but falls far short of being

_ _ ___ . _ __

35

firm; in the transaction of all business of such firm; but as to
matters foreign to such business, be is regarded as a
stranger. The general business of the firm being that of manufacturing lumber, and the ownership of land as incident
tbel;'eto, the subscription to stock in a corporation, or to articles
of association for the creation of one, was not an incident of
such partnership. Incidental benefits would not authoriir.e one
partner to bind his fellow, and no authority so to bind him is
shown.
And the knowledge and assent required to bind the copa.rtner must be established by evidence affil'Inatively showing it,
or from which it may be clearly inferred. 'l'his is sought to be
('stablished from the fact that assessments were made, and
their payment demanded of the firm, which were unresponded
to; and it is urged that it wrui Barnard's duty, upon such
demands, to repudiate any interest in the company, and that
his silPnce should be construed into a recognition oi his relation as a stockholder. Now, a demand either through the
mail, or personal, is sufficient to bind a stockholder, but not to
create one. If the person of whom the demand is made be not
one, it is not his duty to disclaim the character of stockholuer;
it is enough that he does not respond to such demand. The
simple admission that demand was duly made of the firm, is
not one of a personal d(~mnnd of Barnard, nor is it of anything
more than a fact-its (•ffoct being a question of law. T11ere is
no evidence, nor any admission, in the case, that knowledge
of the demand ever came to Barnard; and certainly none that
be ever, by any word or act, recognized any connection with
the company.
The liability of Barnard is also sought to be established from
the testimony of Johnson. This testimony is objected to, a.a
inadmi~~.;j bl<> under the case as presented, and for general
incompelen(~y.

"Te do not regard the stipulation as the making of a case,
but only as an admission of facts for the purpose of obviating
the necessity of producing witnesses •to prove them. Any
other facts necessary for either party to show oould still be
proven.
The testimony was competent as tending to show the interest of the partnership in the road, but falls far short of being
35
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suﬁicient to establish, or of tending to ﬁx, any liability upon

Barnard.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

The other justices concurred.

' NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 165.

BANNER TOBACCO CO. vs. JENISON.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1882.

sufficient to establish, or of tending to fix, any liability upon
Barnard.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.

48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. Rep. 655.

On June 26, 1875, the defendants, Luman and Lucius Jeni-

NOTB: See Mechem's Elem. of Parto., § 185,

son, were in business as partners in the milling business at

Jenisonville under the name of L. & L. Jenison. One B. F.

Emery, who was in business at Whitehall, owed them about

$1,000. He was also heavily indebted to others and presum-

ably insolvent. Under these circumstances, and of his own

motion, he put on record a chattel mortgage on his stock to

defendants and then telegraphed them to come to Whitehall.

Luman Jenion, who had personal charge of the milling busi-

BANNER TOBACCO CO. vs. JENISON.

ness, went. \Vhile at Whitehall an arrangement was made

between him and Mr. Emery under which the apparent owner-

ship of the stock of goods was placed in the ﬁrm of L. & L.

Supreme Court of Mi.chigan, 1882.
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Jenison, and their name placed upon the store as is usual to

indicate proprietorship. Mr. Emery was then to go on and sell

48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. Rep. 655.

the stock in the usual course of business as their agent, keep-

ing it up by new purchases as should be found needful. Luman

Jenison in his testimony says that no purchases were to be

made on credit, and all authority to use the credit of the ﬁrm

was expressly withheld. Emery denies this, but admits he

was cautioned not to get the store in debt. He bought, how-

ever, from time to time on credit, and among other purchases

made of the plaintiff the purchase of cigars, the bill which is

the subject of this suit. Luman Jenison at the time of the

arrangement opened a bank account for Emery in the name of

L. & L. Jenison with a banker at Whitehall, and Emery pro-

On June 26, 1875, the defendants, J,uman and Lucius Jenisan, were in business as partners in the milling business at
Jenisonville under the name of I"'. & J.,. Jenison. One B. }I,_
Emery, who was in business at Whitehall, owed them about
fl,000. He was also heavily indebted to others and presumably insolvent. Uncler these circumstnnces, and of his own
motion, be put on record a chattel mortgage on bis stock to
·defendants and then telegraphed them to come to \Vbitehall.
Luman Jenison, 1"ho had personal charge of the milling business, went. \Vhile at 'Whitehall an arrangement was made
between him and Mr. Emery under which the apparent ownership of the stock of goods was placed in the firm of L. & L. ·
Jenison, and their name placed upon the store a.s is mmal to
indicate proprietorship. Mr. Emery was then to go on and sell
the stock in the usual course of business as their agent, keeping it up by new purchases as should be found needful. Luman
Jenison in bis testimony says that no purrhases were to be
made on credit, and all authority to use the credit of the firm
was expressly withheld. Emery denies this, but admits he
was cautioned not to get the store in dc•bt. He bought, however, from time to time on credit, and among other purchaRel!I
made of the plaintiff the purchase of cigars, the bill which is
the subject of this suit. Luman Jenison at the time of the
arrangement opened a bank account for Emery in the name of
L. & I.... Jenison with a banker at Whltehall, and Emery pro-
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cured letter and bill heads in the same ﬁrm name which were
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used by him.

The business continued under this arrangementuntil the

fall of 1879; Emery and Luman Jenison evidently understand-

ing that, though Emery was ostensibly agent, he was really as

between the parties themselves only mortgagor, with permis-

sion to sell the mortgaged goods to pay the debt. IIe did not,

however, during all this time reduce the debt, but on the other

hand received ﬂour from defendants for which he paid only a.

part. Meantime he took the beneﬁt of the bankrupt law, and

received his discharge. On September 11, 187 9, Luman/Jenison

went to \Vhitehall and with the concurrence of Emery sold

out the stock to one Banks, realizing therefor less than the

sum due his ﬁrm. Subsequently the account of the plaintiff

was presented to him for settlement, and he refused to recog-

nize any liability upon it. It was then put in suit. Plaintiff

had judgment and defendants appealed.

Taggart, Stone ¢f- Earle, for plaintiﬂ.

J. 0. Fitzgerald, for defendants.

Cooucr, J. (After stating the facts.) If the plaintiff’s case
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is weak in any point it is in the evidence to connect Lucius

Jenison with the arrangement whereby Emeny was made agent

for carrying on the business at Whitehall. The circuit judge

correctly instructed the jury that if the action of Luman Jeni-

son was taken, and the business subsequently carried on in the

cured letter and bill heads in the same firm name which were
used by him.
The business continued under this arrangement ·until the
fall of 1879; Emery and Luman Jenhwn evidently understanding that, though Emery was ostensibly agent, be was really as
between the parties themselves only mortgagor, with permission to sell the mortgaged goods to pay the debt. He did not,
however, during all this time reduce the delJt, but on tlle other
hand received flour from defendants for which he paid only a
part. Meantime he took the benefit of the bankrupt law, and
received his discharge. On September 11, 18W, LumalYJenison
went to 'Vhiteball and with the con.currence of Emery sold
out the stock to one Ba~ks, realizing therefor less than the
sum due his firm. Subsequently the account of the plaintiff
was presented to him for settlement, and he refusetl to reco:~
nize any liability upon it. It was then put in suit. Plaintiff
had judgment and defendants appealed.

name of L. & L. Jenison without the knowledge of Lucius at

the time or his subsequent ratiﬁcation, there could be no recov-

ery in this action; but that if Lucius authorized it, or knew

how the business was being conducted and did not dissent, then

Taggart, Stone & Earle, for plainti1f.
J. 0. F'itzgerald, for defendants.

both were bound to the extent of the agency Luman undertook

to create. He also instructed them that merely leaving Emery

in possession with instructions to sell the goods, would not

give him authority to purchase goods on credit. This instruc-

tion was as favorable as defendants could ask, and we ﬁnd no

requests refused which we think the defendants entitled to.

It is conceded that the authority of Luman J enison as a part-

ner in the mill did not empower him to engage the ﬁrm in

another and independent business without the consent of his

associate. It was a very important fact, however, that the

‘Q

CooJ,EY, J. (After stating the facts.) If the plaintiff's ca~
is weak in any point it is in the evidence to connect Lucius
.Jenison with the arrangement whereby Erne~ was made agent
for carrying on the business at Whitehall. The circuit judge
correctly instructed the jury that if the action of Luman Jf.'nison was taken, and the business subsequently carried on in the
name of L. & L. Jenison without the knowledge of Lucius at
the time or his subsequent ratification, there could be no recovery in this action; but that if J,ucius authorized it, or knew
how the business was being conducted and did not dissent, then
both were bound to the extent of the agenry Luman undertook
to create. He also instructed them that merely leaving Emery
in possession with instructions to sell the goodR, would not
give him authority to purchase goods on credit. This instruction was as favornble as defendants could ask, and we find no
requests refused which we think the defendants entitled to.
It is conceded that the authority of J...uman Jenison as a partner in the mill did not empower him to engage the firm in
another and independent business without the consent of his
aasociate. It was a very important fact, however, that the
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debt for which Luman Jenison assumed to take security in the

peculiar manner above described was a partnership debt. He

undoubtedly had authority to take goods in payment, and to

create an agency for the purpose of’ selling oﬁ the goods so

taken; and if in his opinion keeping up the stock for a time

was the best means of enabling the goods to be sold to advan-

tage, very slight circumstances of knowledge or assent on the

part of his copartner ought to be sufficient to make the ﬁrm

responsible for the acts of the agent in keeping up the stock

in the usual way. Secret instructions to the agent under such

circumstances cannot avail. It would be a reproach to the law

if it could suffer a principal to escape responsibility for those

acts of the agent which, according to the usual course of the

business in which he was engaged, the public had a right to

understand were authorized. There was abundant evidence

in the case to charge Luman Jenison, and we think there was

also enough from which the jury might infer that Lucius J eni-

son could not have been ignorant of the business carried on so

long in the name of his ﬁrm.
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It was urged on the part of the defense that as the defend-

ants had a known place of business which they personally man-

aged, and which was altogether different from that carried on

at Whitehall, the plaintiﬁ‘ was guilty of negligence in making

sale to Emery without ﬁrst communicating with defendants

and learning from them - directly what was the extent of

l<1mery’s agency. \Ve think, on the other hand, that the negli-

gence, if any, was all on the other side. The arrangement

under which L. & L. Jenison became apparent owners, while

as to Emery they were mortgagees only, and under which

Emery for several years was enabled to carry on business

though a bankrupt, was more than questionable in its nature,

and if it landed the parties in trouble it was what they ought

10 have anticipated. The plaintiff sold its goods in the usual

course of trade, and with no reason to doubt that Emery had

the authority he professed to have, and which one of the

defendants at least, according to the evidence which the jury

believed, had done what he could to confer.

(Omitting a question of practice.)

Affirmed.

1\'0'rls:— See M~-clie|n’s lilem. of Partn., 165, l66.

debt for which Luman Jt>nison assumed to tnke security In the
peculiar mnnner above described was a partnership debt. Be
undoubtedly bad authority to take goods in payment, and to
create an agency f.or the purpose of selling off the goods so
taken; and if in bis opinion ke<>ping up the stock f <>r a time
was the bt-st means of enabling the goods to be sold to advantage, very slight circumstances of knowledge or assent on the
part of his copartner ought to be sufficient to make the firm
responsible for the acts of the agent in keeping up the stock
in the usual way. Secret instructions to the agent under such
drcumstances cannot avail. It would be a reproach to the law
\
\if It could suffer a princ_ipal to escape responsibility for those
incts of the agent which, according to the usual course of the
'husiness in which he was engaged, the public had a right to
understand were authorized. There was abundant evidence
in the case to charge Luman Jenison, and we think there was
also enough from which the jury mi1d1t infer that Luciu_s JeniKon could not have been ignorant of the business carried on so
long in the name of his firm.
It was urged on the part of the defense that as the defendants had a known place of business which they personally manuged, and which was altogether different from that carried on
:it Whitehall, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in making
sale to Emery without first communicating with defendants
:md learning from them · directly what was the extent of
Emery's ag<>ncy. 'Ve think, on the other hand, that the neglii,:ence, if any, was all on the other side. The arrangement
under which L. & L. Jenison \)(>came apparent owners, while
as to EmPry they were mortgagees only, and under which
Emery for sevt>ral years was enabled to carry on business
1 hough a bankrupt, was more than quf!stionnble in its nature,
and if it landed the parties in trouble it was what they ought
10 have anticipated. The plaintiff sold its good~ in the usual
course of trade, and with no reason to doubt that Emery had
the authority he professed to have, and which one of the
defendants at least, according to the e\··idence which the jury
believed,• had done what he could to confer.
lOmitting a question of practice.)
Affirmed.
NOTK: - 8l'l' l\l•·c!lt'm':i El•'lll, uf Parln.,
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BOARDMAN vs. ADA MS.

-Supreme Cou-rt of Iowa, 1857.

5 Iowa 224.

The plaintiffs, Boardman & Gray. were manufacturers of

pianos at Albany, N. Y. Adams & Hackley were partners in

DOA RD MAN vs. A DA MS.

the printing business and published the “Tribune” newspa.per

at Dubuque, Iowa. On June 19, 1854, Adams wrote to plain-

tiffs, saying “your offer to us of an agency, we accept,” and-

· Supreme Oou.rt of lotva, 1851.

urging plaintiffs to send sample pianos. Hackley also wrote

the same day, recommending Adams a a competent man, and

G Iowa 224.

saying: “I think you would promote your interest by ship-

ping us, at once, a small but select assortment of your instru-

ments.” Plaintiffs replied on June 23 declining to send any as

samples, but offered to sell them the pianos on certain terms

and said they had forwarded two on those terms. On Septem-

ber 29 Hackley wrote, “\Ve have just effected a sale of your

two pianos at six months. We have a prospect of selling two

or three more, if we had them. A. W’. Hackley.” On the

receipt of this letter plaintiff shipped two more pianos on the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

terms mentioned in their previous letter. Hackley received

these pianos and put them in the hands of a commission mer-

chant for sale. When sold the proceeds were paid to Hackley.

Adams had nothing to do with this last transaction, and, in

fact, the partnership between Adams and Hackley had been

dissolved about August 25. Not receiving pay for any of the

pianos plaintiffs brought this action against Adams & Hackley

to recover the price of the four. Verdict for plaintiffs, and

Adams appeals. .

Smith, McKinla_r/ <5 Poor, for appellant.

No appearance for plaintiffs.

STOCKTON, J. The court charged the jury that the plaintiffs

must recover for pianos sold and delivered, or they could not

recover at all; that if the pianos were sold to Hackley alone,

and not to the ﬁrm, the plaintiffs could not recover in this

action; that there must be satisfactory proof, either that the

1

The plaintiffs, Boardman & Gra~·. were mnnnfacturers of
pianos at Albany, N. Y. Adnms & Hackley were partners in
the printing business and publiijhed the "Tribune" newspapet•
at Dubuque, Iowa. On June 19, 1854, Adams wrote to plaintiffs, saying "~·our offer to us of an agency, we accept," and.
urging plaintiffs to send sample pianos. Hackley also wrote
the same day, recommending Adams as a competent man, and
saying: "I think you would promote your inte1·est by shipping us, at once, a small but select assortment of your instru~nts." Plaintiffs replied on June 23 declining to send any as
samples, but offered to sell them the pianos on certain terms
and said th<~y had forwarded two on those terms. On September 29 Hackley wrote, "\Ve have just effected a sale of your
two pianos at six months. We have a prospect of selling two
or three more, if we had them. A. \V. Hackley." On the
receipt of ~his letter plaintiff shipped two more pianos on the
terms mentioned in their previous letter. Hackley received
these pianos and put them in the hands of a commission merchant for sale. When sold the proceeds were paid to Hackley.
A.dams bad nothin~ to do with this last transaction, and, in
fact, the partnership between Adams and Hackley had been
dissolved about Augnst 25. Not receiving pay for any of the
pianos plaintiffs brought this acti-0n against Adams & Hackley
to recover the price of the four. Verdict for plaintiffs, and
Adams appeals.
Smith, McKinla11 & Poor, for appellant~

No appearance for plaintiffs.
STocKTON, J. The court charged the jury that the plaintiffs
must recover for pianos sold and delivered, or they oould not
recover at all; that if the pianos were sold to Hackley alone,
and not to the firm, the plaintiffs could not recover in this
action; that there must be satisfact.o ry proof, either that the
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buying and selling of the pianos was within the scope of the

partnership business of defendants, or that they jointly

ordered the pianos from plaintiffs, before they can recover;

that plaintiffs having sued for pianos sold and delivered, can-

not recover on proof that the pianos were sent to defendants

to be sold on commission, or on any other proof falling short

of proof of sale and delivery; and that the jury must examine

the testimony with reference to each of the defendants sepa-

rately. It is ﬁrst assigned for error, that the district court

refused to charge the jury that it was necessary for plaintiffs

to show that Adams had knowledge of the whole of the trans-

actions, and consented thereto (or what was equivalent

thereto), before he could be made liable. It is assumed that

the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested was in

effect saying to them that one member of a partnership ﬁrm,

without the consent of the other partner, can bind the ﬁrm in

matters which are without the scope of the partnership busi-

ness.

The law is well settled, as claimed by defendants’ counsel,

that one partner cannot bind the ﬁrm by any contract made
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in the name of the ﬁrm, unless it be in a matter within the

scope of the partnership dealings or falling within the ordinary

business and transactions of the ﬁrm: Western Stage C0. vs.

Walker, 2 Iowa 512, 65 Am. Dec. 789; Story on Partnership,

I§ 322. Looking at all the instructions given in this case, and

at the testimony contained in the record, we cannot say that

the court undertook to lay down a different rule, or that there

‘was error in refusing the instructions asked. The respective

iletters of Adams & Hackley to plaintiffs of June 19, 1854,

lthough signed in their individual names, were evidently writ-

‘ten in the name and upon the business of the ﬁrm. Adams

says: “Your advertisement of pianos is in our paper, and your

offer to us of an agency we accept.” Attached to this is the

letter of Hackley in which he says: “I think you would pro-

mote your own interests by shipping to us a small but select

assortment of your instruments.” The jury were told that

“they must be satisfied that the business of buying and selling

pianos was within the scope of the partnership business, or

that defendants jointly and as copartners specially ordered

the pianos before a joint liability was incurred.” By this

instruction the question of fact was left for the determination

________

buying and selling of the pianos was within the scope of the
partnership business of defendants, or that they jointly
ordered the pianos from plaintiffs, before they can recover;
that plaintiffs having sued for pianos sold and delivered, cannot recover on proof that the pianos were sent to defendants
to be sold on commission, or on any other proof falling short
of proof of sale and delivery; and that the jury must examine
the testimony with rc>ference to each of the defendants separately. It is first assigned for error, that the district court
refused to charge the jury that it was necessary for plaintiffs
to show that Adams bad knowledge of the whole of the trans.actions, and consented thereto (or what was equivalent
thereto), before he could be made liable. It is assumed that
the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested was in
effect saying to them that one member of a partnership firm,
without the consent of the other partner, can bind the firm in
matters which are without the scope of the partnership business.
The law is well settled, as claimed by defendants' counsel,
that one partner cannot bind the firm by any contract made
in the name of the firm, unless it be in a matter within the
Fll'ope of the partnrrship dea!ings or falling within the ordinary
hnsinE'ss and transactions of the firm: Western Stage Co. vs.
Wu.Zker, 2 Iowa 512, 65 Am. Dec. 789; Story on Partnership,
1 § 322.
Looking at all the instructions given in this case, and
at the testimony contained in the record, we cannot say that
the court undertook to lay down a different rule, or that there
. was error in refusing the instructions asked. The respective
I letters of Adams & Hackley to plaintiffs of June 19, 1854,
I
!fh-0ugh signed in their individual names, were evidently writ·
·ten in the name and upon the business of the firm. Adams
says: "Your advertisement of pianos is in our paper, and your
offer to us of an agency we accept." Attached to this is the
letter of Hackley in which be says: "I think you would promote your own interests by shipping to us a small but select
assortment of your instl'llments." The jury were told that
"they must be satisfied that the business of buying and selling
pianos was within the scope of the partnership business, or
that defendants jointly and as copartners specially ordered
the pianos before a joint liability was incurred." By this
instruction the question of fact was left for the determination
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of the jury whether the dealing in pianos had been made a part
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of the business of the ﬁrm. And from the evidence we think

accepting, in the name of the ﬁrm, the agency offered them by

they were authorized to infer that the defendants concurred ij

plaintiffs, and had agreed to add to their regular partnershi

business that of dealing in pianos.

It is to be observed that defendants in their letters to plain-

tiifs make no stipulation as to the terms on which the pianos

are to be sent to them. Nothing is said of their being sent to

be sold on commission. They accept the agency, and advise

plaintiffs to send on their pianos to them. In reply the plain-

tiﬁs inform-them that they do not consign pianos to be sol?

on commission——they decline all such applications. The

have, however, shipped to defendants two pianos on these

terms; that they are to be at the risk of the defendants when

delivered at Albany on the railroad or canal, and all sales are

to be at defendants’ risk; that the pianos are sold to them at

the usual rates; but they agree to wait with defendants for

payment until the pianos are sold by them, charging them

interest on account after four months; and that if the defend-
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ants choose to purchase the pianos “out and out” twenty per

cent. will be deducted from the invoice price at six months’

credit—if for cash a discount of ﬁve per cent. additional will be

made. Upon these terms the ﬁrst two pianos were shipped to

defendants. Upon notice to them of the terms of the plain-

tiffs, if not acceptable to them, they should have notiﬁed plain-

titfs of their dissent and their refusal to receive the pianos.

Instead of this Hackley, one of the defendants, writes to plain-

tiffs from the “Tribune” oﬂice, Septem-ber 29: “We have just

eifected a sale of your two pianos at six months.” Having

made the dealing in pianos a part of their partnership busi-

ness, and notiﬁed plaintiffs thereof, this letter, though written"

and signed by Hackley alone, binds the ﬁrm. There is no

expressed dissent to the terms on which the pianos were sold

to them, and no unwillingness manifested to continue the busi-

ness and agency on the same terms. On the contrary, they

inform the plaintiffs that they “have a prospect of selling two

or three more if they had them.” In accordance with this

suggestion the remainder of the pianos charged are shipped

to defendants.

Where a partnership ﬁrm, embarked in a particular business

to which their engagements are conﬁned, and to which alone

of the jury whether the dealing in pianos had been made a part
of the business of the firm. And from the evidence we th.ink
they were authorized to infer that the defendants concurred i~
accepting, in the name of the firm, the agency offered them by
plaintiffs, and bad agreed to add to their regular partnersbi
business that of dealing in pianos.
It is to be observed that defendants in their letters to plain·
tiffs make no stipulation as to the terms on which the pianos
a re to be sent to them. N otlling is said of their being sent to
be sold on commission. They accept the agency, and advise
J'laintiffs to send on their pianos to them. In reply the plain·
tiffs inform them that they do not consign pianos to be sole\.
on commission-they decline all such applications. Thef
have, however, shipped to defendants two pianos on these
terms; that they are to be at the risk of the defendants when
delivered at Albany on the railroad or canal, and all sales are
to be at defendants' risk; that the pianos a.re sold to them at
the usual rates; but they agree to wait with defendants for
payment until the pianos are sold by them, charging them
interest on account after four months; and that if the defend·
ants choose to purchase the pianos "out and out" twenty per
cent. will be deducted from the invoice price at six months'
credit-if for cash a discount of five per cent. additional will be
made. Upon these terms the first two pianos were shipped to
nefendants. Upon notice to them of the terms of the plaintiffs, if not acceptable to them, they should have notified plaintiffs of their dissent and their refusal to receive the pianos.
Instead of this Hackley, one of the defendants, writes to plaintiffs from the "Tribune" office, September 29: "We have just
effected a sale of your two pianos at six months." Having
made the dealing in pianos a part of their partnership business, and notified plaintiffs tb~reof, this letter, though written·
and signed by Hackley alone, binds the firm. There is no
expressed dissent to the terms on which the pianos were sold
to them, and no unwillingness manifested to continue the business and agency on the same terms. On the contrary, they
inform the plaintiffs that they "have a prospect of selling two
or three more if they had them." In accordance with this
suggestion the remainder of the pianos charged are shipped
to defendants.
Where a partnership firm, embarked in a particular business
to which their engagements are confined, and to which alone
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their partnership contracts extend, by mutual agreement,

enlarge the sphere of their operations, and include another

branch of business, the power of each partner to bind the ﬁrm

by his contracts is co-extensive with the whole business of the

partnership; and the acts of each member are as binding on

the ﬁrm in the new branch of business in which they are

engaged as they are in the former regular and ordinary busi-

ness. If Adams & Hackley agree to add the business of deal-

ing in pianos to their regular business of printing and publish-

ing newspapers, the acts of each member of the ﬁ-rm are bind-

ing on the other in everything connected with the buying and

selling of pianos, and neither can object that the other partner

makes contracts or incurs liabilities in the name of the ﬁrm,

which, by virtue of the relation existing between them, shall

bind them both. It was not necessary, therefore, in our view

of the law and the facts, that the plaintiffs hould prove that

Adams had knowledge of all the transactions which passed

between his copartner and the plaintiifs, and that he consented

thereto. He is presumed to consent to all the acts of his part-

ner within the scope of the business of the ﬁrm.
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The second assignment of error is upon the refusal of the

court to charge the jury “that if the letter of Boardman & Gray

does not accept the offer and terms stated by Adams, it is nec-

essary to bring home to Adams a knowledge of the contents

of the letter of Boardman & Gray.” The refusal to give this

instruction was not erroneous. No offer of terms was made by

Adams in his letter to plaintiffs. He informs them that the

offer to their ﬁrm of an agency for the sale of their pianos is

accepted by defendants, and advises plaintiﬂs that they had

better have one of their pianos in Dubuque. Having accepted

the agency proposed, and agreed to make the dealing in pianos

a part of their business as a. partnership, Adams, as one of the

partners, is equally and jointly with Hackley liable for all

pianos sold and delivered to the partnership ﬁrm. Even if

Adams never aw or knew anything of the letter of plaintiffs,

he is bound by the acts of his copartner.

Judgment affirmed.

No'rE:—See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 167; Latta vs. Kilbourn, ante,

p. 212.
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their partnership contracts extend, by mutual agreement,
enlarge the sphere of their operations, and include another
branch of business, the power of each partner to bind the firm
by hie contracts is co-extensive with the whole busine88 of the
partnership; and the acts of each member are as binding on
the firm in the new branch of business in which they are
engaged as they are in the former regular and ordinary business. If Adams & Hackley agree to add the business of dealing in pianos to their regular business of printing and publishing newspapers, the acts of each member of the fl.I'm are binding on the other in everything connected with the buying and
selling of pianos, and neither can object that the other partner
makes contracts or incurs liabilities in the name of the firm,
which, by virtue of the relation existing between them, shall
bind them both. It was not necessary, therefore, in our view
of the law and the facts, that the plaintiffs should prove that
Adame had knowledge of all the transactions which passed
. between his copartner and the plaintiffs, and that he consented
thereto. He is presumed to consent to all the acts of his partner within the scope of the business of the firm.
The second assignment of error is upon the refusal of the
court to charge the jury "that if the letter of Boardman & Gray
does not accept the offer and terms stated by Adams, it is necessary to bring home to Adams a knowledge of the contents
of the Jetter of Boardman & Gray." The refusal to give this
instruction was not erroneous. No offer of terms was made by
Adams in his Jetter to plaintiffs. He informs them that the
offer to their firm of an agency for the sale of their pianos is
accepted by defendants, and advises plaintiffs that they had
better have one of their pianos in Dubuque. Having accepted
the agency proposed, and agreed to make the dealing in pianos
a part of their business as a partnership, Adams, as one of the
partners, is equally and jointly with Hackley liable for all
pianos sold and delivered to the partnership firm. Even if
Adams never saw or knew anything of the letter of plaintiffs,
he is bound by the nets of his copartner.
Judgment affirmed.
NoTE:-See Mt-cheo1'1:1 Elem. of Parto., § 167; Latta va. Kilbourn, ante,
p. 212.
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PORTER vs. CURRY.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1869.

' 50 Ill. 319, 99 Am. Dec. 520.

Assumpsit by Porter against Curry and Majors, as partners,

for the balance of'the price of a mare, claimed to have been

sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. Curry alone was

served. The defendant had a verdict and judgment, and the

PORTER vs. CURRY.

plaintiff appealed.

Skinner and Marsh, for the appellant.

Supreme Coorl of Illinois, 1869.

Warren and Wheat, for the appellee.

Lavvmsxcn, J. Curry and Majors were partners in the man-

60 Ill. 819, 99 Am. Dec. 520.

ufacture of wagons, and in August, 1807, sold a wagon to Por-

ter, the appellant, for $110, for which he gave his note. Soon

afterwards Porter, by an arrangenient with Majors, sold the

latter a mare for $200, and received therefor his own note and

one executed by Majors for~$90. Porter swears, however, that

Majors claimed to be purchasing the horse for the use of the

ﬁrm, and on the credit of the ﬁrm, and that he "himself sup-

Aseumpsit by Porter against Corry and Majors, as partners,
for the balance of ·the price of a mare, claimed to have been
sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. Curry alone was
served. The defendant bad a verdict and judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed.

posed that he was taking the ﬁrm note, instead of the indi-
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vidual note of Majors, and not being able to read did not dis-

cover his error until Majors absconded and he showed his note

to a neighbor. Majors absconded to Missouri a few days after

8kinner and Marsh, for the appellant.
Warren and Wheat, for the appeJJee.

the purchase, taking with him the mare. Curry pursued

Majors, obtained possession of the mare, and sold her. Porter

brought this suit against the ﬁrm to recover the $90, and it

is resisted on the ground that the mare was not required in the

business, and therefore Majors had no power to buy her on the

ﬁrm credit.

It is clear, however, even if the purchase of a horse was not

within the scope and usage of such a partnership as existed

between Curry and Majors, yet if the mare was in fact pur-

chased on the ﬁrm credit, and if Curry afterwards claimed her

from Majors as ﬁrm property, and obtained possession of her

on that ground, he thereby ratiﬁed the act of Majors in buying

her on the partnership credit. He cannot be permitted at the

36

LAwnExcE, J. Curry and Majors were partners In the manufacture of wagons, and in August, 1867, sold a wagon to Porter, the appellant, for fllO, for which be gave his note. Soon
afterwards Porter, by an arrangement ·with Majors, sold the
latter a mare for '200, and received therefor his own n<>te and
one executed by Majors for f90. Porter swears, however, that
Majors clain:ied t-0 be purchasing the horse for the use of the
ilrm, and on the credit of the firm, and that he ·himself supposed that he was taking the firm note, instead of the indi·
vidual note of Majors, and not being able to read did not discover his error until Majors absconded and he showed his note
to a neighbor. Majors absconded to Missouri a few days after
the purchase, taking ~ith him the mare. Curry pursued
Majors, obtained possession of the mare, and sold her. Porter
brought this suit against the firm to recover the f90, and it
is resisted on the ground that the mare was not required in the
business, and therefore Majors had no power to buy her on the
ilrm credit.
It is clear, however, even if the purchase of a horse was not
within the scope and usage of such a partnership as existed
between Curry and Majors, yet if the mare was in fact purchased on the firm credit, and if Curry afterwards claimed her
from Majors as firm property, and obtained possession of her
on that ground, he thereby ratified the act of Majors in buying
her on the partnership credit. Be cannot be permitted at the
36
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same moment to claim the beneﬁt of the purchase and deny

its obligations. This view of the law was embodied in the

sixth and seventh instructions asked by plaintiﬁ, and they

should have been given. For the same reason, the ﬁrst instruc-

tion given for the defendant should have been refused. It puts

the case to the jury wholly on the question of an original power

by Majors to buy on the ﬁrm credit, and makes the case turn

entirely upon that, leaving the question of ratiﬁcation alto

gether out of view.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Nona:-See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 176, 190.

PEASE vs. COLE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1885.

53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. Rep. 681, 55 Am. Rep. 53.

same moment to claim the benefit of the purchase and deny
its obligations. This view of the law was embodied in the
sixth and seventh instructions asked by plaintiff, and they
should have been given. For the same reason, the first instruction gh·en for the defendant should have been refused. It puts
the case to the jury wholly on the question of an original power
by Majors to buy on the firm credit, and makes the case tun
entirely upon that, leaving the question of ratification altogether out of view.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

Action by Ernest M. Pease against Charles H. Cole and

Daniel McC‘-arthy on a no_te executed by McCarthy in the ﬁrm

Nom:-See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 176, 100.

name of defendants to J. B. McCarthy, father of Daniel

M cGarth y, and by him indorsed to plaintiff.
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Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Cole appeals.

G. G. Sill and H. S. Sanford, for appellant.

L. E. Stanton and S. F. Jones, for appellee.

Looms, J. The question involved in this case is whether

one member of a copartnership formed for the purpose of con-

ducting a theater in Hartford could, under the circumstances

PEASE vs. COLE.

mentioned in the ﬁnding, bind the other member by executing

a negotiable promissory note in the name of‘ the ﬁrm for

Supreme Court of Connccttcut, 1885.

money borrowed. The ﬁnding, in terms, excludes all express

authority of the other partner, and even all knowledge of

GS Conn. 63, 22 Atl. Rep. 681, M Am. Rep. 68.

the matter on his partQSo that any conclusion that the note

is the note of the ﬁrm, rather than of the member executing it,

must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here,

again, the facts found so circumscribe the range of inquiry as

-¥

Action by Ernest M. Pease against Charles H. Cole and
Daniel 'M:cCaMhy on a note executed by McCarthy in the firm
name of defendants to .J. B. McCarthy, father of Daniel
McCarthy, and by him indorsed to plaintiff.
.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Cole appeals.
G. G. Sill and H. 8 .•~anford, for appellant.
L. E. Stanton and 8. F. Jones, for appellee.

Looius, J. The qnestion involved in this case is whether
one member of n copartnership formed for the purpose of con·
ducting a theater in Hartford could, under the circumstances
mentioned in the finding, bind the other member by executing
a negotiable promissory note in the name of· the firm for
money borrowed. The finding, in terms, excludes all express
authority of the other partner, and even all knowledge of
the matter on his part._So that any conclusion that the note
is the note of the firm, rather than of the member executing It,
must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here,
ngain, the facts found so circumscribe the range of inquiry·aa

"-·
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to exclude all the ordinary sources of uch authority. The cir-
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cumstances from which an authority may be implied are

identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency,

for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest.

In many cases the decisive fact is found in the customary

course of dealing; but not so here, for it is found that the note

in question was the only note ever given in the name of the

ﬁrm. The copartnership ﬁrst commenced business in August,

1883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in suit was

given. There was therefore very little time for a course of con-

duct or usage of any sort to grow up, giving any apparent

authority. The ﬁnding traces the money bcgﬂowed only into

the hands of McCarthy, the partner who signed the ﬁrm name,

and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively, that

the act was necessary for any of the purposes of the partner-

ship. The only remaining source from which an authority may

be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and

scope of the partnership and in the nature of the act; and here,

if we examine the legal principles that are applicable, it will

be found, not only that all such implication is wanting, but
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that the presumption is directly against the authority assumed.

The weight of authority in the United States, and the uniform

tenor of the authorities in England, will be found to estab-

lish a controlling distinction in respect to implied authority

between commercial or trading and non-trading p~llpS.

Story, Partn.‘ (6th Ed.) § 102a; 1 Lindl. Partn. (4th Ed., by

Ewell), top p. 266, and note 1, and cases there cited; 1 Colly.

Partn. 648, 658; Metc. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes.

In a commercial partnership each acting partner is its gen-

eral agent, with implied authority to act for the ﬁrm in all mat-

ters within the scope of its busines; and the presumption of

law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of

the ﬁrm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the

partnership, for the reason that the giving of such notes would

be Within the usual course of mercantile transactions. But

when we pass to non-trading partnerships the doctrine of gen-

eral agency does not apply, and there is no presumption of

authority to support the act of one partner. Hence, in order

to subject the ﬁrm upon a bill or note executed by one partner

in its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or other facts suiti-

cient to warrant the conclusion that the acting partner had

to exclude all the ordinary sources of such authority. The circumstances from which an authority may be implied are
identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency,
for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest.
Jn many cases the decisive fact is found in the customary
course of dealing; but not so here, for it is found that the note
in q nestion was the onJy note ever given in the name of the
firm. The copartnershjp first commenced business in August,
l.883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in snit was
given. There was therefore very little time for a course of conduct or usage of any sort to grow up, givinO' any apparent
authority. The finding traces the money i;fowed only into
the hands of McCai1hy, the partner who signed the firm name,
and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively, that
1he act was necessary for any of the purp<>ses of the partnersMp. The only remaining source from which an authority may
be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and
scope of the partnership and in the nature of the act; and here,
if we examine the legal principles that are applicabJe, it will
be found, not onJy that all such implication is wanting, but
that the presumption is directly against the authority assumed.
The weight of authority in the United States, and the uniform
tene>r of the authorities in England, will be found to establish a controJJing distinction in i;espect to impJied authority
between commercial or trailing and non-trading partnerships.
Story, Partn. (6th Ed.) § 102a; 1 Lindi. P.artn. (4th Ed., by
Ewell), top p. 266, and note 1, and cases there cited; 1 Colly.
Partn. 648, 658; Mete. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes.
In a commercial partnership each acting partner is its general agent, with implied authority to act for the firm in all matters within the scope of its bnsinees; and the presumption of
law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of
the firm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the
partnership, for the rease>n that the giving of such notes would
be within the usual course of mercau tile transactions. But
when we pass to .non-trading partnerships the doctrine of gen.
eral agency docs not apply, and there is no presumption of
authority to support tlie act of one partner. Hence, in order
to subject the firm upon a bill or note executed by one partner
tn its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or other facts suffi·
dent to warrant the conclusion that the acting partner had
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been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority,

must appear, or that the ﬁrm has ratiﬁed the act by receiving

the beneﬁt of it. That the partnership in question belongs to

the non-trading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion.

The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and

been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority,
must appear, or that the firm bas ratified the act by receiving
the benefit of it. That the partnership to question belongs to

gives a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases

establish as of the non-trading class, and, although the conduct

of a theater is not there mentioned, yet the analogies m-ani-

festly include it. To show the existence of the distinction

contended for, and its application, we elect from a. multitude

of authorities the following in addition to those previously

referred to:

ln Judge rs. Bmswell, 13 Bush, 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185, the

defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in

mining business upon lands then leased or which might be

thereafter acquired. One of the members of the ﬁrm pur-

chased, without the others’ consent, and took conveyancesvof,

mining land in the name of the ﬁrm, and gave the bills of the

ﬁrm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against

the ﬁrm, a defense was made by the other partners that the
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purchase was without their consent or ratiﬁcation, and in the

plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The

court held that the ﬁrm was not liable on the bills, saying that

the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on

the usage of merchants, and _does not amount to a rule of law

in any other than commercial partnerships. In non-commercial

partnerships, one who seeks to hold the ﬁrm bound upon a con-

tract made by a single member must be able to show, either

express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the

particular branch of business in which the ﬁrm is engaged, or

such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partner had

been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority.

In Hetllcy rs. Bra-inbridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the defendants were

attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave a note

in the name of the firm to the plaintiffs for the balance of

advancements made to one partner who was acting in behalf

of the ﬁrm. The advances were to be laid out on mortgage by

the ﬁrm. Lord Dhxnnx, O. J., in giving the opinion, said:

“No doubt a debt was due from the ﬁrm; but it does not follow

that one partner had authority to give a promissory note for

that debt. Partners in trade have authority, as regards

i ‘* mm

the non-trading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion.
The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and
gives a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases
establish as of the non-trading class, and, although the conduct
of a theater is not there mentioned, yet the anal<>gies manifestly include it. To show the existence of the distinction
contended for, and its application, we select from a multitude
of authorities the following in addition to those previously
referred to:
Ju Jud96 vs. Bms1ceil, 13 Hush, 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185~ the
defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in
mining business upon lands then leased or which might be
thereafter acquired. One of the members of the firm purchased, without the others' consent, and took conveyances. of.
mining land in the name of the firm, and gave the bills of the
8rm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against
the firm, a defense was made by the other partners that the
purchase was without their consent or ratification, and in the
plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The
court held that the firm was not liable on the bills, saying that
the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on
the usage of merchants, and .does not amount to a rule of law
in any other than commercial partnerships. In non-commercial
partnerships, one who seeks to hold ~he firm bound upon a contract made by a single member must be able to show, either
express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the
particular branch of business in which the firm is engaged, or
such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partner had
been invested by his copnrtners with the requisite authority.
In Hedley i:s. Brainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the defendants were
attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave a note
in the name of the firm to the plaintiffs for the balance of
advancements made to one partner who was acting in behalf
of the firm. The advances were to be laid out on mortgage by
the firm. Lord DkNMAN, C. J., in giving the opinion, said:
''No doubt a debt was doe from the ft rm; but it does not follow
that one partner had authority to give a promissory note for
that debt. Partners in trnde have authority, as regardR

Psasn vs. (ions. 285

third person, to bind the ﬁrm by bills' of exchange, for it is

PEASB VS. UOLB.

the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this

authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is

part of the general law of the land, But the same reason does

not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage

that attorneys should be parties to negotiable instruments, nor

i it necessary. for the purposes of their business. ' ' ‘

Upon the whole, we think that the implied authority is

conﬁned to partners in trade.”

In Dickinson 1:8. Valpy. 10 Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an

indorsee for value of a bill of exchange drawn and accepted in

the name of a mining partnership by order of its regular direct-

ors. It was held incumbent on the plaintiﬂs to prove that the

directors had authority to bind the company, and that it was

necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the

company, or usual for other similar mining companies, to draw

or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were given by Lord

TE.\"l‘ERD1-IN, C. J., and Judges BAYLEY, Lrr'r1.r:oA1.r>, and

PARKE, and the same distinction was made as in the other cases

between trading and non-trading partnerships. See, also,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Grernsladc rs. Dower, 7 Barn. & (3. 635.

In Levy vs. P_1/ne, tried before Baron Annnnsox, 1 Oar. & M.

453. it was held that, "if a bill of exchange or promissory note

be drawn, accepted, or indorsed by one of two persons who are

partners in a business which is not a trade (e. g., as attorneys),

in the name of the ﬁrm. “ ‘ ‘f the plaintiﬂ’ must give

evidence of the authority of the other partner to draw, accept,

or indorse in the name of the ﬁrm; but in the case of a com-

mercial ﬁrm, this is not necessary, as there is a general

;:' "-iority.” See, also, Richards vs. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223;

Garland vs. Ja-comb, L. R. 8 Exch. 218.

ln S1m'th-11s. Sloan. 37 \Vis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757, the court, by

LYON, J., a£ter_a_n_3_b_|_o aml exl1€!_u.S1;i1e review of the a.u.t.hnn'n

ties, adopted the following proposition as fully sustained:

“\Ve gather from all the authorities that the distinction

between a trading and a non-trading partnership, in respect to

the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiable

instruments, is not limited to a mere presumption of such

authority in one case, and the absence of such presumption in

the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but

we think, and must so hold. that one partner in a non-trading

third persons, to bind the firm by bills· of exchange, for it is
the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this
authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is
part of the general law of the land.. B.ut the same reason does
not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage
that attorneys should he parties to negotiable instruments, nor
is it nece>ssary. for the purposes of their business. • • •
Upon the whole, we think that the implied authority is
confined to partners in trade."
In Dickinson vs. Talpy. lO Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an
indorsee for value of a bill of e>xchange drawn and accepted in
the name of a mining partnership hy order of its regular directors. It was held incu1!1b(•nt on the plaintiffs to prove that the
dirc>etors had authority to bind tlle company, and that it was
necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the
company, or nsua 1 for other similar mining companies, to draw
or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were givC'n by Lord
TEXTERDE:I!, C .•J., and .Judges BAYLEY, LITTLEDAI.R, and
PAHKE, and the same distinction was made as in the other cases
between trading and non-trading partnerships. See, also,
Grr,-nsladc 1~.~. T>ou:er, 7 Barn. & C. 6::l5.
In Lcv11 1:s. Pyne, tried he>fore Baron A1.DERSON, 1 Car. & M.
45!l. it was lu•ld that, "if a hil1 of Pxchan~e or promissory note
be cfrawn, ac''"JltPd, or indorspd h,Y one of two persons who are
partners in a business which is not a trade (e.g., as attorneys),
in 1he name of the firm. • • • the plaintiff must give
evidence of the author-ity of thr other partnC'r to draw, accept,
or indorse in the name of the firm; but in the case of a comme1·cial firm, this is not necessary, ns there is a general
:: · · :1ority." See, also, Rickards t:s. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223;
<iarland t:s. Jo.comb, I,. R. R Exch. 218.
Ju Smith ·1111. Slonn. ::l1 'Vis. 2f.:::J, HI Am. Rep. 757, the court, by
LYON, ,J., nftn on able and exhaustive review of the autborj.
tics, adopted the followin~ proposition ns fully sustained:
"'Ye gather from all the authorities that the distinction
bdween a trading and a non-trading partnership, in respect to
the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiahl~
instruments, is not limited to a mei:e presumption of such
authority in one case, and the absence of such presumption in
·the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but
we think, and mm~t i;10 hol<l. tli:1t one partner in a non-trading
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partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn,

accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the ﬁrm, not even

for a debt which the ﬁrm owes, unless he have express

authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of

such instrument is necessary to the carrying on of the ﬁrm’s

business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is

upon the holder of the note. who sues upon it, to prove such

authority, necessity, or usage.”1>

In Ulcry vs. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 53 , the partnership was for farm-

ing purposes, and the note in suit was given by one in the name

of the ﬁrm for money borrowed. It was held to be a non-trading

ﬁrm; and the same principles were adopted as in the cases

previously cited. In Hunt vs. C'hrl:pin, 6 Lans. 139, it was held,

MILLER, P. J., giving the opinion,that the rule which authorizes

one member of a copartnership to bind the ﬁrm is only appli-

cable to business of a trading nature, and has no application

to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a simi-

lar character. See, also, K imbro vs. Baillitt, 22 How. 256;

Graces vs. Kellcnbcrger, 51 Ind. 66; Bank vs. Snyder, 10 Mo.

App. 211.
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In Chalmers’ Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Prom-

issory Notes, and Cheques (2d Ed. pp. 68, 69), the following

propositions are laid down as well-settled rules: “Art. 77. A

partner in a trading ﬁrm has prima facie authority to bind the

ﬁrm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the ﬁrm name

for partnership purposes; and, if the bill get into the hands of

a holder for value without notice, the presumption of authority

becomes absolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given

for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a non-

trading partnership has pr-ima facie no authority to render his

copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name.

The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible.”

Many more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but

these will suﬂice to show that the distinction relied upon is

strongly supported both in England and in the United States.

While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the

two classes of partnership so far as the presumption of author-

ity or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessary

for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry

its application so far as to deny absolutely, as some of the

cases do, the right to recover on a note given by a non-trading

partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn,
accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the firm, not even
for a debt which the firm owes, unless he have express
authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of
such instrument is necessary to the carrying on of the firm's
business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is
upon the bolder of the note, who sues upon it, to prove such
authority, necessity, or usage." \
In Ulery vs. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531(tbe partnership was for farming purposes, and the note in suit was given by one in the name
of tlw firm for money borrowed. It was held to be a non-tradin:.;ft11n; and the same principles were adopted as in the cases
previously cited. In R uut v.'l. Clur=pin, 6 I.ans. 139, it was held,
MILLER, P. J., giving the opinion, that the rule which authorizes
one member of a copartnership to bind the firm is only applicable to business of a trading nature, and has no application
to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a ~mi
lar character. See, also, Kimbro vs. Ba.llitt, 22 How. 25G;
Graus t:s. KellC11berger, 51 Ind. 66; Bank vs. Snydc1·, 10 Mo.
App. 211.
In Chalmers' DigC'st of the Law of Bills of Exchange. Promit:~ory Not('s, and Cheques (2d Ed. pp. 68, 69), the following
propositions are laid down as well-settled rules: "Art. 77. A
partner in a trading firm has prim.a facic authority to bind th~
firm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the firm name
for partnership purposes; and, if the bill get into the hands of
a holder for value without notice, the presumption of authority
becomes absolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given
for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a nontrading partnership bas prima facie no authority to render his
copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name.
.The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible."
Many more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but
these will suffice to show that the distinction relied upon is
strongly supported both in England and in the United States.
While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the
two classes of partnership so far as the presumption of authority or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessary
for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry
its application so far as to deny absolutely, as some of tlie
cases do, the right to recover on a note gh•en by a non-trading
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use, or on a note given in payment of its debts. Some author-

ities ignore the test of liability referred to, but adopt another,

which is equivalent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter

on partnerships in the third volume of his Commentaries (7th

Ed. p. 44), omits the use of the terms “trading” and “non-trad

ing,” and makes the distinction between partnerships, in

respect to the power of one partner to bind the ﬁrm, depend on

the single test of the usual scope of the business, in connection

with the subject-matter of the contract. This rule was adopted

in Crosthwait rs. Ross, 1 Humph. 23, 3-1 Am. Dec. 613, where il-

was held that one pa.rtner in the practice of medicine could

not bind the ﬁrm by drawing a bill or note on which to raise

money, because it was not within the scope of the partnership

business. Though under a different name, the real distinction

here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an

occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Poolcy

vs. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629, 27 Am. Rep. 783, in a most able and

elaborate opinion, held that the liability of a pa.rtnership ﬁrm

of the non-trading class to a bona ﬁde holder of negotiable
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paper without notice, upon a note endorsed in its name by a

member for his own beneﬁt, would depend upon the nature of

the business, the usage of trade, and the course of dealing of

the particular ﬁrm. It was also held that, where the nature

of the partnership is such that it may or may not be proper

to deal in negotiable instruments (as in that case, which was

a publishing company), it was error in the circuit judge to

charge, without qualiﬁcation, that the ﬁrm was liable if the

holder received the note before maturity, in the due course of

trade, and without notice. VVe think the same principle, under

the circumstances of the case at bar, made it error in the

court below to hold the ﬁrm liable. This court hitherto has

had no occasion to give prominence to the distinction under

discussion. The nature of the partnership business has, how-

ever, been made a ground forapresumption and a test of liabil-

ity. In Walcott rs. Canﬁcld, 3 Conn. 1.94, the defendants were

partners in running a line of stages from Hartford to Albany

and back. One of the partners by an advertisement promised

to transport passengers and leave them at Albany in a speci-

ﬁed time, upon which agreement the suit was based. The

advertisement, being the act of one partner, was held not even
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-flrm for money borrowed for the firm and npproprlated to its
nee, or on n note given in payment of its debts. Some author~
ities ignore the test of liability referred to, but adopt another,
which is equivnlent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter
on partnerships in the third volume of his Commentaries (7th
Eel. p. 44), <>mits the use of the terms "trading" and "non-trading," and makes the distinction between partnerships, in
respect to the power of one partner to bind the firm, depend on
the single test of the usual scope of the business, in connection
with the subject-matter of the contract. '!'his ru]e was adopted
in Crosthu;ait t'B. Ross, 1 Humph. 23, 34 Am. Dec. 613, where i ..
was held that one partner in the practice of medicine oould
not bind the firm by drawing a bill or note on which to raise
money, because it was not .within the scope of the partnership
business. Though under a different name, the real distinction
here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an
occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Pooley
vs. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629, 27 Am. Rep. 783, in a moist able and
elaborate opinion, held that the liability of a partnership firm
of the non-trading class to a bona fid.e holdPr of negotiable
paper without notice, upon a note endorsed in its name by a
member for his own benefit, would depend upon the nature of
the business, the usage of trade, and the course of dealing of
the particular firm. It was also held that, where the nature
of the partnership is such that it may or may not be proper
to deal hi negatiable instruments (as in that case, which was
a publishing company), it was error in the circuit judge to
charge, without qualification, that the firm was liable if the
holder received the note before maturity, in the due course of
trade, and without notice. We think the same principle, under
tbe circumstances of the case at bar, made it error in the
court below to bold the firm liable. This court hitherto h~s
had no occasion to give prominence to the distinction under
discussion. The nature of the partnership business has, however, been made a ground fora presumption and a test of liability. In Walcott -rs. Canfield, 3 C-Onn. 194, the defendants were
partners in running a line of stages from Hartford to Albany
and back. One of the partners by an advertisement promised
to transport passengers and leave them at Albany in a specified time, upon which agreement the suit was based. The
adverlisement, being the act of one partner, was held not even
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admissible in evidence against the ﬁrm, without previously

establishing the authority of that one to bind the others.

Hosmnn, C. J., in delivering the opinion, on page 198, said:

“A copartnership formed to transport passengers and their

baggage in a stage does not authorize one of the part-

ners to bind the ﬁrm by an agreement that he will convey a

person a certain distance within a speciﬁed time. Unless he

had special authority, he could only obligate himself by a

contract not within the scope of the connection, and not his

partners, who have never expressly or impliedly assented."

The subject-matter of the contract was different from the case

at bar, but it seems even more closely connected with the scope

of the business than the giving of the note in suit.

Many authorities lay down the unqualiﬁed proposition, as if

it was applicable to all partnerships, that if one partner raises

money on a negotiable bill or note signed or indorsed in the

name of the ﬁrm, and which comes into the hands of a bona ﬁde

purchaser, the partnership is bound, although it was in fact

for the individual use of the acting partner. The doctrine is

so stated in substance by this court in Insurance O0. vs. Bennett,
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5 Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109. The case shows that the part-

nership was a commercial one. VVe do not say, however, that

public convenience does not demand the same rule in the case

of non-commercial partnerships, where the holder was not

advised of the nature of the partnership and its course of deal-

ing, or of other circumstances to put him on inquiry, and where

the circumstances would justify the belief that he was dealing

with the partnership. \-Ve may well leave this for future con-

sideration, for, upon the facts found, we think the plaintiffs

right was impaired by reason of what he knew in connection

with the circumstances. We do not forget that the court

below, in terms, found that the plaintiff purchased the note

in good faith without notice of any defect. This, of course,

means simply that there was no actual bad faith and no actual

notice, and, as matter of fact, it is ﬁnal; but at the same time

the court found special facts as to the plaintiff’s knowledge

and action which we must also consider, and, if we ﬁnd con~

structive notice or constructive fraud, the law must prevail,

The plaintiff, as holder, must stand affected by the nature

of the partnership, of which he was fully advised. He pm--

chased the note in the face of the presumption that it wag

admissible in evidence against the firm, without previously
establishing the authority of that one to bind the others.
HosMER, C. J., in delivering the opinion, on page 198, said:
"A copartnership formed to transport passengers and their
baggage in a stage does not authorize one of the partners to bind the firm by an agreement that he will convey a
person a certain distance within a specified time. Unless he
had special authority, he could only obligate himself by a
contract not within the scope of the connection, and not his
partners, who have never exprc>ssly or impliedly assented."
The subject-matter of the contract was ditl'erc>nt from the case
at bar, but it seems even more closely connected with the scope
of the business than the giving of the note in suit.
Many autboritil>s lay down the unqualified proposition, as if
it was applicable to all partnel"Ships, that if one partner raises
money on a negotiable bill or note signed or indorsed in the
name of the firm, and which comes into the lumds of a bona fide
purchaser, the partners_hip is bound, although it was in fact
for the individual use of the acting partner. The doctrine is
so stated in substa.nce by this court in lnsum11ce Oo. vs. Bennett,
o Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109. The case shows that the partnership was a commercial one. We do not say, however, that
public convenience does not demand the same rule in the case
of non-commercial partnerships, where the holder was not
advised of the nature of the partnership and its course of dealing, or of other circumstances to put him on inquiry, and where
the circumstances would justify the belief _that he was dealing
with the partnership. \Ve may well leave this for future consideration, for, upon the facts found, we think the plaintiff's
right was impnil'ed by reason of what he knew in connection
with the circumstances. We do not forget that the court
below, in terms, found that the plaintiff purchased the note
in good faith without notice of any defect. This, of course,
mP.ans simply that there was no actual bad faith and no actual
notice, and, as matter of fact, it is final; but at the same time
the court found special f3;cts as to the plaintiff's knowledge
and action which we must also consider, and, if we find constructive notice or constructive fraud, the law must prevail.
The plaintiff, as holder, must stand affected by the nature
of the pa1-tnership, of which he was fully advised. He pur':hased the note in the face of the presumption that it was
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unauthorized. To show the general nature of the facts which

courts have held to be constructive notice, we cite a few

cases. In I/icing/ston vs. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 278, 4 Am. Dec.

273, A and B formed a copartnership under the style of A &

Co., in the business of sugar reﬁning, and so advertised in

the newspapers. B afterwards, without the knowledge of A,

bought a quantity of brandy, for which he gave a note indorsed

by him with the name of the ﬁrm. The plaintiﬂ’, who was an

indorsee of the note, took the newspaper in which the ﬁrm’s

business was advertised. l{ENT, C. J., after commenting on

certain facts tending to show that the plaintitf knew that the

purchase of the brandy was not a partnership concern, pro-

ceeded to lay down these principles: “But if the plaintiff did

not in fact knowf that the purchase was made by G. I. Roose

velt on his own account, and acted under the mistaken impres-

sion that it was a partnership purchase, still the ﬁrm were not

"bound by the indorsement, because the facts disclosed

amounted to constructive notice or notice in law. ‘ " ‘

\Vhen a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not

within the scope of the partnership, the intendment of the
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law will be that he deals with him on his private account, not-

withstanding the partner may give the, partnership name,

unless there be circumstances to destroy that presumption. ‘If,’

says Lord ELDON (Em parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves. 544), ‘under the

circumstances the person taking the paper can be considered

as being advertised that it was not intended to be a partner-

ship proceeding, the partnership is not bound.’ Public notice

of the object of a copartnership, the declared and habitual busi-

ness carried on, the store, the counting-house, the sign, etc.,

are the usual and regular indicia by which the nature and

extent of a partnership are to be ascertained. \Vhen the busi-

ness of a partnership is thus deﬁned and publicly declared,

and the cmnpany do not depart from that particular business,

nor appear to the world in any other light than the one

thus exhibited, one of the partners cannot make a valid

partnership engagement on any other than a. partnership

account. “ ' ' When the 'public have the usual

means of knowledge given them, and no nieans have been

suﬁered by the partnership to mislead them, every man

is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with

whose members he deals.” In 1 Collyer on Partnership (page

37

unauthorized. To show the general nature of the facts which
courts have held to be constructive notice, we cite a few
cases. In Livingston vs. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 278, 4 Am. Dec.
273, A and B formed a copartnership under the style of A &
Co., in the business of suga·r refining, and so advertised in
the newspapers. B afterwards, without the knowledge of A,
bought a quantity of brandy, for which he gave a note ind<>rsed
by him with the name of the firm. The plaintiff, who was an
indorsee of the note, took the newspaper in which the firm's
business was advertised. KENT, C. J., after commenting on
c~rtain facts tending to show that the plaintiff knew that the
purchase of the brandy was not a partnership concern, proceeded to lay down these principles: "But if the plaintiff did
not in fact know; that the purchase was made by C. I. Roosevelt on his own account, and acted under the mistaken impression that it was a partnership purchase, still the firm were not
bound by the indorsement, because the facts disclosed
· nmounted to constructive notice or no0tice in law. • • •
'Vhen a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not
within the scope of the partnership, the intendment of the
law will be that he deals wtth him on bis private account, nat:·
withstanding thE> partner may give the. partnership name,
unless there Le circumstances to destroy that presumption. 'If,'
says Lord ELDON (E.r parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves. 544), 'under the
circumstances the person taking the paper can be considered
as being advertisPd that it was not intended to be a partner·
ship proceeding, the partnE>rship is not bound.' Public notice
of the object of a copartnership, the declared and habitual business carried on, the store, the counting-house, the sign, etc.,
nre the usual and regular indicia by which the nature an4,
extent of a partnership nre to be ascertained. 'Vhen the business of a partnership is thus defined and publicly declared,
and the company do not depart from that particular busine88,
nor appear to the world in any other light than the one
thus exhibited, one of the partnns cannot make a valid
partnership engagement on any other than a partnership
account. • • •
'Vhen the ·public have the usual
means of knowleffge given them, and no means have been
suffered by the partnership to mislead them, every man
is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with
whose members he dc>als." In 1 Collyer on Partnership (page
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650) it is said that “a note ‘given by one partner in the partner-

ship name, within the scope of the partnership, is binding upon

the ﬁrm, but the payee is bound to know whether it is within

the scope of his apparent authority, and, if it is in excess

thereof, the ﬁrm is not responsible.” In Cocke vs. Bank, 3 Ala.

175, the note in suit was signed in the partnership name of J.

F. & W. Cocke, who were partners in keeping a tavern. It was

executed by J. F. Cocke, and payable to Lea & Langdon for

their accommodation, without the knowledge of the other part-

ner. §Voodson Cooke. No actual knowledge of the circum-

stances was shown on the part of the bank, which sued as

indorsee; but it was assumed to have been the duty of the bank

to make inquiry. GOLDTI-IWAITE-, J., in delivering the opinion,

said (page 180): “The law presumes that the bank, if it

inquired a.t all into the partnership of the defendants, must

have received information that they were not partners in a.

mercantile trade, but only in the business of tavern-keeping.

This ascertained, it took the note at its peril, and must have

relied on the faith of the indorsers.” It was held that Wood-
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son Cocke, the partner who had no knowledge of the transac-

tion, was not liable.

In the case at bar the plaintiff had full and actual knowledge

of the nature of the partnership, and the law attributed to him

knowledge, also, that one partner could not bind the other by

bill or note with-out authority, and knowing, as he did, that the

note had been written and signed by McCarthy, who was irre-

sponsible, and that, if he purchased it, it would be upon the

credit of Cole alone, and having also actual knowledge of a

course of dealing which avoided McCarthy and pointed to

Cole alone as the ﬁnancial representative of the ﬁrm, it

seems to us the plaintiff took the note at his peril. It

was very strange for the plaintiﬂ’ to inquire of the one who had

used the ﬁrm name if it was the note of the ﬁrm, and omit

entirely, when he had ample and easy opportunity, to inquire

of the other partner, on whose sole credit he depended; but the

court has found that the failure to inquire of Cole was not

owing to a belief that the inquiry would result in ﬁnding the

note invalid, and this we must accept as true. Ordinarily such

a ﬁnding would save the rights of a holder in good faith of

negotiable paper, but the great difﬁculty in the present case is

that the note was purchased with constructive notice that it

- __¢_@;_

650) it ls said that "a note-given by one partner tn the partnership name, within the scope of the partnership, is binding upon
the firm~ but the payee is bound to know whether it is within
the scope of his apparent authority, and, if it is in excess
thereof, the firm is not responsible." In Cocl.'.e vs. Bank, 3 Ala.
175, the note in suit was signed in the partnership name of J.
F. & W. Cocke, who were partners in keeping a tavern. It was
executed by .J. F. Cocke, and payable to Lea & Langdon for
their nc<'ommodation, without the knowledge of the other part·
ner, ~Yoodson Corke.
No actual knowlc>dge of the circumstances was shown on the part of the bank, which sued as
indorsee; but it was assumed to ha Ye been the duty of the bank
to make inquiry. GoLDTHWAITI~, J., in delivering the opinion,
said (page 180): "The law p·resumes that the bank, if it
inquired at all into the partnership of the defendants, must
have received informntion that they were not partners in a
mercantile trade, but only in the business of tavern-keeping.
This ascertained, it took the note at its peril, and must have
relied on the faith of the indorsers." It was held that \Voodso-n Cocke, the partner who had no knowledge of the transaction, was not liable.
In the case at bar the plaintiff had full and actual knowledge
of the nature of the partnership, and the Jaw attributed to him
knowledge, also, that one partner could not bind the other by
bill or note with.out autho1·ity, and knowing, as he did, that the
note had been written and signed by ;McCarthy, who was irresponsible, and that, if he purchased it, it would be upon the
credit of Cole alone, and having also a('tual knowledge of a
course of dealing which avoided McCarthy and pointed to
Cole alone as the financial representative of the firm, it
seems to us the plaintiff took the note at his peril. It
was ve1·y strange for the plaintiff to inquire of the one who had
used the firm name if it was the note of the firm, and omit
entirely, when he had ample and easy opportunity, to inquirr.
of the other pnrtncr, on whose sole credit he depended; but the
court has found that the failure to inquire of Cole was not
owin~ to a belief that the inquiry would result in finding the
note invalid, and this we must accept as true. Ordinarily such
a finding would save the rights of a holder in good faith of
negotiable paper, but the great difficulty in the present case iR
(
that the note was purchased with constructive notice that it
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and pri-ma faeic was not the note of the ﬁrm; and the actual

course of business, so far as it was known to the plaintiff’,

tended to increase rather than allay the suspicion of a want of’

authority.

But the plaintiff contends that the judgment in his favor

cannot be disturbed because the burden of proof was on the

defendant. On this general subject of the burden of proof,

most of the authorities cited in another connection to show the

distinction between the two classes of partnerships, and many

others that we might cite, assert most positively that in the

case of noncommercial partnerships the burden is on the

holder of the note. But we concede that many cases can be

found which in terms would seem to place the burden on the

defendant. In some of these cases the partnerships were in

fact commercial, as in the case of Faler vs. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283.

In Doty vs. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, PLATT, J., giving the opinion,

said: “The partnership being admitted, the presumption of

law is that a note made by one partner in the name of the ﬁrm

was given in the regular course of partnership dealings until

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the contrary is shown on the part of the defendants.” The case

is so brief in the report that we cannot see clearly what was

involved in the admission of the partnership which furnished

the basis for the presumption. It incidentally appears in the

description of the ﬁrm that its business was tanning, currying,

and shoe making. This, doubtless, involved the buying of

hides, bark, and materials for tanning, and the sale of leather

and shoes. The basis of the presumption was doubtless the

apparent scope of the business. In Holmes rs. Porter, 39 Me.

157, the head note omits an important qualiﬁcation. The

proposition laid down by the court is that, “when the contract

i made in the name of the ﬁrm, it will prima facie bind the

ﬁrm unless it is ultra the business of the ﬁrm.” The head

note omits the last clause. The case of Carrier cs. Cameron,

31 Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. 192, was relied upon by the

plaintiff to show that the burden was on the defendant.

In terms it so holds, but a brief analysis will show that it is not

inconsistent with our position in this case, and will suggest a

mode of reconciling many apparently conﬂicting cases. There

was nothing at all in the case to show the nature of the partner-

ship, and the plaintiff’s knowledge of it. GRAVES, O. J., in

l was not within the apparent scope of the partnership business,
(and pritna facic was not the note of the firm; and the actual
course of bm:iness, so far as it was known to the plaintiff,
tendf'd to increase rather than allay the suspicion of a want of
authority.
But the plaint!ff contends that the judgm«.>nt in his favor
cannot be disturbed because the burden of proof was on the
defendant. On this general subject of the bur<len of proof,
most of the authorities cited in another connection to Hhow the
distinction between the two classes of partnerships, and many
othen that we might cite, assert most positively that in the
case of non-commercial partnerships the burden is on the
holder of the note. Rut we concede that many cases can be
found which in terms would seem to place the burden on the
defendant. In some of these cases the partne1·ships were in
fact commercial, as in the case of Faler vs. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283.
In Doty vs. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, PLATT, J., giving the opinion,
said: "The partnership being admitted, the presumption of
law is that a note made by one partner in the name of the firm
was given in the regular course of partnership dealings until
the contrary is shown on the part of the defendants." The case
is so brief in the report that we cannot see clearly what was
involved in the admission of the partnership which furnished
the basis for the p1·esumption. It incidentally appears in the
description of the firm that its business was tanning, currying,
and shoe making. This, doubtless, involved the buying of
hides, bark, and materials for tanning, and the sale of leather
and shoes. The basis of the presumption was doubtless the
apparent scope of the business. In Halmes rs. Porter, 39 l\Ie.
157, the head note omits an important qualification. The
proposition laid down by the court is that, "when the contract
is made in the name of the firm, it will prima facie bind the
firm unless it is ultra th~ business of the firm." Th~ head
note omits the last clause. The case of Carrier vs. Cameron,
Sl Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. rn2, was relied upon by the
plaintiff to show that the burden was on the defendant.
In terms it so holds, but a brief anal.vsis will show that it is not
Inconsistent with our position in this case, and will sugj:!'est a
mode of reconciling many apparently eontlicting cases. There
was nothing at all in the case to show the nature of the partnership, and the plaintiff's knowledge of it. GnAYEs, C. J., ill
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giving the opinion, stated the question as follows: “Was the

plaintiff below required, in order to make out a prima facile

case, to show at the outset that Carrier had express authority

to make notes generally, or else to show either that the copart-

nership was one of the class in respect to which such authority

is presumed, or that its course of business had been such as to

imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been ap-

proved or ratiﬁed?” The question was answered in the nega-

tive, upon the authority of Littcll vs. Fish, 11 Mich. 525. It is to

be noticed that the question was simply as to the burden of

proof after the fact of partnership was admitted, and before

the nature or class of the partnership appeared. That being the

position of the case, the court well remarked that “it was not

needful for the plaintiff, by any positive averment or positive

proof, to negative a defense which, in virtue of a general pre

sumption, would be intended not to exist. He could not be re-

quired to go into particular proof on such a point until some

proof should appear in contravention of the presumption.” In

this statement of the law we fully concur, but it is not applica-

ble to the facts in the case at bar, because the controlling fact
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in the proposition is wanting. Proof in contravention of the

presumption, which at the outset was in favor of the plaintiff,

had appeared, and had resulted in the ﬁnding of the opposing

facts; and it is signiﬁcant that all the facts which the above

question impliedly concedes to be suﬁicient to overcome the

presumption referred to are distinctly found,namely, that there

was no express authority to make notes generally or to give

this note; that the partnership was of the non-trading class, in

respect to which no authority can be implied; that there was

no course of business that could imply authority; and that the

giving of this note had never been ratiﬁed or approved by Cole.

\Vhatever presumption, therefore, there might have been in

favor of the plaintiﬂ’ at the outset had been fully overcome,

and, if there exists any further fact from which an authority

might be implied, the plaintiff must show it, or lose his case.

It is manifest that in the Michigan case, as, indeed, in all the

cases treating of the burden of proof in suits on notes alleged

to have been executed by partnerships, an illegitimate use has

been made of the term “burden of proof.” Properly, it is ap-

plied only to a party atiirming some fact essential to the sup-

port of his case. Thus used, it never shifts from side to side

‘ i "A"-'* ‘ "_ ‘*~==~$u

giving the opinion, stated the question as follows: "Was the
plaintiff below required, in order to make out a prima facie
case, to show at the outset that Carrier had express authority
to make notes generally, or else to show either th.at the copartnership was one of the class in respect to which such autl1ority
IR presumed, or that its course of business had been such as to
imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been approved. or ratified?" The question was answered in the negative, upon the authority of Littell vs. Fisli, 11 Mich. 525. It is to
be noticed that the question was simply as to the burden of
proof after the fact of partnership was admitted, and before
the nature or class of the partne1·ship appeared. That being the
position of the case, the court well remarked that "it was not
needful for the plaintiff, by any positive averment or positive
proof, to negative a defense which, in virtue of a general presumption, would be intended not to exist. He could not be required to go into particular proof on such a point until some
proof should appear in contravention of the presumption." In
this statement of the law we fully concur, but it is not applicable to the facts in the case at bar, because the controlling fact
in the proposition is wanting. Proof in contravention of the
presumption, which at the outset was in favor of the plaintiff,
had appeared, and had resulted in the finding of the opposing
facts; and it is significant that all the facts which the above
question impliedly concedes to be sufficient to overcome the
presumption referred to are distinctly found, namely, that there
was no express authority to make notes generally or to give
this note; that the partnership was of the non-trading class, in
respect to which no authority can be implied; that there was
no course of business that could imply authority; and that the
giving of this note had never been ratified or approved by Cole.
\Vhatever presumption, therefore, the1·e might have been in
favor of the plain tiff at the outset had been fully overcome,
and, if there exists any further fact from which an authority
might be implied, the plaintiff must show it, or lose his case.
It is manifest that in the Miohigan case, as, indeed, in all the
cases treating of the burden of proof in suits 011 notes alleged
to have been executed by partnerships, an illegitimate use has
been made of the term "burden of proof." Properly, it is applied only to a party affirming some fact essential to the support of his case. Thus used, it never shifts from side to side
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during the trial. Loosely used, as in the cases referred to, it is
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confounded with the weight of evidence, a very different thing,

which often shifts from one side to the other as facts and pre-

sumptions appear and are overcome; and, in this indiscrim-

inate use of the term “burden of proof,” much of the apparent

conﬂict in the cases has its origin. For, after all, the test of

the burden of proof is very simple, and so is the question of the

weight of evidence, and there is no contrariety in the principle

adopted by the authorities. In the light of principle, we

think it may be demonstrated that the position of the plaintiff

is untenable. A partnership has been sued on a note executed

in its name. Upon the trial the note is produced by the plain-

tiﬁf, and the ﬁrst question is, wa_it the note of the ﬁrm? The

plaintiff takes the aﬂirmative of this issue, because, if no evi-

dence is offered on either side. he must fail. He has then the

burden of proof, and it remains on him, and does not pass at all

to the defendant, But suppose now it is shown or.admitted

that the partnership alleged exists, and that one of the ﬁrm

executed and delivered the note in its name. By virtue of the

genera] presumption that authority was given by the partner-
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ship, the plaintiﬂ’ is entitled to recover, if nothing further ap-

pears, because the weight of evidence is on his side. But sup-

pose the defendants take their turn, and prove the identical

facts here found, that there was no authority, general or

special, given; no ratiﬁcation of the act; no course of dealing

to imply authority; a.nd, furthermore, that the partnership was

of a class from which no authority can be implied. Is the

plaintiﬁ now entitled to a verdict? Has he proved that the

note was the note of the ﬁrm? Surely not. \Vhat,then,is left on

which to rest his case? The preponderance of evidence is not

with him. The burden upon him to show that it was a partner-

ship note has not now been met. But it is said that there is a

realm of inquiry not touched by either party; that is, that itwas

not shown whether or not the partnership had the beneﬁt of the

consideration of the note. If such a fact appeared, we concede,

for the purposes of this case, that it would tend to show that

the note was the note of the ﬁrm. But if any authority could

not be implied as the case stood before, can it now be implied?

The case stands precisely a before. There can be no change

during the trial. Loosely used, as in the cases referred to, it is
confounded with the weight of evidence, a very different thing,
which often shifts from one side to the other as facts and presumptions appear and are overcome; and, in this indiscriminate use of the term "burden of proof," much of the apparent
conflict in the cases has its origin. For, after all, the test of
the burden of proof is very simple, and so is the question of the
weight of evidence, and there is no contrn1·iety in the principle
adopted by the authorities. In the light of principle, we
think it may be demonstrated that the position of the plaintiff
is untenable. A part~ership bas been sued on a note executed
in its name. Upon the frial the note is produced by the plain·
tiff, and the first question is, was _it the note of the firm'? The
plaintiff takes the affirmative of this issue, because, if no evi·
dence is offered on either side. he must fail. Ile hrui then the
burden of proof, and it remains on him, and does not pass ht all
to the defendant, But suppose now it is shown or .admitted
that the partners11ip alleged exists, and that one of the firm
executed and delivered the note in its name. By virtue of the
general presumption that authority was given by the partnership, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if nothing further appears, because the weight of evidence is on his side. But suppose the defendants take their turn, and prove the identical
facts here found, that there was no authority, general or
specia I, given; no ratification of the act; no course of dealing
to imply authority; and, furthermore, that the partnership was
of a class from which no authority can be implied. Is the
plaintiff now entitled to a verdict? Has he proved that the
note was the note of the firm? Sn rely not. 'Vhat, then, is left on
which to rest his case'! The preponderance of evidence is not
with him. The burden upon him to show that it was a partnership note bas not now bC>en met. llut it is said that there is a
realm of inquiry not touclled by either party; that is, that it.was
not shown whetheP or not the vartnership had the benefit of the
consideration of the note. If such a fact appeared, we concede,
for the purposes of this case, that it would tend to show that
the note was ~he note of the firm. But if any authoiity could
not be implied as the case stood before, can it now be implied?
The case stands precisely as before. There can be no chauge
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in the weight of evidence, because nothing has been added; and

CASKS ON PARTNERSHIP.

the claim of the plaintiff would seem to be reduced to the

in the wr\ght of evidence, because nothing bas been added; and
the cla\m of the plaintiff would seem to be reduced to the
absurdity that he is to have the same benefit from an unproved
fact as from one proved. There wa.s error in the judgment
complained of, and, as against the defendant Cole, it is reversed, and a new trial ordered. The other judges concurred,
except GRANGER, J., who dissented.

absurdity that he is to have the same beneﬁt from an unproved

fact as from one proved. There was error in the judgment

complained of, and, as against the defendant Cole, it is re-

versed, and a new trial ordered. The other judges concurred,

except GRANGER, J ., who dissented.

N011: :—For other cases upon the power of one partner to bind the ﬁrm

by negotiable instruments, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 174.

For the distinction between trading and non-trading ﬁrms. see Id.

§ 162,

/n

____ y,

NOTE:-For otller cases upon the power of one partner to hind the firm
of Partn., § 174.
For the dlslincLion between trading and non·LradinllC fi1ms, see Id.

MORGAN vs. RICHARDSON.

by negotiable instruments, see :Mechem's Elem.

Supreme Court of Missouri, 1852.

16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 235.

§ 162.

This was a proceeding to set aside a judgment entered

against A. & J. M. Richardson, partners, upon a promissory

note executed in the name of the ﬁrm. The judgment was

entered upon a confession made by J. M. Richardson alone,
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after the dissolution of the partnership. The execution was

levied upon the property of A. Richardson. The court below

set aside the judgment against A. Richardson and quashed the

execution. Plaintiff appeals.

MORGAN vs. RICHARDSON.

Leonard, for the appellants.

Hayden, contra.

Soorr, J. The facts in this case stand admitted by the

Bupreme Court of Missouri, 185!.

1·

demurrer to the petition, and we are at a loss to conceive the

16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 235.

ground upon which the proceeding can be susta.ined against

A. Richardson. The case of Green vs. Bcals, 2 Caines (N. Y_)

254, is an authority to show that the judgment confessed by

J. M. Richardson was void as to A. Richardson. The cases of

M otteum vs. St. Aubin, 2 W. Blackst. 1133, and Danton vs. Noyes,

6 Johns (N. Y.) 299, 5 Am. Dec. 237, are not applicable to the

circumstances of this case. It cannot be maintained that a

— ?_‘ -“smile

This was a proceeding to set aside a judgment entered
against A. & J. M. Richardson, partners, upon a promissory
note executed in the name <>f the firm. The judgment was
entered upon a confession made by J. M. Richardson alone,
after the dissolution of the partnership. The execution was
levied upon the propert1 of A. Richardson. The court below
set aside the judgment against A. Richardson and quashed the
executi-0n. Plaintiff appeals.
Leonard, for the appellants.
Hayden, contra.

J. The facts in this case stand admitted by the
demurrer to the petition, and we are at a loss to conceive' the
ground upon which the proceeding can be sustained agai..ufi
A. Richardson. The case of Green vs. Beals, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
254, is an authority to show that the judgment confessed by
J.M. Richardson was void as to A. Richardson. The cases of
Mottcu:c vs. St. Aubin, 2 W. Blackst. 1133, and Denton vs. Noyes,
G Johns (N. Y.) 2!)~, 5 .\m. DPc. ~:n, are not applicable to the
circumstances of this case. It cannot be maintained that a
SooTT,

ml -_____.___-._ 4-i-D ‘Z—
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partner, either before or after the dissolution of the copartner-

ship, has authority to confess a judgment for his copartner.

The authorities are abundant to show that one partner cannot

confess a judgment which will bind his copartner: Crane vs.

French-, 1 \Vend. (N. Y.) 311; McBride vs. Hagan, Id. 327. We

can see no difference in principle between setting aside the

judgment and restraining an execution upon it, as either mode

of action is based upon the nullity of the proceeding, which

is not permitted to be used as a foundation for any future

action against the party for whom it has been unwarrantedly

entered. It does not appear that the judgment against J. M.

Richardson has been vacated, nor will we interfere with it.

Affirmed.

NOTE.-_—-S98 Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., Q 179.

‘4

FOX vs. NORTON.

Supreme Court of Mich-igan, 1861.

9 Mich. 207.

Norton and others sued Charles R. Fox, Thomas D. Gilbert
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and Francis B. Gilbert on a bond. The bond, which was

received in evidence against defendants’ objection, described

the obligors as Charles R. Fox and Gilbert & Co. It was con-

ditioned that said Fox and Gilbert & Co. should pay, etc.; and

partner, either before or after the dissolution of the copartne~
ship, has authority to confess a judgment for his copartneri.
The authorities are abundant to show that one partner cannot
confess a judgment which will bind his copartner: Crane tJB.
F1·cncll, 1 'Vend. (N. Y.) 311; McRridc vs. Hagan, Id. 327. We
can see no difference in principle between setting aside the
juclgment and restraining an execution upon it, as either mode.
of action is based upon the nullity of the proceeding, which
is not permitted to be used as a foundation for any future_
action against the party for whom it has been unwarraptedli
entered. It does not appear that the judgment against J. M.
Richardson has been vacated, nor will we interfere with it
Affirmed.

,,

NoTB.~e

Mechem's Elem. of Partn..1179.

was signed thus:

Cnsnnns R. Fox [Seal].

., GILBERT & Co. [Seal].

Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error.

Withcy é Gray, for plaintiffs in error.

FOX vs. NORTON.

J . T. Holmes, for defendants in error.

CIIRISTIANCY, J. (After stating the facts.) The individual

names of the Gilberts do not appear upon the bond. It was,

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1861.

however, proved that Thomas D. Gilbert and Francis B. Gil-

bert were, at the date of the bond, partners composing the ﬁrm

9 Mich. 207.

of Gilbert & Co., and that the said Thomas D. Gilbert executed

Norton and others sued Charles R. Fox, Thomas D. Gilbert
nnd Francis B. Gilbert on a bond. The bond, which waa
l'eceived in evidence against defendants' objection, described
the obligors as Charles R. Fox and Gilbert & Co. It was conditioned that said Fox and Gilbert & Co. should pay, etc.; and
was signed thus:
CHARLES R. Fox [Seal].
G1LnE1t'l' & Co.
[Sealj.
Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error.
Wit11CTJ & Gray, for plaintiffs in error.
J. T. Holmes, for defendants in error.

CHRIBTIASCY, J. (After stating the facts.) The individual
names of the Gilberts do not appear upon the bond. It was,
Iiowever, proved that Thomas D. Gilbert and Francis B. Gilbert were, at the date of the bond, partners composing the firm
of Gilbert & Co., and that the said Thomas D. Gilbert executed
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the bond in the name of the ﬁrm. £But no evidence was given
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or offered showing or tending to s ow that the bond was exe-

cuted by the single partner in the presence of the other part-

ner, nor that the other partner had previously assented to its

execution, nor that he subsequently recognized or ratiﬁed it

as the act or obligation of the ﬁrm.)

We understand the general rule of law to be well settled

that (with the exception of the release of a debt, which stands

upon peculiar ground) one partner cannot execute a specialty

binding as such upon the ﬁrm, without express authority for

that purpose under seal. The English decisions recognize but

a single exception to this rule, and that is when the single part-

ner executes the instrument in the preence and with assent

of the other member or members of the ﬁrm. But, by the gen-

eral current of American authorities, the instrument may also

be sustained against the ﬁrm by proof of prior parol assent, o-r

subsequent parol ratiﬁcation by the other member. We are

aware of no case which goes further. See the authorities col-

lected in Story on Cont. §§ 218, 220; Story on Partn. § 117,

at scq.; Gollyer on Partn. (Perkins Ed.) §§ 462 to 467.
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The bond in this case was not admissible under the general

rule, and no evidence was given tending to bring it within any

of the recognized exceptions to the rule. It was therefore

improperly admitted. The bond not being in evidence, and all

the other questions raised in the case being dependent upon the

bond, such dependent questions have no bearing upon the case

before us, and we do not deem it necessary to notice them here.

Reversed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 180.

SHATTUCK vs. CHANDLER.

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1889.

40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 225, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227.

Chandler,.as assignee of the ﬁrm of Pierpont & Tuttle, sued

Shattuck and Bowers, upon the notes referred to in the opinion.

Plaintiff had judgment below and defendants bring error.

the bond in the name of the firm. {But no evidence was given
or offered showing or tending to stow that the bond was executed by the single partner in the presence of the other partner, nor that the other partner had previously assented to its
execution, nor that he subsequently recognized or ratified it
as the act or obligation of the firm.)
We understand the general rule of law to be well settled
that (with the exception of the relea.se of a debt, which stands
upon peculiar ground) one partner cannot execute a specialty
binding as such upon the firm, without express authority for
that purpose under seal. The English decisions recognize but
a single exception to this rule, and that is when the single partner executes the instrument in the presence and with assent
of the other member or members of the firm. But, by the general current of American authorities, the instrument may also
be sustained against the firm by proof of prior parol assent, or
subsequent parol ratification by the other member. We are
aware of no case which goes further. See the authorities collected in Story on Cont. §§ 218, 220; Story on Partn. § 117,
et seq.; Collyer on Partn. (Perkins Ed.)§§ 462 to 467.
The bond in this case was not admissible under the g~neral
rule, and no evidence was given tending to bring it within any
of the recognized exceptions to the rule. It was therefore
improperly admitted. The bond not being in evidence, and all
the other questions raised in the case being dependent upon the
bond, such dependent questions have no bearing upon the case
before us, and we do not deem it necessary to notice them here.
Reversed.
NOTE: Bee Mecbem's Elem. of Partn.,

~

180.

fiBATTUCK vs. CHANDLER.

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1889.
40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 22li, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227.
Cha~dler,. as assignee of the ft rm of Pierpont & Tuttle, sued
Rhattuck and Bowers, upon the notes referred to in the opinion.
Plaintitf bad judgment below and defendants bring erroi:.
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Don C'a.rlos ¢G Son, for the plaintiffs in error.

SHATTUCK
A. G. ¢€ W. H. M 0B1-ids, for the defendants in error.

vs.

CllANDl.ER.
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CLocs'r0N, C. This was an action upon a large number of

promissory notes made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and

Dem Ca.rlos & Son, for the plaintiffs in error.

guaranteed by the ﬁrm of Shattuck & Bowers in these words:

“For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of this

A.G. & W. H. McBride, for the defendants in error.

note according to the terms thereof, waiving demand, notice,

and protest. Shattuck &'Bowers.” The evidence shows that

Pierpont & Tuttle were a manufacturing ﬁrm, located at Bush-

nell, Illinois, and that Shattuck 8: Bowers resided in Phillips

county, Kansas, and were engaged in the sale of agricultural

implements. I Certain 'agricultural implements furnished by

Pierpont & Tuttle were sold by Shattuck & Bowers, and the

notes sued on were taken in payment therefor, said notes being

made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and before delivery to

them were guaranteed as above stated. In answer to the peti-

tion, the defendant alleged, aniong other defenses, that the

plaintitf was not the assignee of Pierpont & Tuttle, and that

he had no right or authority to bring the action; and also

alleged that Pierpont & Tuttle had failed to collect the notes
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when the same were due and payable; that the makers of the

notes were solvent at that time, and afterward became insol-

vent and non-residents of Kansas.

The plaintiff oifered in evidence the notes sued on, and the

deed of assignment made in Illinois by Tuttle in the ﬁrm name

of Pierpont & Tuttle; also a deed of assignment by Tuttle as

the surviving partner of Pierpont & Tuttle. Said last deed of

assignment, in addition to a general assignment of all the prop-

erty of the ﬁrm of Pierpont & Tuttle, ratiﬁed the ﬁrst deed of

assignment, and all the doings and proceedings had there-

under by the plaintiff as such assignee. Both of these assign-

ments were objected to, and the objection overruled, and were

admitted in evidence. The ﬁrst deed was objected to upon the

ground that one of several partners has no authority, with-

out the consent of the other partners, to make a general assign-

ment of the partnership property. The plaintiff contends that

the deed of assignment is prima facie good, and it devolved

upon the defendant to show that Pierpont did not consent to

the assignment, and that unless it was at least shown that he

objected to the assignment, the assignment must be held good.

38

CLOGSTON, C. This was an action upon a large number o~
promissory notes made payable to Pierpont & Tnttle, and
guaranteed by the firm of Shattuck & Bowers in these words:
"For value received, I hereby guar~tee the payment of this
note according to the terms thereof, waiving demand, notice,
and protest. Shattuck &. Bowers." The evidence shows that
Pierpont & Tuttle were a manufacturing firm, located at Bushnell, Illinois, and that Shattuck & Bowers resided in Phillips
county, Kansas, and were engaged in the sale of agricultural
implements. / Certain 'agricultural implements furnished by
Pie1-pont & Tuttle were sold by Shattuck & ~owers, and the
notes sued on were taken in payment therefor, said notes being
made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and before delivery to
them were guaranteed as above stated. In answer to the peti·
tion, the defendant alleged, aniong other defenses, that the
plaintiff was not the assignee of Pierpont & Tuttle, and that
he ha.d no right or authority to bring the action; and also
alleged that Pierpont & Tuttle had failed to collect the notes
when the same were due and payable; that the makers of the
notes were solvent at that time, and afterward became insolvent and non-residents of Kansas.
The plaintiff offt>red in evidence the notes sued on, and the
deed of assignment made in Illinois by Tuttle in the firm name
of Pierpont & Tuttle; also a deed of assignment by Tuttle as
the surviving partner of Pierpont & 'futtle. Said last deed of
assignment, in addition to a general assignment of all the property of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, ratified the first deed of
assignment, and all the doings and proceedings had thereunder by the plaintiff as such assignee. Both of these assignments were objected to, and the objection overruled, and were
admitted in evidence. The first deed was objected to upon the
ground that one of several partners has no authority, without the consent of the other partners, to make a general assignment of the pa11:nersbip property. The plaintiff contends that
the deed of assignment is prima facie good, and it devolved
upon the defendant to show that Pierpont did not consent to
the assignment, and that unless it was at least shown that he
objected to the assignment, the assignment must be held good.
38
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In this we do not agree with the plaintiff. VVhere an assign-

ment is made by one partner, his right to make that assign-

ment depends upon the consent of his copartner; and to give

him authority to make it, he must, in addition, show that his

partner consented thereto, or show such a state of facts from

which the court could presume assent, or show that the part-

ner was absent from the country, and that therefore his assent

could not be procured, or some other state'of facts that would

show to the court that the partner making the assignment

had authority, either by reason of the articles of‘ partnership,

or by the fact of his being managing agent of the partner-

ship, or some such fact from which the court could say that

the assignment was authorized by the partnership. 'N 0 such

,/proof was made in this case, and we think, in the absence of

such proof, the assignment offered in evidence was absolutely

void. See Burrill o-n Assignments, 5th Ed., Secs. 68-88; Loeb vs.

Pierpont, 58 Iowa, 469; 43 Am. Rep. 122; Lowenstein vs.

Flaurand, 82 N. Y. 494; Haggerty vs. Granger, 15 How. Pr. 243;

'J
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Dunklin vs. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251; Sloan vs. Moore, 37 Pa. St.

217; Graves vs. Hall, 32 Tex. 665; Story on Partnerships, Sec.

101; Parsons on Partnerships, 166. This doctrine is now

almost universally acknowledged to be the rule.

The second assignment offered in evidence presents a more

difficult question. In many of the states the doctrine is held

that a surviving partner cannot make a general assignment,

and in these states, the theory upon which the decisions were

rendered is, that, at the death of one partner, the surviving

partner becomes trustee of the partnership estate, and that he

has no power to transfer the trust so created to another trus-

tee. This seems to be the doctrine held in New York: Nelson

vs. Sutlierland, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 327; Loeschigk -vs. Hatﬁeld, 51

N. Y. 660; Cushman vs. Addison, 52 Id. 628; also Tiemann vs.

Molliter, 71 Mo. 512; Vesper rs. Kramer, 31 N. J . Eq. 420.

On the other hand, it has been held by ome of the states that

the surviving partner may make a general assignment of a

partnership; and to this etfect are numerous decisions, among

which is Emcrson rs. Scntcr, 118 U. S. 3, in which case the court

held that the surviving partner could make a general assign-

ment. The court said: “The right to do so grows out of h-is

duty, from his relations to the property, to administer the

affairs of the ﬁrm so as to close up its business without unrca.

~i v‘ ’ ~

\J

In this we do not agree with the plaintiff. Where an assignment is made by one partner, his right to make that assignment depends upon the consent of his copartner; and to give
him authority to make it, he must, in addition, show that his
partner consented thereto, or sho'Y such a state of facts from
which the court could presume assent, or show that the partner was absent from the country, and that therefore his assent
could not be procured, or some other state·of facts that would
show to the com1 that the partner making the assignment
had authority, either by reason of the articles of" partnership,
or by the fact of his being managing agent of the partnership, or some such fact from which the court could say that
the assignment was auth-Orized by; the partnership. ·No such
Jproof was made in this case, and we think, in the absence of
such proof, the assignment offered in evidence was absolutely
void. See Burrill o·n Assignments, 5th Ed., Secs. 68-88; Loeb t>8.
Pierpont, 58 Iowa, 469; 43 Am. Rep. 122; Lowenstein !'8.
Flaurand, 82 N. Y. 494; Haggerty vs. Granger, 15 How. Pr. 243;
Dunklin vs. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251; Sloan VB. Moore, 37 Pa. SL
217; Graves VB. Hall, 32 Tex. 665; Story on Pa.rtnerships, Sec.
101; Parson'S on Partnerships, 166. This doctrine is now
almost universally acknowledged to be the rule.
The second assignment offered in evidence presents a ID<>re
difficult question. In many of the states the docb•ine is lield
that a surviving partner cann()t make a general assignment,
and in these states, the theory upon which the decisions were
rendered is, that, at the death of one partner, the surviving
partner becomes trustee of the partnership estate, and that he
has no power to transfer the trust so created to another trustee. This set> ms to be the doctrine held in New York: N el.sOR
tJB. Sutllerland, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 327; Loescliigk vs. Hatfield, 51
N. Y. 660; Cushman vs. Addison, 52 Id. 628; also Tiemann vs.
Jlolliter, 71 Mo. 512; l'osper i·s. Kramer, 31 N. J. Eq. 420.
On the other hand, it bas been h<"ld by some of the states that
the surviving partner may make a general assignment of a
partnership; and to this effect a.re numerous decisions, among
which is Emerson i~s. Senter, 118 U.S. 3, in which case the court
held that the surviving partner could make a general assignment. The court said: "The right to do so grows out of hf s
duty, from his relations to th.e property, to administer the
n!Tairs of the firm so as to close up its business without unrea-
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_s_on_able delay.” (This seems to be the settled doctrine of the

supreme court of the United States, and should be followed

SnA.rrucx vs. CnAN DLEB.

unless there is some statute making a different rule) This

assignment was made under the laws of Illinois, and should be

interpreted thereunder; but in this case no statute of Illinois -

was offered disclosing what provisions had been made in that

state by statute for the winding up of partnership business;

and in the absence of any showing of this kind, we must pre-

sume that the statute of Illinois is like that of Kansas. This

brings up the question, is there any statute in Kansas that

conflicts with the rule laid down by the supreme court of the

United States in the last case cited? Article 2, chapter 37, of

the compiled laws of 1885, provides for the winding up and

settlement of partnership estates. This provides for the

appraisement of partnership property, and that the property

shall remain in the possession of the surviving partner, and if

he sees ﬁt to continue its management, and the disposing of

the partnership assets and the payment of the partnership

debts, he may do so upon condition that he give a bond for

faithful performance of the duties imposed, and the power is
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given the probate court to cite him, after the giving of such

bond, to an accounting, and to adjudicate upon such accounts,

as in the case of an ordinary administrator, and for an action

upon the bond in case of his failure to faithfully administer

the partnership estate; and upon his refusal to give the bond

and take charge of the partnership property, it becomes the

duty of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate to

assume the management of the same and to settle it up. By

this statute ample provisions are made for the closing up of a

partnership estate, either by the surviving partner, or by the

administrator of the deceased partner’s estate. (\Ve think

that the legislature by this provision intended to provide a

trustee to close up the partnership upon the death of a member

of the ﬁrm, and that the statute creates a trust in the surviv-

ing partner which he has no power to transfer to another

except as it is transferred by his refusal to administer upon the \ ,

partnership estate, in which event it is transferred by operating

of law to the administrator of the deceased partner’s estate.) '/

_ It was said in Carr vs. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393, in speaking of this

class of administrators: “He is neither more nor less than a

special trustee as to this property and this class of debts.”

~ _ J— __ - —_7»

sonable delay." (This seems to be the settled doctrine of the
supreme court of the United States, and should be followed
unless there is some statute making a different rule~ This
assignment was made under the laws of Illinois, and' should be
interpreted thereunder; but in this case no statute of Illinois
was offered disclosing wbat provisions had been made in that
state by statute for the winding up of partnership business;
and in the absence of any showing of this kind, we must presume that the statute of Illinois is like that of Kansas. This
brings up the question, is there any statute in Kansas that
conflicts with the rule laid down by the supreme court <>f the
United States in the last case cited? Article 2, clrn.pter 37, of
the compiled laws of 1885, proYides for the winding up and
settlement of partnership estates. This provides for the
appraisement of partnership property, and that the property
shall remain in the possession of the surviving partner, and if
he sees ftt to continue its managem~nt, and the disposing of
the partnership assets and the payment of the partnership
debts, he may do so upon condition that he give a bond for
faithful performance of the duties imposed, and the pow.er is
given the probate court to cite him, after the giving of such
bond, to an accounting, and to adjudicate upon such accounts,
as in the case of an -0rdinary administrator, and for an action
upon the bond in case of his failure to faithfully administer
the partnership estate; and upon his refusal to give the bond
and take charge of the partnership property, it becomes the
duty of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate to
assume the management of the same and to settle it up. By
this statute ample proviHions are made for the closing up of a
partnership estate, either by the surviving partner, or by the
administrator of the dect"ased partner's estate. (\Ve think
that the legislature by this provision intended to provide a
trustee to close up the partnership upon the death of a member
of the firm, and that the statute creates a trust in the surviving partner wliicb he bas no power to transfer to another
except as it is transferred by his refusal to administer upon the ~
partnership estate, in which event it is transferred by operation~\)IJ
of law to the administrator of thl" deceased partner's estate.) v
. It was said in Carr vs. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393, in speaking of this
class of administrators: "Ile is neither more nor less than a
special trustee as t-0 this property and th.is rlass of debts."
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The rule is, that where a form of procedure is provided by

800

VASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

statute, and the manner of doing a particular act or thing is

pointed out, it precludes the doing of it in any other manner

or form. If the surviving partner under our statutes may

transfer his trust toan assignee, then the assignee would close

up the entire partnership business in the court having juris-

diction of the assignment and estate thereunder, and would

be entirely free from the jurisdiction of the probate court, and

the statute above cited would be without any force or effect.

Did the legislature intend that this statute might be regarded,

or not, at the pleasure of the surviving partner? We think

not. This means of winding up a partnership business has

been prescribed by the legislature, and in the absence of any

proof of the statutes of Illinois to the contrary, we must pre

sume that this is the manner of closing up partnership estates

in that state. We therefore think the court erred in permitting

the second assignment to begiven in evidence, as it gave the

plaintiﬁ no authority or right to commence the action. ' ‘ '

l Judgment of the court below reversed and a new trial

ordered.
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NOTE: For other cases upon the powerto make assignments for creditors,

see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 172.

LO\V M AN vs. S11 El-ITS.

Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.

124 Ind. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. 351, 7 L. R. A. 73$

Templeton and Sheets made a contract for the establishment

of a stock farm and acquired a herd of brood mares for that pur-

pose. Without the knowledge or consent of Sheets, Templeton

undertook to sell the entire herd to the plaintiﬂ’. Sheets re

The rule is, that where a form of procedure is provided by
statute, and the manner of doing a particular act or thing is
pointed out, it precludes the doing of it in any other manner
or form. If the surviving partner under our statutes may
transfer hie trust to·an assignee, then the assignee would close
up the entire partnership business in the court having jurisdiction of the assignment and estate thereunder, and would
be entirely free from the jurisdiction of the probate court, and
the statute above cited would be without any force or effect.
Did the legislature intend that this statute might be regarded,
or not, at the pleasure of the surviving partner? We think
not. This means of winding up a partnership business has
been prescribed by the legislature, and in the abs~nce of any
proof of the statutes of Illinois to the contrary, we must presume that this is the manner of closing up partnel'Ship estates
in that state. We therefore think the court erred in permitting
the second assignment to be 'given in evidence, as it gave the
plaintiff no authority or right to commence the action. • • •
· Judgment of the court below reversed and a new trial
ordered.

fused to surrender them and Ltii/nan brought replevin. Verdict

for defendant and plaintiﬂf appeals.

Wallace, Baird & Chase, for appellant.

NOTE: For other caaes. upon the power to make Balignmenta for creditors,
.ee M:echem's Elem. of Partn., § 17.8.
·

E. P. Hammond, M. H. Wall.-er, D. Fraser, I . H. Phares and W.

B. Austin, for appellee

. _. ____...x_;.§____ _~ _m_______ Q -__
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LO\VMAN vs. SHEETS.
8uprC"me Court of Indiana, 1890.
124 lnd. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. B:Jl, 7 L. R. A. 784.

Templeton and Sheets made a contract for the establishment
of a stock farm and acquired a herd of brood mares for that purpose. Without the knowledge or consent of Sheets, Templeton
undertook to sell the entire herd to the plaintiff. Sheets rew
fused to surrender them and Lqinan brought replevin. Verdict.
for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
- Wallace, Baird & Chase, for appellant.

E. P. Hammon.d, Al. H. Walker, D. Fraaer, I. H. Pharea and W.
B. Austin, for appellee

y
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CLARKE vs. WALLACE. 301

301

Corrnr, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of other

and appellee were partners, and that, as such, either partner

had the right to sell the property owned by the ﬁrm and confer

a good title,and that by his purchase from Templeton he ac-

quired the title to the whole of the property in controversy and

has a right to its possession. \Ve do not deem it necessary to

decide whether the contract between the parties was one of

partnership or not, as the appellant had no power to sell the

entire property, whether it was held as partnership property or

otherwise. The partnership, if one existed, was not one in

which the parties contemplated a sale of the property here in-

volved, but it was one in which this property was to be kept for

the purpose of carrying on a particular business. In such case

neither party had the power to sell the entire property: Bates,

Partn. § 401; Hewitt vs. iqturdevant, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Ca-yton

vs. Hardy, 27 Mo. 536; Massey vs. Holt, 24 N. H. 248; Hudson vs.

M cKenz1'.e, 1 E. D. Smith, (N Y.)358. Mr. Bates, in his valuable

work on partnerships, in treating the subject in the section
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above cited, says: "But I have no doubt but that the power of

sale must be conﬁned to those things held forsale, and that the

scope of the business does not include the sale of the property

held for the purpose of business and to make a proﬁt out of it,

and that this only is the true rule.” ' ' '

Aﬂirmed.

NOTE.—See also Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 186, and cases there cited;

Arnold vs. Brown, 24 Pick. 89, 35 Am. Dec. 296.

CLARK E VS. W1\ l.l.1\ CE.

Supreme Court of North Dakota, I891.

I N. Dak. 404, 48 N. W. Rep. 339. 26 Am. St. Rep. 636.

Action by Clarke against Wallace, Winslow, Allen and the

administrators of Sheets and Bickford. Judgment for plaint-

iff, and the defendants, \Vinslow, Allen ct al., appeal. The

ﬁndings of the court show that in 1883 the defendants Wins-

low and Allen, together with John A. J. Sheets and Samuel

J. (After stating the facts and disposing of oth~r
questions.) It is oontended by the appellant thad: Templetoii
and appellee were partners, and that, as such, either partner
bad the right to s~ll the property owned by the firm and confer
a good title,and that by his purchase from Templeton be aer
quired the title to the whole of the property in controversy and
has a right fo its possession. "re do not deem it necessary to.
decide whether the contra.ct ,between the parties was one of
partnership or not, a.a the ap~1lant bad no power to sell the
entire property, whether it was held as partnership property or
otherwise. The partnership, if one existed, wa.e not one in
which the parties contemplated a sale of the property here involved, but it was one in which this property was to be kept for
the purpose of carrying on a particular business. In such case
neither party had the power to sell the entire pr<>perty: Bates,
Partn. § 401; Hewitt t'B. Sturdevant, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Cayton
cs. Hardy, 27 Mo. 53G; Mussey vs. Holt, 24 N. H. 248; Hudson vs.
McKenzie, 1 E. D. Smith, (N Y.)358. Mr. Bates, in his valuable
work on partnerships, in treating the subject in the section
above cited, says: ''But I have no doubt but that the power of.
sale must be confined to those things held for·sale, and that the
scope of the business does not include the sale of the property
held for the purpose of business and to make a profit out of it,
and that this only is the true rule." • • •
Affirmed.
COFFEY,

questions.) It is contended by the appellant thaxt Templeton

-

NOTB.-See also Mechem's ElE>m. of Partn., ~ 186, and casea there cited;
Arnold va. Brown, 24 Pick. 89, 85 Am. Dec. 296.

CLARKE vs. WAT.LACE.
Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1891.
1 N. Dak. 404, 4.8 N. W. Rep. 839, 26 Am. St. Rep. 636.

Action by Clarke against Wallace, Winslow, Allen and the
administrators of Sheets and Bickford. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendants, Winslow, All~n ct al., appeal. The
findings of the court show that in 1883 the defendants Winslow and Allen, together with John A. J. Sheets and Samuel
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PART.N.RRSIIlP.

M. Bickford, the‘ two latter now deceased, and their adminis-

trators, being defendants herein, were co-partners engaged in

the banking, real estate, and loan business at Jamestown, Dak.

T., under the ﬁrm name of “North Dakota Bank.” Allen was

the managing member of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm had about $1,300

on deposit in the First National Bank of Jamestown. The

defendant Robert E. \Vallace was president of the la-tter bu/nk.

This bank was in failing circumstances. \Vallace needed

$5,000 to help him out of the embarrassments connected wit‘:

the failure of the bank, and he proposed to Allen that, if the

North Dakota Bank would aid him in obtaining a loan of that

amount, he would secure the deposit of that ﬁrm in the said

First National Bank. Allen, in his individual name, opened

a correspondence with the plaintiff, Clarke, who was a non-

resident, which resulted in obtaining a loan from Clarke, to

Wallace for the required amount, the note to be guaranteed

by the North Dakota Bank. Accordingly Wallace executed

the note, and Allen guaranteed it in the name of the.North

Dakota Bank, and the money was paid over to, W'allace._

Plaintiff, Clarke, loaned the money largely on the credit of
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the North Dakota Bank. Wallace secured the deposit of the

North Dakota Bank in the First National Bank by deliver-

ing collatcrals to Allen, and the amount of the deposit was

subsequently realized out of the collaterals. Allen had no

express authority from the other members of the ﬁrm to

guaranty the note of Wallace, nor did the other members of

the ﬁrm have any knowledge of such guaranty, or ever in any

manner ratify the same, nor did they, prior to the bringing

of this action, have any knowledge that the deposit in the

First National Bank was paid from the proceeds of collaterals

delivered by Wallace to Allen. .

N ickeus <G Baldwin, for appellants.

Edgar W. Camp, for respondent.

Bsrrruonomnw, J . (After stating the facts.) This action, so

far as these appellants are concerned, is brought on the guar-

anty heretofore mentioned, the defense being lack of authority

on the part of Allen to thus bind the ﬁrm. The contract of

guaranty was entered into contemporaneously with the execu-

tion of the note, and plaintiff parted with his money largely

M. Bickford, the' two latter now deceased, and their administrators, being defendants herein, were co-partners engaged in
the banking, real estate, and loan business at Jamestown, Dak.
T., under the fl.rm name of "North Dakota Bank." Allen was
the managing member of the firm. The firm had about $1,300
on deposit in the First National Bank of Jamestown. ~he
defendant Hobert E. 'Vallace was president of the latter bdnk.
This bank was in failing circumstances. \Vallace needed
15,000 to help him oat of the embarrassments connected wit '1
the failure of the bank, and he proposed to Allen that, if the
North Dakota Bank would aid him in obtaining a loan of that
amount, he would secure the deposit of that firm in the said
First National Bank. AJJen, in his individual name, opened
a correspondence with the plaintiff, Clarke, who was a nonresident, which resulted in obtaining a loan from Clarke, to
Wallace for the required amount, the note to be guaranteed
by the North Dakota Bank. Accordingly WaJJace executed
the note, and Allen guaranteed. it in the uame of the .North
Dakota Bank, and the money was paid over to Wallace.
Plaintiff, Clarke, loaned the money largely on the' credit of
the North Dakota Bank. Wallace secured the deposit of the
North Dakota Bank in the First National Bank by deli,·ering coJJaterals to A)]en, and the amount of the deposit was
subsequently re:ilized out of the collatefals. Ailen had no
express authority from the other members of the fl.rm to
guaranty the note of \Va)]ace, nor did the other members of
the firm have any knowledge of such guaranty, or ever in any
manner ratify the same, nor did they, prior to the bringing
of this action have any knowledge that the deposit in the
'
.
First National Bank was paid from the proceeds of conaterale
delivered by Wallace to Allen.
Nickeus &: Baldwin, for appellants.

Edgar W. Camp, for respondent.
BARTHOLOMEW, J. (After stating the facts.) This action, eo
far as these appellants are concerned, i.s brought on the guaranty heretofore mentioned, the defense being lack of authority
on the part of Allen to thus bind the firm. Tb.e contract of
guaranty was entered into contemporaneously with the execution of the note, and plaintiff parted with his money largely
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upon the strength of the guaranty, and the considera.tion there-

for was ample. “ Ilaylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law,

69, and cases cited. The beneﬁt received by the ﬁrm in obtain-

ing security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes

material only so far as it bears upon the question of the author-

ity of Allen to bind the ﬁrm. It i not usual for persons in

business to make themselves answerable for the conduct of

other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a

fpromissory note bearing the indorsement of a ﬁrm, either as

guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption

‘that the ﬁrm name was not signed in the usual course of part-

nership business, and no recovery can be had by simply show-

ing the indorsement. The holder is required to show special

authority to make the indorsement on the part of the partner

by whom the ﬁrm name was signed, or an authority to be im-

plied from the common course of business of the ﬁrm or pre-

vious course of dealing between the parties, or that the

indorsement was subsequently adopted and acted upon

by the ﬁrm. Swectser vs. French, 2 Cush. 309, 48 Am. Dec. 666;

Schermcrhorn vs. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; Bank vs.
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Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot vs. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154, 10 Am. Dec.

208; Bank vs. Mcllonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan vs. H anaford,

42 Mich. 329, 3 N. WV. Rep. 944. In this case there was no pre-

vious course of dealing between t-he parties from which author-

ity on the part of Allen to guarantee in the ﬁrm name could be

implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent

ratiﬁcation on the part of the ﬁrm, or any member thereof.

But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the pur-

pose of preserving the ﬁrm assets or collecting a ﬁrm debt, and

that the implied powers of a partner cover such a case. We

think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further

than any decided case warrants. The case of A ndrcws vs. Con-

gar, 102 U. S. (Co. Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support

the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one mem-

ber of a ﬁrm, without the consent of his copartners, indorsed in

the ﬁrm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It ap-

pear-ed, however, that the ﬁrm owned a majority of the stock of

the corporation,and the larger part of the beneﬁt-s arising from

the notes accrued at once to the ﬁrm. The business of the

corporation might almost be regarded as a branch of the busi-

l

\

upon the strength of the guaranty, and the consideration therefor was ample. · _Baylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law,
G9, and cases cited. The ben'efit received by the firm in obtaining security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes
material only so far as it bears upon the question of the authority of Allen to bind the firm. It is not usual for persons in
business to make themselves answerable for the conduct of
other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a !
!promiss-0ry note bearing the indorsement of a firm, either as \
guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption '
:that the firm name was not signed in the usual course of partpership business, and no recovery ran be bad by simply show- '
~ng the indorsement. The holder is required to show special
~uthority to make the indorsement on the part of the partner
by whom the firm name was signed, or an authority to be implied from the common course of business of the firm or previous course of dealing between the parties, or that the
indorsement was subsequently adopted and acted upon
by the firm. Sweetser vs. F-rench, 2 Cush. 309, 48 Am. Dec. 666;
Schermerh01"n vs. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; Bank vs.
Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot vs. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154, 10 Am. Dec.
208; Bank vs. McDonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan vs. Hanaford,
42 Mich. 329, 3 N. ,V, Rep. 944. In this case there was no previous course of dealing between the parties from which authority on the part of Allen to guarantee in the firm name could be
implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent
ratification on the part of the firm, or any member thereof.
But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the purpose of preserving the firm assets or collecting a firm debt, and
that the implied powers of a partner cover such a case. We
think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further
than :my decided case warrants. The case of A.ndrews vs. Congar, 102 U. S. (Co. Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support
the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one member of a firm, without the consent of bis copartners, indorsed in
the firm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It appeared, however, that the firm owned a majQ.lity of the stock of
the corporation, and the larger part of the benefits arising from
the notes accrued at once to the firm. The business of the
eorporation might almost be regarded as a branch of the busi-
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ness of the ﬁrm. But the correctness of the deci_sion in that

case seems to be questioned in Bates on Partnership (volume

1, § 321), and it no doubt goes as far as any court has gone in

that direction. In Lindley on Partnership, 341 (bottom pag-

ing), it is said: “The latter cases, however, decide that, unless

it can be shown that the giving of guaranties is necessary for

carrying on the business of the ﬁrm in the ordinary way, one of

the members will be held to have no implied authority to bind

the ﬁrm by them.” Nor do we think that one partner has any

implied power to bind his ﬁrm in the use of unusual and extra.-

ordinary means for collecting a debt. In this case the guar-

anty was not necessary to carry on the ﬁrm business in the or-

dinary way. It does not appear but that the deposit of the ﬁrm

would have been paid in full without the guaranty; but further

than that we are not willing to hold that one member of a ﬁrm,

in order to secure a debt, has implied authority to bind a ﬁrm

for a distinct and separate liability to a third person; and, par-

ticularly must that be true where, as in this case, the liability

incurred is several times greater than the debt sought to be

secured. It can be readily seen that any different rule would
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be extremely hazardous. As fully sustaining our views, see

Moore vs. Stevens, 60 Miss. 809; Macklin vs. Kerr, 28 U. C. C. P.

90. Plaintiff failed to establish any liability upon the guar-

anty in suit as against these appellants, and the judgment of

the lower court as to them must be reversed, and a new trial

ordered. All concur. -

NOTE.-—S€B Mechem‘s Elem. of Partnership, Q 188.

1

JOHNSTON vs. DUTTON.

Supreme Court of Alabama, 1855.

27 Ala. 245.

Action by Dutton’s administrator against Johnston & Co.

The latter ﬁrm was composed of Johnston, Fogg and Vander-

slice. The notes were drawn and signed, in the ﬁrm name, by

Fogg. They were dated Dec. 17, 1852, and Jan. 8, 1853. John-

- ' ‘ ' ﬂI=mz:__1-as-an

ness of the firm. But the correctness of the decision in that
case seems to be questioned in Bates on Partnership (volume
1, § 321), and it no doubt goes as far as any court has gone in
that direction. In Lindley on Partnership, 341 (bottom paging), it is said: "The latter cases, however, decide that, unless
it can be shown that the gh•ing of guaranties is necessary for
·carrying on the business of the firm in the ordinary way, one of
the members will be held to have no implied authority to bind
the firm by them." Nor do we think that one partner has any
implied power to bind his firm in the use of unusual and extraordinary means for collecting a qebt. In this case the guaranty was not necessary to carry on the firm business in the ordinary way. It does not appear but that the deposit of the firm
would have been paid in full without the guaranty; but further
than that we are not willing to hold that one m_e mber of a firm,
in order to secure a debt, has implied authority to bind a ftrm
for a distinct and separate liability to a third person; and, particularly must that be true where, as in this case, the liability
ineurred is several times greater than the debt sought to be
secured. It can be readily seen that any different rule would
be extremely hazard-0us. As fully sustaining our views, see
Moore vs. Stevens, 60 Miss. 809; Uacklin vs. Kerr, 28 U. C. C. P.
90. Plaintiff failed to establish any liability upon the guaranty in suit as against these appellants, and the judgment of
the lower court as to them must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered. All concur.
NoTB.-See Mechem·a Elem. of Partnership, I 188.

JOHNSTON vs. DUTTON.

Supreme Court of Alabama, 1855.
27 Ala. 245.

Action by Dutton's administrator again-st Johnston & Co.
The latter firm was composed of Johnston, Fogg and Vanderslice. The notes were drawn and signed, in the firm name, by
Fogg. They were dated Dec. 17, 1852, and Jan. 8, 1853. John-

•
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JonNsToN vs.

ston denied liability on the ground that prior to the giving of

DtT:roN.

305.

the notes he had given personal notice to Dutton and had also

published a notice in the newspaper that he, Johnston, would

not be bound by or for any future contracts made by Fogg

without Johnston‘ consent. Other facts appear in the opin-

ion. Judgment for plaintitl’ and defendant appeal. _

P. Hamilton and F. S. Bloun t, for appellants.

R. H. Smith, contra.

GOl.l)'l‘IIWAl'l‘E, J . The evidence in this case tended to show

that the appellants and one Vanderslice carried on in copart-

ston denied liability on the ground that prior to the giving of.
the notes he bud given personal notice to Dutton and bad also
published a notite in the newspaper tha.t he, Johnston, would
not be bound by or for any future c-0ntracts made by Fogg
without Johnston's consent. Other facts appear in the opin·
ion. J udgrn:!n t for plain tifI and defendant appeal.

nership a steam saw-mill, which, by the articles of copartner-

ship, was to continue at least ﬁve years; that the note sued on

P. lla111ilto1i and P. S. Blount, for appellants.

was given with the concurrence of two of the partners, Fogg

and Vanderslice, for supplies necessary for the hands engaged

I~.

II. Smilli, contra..

in carrying on the mill, which had been ordered by one of them.

Upon these facts alone, there can be no doubt that the ﬁrm

would be bound. The furnishing of supplies to those engaged

in the immediate direction of the business was essential to the

conducting of it, and within the scope of the purpose for which

the individuals had associated; and the authority of either of
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the partners to purchase such supplies, and give the note 01'

the ﬁrm, cannot be questioned.

The principal ground of objection, however, is, that the evi-

dence proved that, before the goods were furnished and the

note given, the appellant, Johnston, gave notice to the public

that he would not be responsible for any future debt con-

tracted on account of the copartnership, and that this notice

was brought home to the party with whom the debt was con-

-tracted; and it is insisted that its effect was to revoke the

authority of the other partners, so far as he was concerned, to

bind the ﬁrm from that time. ,

It is to be observed, that in the present case the contract was

concurred in by two members of the ﬁrm; and the question,

therefore, is, as to the right of the majority to bind the other

pa;-me;-,a.gainst_their disst-nt,as to matters appertaining to the

common business, and in the absence of any stipulation con-

ferring that power in the articles of copartnership. This ques-

tion is a new one in this court, and indeed we have found no

case in which it has been expressly decided. Both in England

39

Gor.nTIIWAITF., J. The eYidenre in this case tenclrd to s~rn\V
that the appellants and one Vandrrslice carrir(l on in copartnership a steam saw-mill, which, by the articlP-s of copartnerflhip, was to continue at least five years; that the note sued on
was gfren \vith the concurrence of two of the partners, Fogg
and Yandersliee, for supplies nec<~ssary for the hands engaged
in cnil'ying on the mill, which had been ordered by one of them.
Upon these facts alone, there can be no doubt that the firm
would be bound. The furnishing of supplies to those engaged
in the immediate direction of the business was essential to the
conducting of it, and within the scope of the purpose for which
the individuals had associatrd; and the authority of either of
the partners to purchase such supplies, and give the note of
the firm, cannot be qut>stioned.
The principal ground of objection, however, is, that the evi·
dence proved that, before the goods were furnished and the
note given, the appellant, Johnston, gave notice to the public
that he would not be responsible for any future debt C()n·
tracted on account of the copa1·tnership, and that this notice
was b1·ought home to the pai1y wilh whom the debt was con·
tracted; and it is insisted that its effect was to revoke the
nuthot•ity of the other partners, so far as he was concerned, to
bind the firm from that time.
It is to be observed, that in the present case the contract was
concurred in by two members of the firm; and the question,
therefore, is, as to the right of the majority to bind the other
partners, against their diss~nt,as to matters appertaining to the
common business, and in the absence of any stipulation con·
!erring that power in the articles of c-0partnership. This question is a new one in this court, and indeed we have found no
case in which it bas been expressly decided. Both in England

39
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and the United States, there are cases which assert the general

proposition, that a partner may protect himself against the con-

equences of a future contract, by giving notice of his dissent

to the party with whom it is about to be made. Gallway vs. Mat-

thew, 10 East 264; Will-is vs. Dyson, 1 Stark. 164; ll‘-icc vs. Flem-

ing, 1 Y. & Jerv, 227, 230; Lc(u:itt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 125, post

p. 308; Feiglcy vs. Sponebcrger, 5 W. & S. 564; Monroe vs. Con-

nor, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. And where the ﬁrm consists

if-bf but two persons and there is nothing in the articles to pre-

‘ vent each from having an equal voice in the direction and con-

J trol of the common business, the correctness of the proposition

cannot be questioned. In such case, the duty of each partner

? would require him not to enter into any contract from which

I the other in good faith dissented; and if he did, it would be a

violation of the obligations which were imposed by the nature

‘| of the partnership. It would not, in fact, be the contract of

the ﬁrm; and the party with whom it was made, having notice,

‘could not enforce it as such. So, if the ﬁrm was composed of

,more than two persons, and one of them dissented, the party
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. with whom the contract is made acts at his peril, and cannot

ihold the dissenting partner liable, unless his liability results

lfrom the articles or from the nature of the partnership con-

mpact. All the cases can be sustained on this principle; and

1 is in strict analogy with the civil law, which holds where the

stipulations of the partnership expressly intrust the diq,,ﬁ'ion

and control of the business to one of the partners, that the‘dis-

sent of the other would not avail, if the contract was made in

good faith, (Pothier, Traits du Com. dc Soc., No. 71, 90); and

such also, we think, is the rule of the common law. Const vs.

Harris, Turn & Russ. 496; Story on Partn. Sec. 121. Were it

otherwise it would be denying to parties the right to make

their own contracts. If our views as to the governing force

of express stipulations are correct, the eﬂ’ect of such terms

or conditions as result by clear implication from the articles,

or arise out of the nature of the partnership, must be the

same. It is as if they had been expressly provided.

_ Now, whenever a partnership is formed by more than two

persons, we think that in the absence of any express provision

to the contrary, there is always an implied understanding that

(the acts of the majority are to prevail over those of the min-

(ority, as to all matters within the scope of the common busi-

_?_#_

and the United States, there are cases which assert the general
proposition, that a partner may protect himself against the con:
sequences of a future rontract, by giving ru>tice otf his dissent
to the party with whom it is about to be made. Gallway vs. Matthew, 10 East 264; Willis 11s. Dyson, 1 Stark. 164; rice vs. Fleming, 1 Y. & Jerv, 227, 230; Leavitt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 125, post
p. 308; Feigky vs. 8poneberger, 5 W. & S. 564; Monroe vs. Oonor, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. And where the firm consists
of but two persons and there is nothing in the articles to prevent each from having an equal voice in the direction and control of the common business, the <.'<>rrectness of the proposition
cannot be questioned. In such case, the duty ()f each partner
would require him not to enter into any contract from which
the other in good faith dissented; and if be did, it would be a
violation of the obligations which were imposed by the nature
of the partnership. It would not, in fact, be the contract of
the firm; and the party with whom it was made, having notice,
could not enforce it as such. So, if the firm was composed of
more than two persons, and one of them dissented, the party
with whom the contract is made acts at his peril, and cannot
hold the dissenting partner liable, unless bis liability results
from the articles or from the nature of the partnership contract. All the cases can be sustained on this principle; and
1 is in strict analogy with the civil law, which holds where the
stipulations of the partnership expressly intrust the di-•'ion
and control of the business to one of the partners, that tne dissent of the other would not avail, if the contract was made in
good faith, (Pothier, Traite du Com. de l~oc., No. 71, 90); and
such also, we think, is the rule of the common law. Const vs.
Harris, Turn & Huss. 496; Story on Partn. Sec. 121. Were it
otherwise it would be denying to parties the right to make
their own contracts. If our views as to the governing force
of express stipulations are correct, the effect of such terms
or conditions as result by clear implication from the article!':,
or arise out of the nature of the partnership1 must be the
same. It is as if they had been expressly provided.
Now, whenever a partnership is formed by more than two
persons, we think that in the absence of any express provision
to the contrary, there is always an implied understanding that
1 the acts of the majority are to prevail over those of the min( ority, as to all matters within the scope of the common busi-

..,...

~
'

JOHNSTON vs. Durrox. 307

ness; and such we understand to be the doctrine asserted by

JOHNSTON

vs. Dono.K.

807

Lord ELDON in Const vs. Harris, supra, and such was the

opinion of Judge Story: Story on Part., sec. 123; 3 Kent’s

Com. (5 ed.) 45. The rule as thus laid down, is certainly more

reasonable and just, than to allow the minority to stop the

operations of the concern, against the views of the majority.

We do not sav that it would-be a bona ﬁdc transaction, so as

to bind the ﬁrm, if the majority choose information to or consultation with the minority (Story on

Part. sec. 123); but when, as in the present case, the one partner

has given notice, and expressed his dissent in advance, there

could be no reason or propriety in requiring him to be con-

sulted by the other two.

We do not consider the cases to which we have been referred,

holding that one partner has the right at pleasure to dissolve

a partnership, although the articles provide that it is to con-

tinue for a speciﬁed term (lllarquand vs. New York Ins. Co., 17

Johns. 525; Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Id. 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286), as

having any bearing on the case under consideration. Conced-

ing they are law—-which is doubtful (Story on Part. sec. 275, n.

3, and cases there cited)—the decision rests solely upon the
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ground, that the limitation on the right of dissolution is incom-

patible with the nature of the copartnership contract; and this

principle does not militate against the position we have

asserted. The dissent, in the present case, cannot be regarded

as a dissolution; for, if effectual, it would not necessarily pro-

duce that result, although it might operate to change the mode

of conducting the business. In other words, it might be car-

ried on without contracting debts.

Our conclusion is, that the act, being concurred in by two

of the partners, was, under the circumstances, the act of the

ﬁrm; and that the charge, asserting the proposition that the

dissent of one partner against the other two would necessarily

exonerate him, was properly refused.

Judgment aﬁirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 163, 189.

Compare with cases following. ____ _

I’ , \' Q,‘
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nees; and such we understand to be the doctrine asserted by
Lord ELDON in Const VB. Harris, supra, and such was the
opinion of Judge Story: Story on Part., sec. 123; 3 Kent's
Com. (5 ed.) 45. The rule as thus laid down, is certainly more
reasonable and just, than to allow the . minority to stop the
operations of the concern, against the views of the majority.
W~ do not sa__y that it would ·be a bona fide transaction, so as
to bind the firm, if the majority choOf!e wanjWJJy to 1ict wHhou;._
information to or consultation with the min.o-ri.!..Y (Story on
Part. sec. 123); but when, as in the present case, the one pai-tner
bas given notice, and expi-essed his dissent in advance, there
could be no reason or propriety in requiring him to be con·
suited by the other two.
We do not consider the cases to which we have been referred,
holding that one partner has the right at pleasure to dissolve
a partnership, although the articles provide that it is to con·
tinne for a specified term (Marquand t•s. New York Ins. Co., 17
Johns. 525; Skinner VB. Dayton, 19 ~d. 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286), as
having any bearing 011 the case under consideration. Conceding they are law-which is doubtful (Story on Part. sec. 275, n.
3, and cases there <:ited)-the decision rests solely upon the
ground, that the limitation on the right of dissolution is incompatible with the nature of the copartnership contract; and this
principle does not militate against the position we have
asserted. The dissent, in the present cHse, cannot be regnnled
as a dissolution; for; if effectual, it wouM. not necessarily produce that result, although it might operate to chang~ the mode
of conducting the business. In other words, it might be carried on without contracting debts.
Our conclusion is, that the act, being concurred in by two
of the partners, was, under the circumstances, the act of the
.O.rm; and that the chargP., asst:"t1ing 11.e p1·oposition that the
dissent of one partner against the other two would necessarily
Pxonerate him, was properly refused.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 163, 189.
Compare with cases foHowiog.
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LEAVITT Vs. PECK.

Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1819.

8 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157.

Action, against G-ad Peck and Egbert D. Peck, as copartners

under the ﬁrm name of Egbert D. Peek, to recover upon :1.

promissory note made by Egbert to Gad, and by him endorsed

LEAVITT vs. PECK.

to plaintiﬁ’. There was evidence that Gad was a dormant

partner with Egbert, but Gad denied this and a.lso proved that

Supreme Court of Con11ccticut, 1819.

when plainliﬂ’ applied to him to sign the note with Egbert he

had refused to do so, but agreed to indorse it and did indorse

8 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157.

it, and that plaintiff accepted it. Verdict for and

~h1)1)c.1lcd. /\_’QJ/I/..,, \> €

N. Smith and Twining, for appellant.

1

Staples and Denison, eontra._

]1os.\n-zn, C. J. It is a well established principle that the

contract of a partner is obligatory on his copartner, by virtue

of an implied authority which may be rebutted by a refusal to

be bound by his acts. By legal consequence, the partner

whose authority is thus declined cannot bind the copartner-
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ship in favor of those who have knowledge of this fact: Gal-

~wa_1/ vs. Matthew, 1 Campb. 403; S. C. I0 East 264; Willis vs.

D3/son, 1 Stark; 164. Nothing can be more reasonable than

~that a person may protect himself in this manner against the

Ac1ion, ngninst Gnd reek and Egbert D. reek, as copartnC'r&
under the firm name of Egbert D. l'C'ck, to recover upon a.
promissory note made by Egbert to Gad, and by him endorsed
to plaintiff. There was evidence that Gad was a durniant
partner with J<:gbert, but Gad denied this and also 1n·on•d that
when plaintiff applic·d to him to sign the note with Egbert he
liad refused to do so, but agreed to indorse it and did in1lorse '
it, and that J>laintilI accepted it. Verdict fo1· ~HI and

~"1ppcalcd.

/\/(_/?,-._.;_ ·\_.J ,~. {

fraud and misconduct of his associate. The principle under

consideration is not founded at all on any supposed waiver by

the creditor; but solely and exclusively on the declaration of

the person declining to be bound. The implied authority of

N. Smitl! mu] 1'1ri11i119, for ap11cllant.

'
Staples and Denison., contra..

his partner he has annihilated; and the contract in the name

of the ﬁrm is of no validity beyond the personal obligation it

infers on the individual making it.

Vvhether a person in any given case has rebutted the implied

authority of his partner to-bind him, is a question of fact. On

this head I am inclined to think the charge to the jury wag

incorrect. They were directed, if Gad Peck was a dormant

partner with Egbert, and refused to give a joint note with

~_ "5 <3?

Ilos:'lrnn, C. J. It is a well establiflhed principle that the
contract of a partner is obliiwtory on bis copartner, by virtue
of an implied authority wllich may be rebutted by a refusal to
be bound by his acts. Ily legal consequence, the partn_er
whose authority is thus declined cannot bind the copartnership in favor of those who Jmve knowledge <>f this fact: Ga1,..
·way t:s. Mattlw1v, 1 Campb. 403; S. C. to East 264; lVillis vs.
Dyson, 1 Stark. 164. Nothing can be more reasonable than
·that a pel'son may protect himBelf in this manner against the
fraud and misconduct of bis associate. The principle under
consideration is not founded at all on any supposed waiver by
the creditor; but solely and exclusively on the declaration of
the person declining to be bound. The implied authority of
bis partner he has annihilated; and the contract in the name
of the firm is of no validity beyond the personal obligation it
infers on the individual making it.
'Vhether a person in any given case has rebutted the implied
nuthority of his partner to bind him, is a question of fact. On
this head I am inclined to think the charge to the jury was
in<'orrect. They were directed, if Gad reek was a dormant
partner with Egbert, and refused to give a joint note with

~

WIPPERMAN vs. Snot. 809

him, to render a verdict for the defendant. The charge

WIPPEIUU.N VS. STACY.

809

involved this principle, that a refusal by Gad Peck to put his

name to the note in suit was necessarily a. revocation of

Egbert’s implied authority. This ascribed a consequence to

the act of Gad Peck which the premises did not warrant. It

is very possible that he might decline aﬂixing his signature

to the note, and not refuse to be bound by his acts as a partner.

l am aware that there is a diﬂiculty attending the prohibition

of Egbert’s authority without dissolving the partnership, but

l do not consider it as insuperable. If it should appear that

Gad Peck did not merely decline to execute a. joint note with

Egbert, but refused to be bound by his acts, at all events,

and this was clearly understood by the plaintiff, I should con-

sider him as within the principle of the cited cases.

The ignorance of the plaintiffs relative to the existence of \

the copartnership could be of no avail. It is true, they did

not know that Gad Peck was partner with Egbert; and of con-

sequence, they could not foreee the manner in which his

refusal to become bound as joint promisor would operate. But

they would know, and this alone was necessary, that if Egbert
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were a partner, his authority was disclaimed. The opposite

principle involves this proposition: that the plaintiff must have

knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal

would extend. Sufficient is it, if they know the fact, that in

every conceivable shape, Gad Peck refued to be bound by the

note of Egbert.

New trial to be granted.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 163.

WIPPERMAN vs. STACY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.

so Wis. 345, 50 N. w. Rep. ass.

Action for the price of goods sold by Wipperman to Green

and Stacy. Recovery below and Stacy appeals.

The defendants, F. F. Green and W. H. Stacy, on the 26th

day of October, 1888, entered into an agreement whereby

him, to render a verdict for the defendant. The charge
involved tbie principle, that a refusal by Gad Peck to put hie
name to the note in suit was necessarily a revocation of
Egbert's implied authority. This ascribed a consequenee to
the act of Gad Peck which the premises did not warrant. It
is very possible that he might decline affixing his signature
to the note, and not refuse to be bound by bis acts ae a partner.
1 am aware that there is a difficulty attending the prohibition
of Egbert's authority without dissolving the partnership, but
I do not consider it as insuperable. If it should appear that
Gad Peck did not merely decline to execute a joint note with
Egbert, but refused to be bound by his acts, at all events,
and this was cleal'ly understood by the plaintiff, I should con·
sider him as within the principle of the cited cases.
The ignorance of the plaintiffs relative to the existence of\
the copartnership could be of no avail. It is true, they did
not know that Gad Peck was partner with Egbert; and of consequence, they could not foresee the manner in which bis
refusal to become bound as joint promisor would operate. But
they would know, and this alone was necessary, that if Egbert
were a partner, bis authority was disclaimed. The opposite
principle involves this proposition: that the plaintiff must have
knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal
would extend. Sufficient is it, if they know the fact, that in
every conceivable shape, Gad Peck refused to be bound by the
note of Egbert.
New trial to be granted.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 168.

WIPPERMAN vs. STACY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.
80 Wis. 34/'i, 50 N. W . Rt>p. 836.

Action for the price of goods sold by 'Vipperman to Green
and Stacy. Recovery below and Stacy appeals.
The defendants, F. F. Green and W. H. Stacy, on the 26th
day of October, 1888, entered into an ag1·eement whereby

310 Osszs on PARTSEl{SLl1l’.

defendant Green was to put in his time and labor, and the
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said Stacy was to furnish $20,000 in money or credits, to carry

on the business of retail merchandise at the village of Keshena,

in this state, and they were to share the proﬁts of said business

equally. The said Green was to have the purchasing of all

goods that were used in said store, but of parties named by

said Stacy. Stacy resided at Clintonville, a considerable dis-

tance from Keshena, and Green resided at Keshena with his

family. Plaintitf had been in the habit of selling goods to

the concern at Kcshena on the order of Green, and by the con-

sent of Stacy, up to the 3d day of December, 1888. On that

day Stacy served upon the plaintiff the following notice:

“Clintonville, Wisconsin, Dec. 3d, 1888. Dear Sir: Don’t

let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me unless by

an order [upon order] from Clintonville,given by me. [Signed.]

W. H. Stacy.” About that time Stacy published in a Clinton-

ville paper the following notice: “Notice is hereby given that

I, \V. H. Stacy, do forbid all and every one from selling F. F.

Green, in my name, anything of any kind or nature, for I will

not pay for the same, nor hold myself responsible. [Signed.]

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

VV. H. Stacy.” Of the goods sued for, part were sold and

delivered and went into the Keshena store before, and part

after, the service of the above notice; and they were used or

sold and accounted for in said store; and Stacy knew that at

least some of them were so sold and delivered and used or

sold in said store after the service of said notice, and without

any objection from him. Stacy was often at the store, and

knew what business was done, and all the bills for the same

were present in the store, open to his observation and inspec-

tion.

Benjamin M. Goldberg (Charles Barber, of counsel), for

appellant.

E. J. Goodrich, for respondents.

OR'roN, J. (After stating the facts.) The referee found, in

both cases, that the defendant Stacy, by his acts and conduct,

previous and subsequently to said notice, in receiving the

plaintitf’s goods without hindrance or objection, and selling

the same, and applying the proceeds to the use and beneﬁt of

the said copartnership, ratiﬁed and approved or consented to

the doings and acts of his copartner, F. F. Green, in said

”__"'__ “=““'~;§

defendant Green was to put in his time and labor, and the
said Stacy was to furnish $20,000 in money or credits, to carry
on the business of retail merchandise at the village of Kesbena,
in this state, and they were to share the profits of said business
equally. The said Green was to have the purchasing of all
goods that were used in said store, but of parties named by
said Stacy. 8tar.y resided at Clintonville, a considerable distance from Keshena, and Green resided at Keshena with his
family. Plaintiff had been in the habit of selling goods to
the concern at Keshena on the order of Green, and by the conRent of Stacy, up to tlle 3d day of December, 1888. On that
day Stacy served upon the plaintiff the following notice:
"Clintonyille, '\Visconsin, Dec. 3d, 1888. Dear Sir: Don't
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me unless by
an ord2r [upon order] from Clintonville, given by ri1e. [Signed.]
W. H. Stacy/' About that time Stacy published in a Clinton·
ville paper the following notice: "Notice is hereby given that
I, ,V, H. Stacy, do forbid all and every one from selling F. F.
Green, in my nnme, anything of any kind or nature, for I will
not pay for tbe same, nor hold myself responsible. [Signed.]
'\V. H. Stacy." Of the goods sued for, part were sold and
delivered and went into the Keshena store before, and part
after, the service of the above notice; and they were used or
sold and accounted for in said store; and Stacy knew that at
least some of them were so sold and delivered and used or
sold in said store after the service of said notice, and without
any objection from him. Stacy was often at the store, and
. knew what business was done, and all the bills for the same
were present in the store, open to bis observation and inspection.
Benjamin M. Goldberg (Charles Barber, of counsel), for
appellant.
E. J. Goodrick, for respondents.

OnToN, J. (After stating the facts.) The referee found, in
both cases, that the defendant Stacy, by his acts and conduct,
previous and subsequently to said notice, in receiving the
plaintiff's ~oods without hindrance or objection, and selling
the same, and applying the proceeds to the use and benefit of
the said copartnership, ratified and approved or consented to
the doings and acts of bis copartner, F. F. Green, in said
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matter. This ﬁnding appears to have been fully warranted by

the evidence. These are the substantial and material facts,

and, as a question of fact, we cannotdisturb the ﬁnding of the

referee. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that

the ﬁrm is not liable for any goods sold to it by the order of

Green after the service of that notice. There was no provision

in the agreement of copartnership for any such notice to those

who are selling goods to the concern, not to sell on Green’s

order. There is a clause, “that said goods shall be purchased

of parties named by said WV. H. Stacy.” That can have force

only as between Stacy and Green. Stacy may name to Green

the parties from whom he shall purchase goods for the concern.

From the fact that the plaintiff had been selling goods to the

ﬁrm for a long time by the consent and acquiescence of Stacy,

the presumption would be that he was one of the parties named

by Stacy. There is no evidence that Stacy had ever notiﬁed

Green that he should not continue to purchase good-s of the

plaintiff. It follows that Green had the right to continue to

purchase of the plaintiﬂ’. If Green had such right, then the

plaintiff had the right to sell to him, so far as the agreement
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is concerned. It is stipulated that Green should have the

purchasing of all goods that are used in said store. The only

limitation of that right was that Stacy should name the parties

from whom purchases might be made by him, and that limita-

tion Stacy has never attempted to enforce upon Green. Green

had the right, therefore, to purchase from whom he pleaed. If

Green had the right to purchase, the plaintiff had the right to

sell. ¥Vhat right had Stacy to forbid the plaintiﬁ’ from selling

to Green or any-one else? The agreement contains no such

provision. This must be the legal construction of the agree-

ment. But the notice is not that the plaintiff shall not sell

to the ﬁrm of Stacy & Green for their store. But it is: “Don’t

let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me, unless by

order [or upon order] given by me.” The notice provided for

in the agreement is personal to Stacy and Green as individuals.

“Don’t let Green have anything on my account, without my

order,” is the effect of the notice. The plaintiff had the right

to construe and undertand this notice according to its lan-

guage. The plaintiff had no notice from Stacy not to sell

goods to the partnership to be charged to the partnership. The

notice, therefore, has no effect whatever upon the liability of

matter. This finding appears to have been fully warranted by
the evidence. These are the substantial and material facts,
und, as a question of fact, we cannot'disturb the finding of the
referee. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that
the firm is not liable for any goods sold to it by the order of
Green after the sen·ice of that notice. There was no provision
in the agreement of copartnership for any such notice t-0 those
who are selling goods to the concern, not to sell on Green~s
order. There is a clause, "that said goods shall be purchased
of parties named by said \V. H. Stacy." That can have force
only as between Stacy and Green. Stacy may name to Green
the parties from whom he shall purchase goods for the concern.
F1·om the fact that the plaintiff had been selling goods fo the
firm for a long time by the consent and acquiescence of Stacy,
the presumption would be that he was one of the parties named
by Stacy. There is no evidence that Stacy had ever notified
. Green that he should not continue to purchase goods of the
plaintiff. It follows that Green had the right to continue to
purchase of the plaintiff. If Green had such right, then the
plaintiff had the right to sell to him, so far as the agreement
is concerned. It is stipulated that Green should have the
purchasing of all goods that are used in said store. The only
limitation of that riglit was that Stacy should name the parties
from whom purchases might he made by him, and that limitation Stacy bas never attempted to enforce upon Green. Green
had the right, therefore, to purchase from whom be pleased. If
Green had the right to purchase, the plaintiff had the right to
sell. \Vhat right had Stacy to forbid the plaintiff from selling
to Green or any one else? The agreement contains no such
provision. This must be the legal construction of the agreement. But the notice is not that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the firm of Stacy & Green for theil' store. But ,it is: "Don't
let F . F. Green have anything to be charged to me, unless by
order [or upon order] given by me." The notice provided for
in the agreement is personal to Stacy and Green as individuals.
"Don't let Green have anything on my account, without my
order," is the effect of the notice. The plaintiff had the right
to construe and understand this notice according to its language. The plaintiff had no notice from Stacy not to sell
goods to the partnership to be charged to the partnership. The
notice, therefore, has no effect whatever upon the liability of
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the ﬁrm, even if Stacy had any right to give it. But if the

notice can be construed to mean that the plaintiff shall not sell

to the concern to be charged to the concern, which was the only

thing he had been doing or offered to do, it is equally nugatory,

because not provided for in the agreement.

The only other contention of the learned counsel is that

the agreement does not constitute a copartnership between

Stacy and Green. It seems to us that it contains every essen-

tial element of a partnership. Stacy was to contribute his

money, and Green his skill and labor as a merchant, and to

conduct the business and make all the purchases, and they

were each to have one-half the proﬁts. Although there is no

provision that each was to bear one-half of the losses, the equal

division of the proﬁts implies that of the losses. Upham vs.

Hewitt, 42 YVis. 85. As is said in that case, where there was no

such express provision, “there was necessarily a communion of

proﬁt and loss.” Rosenﬁcld vs. Height, 53 Wis. 260, 10 N. W.

Rep. 378, 40 Am. Rep. 770, 1 Lindl.1’artn. 12; see Gilbank vs.

Stephenson, 31 Wis. 592, and other cases cited in respondent’s

brief. But the evidence that Stacy knew that these goods
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were being sold to the ﬁrm, and that they were received into

the store, and were being sold out, and tacitly assented to the

purchases, and participated in the proﬁts derived therefrom,

without dissent or objection, is a ratiﬁcation of the purchases,

and it is now too late for him to shield himself by such a

notice, even if it had been given to Green himself with the

knowledge of the plaintiﬁ. The liability of the partnership

is beyond question.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § I63.
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the ftrm, even if Stacy bad any right to give it. But if the
notice can be construed to mean that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the concern to be charged to the concern, which was the only
thing he had been doing or offered to do, it is equally nugatory,
because not provided for in the agreement.
The only othe1• contention of the learned counsel is that
the agreement does not constitute a copartnershlp between
Stacy and Green. It seems to us that it contains evecy essential element of a partnership. Stacy was to contribute bis
money, and Green his skill and labor as a merchant, and to
conduct the business and make all the purchases, and they
were each to have one-half the profits. Although there is no
provision that each was to bear one-half of the losses, the equal
division of the profits implies that of the losses. Upham vs.
Hewitt, 42 Wis. 85. As is said in that case, where there was no
such express provision, "there was necessarily a communion of
profit and loss." Rosenfield vs. Haight, 53 "\Vis. 260, 10 N. W.
Rep. 378, 40 Am. Rep. 770, 1 Lindi. Partn. 12. See Gilbank vs.
Stephenson, 31 Wis. 59~, and other cases cited in respondent's
brief. But the evidence that Stacy knew that these goods
were being sold to the firm, and that they were received into
the store, and were being sold out, and tacitly assented to the
purchases, and participated in the profits derived therefrom,
without dissent or objection, is a ratification of the purchases,
and it is now too late for him to shield himself by such a
notice, even if it had been given to Green himself with the
knowledge of the plaintiff. The liability of the partnership
is beyond question.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
NoTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § i63.
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WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF A PARTNER.

(See also the cases under Subd. IX, ante.)

1. In Oonrrcscr.

PITKIN vs. BENFER.

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1893.

50 Kan. 108, 31 Pac. Rep. 695, 84 Am. St. Rep. 110.

x.

Action by Geo. W. Pitkin & Co. against John Y. Benfer, H.

C. Settle and L. B. Keith, as copartners doing business under

the ﬁrm name of John Y. Benfer, to recover for goods sold and

delivered. There had been such a ﬁrm, but, in pursuance of a

notice given in January, it was dissolved on the last day of

WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF A PARTNER.

February, 1888. Benfer gave a written order for the goods on

(See also the cases under Subd. IX, ante.)

February 9, but stipulated that they should not be shipped

until March 1, 1888. Plaintiffs, at the time of the sale, did

not know of the partnership, and charged the goods to Benfer.

1. IN CONTRACT.

Judgment below was in favor of Settle and Keith, and plaintitf

appealed.

H. (7. Solomon, for plaintiffs.

Wells ¢€ Wells, for defendants.

Jonxsrox, J. (After stating the facts.) It is insisted by

PITKIN vs. BENFER.
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plaintitfs in error that, as Settle and Keith were dormant part-

ners of the ﬁrm of John Y. Benfer, they are liable for the goods

Supreme Court of Kansas, 1892.

ordered during the existence of the partnership. It will be

observed that, while the goods were ordered during the con-

ISO Kan. 108, 81 Pac. Rep. 695, 24 Am. St. Rep. 110.

tinuance of the partnership, they were not to be shipped or

delivered until the partnership had expired. By agreement of

the parties the partnership was to be discontinued on the last

day of February,1888,and Benfer ordered the goods in his own

name, to be shipped the day after the dissolution of the partner'-

40

Action by Geo. W. Pitkin & Co. against John Y. Benfer, H.
C. Bettle and L. B. Keith, as copartners doing business under
the firm name of John Y. Benfer, to recover for goods sold and
delivered. There bad been such a firm, but, in pursuance of a
notice given in January, It was dissolved on the last day of
February, 1888. Benfer gave a written order for the goods on
February 9, but stipulated that they should not be shipped
until March 1, 1888. Plaintiffs, at the time of the sale, did
not know of the partnership, and charged the goods to Benfer.
Judgment below was in favor of Settle and Keith, and plaintiff
appealed.
H. 0. Solomon, for plaintiffs.
Wells~

Wells, for defendants.

JOHNSTON, J. (After sta.ting the facts.) It Is insisted by
plaintiffs in error that, as Settle and Keith were dormant partners of the firm of John Y. Benfer, they are liable for the goods ,
ordered during the existence of the partnership. It will be 1
observed that, while th·e goods were ord€red during the continuance of the partnership, they were not to be shipped or
deJiYercd until the partnership had expired. By agreement of
the parties the partnership was to be discontinued on the last
day of February,1888,and Benfer orde1·ed the goods in his own
name, to be shipped the day after the dissolution of the partner40
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ship occurred. It is true, as contended, that the persons who

participate in the proﬁts of a trade or business ostensibly car-

ried on by another are liable for contracts made and credits

given during the existence of the partnership. The credit is not

presumed to have been given on the sole and separate respon-

sibility of the ostensible partner, but binds all for whom the

partner acts, if done in their business and for their beneﬁt,

to the same extent as though the partnership had been open

and avowed. Here, however, no goods had been furnished, no

sale made, nor was any credit given while the partnership

existed. Particular attention is called to the case of Bromley

-vs. Elliot, 38 N. H. 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182, as being on all fours

with the case at bar. In that case the goods were furnished

and the credit given while the dormant partner was a mem-

ber of the ﬁrm. He received the beneﬁts of the transaction,

and, according to all the authorities, was equally liable with

the ostensible partner. The distinction in this case is that the

goods were not received while Settle and Keith were connected

with the partnership, nor was it intended by Benfer that they

should be shipped and delivered to the ﬁrm. Knowing that
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the partnership would expire with the month of February, Ben-

fer ordered the goods in his own name, and particularly

directed that they should not be shipped to him until the 1st.

of March, after the expiration of the partnership. It was evi-

dently his intention that no sale or shipment would be made

to the ﬁrm, and that delivery would be purposely deferred until

he would have absolute control of the business. No beneﬁts

were received by Settle and Keith from the transaction, nor

was there any credit given to the ﬁrm for these goods while

they were members of it. A dormant partner, when discov-

ered, is liable to the same extent as an ostensible partner, but

no further; and, if the partnership had been open and avowed

in this case, and its duration known, and Benfer had ordered

goods in its own name, to be shipped and delivered after the

dissolution of the partnership, Settle and Keith would not have

been liable for the value of the same. Judge S'ronY, in speak-

ing of the liability of dormant partners, remarks that “of

course, the retiring partner is not, by his retirement, exoner~

ated from the prior debts and liabilities of the ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst

place, then, a dormant partner is not liable for any debts or

other contracts of the ﬁrm, except for those which are con-

?---— ~i _i 1

ship occurred. It is true, as contended, that the persons who
participate in the profits of a trade or business ostensibly carried on by another are liable for contracts made and credits
given during the existence of the partnership. The credit is not
presumed to have been given on the sole and separate responsibility of the ostensible partner, but binds all for whom the
partner acts, if done in their business and for their benefit,
to the same extent as though the partnership bad been open
and avowed. Here, however, no goods had been furnished, no
sale made, nor was any credit given while the partnership
existed. Particular attention is called to the case of Brom'ley
t:B. Elliot, 38 N. H. 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182, as being on all fours
with the case at bar. In that case the goods were furnished
and the credit given while the dormant partner was a member of the firm. He received the benefits of the transaction,
and, according to all the authorities, was equally liable with
the ostensible partner. The distinction in this case is that the
goods were not received while Settle and Keith were connected
with the partnership, nor was it intended by Benfer that they
should be shipped and delivered to the firm. Knowing that
the partnership would expire with the month of February, Benfer ordered the goods in his own name, and particularly
directed that they should not be shipped to him until the 1st
of March, after the expiration of the partnership. It was evidently his intention that no sale or shipment would be made
to the fl.rm, and that delivery would be purposely deferred until
he would have absolute control of the business. No benefits
were received by Settle and Keith from the transacti-On, nor
was there any credit given to the firm for these goods while
they were members of it. A dormant partner, when discovered, is liable to the same extent as an ostensible partner, but
no further; and, if the partnership bad been open and avowed
in this case, and its duration known, and Benfer had ordered
goods in its own name, to be shipped and delivered after the
dissolution of the partnership, Settle and Keith would not have
been liable for the value of the same. Judge STonY, in speaking of the liability of dormant partners, remarks that "of
course, the retiring partner is not, by his retirement, exonerated from the prior debts and liabilities of the firm. In the first
place, then, a dormant partner is not liable for any debts or
other contracts of the firm, except for those which a.re con-
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tracted during the period that he remains a dormant partner.
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Upon his retirement, his liability ceases, as it began, dc jure,

only with his accession to the ﬁrm. The reason is that no

credit is, in fact, in uch case, giv'en to the dormant partner.

His liability is created by operation of law, independent of

his intention, from his mere participation in the proﬁts of the

business; and therefore it ceases by operation of law as soon

as such participation in the proﬁts ceases, whether notice of his

retirement be given or not.” Story, Partn. § 159. See, also,

Pars. Partn. (3d Ed.) p. 451. Here no liability was created

until Settle and Keith had retired from the ﬁrm. The goods

never came into the possession of the ﬁrm, nor was it the pur-

pose that they should. They were sold to Benfer, and came

into his individual possession as his own property, and he sold

them as such. We think the court correctly held that he alone

was liable for the price of the same. A

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

All the justices concurred.

NOTE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §§ 193, 265.

GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1850.

22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 64.

Action by Griﬁith & Co. against Buffum and Ainsworth as

partners, to recover for marble sold to Butfum. Judgment to

account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor was

appointed to report the facts. Judgment was rendered for the

defendants upon the report. The facts appear from the

tracted during the period that be remains a dormant partner.
Upon bis retirement, his liability ceases, as it began, de jure,
only with his accession to the firm. The reason is that no
credit is, in fact, in such case, given to the dormant partner.
His liability is created by operation of law, independent of
his intention, from his mere participation in the profits of the
businetis; and therefore it ceases by operation of law as soon
as such participation in the profits ceases, whether notice of his
retirement be given or not." Story, Partn. § 150. See, also,
l'ars. Partn. (3d Ed.) p. 451. Ilere no liability was created
until Settle and Keith had retired from the firm. The goods
never came into the possession of the firm, nor was it the purpose that they should. '£hey were sold to Benfer, and came
into his individual possession as his own property, and he sold
them as such. \Ve think the court correctly held that he alone
was liable for the price of the same.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
All the justices concurred.

opinion.

Cook, Harrington ¢€- Ross, for the plaintiffs.

NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.• §a Ul3, 2G3.

D. E. Niclwlson, for the defendants. ~

HALL, J. The question for our decision is, whether, upon

the facts reported by the auditor, the defendants are properly

chargeable with the marble slabs sold and delivered by the

plaintiffs to the defendant Buffum.

GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM.

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1850.
22 Vt. 181, M Am. Dec. 64.

Action by Griffith & Co. against Buffum and Ainsworth as
partners, to recover for marble sold to Buffum. Judgment to
account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor was
appointed to report the facts. Judgment was rendered for the
defendants upon the report. The facts appear from the
opinion.
Cook, Harrington & Ross, for the plaintiffs.

D. E. Nicholson, for the defendants.
HALL, J. The question for our decision IR, whether, upon
the facts reported by the auditt>r, the defendants are properly
chargeable with the marble slabs sold and delivered by the
plaintiffs to the defendant Buffum.
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concern, and the seller is not aware of the existence of the

partnership, he may, when he discovers it, have the beneﬁt of

the partnership liability. The ground of making the partner-

j There seems to be no doubt that if one partner purchase

ship ﬁrm liable is, that the property having been obtained

for their joint beneﬁt and to enable them to make a common

proﬁt, it is but just that they should be jointly liable to pay

for it. _

It is doubtless essential to the validity of such a. claim

by the vendor that the partnership should have been unknown

to him at the time of the sale; for if he were aware of the

partnership, or ignorant of it through his own fault, he would

be presumed to have made his election to give credit to the

individual instead of the ﬁrm, and having made such election,

would be bound by it: 3 Steph. N. P. 2402.

It is not claimed on the part of thefdefendants that the

plaintiffs had any knowledge that they were partners. The

existence of such partnership is denied, and the question is,

whether the defendants were in fact partners.
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It is true, that two or more persons may be made liable to

third persons as ‘partners, when, as between themselves, they

are really not so. But such liability only arises when third

persons have trusted to their credit—have parted with their

property upon the faith of the acts or declarations of the

supposed partners, indicating that they were such. In this

they gave no credit to the ﬁrm, but trusted Buffum only; and

if Ainsworth is to be made liable, it can only be because he was

fase the plaintiffs were not deceived by any false appearances;

really and truly a partner with Butfum.

In order to constitute a partnership between the parties

themselves, it is necesary that they should have a common

interest in the Proﬁt and loss of the business in which they

are engaged.

It is not essential that each should furnish a share of the

capital or property which is to become the stock or subject

matter of the business of the partners.

One may furnish the capital or stock, and another con-

tribute his labor and skill. And if it be agreed between

the parties that one shall furnish on his own account a par-

ticular kind of stock to. he used in the business, yet if,

_»-—- .-l>___ T

· There seems to be no doubt that if one partner purchase
property upon his single credit, for the use of the partnership
concern, and the seller is not aware of the existence of the
partnership, he may, when he discovers it, have the benefit of
the partnership liability. The ground of making the partner·
s ip firm liable is, that the property having been obtained
for their joint benefit and to enable them to make a common
profit, it is but just that they should be jointly liable to pay
for it.
It is doubtless essential to the validity of such a claim
by the vendor that the partnership should have been unknown
to him at the time of the sale; for if be were aware of the
partnership, or ignorant of it through his own fault, be would
be presumed to have made his election to give credit to the
individual instead of the firm, and having made such election,
would be bound by it: 3 Steph. N. P. 2402.
It is not claimed on the part of the ·defendants that the
· plaintiffs had any knowledge that they were partners. The
existence of such partnership is denied, and the question is,
whether the defendants were in fact partners.
It is true, that two or more persons may be made liable to
third persons as 'partners, when, as between themselves, the,-,
are really not so. But such liability only arises when third
persons have trusted to their credit-have parted with their
property upon the faith of the acts or declarations of the
upposed partners, indicating that they were s_uch. In this
case the plaintiffs were not deceived by any false appea.rances;
they gave no credit to the firm, but trusted Buffum only; and
if Ainsworth is to be made liable, it can only be because be was
l'E'ally and truly a partner with Buffum.
In order to constitute a partnership between the parties
themselves, it is necesary that they should have a common
interest in the profit and loss of the business in which they
a re engaged.
It is not essential that each should furnish a share of the
cnpital or property which is to become the stock or subject
matter of the business of the partners.
One may furnish the capital or stock, and another contribute his labor and skill. And if it be agreed b~tween
the parties that one shn 11 furnish on his own nccount a par·
t icular kind of stock to . be used in the business, yet if,
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when purchased, it becomes the subject of labor and ‘skill,
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and in its altered state is to be sold for the common beneﬁt,

it constitutes a partnership business; and if such particu-

lar kind of stock be purchased on his own account by the

party who is by the agreement to furnish it, yet the seller, on

discovering the partnership, may make the ﬁrm chargeable

for it. This position is sustained by many authorities referred

to in the argument: 3 Kent‘s Com. 26; S_r/lrcstcr 1:8. Smith,

9 Mass. 119; Ercritt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347. ‘

In the present case the parties agreed to work together in

the business of manufacturing marble. Butfum was to furnish

the marble and Ainsworth to pay him one-half of the cost

of it. Buffum was to board Acinsworth, and both were to con-

tribute their labor and skill in the business; and the products

and avails of the business were to be equally divided between

them. We think the parties became strictly partners as

between themselves. \Vhatever the manufactured articles

should sell for, above the‘ cost of the materials and labor

bestowed upon them, would be proﬁts, which the parties were

to share in common; and if the sale should be for less than such
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cost, the parties would suffer a loss, which would fall equally

on both. The defendants thus having a common interest in

the proﬁts and loss of the business, and the marble charged in

the plaintitf’s account having been used by the defendants

in such business, we think they are liable for it as partners.

The judgment of the county court is therefore reversed, and

judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount

of their account, as reported by the auditor.

No'rs.—See Mcchenfs Elem. of Partn., § 197.

when pnrcliai;tc>d, it becomes the subjrct of labor and 'skill,
and in its altered state is to be sold for the common benefit,
it ronstitutes a partnership business; and if such particular kind of stock be purchased on his own ael'·ount by the
party who is by the agreC'ment to furnish it, yet the seller, on
discovering the partnership, mn~· make the fi1·m chargeal>le
for it. This position is sustained by many authorities referred
1o in the al'gument: a Kent's Com. 2G; Sylt-cslcl" t:s. Smith,
9 l\lass. 110; Ercritt tis. Chapman, G Conn. :3-17.
In the present case the parties agreed to work together in
the business of manufacturing marble. Buffum was to furnish
the ~arble and Ainsworth to pay him one-half of the cost
of it. Buffum was to board Ainsworth, and both were to contribute their labor and skill in the business; and the products
and avails of the business were to be equally divided between
them. \Ve think the pa.rties became strictly partners as
between themselves. \Vhatever the manufactured articles
ehould sell for, above the· cost of the materials and labor
bestowed upon them, would be profits, which the parties were.
to share in common; and if the sale should be for less than such
cost, the parties would suffer a loss, which would fall equally
on both. The defendants thus having a common interest in
the profits and loss of the business, and the marble charged in
the plaintiff's account having been used by the defendants
in such business, we think they are liable for it as partners.
The judgment of the county court is thPrefore reversed, and
judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount
of their account, as reported by the auditor.
NOTli:.-5ee :Mechem•s Elem. of Partn., § 197.
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CLEVELAND vs. VVOODVVARD.

Supreme Court of Vermont, 1843.

15 Vt. 302. 40 Am. Dec. 682.

A ction u a book account. The 0 ' /lop sufﬁ iently states

the case.

S. H. <6 . F. Ho ges, for the plaintiff. p

CLEVELAND vs. WOODWARD.

By Court, W'|Lr.1Ans, C. J. This case seems to be conclu-

sively settled by authority. The plaintiff had dealings with

Bupreme Coterl of Vermont, 1848.

the defendant. The only dispute is in relation to the four last

items in the plaintiiT’s account, which were for labor performed

on a farm, of which the defendant and Stillman Woodward

were owners, and which they carried on in company. The

Action

not know of the existence of the company until after the com-

mencement of this suit. If these items are disallowed, the

balance would be due to the defendant. It is to be remem-

.the ease.

°},

15 Vt. 802, 40 Am. Dec. 682.

bered that it is only in this action that advantage can be taken

8. H. 4:

[defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the labor, who did

r

a book account.

• F'. Ho

Tpe o~SU.?Jient11 statBS

~~

es, for the plaintiff.

_

IS settled that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be a creditor

of two, one of whom he did not know, as his joint debtors, and

not be the sole creditor of the one he does know. In the case
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of Dubois vs. Ludert, 5 Taunt. 609, it was decided that if a man

enters into a contract with one person, not knowing he has a

partner, it is competent for that partner, being sued, to plead.

in abatement, that he has other partners who are not joined.

That case, however, stands alone, and is opposed to the deci-

sion in the case of Baldney vs. Ritchie, 1 Stark. N. P. Cas. 338;

Doe vs. Clzippmden, there cited; to the opinion of Lord Enraox

in I-1.1: parte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, and directly overruled by

Lord TENTERIJEN, in Mullett rs. Hook, Moo. & M. 88, and by the

court of king’s bench, in the case of De Jllautort vs. Saunders,

1 Barn. & Adol. 398. By these cases it is fully settled that,

even in the case of a general partnership, if a contract is made

with one of two partners alone, and the plaintiff is not aware

that he is dealing with the partnership, and it is not disclosed

If the non-joinder of a joint debtor, on trial of the merits. It

1

_ _ - _,, ___._.m_ 4

J

I

J

By Court, 'VJLI.IAllS, C. J. This case seeml!I to be conc1uBfyely settled by authority. The plaintitJ had dealings with
tht~ defendant. The only dispute is in relation to the four last
Items in the plaintiff's account, which were for labor performed
on tt farm, of which the defendant and Stillman Woodward
were owners, and which they carried on in company. The
defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the labor, who did
[ not know of the existence of the company until after the commencement of this suit. If these items are disallowed, thP.
balance would be due to the defendant. It is to be remembered that it is only in th.is action that advantage can be takPn
f the non-joinder of a joint debtor, on trial of the merits. It
s settled that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be a creditor
f two, one of whom he did not know, as his joint debtors, and
not be the sole creditor of the one he does know. In the case
of Dubois vs. liltdcrt, 5 Tmmt. 609, it was decided that if a man
enters into a contract with one person, not knowing he has a
partn<'r, it is competent for that partner, being sued, to plead,
In abatement, that he has other partners who are not joined.
That case, however, stands alone, and is opposed to the deci·
sion in the case of Baldney -vs. llitclt·ie, 1 Stark. N. P. Cas. 33S;
Doe tiS. Cllippenden, there cit«!d; to the opinion of Lord Er.noN
in E.:c pa.rte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, and directly overruled by
Lord TEXTEIWE~, in Mullett t'S. Hook, Moo. & M. 88, nnd by the
\!OUrt of king's bench, in the case of De Ma·utort va. Saundera,
1 Barn. & Adol. 398. By these cases it is fuIJy settled that,
even in the case of a general partnership, if a contract is made
-with one of two partners alone, and the plaintiff is not awal'c
that he is dealing with the partnership, and it is not disclosed

f:

BBnKsirrnE WooLEN Co. vs. JtrILLAnD.

Bsnxsnrni-: Woonun Co. vs. Jurnmnn. 319

319

to him by the defendant with whom he deals, the non-joinder

cannot be pleaded in abatement. A fortiori, it cannot be done

in the action on book, where a failure to recover might endan-

ger all the security he may have by attachment for his debts.

The judgment the county court is, therefore, atﬁrmed.

No'rE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., I 197. Compare with preceding

case. _

~i

to him b7 the defendant with whom he deals, the non-joinder
cannot be pleaded in abatement. A fortiori, it cannot be d-0ne
in the action on book, where a failure to recover might endanger alJ the security he may have by attachment for bis debts.
The judgment
the county court is, therefore, affirmed.

oj".

" BERKSHIRE woonniv co. vs. JUILLARD.

New York Court of Appeals, 1879.

75 N. Y. 535, 31 Am. Rep. 488.

NOTB.-See llechem•a Elem. of Pa.rtn.,

cue.

i 197. Compare with preceding

Action in the nature of a creditor’s bill. The opinion suffi-

ciently states the facts.

Thomas H. Hubbard, for appellant.

Charles M. Da Costa, for respondent.

RAPALLO, J. The bond upon which the hanks found their

.

Spragues & Co. is executed by all the six members of that ﬁrm,

BERKSHIRE WOOLEN CO. Ta• .JUILLARD.

and purports to be their joint obligation, as well as the several

obligations of each of them. It also purports to create a

New York Court of Appeals, 1819.

[laim against the copartnership assets of the ﬁrm of Hoyt,
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joint obligation on the part of any two or more of them. The

'3 N. Y. 585, 81 Am. Rep. .(89.

only aspect in which it is necessary to consider it on this

appeal, is as the joint obligation of all the members of the ﬁrm,

and the question presented is whether it can be enforced as

a copartnership obligation against the copartnership assets,

notwithstanding that the firm name is not mentioned therein,

Action in the nature of a creditor's bill. The opinion sufficiently states the facts.

but it appears on its face to he simply the joint obligation of

the copartners, contracted in their individual names, and is

Tlwmas H. Hubbard, for appellant•

under seal.

instrument, if it was executed in the business of the ﬁrm and

. Charles M. Da Costa, for respondent.

for its beneﬁt. it should be regarded as a copartnership obli-

K We are of the opinion that, notwithstanding the form of the

gation payable out of the copartnersliip funds.

In the present case it is quite clear from/ut\l%eQproofs that the

transaction in which the bond was givenA or the beneﬁt of

RAPALLO, J. The bond upon which the banks found their ,
·claim against the copartnership assets of the firm of Hoyt,
Spragues & Co. is executed by all the six members of that firm,
and purports to be their joint obligation, as well as the s~veral
obligations of each of them. It also purports to create a
Joint obligation on the part of any two or more of them. The
only aspect in which it is necessary to consider it on this
appeal, is as the joint obligation of all the members of the firm,
and the question presrntcd is whether it can be enforced as
a copartnership obligation against tlte copartnersbip assets,.
notwithstanding that the firm name is not mentioned therein,
but it appears on its face to be simply the joint obligation of
the copartners, contracted in their individual names, and is
under seal.
We are of the opinion that, no.twithstanding the form of the
nstrument, if it was ex. ecuted in the business of the firm and
or its benefit, it should be regarded as a copartnership obligation payable out of tbe copa.rtnership funds.
In the present case it is quite clear froll\JJle/'proofs that the
transaction in whic~ the bond was give~10r the benefit of

0
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the ﬁrm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., and that all but a fraction of

the sum advanced by the banks on the credit of the bond was

paid over by them to that firm. and ap-plied on account of its

claims against the Riverside Mills and the City \Voolen C0m~

pany. The loan from the banks to Chapin was negotiated by

Mr. Gallup, one of the firm of Iloyt, Spragiies & Co., in behalf

of that ﬁrm, as he testifies. The two companies last named

being indebted to Hoyt, Spragucs & Co. in a million of dollars:

for which indebtedness Mr. Chapin was surety, Mr. Gallup

negotiated the arrangement whereby the banks agreed to loan

to Mr. Chapin the sum of $600,000 on his notes for that amount,

secured by mortgage on his real estate and the collateral guai-~

anty of the bond in question executed by all the members of

the ﬁrm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co. All this was done to enable

Chapin to reduce the debt for which he was surety to Hoyt,

Spragues & Co, and accordingly he gave that ﬁrm orders on

the several banks for their respective proportions of the loan‘

of $600,000, all of which sums were paid to and receipted for

by Hoyt, Spragues 8: Co. except the ﬁrst six months’ interest

in advance, which was retained by the banks, and the sum
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of about $55.()0() of the principal sum loaned, which Hoyt,

Spragues & Co. do not appear to have received. The form of

the bond is peculiar, but seems to have been contrived for the

purpose of giving to the banks power to enforce it against

either the joint or separate estates of the members of the ﬁrm

of Hoyt, Spragues 8: Co., or any of them, as might prove mo-st

to the interest of the banks. From the nature of the trans~

action we think it must have been the intention of the parties

that the ﬁrm should be bound, and that the individual names

of all the partners were used for the reason that the instrument

was under seal, and that a several as well as joint liability was

desired. \\’e can see no objection to a ﬁrm binding itself in

that form, where the transaction is one for the account of the

partnership and all the partners unite in the act; while it

would be in the highest degree inequitable to deny to the credi-

tors whose funds have under such circumstances gone into and

increased the copartnership assets, the right of resorting to

those assets for repayment.

When funds or property are obtained on the obligation of

only a portion of the members of a ﬁrm, the fact that the prop-

erty thus obtained goes to the use of the ﬁrm is not of itself

i K *-I=n:m~_~_~==.1s=ma

the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., and that all but a fractioo of
t Ile sum advanced b~· the l>nnks on the credit of the bond was
paid over by them to that firm, nnd npplied on account of its
claims ngainst the Rh·l~rside Mills and the City 'Voolen Company. The loan from the banks to C!1:ipin was nC'gotiated by
Mr. Gallup, one of the firm of Ilo~·t, f\pr·a~ues & Co., in behalf
of that firm, as he testifiC's. 'fhe two companies last named
being indebted to Hoyt, Spragues & Co. in a million of dollars;
for which indebtedness Mr. Chapin was surety, Mr. Gallup
nC'gotiated the arrangement whereby the bnnks agreed to loan
to ~[r. Clwpin the sum of $GOO,OOO on his notc>s for that amount,
securc>d by mortgrige on his real estate and the collateral guar·
nnty of the bond in question executed by all the members of
the firm of Ilo,yt, Spragues & Co. All this was done to enable
Chapin to 1·educe the debt for which he was surety to Hoyt,
Rpragues & Co, and a<>cordingly he gal"e that firm orders on
t)le seyeral banks for their respective proportions of the load
. of f600,000, all of which sums were paid to and receipted for .
by Hoyt, Spragues & Co. except the first six months' interest
in advance, which was retainetl by the banks, and the sum
of about ~:15,000 of the pl'incipal sum loaned, which Iloyt,
Spragues & Co. do not appear to have received. 'l'he rorm of
the bond is peculiar, but seems to have been contrived for the
purpose of giving to tlle banks power to enforce it against
either the joint or separate estates of the rnernb(lrs of the firm
of Iloyt, Spragues & Co., or any of them, as might prove most
to the inte1·est of the banks. From the nature of the trans·
action we think it must have been the intention of the parties
that the firm should be bound, and that the individual names
of all the partners were used for the re:ison that the instrument
was under seal, and that a several as well as joint liability was
desired. '\Ye can see no objection to a firm binding itself in
that form, where the transaction is one for the account of the
partnership and all the partners unite in the act; while it
would be in the highest degree inequitable to deny to the creditors whose funds have under such circumstances gone into and
increased the copartnership assets, the right of resorting to
those assets for repayment.
When funds or property are obtained on the obligation of
only a portion of the members of a firm, the fact that the property thus obtained goes to the use of the firm is not of itself

Bsnxsnms Woo1.r;s Co. vs. J ornnsnn. 321

BERKSHIRE WooLEN

Co.

vs. Ju1LLARD.

821

is not only obtained for and applied to the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm‘

but is so obtained by the joint act and upon the joint written

obligation of all its members, and the credit is given to all,

the transaction is in substance a copartnership transaction,

though the ﬁrm name is not actually used in the writing and

though the partners may have superadded to their joint obli-

sufficient to render the ﬁrm liable. But where the properﬂi

gation the several liability of each of them. The cases cited

on the part of the appellant in support of the proposition that

the joint obligation of all the members of a ﬁrm is not equiva-

lent to an .,obligation of the ﬁrm do not sustain that propo-

sition, where the transaction i-s in the business or for the bene

ﬁt of the ﬁrm. In Forsyth vs. Woods, 11 \Vall. (U. S.) 486, the

reasoning is strictly conﬁned to an obligation contracted by

the members outside of the partnership business and proceeds

wholly on the ground that the ﬁrm property should be applied

in the ﬁrst instance to the payment of debts incurred for the

beneﬁt of the partnership, as its property presumably consists

of what has been obtained from its creditors. In Turner vs.

Jag/com, 40 N. Y. 470, I do not understand, from the note of
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the reporter, anything more than that the majority of the

court declined to hold as a general proposition that a note

signed by all the members of a ﬁrm was the same as one signed

by the ﬁrm. That no-thing more was decided is apparent from

the judgment, which sustained the note in that case as a

copartnership debt. In In re Weston, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 1, the

decision is placed upon the ground that the partners had

signed as sureties and there was no evidence that it was a

partnership transaction. In Ea: partc Stone, L. R. 8 Chan. App.

914, 917, where the obligation was shown to have been given

for money borrowed for partnership purposes, it was allowed

to be proved against the partnership estate though signed and

sealed by the partners as individuals without naming the ﬁrm.

IVe think it suﬁiciently appears in this case that the pur-

pose of the transaction was to raise money from the banks, to

be paid to the ﬁrm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., for which loans

Ghapin and his property were to be primarily liable to the

banks, and that the bond now in question was given by the

members of the ﬁrm to induce the banks to make the loan,

so that the ﬁrm might receive the avails in part payment of the

claims for which Chapin was liable to them as surety, and

41

sufficient to ·render the firm liable. But whe-re the propert
is not only ohtained for and applied to the benefit of the firm 1
but is so obtained by the joint act and upon the joint written
obligation of all its members, and the credit is given to all.
the transaction is in substance a copartnei'ship transaction,
though the firm name is not actually used in the writing and
though the partners may have superadded to their joint obligation the several liability of each of them. The cases cited
on the pnrt of the appellant in support of the proposition that
the joint obligntion of all the members of a firm is not equivalent to an obligation of the firm do not sustain that proposition, where the tr.msa.c tion i-s in the business or for the benefit o-f the firm. In Fo1·syth vs. Wood.s, 11 \Vall. (U. S.) 486, the
t•easoning is strictly confined to an obligation contracted by
the members outside of the partnership business and proceeds
wholly on the ground that the firm property should be applied
in the first instance to the payment of debts incurred for .the
benefit of the partnership, as its property presumably consist:a
of what has been obtained from its creditors. In Turner va.
J aycoz, 40 N. Y. 470, I do not understand, from the note of
the reporter, anything more than that the majority of the
court declined to hold as a general pt·oposition that a note
signed by all the members of a firm was the same as one signed
by the firm. That nothing m')re was decided is apparent from
the judgment, whi('h sustained the note in that case as a
copartnersbip debt. In In 1·e Weston, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 1, the
decision is placed upon the ground that the partners had
eigned ns sureties and there wns no evidence that it was a
pai·tnership transaction. In Ex partc Stone, L. R. 8 Chan. App.
014, 017, where the obligation was shown to have been given
for money borrowed for partnership purposes, it was all(}Wed
to be proveu against the partnership estate though signed and
sealed by the partners as inuivicluals without naming the firm.
We think it sutliciently appears in this case that the purpose of the transaction was to raise mon<.>y from the banks, to
be paid to the ftrrn of Hoyt, Sprngues & Co., for which loans
Chapin and his property were to be primarily liable to the
banks, and that the bond now in question was given by the
members of the firm to induce the banks to make the loan,
so that the firm might receive the avails in part payment of the
claims for which Chapin was liable to them as surety, and
41

/
322 Casts on PARTNERSHIP.

822

OAS.ES 011 PARTNEliSBIP.

/

that these circumstances are sufficient to justify the allowance

of the claims of the banks against the copartnership.

The orders should be atlirmed, with costs out of the fund.

All concur.

Orders atﬁrmed.

See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 200. _

It

thnt these circumstances are eumcient to justify the allowance
of the claims of the banks against the copartnership.
The orders should be afllrmed, with costs out of the fund.
All concur.
Orders aftlrmed.

HASTINGS NATIONAL BANK vs. HIBBARD.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1882.

8ee Hechem'• Elem. of Partn. , § 200.

..

48 Mich. 452, 12 N. W. Rep. 651.

.

Assumpsit. Plaintiff sued W. and M. Hibbard, Peter Graff

and Covode as makers, and Hinsdale and Philip Graft as

endorsers of a promissory note for $5,000 made and discounted

in December, 1879, and payable April 1, 1880, when it was dis-

honored. The only question which became material related to

the legal identity of the makers, who signed as “Hibbard &

HASTINGS NATIONAL BANK vs. HIBBARD.

Gratf.”

Buprcme Court of Michigan, 1882.

Upon certain facts there was no dispute. The two Hibbards

and Peter Graif for several years did business at Grand Rapids

48 Mich. 452, 12 N. W. Rep. 631• .
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under the name of Hibbard & G1-alt, and in that name ran two

ﬂouring mills, called the Valley City mills and the Crescent

mills. The Valley City mill was a rented building and had

only been occupied about a year. .

On January 27, 1879, Hibbard & Graﬁ formed a partnership

with Covode to run the Valley City mill, that ﬁrm to own

three-fourths and Covode'one-fourth interest. The business

was to be entirely distinct from the Crescent mill business, in

which Covode was to have no interest, although the business

so far as practicable was to be done in the Crescent mill oﬂice,

Assumpslt. Plalntitr sued W. and M. Hibbard, Peter Graf!
and Covode as makers, and Hinsdale and Philip Graff as
endorsers of a promissory note for f5,000 made and discounted
in December, 1879, and payable April 1, 1880, when it was di•
honored. The only question which became material related to
the legal identity of the makers, who signed as "Hibbard &

but the accounts were to be kept separate. Different book-

keepers kept the books, and the Valley City mill oﬁice was in

a different room from the other. The name of the new ﬁrm

was to be the same as the old one, Hibbard & Graff.

. After the new ﬁrm was organized letter heads were printed

which at the top contained the names of all four. Beneath

these names appeared the name Hibbard & Graft‘, as proprie-

Graff."

Upon certain facts there was no dispute. The two Hibbards
and Peter Graff for several years did business at Grand Rapids
under the name of Hibbard & Graff, and in that name ran two
flouring mills, called the Valley City mills and the Crescent
mills. The Valley City mill was a rented building and had
only been occupied about a year.
On January 27, 1879, Hibbard & Graff formed a partnership
.with Covode to run the Valley City mill, that firm to own
three-fourths and Covode' one-fourth interest. The .businesl!I
was to be entirely distinct from the Crescent mill business, in
which Covode was to have no interest, although the business
so. far as practicable was to be done in the Crescent
office,
but the accounts were to be kept separate. Different bookkeepers kept the books, and the Valley City mill office was in
a different room from the other. The name of the new firm
was to be the same as the old one, Hibbard & Graff.
. After the new firm was organized letter heads were printed
which at the top contained the names of all four. Beneath
these names appeared the name Hibbard & Graff, as proprie-

mill

1
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tors of the two mills. These appear to have been used indis-

tors of the two mills. These appear to have been used indiscriminately. The Valley City mill kept no bank account and
did no bank business, but borrowed when necessary of the
Crescent mill, and was charged for such advances and credited
with money and other counter credits furnished by itself to
the other. No notes were issued by the Valley City mills in
the course of their business, and all moneys received on loan
discounts were paid into the Crescent mills where an account
was kept of advances made to the Valley City mills as with
any other individual debtor.

criminately. The Valley City mill kept no bank account and

did no bank business, but borrowed when necessary of the

Crescent mill, and was charged for such advances and credited

with money and other counter credits furnished by itself to

the other. No notes were issued by the Valley City mills in

the course of their business, and all moneys received on loan

discounts were paid into the Crescent mills where an account

was kept of advances made to the Valley City mills as with

any other individual debtor.

Blair, Kingsley ¢£- Klei-nhains, for appellant.

John Patton, Jr., and N. A. Earle for defendant Covode;

John C’. Fitzgerald for \V. Hibbard; and Si-monds, Fletcher <5

Wolf for P. M. Graif, M. Hibbard and P. Graff, Jr.

CAMPBELL, J. The note in suit is one of two $5,000 notes

executed by Wellington Hibbard while Covode was absent in

Europe, under the name of Hibbard & Graﬂ’, not for the beneﬁt

-of the ﬁrm, but to use in his and Philip Graifs outside gam-

bling wheat speculations, which seem to have been destroying
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the means of the business. The money was obtained as claimed

by plaintiff under pretense that it was wanted for actually

.

Blair, Kingsley &: Kleinhans, for appellant.
John Patton, Jr., and N. A.. Earle for defendant Covode;
John 0. Fitzgerald for 'W. Hibbard; and Simonds, Fletcher "
Wolf for P. M. Graff, M. Hibbard and P. Graff, Jr.

contemplated wheat purchases for milling business. The ques-

tion is, if this was so, which ﬁrm was the maker in the eye of

the law? The jury found that the new ﬁrm was not the

maker. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court,

given or refused, on various parts of the case.

The court actually charged that Covode would not be liable

merely because he was a partner in the Valley City business,

if the loan was negotiated as part of the business of the Cres-

cent mills, but that presumptively a note might be made by

a partner which would bind the ﬁrm for which he made it, if

’taken without knowledge in the bank, on reasonable grounds

of inquiry, that it was unauthorized. Also that Covode might

be hound by allowing himself to be held out as a member of

the ﬁrm purporting to act, if faith was given in the discount

to his being a partner;

It was charged that if credit was given exclusively to the

other members of the ﬁrm and not to Covode, he would not be

bound unless by subsequent ratiﬁcation, if the money was not

negotiated for the business of the Valley City mill. But on

CAMPBELL, J. The note in suit is one of two f5,000 notes
executed by Wellington Hibbard while Covode was absent in
Europe, under the name of Hibbard & Graff, not for the beneftt
·of the firm, but to use in bis and Philip Graff~s outside gambling wheat speculations, which seem to have been destroying
the means of the business. The money was obtained as claimed
by plaintiff under pretense that it was wanted for actuall'
contemplated wheat purchases for milling business. The question is, if this was so, which firm was the maker in the eye of
the law? The jury found that the new firm was not the
maker. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court,
given or refused, on various parts of the case.
The court actually charged that CoYode would not be liable
merely because he was a partner in the Valley City business,
if the loan was negotiated as part of the business of the Crescent mills, but that presumptively a note might be made by
a partner which would bind the firm for which he made it, if
•taken without knowledge in the bank, on reasonable grounds
of inquiry, that it was unautl10rized. Also that Covode might
be bound by allowing himself to be held out as a m~mber of
the firm purporting to act, if faith was given in the discount
to his being a partner;
It was charged that if credit was given exclusively to the
other members of the firm and not to Covode, he would not be
bound unless by subsequent ratification, if the money was not
negotiated for the business of the Valley City mill. But on

•
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the other hand if the bank only knew of a ﬁrm which it sup

posed to be composed of the four, and made the loan on the

credit of that ﬁrm, then all would be bound if the transaction

was in good faith; and further, that although Covode was not

a member of the Crescent mills ﬁrm, he would be bound if he

had allowed himself to be held out as a member of a ﬁrm operé

ating both mills, if the bank relied upon that in good faith.

The letter heads were held to authorize the jury to draw such

an inference if they thought them calculated to create such an

impression, and if acted on by the bank as before mentioned.

And it was also held that unless the bank had reason to believe

to the contrary it could rely on the representations of Mr. Hib-

bard concerning the purpose of the loan, and if informed it was

for the ﬁrm of four, credit should be presumed to have been

given to the four. .

The jury, in answer to speciﬁc requests, found that Covode

was not known to plaintiﬂ’, and that exclusive credit was given

to the other persons as a ﬁrm. They also found that the note

was given by Wellington Hibbard to obtain money to speculate

in wheat margins on his own account, and that this was a
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gambling transaction.

It is assigned as error that these ﬁndings are not supported

by evidence. .

Error is also assigned on the charges bearing on the eﬁect of

giving exclusive credit to others than Covode and on his liai-

bility in case he was not actually a partner of the ﬁrm relied

on. Also to so much of the charge as held that if the money

was lent with notice that it was tor business beyond the scope

of the partnership business and for different parties, the bank

might be affected by the fraud without absolute knowledge

of it. '

\ Error is also alleged on the refusal of the court to make

‘several charges substantially as follows: First, that when

two ﬁrms in one city of the same name have some members in

common, and a person who is a member of both issues a note

which is discounted in good faith without information as to

which ﬁrm issued it, the holder may elect which ﬁrm he will

hold. Second, a charge was asked to the same effect as applied

speciﬁcally to the ﬁrms in question and Mr. Covode’s liability.

Thirdly, that in such case the partners were themselves respon-

sible for the hardship which they might have avoided by using

the other band if the bank only knew of a firm which it supposed to be composed of the four, and made the loan on the
credit of that firm, then all would be bound if the transaction
was in good faith; and further, that although Covode was not
n member of the Crescent mills firm, he would be bound if he
had allowed himself to be held out as a member of a firm oper:
ating both mills, if the bank relied upon that in good f ait~
The letter heads were held to authorize the jur-y to draw such
an inference if they thought them calculated to create such an
impression, and if acted on by the bank as before mentioned:
And it was also held that unless the bank had reason to believe
to the contr-ary it could rely on the representations of Mr. Hibbard concerning the pul"pose of the loan, and if informed it was
for the firm of four, credit should be presumed to have been •
given to the four.
The jury, in answer to specific requests, found that Covode
was not known to plaintift', and that exclusive credit was given
to the other persons as a firm. They also found that the note
was given by Wellington Hibbard fo obtain money to speculate
in wheat margins on his own account, and that this was a
gambling transaction.
It is assigned as error that these findings are not supported
by evidence.
Error is also assigned on the charges bearing on the effect of
giving exclusive credit to others than Covode and on his liability in case he was not actually a partner of the firm relied
on. Also to so much of the charge as held th.at if the money
was lent with notice that it was £or business beyond the scope
of the partnership business and for different parties, the bank
might be affected by the fraud without absolute knowledge
·\of it.
\ Error is also alleged on the refusal <>f the court to make
'several clmr-ges substantially as follows: First, that when
two firms in one city of the same name have some members in
·common,
and a person who is a member of both issues a note
r
· which is discounted in good faith without information as to
· which firm issued it, the holder may elect which firm he will
' hold. Second, a charge was asked to the same effect as applied
specifically to the firms in question and Mr. Covode's liabillt).
Thirdly, that in such case the partners were themselves responsible for- the hardship which they might have avoided by using

1
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different ﬁrm names. Fourth, that writing the letters which

were sent in regard to obtaining the discounts, on the letter

heads before referred to, was such a holding out of Covode

as a partner in both mills as, if relied on in good faith, would

rend_er him liable. And ﬁfth, that there was no evidence that

the bank ofﬁcers knew it was for an improper purpose.

The special ﬁndings of the jury, if based on testimony, ren-

der the fourth and ﬁfth requests just named unimportant. It is

distinctly found that credit was not given to Covode as a. part-

ner and was given only to the others. It is not claimed, how-

ever, and the court below did not hold, that the use of the letter

heads in question would not have bound him if credit was

actually given in reliance on them as showing one ﬁrm for

-both mills. But we are not satisﬁed that the jury had not tes-

timony enough to act on, which justiﬁed them in the conclusion

that the bank oﬂicers relied on the formerly existing ﬁrm,

which had been known for some time, and p-aid no heed to

the names printed in the corners, or to the letter head itself.

It is not uncommon for persons dealing with business houses
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to pay very little attention to their printed letter heads, and

if the inference the jury drew from the whole testimony and

demeanor of the witnesses before them was, as it seems to have

been, that the bank officers acted on other grounds, we have

no right to say, as matter of law, that their conclusions are

wrong. It was, after all, a question of fact.

the fact that Hibbard represented both ﬁrms and both had a

ommon name, gave the plaintiff a right to elect which ﬁrm

to hold responsible, without reference to the credit actually

relied on.

The cases referred to in the elementary works cited by coun-

sel 1'o»r plaintiff do not, in our opinion—whether correctly

decided or not—-cover just such a case as the present. They

hold unquestionably that where money is lent or credit given

to a partnership business, unknown as well as known partners

will be bound. It i held also in one or more of these cases

that where several ﬁrms are concerned together in common

interests and a member of some of the ﬁrms has so acted con-

cerning paper issued by one of the ﬁrms in which he was not

a partner, as to give reason to believe him a member, those

Tlhe case, so far as we can see, comes do-wn to the question

which was the chief one relied on upon the hearing, whether

different firm names. Fourth, that writing the letters which
were sent in regard to obtaining the discounts, on the letter
heads before referred to, was such a liolding out of Covode
as a partner in both mills as, if relied on in good faith, would
rend.er him liable. And fifth, that there was no evidence that
the bank officers knew it was for an improper purpose.
The special findings of the jury, if bused on testimony, ren·
der the fourth and fifth requests just named unimportant. It is
distinctly found that credit was not given to Covode as a part·
ner and was given only to the others. It is not claimed, how.
ever, and the court below did not hold, that the use of the letter
heads in question would not have bound him if credit was
actually given in reliance on them as showing one firm for
both mills. Ilut we are not satisfied that the jury had not tes·
timony enough to act on, which justified them in the conclusion
that the bank officers relied on the formerly existing firm,
w'hir.h bad been known for some time, and paid no •heed to
the names printed in the comers, or to the letter head itself.
It is not uncommon for persons dealing with business houses
to pay very little attention to their printed letter beads, and
if the inference the jury drew from the whole testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses before them was, as it seems to have
been, that the bank officers acted on other grounds, we have
no right to say, as matter of law, that their conclusions are
wrong. It was, after all, a question of fnct.
The case, so ~ar as we can see, comes down to the question
which was the chief one relied on upon the bearing, whether
the fact that Hibbard represented both firms and both had a
ommon name, gave tlle plaintiff a right to elect which firm
to hold responsible, without reference to the credit actually
relied on.
The cases referred to in the elementa1·y works cited by cou11.
sel for plaintiff do not, in our opinion-whether correctly
decided or not-cover just such a case as the present. They
hold unquestionably that where money is lent or credit given
to a partnership business, unknown as well as known partners
will be bound. It is held also in one or more of these cases
that where several firms are concerned together in c<>mmon
interests and a member of some of the firms has eo acted concerning pa.per issued by one of the firms in which he was not
a partner, as to give reaeon to believe him a member, those
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who dealt on that belief might hold him personally. This is

all that was actually decided in the Scotch case of 1lIcNair vs.

Fleming, in which the House of Lords partially aﬂirmed the

decision of the Court of Sessions, 3 Dow. P. C. 229. This is

the case which Mr. Collyer (Partnership, p. 222) says was

regarded by Sir Samuel Romilly as deciding that where differ-

ent partnerships do business under the same ﬁrm and make

negotiable paper under the same signature the holder may

select whichever of them he pleases as his debtor, but cannot

select them all. Neither this nor any other well-deﬁned clas

of cases went—so far as we can judge—outside of the general

rule that partnership lia.bility rests on the ground of agency,

and that those who have authorized any one to act on their

behalf, either actually or impliedly, are bound when he does

so act, to those who deal with him as representing them or the

ﬁrm to which they belong. It must always be remembered

that general- language in legal discussions is to be construed

with its surroundings, and cannot be dealt with in the

abstract. ,

In the case of .l[cNair vs. Flcmin_r/, after sustaining the gen-
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eral view of the Court of Sessions; the House of Lords allowed

the defendant to set up the defense that plaintiff was barred

by sequestration proceedings against the partnership in whose

name the paper was issued, of which he was no-t actually a

member, although they supposed him to be. The case of York

shire Banking Go. vs. Beatson, 4 C. P’. Div. 204; s. c. on appeal,

5 C. P. Div. 109, refers to several of the familiar cases on the

subject, and like most of them regards the facts of each case as

material in ﬁxing the liability. ‘

In the present case there can be no doubt that as between

himself and his partners Hibbard had no right to borrow this

money for his own purposes. If not absolutely determined by

‘the evidence it certainly tends to show that under their usual

course of business even the main ﬁrm of Hibbard & Grad could

not properly bind Covode by any such loan for ﬁrm purposes.

As between the two ﬁrms the usual practice seems to have con-

ﬁned loans to the original ﬁrm. In any event the latter ﬁrm

if bound at all could only be bound on the principle that it is

incident to such business that one partner may bind it. And

it is equally clear in our judgment that the ﬁrm to be bound

must be the ﬁrm in whose name and for whose beneﬁt Hibbard.

_r
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who dealt on that belief might hold him personally. This is.
all that was actually decided in the Scotch case of McNair t)8.
Fleming, in wbi('h the House of Lords partially affirmed the
·decision of the Court of Sessions, 3 Dow. P. C. 229. This is
the case which l\Ir. Collyer (Partnership, p. 222) says was
regarded by Sir Samuel Romilly as deciding that where different partnerships do business under the same firm and make
negotiable paper under the same signature the holder ma;.,
select wliicheYer of them he pleases as his debtor, but cannot
sel~ct them all. Neither this nor any other well-defined class
of cases went-so far as we can judge-outside of the general
rule that partnership liability rests on the ground of agency,
·and that those who have authorized any one to act on their
behalf, eith<"r actually or impliedly, are bound when he does
so act, to those who deal with him as representing them or the
firm to which they belong. It must always be remembered
that general language in legal discussions is to be construed
with its surroundings, and cannot be dealt with in the
abstract.
~
In the case of McNair f)8. Fleming, after sustainin~ the general view -0f the Court of Sessions; the House -of Lords allowed
the defendant to set up the defense tliat plaintiff was barred
by sequestration proceedings against the partnership in whose
name the paper was issued, of which he was not actualJy a
member, although they supposed him to be. The ca.se of Yorkshire Banking Co. vs. Beatson, 4 C. P. Div. 204; s. c. on appeal,
5 C. P. Div. 109, refers to several of the familiar cases on the
subject, and like most of them regards the facts of each case as
material in fixing the liability.
...
In the present case there ran be no doubt that as between
himself and his partners Hibbard had no right to borrow this
money for his own purposes. If not absolutely determined by
'.the evidence it certainly tends to show that under their usual
'course of business even the main firm of Hibbard & Graff could
not properly bind Covode by any such loan for firm purposes.
As between the two firms the usual practice seems to have confined loans to the original firm. In any event the latter firm
If bound at all could only be bound on the principle that it i15
incident to such business that one partner may bind it. And
rit is equally clear in our judgment that the firm to be bound
/Jnust be the firm in whose name and for whose ben~~t Hibbard.
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ﬁrm of all the four doing business,.all would be bound.

But as a matter of fact the original ﬁrm of Hibbard & Graft

had never changed, and continued on the same relations as

before. It had only made an arrangement for two years, sub-

ject to termination on ninety days’ notice, whereby it allowed

the use of one of its mills to a ﬁrm in which it held a three-

fourths interest, as a partnership, and not in the several names

of its members‘. The case does not therefore differ materially

from that of an individual making a partnership arrangement

for a separate part of his business, where it has always been

held that it must depend on the facts of the case whether paper

signed in the individual name was sole or ﬁrm paper.

If therefore the bank dealt with the ﬁrm it had always

known and which was still doing business, and lent money

supposing it to be for that ﬁrm, the new ﬁrm could not be made

liable unless the money was actually borrowed or used for

its beneﬁt. But this is not pretended, unless on the theory

lgas gnderstood to be acting. The court below charged very

_ that credit was given to all four, which is clearly negatived.
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\Vhen this case was here before—although not then in per-

fect shape for disposal—it was intimated that the result now

arrived at appeared to be the proper one. If the jury were

right on the facts, we think the court was right on the law.

There was evidence from which a different conclusion might

have been reached, but the verdict has been allowed to stand,

and we must assume justly.

We discover no error in the record, and the judgment must

be aﬂirmed with costs. _- it

__/

,/

NOTE: See Mei.-hem's Elem. of I’a.rt.n., § 202. "

Q

was understood to be acting. The court below charged very
clearly that if the bank officers supposed there was but one
firm of all the four doing business,.all would be bound.
But as a matter of fact the original firm of Hibbard & Graff
had never changed, and continued on the same relations as
before. It had only made an arrangement for two years, subject to termination on ninety days' notice, whereby it allowed
the use of one of its mills to a firm in which it held a threefourths interest, as a partnership, and not in the several namea
of its members'. The case does not therefore differ materially
from that of an individual making a partnership arrm.~gement
for a separate part of his business, where it has always bee:g
held that it must depend on the facts of the case whether paper
signed in the individual name was sole or firm paper.
If therefore the bank dealt with the firm it had always
known and which was still doing business, and lent money
supposing it fo be for that firm, the new firm could not be made
liable unless the money was actually oorro.wed or used for
Its benefit. But this is not pretended, unless on the theory
that credit was given to all four, which is clearly negatived.
When this case was here before-although not then in per·
feet shape for disposal-it was intimated that the result now
arrived at appeared to be the proper one. If the jury were
right on the facts, we think the court was right on the law~
There was evidence from which a different conclusion might
have been reached, but the verdict has been allowed to stand,
and we must assume justly.
We discover no error in the record, and the judgment must
be affirmed with costs.
/ . - Il
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NOTE:

See Mechew'i:; Elem. o1 Partn., § 20!).
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EN GLAR vs. OFFUTT.

Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1889.

70 Md. 78, 16 Atl. Rep. 497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 833. _

On the 21st of May, 1883, John P. Shriner, who was engaged

I. Fon Tonn.

in business in Baltimore, was appointed guardian of Mary and

John Englar, infants, and as such guardian received of their

estate the sum of $10,846.25. He deposited this sum in his

own account and used more or less of it in his business. On

December 31, 1885, he took his brother, Edward C. Shriner,

into partnership with him in the business. On November 15,

ENGijAR ve. OFFUTT.

1886, the ﬁrm was insolvent and made an assignment for the

beneﬁt of creditors. The partnership assets amounted to but

Courl of Appeals of Maryland, 1889.

$9,500. The wards, Mary and John Englar,‘sought to impress

this fund with the trust in their behalf and in priority to the

'10 Md. 78, 18 Atl. Rep. 497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 831

ﬁrm creditors upon the ground that their money, in the hands

of John P. Shriner as guardian, had gone into the stock of the

ﬁrm, and that the ﬁrm had received the money knowing that

it was trust money and was so used in violation of the trust.

Edward C. Shriner dehied any knowledge that the trust funds
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had gone into the business. The claim of the wards was

denied and they appealed.

F. C. Slingluﬂ‘ and Robert Biggs, for appellants.

John P. Poe, for appellee.

1ALv1~:Y, C. J. (After_discussing the principle upon which

trust funds may be traced.) But suppose at the time of the

partnership formed between John P. Shriner and Edward C.

Shriner that some portion of the trust fund remained invested

in the stock of goods then on hand, or was otherwise em-

ployed in the business; in such case the question whether

the appellants can be entitled to occupy the position

of creditors of the ﬁrm, so as to share in the distribu-

tion of its assets, and to hold Edward C. Shriner liable,

depends upon the fact whether Edward C. Shriner had

@_~ -

On the 21st of May, 1883, John P. Shriner; who was engaged
in business in Baltimore, was appointed guardian of .Mary and
John Englar, infants, and as such guardian received of their
t>state the sum of $1.0,846.25. He deposited this sum in his
own account and used more or less of it in his business. On
December 31, 1885, he took his brother, Edward C. Shriner,
Into partnership with him in the business. On November 15,
188_6, the firm was insolvent and made an assignment for the
bt>nefit of creditors~ The partnership assets amounted to but
f9,500. The wards, ~fary and John Englar, -sought to impress
this fund with the trust in their behalf and in priority to the
ftnn creditors upon the ground that their money, in the hands
of John P. Shriner as guardian, had gone into the stock of the
firm, and that the firm had received the money knowing that
it was trust money and was so used in violation of the trust.
Edward C. Shriner denied any knowledge that the trust funds
had gone into the business. 'fhe claim of the wards was
denied and thPy appealed.
F. 0. Slingluff and Robe1·t Biggs, for appellants.
John P. Poe, for appellee:
h.LVEY, C. J. (After. discussing the principle upon which
trust funds may be traced.) But suppose at the time of the
partnership formed between John P. Shriner and Edward C.
Shriner that some portion of the trust fund remained invested
in the stock of goods then on hand, or was otherwise em·
.vloyed in the business; in such case the question whether
the appellants can be entitled to occupy the position
of creditors of the firm, so as to share in the distribution of its assets, and to hold Edward C. Shriner liable,
. depends upon the fact whether Edward C. Shriner had

1.4’

ENGLAR

'E1~zo1.».n vs: Oren-rr. 829

vs; Onul'T.

629

notice of and a~ in the breach of trust ~ by John P.

$5313 the guardian; for the principle of law is very clear

/that if a partner, being a trustee or ﬁduciary, improperly

employs the money of his _¢£:§tui quc trust in the partnership

-business, or in the payment of partnership debts, this fact

lalone, andwithout anything more, is not suﬂicient to entitle

the cestui que trust to occupy the position of creditor, and to

der the ﬁrm liablein such case the ﬁrm itself must be shown

,enforce repayment of his money as against the ﬁrm. To ren-

to liaVe'B'e'én implicated in the breach of trust, and this can-

not be unless all the partners either knew whence the money

came, or knewthat it did not belong to the partner making use

of it. But if the other partners have knowledge of such mis-

ue of trust money, and know that such money is being

employed in the partnership business for common beneﬁt, they

will all be bound for the money so employed, and be made

answerable for the breach of trust committed by their copart-

ner with their acquiescence. Ea: parte Heaton, Buck, 386; Ea:

parte Apsey, 3 Brown, Ch. 266; Sm-ith vs. Jameson, 5 Term R.
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601; Ea: partc Watson, 2 Ves. & B. 415; Story, Partn. § 368;

1 Lindl. Partn. (5th Ed.) 161. Here, however, the proof would

seem to establish the fact of thelentire absence of knowledge

on the part of Edward C. Shriner of the use of trust money by

John J . Shriner in the partnership business; and in this class

of cases it is clearly established by the authorities that the

knowledge of the partner committing the breach of trust does

not affect the other members of the ﬁrm. 1 Lindl. Partn. 161}

Edward C. Shriner swears that he had no such knowledge, and

he is fully supported in his testimony as to this fact by the testi-

mony of his brother, who swears that no part of the trust fund

was used in the business after the formation of the partner-

ship. It is true, Mr. Englar testiﬁes to a declaration or admis-

sion made by Edward C. Shriner to the effect that he knew that

the trust money was used in the partnership business; but we

think there must be some mistake or misunderstanding in

regard to the matter, as Edward C. Shriner is emphatic in

denying that he ever made such declaration, and he is strongly

corroborated in this by the testimony of his brother, and the

circumstances of the case. ' Upon the whole, we are of opinion

that the court below committed no error in overruling the

42

notice of and a~~ced in the breach of trust · by John P.
Biirrner, the guardian; for the principle of law is very clear
'rthat if a p:u·tner, being a trustee or 6.duciary, improperly
employs the money of his _c.E._s_tui que trust iIJ, the partnership
busin<~ss, or in the payment of partnership debts, this fact
t alone, and without anything more, is not sufficient to entitle
the cestui que trust to occupy the position of creditor, and to
enforce
repayment of his money as against the firm. To ren- \ .
1
der the firm liable..Jn such case the firm itself must be shown
, to liaveoef>n- -i~plicated in the breach of trust, and this can, not be unless all the partners either knew whence the mom•y
came,or knew that it did not belong to the partner making use
of it. But if thE! other partners have knowledge of such misuse of trust m-0ney, and know that such money is being
employed in the partnership business for common benefit, they
will all be bound for the money so employed, and be made
an8Werable for the breach of trast committed by their copartner witl1 their acquiescence. Ea: parte Heaton, Buck, 386; E:D
parte Apsey, 3 Brown, Ch. 266; Smith vs. Jameson, 5 Term R.
601; Ex parte lVatson, 2 Ves. & B. 415; Story, Partn. § 368;
l Lindi. Partn. (5th Ed.) 161. Here, however, the proof woultl
seem to establish the fact of the ·entire absence of knowledge
on the part of Edward C. Shriner of the use of trust money by
J<>bn J. Shriner in the partnership business; and in this class
of cases it is clearly establisht•d by the authorities th.at th<•
knowledge of the partner committing the breach of trust d-0es
not affect the other members of the firm. 1 Lindi. Partn. 161.
Edward C. Shriner swears that he had no such knowledge, and
he is fully supported in his testimony as to this fact by the testimony of his brother, who swears tbat no part of the trust fund
was used in the business after the formation of the partnert1hip. It is true, Mr. Englar testifies to a declaration or admission made by Edward C. Shriner to the effect that he knew that
the trust money was used in the partnership business; but we
think there must be some mistake or misunderstanding in
regard to the matter, as Edward C. Shriner is emphatic in
denying that he ever made such declaration, and he is strongly
corroborated in this by the testimony of his brother, and the
eircumstances of the case. · Up-0n the whole, we are of opinion
that the court below committed no error in overruling the

I

42

I

-1 '

I

••

•.i \.

.· l

<.

\_

C~sES Olf PARTlfERSHlP.

' ' . 330

\ ._

AI‘

\¢

330 CASES on PARTNERSHIP.

appellants’ exceptions to the auditor’s account and distribu-

appellants' exceptions to the auditor's account and distribution, and in dismissing the petition, and the order appealed
from will therefore be affirmed. ~ ,·.-· ~ . t · . - . /
,,... -

:

tion, and in dismissing the petition, and the order appealed

~ > f _» ‘ ‘ ,’ _

from will therefore be aﬂirmed. 5 L. g _ i 6;’/_/_;’T:‘~

NoT&.-See Mechem's Elem. of Par.tn., § 208.

(, o""'

"'
.)

·i-:

/

N0'1‘Ic.—See l\Iechem's Elem. of Partn., § 206. -., /
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HESS vs. LOWREY.

Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.

122 Ind. 225, 23 N. E. Rep. 156, 17 rkm. St. Rep. B55.

BESS vs. LOWREY.

Action for damages for malpractice, brought by Isaac Low-

rey against Luther W. Hess and Frank C. Hess. There was

8up1·eme Court of Indiana, 1890.

judgment for plaintiif, and defendant appealed.

llfellctt <6 Bundy and Brown <6 Brown, for appellant

T. B. Rcdding, Chambers ¢£ Hedges and Charles Rochl, for

129 Ind. 22j, 23 N. E. Rep. lfiG, 17 ~m.

t:;t. .Rep.

m.

appellee. _
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l\I1'roum.i., O. J. This action was originally instituted by

Isaac Lowrey against Luther \V. and Frank G. Hess, to recover

damages for an injury sustained to the person of the plaintiff,

alleged to have been caused by the negligent and unskillful

Action for damages for malpractice, brought by Isaac LowrPy ngainl!lt Luther \V. Hess and Frank C. Hess. There was
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

manner in which the defendants, who were partners engaged

in the practice of medicine and surgery, reset and treated the

plaintiff’s shoulder, which had been dislocated. Pending the

action, Luther \V. Hess died, and the case proceeded to judg-

ment against his personal representative and surviving part-

ner jointly. On appeal to this court, the judgment was

Mellett & Bundy and Brown di Brown, for appellant
'l'. B. Redding, Chambers cG Hedges and Cliarks Roc1,l, few
appcllee.

reversed. Boor vs. Lowrcy, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N. E. Rep. 151, 53

Amer. Rep. 519, and note. On the former appeal we arrived

at the conclusion that, even though the action was in form

ea: cmitractu, since the principal or only damages sought to be

recovered grew out of an injury to the person, the action would

not survive against the personal representative of a deceased

partner. Hegerich vs. Kcddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. Rep. 787,

52 Am. Rep. 25; Ott vs. Kaufman, 68 Md. 56, 11 At]. Rep. 580.

The nature of the daniageésued for, and not the nature of its

5/
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C. J. This action was originally instituted by
Jsnac Lowrey ngainRt Luther \V. and Frank C. Hess, to reco"cr
damages for an injury sustained to the person of the plaintiff,
allPged to have been caused by the negligent and unskillful
manner in which the defendants, who were partners engaged
in the practice of medicine and surgery, reset and treated the
plaintiff's shoulder, which had been dislocated. Pending tht•
action, Luther W. Hess died, and the case proceeded to judgment ngainst his personal representative and surviving partner jointly. On appeal to this court, the judgment we.a
reversed. Boor va. Lowre:iJ, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N. E. Rep. 151, 53
Amer. Rep. 519, and note. On the former appeal we arrived
ot the conclusion that, even though the action was in form
u co11tractu, since the principal or only damag~s sought to be
recov<>red grew out of an injury to the person, the action would
not survive against the personal representative of a deceased
partner. Hegericli vs. Kedd·ie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. Rep. 787,
52 Am. Rep. 25; Ott vs. Kaufman, GS Md. 56, 11 Atl. Rep. 580.
The nature of the damagtued for, 8lld not the nature of ibi
M1TCHEI.L,
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cause, determines whether or not the action survives. Cutter

HESS vs.

LOWRF.Y,

331

cs. Hamlcn, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. Rep. 397; 1 Chit. Pl. 101.

The case is here on a second appeal, and the question is now

presented \lligther_<)r not, the action having been abated

against the estate of the deceased partner. it can be prose;

cjg-.d to jpdgment againgtlhe survivor. That each partner

is the agent of the ﬁrm while engaged in the prosecution of

the partnership business, and that the ﬁrm is liable for the

torts of each, if committed within the scope of his agency,

appears to be well settled. Ghamplin vs. Laytin, 18 \Vend.

407, 31 Am. Dec. 382; Tucker vs. Cole, 54 Wis. 539, 11 N. W’.

Rep. 703; Fletcher vs. Ingram, 46 Wis. 101; Taylor vs. Jones, 42

N. H. 25; Schu-abaclccr vs. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517; Story, Partn.

§§ 107-166; 1 Bates, Partn. § 461. “It follows from the prin-

ciples of agency, coupled with the doctrine that each partner

is the agent of the ﬁrm, for the purpose of carrying on its busi-

ness in the usual way, that an ordinary partnership is liable

in damages for the negligence of any one of its members in

conducting the business of the partnership.” 1 Lindl. Partn.

299. Thus, in II~_|/trnc vs. Erwin, 23 S. C. 226, 55 Am. Rep. 15,
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which was an action against‘ two physicians for an injury

resulting from the negligent and unskillful setting of a broken

arm, it was held that the act of one within the scope of the

partnership business was the act of each and all, as fully as

if each was present, participating in all that was done, and

that each partner guaranties that the one in charge shall dis-

play reasonable care, diligence, and skill, and that the failure

of one is the failure of all. lt is contended, however, that if

the appellant was liable at all, he was only liable jointly with

his deceased partner, and that, the action having abated as to

the deceased partner, the case falls within the rule that, where

one or more of the joint plaintiffs or joint defendants dies, the

action shall not thereby be abated, if the cause of action

survives, but if the cause of action is one that does not sur-

vive, then the death of either joint plaintiff or joint defendant

abatcs the whole action: Mock vs. Raffncr, 2 Blackf. 23; Wil-

liams rs. Kent, 15 ‘Wend. 360. The general rule established

by the cases is that, where several persons jointly commit

a tort for which an action in form cw dclicto may be main-

tained, without reference to any contract relation between

the parties, the plaintiﬂ’ has his election to sue all or any

cause, determines whether or not the action survives. Outte1·
t:B. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. Rep. 397; 1 Obit. Pl. 101.
The cnse is here on a second appeal, and the question is now
presented whet_her_gr not, the action h.nving been aba~
i'!_gainst the estate of the deceased partner, it can be prose·
~d to judgme11:t against_j_he survivor. That each partner
is the agent of the firm while engaged in the prosecution of
the partnership business, and that the firm is liable for the
torts of each, if committed within the scope of Ws agency,
appears to be well settled. Champlin vs. Laytin, 18 \Vend.
407, 31 Am. Dec. 382; Tur.ker vs. Cole, 54 Wis. 539, 11 N. \V'.
Rep. 703; Jt'lcfr,her vs. Ingram, 46 \Vis. 191; Taylor vs. Jones, 42
N. H. 25; l~chu:abarker vs. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517; Story, Partn.
§§ 107-166; 1 Bates, Partn. § 461. "It follows from the principles of agency, coupled with the doctrine that each partner
is the agent of the firm, for the purpose of carrying on its business in the usual way, that an ordinary partnership is liable
in damages for the negligence of any one of its members in
conducting the business of the partnership." 1 Lindi. Partn.
299. Thus, in Ily1·nc vs. E1"1Cin, 23 S. G. 226, 55 Am. Rep. iu,
which was an action ngninst two physicians for an injury
resultin~ from the negligent and unskillful setting of a broken
nrm, it was held that the act of one within the scope of the
partnership business was the act of each and all, as fully us
if each was present, participating in all that was done, and
1hat each partner guaranties that the one in charge shall dis·
play reasonable care, diligence, and skill, and that the failure
of one is the failure of all. lt is contended, however, that if
the appellant was Hable at all, he was only liable jointly with
his deceased partner, and that, the action having abated as to
the deceased partner, the case falls within the rule that, where
one or more of the joint plaintiffs or joint defendants dies, the
nction shall not thereby be abated, if the cause of action
survi\"es~ but if the cause of action is one that does not survive, then the death of either joint plaintiff or joint defendant
abates the whole action1 Meck vs. Ruffner, 2 Blackf. 23; Williams t~a. !Cent, 15 "rend. 360. The general rule established
h;v the cases is that, where several persons jointly commit
a tort for which an action in form ea: delicto may be maintnined, without reference to any contract relation between
the parties, the plaintiff has his election to sue all or nny
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"one of those engaged in the wrongful act, even though the

existence of a contract may have been the occasion, or fur-

nished the opportunity, to commit the act complained ofl

But where the action is founded on a joint contract, and

is in substance, whatever its form may be, to recover dam-

ages for a breach of the contract upon which the action is

predicated, all those jointly liable must be sued, in case all are

alive, and within the jurisdiction of the court. Low vs. Mum-

ford, 14 Johns. 426, 7 Am. Dec. 469; Weall vs. King, 12 East.

452; Whittaker vs. Collins; 34 Minn. 299, 57 Am. Rep. 55, 25 N.

\V. Rep. 632; 1 Lindl. Partn. 482; Bish. Non-Contract Law,

§ 521; Chit. Pl. 469. In a case like the present, where the

gravamcn of the action isthe breach of a contract, by the terms

' of which two persons undertook, as partners, to reset the

plaintiﬂ”s shoulder, and to treat him with the skill and dili-

gcnce ordinarily displayed by competent surgeons, and the

action is not maintainable without referring to the contract,

it may well be, even though the action be laid in tort, that the

non-joinder of one of them would be ground for a plea in abate-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ment. Colly. Partn. § 732; Dicey, Parties, 455. But a plea

-_in\ abatement for non-jqindggiparties _nlust_, in ol1I1e1'_t9_be

goodfshow th_:I_tj_hc pershn alleged to be jointly liable and not

s_ue_d is living, alld/§l&j€Ct to _thejgfocess _of’the7 cougt. Dillon

as. Bun'k,’6'Elackt. 5; lV_i§on vs. State, Id. 212; Bragg vs. Wot-

zcl, 5 Blackf. 95; Levi vs. Haverstick, 51 Ind. 236; Ferguson rs.

Hagans, 90 Ind. 38; Golly. Partn. § 741; Merriman vs. Barker,

121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. Rep. 992. -

If, in an action against partners to recover damages for a per-

sonal injury growing out of the breach of a contract, it is neces-

I sary, as in ordinary actions an coutractu, to join all the part-

" ners, it must follow that upon the death of one, notwithstand-

l ing the action may abate as to the deceased partner, the rule

f applicable to ordinary actions upon contracts against part-

lxners must obtain. At the common law, the contract of part-

ners was always treated as a joint agreement, but the ﬁrm

creditors could not proceed against the estate of a deceased

partner, because the death of one of the partners extinguished

the contract as to him, leaving it in force as the separate

engagement of the survivior./ The legal remedy of the cred-

itor was thereafter conﬁned exclusively to the surviving part-

ner, exccpt as the common law was modiﬁed by statutes, or

i

I

1

~lie

of those engaged in the wrongful act, even though the
existence of a contract may have been the occasion, or furnished the opportunity, to commit the act complained ofl
But where the action is founded on a joint contract, and
is in substance, whatever its form may be, to recover damages for a breach &f the contract upon which the action is
predicated, all those jointly liable must be sued, in case all .are
alive, and within the jurisdiction of the court. /.Jow vs. Mumford, 14 Johns. 426, 7 Am. Dec. 469; Weall vs. King, 12 East.
4:5~; Wltittalrer vs. Collins; 34 :Minn. 2!l9, 57 Am. Rep. 55, 25 ~.
W. Rep. 632; 1 Lindi. Partn. 482; Bish. Non-Contract Law,
I 521; Chit. Pl. 469. In a case like the present, where the
gravamen. of the action is.the breach of a oontract, by the terms
of which two persons undertook, as partners, to reset tbP.
plaintiff's shoulder, and to treat him with the skill and diligence ordinarily displayed by competent surgeons, and the
action is not maintainable without referring to the contract,
it may well be, even though the action be laid in tort, that the
non-joinder of one of them would be ground for a plea in abah"!ment. Colly. Partn. § 732; Dicey, Parties, 455. But a plea.
J. abatement for non-joinder of arties 11!..1:1~~1 in o~_J9_bf!
good, show that_the p
n alleged t-0 be jointly liable and not
~g, and ~~!_~the !1rocess ~f the ~ou~. Dilkm
vs. Bank, 6 illilckf. 5; Wilson vs. State, Id. 212; Bragg vs. Wetzel, 5 Blackf. 95; Led vs. H at·erstick, 51 Ind. 236; Ferguson i:s.
Hagans, 90 Ind. 38; Colly. Partn. § 741; Ale,..riman vs. Barker,
121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. Rep. 992.
•
lf,in an action against partners to recover damages for a per·
ysonal injury growing out of the breach of a contract, it is neces. sary, as in ordinary actions c:c coutractu, to join all the part{ ne1·s, it must follow that upon the death of one, notwitbstand·
! ing the action may abate as to the deceased partner,, the rule
j\~pplicable to ordinary actions upon contracts against part1iners must obtain. At the common law, the contract of pa1'tners was always treated as n joint agreement, but the firm
creditors could not proceed against the estate of a deceased
partne1·, because the death of one of the partners extinguished
the contract as to him, leaving it in force as the separate
engagement of the sunivior.1 'rhe legal remedy of the cred·
itor was thereafter confined exclusively to the surviving part~er, except a1 the common law was modified by statut~e, Qr
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by the principles of equity. Sherman vs. Kreul, 42 “’is. 33.

· Hl!SS vs; 'Lo:wnEY.

The right to sue for claims due the ﬁrm, as well as the liability

to be sued for claims against the ﬁrm, devolves exclusively

upon the surviving partner. Meek vs. Ru/Tner, supra; Mcbain

vs. (7arson’s E'.z-’r, '4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777; Chtlds vs. H _1/do,

10 Iowa 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 596,

54 Am. Dec. 200; 2 Lindl. Partn. 665. Upon the death of one

partner, the creditor has a right to collect his claim at law

from the survivor, or, if the cause of action survives against

the personal representative, to proceed, in the manner pointed

out by the statute, against the estate of the deceased partner.

Ralston vs. Moore, 105 Ind. 243, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Kimball vs.

Whitney, 15 Ind. 280; Gere vs. Clarke, 6 Hill, 350. If a partner

dies pending an action against the ﬁrm, the death being sug-

gested on the record, the action does not abate, but may pro-

ceed to judgment against the surviving partner__unless the

cause of action dies, not only as against the personal repre-

sentative of the deceased partner, but as against the surviving

partner also. Golly. Partn. §_727; Pom. Rem. §§ 250, 251;

Bates, Partn. § 1055; Williams vs. K ent, supra. When the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

damages sued for arise out of an injury to the person of the

plaintiff, the cause of action dies with the person of either,

party; but the cause of action dies only so far as it affects the,

liability of the decedent, or his personal representative,

Neither by the common law, nor under the statute, does the

cause of acti-on die as to a surviving partner or defendant, who,

as we have seen, remains liable for all claims against the ﬁrm.

King vs. Bell, 13 Neb. 409, 14 N. VV. Rep. 141; 8 Wait. Act. Def. 502. I While the members of the ﬁrm were all alive, each

was liable in sollclo as principal, .the ﬁrm being in law a single

entity. Upon the death of one partner, his liability was extin-

guished, but the surviving partner, as the sole representative

of the ﬁrm, continued liable.I Shale vs. Sehantz, 35 Hun, 622.

It is only where the cause of action does not survive in favor

of, or against either of, the joint plaintiffs or defendants that

the death of one abates the whole action. If the action is,; as

doubtless it should be, regarded as a suit quasi ea: con-tractu for

damages, for an injury to the person occasioned by the breach

of a joint contr., the death of one of the defendants simply

severed the joint liability and extinguished the claim against

the decedent, while it continued in full force as to the sur-

by the principles of equity. STicrman vs. Kreul, 42 Wis. 3.1.
"'rhe right to sue for claims due the firm, as well as the liabilitj
to be sued for claims against the firm, devolves exclusively
upon the surviving partner. Meek rs. Ruffner, supra; McLafa
t~s. Carson'IJ Ex'r, 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777; Child.a vs. Hyd.o,
10 Iowa 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113; Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 596,
54 Am. Dec. 200; 2 Lindi. Partn. 665. Upon the death of one
partner, the creditor has a right to collect his claim at law
from the survh·or, or, if the cause of action survives against
the personal representative, to proceed, in the manner pointed
<>at by the statute, against the estate of the deceased partnel'.
Ralston vs. Moore, 105 Ind. 24!l, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Kimball VB.
Whitney, 15 Ind. 280; Gere vs. Clarke, 6 Hill, 350. If a partnr.r
dies pending an action against the firm, the death being suggested on the record, the action does not abate, but may proceed to judgment against the surviving partner __unless the~
cause of action dies, not only as against the personal representative of the deceased partner, but as against the surviYing
partner also. Colly. Partn. § .727; Porn. Rem. §§ 250, 251;
"Bates, Partn. § 1055; William.JJ vs. [(cnt, supra. When the)
damages sued for arise out of an injury to the person of tbe
plaintiff, the cause of action dies with the person of either,
party; but the cause of action dies only so far as it affects the,
liability of the decedent, or his personal representative,
Neither by the common law, nor under the statute, does the
cause of action die as to a surviving partner or defendant, who,
as we have seen, remains liable for all claims against the firm.
King VB. Bell, 13 Neb. 409, 14 N. \V. Rep. 141; 8 Wait. Act. &
Def. 502. r While the members of the firm were all alive, each
was liable in solido as prineipal, .the firm being m law a single
entity. Upon the death of one partner, his liability was extinguished, but the survivin~ partner, as the sole representative
of the firm, continued liable.I Shale vs. Schantz, 35 Hun, 622.
It is only where the cause of action does not survive in favor
of, or against either of, the joint plaintiffs or defendants that
the death of one abates the whole action. If the action is,: as
doubtless it should be, regarded as a suit quasi eJ: co11.tractu for
damages, for an injury to the person occasioned by the breach
of a joint cont., the death of one of the defendants simply
severed the joint liability and extinguished the claim against
the decedent, while it continued in full force as to the sur-
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vivor. If the action is regarded as purely in tort, as where the

injury is willful and intentional, then the liability of the

defendants may be joint and several, and the death of one

does not abate the action as to the other. (Jolly. Partn. (Gth

Ed.) 1079, note. |The death of one partner in no wise affects

the liability of th~ upon the happening of that

event, becomes individually liable to make good the joint

undertaking of both.’ Ordinarily, in actions ea: dclieto, where

the liability arises from the misconduct or wrongful act of the

partie, each, is liable for all the consequences, and there is

no right to enforce contribution; but this r_ul_e does not apply

_g1wggn_pa_rti_1§§s, unless the liability resultedfrom a rxfedi

tated or willful wrong, intentionally inﬂicted by the one seek-

ing to enforce contrihution..o Armstrong Co. vs. Clarion Co.,

66 Pa. St. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 368; Pearson vs. Skelton, 1 Mecs. &

W. 504; Jacobs vs. Pollard, 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105;

Acheson rs. Miller, 2 0'hio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 603; Bailey cs.

Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; 4 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 12, 13;

Lindl. Partn. 771. '

at all affect the question of the right of contribution between
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he survivor and his personal representative. The right of

contribution grows out of the partnership relation, and rests

upon the implgicd obligation of each partner to contribute jn

proportion to the liquidation of all partnership liabilities,

unless theliability arose out of an intentional tort, committed

by the partner asking contribution. That the right of con-

tribution exists, affords a persuasive reason for holding that

the action may be maintained against the surviving partner.

6 That the cause of action died a to Luther W. Hess does not

cause of action did not die as to both partners because one

.member of the firm died, and that the proceeding to judgment

against the survivor was not of itself erroneous.

. (Omitting questions of practice.)

Aﬂirmed.

2" From every point of view the conclusion follows that the

Nam; See Mechem’s-Elem. of Partn., § 204, and cases cited,‘

4? -.

I

vivor. If the action is regarded as purely in tort, as where t11e
mJury is willful and intentional, then the liability of the
defendants may be joint and several, and the death of one
does not abate the action as to the other. Colly. Partn. (Gth
Ed.) 1079, note. IThe death of one partner in no wise affect11
the liability of the suryivor, who, upon the happening of that
event, becomes individually liable to make good the joint
undertaking of both.) Ordinarily, in actions e:i: dclicto, where
the liability arises from the misconduct or wrongful act of the
parties, each. is liable for all the consequcnce8, and there is
no right to enforce contribution; b_ut this rule does not apply
.l!tl~eep_p~rt~ unless the liability re-slllted'-from a meat- .
tatt>d or willful wrong, intentionally inllicted by the one seeking to enforce contribution.1 Annst1·ong Co. vs. Clal"ion Co.,
66 Pa. St. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 3GS; Pca1'son vs. Skelton, 1 Mees. &
W. 504; Jacobs 'l:B. Pollard, 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105;
Ache8on t·s. J.l illcr, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; BaUey t·s.
Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; 4 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 12, 13;
Lindi. Partn. 771.
·
That the cause of action died as to Luther W. Hess does not
[ ;t all affect tlle question of the right of contribution between
~
he sun'iYor nnd his personal representative. The right of
contribution grows out of the partnersllip relation, and rests
upon the impl,ied obligation of each partner to contribute )n
proportion to the liquidation of all partnership liabilities,
unl<.'ss the-1iability nrose out of an intentional 1.ort, committed
by the partne1· asking contribution. That the right of contribution exists, affords a persuasive reason for holding that
the action may be maintained against the surviving partner.
:from every point of view the conclusion follows that the
[ cause of action did not die ns to both partners because one
member of the firm <lied, and that the proceeding to judgment
against the survivor was not of itself e1·roneous.
(Omitting questions of practice.)
Aft\ rmed.

l

1

No~-

See M.echem's·Elem. of Partn., § 204, and cases citecJ..
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IIOSENKRANS vs. BARKER.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885.

115 Ill. 331, 8 N. E. Rep. 93, 56 Am. Rep. 109.

This was an action brought by A. E. Barker in the superior

court of Cook county against O. L. Rosenkrans and J. H.

~OSENKRANS

Weber, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecu-

vs. BARKER.

tion and false imprisonment. A trial of the cause before a

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885.

jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plain-

titf for $2,000. The defendants appealed to the appellate

115 Ill. 831, 8 N. E. Rep. 98, li6 Am. Rep. 109.

court, where the judgment was aﬁirmed, and they now appeal

to the supreme court. The facts out of which. this litigation

grew, so far as is necessary to state them, are substantially.

as follows: In 1882 Barker resided in Iowa, and was engaged

in a small way in the jewelry business. In the latter part of

the year he bought a bill of goods of Rosenkrans & \Veber, of

Chicago, amounting to $350. The goods were sold by a trav-

eling man named Johnson. When the bill became due $100

was paid, but no part of the balance has Over been paid.

Rosenkrans resided in Wisconsin and did business in Milwau-
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kee, but at the same time he was a partner in the jewelry busi-

ness of Rosenkrans & Weber, in Chicago, the ﬁrm being com-

posed of Rosenkrans and Lucy B. Weber, who was the wife of

J. H. YVeber. J. H. Weber had the general management of

the business of this Chicago ﬁrm. On or about the ﬁrst of

February, 1883, the bill of goods remaining unpaid, Johnson,

who had sold the goods, induced Barker to visit Chicago under

the pretense that he.would enter into partnership with. him

in the jewelry business in Chicago. Upon the arrival of Bar-

ker, Y-Veber was notiﬁed by Johnson of the arrival, and on the

ﬁfth day of February, 1883, Weber ﬁled a petition and obtained

an order for a writ of no eazeat. The writ was issued and

placed in the hands of the sheriﬂ’, who arrested Barker and

held him in custody ten or twelve hours, when he was released

on bail. Subsequently, and on the 17th day of March, 1883,

...

This was an action brought by A. E. Barker in the superior
court of Cook county against 0. L. Rosenkrans and J. H.
Weber, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecu·
tion and false imprisonment. A trial of the cause before a
jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plain·
tiff for f2,000. The defendants appealed to the appellate
·ec>ort, where the judgment was aftlrmed, and they now appeal
to the supreme court. The facts out of which this litigation
grew, so far as is necessary to state them, are substantially•
as follows: In 1882 Barker resided in Iowa, and was engaged
in a small way in the jewelry business. In the latter part of
the year he bought a bill of goods of Rosenkrans & Weber, of
Chicago, amounting to $350. The goods were sold by a trav·
eling man named Johnson. 'Vhen the bill became due $100
was paid, but no part of the balance has ever been paid. ·
Rosenkrans resided in Wisconsin and did business in Milwau·
kee, but at the same time he was a partner in the jewelry busi·
ness of nosenkrans & Weber, in Chicago, the firm being com·
posed of Rosenkrans and Luc;:i B. Weber, who was the wife of
J. H. ·weber. J. H. \Veber had the general management of
the business of this Chicago firm. On or about the first of
February, 1883, the bill of goods remaining unpaid, Johnson,
who had sold the goods, induced Barker to visit Chicago under
the pretense that h1J would enter into partnership with him
in the jewelry bu~iness in Chicago. Upon the arrival of Barker, ·weber was notified by Johnson of the arrival, and on the
ftfth day of February, 1883, \Veber filed a petition and obtained
an order for a writ of nc ezeat. The writ was issued and
placed in the hands of the sheriff, who arrested Barker and
.beld him in custody ten or twelve hours, when he was released
o.n bail. Subsequently, and on the 17th day of March, 1883,

~

I

CA.SES ON

-336 Cases ox PARTNERSHIP. ,

p ARTNERSHIP.

on demurrer, the petition was dismissed. It does not appear

that Rosenkrans had any knowledge that the proceedings had

been instituted against Barker until about the 1st day of

April, 1883, and at this time a petition for a ne eareat had been

held bad on demurrer and dismissed, and Weber had then or

a few days thereafter appealed to the appellate court. When

Rosenkrans learned what had been done he notiﬁed Vveber

that it was wrong, and advised the dismissal of the appeal

from the appellate court, and under his advice no further steps

were taken to prosecute the appeal. ' 1

Rosenthal d? Pence, for Omar L. Rosenkrans.

Shaman 16 Dcfrccs, for J . Hawley Weber.

Abbott, Oliver 45 Showalter, for appellee.

Cn.uo, J. (After stating the facts.) At the request of

nthe plaintiﬂf the court instructed the jury: “If Rosenkrans

l

on demurrer, the petition was dismissed. It does not ,appear
that Rosenkrans had any knowledge that the proceedings had
been instituted against Barker until about the 1st day of
April, 1883, and at this time a petition for a ne e:ceat had been
held bad on demurrer and dismissed, and Weber had then or
a few days thereafter appealed to the appellate court. When
Ro8enkrans learned what had been .done he notified '\Yeber
that it was wrong, and advised the dismissal of the appeal
from the appellate court, a.Iid under his advice no further steps
were taken to prosecute the appeal.

became acquainted with the facts in the matter about the last

of March, 1883; that, being so informed as to said facts attend-

Rosenthal & Pence, for Omar L. Rosenkrans.

ing the commencement of said proceedings, said Rosenkrans

suffered said proceedings to be continued in the courts'through

Sh1lman <G Defrees, for J. Hawley 'Veber;.

the medium of an appeal, and did not in any way discounten-
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ance said procﬁedings, or put a stop to the same,—then the

Abbott, Oliver

4

Showalter, for appellee.

court instructs the ‘jury that if they ﬁnd from the evidence that

said nc em-eat proceedings were intituted maliciously and with-

out probable cause, and said Rosenkrans was so informed, but

allowed the ne meat case to proceed, then all such facts, if the

jury so believe, may be taken into consideration in determin-

ing whether said Rosenkrans ratiﬁed and approved of the

arrest of said Barker; and if he did so approve and ratify the

arrest of said Barker, then he would be equally liable with

_\Veber, if said arrest was made maliciously and without prob»-

able cause.” The court also instructed Qhe jury that if they

found the defendants guilty under the evidence, that the arrest

was malicious and without probable cause, and that plaintitf

has sustained actual damages, then, on assessing damages,

they are not limited to compensation for actual damages sus-

tained, but may give exemplary or vindictive damages.

= These instructions are claimed to be erroneous as to the

defendant Rosenkrans. An instruction which is not based on

CRAIG, tT. (After stating the facts.) At the request of
.the plaintiff the court instructed the jury: "If Rosenkrans
became acquainted witl1 the facts in the matter about the last
of March, 1883; that, being so informed as to said facts attending the commencement of said proceedings, said Rosenkrans
suffered said proceedings to be continued in the courts'through
the medium of an appeal, :md did not in any way discounten•
ance said proc~dings, or put a stop to the same,-then the
court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence that
said nc e:.ceat proceedings were instituted maliciously and without probable cause, and said Rosenkrans was so informed, but
·&llowed the ne exeat case to proceed, then all such facts, if the
jury so believe, may be taken into consideration in determining whether said Rosenkrans ratified and approved of the
arrest of said BRrker; and if he did so approve and ratify the
.arrest of said Barker, then he would be equally liable with
'Veber, if said arrest was mc;tde maliciously apd without probp·
able cause." The court also instructed ~e jury that if they
found the defendants guilty under the evidence, that the arrest
,w as malicious and without probable cause, and that plaintiff
has sustained actual damages, then, on assessing damages,
they are not limited to compensation for actual damages sustained, but may give exemplary or vindictive damages.
: These instructions are claimed to be erroneous as to the
·d efendant Rosenkrans. An instruction which is not baaed otl

Rosnnnsaxs vs. Barnum. 337
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the evidence in the case is improper, and should not be given;
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it is liable to mislead the jury, and usually results in a wrong

verdict. As to the ﬁrst instruction supra, we ﬁnd no evi-

dence in the record upon which it could fairly be predicated.

Rosenkrans testiﬁed, and in this he is corroborated by other

evidence, that when he came to Chicago and learned for the

ﬁrst time of the proceedings, he notiﬁed \Veber, who was in

charge of the matter, that it was wrong, and the appeal ought

to be dismissed. Here he not only failed to sanction and

approve, but condemned, what had been done, and under his

direction no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal.

The conduct and acts of Rosenkrans contain no element of

approval, and the instruction based upon the theory of an

approval, in the absence of any evidence to sustain such theory,

could do no less than mislead the jury. As respects the other

instruction, we are of opinion as to Rosenkrans it is erroneous.

It is not claimed that he ordered, advised, or directed the

arrest, or_ that he even knew of the occurrence until after the

proceeding in the ne (meat case had been dismissed. The claim

is that after knowledge of the arrest he approved what had
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been done. If such was the case, he would only be liable for

the real injury sustained, and not for vindictive damages, as

held in Gru-mi vs. Van Week, 69 Ill. 478. But under the instruc-

tion the jury were directed that each defendant was liable for

actual and vindictive damages.

It is, however, claimed by appellee that Rosenkrans is

liable upon either one of two grounds: First, because those

who caused the arrest were servants or agents of Rosenkrans,

acting within the scope of their agency; second, the wrongful

proceeding was instituted for Rosenkrans, and in his name,

and when he became aware of what had been done he ratiﬁed

it. W'eber, who caused the arrest of Barker, was not in fact

a partner of Rosenkrans, but he acted for his wife, who was

the partner, and, so far as the acts are concerned, they may

be regarded as the acts of Rosenkrans’ partner. In many

respects one partner is the agent of the other. In the purchase

and sale of goods within the scope of the partnership business

the acts of one may be regarded as the acts of both. In such

cases the one that transacts the business acts for himself and

in the capacity as agent of the other, and in that capacity he

43

the evidence in the case is improper, and should not be given;
it is liable to mislead the jury, and usually results in a wrong
verdict. As to the first instruction supra, we find no evidence in the record upon which it could fairly be predicated.
Rosenkrans testified, and in this he is corroborated by other
evidence, that when he came to Chicago and learned for the
first time of the proceedings, be notified Weber, who was in
charge of the matter, that it was wrong, and the appeal ought
to be dismissed. Here be not only failed to sanction and
approve, but condemned, what had been done, and under his
direction no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal.
The conduct and acts of Rosenkrans contain no element of
approval, and the instruction based upon the theory of an
approval, in the absence of any evidence to sustain such theory,
could do no less than mislead the jury. As respects the other
instruction, we are of opinion as to Rosenkrans it is erroneous.
It is not claimed that be ordered, advised, or directed tha
arresti or. that he even knew of the occurrence until after the
proceeding in the ne exeat case bad been dismissed. The claim
is that after knowledge of the arrest he approve(! what had
been done. If such was the case, he would only be liable for
the real injury sustained, and not for vindictive damages, H
held in Grund vs. l'an Vlcek, 6!) Ill. 478. But under the instruction the jury were directed that each defendant was liable for
a-ctual and vindictive damages.
It is, however, claimed by appellee that Rosenkrans la
liable. upon either one of two grounds: First, because those
who caused the arrest were servants or agents of Rosenkrans,
acting within the scope of their agency; second, the wrongful
proceeding was instituted for Rosenkrans, and in his name,
and when he became aware of what had been done he ratified
it. Weber, who cnused the arrest of Darker, was not in fact
a partner of Rosenkrans, but he acted for his wife, who was
the partner, and, so far as the acts are concerned, they may
be regarded as the acts of R-Osenkrans' partner. In man7
respects one partner is the agent of the other. In the purchaseand sale of goods within the scope of the partnership business
the acts of one may be regarded as the acts of both. In such
cases the one that transacts the business acts for himself and
in the capacity as agent of the other, and in that capacity he
43
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binds himself and also binds his partner. By entering into

partnership each party reposes conﬁdence in the other, and

constitutes him his general agent as to all partnership con-

cerns. Gow, Partn. 52. But the question involved here is

other, but it is whether one partner may be liable in damages

for the wrongs of the other. Mr. Collyer, in his work on Part-

ership, § 457, says: “A learned writer observes that though

partners are in general bound by the contracts, they are not

answerable for the wrongs, of each other. In general, acts

or omissions in the course of the partnership trade, or busi-

ness, in violation of law, will only implicate those who are

guilty of them.” And, in 1 Lindl. Partn. bk. 2, c. 1, § 4, the

author says: “As a rule, however, the willful tort of one part-

ner is not imputable to the ﬁrm. For example, if one partner

maliciously prosecutes a person for stealing partnership prop-

erty, the ﬁrm is not answerable unless all the members are in

fact privy to the malicious prosecution.”

In Gilbert vs. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, where a question arose as

to the liability of one partner for the act of the other in causing

the arrest of a person charged with larceny of money belong-
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ing to the ﬁrm, it was held that the mere knowledge and con-

sent of one partner that the other should have the person

accused arrested would not render the partner so knowing

and consenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution;

it was necessary that the consent should be of such a char-

acter as to amount to advice a.nd co-operation. In Grund rs.

Van Vleck, 69 lll. 478, a question arose as to the liability of one

partner for the tort of the other, and it was held that one part-

ner cannot involve another in a trespass unless in the ordinary

course of their business, and in a case where the trespass is

tn the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership;

and in such case, to render the partner liable who did not join

in the commission of the trespass, he must afterwards have

concurred and received the beneﬁt of it. Here no part of the

debt was collected by the commencement or prosecution of the

proceedings against Barker, and it is not claimed that a liabil-

ity exists on account of receiving any beneﬁt from the arrest;

and if Rosenkrans is to be held liable, it is upon the ground

that he was a member of the ﬁrm which instituted the suit and

ﬁt as to the liabilit_v of one partner for the contracts of the

binda himself nnd ah10 binds his partner. By entering into
partnersWp each party reposes confidence in the other, and
constitutes him his general agent as to all partnership concerns. Gow, Partn. 52. But the question involved here ia
ot as to the liability of one partner for the contracts of the
ther, but it is whether one partner may be liable in damages
or the wrongs of the other. Mr. Collyer, in his work on Partership, § 457, says: "A learned writer observes that though
partners are in general bound by the contracts, they are not
answerable for the wrongs, of each other. In general, acts
or omissions in the course of the partnership trade, or business, in violation of law, will only implicate those who are
guilty of them." And, in 1 Lindi. Partn. bk. 2, c. 1, § 4, the
author says: "As a rule, however, the 'ICillful tort of one partner is not imputable to the firm. For example, if one partner
maliciously prosecutes a person for stealing partnership property, the firm is not answerable ~nless all the members are in
f~ct privy lo the malicious prosecution."
In GillJert N. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, where a question arose ·1.9
to the liability of one partner for the act of the other in causing
the arrest of a person charged with larceny of money belonging to the firm, it was held that the mere knowledge and coneent <>f one partner that the other should have the person
accused arrested would not render the partner s<> knowing
and consenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution;
it was necessary that the consent should be of such a chai·acter as to amount to advice and co-operation. In Grund f'I.
Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478, a question arose as to the lia.b ility of one
partner for the tort of the other, and it was held that one partner cannot involve another in a trespass unless in the ordinary
course of their business, and in a case where the trespass ia
in the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership;
and in such case, to render the partner liable who did not join
in the commission of the trespass, he must afterwards have
concurred and receh'ed the benefit of it. Here no part of the
debt was collected by tlle commencement or prosecution of the
p1•oceedings against Barker, and it is not claimed that a liabil~
ity exists on account of receiving any benefit from the arrest;
end if Rosenkrans is to be held liable, it is upon the ground
that he W&S a member of the firm Which iDBtituted the suit anCJ

i
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caused the arrest. This, under the authorities cited, cannot

be done. As to the second ground relied upon by appellee,—-

ratiﬁcation,—what was said in passing upon the instructions

given for appellee is sufficient to dispose of that matter, and

no further discussion of the subject is deemed necessary.

(-Omitting questions of practice.)

Reversed.

No'rs.—See Mechem's Elem. of Partn.. §§ 204 and 205, and notes.

See also Mm~

caused the nrrest. This, under the authorities cited, cannot
be done. As to the second ground relied upon by appellee,-ratiflcation,-what was said in passing upon the instructions
giyen for appellee is sufficient to dispose of that matter, and
no further discussion of the subject is deemed necessary.
(Omitting questions of practice.)
Reversed.
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NoTE.-See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., §li 204 and 203, and notes.
See also I.HiarrteU 1!'8, Btt?JtleP, ett'6w 120. ~
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Xi. _

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A PARTNER’S

' LIABILITY.

O

HARALSON vs. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Alabama, 1879.

63 Ala. 278.

XI.

Appeal from a judgment denying a petition to supersede

or quash an execution. The opinion states the facts.

Bragg and Thorington, for appellants.

L. A. Dobbs, contra.

Sross, J. Partnership debts and liabilities, except in lim-

ited partnerships, are equally the debts of the ﬁrm and each

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A PARTNER'S
LIABILITY.

member thereof; and the individual property of the several

members, as well as the partnership property, may be taken

in executon for the payment of such partnership debt. Part-

nership debts (under the code in this state, though not at com-

•

mon law) are joint and several, if evidenced by promise in

writing, and may be sued on against the members jointly or

HARALSON vs. CA.MPBELL.

severally. Code of 1876, Sec. 2905, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala.
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596; Waltlron vs. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Va/n Wagner vs. Chap’

Supreme Courl of Alabama., 1819.

man, 29 Ala. 172. A modiﬁcation of this principle exists, in

cases of bankruptcy and insolvent administration, and a

63Ala. 278.

marshalling of assets will sometimes be decreed; but that doc-

trine has no application to this case, as no bankruptcy or insol-

vency is averred.

The suit and the judgment in the present case are against

W. J . Haralson and Terrence Reynolds, defendants, under the

Appeal from a judgment denying a petition to supersede
or quash an execution. The opinion states the facts.

ﬁrm name of W. J. Haralson & Co. The mandate of the exe~

O

Bragg and Thorington, for appellanta.

|:.__‘ __i _ *7

L. A. Dobb1, contra.
.J. Partnership debts and liabilities, except In limited partnerships, are equally the debts of the firm and each
member thereof; and the individual property of the several
members, as well as the partnership property, may be taken
in executon for the payment of such partnership debt. Partnership debts (under the code in this state, though not at common law) are joint and several, if evidenced by promise in
writing, and may be sued on against the members jointly or
severally. Code of 1876, Sec. 2005, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala.
596; lVal<lrnn vs. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Van Wagner vs. Cliaptnan, 29 Ala. 172. A modification of this principle exists, in
<>ases of bankruptcy and insolvent administration, and a
mar.i!halling of assets will sometimes be decreed; but that doctrine has no a'pplication to this case, as no bankruptcy or insolYency is averred.
The suit and the judgment in the present case are against
"'· J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds, defendants, under the
tlrm name of W. J. Haralson & Co. The mandate of the exeSTONE,

•

Juno 011. Co. vs. Husnnnn. 341

cution is, that the sheriff cause the amount of the judgment

JUDD

OrL Co. vs.

341

HUBBELL.

to be made “of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements,

of Willialn J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds.” There was

a motion in the court below to quash the execution, because

it directed the money to be made out of the individual effects

of the defendants, and not out of the partnership property.

The circuit court overruled the motion. This suit is not gov-

erned by Sec. 2904 of the Code. That section contemplates a

suit against the partnership, in its partnership name merely,

without naming the individual members composing the ﬁrm.

In this case the individuals are named, and sued as such. The

individual property of each partner is liable to seizure in satis-

faction of this judgment. ‘ " '

The judgment is affirmed.

I

NOTE.-See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn. §§ 209 21$

See also the two cases next following herein.

.~

JUDD OIL CO. vs. HUBBELL.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1879.
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76 N. Y. 543.

cutfon is, that the sheriff cause the amount of the judgment
to be made "of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements,
of William J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds." There was
a motion in the court below to quash the execution, because
it directed the money to be made out of the individual effects
of the defendants, and not out of the partnership property.
The circuit court overruled the motion. This suit is not governed by Sec. 2904 of the Code. That section contemplates a
suit against the partnership, in its partnership name merely,
without naming the individual members composi~g the firm.
In this case the individuals are named, and sued as such. The
individual property of each partner is liable to seizure in sa.tia·
faction of this judgment. • • •
The judgment is a1Jirmed.

Appeal from an order made upon a motion to set aside a

judgment, obtained by the Oil Co. against Hubbell and one

Taylor, as copartners. The opinion states the facts.

NOTE.-See Mechem'& Elem. of Parto. ~§ 209 Jl'J
Bee also the two cases next following herein.

•

Charles H. Tweed, for appellant.

George H. Forster, for respondent.

DANFORTH, J . (After disposing of other matters.) At ‘the

outset the plaintiff was called upon “to show cause why the

judgment should not be vacated and set aside as irregular, in

that a several judgment is entered against tlge deg:-ligant,

Hubbell, for'$40,950.29, and a several. judgment is entered

JUDD OIL ·co. vs. HUBBELL•.

against the defendant, Taylor, for $43,420.11), instead of a judg-

ment against the defendants joiiitly, pursuant to the um-

Court of Appeals of New York, 1819.

mons and complaint; also as unauthorized l;y__law.” The

moving papers establish beyond coﬁtroversy that the cause

76 N. Y. MS.

of action was a joint liability on the part of Hubbell and Tay-

>_' .,.

Appeal from an order made upon a motion to set aside a
judgment, obtainf'd by the Oil Co. against Hubbell and one
Taylor, as copartners. The opinion states the facts.
Oha.rles H. Tweed, for appellant.

Qeorge H. Forster, for respondent.
DANFORTH, J. (After disposing of other matters.) At 'the
outset the plaintiff was called upon "to show cause why the
judgment should not be vacated and set aside as irregular, in
thnt a several "udgment is entered against
e defendant,
Hubbell, for $40,950.2., and a several _judgment is entered
against the defendant, 'l'aylor, for $431420:'.Iil, instead of a judgment against the defendants jointly, pursuant to the summons and complaint; also as unauthorized b
w." The
moving papers establish beyond co troversy that the cause
of action was a joint liability on the part of Hubbell and Tay-
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tor as copartners. This the complaint alleged, the defendant

~Hubbell by his default admitted, and the defendant Taylor has

had that fact found against him by a referee, and by his silence

acquiesces in the ﬁnding. Upon that determination the plain-

tiﬂ's, at the same time and by means of the same record or

judgment roll, took judgments against the defendants sep-

arately, as stated in the order to show cause. This was clearly

irregular; but we think it was nothing more. The plaintiﬁs

did not adhere “to the prescribed rule or mode of proceeding,"

by which they were entitled to a joint judgment, and which

n. due and orderly conduct of the suit required them to take.

But this defect was m~and does not affect any

substantial right of the adverse party. It does not in any

way increase the liability of the defendant, for upon each part-

ner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of every

debt due from the partnership. Parsons on Partnership (2d

Ed.) 63; and although originally a joint contract, it may be

separate as to its effects. Though all are sued jointly and a

joint judgment obtained and a joint execution taken out, yet

it may be enforced aga~ly. Each partner is answer-
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able for the whole, and not merely for his proportionable part;

and as the judgments were taken against each partner, for a

partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the

same extent as if there had been but one judgment, for the

whole, aga~t1Ers. Brinkcrhoﬂ‘ cs. Marvin, 5 Johns.

Ch;, 326. Nor does the form of the judgment in any way affect

the debtor's relations with his copartner; for if he pays the

debt or judgment, he ~&dt:opti-il>gt’i@ mat

credit for the sum/p_:_1_id, in any accounting respecting the part-

nership affairs.

Motion to set aside judgment denied.

Nu'rn.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 209, 215, 216.

ii
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ior as copal'tnere. This the oo:mplaint alleged, the defendant
Hubbell by his default '8dmitted, iand the defendant Taylor has
had that fact found against him by a referee, and by his silenc'~
acquiesces in the finding. Upon that determination the plaintifl's, at the snme time and by means of the same record or
judgment roll, took judgments against the defendants separately, as stated in the order to show cause. This was clearly
irregular; but we think it was nothing more. The plaintiffs
did not adhere "to the prescribed rule or mode of proceeding,"
by which they were entitled to a joint judgment, and which
a due and orderly conduct <>f the suit required them to take.
But this defect was mtlfl1 teclmicaland does not affect any
substantial right of the adverse party. It does not in any
way increase tbe liability of the defendant, for upon each partner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of every
debt due from the partnership. rarsons on Partnership (2d
Ed.) 63; and although originally a joint contract, it may be
separate as to its effects. Though all are sued jointly and a
joint judgment obtained and a joint execution taken out, yet
it may be enforced against one only. Each partner is answerable for the whole, and not merely for his proportionable part;
and as the judgments were taken against each partner, for a
partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the
same extent as if there had been but one judgment, for the
whole, nga~!~rs. Brinkerhoff cs. Marvfo, 5 Johns.
Ch;, 326. Nor does the form of the judgment in any way affect
the debtor's relations with his copartner; for if he pays the
debt or judgment, he WiITbe engtle~o!!Jrj_butiQD or tQ._ il.
credit for the su~d, in any accounting respecting the part- ._·
nership affairs.
Motion to set aside judgment denied.
NoTB.-See llcchem'is Elem. of Partn., ~ 209, 2ll>, 818.

~
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MASON vs. ELDRED/»i'~$'

Supreme Court of United States, 1867.

6 Wall. 231, 18 L. Ed. 783.

Mason sued, in the circuit court for Wisconsin, Anson

Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and one Balcom, trading as partners,

upon a partnership note of theirs. Process was served on

\>

UASON vs. ELDRED. i;, f-S

Anson Eldred alone, who alone appeared, and pleaded non

assumpsit. On the trial, the note being put in evidence by the

Buprcme Court of United States, 18G1.

plaintiff, Eldred offered the record of a judgment in one of the

state courts of Micltigan, showing that Mason had already

6 Wall. 231, 18 L. Ed. 783.

brought suit in that court on the same note against the part-

nership; where, though Elisha Eldred was alone served and

alone appeared, judgment in form had p ed against all the

defendants for the full amount due uponme note.

The evidence being objected to by the plaintiff, because not

admissible under the pleadings, and because it appeared on

the face of the record that there was no judgment -against,

either of the defendants named except Elisha Eldred, who

alone, as appeared also, was served or appeared, and because
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it was insufficient-to bar the plaintiff’s action,(the question

whether it was evidence under the issue in bar of, and to

defeat a recovery againt Anson Eldred, was certiﬁed to this

court for decision as one on which the judges of the circuit

court were opposed.

G. W. Lakin, for plaintiff.

J. W. Cary, contra.“

FIELD, J. (After stating the facts.) If the note in suit

was merged in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to

the action, and an exempliﬂcation of its record is admissible,

for it has long been settled that under the plea of the general

issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to sh0w,,n_gt

-§

~ulmalleged cause of action never existed, but also

to show that it did not subsist at the commencement of the

suit. Young vs. Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Young vs. Rummcll, 2

ﬂill, 480. On the other hand, if the note is not thus merged,

Mason sued, in the circuit court for \Visconsin, Ansen
Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and one Balcom, trading as partnerH,
upon n pnrtnersbip note of th~irs. Process wns served on
Anson Eldred nlone, wb.o alone appeared, and pleaded n!ln
~ssumpsit. On the trial, the note being put in evidence by tho
plaintiff, Eldred offered the record of a judgment in one of tha
state courts of Micll'lgan, showing that Mason had already
brought suit in that court on the same note against the partnership; where, though Elisha Eldred was alone served and
alone a~peared, judgment in form had PfjiSCd against all the
defendants for the full amount due upon ~e note.
The evidence being objected to by the plaintiff, because not
admiEisible under the pleadings, and because it appeared on
the face of the record that there was no judgment against.
eithel' of the defendants named except Elisha Eldred, who
alone, as appeared also, was served or appeared, and because
it was insufficient -to bar the plaintiff's action,· (the question
whether it was evidence under the issue in bar of, and to
defeat a recovery against Anson Eldred, was certified to thiscourt for decision as one on which the judges of the circuit
· court were opposed.
G. lV. La-kin, for plaintiff.

J. W. Cary, contra...i_
FIELD, J. (After stating the facts.) If the note in (:Juit
was me1·ged in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to
the action, and an exemplification of its record is admissible,
for it has long been settled that under the plea of the general
issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to show, _nQ!..
lllfil'_~LtlllLaIJeged cause of action never existed, but also
to show that it did not subsist at the commencement of the
suit. Young i·s. Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Young vs. Rummell, 2
Jlill, M~O. On the other hand, if the note i~ pot thus pi~r~~Q.J
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it still forms a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment

is immaterial and irrelevant.

The question then for determination relates to the operation

of the judgment upon the note in suit.

The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note is the sev-

eral obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obliga-

tion of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note

against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note

against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted

upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint

debtor act of Michigan.

It is true that e§h copartner is bound for the entire amount

due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so

far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the non-

joinder of his copartners, a recovery may be had against him

for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judg-

ment against the copartners may be enforced against the prop-

erty of each. But‘his is a different thing from the liability

which arises from a joint and several contract. There the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

contract contains distinct engagements, that of each con-

tractor individually, and that of all jointly, and different rem-

edies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be

sued separately on their several engagements or together on

their joint undertaking. But in copartnerships there is no

such several liability of the copartners. The copartnerships

are formed for joint purposes. The members undertake joint

enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases

joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this com-

mon risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon

these transactions all the copartners must be brought in,except

when there is some ground -of personal release from liability,

as infancy or a. discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought

in, theomission may be pleaded in abatement. The plea in

abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the

action is brought were made jointly with another and n-ot with

the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning,

if the oopartnership contract was the several contract of each

copartner.

The language of Lord Maxsrmnn in giving the judgment of

the king’s bench in Rico cs. Slmte, 5 Burr. 2611, “that all con-

tracts with partners are joi\nt and sgreral, and every partner

1

ft still forms a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment
is immaterial and irrelevant.
The question then for determination relates to the operation
of the jndgrn~nt upon the note in suit.
The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note Is the several obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obligation of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note
against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note
against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted
upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint
debtor act of Mich~n.
'-It is true that each co.p artner is bound for the entire amount
due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so
far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the nonjoinder of his copa.rtners, a recovery may be had against him
for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against the oopartners may be enforced against the property of each. Bu~ie is a different thing from the liability
which arises from a joint and several contract. There the
contract contains distinct engagements, that of each con·
tractor individually, and t'hat of all jointly, and different remedies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be
1med separately on their several engagements or together on
their joint under·taking. But in copartnerships there is no
such several lia.b ility of the copartners. The copartnerships
are formed for joint purposes. The members undertake joint
enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases
joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon
these transactions all the copnrtners must be brought in, except
when there is some ground -0f personal release from liability,
as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought
In, the omission may be pleaded in abatemen~. The plea in
abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the
action is brought were made jointly with anot11er and not with
the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning,
if the oopartnership contract was the several ~ntract of each·
copartner.
The language of IJOrd MANSFIELD in giving the judgment of
the king's bench in Rfoe vs. Sh11te, 5 Burr. 2611, "that all con- .
tracts with partners are j~t and s~erai, and e.,,.y partner

\
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is liable to pay the whole,” must he read in connection with the

MA-SON

vs.

ELDRED.

facts of the case, and when thus read does‘not warrant the

conclusion that the court intended t-0 hold a copartnership

contract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the

joint contract of all the copartners, in the sense in which these

terms are understood by the plaintiﬁ"s counsel, but only that

the obligation -of each copartner was so far several that in a

suit against him judgment would pass for the whole demand,

if the non-joinder of his copartners was not pleaded in abate-

ment.

The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be inter-

posed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a

several liability.

For the support of the second position, that a judgment

against one copartner on a copartnership note does not con-

stitute a bar to a suit upon the same note against another

copartner, the plaintiff relics upon the case of Shcchy vs. Man-

deellle ¢£ Jamesson, decided by this oourtﬂand reported in 6

Cranch, 254. In that case the plain-tiff brought a suit upon a

promissory note given by Jamesson for a copartnership debt
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of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit had been brought

upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment

recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the

judgment in the ﬁrst action was pleaded by the defendant,

Mandeville, and the court held that it constituted no bar to

the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea.

The decision in this case has never received the entire appro-

bation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted

and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the

highest tribunals of different states. It was elaborately

reviewed by the supreme court of New York in the case of

Robertson es. Smith, 18 Johnson, 459, where its reasoning was

declared unsatisfactory, and a judgment rendered in direct

conﬂict with its adjudication.

In the supreme court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to

that of Robertson vs. Smith was made. Ward vs. Johnson, 13

Mass. 148. In Wann vs. McNulty, 2 Gilman, 359, the supreme

court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy vs. Man-

devi-lle, and declined to follow it as authority. The court

observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for

the opinions of the supreme court of the United States, ‘it

44

Is liable to pay the whole," must be read in connection with the
facts of the case, and when thus read does ·not warrant the
conclusion that the court intended to bold a copartnership
eontract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the
joint ronirart of all the cop:utners, in the sense in which these
terms are understood by the plaintiff's counsel, but only that
the obligation of each oopartner was so far several that in a
suit against him judgment would pass for the whole demand,
if the non-joinder of his oopartners was not pleaded in abatement.
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be interposed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a
several liability.
For the support of the second position, that a judgment
against one copartner on a copartnership note does not constitute a bar to a suit upon the same n-0te a~ainst another
co1>artner, the plaintiff relic.•s upon the case of Sheehy -va. Mandeville & Jamesson, decided by this oourt~nd reported in 6
Cranch, 254. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit upon a
promissory note given by .Jamesson for a copartnership debt
of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit bad been brought
upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment
recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the
judgment in the :first action was pl~ed by the defendant,
Mandeville, and the court held that it oonstituted no bar to
the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea.
The decision in this case bas never received the entire approbation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted
and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the
highest tribunals of different states. It was elaborately
reviewed by the supreme court of New York in the case of
Robertson t,s. Smith, 18 Johnson, 450, where its reasoning was
declared unsatisfactory, and a judgment rendered in direct
conflict with its adjudication.
In the supreme court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to
that of Robertson VB. Smith was made. Ward vs. Johnson, 13
Mass. 148. In Wann 'VB. McNu.lty, 2 Gilman, 359, the supreme
court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy vs. Mandeville, and declined to follow it as authority. The court
observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for
the opinions of the supreme court of the United States, it
44
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was well satisﬁed that the rule adopted by the several state

courts--referring to those of New York, Massachusetts, Mary-

.was well Bfttisfted that the rule adopted by the several state
~ourts-referring to those of New York, Massachutietts, Marylan!J, and Indiana-was more consistent with the principlei, of
law, and was supported by better reasons.
In Smilli vB. Rlac.k, 9 Sergt. & Rawlf', 14~, the supreme court
of Pennsylvania held that a judgment recover~d against one
of two partners was a bar to a subsequent suit against both,
though the new defendant was a dormant p:irtner at the time
of the contract, and was not discovered until after the judgment. "No principle," said t11e court, "is better settled than
that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole
cause of action, and that neither the matter nor the partie~
can be severl•d, unless indeed where the cause of action Is joint
and several, which, certainly, actions against partners are
not."
In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy t:s. Mandevill&,
and remarked that the decision in that case, however much
entitled to respect from the character of the judges who com~
posed the supreme court of the United States, was not of
binding authority, and it was disregarded.
Jn King i~s. Hoar, 13 Meeson & 'Velsby, 495, the question
whether a judgment recovered against one of two joint contractors was a bar to an action against the other, was presented to the court of exchequer and was elaborately considered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the conclusion reached that by the judgment recovered the original
demand bad passed in rem. judicatam, and could not be made
the subject of another action. In the course of the argument
the case of Sheehy VB. Mandeville was referred to -as opposed
to the conclusion reached, and the court observed that it had
the greatest respect for any decision of Chief Justice MARSHALL, but that the reasoning attributed to him in the report
of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice STORY, in
Trafton vs. The United States, 3 Story, 651, refers to this case
in the exchequer, and to that of Bheehy VB. Mandeville, and
observes that in the first case the court of exchequer pronounced what seemed to him a very sound and satisfactory
judgment, and as to the decision in the latter case, that he
'had for years entertained great doubts of its propriety.
The general doctrine maintained in England and the United States mny be briefly stated. A judgment against one
upon a joint contract of several persons, bars an action against

land, and lndiana—was more consistent with the principles of

law, and was supported by better reasons.

In Smith vs. Black, 9 Sergt. & Rawle, 142, the supreme court

of Pennsylvania held that a judgment recovered against one

of two partners was a bar to a subsequent suit against both,

though the new defendant was a dormant partner at the time

of the contract, and was not discovered until after the judg-

ment. “No principle,” said the court, “is better settled than

that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole

cause of action, and that neither the matter nor the parties

can be severed, unless indeed where the cause of action is joint

and several, which, certainly, actions against partners are

not.”

In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy cs. lllandev-illo,

and remarked that the decision in that case, however much

entitled to respect from the character of the judges who com-

posed the supreme court of the United States, was not of

binding authority, and it was disregarded.
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In King rs. Hoar, 13 Meeson & \Velsby, 495, the question

whether a judgment recovered against one of two joint con-

tractors was a bar to an action against the other, was pre-

sented to the court of exchequer and was elaborately consid-

ered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the con-

clusion reached that by the judgment recovered the original

demand had passed in rem judicatam, and could not be made

the subject of another action. In the course of the argument

the case of Shcchy vs. Mandecillc was referred to as opposed

to the conclusion reached, and the court observed that it had

the greatest respect for any decision of Chief Justice Man-

SHALL, but that the reasoning attributed to him in the report

of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice Sronr, in

Trafton vs. The United States, 3 Story, 651, refers to this case

in the exchequcr, and to that of Sheehy vs. Mandcuillc, and

observes that in the ﬁrst case the court of exchequcr pro-

nounced what seemed to him a very sound and satisfactory

judgment, and as to the decision in the latter case, that he

‘had for years entertained great doubts of its propriety.

The general doctrine maintained in England and the Unl-

ted States may be brieﬂy stated. A judgment against one

upon a joint contract of several persons, bars an action against

'

. ,
,
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the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the

defendant in the original action, and this fact was unknown

to the plaintiff when that action was commenced. When the

contract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause

of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of-

the parties not sued with those against whom the judgment

is recovered, being extinguished, their entire liability is gone.

They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no

several obligation; they cannot be sued jointly‘with the others,

-because judgment has been already recovered against the lat-

ter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the

same cause.

If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern the deci-

sion of this case, we should feel obliged notwithstanding

Shcchy v. lllandcvillc, to hold that the promissory note was

merged in the judgment of the court of Michigan, and that the

judgment would be a bar to the pres-ent action. But, by a.

statute of that state, compiled laws of 1857, vol. 2, chap. 133,
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page 1219, the rule of the common law is changed with respect

to judgments upon demands of joint debtors, when som-e only

of the parties are served with process. The statute enacts

that “in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted

upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process

against all of the defendants shall have been duly served upon

either of them, the defendant so served shall answer to the

plaintiff, and in such case the judgment, if rendered in favor

of the plaintiff, shall be against, all the defendants in the same

manner as if all had been served with process,” and that, “such

judgment shall be conclusive evidence of the liabilities of the

defendant who was served with process in the suit, or who

appeared therein; but against every other defendant it shall be

evidence only of the extent of the plaintiff’s demand, after the

liability of such defendant shall have been established by other

evidence.” '

Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not

served with process, or who do not appear therein, have no

binding force upon them, personally. The principle is as old

as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be per-

sonally bound until he has had his day in court, which means

until citation is issued to him, and opportunity to be heard is

afforded. D’.-fray -rs. Kctchum-, 1 Howard 165. Nor is the

demand against the parties not sued merged in the judgment

___ __%_~

the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the ·
defendant in the original action, and this fact was unknown
tP the plaintiff when that action was commenced. When the
contract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause
of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of
the parties not sued with those against whom the judgmant
is recovered, being extinguished, theh· entire liability is gone.
They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no
several obligation; they cannot be sued jointly-with the others,
·becaus~ judgment has been already recovered against the lat·
ter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the
same cause.
If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern tbe deci·
sion of this case, we should feel obliged notwithstanding
Sheehy v. Mandeville, to hold that the promissory note was
merged in the judgment of the court of :Michigan, and that the
judgment would be a bar to the preeent action. But, by a
statute of that state, compiled laws of 1857, vol. 2, chap. 133,
page 1210, the rule of the common law is changed with respect
to judgments upon demands of joint debtors, when some only
of the parties are serYed with process. The statute enacts
that "in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted
upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process
against all of the defendants shall have been duly served upon
either of them, the defendant so served shall nnswer to the
iflttintiff, and in such cnse the judgment, if rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, shall be against all the defendants in the same'
manner as if all had been served with process," and that, "such
judgment shall be conclusive eYidenoo of t'he liabilities of the
defendant who was served with process in the suit, or who
appeared therej.n; but against every other defendant it shall be
evidence only of the extent of the plnintiff's demand, after the
liability of such defend_ant shall have been established by other
evidence."
Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not
served with process, or who do not appear therein, have no
binding force npon them, personally. The principle is as old
as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be p<!reonally bound until he has bad his duy in court, which means
until citation is issued to liim, ancl opportunity to be heard is
afforded. D'A.rc11 -rs. Kctr.11um-, 1 Howard 165. Nor is the
demand against the parties not sued merged in the judgment
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against the party brought into court. The statute declares

what the effect of the judgment against him shall be with

respect to them; it shall only be evidence of the extent of the

plaintiit’s demand after their liability is by other evidence

established. It is entirely within the power of the state to

limit the operation of the judgment thus recovered. The state

can as well modify the consequences of a judgment in respect

to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the original

demand, as it can modify the operation of the judgment in any

other particular.

A similar statute exists in the state of New York, and the

highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing

these statutes, have held, notwithstanding the special pro-

ceedings which they authorize against the parties not served

to bring them afterward before the court, if found within the

state, that such parties may be sued upon the original demand.

In Bonrstcel rs. Todd, 9 Mich. 379, an action of covenant was

brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a

lease. One of them was alone served with process, and he

appeared and pleaded the general issue, and on the trial, as in
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the case at bar, produced the record of a judgment recovered

against himself and his co-defendant under the joint debtor

act of New York, processin that state having been served upon

his co-defendant alone. The court below held the judgment to

be a bar to the action. On error to the supreme court of the

state this ruling was held to be erroneous. After referring to

decisions in New York, the court said, “No one has ever

doubted the continuing liability of all parties. We cannot,

therefore, regard the liability as extinguished. And, inasmuch

as the new action must be based upon the original claim, while,

as in the case of foreign judgments at common law, it may be

of no great importance whether the action may be brought in

form upon the judgment, or on the previous debt, it is cer-

tainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form

of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy.

While we do not decide an action in form on the judgment to

be inadmissible, we think the action on the contract the better

remedy to be pursued.”

In Oakley vs. Aspinzcall, 4 N. Y. 513, the court of appeals

of New York had occasion to consider the effect of ajudgment

recovered under the joint debtor act of that state upon the

"Y * we

against the party brought into court. The statute declares
what the effect of the judgment against him shall be with
respect to them; it shall only be evidence of the extent of the
plaintiff's demand after their liability is by other evidence
established. It is entirely within the power of the state to
limit the operation of the judgment thus recovered. The state
can as well modify the consequences of a judgment in respect
to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the original
demand, as it ran modify the operation of the judgment in any
other particular.
A similar statute exists in the state of New York, and the
highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing
these statutes, have held, notwithstanding the svecial proceedings which they authorize against the parties not served
to bring them afterward before the court, if found within the
state, that such parties may be sued upon the original demand.
In BonestceZ t•s. Todd, 9 Mich. 379, an action of covenant was
brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a
lease. ·One of them was alone served with proceBB, and he
appeared and pleaded the general issue, and on the trial, as in
the case at bar, produced the record of a judgment recovered
against himself and his co-defendant under the joint debtor
act of New York, process in that state having been served upon
his co-defendant alone. The court below held the judgment to
be a bar to the action. On error to the supreme court of the
. state this ruling was held to be erroneous. After referring to
decisions in New York, the court said, "No one has ever
doubted the continuing liability of all parties. We cannot,
therefore, regard the liability as extinguished. And, inasmuch
as the new attion must be based upon the original claim, while,
as in the case of foreign judgments nt common law, it may be
of no g.reat importance whether the action may be brought in
form upon the judgment, or on the previous debt, it is certainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form
of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy.
While we do not decide an action in form on the judgment to
be inadmissible, we think the action on the contract the better
remedy to be pursued."
In Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 513, the court of appeals
of New York had occasion to consider the effect of ajudgment
recovered under the joint debtor act of that state upon the

1
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MASON VS. ELDRED.

Mason vs. ELDBED. 849

original demand. Mr. Justice BRONSON, speaking for the court,

says: “It is said that the original demand was merged in,

and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently, that the

plaintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That

would undoubtedly be so if both the defendants had been be

fore the court in the original action. But the joint debtor act

create an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving

eﬂ’ect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the

rights of all parties, the plaintitf must be allowed to sue on the

original demand. There is no diiﬁculty in pursuing such a

course; it can work no injury to any one, and it will avoid the

absurdity of allowing a party to sue on a pretended cause of

action which is, in truth, no cause of action at all, and then to

recover on proof of a different demand.”

Following these authorities, and giving the judgment recov-

ered in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would

have in that state, we answer the question presented in the

certiﬁcate, that the exempliﬁcation of the record of the judg-

ment recovered against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, olfered
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by the defendant, Anson Eldred, is not admissible in evidence

in bnr of, and to defeat, a recovery against the latter.

g_____%

NOTE: S99 Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 210, 211- , . -'

1/ Z
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original demand. Mr. Justice BRONSON, speaking for the court,
says: ''It is said that the original demand was merged in,
and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently, that the
plaintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That
would undoubtedly be BO if both the defendants bad been re
fore the court in the original .action. But the joint debtor act
creates an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving
effect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the
rights of all parties, the plaintiff must be allowed to sue on the
original demand. There is no difficulty in pursuing such a
course; it can work no injury to any one, and it will avoid the
absurdity of allowing a party to sue on a pretended cause of
action which is, in truth, no cause of action at all, and then to
recover on proof of a different demand."
Following these authorities, and giving the judgment recovered in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would
have in that state, we answer the question presented in the
certificate, that the exemplification of the record of the judgment recovered against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, offered
by the defendant, Anson Eldred, is not admissible in eviden•
In bar of, and to defeat, a recovery against the latter.

'---

.

Nors: See Mechem'• Elem. of Putn., §j 2101 211.

'
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XII.

or DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE.

HOARD vs. CLUM.

Supreme Con-rt of Minnesota, 1883.

81 Minn. 186, l7 N. W. Rep. 275.

Action for an accounting and the winding up of the aﬁairs of

it partnership. The plaintiffs in the action are three of the

"partners and the widow and heirs-at-law of a fourth partner,

and the defendant is the only other partner. From the articles

which are dated March 15, 1880, it appears that the partner-

ship was formed, under the name of the Clum Compounding

XII.

Company, for the purpose of manufacturing and selling a med-

icine, and that the partnership was “to have an existence of

thirty years from the date of these articles, unless sooner

dissolved by mutual consent.” The articles also provide for

OF DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE.

the taking of inventories at stated times, and that, in case any

member of the partnership may wish at any time to dispose of

his interest in the business, the other partners are to have the

right to purchase such interest by paying its value as deter-

mined by the last preceding inventory. The articles then pro-

vide that “in case of death of any member of the company, the

HOARD' vs. Ct.UM.
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heirs of such member may retain their interest therein, with all

the rights and privileges of the original members; and the

8uprenw; Coiirt of Mitaneaota., 1BU.

administrator of his estate, or the executor under his will, shall

represent such heir or heirs at the meetings (or otherwise) of

81 Mino. 186, 1'1 N. W. Rep. 275.

said company, so as to share the burden of management; and

in the event that this cannot be done, the company shall have

the right to purchase the interest of such deceased member in

the same manner, and for the same amount, as in the case of

Action for an accounting and the winding up of the llffairs of
ll i>artnetship. The plaintiffs in the acfion are three of t'IW
partners and the widow and heirs-at-law of a fourth partner:
an~ tlle defendant iR the only other partner. From the article~
which are dated March 15, 1880, it appears that the partnership was formed, under the name of the Clum Compounding
Company, for the purpose of manufacturing and selling a medicine, and that the partnership was "to have an existence of
thirty years from the <late of these articles, unless sooner
dissolved by mutual c-0nsent." The articles also provide for
the taking of inventories at stated times, and that, in case any
member of the partnership may wish at any time to dispose of
his interest in the business, the other partners are to have the
right to purchase such interest by paying its value as determined by the last preceding inventory. The articles then provide that "in case of death of any member of the company; the
heirs of such member may retain their interest therein, with all
the rights and privileges of the original members; and the
administrator of his estate, or the executor under his will, shall
re11resent such heir or heirs at the meetings (or otherwise) of
said company, so ns to share the burden of management; and
ln the event that this ca~not be done, the company shaJJ have
the right to purchase the interest of snch deceased member in
the same manner, and for the same amount, as in the case of

HoAnD v8. C.uu11.

I -Hosmb vs. Gram. 1* 351

a member wishing to sell as before stated. Nothing in the

351

foregoing articles is to be construed as meaning that the com-

pany is compelled to pay at the inventory price, but it simply

gives the right to buy on the above-named terms if it chooses

to do so; and each party to this agreement hereby grants such

right and privilege to buy such retiring or deceased party’s

interest on above-named terms; the company reserving the

right to buy at better ﬁgure and terms if they can.” The

complaint further alleges the adoption of a resolution, on

February 17, 1882, for the discontinuance of business and the

"dissolution of the partnership, and due notice thereof given to

defendant; also the death of one of the partners, on April 1,

1882, and the refusal of each and all of the plaintiffs to pur-

chase the interest of the deceased partner. .

Defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds (1)

that there is a defect of parties plaintiff, and (2) that the com-

plaint does not state facts suﬂicient to constitute a cause of

action. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant ap-

pealed.

H. G. Williston, for plaintiff.
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J. 0'. McClure, for appellant.

Bnnnr, J. 1. An excess of parties is not ground of demurrer

‘as “a defect of parties,” in the meaning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 66,

’§ 92, subd. 4; Pomeroy on Remedies, § 206; Richtmg/er rs.

’R'ichtm3/er, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 55; Allen vs. City of Buffalo, as N. Y.

280; Lewis vs. W-ill-imns, 3 Minn. 95 (151). _ ‘

2. Three members of a partnership ﬁrm and the heirs of a

deceased fourth bring this action against the remaining mem-

a· member

wishing to sell a8 before stated. Nothing in the
foregoing articles is to be construed as meaning that the com·
pany is compelled to pay at the inventory price, but it simply
gives the right to buy on the above-named terms if it chooses
to do so; and each party to this agreement hereby grants such
right and privilege to buy such retiring or deceased party's
interest on above-named terms; the company reserving the
right to buy at better figure and terms if they can." '.l'he
complaint further alleges the adoption of a resolution, on
February 17, 1882, for the discontinuance of business and the
·'1issolution of the partnership, and due notice thereof given to
d.e fendant; also the death of one of the partners, on April 1,
1&:2, and th(' refusal of each and all of the plaintiffs to purchase the interest of the deceased partner.
nC'fendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds (1)
'that there is a defect of parties plaintiff, and (2) that the com·
plaint does not state facts sumcient to constitute a cause of
action. The demurrer was overruled an'1 the defendant ap~nled.

ber, for the purpose (1) of having the partnership adjudged

dissolved; (2) of having the partnership wound up, and, to that

H. C. Will'8tc»i,

for plaintiff.

end, an accounting had, a receiver appointed, its assets con-

verted, its debts paid, and the rights of the partners among

,/. 0. Mc(Hure, for aIJPellant.

themselves ascertained and adjusted.

In the absence of previous agreement to the contrary, the.

death of a partner works a total dissolution of a partnership;

that is to say, a dissolution both as respects the deceased and"

the surviving partners: Pollock on Partnership, § 183; Coll-

yer on Partnership, §§ 103, 106; Story on Partnership, §§ 317,

819 a; Mavrlett vs. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass) 287; Roberts vs.

11EnnY, J. 1. An e:cccss ot parties ts not gfonnd of demurrer
ns "a defect of parties," in the meuning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 6G.,
t nz, subd. 4; Pomeroy on RPmE'dieA, § 206; R-ichtmt1er 1:-9.
"Rwhtmyer, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 55; Allen vs. Oitu of BuffakJ, 38 N. Y.
280; Leu:is vs. lV-illimns, !l .Minn. 95 (151).
·
2. Three members of a partnership firm and the heirs of a

dec:eased fourth bring this action against the remaining member, for the purpose (1) of having the partnership adjudged
dissolved; (2) of hnving t.he partnership wound up, and, to that
end, aD' accounting had, a receiver appointed, its assets convert<'d, its debts pnid, and the rights of the partners among
tht:mselves ascertained and adjusted.
Jn the absence of previous agreement to the contrary, the ,
death of a partner works a total dissolution of a partnership;/
that is to say, a dissolution both as respects the deceased and;
t\le surviving partners: Pollock on Partnership, § 183; Collyer on Partnership, ~§ 103, 106; Story on Partnership, §§ 317,
319 a; Ma·rlett vs. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 287; Roberts .:a.
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Kelsey, 38 Mich. 602; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 231. A simple

provision in the articles for the continuance of the partnership

for a ﬁxed period, as, in the present instance, for thirty years,

is not such an agreement: Collyer on Partnership, §§ 100, 105 ;

Crawford ts. H amilton, 3 Madd. 251; Crosbi-e vs. Guion, 23 Beav.

518; Story on Partnership, § 319 a. Mining partnerships

appear to be governed by somewhat different rules: Jomzs vs.

Clark, 42 Cal. 180.

In case of such dissolution, the right of surviving partners

and of the representative of a deceased partner to have the

partnership wound up, and any surplus property distributed,

-is matter of course; 1 Collyer on Partnership, § 107.

In the case at bar the partnership was dissolved by the death

of the partner Hoard. The articles contain no stipulation

for the continuance of the business of the concern, except upon

speciﬁed contingencies, none_of which have occurred, and none

of which, therefore, cut any material ﬁgure in the case. It

follows that the three partners plaintilt can maintain this

action against the partner who refuses to recognize the dissolu-

tion, and to co-operate in closing up and adjusting the business
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of the concern. As respects their right to maintain it, it is not

important that the heirs of the fourth partner, who are joined

with them as plaintiffs, havealleged no facts to show that

they are proper parties to the action, nor that the executor or

administrator of the deceased is not joined; for no objection,

as respects parties, has been taken, except that there is a defect

of parties on account of the joinder of the heirs, and this we

have disposed of.

Order affirmed.

NOTE: See Mecl\em’s Elem. of Partn., § 245.

See also cases under Subd. VIII, Acrioxs Bsrwnsx PARTNERS.

Kel8ey, 38 Mich. 602; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 231. A simple
provision in the articles for the continuance of the partnership
for a fixed period, as, in the present instance, for thirty years,
is not such an agreement: Collyer on Partnership,§§ 100, 105;
Cratcford i-s. Hamilton, 3 Madd. 251; Crosbie t'B. Guion, 23 Beu-.
51~; Story on Partnership, § 319 a. Mining partnerships
appear to be governed by somewhat differeut rules: Jones w.
Clark, 42 Cal. 180.
In case of such dissolution, the right of surviving partners
and of the representative of a deceased partner to have the
partnership wound up, and any surplus property distributed,
-is matter of course; 1 Collyer on Partnership,§ 107.
In the case at bar the partnership was dissolved by the death
of the partner Hoard. The articles contain no _stipulation
for the continuance of the bmdness of the concern, except upon
specified ~ontingencies, none. of which have occurred, and none
of which, therefore, cut any material figure in the case. It
follows that the three partners plaintiff can maintain this
action against the part:per who refuses to recognize the dissolution~ and to co-operate in closing up and adjusting the business
of the concern. As respects their right to maintain it, it is not
important that the heirs of the fourth partner, who are joined
with them as plaintiffs, have · alleged no facts to show that
they are proper parties to the action, nor that the executor or
administrator of the deceased is not joined; for no objectioa,
as respects parties, has been taken, except that there is a defect
.of parties on account of the joinder of the heirs, and this we
have disposed of.
Order affirmed.
NoTB: See Meehem's Elem. or Partn., ~ 243.
See also cases under 811bd. Vlli, A.orm.:u B&TW.BBN PAB.TYBB&
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HALSEY vs. NORTON.

353

Suprerrw Court of Mississippi, 1871.

45 Miss. 703, '7 Am Rep. 745.

Actioh by Norton a assignee in bankruptcy of H. F. Giren

and D. A. Giren, as members of the ﬁrm of Giren, Brown &

Co., against Halsey. Judgment below for plaintitf. Halsey

appealed. ,

HALSEY vs. NORTON.

W. <5 J. R. Ycrger, for appellant.

No counsel for appellee.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1811.

Snmnnn, J. It is urged for the plaintiff in error that the

judgment ought to be reversed because the assignee, Norton,

45 Mi1?9. 703, 7 Am Rep. 745.

ought to have united with him as co-plaintitf the solvent part~

ner. It was said by the Chief Baron in Taylor vs. Fields, 4 Ves.

396, “that the surplus of partnership eﬂects is joint property;

and that the interest of each partner is only his share of what

remains after the partnership accounts are taken.” The

asignee takes precisely the position of the bankrupt, as

respects the joint property. That interest is transferred to

him to be administered for the creditors. Bankruptcy does not

Action by Norton as assignee in bankruptcy of H. F. Giren
and I>. A. Giren, as members of the firm of Giren, Brown &
Co., against Halsey. Judgment below for plaintiff. Halsey
appealed.

divest the title of the solvent partner. It dissolves the copart-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

nership, and constitutes the assignee and the solvent partner

W. cf J. R. Yerger, for appellant.

tenants in common or joint owners. To stand in :1 court of law,

the plaintitf must have the entire legal right; if the title be

No counsel for appellee.

held by several, all must join in the suit. Eckhard vs. Wilson,

8 Term Rep. 140, and Murray vs. Murray, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ch.

70, are to the point that the assignee and the solvent partner

must unite in a suit respecting the joint effects and choses in

action. But it must be manifested that there is another per-

son, not co-plaintitf, who ought t-o, etc.; this may be by plea in

abatement, or by nonsuit if proved on the trial (1 Chitty’s

Plead. 452, 453); or by demurrer if it appears on the face of the

declaration. The declaration is thus: “E. E. Norton, assignee,

etc., of Henry F. Giren and Dickson A. Giren, as members of

the ﬁrm of Giren, Brown & Co.” It is not averred who com-

45

SmnALL, J.

It is urged for the plaintiff in error that the

judgment ought fo be reversed because the assignee, Norton,
ought to have united with him as co-plaintiff the solvent partner. It wns said by the Chief Baron in Taylor -r;s. Fields, 4 Ves.
39f)~ "thnt the surplus of partnershJp effects is joint property;
and that the interest of each partner is only his share of what
remains after the partnership accounts are taken." The
assignee takes precisely the position of the bankrupt, as
respects the joint property. That interest is transferred to
Mm to be administered for the creditors. Bankrupt<'y does not
divest the title of the solvent partner. It dissolves the copar.tnership, and constitutes the assignee and the solvent partner
tenants in common or joint owners. To stand in a court of law,
the plaintiff most have the entire legal right; if the title be
held by several, all must join in the suit. Eckhard vs. Wilson,
8 Term Rep. 14-0, and Murray vs. Murray, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ch.
70, are to the point that the assignee and the solv~nt partner
must unite in a suit respecting the joint effects and choses in
action. But it must be manifested that there is another person, not co-plaintiff, who ought t·o, etc.; this m'.ly be by plea in
abatement, or by nonsuit if proved on the trial (1 Cbitty's
Plead. 452, 453); or by demurrer if it appears on the face of the
declaration. The declaration is thus: "E. E . Norton, assignee,
etc., of Henry F. Giren and Dickson A. Giren, as members of
the firm of Giren, Brown & Co." It is not averred who com45
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pose the ﬁrm, except these two bankrupts, nor does it appear

aﬂirmatively that there were any other members; the copart-

nership name may be and often is purely artiﬁcial, not discov-

ering who are its members. Proof was not made on the trial

that any other person was a member, although objection was

made by the defendant to the admission of evidence, in trutli

of the account, on that ground. If it was not apparent on the

record that there was a solvent partner; if the defendant pro-

posed to nonsuit the plaintiﬂ? or prevent his recovery, she

ought to have proved the existence of such a partner. We do

not think that the record presents the point made by the plain-

tiﬂ’ in error, so that she can avail of it in this court.

Affirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. Q 247; Bank vs. R. R., ante, p. 147.

HOWELL vs. HARVEY.

Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1843.

5 Ark. 270, 39 Am. Dec. 8'76.

Bill for an accounting brought by Harvey, alleging that he

and one Shanklin sold a store of goods to John Howell and

pose the firm, except these two bankrupts, nor does It appear
aftlrmatively that there were any <>ther members; the copartne~ship name may be and often is purely artificial, not discovering who are its members. Proof was not made on the trial
that any other person was a member, although objection was
made by the defendant to the admission of evidence, in truth
of the account, on that ground. If it was n<>t apparent <>D the
record that there was a solvent partner; if the defendant proposed to nonsuit the plaintiff or prevent his recovery, she
ought to have proved the existence of such a partner. We do
not t~ink that the record presents the p<>int made by the plaintiff in error, so that she can avail of it in this court.
Affirmed.

McConnell, taking their notes for the purchase price. That
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McConnell afterwards withdrew; and Harvey bought his inter-

NOT&: See Mechem'& Elem. of Partn., f 247; Bank t.ta. R.R., ante, p. 147.

est, paying therefor his share in the notes. One Smith was

afterwards taken in as partner. The remaining facts suf-

ficiently appear from the opinion. Judgment for the complain-

ant. The defendants appealed.

Linton, for the appellants.

Pike and Baldwin, contra.

Lacy, J . It i said that the bill should have been dismissed

upon the hearing, for the want of proper parties. W'e think

HOWELL vs. HARVEY.

Iotherwise. The necessary parties were all before the court.

-The ﬁrm of John Howell & Co. was composed of John B. Har-

8upreme Court of Arkansas,

184~.

vey, John Howell, and John B. Howell, and the record shows

that no one else had any interest in their business, or the set-

5 Ark. 270, 89 Am. Dec. 878.

Bill for an accounting brought by Harvey, alleging that he
and one Shanklin sold a store of goods to John Howen and
McConnell, taking their notes for the purchase price. That
McConnell afterwards withdrew; and Harvey bought his interest, paying therefor his share in the notes. One Smith was
afterwards taken in as partner. The remaining facts suf6ciently appear from the opinion. Judgment for the complainant. The defendants appealed.

Linton, for the appellants.
Pike and Baldwin, contra.
LACY, J. It is said that the bill should have been dism!ssed
upon the hearing, for the want of proper parties. We think
'otherwise. The necessary parties were all before the court.
·The firm of John Howell & Co. was composed of John B. Harvey, John Howell, and .John B. HowE>Il, and the record shows
that no one else had any interest in their business, or the set·

Howsu. vs. HARVEY. 355

. HOWELL
tlement of their accounts; Shanklin had not the most remote

vs.

HA.RVET.

355

connection with the partnership concern. Harvey bought an

interest in a stock of goods of John Howell, and credited a

note that he and Shanklin jointly held on Howell and McCon-

nell with the amount of the purchase money. This he had a

right to do. Should Harvey have used more than his just pro-

portion of this joint note, he would unquestionably be answer-

able over to Shanklin; but then it is manifest that this mere

possible liability of Harvey would give Shanklin no interest in

the partnership concern, nor would it entitle him to be made

a party to the present suit. Smith was originally one of the

partners with Harvey and Howell, but after continuing in the

ﬁrm eight or nine months, he sold and conveyed all his interest

to John B. Howell, with the consent and approbation of the

other partners. As it is evident that John B. Howell was sub-

stituted as a partner in the ﬁrm in the place of Smith, he of

course was subrogated to all the rights and privileges of

Smith, who has no interest in the present suit. The rule on

the subject of making the necessary parties in suits of equity,

is so plain and universal that it can neither be mistaken nor
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misapplied. All persons should be made parties who have an

interest in the matters in dispute, or who may be beneﬁted or

injured by the decree. This rule has been followed in the pres-

ent instance, and therefore it was proper to hear the cause

upon its merits: Wendell vs. Van Rensselacr, 1 Johns. Ch. 349;

Petch vs. Dalton, 8 Price, 9; Duﬂ‘ vs. East I ndla Co., 15 Ves. 213,

227. The business was to be conducted in the name of John

Howell and Company, and Howell and Harvey were to share

an equal moiety of the proﬁts and losses with Smith, and upon

the dissolution of the partnership, Smith was to be reimbursed

for the excess of his advances with six per cent interest.

Smith and Howell agreed to advance the necessary funds, as

far as practicable, to keep up a supply of goods, and Harvey

was to attend to selling them while at home. Smith, as before

stated, sold and conveyed to John B. Howell all his interest

on the sixteenth of December, 1838; thereupon Howell was

admitted as a partner, with all Smith’s rights, and he took

upon himself the discharge of all his duties. The bill states

that the complainant performed his part of the agreement,

and that John Howell and‘John B. Howell violated their con-

tract, in not furnishing the necessary supplies of goods for

tlement of their accounts; Shanklin bad not the most remote
connection with the partnership concern. Harvey bought an
interest in a stock of goods of John Howell, and credited a
n-0te that he and Shanklin jointly held on Howell and McC<>nnell with the amount of the purchase money. This he bad a
right to do. Should Harvey have used more than his just proportion of this joint note, he would unquestionably be answerable over to Shanklin; but then it is manifest that this mere
imssible liability of Harvey would give Shanklin n-0 interest in
the partnership coocern, nor would it entitle him to be made
a party to the present suit. Smith was originally one of the
partners with Harvey and Howell, but after continuing in the
firm eight or nine months, he sold and conveyed all his interest
to John B. H-0well, with the consent and approbation of the
other partners. As it is evident that John B. Howell was substituted as a partner in the firm in the place of Smith, he of
eourse was subrogated to all the rights and privileges of
Smith, who has no interest in the present suit. The rule on
the subject of making the necessary parties in suits of equity,
is so plain and universal that it can neither be mistaken nor
misapplied. All persons should be made parties who have an
interest in the matters in dispute, or who may be benefited or
injured by the decree. This rule has been followed in the present insta·nce, and therefore it was proper to hear the cause
upon its merits: Wendell vs. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Cb. 349;
Petch vs. Dalton, 8 Price, 9; D1tff vs. East India Co., 15 Ves. 213,
227. The business was to be conducted in the name of John
Howell and Company, and Howell and Harvey were to share
an equal moiety of the profits and losses with Smith, and upon
the dissolution of the partnership, Smith was to be reimbursed
for the excess of his advances with six per cent interest.
Smith and Howell agreed to advance the necessary funds, ~
far as practicable, to keep up a supply of goods, and Harvey ·
was to attend to selling them while at home. Smith, as before
stated, sold and conveyed to John B. Howell all his interest
on the sixteenth of December, 18~8; thereupon Howell was
admitted as a partner, with all Smith's rights, and he took
upon himself the discharge of all his duties. The bill states
that the complainant performed his part of the agreement,
and that John Howell and John B. Howell violated their contract, in not furnishing the necessary supplies of goods for
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the store; that John Howell went to Philadelphia and bought

a large stock of goods and shipped them in his own name, and

on his return advertised a dissolution of the copartnership,

with the consent of John B. Howell, in the absence of the com-

plainant, and against his will. It avers that John Howell took

all the goods, books, and accounts into his own hands, and

excluded Harvey from all participation in the business. The

bill makes John Howell and John B. Howell defendants, and

prays an account may be taken; that the partnership may be

continued or dissolved, as the equity of the case may be, and it

concludes with a prayer for general relief.

The answers admit most of the material allegations of the

bill. The answer of John Howell insists that he, together

with Smith, had purchased the necessary supplies for the

store, and that he bought the goods at Philadelphia, on his

own account and shipped in his own name, and that he

excluded the complainant from intermeddling with the part-

nership effects and from taking charge of the goods of him-

self, and that he dissolved the ﬁrm, as he had the right to do,

‘because the complainant was guilty of gross negligence and
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misconduct, in not attending to the business of the ﬁrm, and

in absenting himself unnecessarily from the state.

A partnership, in its most signiﬁcant and extended sense,

is a voluntary contract of two or more persons for joining

together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all

of them, upon an agreement that the gain or loss shall be

divided proportionably between them, and having for its object

the advancement and protection of fair and open trade: Gow.

Part. p. 1; Story’s Part. p. 1; 1 Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2;

Initrod. 1 Doma.t Civ. L. b. 1, tit. 8, art. 1. This is, sub

stantially, the deﬁnition given by all the writers on the sub-

ject, and it embraces within its terms and spirit all the

principal obligations and duties of the contract. It is per-

fectly clear, upon principle as well as authority, that

wherever the conditions of the partnership are incapable

of being fulﬁlled, or the fruits arising from ‘the agree-

ment can not be properly enjoyed, that such a case fur-

nishesa. good cause for the renunciation of either party. _Under

such circumstances the further continuance of the partner-

ship would be productive of serious inconvenience and great

injury to the other partners, and might end in their immediate

the store; that John Howell went to Philadelphia and bought
a large stock of goods and shipped them in his own name, and
on his return advertised a dissolution of the copartnersbip,
with the consent of John B. Howell, in the absence of the complainant, and against his will. It avers that John Howell took
all the goods, books, and accounts into his own hands, and
excluded Harvey from all participation in the business. The
bill makes John Howell and John B. Howell defendants, and
prays an account may be taken; that the partnership may be
continued or dissolved, as the equity of the case may be, n.nd it
concludes wit:Q a prayer for general relief.
The answers admit most of the material allegaU.oos of the
bill. The answer of J olm Howell insists that he, together
with Smith, had purchased the necessary supplies for the
store, and that he bought the goods at Philadelphia, on his
own account and shipped in his own name, and that he
excluded the complainant from intermeddling with the partnership etrects and from taking charge of the goods of himself, a"'d that he dissolved the firm, as he bad the right to do,
because the complainant was guilty of gross neg1igence and
misconduct, in n-0t attending to the business of the firm, and
in absenting himself unnecessarily from the state.
A partnership, in its most significant and extended sense,
is a voluntary contract of two or more persons for joining
together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all
of them, upon an agreement th.at the gain or loss shall be
divided proportionably between them, and hnving for its object
• the advancement and protection of fair and open trade: Gow.
Part. p. 1; Story's Part. p. 1; 1 Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2;
Introd. 1 Doma.t Civ. L. b. 1, tit. 8, art. 1. This is, su~
stantially, the definition given by all the writers on the subject, and it embraces within its terms and spirit all the
principal obligations and duties of the contract. It is perfectly clear, upon principle as well as authority, that
wherever the conditions of the partnership are incapable
of being fulfilled, or the fruits arising from ,the agreement can not be properly enjoyed, that such a case furnishes :a good cause for the renunciation o-f either party. pnder
such circumstances the further continuance of the partnership would be productive of serious inconvenience and great
injury to the other partners, and might end in their immediate
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ruin or the utter prostration of the business. Story on Part.

419, 421. The same doctrine is fully borne out by the civil

law, and is illustrated by the case of a partner, where one of

the partners.is grievously oppressed with insolvency, or where

from some bodily inﬁrmity he i unable to discharge his

engagements. The jurisdiction of a. court of equity, in cases

of copartnership ﬂowing from the peculiar trust and duties

growing out of that connection, is of the most extensive and

beneﬁcial character. It often declares partnerships utterly

void, in cases of fraud, imposition, and oppression in the orig-

inal agreement; or decrees a dissolution of a partnership which

wa unobjectionable in its origin, but which subsequent causes

have rendered onerous and oppressive; gross misconduct, want

of good faith, or criminal want of diligence, or such cause as

is productive of serious and permanent injury in the partner-

ship concerns, or renders it impracticable to carry on the bui-

ness, is good ground for a dissolution at the suit of the injured

partner. Habitual drunkenness, great egztravagance, or

unwarrantable negligence in conducting the business-of_ the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

partnership, justiﬁcs a dissolution; but then it mut be a.

strong and clear case of positive or meditated abuse to author-

ize such a decree. For minor misconduct and grievances, if

they require redress, the court will interfere by way of injunc-

tion to prevent the mischief : Story on Part. 414, 415.

The application of the principles here stated will test the

conduct of the complainant, and show whether or not the

defendan»t_.John Howell,was justiﬁed in renouncing the copart-

nership at the time and under the circumstances of the pres-

ent cae. The proof is somewhat contradictory on this point;

still the weight of the testimony, both in respect of numbers

and the circumstances detailed by the witness, is clearly with

the complainant. The articles of partnership show that the

defendants were to furnish the funds to keep up the necessary

supplies, when it was in their power to do so, and that the

complainant was to attend to selling the goods while he

remained at home. The terms of this agreement clearly indi-

cate that the parties never contemplated that slight neglect

or accidental failure of their respective engagements should

dissolve the partnership. The articles of the partnership con-

clusively show that the parties themselves looked to unequiv-

ocal demonstrations of gross acts of abuse and misconduct,

ruin or the otter prostration of tl1e bu~in<>ss. Story on Part.
419, 421. The same doctrine is fully borne out by the civil
law, and is illustrated by the case of a partner, where one of
the partners.is grievously oppressed with insolvency, or where
from some bodily infirmity he is unable to discharge his
engagements. The jurisdiction of a court of equity, in cases
of copartnership flowing from the peculiar trust and duties
growing out of that connection, is of the most extensive and
beneficial character. It often declares partnerships utterly
void, in cases of fraud, imposition, and oppression in the original ugreement; or decrees a dissolution of a partnership wbich
was unobjectionable in its origin, but which subsequent causes
have rendered onerous and oppressive; gross misconduct, want
of good faith, or criminal want of dilig<'nce, or such cause as
·is productive of serious and permanent injury in the partnership concerns, or renders it impracticable to carry on the business, is good ground for a dissolution at the suit of the injured
partner. Habitual drunkenness, great e~travagance, or
on warrantable negligence in conducting the business· ef. the
partnership, justifies a dissolution; but then it must be a
strong and clear case of positive or meditated abuse to authorize such a decree. For minor misconduct and grievances, if
they require redress, the court will interfere by way of injunction to prevent the mischief: Story on Part. 414, 415.
The application of the principles here stated will test the
conduct of the complainant, and show whether or not the
defendant.Jo-ho Howell, was justified in renouncing the copa1·tnership at the time and under the circumstances of the present case. The proof is somewhat contradictory on this point;
still the weight of the testimony, both in respect of numbers
and the circumstnnces detailed by the witness, is clearly with
the complainant. The articles of partnership show that the
defendants were to furnish the funds to keep up the necessary
supplies, when it was in their power to do so, nnd that the
compluinant was to attend to selling the goods while he
remained at home. The terms of this agreement clearly indi·
cate that the parties never contemplated that slight neglect
or accidental failure of tlleir respective engagements should
dissolve the partnership. The articles of the partnership eonclusively show that the parties themselves looked to unequivocal demonstrations of gross acts of abuse and miscollllnct,
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orize a dissolution. It is true that the complainant was absent

in Kentucky upon several occasions, but then, business or his

family aﬁlictions seem to have called and detained him there;

and the proof is that Howell was apprised of his absence, and

so far from objecting to his going the last time to Kentucky,

or making it a cause of complaint against him, that upon the

eve of starting for Philadelphia to purchase goods, he urged

the complainant to get back against his return, and be ready

to receive the goods. This the complainant tried to do, but

was detained by the sickness of his family, and did not arrive

until after Howell's return with the goods, which he claims

to have purchased for himself, and until after he had published

the dissolution of the copartncrship. Howell, it seems, never

intimated a wish. or desire to dissolve the copartnership before

he started to Philadelphia. The testimony is that in the opin-

ion of some of the witnesses, the complainant was not a very

proﬁtable or attentive partner, but it wholly fails to establish

such overt acts of misconduct or gross negligence as would

authorize a dissolution of the partnership.
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In the present case the partnership was to continue during

the pleasure of the contracting parties. It is therefore strictly

a partnership at will, and subject to the rules that govern

such agreements. Chancellor I{m:'r says, that it is an estab-

lished principle of the law of partnership, that if it be without

any deﬁnite period, any party may withdraw at a minute’s

notice when he pleases and dissolve the partnership. The ex-

istence of engagements with third person.s will not prevent

the dissolution, though their engagements will not be affected

by the act. He admits that cases may occur where reasonable

notice might be advantageous, but he holds it not to be requi-

site. and he adds that a party may, in a case free from fraud,

choose an unreasonable time for the dissolution. The exception

he makes in a case of fraud, indicates to our minds that the

rule is not so unbending or universal, as it is laid down, unless

the limitation is intended to include those cases where the

renunciation is made in good faith and at a proper time. As

a general principle, contracts subsisting during pleasure, are

naturally and necessarily dissolvable by the mere exercise of

the will of either of the parties; and this is the principle ac-

cording to the civil law under ordinary circumstances, and to

where the injury would be imminent and irreparable, to authorize a dissolution. It is true that the oomplainant was absent
in Kentucky upon several occasions, bot then, business or hie
family affiictions seem to have called and detained him there;
and the proof is that Howell was apprised of his absence, and
so far from objecting to his going the last time to Kentucky,
or making it a cause of complaint against him, that upon the
eve of starting for Philadelphia to purchase goods, he urged
the complainant to get back against his return, and be ready
to receive the goods. This the oompln.inant tried to do, bot
was detained by the sickness of his family, and did not arrive
until a!ter Howell's return with the goods, which be claims
to have purchased for himself, and until after he had published
the dissolution of the copartnership. Howell, it seems, never
intimat<•d a wish or desire to dissolve the copa1·tnership before
be started to Philadelphia. The testimony is that in the opinion of some of the witnesses, the complainant was not a very
profitable or attentive partner, but it wholly fails to establish
such overt acts of misconduct or gross negligence as would
authorize a dissolution of the partnership.
In the presrnt case the partnership was to continue during
the pleasure of the contracting parties. It is therefore strictly
a partnership at will, and subject to the rules that govern
such agreements. Chancellor K1~N"T says, that it is an established principle of the law of partnership, that if it be without
any definite period, any party may withdraw at a minute's
notice when be pleases and dissolve the partnership. The existence of engagements with third persons will not prevent
the dissolution, though their engagements will not be affected
by the act. Ile admits that cases may occur where reasonable
notice might be advantageous, but be holds it not to be requisite, and he adds that a party may, in a case free from fraud,
choose an unreasonable time for the dissolution. The exception
he makes in a case of fraud, indicates to our minds that the
rule is not so unbending or universal, as it is laid down, unless
the limitation is intended to include those cases where the
renunciation is made in good faith and at a proper time. As
a general principle, contracts subsisting during pleasure, ar«i>
naturally and necessarily dissolvable by the mere exercise of
the will of either of the parties; and this is the principle according to the civil law under ordinary circumstances, and to
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such an extent is it carried that a positive stipulation against

the dissolution at the will of either o_f the parties will be held

utterly void, as inconsistent with the true nature and intent

of such relation. In cases of equity, we think the true rule to

be this,that to enable one partner to dissolve at will the part-

nership, two things must occur; ﬁrst, the renunciation of the

partnership must be in good faith, and secondly, it must not

be made at an unreasonable time. This is the doctrine of the

civil law, and of the code of Louisiana, and Pothier lays down

the same rule, and inculeates it in the same manner; for he

says that no partner has a right to prefer his own particular

interest to that of the ﬁrm, or to take away its proﬁts, or to ap~

propriate them to his own private advantage, and it is upon

this principle, that while a partner is engaged in business,

courts of equity will restrain him from like pursuits. He has

no right to divert from the firm the diligence, skill, or capital

that rightfully belongs to it. The French civil law expresses

the whole law upon the subject in the following brief terms:

“Dissolution of partnerships,” says Domat, “by the will of

one of the "partners, applies only to partnerships the duration
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of which is unlimited, and is effected by a renunciation notiﬁed

to all the parties; provided such renunciation be bona ﬁdc; and

not made at an improper time.” Renunciation is held not to

be made bona ﬁde, where one partner renounces in order to

appropriate to himself the proﬁts which the partners are en-

titled to receive. It is said to be made at an improper time,

when the things are no longer entire that were of consequence

to partnership, and which should have deferred the dissolu-

tion. A partnership for a limited period of time cannot be

dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the parties, within the

time prescribed. On the contrary, it only can be dissolved from

just motives and for a reasonable cause. There is an implied

understanding that the partnership shall continue to the ex-

piration of the term, unless where one partner fails in his

engagements, or any habitual inﬁrmity renders him unﬁt to

carry on the business, or where the renunciation is for the

beneﬁt of the partnership and not for the advantage of the

dissolving partner. The principle here stated is extracted from

all the authorities by Justice Sronx, and fully approved by

him in his complete and admirable treatise upon partnerships.

In cases where the partnership is to endure for a limited

such an extent is it carried that a positive stipulation against
the dissolution at the will of either of t~e parties will be held
utterly void, as inconsistent with the true nature and intent
of such relation. In cases of equity, we think the true rule to
be this,that to enable one partner to dissolve at will the partnership, two things must occur; first, the renunciation of the
partnership must be in good faith, and secondly, it must not
be made at an unreasonable time. This is the doctrine of the
civil law, and of the code of Louisiana, and Pothier lays down
the same rule, and inculcates it in the same manner; for he
says that no partner has a right to prefer his own particular
interest to that of the firm, or to take away its profits, or to appropriate them to his own private adYantage, and it is upon
this principle, that while a partner is engaged in business,
courts of equity will restrain him from like pursuits. He has
no right to divert from the firm the diligence, skill, or capital
that rightfully belongs to it. '!'he French civil law expresses
the whole law upon the subject in the following brief terms:
"Dissolution of partnerships,'' says Domat, "by the will of
one of the partners, a.pplies only to partnerships the duration
of which is unlimited, and is effected by a renunciation notified
to all the parties; provided such renunciation be bona fide; and
not made at an improper time." Uenunciation is held not to
be made bona fide, where one partner renounces in order to
appropriate to himself the profits which the partners are en·
titled to receive. It is said to be made at an improper time,
when the things are no longer entire that were of consequence
to partnership, and which should have deferred the dissolution. A partnership for a limited period of time cannot be
dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the parties, within the
time prescribed. On the contrary, it only can be dissolved from
just motives and for a reasonable cause. 'fhere is an implied
11ndc>rstanding that the partnership shall continue to the expiration of the term, unll:'ss wlwre one partner fails in his
engagements, or any habitual infirmity renders him unfit to
carry on the business, or where the renunciation is for the
benefit of the partnership and not for the advantage of the
dissolving partner. The prinriple hc.>re stated is extracted from
all the authorities by Justice STonY, and fully approved by
him in his complete and admirable treatise upon partnerships.
In cases where the partnership is to endure for a limited
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period of time, the question, whether within that period it

may be dissolved by the mere act and will of one of the part-

ners, without the consent of the others, is not deﬁnitely or

absolutely settled, says Justice Sronr, in our jurisprudence.

He clearly intimates, if ever such a case should arise, where

one partner claimed the right, sua sponte, of dissolving the

partnership, that he possesses no such power; and he takes

the distinction between a. court of equity dissolving the part-

nership, and that of a partner, acting upon his own caprice and

pleasure, dissolving the engagement. He admits the doctrine

to be somewhat different according to the Roman law; but he

denies that a partner has a right to found his own claim to

immediate indemnity and safety by committing a known injury

on the interest and privileges of his copartners: and in this

opinion he is sustained by many elementary writers and a

number of adjudged cases of unquestionable authority: Gow.

on Part. c. 5, sec. 1, 219, 225, 226, 288; 3 Coll. Part. b. 1, c. 2,

sec. 2, p. 62, 2d Ed.; Kent's Com. sec. 43, pp. 61, 4th Ed.;

Peacock vs. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56; Crawshay vs. Mauls, 1 Swans.

495; Pcnrpoint vs. Graham, 4 \Vash. G. O. 234.
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The partner who breaks off the partnership with an unfair

design, or for selﬁsh objects, discharges his copartners from

all liabilities to him, but he does not thereby free himself from

his obligations to them. \Vhen he quits the partnership, that

he may buy for himself what the partnership has a right to

purchase, or that he may make a proﬁt for his own advantage

and to their prejudice, he is answerable to the community for

the loss and damage; and so, if he quits at an unreasonable

time, which occasioned a deprivation of proﬁts to the com-

munity, it is but right he should repair and make good such

loss: Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 64-68; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sec.

5; arts 1-S, by Straham; Story on Part. 383-420. -

The proof-in this case clearly shows that Howell renounced

the partnership for his own private advantage, and not to ben-

eﬁt the ﬁrm. He said nothing to his partner of his wish to

dissolve until his return from Philadelphia. He then adver-

tised a dissolution of the ﬁrm, and seized all the goods and

effects into his own hands. \'Vhile he was in partnership with

Harvey, he had no right to purchase the goods in his own

name; for in doing so he would have acted in bad faith, and

besides, Harvey would have been answerable for the purchase.

’ '— '=an!!.==-‘J

perioo of time, the question, whether within that period it
may be dissolved by the mere act and ,will of one of the partners, without the consent of the others, is not definitely or
absolutely settled, says Justice STORY, in our jurisprudence.
He clearly intimates, if ever such a case should arise, where
one partner claimed the right, BUa 8ponte, of dissolving the
partnership, that he possesses no such power; and he takes
the distinction between a court of equity dissolving the part·
nership, and that of a partner, acting upon his own caprice and
pleasure, dissolving the engagement. He admits the doctrine
to be somewhat different according to the Roman law; but he
denies that a partner has a right to found his own claim to
immediate indemnity and safety by committing a known injury
Qn the intere8t and privileges of his copartners: and in this
opinion he is sustained by many elementary writers and a
number of adjudged cases of unquestionable authority: Gow.
on Part. c. 5, sec. 1, 219, 225, 226, 288; 3 Coll. Part. b. 1, c. 2,
aec. 2, p. 62, 2d Ed.; Kent's Com. sec. 43, pp. 61, 4th Ed.;
Peacock vs. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56; Cratcshay tis. Maule, 1 Swans.
495; Pearpoint vs. Graham, 4 'Yash. C. C. 234.
The partner who breaks off tl1e partnership ·with an unfair
design, or for seltish objects, discharges bis copartners from
all liabilities to him, but he does not thereby free himself from
his obligations to them. \Vhen he quits -the partnership, that
he may buy for himself what the partnership has a right to
purchase, or that he may make a profit for his own advantage
and to their prejudice, be is answerable to the community for
the loss and damage; and so, if he quits at an unreasonable
time, which occasioned a deprivation of profits to the community, it is but right he should repair and make good such
loss: Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 64-68; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sec.
5; arts 1-8, by Strabam; Story on Pal't. 383-420.
The proof· in this case clearly shows that Howell reno.unced
the partnership for his own private advantage, and not to benefit the firm. Re said nothing to his partner of his wish to
dissolve until his return from Philadelphia. He then advertised a dissolution of the firm, and seized all the goods and
effects into his own hands. 'Vhile be was in partnership with
Harvey, he had no right to purchase the goods in his own
name; for in doing so he would have acted in bad faith, and
besides, Harvey would have been answerable for the purchase.

So1.o non vs. Kmnwoon- 361

SOLOY.ON

vs.

KIRKWOOD•.

861

Was it more to Howell’s interest, or to the ﬁrm’s, that the dis-

solution should take place at the time it did? The answer to

this inquiry is neither diﬁicult nor doubtful. At the time

Howell published the dissolution of the copartnership, mer-

chants were realizing large proﬁts upon their stock, and goods

,were sold readily at an advance of ﬁfty to one hundred per

Acent. Did he not dissolve the partnership that he might buy

,for himself and realize this proﬁt? \Vere not the other part-

ners of the ﬁrm prejudiced in their business, and he beneﬁted

,by the transaction? Were not his motives sinister and selﬁsh,

,and did he not withdraw from the community at an unwar-

rantable time and in bad faith? The proof leaves no doubt

upon this subject, and if the rules and principles above stated

be correct, then he is unquestionably answerable to the com-

plainant for the damages he may have sustained. That damage

seems to have been calculated and awarded upon a correct

basis. The chancellor, in rendering the decree, debited and

credited each of the partners in conformity to the articles of

agreement, with their respective advance and expenditures,

taking a list of the notes and accounts furnished by the books,
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and properly auditing them; and he then charged Howell with

ﬁfty per cent proﬁt upon the whole amount of goods "he pur-

chased at Philadelphia, as well as the stock on hand belonging

to the ﬁrm. In this calculation and -adjustment, we perceive no

error.

Decree afﬁrmed.

NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 237, 251.

Compare with following case.

-1

SOLOMON vs. KIRKYVOOD.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884.

55 Mich. 258, 21 N. ‘V. Rep. 336.

The plaintiffs, who are, in the city of Chicago, dealers in

jewelry, seek to charge the defendants, as partners, upon a.

promissory note for $791.92, bearing date November 9, 1882,

and signed “Hollander & Kirkwood.” The note was given by

the defendant Hollander, but Kirkwood denies that any part-

46

Was it more to Howell's interest, or to the firm's, that the dissolution should take place at the time it did? The answer to
this inquiry is neither difficult nor doubtful. At the time
Howell published the dissolution of the copartnership, merchants were realizing large profits upon their stock, and goods
,were sold readily at an advance of fifty to one hundred per
,cent. Did he not dissolve the partnership that he might buy
~or himself and realize this pro.fit? Were not the other part.ners of the firm prejudiced in their business, and be benefited
1by the transaction? Were not bis motives sinister and selfish,
,and did he not withdraw from the community at an unwarrantable time and in bad faith? The proof leaves no doubt
upon this subject, and if the rules and principles above stated
be correct, then he is unc1uestionably answerable to the complainant for the damages be may have sustained. That damage
seems to have been calculated and awarded upon a correct
basis. The chancellor, in rendering the decree, debited and
credited each of the partners in conformity to the articles of
agreement, with their respective adva:n.ces and expenditures,
taking a list of the notes and accounts furnished by the books,
and properly auditing them; and he then charged Howell with
fifty per icent profit upon the whole amount of gio.ods ·be purchaaed at Philadelphia, as well as the stock &n hand belonging
· to tthe firm. In this caloulation Md adjustment, we perceive no
error.
Decree affirmed.
Non: Bee Meehem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 287, 251.
Compare with following caee.

SOLO.~!ON

vs. KIRKWOOD.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884.
55 Mich. 256, 21 N. W. Rep. 83B.

The plaintiffs, who are, in the city of Chicago, dealers In
jewelry, seek to charge the defendants, as partners, upon a
promissory note for $791.92, bearing date November 9, 1882,
and signed "J;lollander & Kirkwood." The note was given by
.the defendant Hollander, but Kirkwood denies that any part46
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nership existed between the defendants at the date of the

note.

The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July

6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agree-

ment for a partnership for one year from the ﬁrst day of the

next ensuing month, in the business of buying and selling

jewelry, clocks, watches, etc., and in repairing clocks, watches,

and jewelry, at Ishpeming, Michigan. Business was begun

under this agreement, and continued until the latter part of

October, 1882, when Kirkwood. becoming dissatisﬁed, locked

up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the

business. He also caused notice to be given to all persons

with whom the ﬁrm had had dealings that the partnership

was dissolved, and had the following inserted in the local

column of the paper published at Ishpeming: “The copartner-

ship heretofore existing between Mr. C. H. Kirkwood and one

Hollander, as jewelers, has ceased to exist, Mr. Kirkwood

having purchased the interest of the latter.” This was not

signed by any one.

A few days later Hollander went to Chicago, and there, on
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November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of Hollander &

Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to

$7 91.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissor_v note

now in suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882,

at a bank in Ishpeming. When the purchase was completed

Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintiffs

had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but

they had heard that there was such a ﬁrm, and were not aware

of its dissolution. They claim to have made the sale in good

faith, and in the belief that the ﬁrm was still in existence. On

the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the

plaintiffs had conspired together to defraud him by a pre-

tended sale to the ﬁrm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hol-

lander intended to appropriate exclusively to himself; and he

was allowed to prove declarations of Hollander which, if

admissible, would tend strongly to prove such a conspiracy.

The questions principally contested on the trial wer<=>First,

whether the acts of Kirkwood amounted to a dissolution of the

partnership; second, whether suﬁicient notice of dissolution

was given; and, third, whether there was any evidence to go

to the jury of an understanding between Hollander and the

- ‘===tEP=§I

nerehip existed between the defendants at the date of the
note.
The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July
6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agreement for a partnership for one year from the first day of the
next ensuing month, in the business of buying and selling
jewelry, cl-0cks, watches, etc., and in repairing clocks, watches,
and jewelry, at Ishpeming, :Michigan. Business was begun
under this agreement, and continued until the latter part of
October, 1882, when Kirkwood, becoming dissatisfied, locked
up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the
business. He also caused notice to be given to all persons
with whom the firm had had dealings that the partnership
was dissolved, and bad the following inserted in the local
column of the paper published at Ishpeming: "The copartnership heretofore existing between Mr. C.H. Kirkwood and one
Hollander, as jewelers, has ceased to exist, Mr. Kirkwood
having purchased the interest of the latter." This was not
signed by any one.
A few days later Hollander went to Chicago, and there, on
November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of Hollander &
Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to
$791.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissory note
now in suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882,
at a bank in Ishpeming. "rhen the purchase was completed
Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintiffs
~ had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but
they had beard that there was such a fl.rm, and were not aware
of its dissolution. They claim to have made the sale in good
faith, and in the belief that the firm was still in existence. On
the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the
plaintiffs had conspired tog-ether to defraud him by a pretended sale to the firm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hollander intend(>(} to appropriate exclusively to himself; and be
was allowed to prove declarations of Hollander which, if
admissible, would tend strongly to prove such a conspiracy.
The questions principally contested on the trial were-First,
whether the acts of Kirkwood amounted to a dissolution of the
partnership; second, whether sufficient notice of dissolution
was given; and, third, whether there was any evidence to go
to the jury of an understanding between Hollander and the

Sonouon vs. KIRKWOOD. 363

plaintiffs to defraud Kirkwood. The trial judge, in submitting

SOLOXON VS. KIRKWOOD.

363

the case to the jury, instructed them that Kirkwood, notwith-

standing the written agreement, had a right to withdraw from

the partnership at any time, leaving matters between him and

JHollander to be adjusted between them amicably or in the

courts; and for the purposes of this case it made no difference

whether Kirkwood was right or wrong in bringing the part-

nership to an end; if wrong, he might be liable to Hollander

in damages for the breach of his contract. Also, that when

partners are dissatisﬁed, or they cannot get along together,

and one partner withdraws, the partnership is then at an end

as to the public and parties with whom the partnership deals,

and neither partner can make contracts in the future to bind

the partnership, provided the retiring partner gives the proper

notice. Also, that if they should ﬁnd from the evidence that

there was trouble between Hollander and Kirkwood prior to

the sale of the goods and the giving of the note; that Kirk-

wood informed Hollander, in substance, that he would have

no more dealings with him as partner; that he took possession

of all the goods and locked them up, and from that time they
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ceased to do business—then the partnership was dissolved.

Further, that whether suﬁicient notice had been given of the

\ dissolution was a question for the jury. Kirkwood was not

bound to publish notice in any of the Chicago papers; he was

only bound to give actual notice to such parties there as had

dealt with the partnership. But Kirkwood was bound to use

all fair means to publish as widely as possible the fact of a dis-

solution. Publication in a. newspaper is one of the proper

means of giving notice, but it is not absolutely essential; and

on this branch of the case the question for the jury was

whether Kirkwood gave such notice of the dissolution as under

the circumstances was fair and reasonable. If he did, then he

is not liable on the note; if he did not, he would still continue

liable.

The judge also submitted to the jury the question of fraud

in the sale of the goods. The jury returned a verdict for the

defendants. Plaintiff brings error.

Ball <£ Hanscom, for appellants.

W. P. H ealy, for appellee.

Coouazv, C. J . (After stating the facts as above.) I. We

think the judge committed no error in his instructions respect-

plaintiffs to defraud Kirkwood. The trial judge, in submitting
the case to the jury, instructed them that Kirkwood, notwith:standing the written agreement, had a right to withdraw from
the partnership at any time, leaving matters between him and
;Hollander to be adjusted between them amicably or in the
courts; and for the purposes of this case it made no difference
whether Kirkwood was right or wrong in bringing the partnership to an end; if wrong, he might be liable to Hollander
in damages for the breach of his contract. AlBO, that when
partners are dissatisfied, or they cannot get along together,
and one partner withdraws, the partnership is then at an end
as to the public and parties with whom the partnership deals,
and neither partner can make contracts in the future to bind
the partnership, provided the retiring partner gives the proper
notice. Also, that if they should find from the evidence that
there was trouble between Hollander and Kirkwood prior to
the sale of the goods and the giving of the note; that Kirkwood informed Hollander, in substance, that he would have
no more dealings with him as partner; that he took possession
of all the goods and locked them up, and from that time they
ceased to do business-then the partnership was dissolved.
Further, that whether sufficient notice had been given of the
~.dissolution was a question for the jury. Kirkwood was not
bound to publish notice in any of the Chicago papers; he was
only bound to give actual notice to such parties there as had
dealt with the partnership. But Kirkwood was bound to use
nll fair means to publish as widely as possible the fact of a dissolution. Publication in a newspaper is one of the proper
means of giving notice, but it is not absolutely essential; and
on thjs branch of the case the question for the jury was
whether Kirkwood gave such notice of the dissolution as under
the circumstances was fair and reasonable. If be did, then he
is not liable on the note; if he did not, he would still continue
liable.
The judge also submitted to the jury the question of fraud
In the sale of the goods. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants. Plaintiff brings error.

Ball & Hanscom, for appellants.
W. P. Healy, for appellee.
CooLEY, C. J. (After stating the facts as above.) I. We
think the judge committed no error in his instructions respect-
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ing the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this sub-

ject is thus stated in an early New York case: The right of a

partner to dissolve, it is said, “is a right inseparably incident

to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indis-

solublc partnership. Every partner has an indefeasible right

to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by pub-

lishing his own volition to that effect; and after such publica-

tion the other members of the ﬁrm have no capacity to bind

him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with

each other ‘that the partnership shall continue seven years,

either partner may dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his

determination for that purpose; the only consequence being

that he thereby subjects himself to a claim for damages for a

breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to

another to make joint contracts for them both is not only a

revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of

the capacity to revoke it:” Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N.

Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286. To the same effect are Mason

vs. Con-nell, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 381, and Slemnwr’s Appeal, 58 Pa.

St. 155. There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to

make it' specially injurious; but no question of equitable

restraint arises here. When one partner becomes dissatisﬁed

there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compel-

ling a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract

will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the

right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure,

subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that

responsbility would exist in breaking a contract of partner-

ship as in other cases.

II. The instruction respecting notice was also correct. No

court can determine for all cases what shall be sufficient

notice and what shall not be; the question must necessarily

be one of fact. Publication of notice of dissolution in a local

newspaper is common, but it is not the only method in which

notice can be given. The purpose of the notice is to make

notorious in the local community the fact that a dissolution

has taken place; and publication of a notice may or may not

be the most effectual means for that purpose. Very few per-

sons in any community probably read all the advertisements

published in the local papers; and matters of local importance

Ing the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this subject is thus stated in an early New York case: The right of a
partner to dissolve, it is said, "is a right inseparably incident
to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership. Every partner bas an indefeasible right
to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by publishing hi.9 own volition to th?t effect; and after such publication the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind
him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with
each other 'that the partnership shall continue seven years,
eith~r partner may dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his
determination for that purpose; the only consequence being
that he thereby SQbjects himself to a claim for damages for a
breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to
anotb.er to make joint contracts for them both is not only a
revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of
the capacity to revoke it:" Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N.
Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286. To the same effect are Mason
vs. Connell, 1 Wbart. (Pa.) 381, and Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa.
St. 155. There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a
dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to
make if specially injurious; but no question of equitable
restraint al'ises here. When -0ne partner becomes ilissatisfied
there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compelling-a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract
will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the
right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure,
subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that
responsbility would exist in breaking a contract of partnership as in other cases.
II. The instruction respecting notice was also correct. No
court can determine for all cases what shall be sufficient
notice and what shall not be; the question must necessarily
be one of fact. Publication of notice of dissolution in a local
newspaper is common, but it is not the only method in which
notice can be given. The purpose of the notice is to make
notorious in the local community the fact that a dissolution
has taken place; and publication of a notice may or may not
be the most effectual means for that purpose. Very few persons in any community probably read all the advertisements
published in the local papers; and matters of local importance

Sotouou vs. KIRKWOOD. 365
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which are advertised are quite as likely to come to them from

365

other sources as from the published notices.

That publication in a newspaper is suﬂicient, is not dis-

puted by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be

n.utho1-itative: Ketcham vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5 Am.

ﬂee. 197; Graves vs. Merry, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 701; 16 Am. Dec.

-171; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill ‘(N. Y.), 578; Nott vs.

roaming, 6 La. 680; 26 Am. Dec. 491; Watkinson rs. Bank of

I’:-nnsylvania, 4 W'hart. (Pa.) 482; 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose vs.

('o;7ield, 53 Md. 18; 36 Am. Rep. 389. But in this case it is said

the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a

local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and

may in any particular case have no better foundation than

rumor or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the

verity which a notice signed by the party would import.

.\ll this may be true without being conclusive. \Vhen the

purpose is to "put the fact of dissolution before the public, it

certainly cannot be affirmed that the purpose is more likely

to be accomplished by a formal advertisement than by an

item in the local column of the newspaper. Many publish-
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ers, it is believed, have in their papers a local column in which

items appear which seem onptheir face to be editorial, but

which are really advertisements; and not only paid for, but

paid at extra rates, for the reason that in that column they

would be more likely to be seen and read than if published

as advertisements in the ordinary way. When such is the

case, a court could hardly hold as matter of law that the

advertisement would be sufficient, but the notice in the local

column not. To do so would be to make form more important

than the purpose to be accomplished. One who derives knowl-

edge of the fact from public notoriety is suﬂiciently notiﬁed:

Bernard vs. Torrance, 5 Gill & J . (Md.) 383; H alliday vs. M cD0u-

gall, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 81; and probably in many small com-

munities a fact would sooner be made notorious by a. notice in

the loxml column of the county or village paper than in any

other way. In a large city it might-be otherwise. But all that

can be required in any case is that such notice be given as is

likely to make the fact generally known locally: Vernon vs.

Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 183, 193; Loaejoy vs. Spa/ford,

93 U. S. 430. When that is done the party giving the notice

has performed his duty, and "any one contemplating for the

•

which are advertised are quite as likely to come to them from
other sources as from the published notices.
That publication in a newspaper is sufficient, is not disputed by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be
nuthoritative: I{etcham vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5 Am.
J)ec. 197; Grave.s vs. Merr11, 6 Cow. (N. Y:) 701; 16 Am. Dec.
-~71; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 578; Nott va•
:rmming, 6 La. 680; 26 Am. Dec. 491; Watkinson i·s. Ba.nk of
l'1·1111sylvania, 4 "'·h.-irt. (Pa.) 482; 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose vs.
<'offeel.d, 53 Md. 18; 36 Am. Rep. 389. But in this case it is said
the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a
local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and
may in any particular case have no better foundation than
rumor or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the
verity which a notice signed by the party would import.
All this may be true without being conclusive. 'Vhen the
purpose is to ·put the fact of diss<>lution before the public, it
certainly c:mnot be affirmed that the purpose is more likely
to be accomplished by a formal advertisement than by an
item in the local column of the newspaper. Many publish·
ers, it is believed, have in their papers a local column in which
item~ appear which seem on their face to be editorial, but
wh.ieh are really advertisements; and not only paid for, but
paid at extra rates, for the reason that in that column they
would be more likely to be seen and read than if published
as advertisements in the ordinary way. When such ie the
case, a court could hardly h.old as matter of law that the
advertisement would be sufficient, but the notice in the local
column not. To do so would be to make form more important
than the purpose to be accomplished. One who derives knowled~e of the fact from public notoriety is sufficiently n<>tifiedc
Bernard vs. Tormnce, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383; Halliday vs. McDougall, 20 ·wend. (~. Y.) 81; and pr<>bably in many small communities a fact would s~oner be made notorious by a notice in
the local column of the county or village paper than in any
other way. In a large city it might·be otherwise. But all that
can be required in any case is that such notice be given as ie
likely to make the fart generally known locally: Vernon vs.
.Manhattan Oo., 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 183, 193; Lovejoy vs. Spafford,
93 U. S. 430. When that is done the party giving the notice
has performed his duty, and ·any one contemplating for the
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ﬁrst time to open dealings with the partnership must at his

peril ascertain the facts. This, in eﬂect, was the instruction

given.

III. But we think the judge erred in receiving evidence

of Holl:.nder’s admissions or declarations tending to show

fraudulent collusion between him and the plaintiffs. The dec-

larations of a conspirator may be evidence against his asso-

ciates after the conspiracy is made out; but to receive them as

proof of the conspiracy would put every man at the mercy of

rogues. VVe ﬁnd in this case no evidence of the conspiracy

except in the statements of Hollander; and those having been

erroneously received, there was nothing on that branch of the

case to submit to the jury.

For this error there must be a new trial.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §240.

See also Fletcher ca. Pullen, ante, p. 134.

GERARD vs. GATEAU.

Supreme Court of Illinois, 1876.

84 Ill. 121, 25 Am. Rep. 438.

Bill for dissolution of partnership, etc. The facts appear in
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the opinion.

ftret time to open dealings with the partnership must at his
peril ascertain the facts. This, in effect, was the instruction
given.
III. But we think the judge erred in receiving evidence
of Holl:4nder's admissions or declarations tending to show
fraudulent collusion between him and the plaintiffs. The declarations of a conspirator may be evidence against his associates after ~ conspiracy is made out; but to receive them as
proof of the conspiracy would put eT"ery man at the mercy of
rogues. We find in this case no evidence of the conspiracy
except in the statements of Hollander; and those having been
erroneously received, there was nothing on that branch of the
ease to submit to the jury.
For this error there must be a new trial.

Emery A. Storrs, for appellant.

Geo. W. Cass, R. Riddle Roberts, and E. Harvey, for appellee.

Sco'r'r, J. The copartnership between the parties to this

NOTB:: See Mechem's Elem. ot Pa.rtn •• ~ 240.
See also Jr'letcher
Pullen, ante, p . 134.

t:•.

litigation was for the manufacture and sale of zinc rooﬁng and

zinc and other metal ornamen-tal work. It was formed in Jan-

uary, 1872, and was to continue through a period of ten years.

Although equal partners the capital put in was not equal.

Complainant put in $12000 in cash, and defendant was the

GERARD vs. GATEAU.

owner of plaster of Paris dies which would be needed in

the business of the ﬁrm, and which were rated to h-im as

capital at $3,500. It was stipulated that the ﬁrm was to

Supreme Court of llZinoi8, 1816.

pay interest on t-he excess of capital put in by complain-

ant, a.nd it was secured to him upon the stock of the ﬁrm.

St Ill. 121, 25 Am. Rep. '38.

Bill for dissolution of partnership, etc. The fact1 appear in
the opinion.

Emery A.. Storrs, for appE>IJant.
Geo. W.

Cass~

R. Riddle Roberts, and E. Han;ey, for aprllee.

Sco'M', J. 'rhe copartnership between the parties to this
litigation was for the manufacture and sale of zinc roofing and
~inc and other metal ornamt>nital work. It was formed in January, 1872, and was to continue through a period of ten years.
Although equal partnC'rs the capital put in was not equal.
Complainant put in ~1 ~.000 in cnsh, and defendant was the
owner of plaster of Paris dies which would be needed in
the businel!ls of the firm, and whiC'h were ra:ted to him a.a
capital at ,3,500. It was stipulntPd that the firm was to
pay interest on t·be ex('('Ss of capital put in by -complainant, and it was secured to him upon the stock <>f the firm.
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In the articles of copartnership it was provided what causes

should operate as a dissolution: First, death of either party;

and second, “incapacity, embezzlement or gross neglect or

misconduct of either party.” On account of the latter causes

either party could have the ﬁrm dissolved by giving thirty

days’ notice to the other party, of such intention, stating in

uch notice his grounds and reasons for so doing. After the

lapse of a little over two years complainant ﬁled this bill for

a dissolution of the copartnership, for an account and for an

injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the

affairs of the company. No notice was given of his intention,

as provided in the articles of copartnership, to ask a dissolu-

tion, but without regard to the agreement, complainant in-
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vokes the general powers of a court of chancery.

It is not set forth in the bill, that defendant is wanting in

capacity, or that he has been guilty of embezzlement or any

other act affecting his integrity of character. Among the

caues alleged for a dissolution of the copartnership is, the

plaster of Paris dies, formerly owned by the defendant, were

put in as capital at a sum greatly in excess of the real value.

Conceding the fact, we do not understand it would constitute

any ground for canceling the partnership contract. On the

dissolution of the copartnership, by lapse of time or otherwise,

equities between the parties arising out of this cause, could

be adjusted. But upon the principal fact, as to the value of

the dies, the evidence is quite conﬂicting, and if trying the case

as an original question, we would be at a loss to determine

with which party is a preponderance of the testimony. Cer-

tainly there is no decided preponderance in favor of com-

plainant.

VVith regard to the overcharge on the work for Oxley & Co.

for work done under a special contract for that company it is

hardly of sufficient importance to deserve much consideration.

It was ornamental work of elaborate design, to be used on the

State House and as to the actual cost of the material and

labor, persons skilled in that department of labor differ widely

in their estimates. It may or it may not have been an over-

charge. There is nothing that shows defendant acted cor-

ruptly in the matter. The differences in regard to the -price

charged were afterward adjusted with the parties in interest,

and no harm came to complainant.

In the articles of copartnership it was provided what causes
should operate as a dissolution: First, death of either party;
and second, "incapacity, embezzlement or gross neglect or
misconduct of either party." On account of the latter causes
either party could have the firm dissolved by giving thirty
days' notice to the other party, of such intention, stating in
such notice his grounds and reasons for so doing. After the
lapse of a little over two years complainant filed this bill for
a dissolution of the copartnership, for an account and for an
injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the
affairs of the company. No notice was given of his intention,
as provided in the articles of copartnership, to ask a dissolution, but without regard to the agreement, complainant invokes the general powers of a court of chancery.
It is not set forth in the bill, that defendant is wanting in
capacity, or that he has been guilty of embezzlement or any
other act affecting bis integrity of character. Among the
causes alleged for a dissolution of the copartnership is, the
plaster of Paris dies, formerly owned by the defendant, were
. put in as capital at a sum greatly in excess of the real value.
Conceding the fact, we do not understand it would constitute
any ground for canceling the partnership contract. On the
dissolution of the copartnership, by lapse of time or otherwise,
equities between the parties arising out of this cause, could
be adjusfrd. But upon the principal fact, as to the value of
the dies, the evidence is quite conflicting, and if trying the case
as an original question, we would be at a loss to determine
with which party is a preponderance of the testimony. Certainly there is no decided preponderance in favor of complainant.
With regard to the overc·b arge on the work for Oxley & Co.
for work done under a special contract for that company it is
hardly of sufficient importance to deserve much consideration.
It was ornamental work of elaborate design, to be used on the
State House and as to the actual cost of the material and
labor, persons lilkilled in that department of labor differ widely
in their estimates. It may or it may not have been an overcharge. There is nothing that shows defendant acted corruptly in ithe matter. The difference-s in regard to the price
charged were aftierward adjusted with the parties in interest 1
and no harm came to complainant.
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Another cause of complaint is, the prosperity of the ﬁrm
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was impaired by the personal bearing of defendant toward

customers. If the inventory taken of the assets of the ﬁrm anywhere near correct, it cannot be the prosperity of the con-

cern was in any great degree affected by the conduct of de

fendant, whatever it may have been. An unusual measure of

success seems to have attended their affairs. In the brief

period the ﬁrm had been doing business, according to the testi-

mony, th-e assets of the company had more than doubled, with-

out contracting any considerable amount of -indebtedness.

The charge is, defendant had an irascible temper, was in-

solent in his department, or, as one of the witnesses expressed

it, was “high and mighty with customers.” Evidence intro-

duced shows that, while defendant was disagreeable, and

perhaps wanting in courtesy to some, with others he was

always pleasant and affable. It is shown that for some time

before and after the formation of the copartnership, the

social relations of the partners were of the most friendly

character. The causes that interrupted those relations were

not more serious -in their nature than the annoyances that

often attend the transaction of any business. We ﬁnd no well
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considered case going to the extent that such defect as indi-

cated in the character of one partner would justify a dissolu-

tion of the copartnership contract. Should such a rule be

adopted it is apprehended, on account of the inﬁrmities of

character, no asociation of persons for the transaction of

business would endure for any great length of time.

As was said by this court in Cash vs. Earnshaw, 66 Ill. 402,

it is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner,

a court of equity, at the instance of another, will dissolve the

partnership and close up the affairs of the company. The/

court will require a strong case to be made, and it is laid down

as a general principle, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to

declare a separation between partners for triﬂing causes or

temporary grievances, involving no permanent mischiefs.

That defcndant’s conduct toward some of the customers of the

ﬁrm is subject to severe criticism admits of no doubt, but that

i-t worked any permanent misc-hief to the partnership interests

is not established by any evidence in the case.

The debatable point in the case is, as to the personal rela-

tions between the partners, and whether the hostile relations

Another cause of complaint is, the prosperity of the firm
was impaired by the personal bearing of defendant toward
customers. If the inventory taken of the assets of the firm ~
anywhere near rorreet, it cannot be the prosperity of the concern was in any great degree atfected by the oonduct of def endant, whatever it may have been. An unusual measure of
success seems to h'ave attendoo their affail"s. In the brief
period the firm had been doing business, according to the testimony, the asset.'4 of the company ·had more than doubled, without contra"Cting any considera;ble amount of indebtedness.
The char~e is, defendant had an irascible temper, was insolent in his department, or, as one of the witnesses expressed
it, was "high and migllty with customers.'' Evidence introduced shows that~ while d(•fendant was disagreeable, and
perhaps wanting in courtesy to some, with others he was
always pleasant and atl'able. It is shown that for some time
before and after the formation of the copartnership, the
social relations of the partners were of the most friendly
·character. The causes that interrupted those relations were
not more serious in their nature than ·the annoyances that
often attend the transacUon of ;a,ny business. We find no well
considered cµse going to the extent that such defect as indicated in the character of one partner would justifJ a dissolution of the copartnership contract. Should such a rule be
adopted it is apprehended, on account of the infirmities of
character, no association of persons for the tl"ansaction of
business would endure for any great length of time.
.As was said by this court in Cash vs. Ea.nzsliaw, 66 Ill. 402,
it is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner,
a court of equity, at the instance of another, will dissolve the
partnership and close up the affairs of the company. Thi°
court will require a strong case to be made, and it is laid down
as a general principle, a court of equity bas no jurisdiction to
declare a separation between partners for trifling causes or
tempomry grievances, involving no permanent mischiefs.
That defendant's conduct toward some <>f the customers of the
firm is subject to severe criticism admits of no doubt, but that
it worked any permanent misc-llief to the partnership interests
is not established by any evidence in the case.
The debatahle point in the case is, as to the personal relations between the partners, and whether the hostile relationa
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existing are justly attributable to the unreasonable conduct
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of defendant. This is always a difficult question, and cases

differ so essentially in their constituent elements, that we

ﬁnd no accurate and distinct deﬁniti-ons on this branch of the

law. That such embittered relations may exist as would

render it impracticable to'conduct the business, and justify

a decree dissolving the partnership, admits of no discussion, on

principle as well as upon authority. Permanent mischiefs

would be the result that could only be avoided by a severance

of the partnership relations. But that is not the case here.

Under the copartnership articles defendant had the principal

control of the affairs of the company. Complainant was not

obliged to give any more personal attention to the business than

he chose to bestow. Defendant was a skilled workman in their

business, and complainant was not. This fact was well under-

stood and canvassed before the partnership was formed.

Although the social relations between the partners were not

what they ought to have been it is not perceived how the ex-

isting ill-fceling could seriously impair the prosperity or

interfere with the management of the ﬁrm affairs. By positive
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agreement the business was under the principal control of

defendant, and, notwithstanding the want of cordiality, it

might be carried on with equal success. _

ln all the cases _we have examined, where the partnership

has been dissolved on account of the unfriendly relations be-

tween the partners, it has generally been at the instance of a

party who was not himself at fault, and where the estrange-

ment was such as would prevent the successful management

of the business. IA party who is the author of the ill-feeling

between himself and partners ought not to be permitted to

make the relation he has induced the ground of a dissolution

of the partnership. His conduct may have been taken with a

view to that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow

him advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow

one partner, at his election, to put an end to his own deliberate

contract, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful a-ct or

omission of duty. The results ﬂowing from the premature

dissolution of a partnership might be most disastrous to a

partner who had embarked his capital in the enterprise.

Complainant’s conduct in relation to the affairs of the com-

pany is not altogether blameless, and it may be, defendant’s

47

existing are justly attributable to the unreasonable conduct
of .defendant. '!'his is alwa.)'S a difficult question, and cases
differ so essentially in their constituent elements, that we
find no accurate and distinct definiti-ons on this branch of the
Jaw. That such embittered relations may exist as would
render it impracticable to 'conduct the business, and justify
a decree dissolving the partnership, admits of no discussion, on
principle as well as upon authority. Permanent mischiefs
wonld be the rt"'snlt that could only be avoided by a severance
of the partnership relations. But that is not the case here.
Cnder the copartnership articles defendant had the principal
control of the affairs of the company. Complainant was not
obliged to give any more personal attentiontothe business than
he C'bose to b£'stow. Defendant was a skilled workman in their
husinPss, and romplainant was not. This fact was weJI under~tood and canva!'iwd before the partnership was formed.
~\It hough the social relationR between the partners were not
what thfl'~' ou~ht to have been it is not perceived how the existing ilJ·fPeling could seriously impair the prosperity or
intc.•rfere with the management of the firm affairs. By positive
agrpement the business wa.s under the principal C·Ontrol of
defendant, ::rnd, notwithstanding the want of cord'iality, it
might be carried on with equal success.
In all the cnseR ~e luwe examined, where the partnership
has bet"'n disRolved on account of the unfriendly rplations between the partners, it has generally bt•en at the instance of a
party who was not himself at fault, and where the estrangemt-nt was sueh as would pr('vent the succPssfnl managC>ment
of the business.
part.)' who is the author of the ill-feeling
betwe<'n himself and partnPrs on~ht not to bP permiUt>d to
make the relation he has induced the ground of a dissolution
of thl' partn('t·ship. His condnrt ma.'' havl' be<:>n takl'n with a
view to that ver~' rPsnlt, and it would be inequitable to allo-w
him advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow
one partner, at his election, t·o put an Pnd to his own deliberate
contract, when the Mher lnd been guilt.'· of no wrongful a.ct or
omission of duty. The results flowing from the prematur«~
dissolution of a partnership might be most disastrous to a
partner who had embarked hi!-~ rnpital in the enterprise.
Complainant's conduct in rt>lation to the affairs of the company is not altogethPr bh1ml'll'ss, and it may be, defendant's
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conduct, to which exceptions are taken, was induced, in some

870

CASES OB .PARTNERSHIP.

measure, by his own action. Principally, it seems, the ill-feel-

ing between the partners was engendered by the employment

of a nephew of complainant as a traveling salesman for the

house. It was done against the wishes of defendant, and

proved, as he anticipated, unproﬁtable. This young man had

before been discharged from the service of the ﬁrm on account

of his incapacity, and the last employment seems to have been

because complainant became responsible for his successful

management. A loss ensued, and it was in regard to the

salary and traveling expenses of this salesman the parties

disagreed. Evidence oﬂ'ered tends to show complainant was

in the wrong; but, however, that may have been, it ought not

to have affected, permanently the social relations of the

partners. c

We have given this case a most careful consideration, and

we can see nothing that would prevent, amomg reason-able men,

a harmonious cooperation between the partners, so far as any

is necessary to a proﬁtable prosecution of the common business

of the ﬁrm, and hence, no reason i perceived for dissolving the
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partnership.

The decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction

will be aﬂirmed.

Decree aﬂirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn , § 256.

See also New vs. Wright, ante, p. 263.

_i_i_.__i_

AUSTIN vs. HOLLAND.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1877.

69 N. Y. 571, 25 Am. Rep. 246.

Action on promissory note made in ﬁrm name of Dillon,

Beebe & Co. to order of Horace Loveland. Defendant Holland

answered that he was not a member of the ﬁrm. Defendants

were copartners under said ﬁrm name, prior to the giving of '

conduct, to which exceptions are taken, was induced, in some
measure, by bis own action. Principally, it seems, the ill-feeling between the partners was engendered by the employment
of a nephew of complainant as a traveling salesman for the
house. It was done against the wishes of defendant, and
proved, as he anticipated, unprofitable. This young man bad
before been discharged from the service of the firm on account
of his incapacity, and the last employment seems to have been
because complainant became responsible for his successful
management. A loss ensued, and it was in regard to the
salary and traveling expenses of this salesman the parties
disagreed. Evidence offered tends to show complainant was
in the wrong; but, however, that may have been, it ought not
to have affected, permanently the social relations of the
partners.
We have given this case a most careful consideration, and
we can see nothing that would preve111t, amoog reasonable men,
a harmoniouR co-operation between the partners, so far as any
is necessary to a profitable prosecution of the commol). business
of the firm, and hence, no reason is perceived for dissolving the
partnership.
The decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction
will be affirmed.
Decree afiirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn , § 2j8.
See also New vs, Wl'ight, ante, p. 2G3.

AUSTIN vs. HOLLAND.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1817.
69 N. Y. 571, 25 Am. Rep. 246.

Action on promissory note made in firm name of Dillon,
Beebe & Co. to order of Horace Loveland. Defendant Holland
answered that he was not a member of the firm. Defendants
were copartners under said firm name, prior to the giving of •
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the note. The facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for

plaintitf on verdict was aﬁirmed at general term of the

supreme court, and defendant appealed.

the note. The facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for
plaintiff on verdict was affirmed at general term of the
supreme court, and defendant appealed.

Esck Oowen, for defendant.

Mart-in I._Tou:nsend, for plaintiﬂ’. .

Asnnmws, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the ﬁrm of

Eaek Cowen, for defendant.

Dillon, Beebe _& Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of

the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent

Mai-Un I .. Tou;nscnd, for plaintiff.

engagements made by his former copartner in the ﬁrm name,

with those who had previous dealings with the ﬁrm, and who

entered into the new transaction without no-tice of the change

in the partnership. In Vernon vs. The Manhattan Co., 22 Wend.

(N. Y.) 190, the chancellor said: “The word ‘dealing’ is merely

used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who

is entitled to actual notice of the dissolution must be one who

has had business relations with the ﬁrm, by which a credit

is raised upon the faith of the copartnership,” and this -state-
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ment of the chancellor is recited with approval by DENIO, J.,

in Clapp vs. Rog/ers, 12 N. Y. 286.

There does not seem to be any reason for distinguishing the

case of an agent who is in the employment of the ﬁrm at the

time of the dissolution, and who thereafter, without notice

of the dissolution, continues under the same apparent employ-

ment, from that of a person who has had mercantile trans-

actions and relations with the ﬁrm, as a vendor or otherwise.

In each case the credit is presumed to have been given origi-

nally upon the responsibility of the individual members of the

partnership, and justice requires as much in the one case as

the other that all the members should be bound so long as the

partnership may be supposed to exist. Watson on Part. 384.

The principal question in this case is, whether Loveland had

notice of the dissolution of the ﬁrm of Dillon, Beebe & Co.,

which occurred March 29, 1869, prior to August 31, 1869, when

the note upon which the action was brought was made. The

ﬁrm was engaged in the business of the purchase, shipment

and sale of lumber, and its principal oﬁice was at Toledo, in

the state of Ohio. The plaintitf was employed to purchase

lumber in the western states and in Canada, and resided at

Detroit. Notice of the dissolution was published in the news-

ANonmws, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the flrm of
Dillon, Beebe & Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of

the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent
engagements made by his former copartner in the firm name,
with those who had previous dealings with the firm, and who
entered into the new transaction without notice of the change
in the partnership. In T ernon vs. The Manhattan Co., 22 Wend.
(N. Y.) mo, the cbanceJlor said: "The word 'dealing' is mel'ely
used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who
is entitled to actual notice of the dissolution must be one who
has had business relations with the firm, by which a credit
is raised upon tf.1~ faith of the copartner.ship," and this ·statement of the chancellor is recited with approval by DE'.'110, J.,
in Clapp vs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 286.
There does not seem to be any reason for distinguishing the
case of an agent who is in the employment of the firm at the
time of the dissolution, and who thereafter, without notice
of the dissolution, continues under the same apparent employment, from that of a person who has had mercantile transactions and relations with the firm, as a vendor or otherwise.
In each case tbe credit is presumed to have been given originally upon the responsibility of the individual members of the
partnership, and justice requires as much in the one case as
the other that nil the members should be bound so Jong as the
partnership may be supposed to exist. Watson on Part. 384.
The principal question in this case is, whether Loveland had
notice of the dissolution of the firm of DiJlon, Beebe & Co.,
which occurred :March 29, 1869, prior to August 31, 1869, when
the note upon which the action was brought was made. The
firm was eng-aged in the business of the purchase, shipment
and sale of lumber, and its principal office was at Toledo, in
the state of Obio. The plaintiff was employed to purchase
lumber in the western states and in Canada, and resided at
Detroit. Notice of the dissolution was published in the news-
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papers at Toledo, and a copy was mailed to the plaintiﬁ,

addressed to him at Detroit.

I Loveland, on his direct examination, testiﬁed positively that

he never received a notice. On his cross-examination, he

stated that he had no recollection of receiving or seeing the

notice, and that, if he had seen it, he thought he should have

remembered it. The judge submitted it to the jury to ﬁnd

_whether the plaintiff received the notice. The defendant’s

counsel excepted to the submission of the question to the jury

on the ground that the jury would not be justiﬁed in ﬁnding

from the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive the notice,

and upon the further ground that it was immaterial whether

he received it or not; that the mailing of the notice was all

that the defendant was required to do to protect him from

liability for the subsequent services of the plaintiff.

The publication of notice of the dissolution of a par_tner-

ship in a newspaper at the place where the business was car-

ried on is notice to all persons who had not had prior dealings
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with the ﬁrm; and, if thereafter one of the partners enters into

a contract in the ﬁrm name with a new customer or dealer, the

other partners will not be bound. The rule is different in

respect to persons who have dealt with the ﬁrm before the

dissolution. The rule in such cases in this state require that.

to relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in

the partnership name, notice of the dissolution must be

‘brought home to the person giving credit to the partnership.

If, in any way, by actual notice served, or by seeing the publi-

cation of the dissolution, or by information derived from third

persons, the part_v, at the time of the dealing, is made aware

of the fact that the partnership has been dissolved, the con-

tract will not bind the ﬁrm. It is sufficient to exempt the ﬁrm

from liability that the person so contracting with a partner in

the ﬁrm name knew or had reason to believe that the partner-

ship had been dissolved, but this must appear and be found by

the jury, or else the contract will be treated as the contract

of the partnership: Ifelclmm vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5

Am. I)ec. 197; Grurcs rs. .l[crr_1/, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 701; 16 Am. Dec.

471; Vernon rs. .lI(1nhuttan (7-0., 17 “lend. (N. Y.) 52-l; 22 Id.

183; Nat. _I.’l.'. rs. Norton, 1 Ilill (N. Y.), 572; Codclington vs.

Hunt, 6 Id. 50.3; (‘lnpp rs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 287; City Bank vs.

McChcsn-ey, 20 Id. ‘.342; Bank of Commonwealth rs. Mudgctt, 44

papers at Toledo, and a copy was mailed to th~ plaintiff,
·addressed to him at Detroit.
1 Loveland, on his direct examination, testified positively that
he never receh·ed a notice. On bis cross-examination, he
stated that he had no recollection of receiving or seeing the
notice, and that, if he had seen it, he thought he should have
remembered it. The judge submitted it to the jury to find
.whether the plaintiff received the notice. The defendant's
counsel excepted to the submission of the question to the jury
on the ground that the jury would not be justified in finding
from the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive the notice,
and upon the further ground that it was immaterial whether
he received it or not; that the mailing of the notice was all
that the defendant was required to do to protect him from
liability for the subsequc>nt services of the plaintiff.
The publication of notice of the dissolution of a pai:tnership in a newspaper at the place where the business was carried on is notice to all persons who had not had prior dealing-8
with the firm; and, if thereafter one of the partners enters into
a contract in the firm name with a new customer or dealer, the
other partners will not be bound. The rule is different in
respect to persons who have dealt with the firm before the
dissolution. The rule in such cases in this state requires that,
to relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in
the partnership name, notire of the dissolution must be
brought home to the person giving credit to the partnership.
If, in any way, by actual notice se1·,·ed, or by seeing the publication of the dissolution, or by information derived from third
persons, the part~·, at the time of the dealing, is made aware
of the fad that the partnership lms bt>en dissolved, the contract will not bind the firm. It is suflicient to exempt the firm
from liability that the person so contracting with n partner in
the finn name knew or had reason to beli<'Ye that the partnership had bt·en dis:';oked, but this must appPar and be found by
the jur.r, or else Olc> contract will be trPah•d as the contra('t
of the partll(•rship: l\ct<'lwm vs. Clark, G Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5
Am. DN·. l!l7; Grarr.'I r.'I . .lfrrry, G Cow.~· Y.) 701; Hi Am. De<'.
471; Vernon r.'l ..lla11l111ttan Co .• 17 'YC'nd. (N. Y.) 524; !!2 Id.
18:1; Nat .. t:/;. r.~. Norton, 1 IIill (X. Y.), 572; Coddington vs.
Hunt, G Id. ri!lj; Clapp n~. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 287; City Rank 1'S.
JfcCllesney, ~O Id. ~4::!; Rank of Commonu:calth t•s. Mudgett, 44
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Id. 514; Tan Eps vs. Dillage, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; Mechanics‘

Bank vs. Livingston, 33 Id. 458._ In Vernon vs. The Manhattan

Co., the chancellor says: "But to exempt the copartners from

liability (on a contract with a previous dealer with the ﬁrm),

the jury must be satisﬁed that the person with whom the new

debt was contracted either had actual notice that the copart-

nership was dissolved, or that facts had actually come to his

knowledge sufficient to create a belief that such was the fact.”

The same rule is recognized in the other cases cited, and by

elementary writers: 3 Kent’s Com. 607; Story on Part. sec.

161; Coll. on Part. sec. 533; Lindley on Part. 337. Lindley

says: “Those who have dealt with the ﬁrm before a change

took place, are entitled to assume, until they have notice to the

contrary, that no change has occurred. ' ' If notice, in

point of fact, can be established, it matters not by what means,

for it has never been held that any particular formality must

be observed.” In this case, the jury have found that the plain-

tiff did not receive the notice sent by mail, and had no infor-

mation of the dissolution of the ﬁrm of ‘Dillon, Beebe & Co.

prior to the transaction in question. The mailing of notice
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properly directed to the party to be charged raises a

presumption of notice in fact, for it is presumed that letters

sent by post to a party, at his residence, are received by him

in due course. Best on Presumptions, sec. 403. But this is a

presumption of fact,-and not of law, and may be repelled by

proof; and, if the receipt of the letter in this case was dis-

proved, then the defendant failed to show the actual notice

required in order to exempt him from responsibility, and the

question whether the letter was received was, we think upon

the evidence, for the jury. The learned counsel for the defend-

ant has not referred us to any case which decides tlh-ast the

mailingof a notice of dissolution is in law equivalent to actual

notice, and exempts a retiring partner from liability to prior

dealers on subsequent engagements in the ﬁrm name. Notice

by mail of the dishonor of commercial paper is in most cases

suﬂicient by the law merchant to charge an indorser. It is a

part of the contract that notice may be given in this way, and

it is not material in ﬁxing the liability of the indorser whether

he receives it or not.

But we think the rule requiring actual notice of the disso-

lution of a partnership to prior dealers is a part of the law of

Id. 514; Tan Eps vs. Dillage, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; Mechanics'
Banl~ t'S. Livingston, 33 Id. 458. . In f'ernon vs. The Jianltattan
Co., the chancellor says: "But to exempt the copartners from
liability (on a contract with a previous dealer with the firm),
the jury must be satisfied that the person with whom the new
debt was contracted either bad actual notice that the copartnership was dissolved, or that facts had actually come to his
knowledge sufficient to create a belief that such was the fact."
The same rule is recognized in the other cases cited, and by
elementary writers: 3 Kent's Com. G07; Story on Part. sec.
161; Coll. on Part. sec. 5:~3; Lindley on Part. 337. Lindley
says: "Those who have dealt with the firm before a change
took place, are entitled to assume, until they have notice to the
contrary, that no change bas occurred. * * If notice, in
point of fact, can be established, it matters not by what means,
for it has never brrn held that any particular formality must
be obsel'Ved." In this case, the jury have found thnt the plaintiff did not receive the notiee sent by mail, and had no information of tlw dissolution of the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co.
prior to the transal'tion in question. The mailing of notice
p1·operly directed to the party to be oharged raises a
presumption of notice in fact, for it is presnm<>d that IPtters
sent by post to a pa·rty, at his residence, are received by him
in due course. Brst on Presumptions, sPc. 403. But this is a
presumption of fact, ,and not of law, and may be repelled by
proof; and, if the receipt of the letter in this case was disproved, then the clefendnnt failed to show the actual notice
requi1·ed in order to exempt him from responsibility, and the
question whether the letter was received was, we think upon
the evidence, for the jury. 'l'he learned counsel for the defend:ant ·has no:t reft>rred us to any case whid1 decide:s tJrnt the
mailing' of a notice of dissolution is in law equivalent to actual
notice, and exempts a 1·etiring partner from liability to prior
dealers on su l>sequent engagements in the firm name. Notice
by mail of the dishonor of <'Ornrnereial paper is in most cases
sufficient by the law merehnnt to charge an indorser. It is a
part of the contract that notice may be given in this way, and
it is not material in fixing the liability of the indorser whether
be receh'es it or not.
But we think the rule requiring actual notice of the dissolution of a partnership to prior dealers is a part of the law of
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this state, and should not be departed from. It may subject

this state, and should n<>t be departed from. It may subject
pa1·ties in some cases to inconvenience, but the principle upon
which the rule proceeds is that, when one of two parties is to
sustain injury from the giving of credit, the one who originally
induced it should bear the loss, rather than the one who, without notice of the change, relied upon the continued existence
of the partnership: Story on Part. sec. 160; Wat. on Part. 384:.
The judgment of the general term should be affirmed.
All concur, except MILLER, J ., not voting.
Judgment affirmed.

parties in some cases to inconvenience, but the principle upon

which the rule proceeds is that, when one of two parties is to

sustain injury from the giving of credit, the one who originally

induced it should bear the loss, rather than the one who, with-

out notice of the change, relied upon the continued existence

of the partnership: Story on Part. sec. 160; \Yat. on Part. 384.

The judgment of the general term should be afﬁrmed.

All concur, except MILLER, J., not voting.

Judgment afﬁrmed.

Nom: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 202, and notes.

‘\-

I . , g~ ‘ _______

' ~.@,1"“”

' J2!‘ ' DICKINSON vs. mcxmsos.

, ’ J : own of Appeals of Virginia, 1874.

NOTB: See lleohem'a Elem. of Partn., § 262, and notel.

25 Gratt. 321.

Action by Henry Dickinson against Henry J. Dickinson,

Stephen Banner and George Banner, late partners under the

ﬁrm namel6i"H/. Co., to recover upon a promissory
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note signed in that name, and dated March 9, 1860. Stephen

and George Banner defended on the ground that they did not

sign or authorize the note and were not members of the ﬁrm

of H. J. Dickinson & Co., at the date of the n-ote.

' r •

Judgment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.

Burns, f-or appellant.

Gilmore, for the appellees.

STAPLES, J. (After stating the facts.)

r

.f

.....
I

)v

DICKINSON vs. DICKINSON.

'.-i

Court of Appeala of Virginia, 1814•

The main question before us arises upon the plaintiffs ﬁrst

2~

bill of execeptions, and is presented in the sixth assignment

Gratt. 821.

of error. '1‘.his alleged error is in an instruction given to the

jury on motion of the defendants. This instruction declares

substantially that if the defendants, as early as some day in

the month of March, 1859, dissolved, by mutual consent, the

partnership previously thereto existing between them, then

* '~===si=-2::

Acti'O'Il by Hen.ry Dickinson against Henry J. Dickinson,
Stephen Banner and George B :mner, late partners under the
firm name~& Co., to rec<>ver upon a promissory
note signed in that name, and dated March 9, 1860. Stephen
and George Banner defended on the ground that they did not
sign or authorize the ·note and were not members of the firm
of H. J. Dickin90n & Co., at the date of the n-ote.
Judgment for defendants and plain.fit? appeals.
Bums, for appellant.

G-i.lniore, for the appellees.
STAPLES, J. (After stating the facts.)
The main question before us arises upon the plaintiff's first
bill of execeptions, and is presented in the sixth assignment
of error. T.his alleged error is in an instruction gh-en to the
jury on motiO'Il of the defendants. This instruction declares
substantially it.hat if the defendants, as early as some day in
the month of :March, 1859, dissolved, by mutual consent, the
partnership previously thereto existing between them, then

Drcxmsox vs. Dtcxmsos. 375

Drcxnreow vs. DrcXINSON.

875 .

neither partner had thereafter authority to create any new

obligation, or execute a note therefor in the name of the ﬁrm,

binding upon the other partners, unless the new obligation was

created in the usual course of the partnership business t-o a

person who -had no notice or knowledge of the dissolution of

the partnership. And if the jury should believe from the evi-

dence, that as early as the spring of 1859 the defendants ceased

to buy and sell goods, their storehouse was closed up, H. J.

Dickinson, the active partner of the ﬁrm, had moved away

from the storehouse, and had engaged in another employment;

that the storehouse remained closed u-p until the note in con-

troversy was execut-ed, and was then still closed up; that

nothing prior t-o the execution of the note was done in the

business of the partnership after the -h-ou\se was closed, in the

spring of 1859, except wh-at w-as d-one by the active partner,

H. J. Dickinson, in settling u-p the business, and tiizrat all these

facts were known to the plaintiff at the time t-he note in con-

troversy was executed, on the 19th of March, 1860, then these

ﬁarcts are tsuﬂicient to cha-rge the plaintiff with knowledge of

tihe dissolution, and the‘jury should consider him as having
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such kinovwledge.

The manifest error in this instruction is in assuming t»h-at

the facts therein mentioned, if brought home to the plaintiff,

were sufficient of -themselves to charge -him with actual knowl-

edge -of the dissolution of the partnership, whether in fact -he

had or had not such knowledge.

It seems that the defendants did not give notice, public or

private, of tlhe dissolu-txion; they did n-ot notify their custom-

ers of the fact; they did not even take the trouble to publish

or post it at their place of business. At least the instruction

does not assume that either of these acts was done by the de

fendants; but it does assume that, in the absence of

each and all of them, certain other acts constituted

notice which the plaintiff was not permitted to con-

may be suﬂicient to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff

was informed of the dissolution of the partnership; but cer-

tainly they do not constitute notice; they are ~not sufﬁcient as

a matter of law, to charge the plaintiff wit-h such notice. Each

trovert. Now these facts, as stated in the instruction,\

and all of them may have been known to him, an-d still the

plaintiff may not have had such knowledge or information in

neither partner had thereafter :authority to create any new
obligation, or execute a note therefor in the name of the firm,
binding upon the other partners, unless the new obligation was
created in the usual course of the partnership business ro a
person w1ho ·had ·no notice or knowledge -0f the di-ssoluUon of
the partnership. And if the jury should believe from the ev~
denoce, that as early .as the spring of 1859 the defe'Ddants ceased
to buy and se11 goods, their storehouse was closed up, H. J.
Dickinson, the active partner of the firm, had moved aiway
from the .storehouse, and had engaged in another employment;
that the storehiouse remained clooed up until the n•ote in controversy was executed, and w1:is then still closed up; that
nothing prio.r to the execu1:Lo.n of the nlC>te was done in the
business of the partnership after the •house was cl<>Sed, in the
epring of 1859, except what was done by the a.ctive pa.rtner,
H.J. Dickinson, in settling up nhe bu·siness, and t1:~ra.t all these
facts were known to the plaintiff at the time the note in controversy was executed, on the 19th of March, 1860, then these
~acts are sufficient to c.ha.rge the plaintiff with knowledge of
the dissolution, and t1he 'jury should consider him as having
such km·orwledge.
The ma.nifest err.or in this instruction is in assuming that
the facts therein mentioned, if ·b rought home t-0 the plaintiff,
were sufficient .of themselves to charge ·him with actual kn•owlf'dge of the dissolution of the partnership, whether in fact be
had or had not such knowledge.
It seems that the defendants did not give notice, public or
private, of the di·ssolution; they did nQt notify their custooners of the flact; t·h ey did not even take the trouble to publish
or post it .at their plaee of business. At lea.st the instrucUO'll
does not assume that either of these acts was done by the de
fendants; but it does assume that, in the absence of
each and all of them, certain other acts coostituted
notice which the plaintiff was not permitted to con·
trovert. Now these facts, as stated in the instructio~
may be sufficient to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff
was i.nf.ormed of the dissolution of the partnership; but certainly it.hey do not constitute nootice; they are not sufficient a.a
a matter of law, to charge the plaintiff wit·h suo:1 notice. Eacli.
and all of them may have been knCJ1wn 1:0 him, and still the
plaintiff may n'Ot have had such knowledge or information in
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regard to the dissolution as would invalidate t-he note in his

possession.

The instructi-on was therefore a manifest invasion of the

province of the jury, and as such was clearly erroneous. The

learned counsel insists, however, that no injustice was done

the plaintilf, because the question of notice is not involved in

the inquiry. His proposition is, -that one partner cannot, by a

new contract entered int-o after the dissolution, impose any

new obligation upon his copartners with-out some special

authority for that purpose. The note in controversy having

been executed after the partnership was disso-lved, was not

binding upon the partners who did not unite in its execution,

although the creditor may have h-ad no notice of such dissolu-

ti-on. The plaintiff could not, therefore, have been prejudiced

"by anything in the instruction upon the -subject of n-otiice, how-

ever erroneous it may have been.

If the learned coun-sel’s premises are correct, his conclusion

is undoubtedly correct also. But are his premises correct?

T'he only au'th~orit_v he cites to sustain his position is that of

Parker vs. Cousins, 2 Gratt. (Va..) 372, 44 Am. Dec. 388. That
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case does, unquestionably, aﬂirm the general proposition that

one partner cannot, after the dissolution, create a. binding obli-

gation upon t-he ﬁrm without some special authority for that

purpose; but this decisi-on was made upon a state of facts

which showed that the person dealing with the partner was

informed of the dissolution at the time of the renewal of the

note.

The principle is well established that, if a partner contracts

in the name of the ﬁrm with a third person after the partner-

ship is dissolved, but that fact is not made public, or known

by such third person, the law considers the contraict a-s being

made with the ﬁrm and upon their credit. The rule upon this

subject is thus laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 213:

“So if a. partnership is dissolved, or one of the kn-olwn mem-

bers retires from the ﬁrm, until the dissolution or retirement

is duly notiﬁed, the power of each to bind the rest remains in

full force; although as between themselves, a dissolution or

retirement is a revocation of the authority of ea-ch to ac-it for

the other. Thus, if a known partner retires (which is in fact

a dissolution), and no notice is give-n, he will be liable to be

sued in respect of a promissory note made since his retirement

regard to the dissolution a.s would invalidate the note in his
po-ssession.
·The instrucHon was therefore a manifest invasion of the
province of the jury, and as su•ch was clearly erroneous. The
leamed counsel insists, however, that no injustice was done
the plaintiff, becuuse the questi-on of notice is not inrolved in
the inquiry. His proposition is, that one partner cannot, by a
new oontraet entered into aftl"r the dissolurf:ion, impose any
new obligation upon his copartners with•Dut some special
authority for that purpose. The note in oontroversy having
been executed after the p1rtnership was disso.Jved, was n<>t
binding upQon the partners who did n.ot unite in its execuUoo,
although the creditor may have had no notice of such dissoluti()n. 'rhe plaintiff could n-0t, therefore, have been prejud-iced
by anything in the instruction upo.n the ·subject of n-ot:dce, •hlQIWever erroneou'8 it may have been.
If the learned counsel's premises are eoorrect, bis oondusion
fs undoubtedly correct also. But ara his premises correct?
The -011ly auth-ority be cites to sustain h.is positiooi is tb::it of
Parker vs. Cousins, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 372, 44 Am. Dec. 388. That
case does, anquestionably, affirm the general propositi001 that
one partner cannot, after the dissolution, create a binding -obligation upon the firm without some special authority for th11t
purpose; but this decisi·on wia.s made upon a state of faicts
which showed that the person dealing with the partner was
informed of the dissolution at the time of the renewal of the
note.
The prindple is well established tha.t, if a partner contracts
in the name <>f the firm with a third person after the partnership is dissolved, but that fact is n()t mad-e public, or known
by such third persion, flhe law considers the contmct R•S being
made with 1:111e firm and upon their credit. The rule upon this
subject is thus laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 213:
"So if .a. partnership is dissolved, or one Qf the kn-01Wn members retires from the firm, until the dissolution or retirement
is duly notified, the power of each ro bind the rest remains in
full foror; although as betweec themselve'S, a dissolution or·
retirement is a. re,·ocMion -0f the authority of e-a:ch to act for
the other. Thus, if a known partner retires (which is in fa.ct
a dissolution), and no notice is given, he wlll be liable to b~
sued in respect of a promissory note made -since his retirement

DICKINSON vs. DICKINSON. 377

by his l-ate partner, even though the plaintiff had no dealings

DICKINSON VS. DICKINSON.
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with the ﬁrm before the making of the note. And in deter-

mining which was ﬁrst in point of time, t-o wit: notice of the

by his late partner, even though the plaintiff had no dealings

dissolution or the making o-f the note, effect must be given

to the presumption that the instrument was made and issued

-on the day it bears date, unless some reason to the contrary

can be shown.”

In Kctcham vs. Clark, 6 John. (N. Y.) 144, 5 Am. Dec. 197,

the draft was accepted in the name-of the ﬁrm after the disso-

lution. It was held that both partners were bound by the

acceptance, there being no evidence of any public notice of the

dissolution of the partnership, nor any special notice of its dis-

solution to the party dealing with the ﬁrm.

It is useless to multiply citations upon the po-int. The

authorities are believed to be almost uniform in support of

the proposition. National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 572;

Story on Partnership, secs. 160, 161, 334, 336.

In regard to notice of di-ssoluti-on, a disttincti-on Ihas been

justly made between persons who -have 'had previous dealings

with the ﬁrm, and those who have -had no such dealings. As-
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to the former, it -has been universally held that actual notice

is indispensable. It must n-ot be inferred, however, that

special notice must be given to each customer. If actual

knowledge of the dissolution is brought home to the party, he

will be concluded, although no notice whatever may

have been given. Whether in such case the evidence

is sutiici-ent to justify the inference of actual knowl-

edge, is a question of fact for the consideration of a jury,

under the supervision -of tlhe court. I rby vs. Vining, 2 M-cCord,

(S. Car.) 379; Ooddington vs. Hunt, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) 595; Collyer

on Partnership, sec. 332.

It may be proper to add, that these rules apply only to cases

where the di-ssolu-ti~o-n is by act of the parties. It is well set-

tled that, upon the death or bankruptcy of a partner, notice

of the dissolution to third persons is not necessary. The rea-

son see-ms to be, that in those oases the dissolution is by opera-

Horn of law. It would be the height of injustice to allow the

acts -of the other partners to bind the estates of persons who

are incapable of acting themselves, or of continuing an author-

ity for that purpose.

It follows, from what has been said, that -the circuit court

48

with the firm before the making of the note. And in determining which was first in point of time, to wit: notice of the
dissolution or the making of the note, effect must be given
to the presumption that the in-strument was made and issued
()n the day it bears date, unless soone reason to the contrary
can be shown."
In Ketcham vs. Clark, 6 John. (N. Y.) 144, 5 Am. Dec. 197,
the draft w;a.s accepted in the name·<>f the firm after the dissolution. It was held that both partners were bound by the
acceptance, there being no evidence of any public notice of the
dissolution of the partnership, nor· any special notice of its dissolution to the party dealing with the firm.
It is useless ro multiply citati-0.ns upon the point. The
authorities are believed to be almost uniform in support of
the proposition. National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 572;.
Story on Partner·s·hip, secs. 160, 161, 334, 336.
In regard to notice of diseoluti·on, a distfocUon 'has been
justly made between persons who ·have 1had previous dealings
with the firm, and th·m1e who .have had no su•c'h dealingis. As
t-0 the former, it ·ha·s been unin~1·sally held that actual notice
is indispensable. It must n·ot be inferred, ho0owever, that
special notice must be given to each clLStomer. If actual
kn0owledge of the dissolution is brought home to the party, he
will be concluded, although no notice whatever may
have been given. 'Vhether in such case the evidence
is sufficient to justify the inference of actual knowledge, is a question o·f fact for the consideratiOtll of a jury'"
under the supervision ·of t1he court. Irby vs. Yining, 2 McCord,
(S. Car.) 379; Coddington vs. Hunt, 6 Hi~l, (N. Y.) 595; Collyer
on Partnership, sec. 332.
It may be proper ro add, that these rules apply only to cases
where t11e dissolnHon is by act of the parties. It is well settled that, upon the death or bankruptcy of a partner, notice
of the dissolution to third persons is not necessary. The reaSO'Il seems to be, that in those 01se:s the diss·o lntion is by opera1iolll o.f law. It would be the height of injustice to allow t11e
acts of the other partners to bind the estates of persons who
are incapable of acting themselves, or of -continuing an authority f-0r that purpose.
It foUows, from what ·has been said, tha.t the circuit court
48
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erred in giving the instruction set out in the plaintiﬁ’s ﬁrst

bill of exceptiorns. This view renders it unnecessary to c-on-

sider particularly the instruction asked for by the plaintiﬂf and

refused by the court, which is set out in the seoond bill of

excc-pti-ons. ' ' '

For the error already mentioned, t-he judgment of the cir-

cuit court must -be reversed, and the cause remanded to be

proceeded - with in accord;;1nce with the views herein

announced.

Judgment reversed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §§ 259, 271, 272.

MILMO NATIONAL BANK vs. BERGSTROM.

Court of Civil Appeals of Tamas, 1892.

1 Tex. Civ. App. 151, 20 S. W. Rep. 836. .

This suit was brought by appellant against A. N. Cartel‘ and

el"l'ed in giving the instruction set out in the plaintiff's first
bill of excepticms. This view renders it unnecessary to consider particularly the instruction a.sked for by the plaintiff and
refused by the court, which is set out in the seoond bill of
e:xce·pti-ons. • • •
For the error already mentioned, t;~e judgment of the cir<-"llit court must •be rever-sed, and the cau.se remanded to be
proceeded · with in accordlnce with :the views herein
a.nnounced.
Judgment reversed.

Louis Bergstrom, as partners under the ﬁrm name and style

of A. N. Carter, seeking to recover judgment for the sum of

NoT.B: See lfeobem•a Elem. of Partn., §§ 259, 271, 278.

$5,216.91 on account of moneys loaned and advanced to said

ﬁrm. Appellee Bergstrom denied the partnership, and that he

was indebted to appellant. Judgment below was rendered in
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favor of appellant against Carter, and that _it take nothing

against appellee Bergstrom. From this judgment, appellant

prosecutes this appeal. .

The evidence shows that Carter and Bergstrom,_in€eptcm~

ber, 1881, entered into a copartnership for one year for the

!IILMO NATIONAL BANK vs. BERGSTROM.

purpose of dealing in hides, wool, and produce. In October,

1881, the account sued on was opened with appellant by

Court of Civil Appeals of Tea:as, 189!•

Carter, for the purpose of obtaining advances to be usedﬁn

carrying on the business of the ﬁrm. Carter was the busipcss

manager of the ﬁrm at Laredo, and continued to obtain money

from the bank until in the spring of 1883, when the account

sued on was closed. It appears from the evidence that, at the

time the account with appellant was opened, Carter informed

the officers of the appellant bank that Bergstrom was a part-

ner in the ﬁrm of A. N. Carter, and upon the faith of this

1 Tex. Civ. App. list, 20 S. W. Rep. 836.

•

This suit was brought by appeilant against A. N. Carte.rand
Louis Bergstrom, as partners under the'firm name and style
of A. N. Carter~ seeking to recover judgment for the sum of
$5,216.91 on account <>f moneys loaned and advanced to said
firm. Appellee Bergstrom denied the partnership, and that he
was indebted to appellant. Judgment below was rendered in
fa,·or of appellant against Carter, and that jt take nothing
against appellee Bergstrom. From this judgment, appellant
prosecutes this appeal.
•
.
The evidence shows that Carter and Bergstrom,_in4'eptember, 1881, entered into a copartnership for one year for the
purpose of dealing in hides, wool, and produce. In Oc~ober,
1881, the account sued on was opened with appellant by
Carter, for the purpose of obtaining advances to be used'!n
carrying on tlie business of the firm. Carter was the busjpess
manager of the firm at Laredo, and continued to obtain money
from the bank until in the spring of 1883, when the account
fmed on was closed. It appears from the evidence that, at the
time the account with appellant was opened, Carter informed
the officers of the appellant bank that Bergstrom was a part·
ner in the firm of A. N. C!!.rter, and upon the faith of this
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information the advances were made. It was contended by-

379

appellant that, at the beginning of the dealings between it and

Carter, Bergstrom was actually a partner with Carter, and

that credit was extended upon the faith that he was such

partner, and, although he may have ceased to be a partner

after September, 1882,—the time when the contract of part-

nership terminated,—he is liable to appellant because it had

no notice of the dissolution, fr of the contract of partnership,

until after the account was closed, in 1883. Upon the other

hand, it was contended by Bergstrom that although he was a

t

partner for one year from September, 1881, at that time the

ﬁrm was dissolved, and that he is not bound by the statements

made by Carter during the year that he, Bergstrom, was a

partner; that he was a secret or dormant partner of the ﬁrm,

and; being such, he was not required to give notice of his dis-

solution with the ﬁrm and is not bound or liable to appellant.

The seventh paragraph of the charge of the court is as follows:

“If, however, you believe from the evidence that said ﬁrm of

A. N. Cawer ceased to exist on the 23d day of September, 1882,

and that plaintiff had no knowledge, directly or indirectly,
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that Louis Bergstrom continued as a partner of said ﬁrm of A.

N. Carter, and if you,believe, further, from the evidence, that

said Bergstrom did no act, directly or indirectly, to lead plain-

titf or his agents to believe that said ﬁrm of A. N. Carter was

continued, and that the plaintiff had his dealings with A. N.

Carter in his individual capacity, then and in that event the

defendant Bergstrom is not liable for any dealings had

‘between the plaintiff and the said A. N. Carter so made with

said Carter in his individual capacity.” This charge is assigned

as erroii

J. O. Nicholson and S. M. Ellis, for appellant.

Upson cﬁ Bergstrom, for appellees.

ihsnnn, O. J. (After stating the facts.) When credit is

extended to a ﬁrm upon the assumption that certain persons

comprise the membership, and such assumption in point of

fact is correct, the members of such ﬁrm are liable to the cred-

itors for future dealings with the ﬁrm until notice of dissolu-

tion.is given to the creditor. Under such state of facts the

creditors will not be aﬁected by a dissolution or charge in the

ﬁrm until notice be given or knowledge of such fact has been

information the advances were made. It was contended by.
appellant that, at the beginning of the dealings between it and.
Carter, Bergstrom was actually a partner with Carter, and
that credit was extended upon the faith that he was such
partner, and, although he may have ceased to be a partner
after September, 1882,-the time when the contract of partnership terminated,-he is liable to appellant because it had
no notice of the dissolution,
of the contract of partnership,
until after the account was closed, in 1883. Upon the other
hand, it was contended by Bergstr-0m that although he was a
partner for one year from September, 1881, at that time the
firm was dissolved, and that he is not bound by the statements
made by Carter during the year that he, Bergstrom, was a
partner; that he was a secret or dormant partner of the firm,
and; being such, he was not required to give notice of bis dissolution with the firm and is not bound or liable to appellant:
The seventh paragraph of the cbnrge-0f the court is as follows:
"If, however, you believe from the evidence that said firm of
A. N. Cajer ceased to exist on the 23d day of September, 1882,
and that plaintiff had no knowledge, directly or indirectly,
that Louis Bergstrom continued as a partner of said firm of A.
N. Caner, and if youJ>elieve, further, from the evidence, that
said Bergstrom did no act, directly or indirectly, to lead plain.tiff or his agents to believe that said firm of A. N. Carter was
continued, and that the plaintiff had his dealingtt ·with A. N.
Carter in bis individual capacity, then and in that event the
defendant Bergstrom is not liable for any dealings had
"between the plaintiff and the said A. N. Carter so made with
said Carter in his individual capacity." This charge is assigned
ae.erro~

•

J. O. Nicholson and 8. M. Ellis, for appellant.

Upson &

Ber~strom,

for appellees.

l1sBER,. C. J. (.After stating the facts.) When credit is
exte!lded to a firm upon the assumption that certain persons
comprise the membership, and such assumption in point of
fact is correct, the members of such firm are liable to the creditors for future dealings with the firm until notice of dissolution .is given to the creditor. Under such state of facts the
cred-itors will not be affected by n dissolution <>r cha~e in the
firm until notice be given or knowledge of such fact has been

•
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brought home to them, and the burden of proving such notice
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or knowledge rests upon the partner claiming such exemp-

tion. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1117, 1118; 2 Bates, Partn.

§§ 611-613. This rule of law does not apply to partners who

are regarded in law as dormant or secret partners, for no

credit is extended upon the faith of their membership, and

they, in retiring from the ﬁrm, are not required to give notice

of such fact. The uncontradicted evidence in the record is

that Carter notiﬁed the appellant, at the time that the account

was opened, that Bergstrom was a partner of the ﬁrm. Such

in fact was his relationship to the ﬁrm at that time. W'e

think this information given to appellant is sufﬁcient to

make Bergstrom known to appellant as a member of the ﬁrm,

and as to appellant he cannot claim that he was a dormant

partner. If it be true that Bergstrom was a member of- the

ﬁrm at the time appellant received information of that fact,

it makes no difference from what source received, the effect

is to make his connection with the ﬁrm known to appel-

lant, and, as to it, he cannot claim that he is a dormant part-

ner. 1 Bates, Partn. §§ 151, 153; 2 Bates, Partn. §§ 608-623;

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1119-1123. Under these rules of

law it was error to give the charge complained of," and for this

reason we reverse and remand the case. " ' '

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 265.

I
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brought home to them, and the burden of proving such notice
or knowledge rests upon the partner claiming such exemption. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1117, 1118; 2 Bates, Partn.
§§ 611-613. This rule of law does not apply to partners who
are regarded in law as dormant or secret partners, for no
credit is extended upon the faith of their membership, and
they, in retiring from the firm, are not required to give notice
of such fact. The uncontradicted evidence in the record is
that Carter notified the appellant, at the time that the account
was opened, that Bergstrom wa.s a partner of the firm. Such
in fact was his relationsMp to the firm at that time. We
think this information given to appellant is sufficient to
make Bergstrom known to appellant as~ member of the firm,
nnd as to appellant be cannot claim that be was a dormant
partner. If it be true that Bergstrom was a member of- the
fii'm at the time appellant received information of that fact,
it makes no diifference from what source received, ~be effect
is to make his ic001necti-0n with the firm Im.own to a.ppellant, an:d, as to it, he cannot claim that he is a dormant partner. 1 Dates, Partn. §§ 151, 153; 2 Bates, Partn. §§ 608-62a;
17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1119-1123. Under these rules of
law it was error to give the charge oomplained of; and for this
reason we reverse and remand the case. • • •
Non: See Meohem's Elem. of Partn., § 265.

•

XIII.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION.

(See also the cases-in Subd. XII, ante; also Shattuck vs. Chandler, ante, p.

296; Hess vs. Lowrey, p. 330; Shanks vs. Klein, p. 164.)

IIAYYKINS vs. CAPRON.

Supreme Court of Rhoda Island, 1892.

17 R. I. 679, 24 Atl. Rep. 466.

Defendants petition for a new trial.

This was an action of trover brought by the plaintiﬁ, who

was sole surviving partner of a copartnership known as

XIII.

James A. Capron & Co., against the defendant for the con-

version, after Capron’s death, of certain personalty of the ﬁrm.

The defendant was executrix and sole legatee of Capron. This

action was brought in the court of_comm0n pleas, and the

jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the de-

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION.

fendant ﬁled this petition, alleging that the presiding justice

erred in his instructions to the jury.

Stephen A. Cooke, Jun., and Louis L. Angell, for plaintiﬂ’.

Samuel W. K. Allen ,for defendant.

(See also the cases·in Subd. XII, ante; also Shattuck vs. Chandler, ante, p.
206; Hua va. Lowrey, p. 830; Shanks vs. Klein, p. 16-1.)

Pnn Cunmu. Wehaether the relation between copartners

with reference to their ownership of the partnership assets is
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more analog-ou.-s to a tenancy in common or to a joint teiuancy,

we need not decide. In either case, a sole surviving partner is

IIA~~KINS vs. CAPRON.

entitled at law to the possession of the assets of the ﬁrm until

its affairs are settled, as well against the representatives of the

Supreme Court of Rhode I sland1 1892.

deceaed to whom he is ultimately liable to account, as against

strangers. 17 Amer & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1161; Parsons on

17 R. I. 6i9, 24 Atl. Rep. 466.

Partnership, -158, 2 Lawson, Rights, Remedies, and Practice,

Defendnnta pet\tion for a new trial.
This was an action of trover brought by the plnintifl, who
wns sole snr\·iving partner of a copartnership known as
James A. Capron & Co., against the defendant for the coniversion, af.te-r Capron's death, of certain personalty of the firm.
The defendant was executrix nnd sole legatee of Capron. This
action was brought in the court of. common pleas, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the defendant filed this petition, alleging that the presiding justice
(>rred in his instructions to the jury.
Step11en A. Cooke, Jun., and Louis L. Angell, for plaintiff.

Samuel W. K. Allen ,for defendant.

CumAM. Whether the relation between CO'partnera
with r<'fer<'nce to their owneri.;ihip of the pnrtnership assets is
more 1analog.o us t1> a tenancy in common or to a joint teinancy,
we nred not decide. In either case, a sole surviving partner is
entitled at law to the possE>ssion of tbe assets of the finn until
its affairs arc settled, as WPII against the representatives of the
dccensed to whom he is ultimately liable to account, as against
strangers. 17 Amc>r & Eng. Encyc. of I~aw, 11Gl; Parsons on
Partnership, 4;)8, 2 Lu wson, High ts, Rem(•dies, and Practicet
PER
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1256. Trover is a proper remedy for a refusal of such posses-

382
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sion. The court properly construed the articles of agreement

in question, and instructed the jury to consider them as a

whole in deciding the question of fraud.

The cause of action in this case, the conversion of thegoods

occurred after the death of the late partn_er.J It was an injury

to the right of possession of the plaintiﬂ',' not to the joint pos-

session of the plaintiﬂ’ and his late copartner. Hence the

plaintiff properly sued in his own name. Smith v. Barrow, 2

Term Rep. 47 6, 478. The amendment allowed him to add to

his name the words “surviving partner,” etc., which were an

unnecessary but harmless description of the way he claimed to

have acquired title to the goods. " ‘ '

The motion for a new trial must be denied and dismissed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 268.

VALENTINE vs. YVYSOR.

Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.

123 Ind. 47, 23 N. E. Rep. 1076, '7 L. R. A. 788.

This suit was instituted by Emily E. Valentine, Martha M.

Little, Parmelia R. Gilbert, Mary E. \/Vood, and Florence T.
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Horne, the children and -heirs a.t law of John Jack, late of

1256. Trover is a proper remedy for a refusal of such possession. The conrt properly <'Onstrued the articles of agreement
in question, and instructed the jury to consider them as a
whole in deciding the question of fraud.
The cause of action in this case, the conversion of the .goods
·occurred after the death of the late partn.e r.J It was an injury
to the right of possession of the plaintiff, not to the joint possession of the plaintiff and his late copartner. Bence the
plaintiff properly sued in his own name. Sm.ith v. Barrow, 2
. Term Ilep. 476, 4i8. The amendment aJlowed him to add to
his name the words "surviving partner/' etc., which were an
unnecessary but harmless description of the way he claimed to
have acquired title to the goo.ds. * * *
The motion for a new trial must be denied and dismissed.

Delaware county, deceased, against Jacob H. Wysor. John

Jack, father of the plaintiffs below, died testate in the month

Nom: See Mechem'e El~m. of Partn., § 2G8.

of October, 1859. At and before that date, he was in partner-

ship with the defendant, Jacob H. TVys-or, the two composing

the ﬁrm of \Vysor & Jack. The testator was also a member of

the ﬁrm of Wysor, Jack & Kline, which was composed of the

abovenamed Jacob H. \Vysor, John Jack, and \Villiam B.

Kline. This last-named ﬁrm was engaged in the milling busi-

ness, and owned a ﬂouring-mill, together with 65 acres of land

adjacent; each member being the owner of an undivided one-

VALENTINE vs. WYSOR.

third of the business and property. The business of the ﬁrm of

VVysor, Jack & Kline was in no way connected with that of

· Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.

Wysor&Jack; the last-named ﬁrm being the owner of 380 acres

of land, which constituted part of the ﬁrm assets, in which each

__ _

123 Ind. 47, 2S N. E. Rep. 1076, 7 LR. A. 788.

This suit was instituted by Emily E. Valentine, Martha M.
Little, Parmelia R. Gilbert, Mary E. 'Vood, and Florence T.
Borne, the children and ·heirs at law of John Jack, late of
Delaware county, deceased, against Jacob B. Wysor. John
Jack, father of the plaintiffs below, died testate in the month
of October, 1859. At and before that date, he was in partnership with the defendant, Ja cob H. Wysor, the two composing
the firm of 'Vysor & Jack. The testator was also a member of
the firm of Wysor, Jack & Kline, which was composed of the
above-named Jacob B. Wysor, John Jack, and 'Villiam B.
Kline. This last-named firm was e'Ilgaged in the milling business, and <>wned a flouring-mill, together with 65 acres of land
adjacent; each member being the owner of an undivided one.
third of the business and p.-operty. The business of the firm of
Wysor, Jack & Kline was in no way connected with that of
Wysor&Jack; the last-named firm being the owner of 380 acres
of land, which constituted part of the firm assets, in which each
1
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partner had an equal interest. The character of the business of

V ALENTIN'B

VS. WYSOR.

as:f

Wysor & Jack does not distinctly appear, but the land owned

by them is treated by both parties as partnership property. By

the ﬁrst, second, and third clauses of his will, the testator

appointed executors to carry the will into execution, made pro-

vision for his wife by giving her a life-estate in his real estate,

and expressed a desire that she should be admitted into the

ﬁrm, and continue the business as a partner with \Vysor and

Kline, his former associates in the milling business. The

fourth and ﬁfth clauses of his will read as follows: (‘(4) I will

and direct that my said executors, and, in case of the death or

failure to serve of either, the survivor of them, shall adjust,

settle, and compromise any and all debts, claims, or demands

due to or from me according to the best of their or his judg-

ment, without any further authority from any court or jurisdic-

tion whatever; and, further, that they shall make settlement

with my said partners, and each of them, of the partnership

aﬂairs, and of the proﬁts heretofore arising therefrom,

together with any matters of dealing between myself and them,

or either of them, in manner according to his or their judgment,
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without any further authority from any court whatever. (5) l

do further will and direct that my said executors, or, in case of

the failure, from any cause, of either to serve. then the remain-

ing executor, shall sell and convey so much of my personal or

real estate, at either public or private sale, with or without

appraisement, on such terms, at such place, and in such man-

ner, as to him or them shall seem best, as may be necessary to

pay and satisfy all my just debts, reserving, however. to my

said wife the title and possession of the house and grounds

where I now live; otherwise, selling such parcels, the sale of

which will least injure the remainder.” As to the remainder

of his property, after the termination of the life-estate of the

\vidow, the testator died intestate. After the testator died,

Wysor, as surviving partner of the ﬁrm of YVysor & Jack, and

Wysor & Kline, as surviving partners of Wysor, Jack & Kline.

continued in possession of the property of their respective

ﬁrms until June 25, 1866, when the executors of the last will of

John Jack, assuming to act under the provisions of the fourth

and ﬁfth clauses of the will, above set out, made a settlement,

and entered into an agreement with the defendant, \V_vsor,

whereby, in consideration that the latter agreed to pay the in-

partner bad an equal interest. The character of the business of
Wysor & Jack does not distinctly appear, but the land owned
hy them is trea'ted by both parties as partnership property. Hy
the first, second, and third clauses of his will, the testator
nppointed executors to carry the will into execution, made provision for his wife by gh·ing her a life-estate in his real estate,
nnd expressed a desire that ehe should be admitted into the
firm, and continue the business as a partner with Wysor and
Kline, his former associates in the milling business. The
fourth and fifth clauses of bis will read as follows: ~'(4) I will
and direct that my said executors, and, in case of the death or
failure to serve of either, the survivor of them, shall adjust,
settle, and compromise any and all d<>bts, claims, or demands
due to or from me according to the best of their or bis judgment, without any further authority from any court or jurisdiction whuteyer: and, further, that they shall make settlement
with my said partners, and each of them, of the partnership
affairs, and of the profits heretofore arising therefrom,
together with any matters of dealing between myself and them,
or (lither of them, in manner according to his or their judgment,
without any furthc-r anthority from any court whatever. (5) 1
do further will and direct that my said executors, or, in case of
the failure, from any cause, of either to serve. thc>n the remain·
ing exec•1tor, shall sell ancl convey so much of my personal or
real estate, at either pnblic or private sale, with or without
apprnisement, on such tem1s, nt such pla<·e, and in such mun·
ner, as to him or them shall seem best, ns may be necessary to
pay and satisfy all my just debts, reserving~ bowe,·e1\ to my
said wife tht> title and po8session of the house and grounds
where I now live; otherwise, selling such parcels~ the sale of
which will least injure the remainder." As to the remainder
of bis property, after the termination of the life-estate or the
widow, the teRtator died intestate. After the testator died,
Wysor, as ~nrviving partn('r of the firm of "Wysor & Jack, and
Wysor & Kline, as surviving partners of 'Vysor, Jack & Kline.
<·ontinued in possession of the property of their respective
firms until June 25, lS6li 1 when the executors of the last will of
John ,Jack, assuming to act under the provisions of the fourth
and fifth clauses of the will, above set out, made a settlement,
and entered into an agreement with the defendant, \Vysor,
whereby, in consideration that the latter agreed to pay the in-

384 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.

debtedness of the ﬁrm of Wysor & Jack, and certain debts due

384:
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from the testator to Wysor, and also to pay his share of all the

unpaid indebtedness of Wysor, Jack & Kline, and all other

indebtedness of the testator, including the cost of administra-

tion, and, in addition, convey certain property to the widow,

and secure to her one-third interest in the property of \Vys0r,

Jack & Kline, free from any debts, the executors and wvidow

agreed to convey to the defendant, \V_vsor, all the interest of

the testator, excepting certain designated parcels, in the real

estate owned by the ﬁrm of Wysor & Jack. Th-is agreement

was consummated, and conveyances were made, accordingly,

by the widow and executors, in June, 1866; and it is charged

that the defendant claims, in virtue of these conveyances, to be

the sole owner of the property, and denies the title of the

plaintiffs. These conveyances stood without question until

in February, 1380, when this suit was instituted.

Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.

O. T. Boaz, W. W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellants.

William Brotherton and C’. E’. Shipley, for appellee. I,

Mrrcnnnn, J. (After stating the facts.) It does not appear
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from the complaint that there was any disparity between

-the value of tihe property conveyed -and the amount of debts

assumed, or that the debts have not been paid according

to the agreement, or that there was any fraud or collusion

between the surviving partner and the executors, or that the

debtedneeA of the firm of Wysor & Jack, and certain debts dne
from the testator to Wysor, and also to pay his share of all the
unpaid inclebtedness of \Vysor, Jack & Kline, and all other
indebtedness of the testator, including the cost of adminiEatration, and, in addition, convey certain property to the widow,
mid secure to her one-third interest in the property of \-'Vysor,
Jack & Kline, free from any debts, the executors and widow
~grc~d to convey to the defendant, 'Vysor, all the interest of
the testator, excepting certain designated parcels, in the real
estate owned by the firm of 'Vysor & Jack. This agreement
was consummated, and conveyances were made, accordingly,
by the widow and executors, in June, 1866; and it is charged
that the defendant claims, in virtue of these conveyances, to be
the 8-0le owner of the property, and denies the title of the
plaintiffs. These conveyances stood without question until
in February, 1880, when this suit was instituted.
Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.

latter were in any way overreached. It is claimed, however,

that the power of sale contained in the will did not extend

to the partnership real estate, except that speciﬁcally men-

0. T. Boaz, W.W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellants.
William Brotherton and 0. E. Shipley, for appellee.

tioned therein; that, if it did, it only authorized the execu-

tors to sell the tcstator’s interest in so much thereof as

remained after full payment of the partnership debts. More

over, it is claimed that, even if the executors had authority to

sell, the transaction, as disclosed by the complaint, was not a

sale, within the meaning of the language employed in the will,

and that because the sale was made by the executors without

having given notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, and

without having included the value of the real estate in the

bond given by them when they qualiﬁed, the conveyance was

invalid and void. It is claimed, too, that Wysor, being the

surviving partner of the ﬁrm of Wysor & Jack, was a trustee

_ J_____g ,4

J. (After stating tbe facts.) It does not appear
from the complaint that there was any disparity between
·the v.a lue of the property conveyed and the ammmt of debts
assumed, or that the debts have not been paid according
to the agreement, or that there was any friud or c~llusion
between the surviving partner and the executors, or that the
latter were in any way overreached. It is claimed, however,
that the power of sale contained in the will did not extend
to the partnership real est:lte, except that specifically mentioned therein; that, if it did, it only authorized the executors to sell the tC'stator's interest in so much thereof as
remained after full payment of the partnership debts. More·
over, it is claimed that, even if the executors had authority to
sell, the transaction, as disclosed by the complaint, was not a
sale, within the meaning of the language employed in the will,
and that because the sale was made by the executors without
having given notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, and
without having Included tlle value of the real estate in the
bond given by them when they qualified, the conveyance was
invalid and void. It is claimed, too, that Wysor, being the
surviving partner of the firm of "'ysor & Jack, was a trustee
MITCHELL,

VALENTINE vs. Wxson. i 385

VALENTINB

of the partnership property, under a duty to the heirs and

VS. WYSOB.

creditors, and that he was therefore incompetent to purchase

and receive a conveyance from the executors. For all these

reasons, it is urged that the conveya-nce is illegal, and ought to

be set aside, and that an accounting of the affairs of the ﬁrm

of Wysor & Jack should be had; the appellants alleging their

readiness to pay whatever may be found due the defendant,

W§*sor. .

\Vhile it is undoubtedly true, as a general rule, that an action

to compel a surviving partner to account can only be main-

tained by the personal representative of the deceased partner,

yet circumstances may appear which create an exception to

the general rule, and make it proper that a court of equity

should entertain an action on behalf of the heirs. Where it is

shown that there is a collusion between the surviving partner

and the executor, the latter refusing to compel an accounting

by the former, or where there has ‘been uch dealing between

the two as renders it probable that the executor will not make

a bona ﬁde effort to secure an accounting, or other like circum-

stances appear, it has been held that the heirs may maintain
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the action. In t-he absence of special circumstances, heirs have

no locus standi against the surviving partner. 2 Lindl. Partn.

494; Harrison vs. Righter, 11 N. J. Eq. 389; Hyer vs. Burdett, 1

Edw. Ch. 325. '

Assuming, without deciding, that the facts, as pleaded in

the present .case, make it apparent that the executors have

placed themselves in such an attitude towards the surviving

partner, and the transaction sought to be set aside, as to bring

the case within the exception, it becomes pertinent to inquire

whether or not the appella‘nts,.as heirs, show any interest in

the property of the late ﬁrm of \Vysor & Jack upon which to

predicate an action. If the executors had no power under the

will to sell and convey, or the surviving partner was incompe-

tent to purchase, or receive a'conveyance, or if, for any of the

other reasons urged, the transaction between the executors

and the surviving partner was illegal, and the conveyance void,

then the property remained in the possession, and under the

qualiﬁed ownership, of the surviving partner, unaffected by

what transpired. It is familiar law that a surviving partner

has the right to the control and possession of the property of

the ﬁrm, and that he mav dispose of it in order to adjust the

49

of the partnership property, under a duty to the heirs and
creditors, and that he was therefore incompetent to purchase
nnd receive a conveyance from the executors. For all these
,reasons, it is urged that the conveya,n ce is illegal, and ought to
be set aside, and that an accounting of tbe affairs of the fl.rm
of Wysor & Jack should be had; the appellants alleging their
readiness to pay whatever may be found due the defendant,
Wysor.
\Vhile it is undoubtedly true, as a general role, that an action
to compel a surviving partner to account can only be maintained by the personal representative of the deceased partner,
,yet circumstances may appear which create an exception to
the general rule, and make it proper that a court of equity
11bould entertain an action on behalf of the heirs. Where it is
shown that there is a collusion between tlle surviving pal"tner
and the executor, the latter refusing to compel an accounting
by the former, or where there •has 'been such dealing between
· the two as renders it probable that the executor will not make
·a bona fide effort to secure an accounting, or other like circum·
stances appear, it has been held that the heirs may maintain
the action. In t·be absence of special circumstances, heirs have
no locus standi against the surviving partner. 2 Lindi. Partn.
494; Harrison -i:s. Righter, 11 N. J. Eq. 389; Hyer vs. Burdett, 1
Edw. Ch. 325.
Assuming, without deciding, that the facts, as pleaded in
the present case, make it apparent that the executors have
placed themselves in such an attitude towards the surviving
partner, and the transaction sought to be set aside, as to bring
the case within the exception, it becomes pertinent to inquire
whether or not the appellants, .as heiI'S, show any interest in
the property of the late fl.rm of 'Vysor & Jack upon which to
predicate an nction. If the executors bad no power under the
will to sell nnd convey, or the surviving partner was incompetent to purchase, or receive a·conveyance, or if, for any of the
other reasons urged, the transaction between the executors
and the surviving partner was illegal, and the conveyance void,
then the property remained in the possession, and under the
qualified ownership, of the surviving partner, unaffected by
what transpired. It is familiar law that a surviving partner
bas the right to the control and possession of the property of
the firm, and that be mav dispose of it in order fo adjust the

"!)
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partnership accounts, and he is only liable to the representa-

tives of the deceased partner for what remains in his hands

after the partnership affairs are settled; and there is nothing

more thoroughly settled in the law of partnership than that the

rights of the heirs of a deceased partner are subject to the

adjustment of all claims between the partners, and attach only

to the surplus which remains when the partnership debts are

all paid, and the aﬁairs of the ﬁrm wound up. Until all the

debts are paid, the rights of the heirs do not attach. Grissom

vs. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. Rep. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 742, and

cases cited; Wall-ing, vs. Burgess, 122 Ind. 299, 22 N. E. Rep.

419; Deetcr vs. Sellers, 102 Ind. 458, 1 N. E. Rep. 854. The heirs

of a deceased partner have no interest, as such, in t-he property

of the ﬁrm. Their only remedy is to compel the surviving part-

ner to account for t-he surplus after the settlement of all the

partnership liabilities; and, ordinarily, a court of equity will

not entertain jurisdiction of the aﬁairs of a partnership until

by its decree a ﬁnal adjustment of the business can be effected.

Thompson vs. Lowe, 111 Ind. 272, 12 N. E. Rep. 47 6, and cases

cited; Scott vs. Searls, 5 Smedes & M. 25; Rossum vs. Sinker, 12
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Cent. Law J. 205, and note. Now, while it appears that the

deceased partner was indebted to the ﬁrm, and that the ﬁrm

was indebted on partnership account, and that the surviving

partner agreed, in co-nsideration of the conveyance which is

assailed, to pay these and other debts for which the testa~tor’s

estate was liable, and while it may be inferred from the facts

alleged in the complaint that the surviving partner has paid

all the debts of the ﬁrm except what remains'due to himself

on the partnership ac-count, it nowhere appears but -that the

entire interest of the deceased partner would be absorbed in

the adjustment of the partnership account with the surviving

partner. Having averred facts from which the inference arises

that the surviving partner has paid all the partnership debts,

and that the estate of the deceased partner is indebted to him,

it is essential to the right of the heirs to call him to account

that they make it appear that he has in his hands partner-

ship property in excess of the amount required to reimburse

himself. The averments in the complaint wholly fail to do

this, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that the

complainants fail to show such an interest in the property

as entitles them to invoke the aid of a court of equity. This

,~ N’ w ma

partnership accounts, and be is only liable to the representatives of the deceased partner for what remains in his hands
after the partnership affairs are settled; and ~here is nothing
more thoroughly settled in the law of partnership than that the
rights of the heirs of a deceased partner are subject to the
adjustment of all claims between the partners, and attach only
to the surplus which remains when the partnership debts are
all paid, and the affairs of tlie firm wound up. Until all the
debts are paid, the rights of the heirs d<> no.t attach. Grissom
1'8. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. Rep. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 742, and
cases cited; Walling. vs. Burgess, 122 Ind. 2H9, 22 N. E. RPp.
419; Deeter vs. Sellers, 102 Ind. 458, 1 N. E. Rep. 854. The heirs
o0f a deceased partner have no interest, as such, in t·he property
of the firm. Their only remedy is to compel the surviving partner to a.ec:ount for the surplus a.fiter the settlement of all the
partnership liabilities; and, ordinarily, a court of equity will
not entertain jurisdiction of the affairs of a p1rtnersbip until
by its decree a final adjustment of the business can be effected.
Thompson vs. Lowe, 111 Ind. 272, 12 N. E. Rep. 476, and cases
cited; Scott vs. Searls, 5 Smedes & M. 25; Rossum vs. Sinker, 12
Cent. Law J. 205, and note. Now, while it .appears that the
deceased partner was indebted to the firm, and that the firm
was indebted on partnership account, and that the surviving
partner agreed, in co·nsideration of the conveyance which is
assailed, to pay these and other debts for which the testator's
estate was liable, and while it may be inferred from the facts
alleged in the complaint that the surviving partner bas paid
all the debts of the firm except what remains' due to himself
.on the partnership ac·oount, it D()Where a·ppeal'S but that the
entire interest <>f the deceased partner would be ia.bsorbed in
the adjustment of the partnership account with the surviv-ing
partner. Having averred facts from whfoh the inference arises
that the surviving partner has paid all the partnership debts,
and that the estate of the deceased partner is indebted to him,
it is essential to the right of the heirs to call him to account
that they make it appear that he has in his hands partner·
ship property in excess of the amount required to reimburse
himself. The averments in the complaint wholly fail to do
this, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that the
complainants fail to show such an interest in the property
as entitles them to invoke the aid of a court of equity. This
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<-onelusion necessarily follows from the application of the rule

that a surviving partner is entitled to the custody and man-

agement of the assets, unless it be shown that he is committing

waste, or otherwise mismanaging the affairs of the ﬁrm, and

is only liable to the heirs or representatives of the deceased

partner for what remains after everything is settled up. Rays

vs. Vilas, 18 Wis. 179; Shanks vs. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, ante p. 164;

Anderson vs. Aclccrman, A88 Ind. 481; Gobble vs. Tomlinstm, 50

Ind. 550.

If, however, it were conceded that it appeared that the part-

nership assets exceeded in value the amount necessary to

adjust the partnership account, it would by no means follow

that the appellants could maintain this action. It appears

that," more than 14 years before the commencement of this

action, the executors of the deceased partner, on the one hand,

acting under the authority conferred by the will, and the sur-

viving partner, on the other, consummated a ﬁnal settlement

and adjustment of the partnership account of Wysor & Jack.
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The powers conferred by the will are broad and comprehensive,

and include the power to settle, adjust, and compromise all

debts owing by the testator and to make settlements with his

former partners, and each of them, without any authority from

any court, and to sell and convey, either at public or private

sale, with or without appraisement, any or all of the testator’s

real estate, on such terms as to them should seem best, in order

to pay and satisfy debts against his esta-te. It thus plainly

appears that it was the purpose of the testator to invest his

executors with power to make compromises and settlements

at their discretion, and to sell and convey his real and personal

estate according to their best judgment. The statute in force

at the time the sale was made provided, in effect, that, where

lands were directed to be sold by a will, the sale, as to giving

notice,conveying, taking notes, and mortgages, return and con-

ﬁrmation, should be conducted as sales by an administrator

for the payment of debts, “unless, by the terms of the will, dif-

ferent directions are given; but no petition or notice of the

ﬁling thereof shall be required.” 2 Rev. St. 1876, p. 530. As

was, in effect, said in M unson vs. Cole, 98 Ind. 502, the land was

not directed to be sold by the will. That was left to the discre-

tion of the executors. But, if it had been, the executors were

authorized to sell at their own discretion, upon such terms as

<'onclusion nE'Ceesarily follows from the application of the rule/
that a surviving partner is entitled to the custody and management of the assets, unless it be shown that be is committing
waste, or otherwise mismanaging the affairs of the firm, and
ts· only liable to the heirs or representatives of the deceased
partner for what remains after everything is settled up. Roys
'18. Vilas, 18 Wis. 179; Shanks vs. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, ante p. 164;
Anderson vB. Ackerman, 88 Ind. 481; Oobble vs. Tomlinson, 50
Ind. 550.
If, however, it were conceded that it appeared that the partnership assets exceeded in value the amount necessary to
adjust the partnership account, it would by no means follow
that the appellants could maintain this action. It appears
that; more than 14 years before the commencement of thht
action, the executors of the deceased partner, on the one hand,
acting under the authority conferred by the will, and the sar.
viving partner, on the other, consummated a final settlement
and adjustment of the partnership account e>f Wysor & Jack.
The powers conferred by the will are broad and comprehensive,
and include the power to settle, adjust, and compromise all
debts owing by the testator and to make settlements with his
former partners, and each of them, without any authority from
any court, and to sell and convey, either at public or private
sale, with or without appraisement, any or all of the testator's
real estate, on such terms as to them should seem best, in order
to pay and satisfy debts against his estate. It thus plainly
appears that it was the purpose of the testator to invest his
·executors with power to make compromises and settlements
, at their discretion, and to sell and convey his real and personal
. estate according to their best judgment. The statute in force
. at the time the sale was made provided, in effect, that, where
lands were directed to be sold by a will, the sale, ~s to giving
notice, conveying, taking notes, ·a nd mortgages, return and conftrmation, should be conducted as sales by an administra.tor
for the payment of debts, "unless, by the terms of the will, different directions are given; but no petition or notice of the
filing thereof shall be required." 2 Rev. St. 1876, p. 530. As
was, in effect, said in Munson t:s. Oole, 98 Ind. 502, the land was
not directed to be sold by the will. That was left to the discretion of the executors. But, if it had been, the executors were
authorized to sell at their own discretion. upon such terms as
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they might think best; and the authority thus conferred neces-

arily operated as “different directions” from those prescribed

by the statute. The conveyance was not, therefore, invalid

because the terms of the statute were not observed, or on

accounrt of any defect in the power of the executors.

This brings us to inquire whether the surviving partner oc-

cupied such a relation to the property, and to those concerned,

as to disqualify him from purchasing the interest from the

executors of the deceased partner. It is not to be doubted

that a surviving partner is regarded as a trustee, primarily for

the creditors of the ﬁrm, and, secondarily for the heirs or per-

sonal representatives of the deceased partner in all that

remains, or fairly ought to remain, after adjusting the partner-

ship account. Accordingly, it has been correctly laid down

that “the surviving partners are held strictly as trustees, and

their conduct in discharging their trust is carefully looked

after, by the courts of equity. Thus, like other trustees, they

cannot sell the property of the ﬁrm, and buy it themselves;

nor, as the converse of this, can they buy from themselves

property for the ﬁrm. Their trust being to wind up the con-
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cern, their powcrs are commensurate with the trust. " ' ‘

Their trust is to wind up the concern in the best manner for all

interested, and therefore without unnecessary delay.” Pars.

Partn. 442; Case vs. Abecl, 1 Paige 393; Sigourncy vs. Mu-rm,

7 Conn. 11; Jones vs. Dca-ter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 45.9.

Being in a sense a trustee, the surviving partner cannot, of

course, speculate upon the property which the law commits to

his custody, solely for his own advantage, in disregard of the

interests of his ccstuisque trust; and, if he makes proﬁts out

of the trust property, in the course of the adjustment of the

affairs of the partnership, he is held to account to those inter-

ested for their share. He cannot purchase the trust property

from himself, no matter whether the attempt be made by

means of a public or private sale. This is so, not only because

his duty as seller, and his in-terest as purchaser, are in irrecon-

cilable conﬂict, but for the more cogent reason that it is indis-

pensable to everylcgal contract of sale and purchase that there

be two contracting parties competent to enter into a binding

engagement with each other. Hence, an attempt by a. trustee

who holds property in trust, whether he be surviving partner,

administrator, or whatever his designation, to sell the trust

they mig·ht think best; and the authority t:ius conferred necessarily operated as "different directions" from those prescribed ·
by the statute. The conveyance was not, therefore, invalid
because the terms of the. statute were not observed, or on
accouDlt of any defect in the power of the executors.
This brings us to inquire whether the surviving partner occupied such a relation to the property, and to those concerned,
as to disqualify him from purchasing the interest from tbt~
executors of the deceased partner. It is not to be doubted
that a surviving partner is regarded as a trustee, primarily for
the creditors of the firm, and, secondarily for the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased partner in all that
remains, or fairly ought to remain, after adjusting the partnership account. Accordingly, it has been correctly laid do.wn
that "the surviving partners are held strictly as trustees, and
their conduct in discharging their trust is carefully looked
after, by the courts of equity. Thus, like other trustees, they
cannot sell the property of the firm, and buy it themselves;
nor, as the oonverse of this, can they buy from themselves
property for the• firm. Their trust being to wind up the con.
cern, their powc"'rs are commensurate with the trust. • • •
Their trust is to wind up the concern in the best manner for all
interested, and therefore without unnecessary delay." Pars.
Partn. 442; Case vs. A~ becl, 1 Paige 393; Sigourney vs. Munn,
7 Conn. 11; Jon~s vs. Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459.
Being in a sense a trm1ter, the surviYing partner C'annot, of
"COurse, speculate upon the property wl1ich the law commits to
his custody, solely for bis own advantage, in disregard of the
interests of his ccstuisque trust;· and, if he makes profits out
of the trust property, in the course of the adjustment of the
affairs of the partnership, be is held to account to those interested for thrir share. Ile cannot purchase tbe trust property
from himself, no matter whether the attempt be made by
means of a public or prh·ate sale. This is so, not only because
his duty as seller, and bis interest as purchaser, nre in irreconcilable conflict, but for the more cogent reason that it is indisJlensable to every legal contract of sale and purchase that there
be two contraeting partiPs competent to enter into a binding
engagement with each other. Hence, an attempt by a trustee
who holds property in trust, whether he be survivin_r partner,
administrator, or whatever his designation, to sell the trust
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y AL!NTIN B vs.

wno R.

.

889

Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; 74 Am. Dec. 209; Hunsucke-r vs. Smith,

49 Ind. 11S; Murphy vs. Teter, 56 Ind. 545; Rochester vs. Lever-

ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203; Nelson vs. H ayner, 66 Ill. 487.

In the case of a sale thus made or attempted, it can well be said,

it is of no avail to show that the trustee acted in good faith.

Such transactions are poisonous in their tendencies, and viola-

tions of the principles of public policy. They are declared

void, not for the purpose of aﬂording a remedy against actual

mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong. Potter cs.

Smith, 36 Ind. 231 ; Morgan rs. Wattles, 69 Ind. 261. These prin-

ciples do not apply or control in the case of a sale made by the

personal representative of a deceased partner to a surviving‘

partner. No good reason can be suggested why a survivingi

partner should be held legally incompetent and absolutely,

disqualiﬁed from becoming the purchaser of the interest of \

his deceased partner in the partnership business from his prop-

erly authorized legal representative, while very many reasons

occur why such transactions, fairly entered into, should not

only be upheld, but encouraged. In addition, the adjudge<1(i
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cases ﬁrmly support the right to make such sales. Brawn vs.

Slee, 103 U. S. 828; Baird vs. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 524, 31 Am.

Dec. 399; Chambers vs. Howell, 11 Beav. 6; Rays vs. Vilas, supra.

In Kimball vs. I/incoln, 99 Ill. 578, after reiterating the rule

that a. surviving partner could not become a purchaser of the

ﬁrm property at his own sale, nor from a co-trustee, the court

said: “But the reason that would forbid a transaction of this

character has no application to a case where asurviving part-

ner purchases property from the executor or administrator of

the deceased partner, and hence the rule which would govern

the one case cannot control the other.” See Lu-dl0w’s Heirs vs.

C'ooper’s 1)evisces, 4 Ohio St. 1. It has thus been seen that the

executors had plenary power to make settlements of the part-

nership account, and to sell and convey the real and peronal

estate of the testator at their discretion, and that the surviving

partner was competent to negotiate a settlement of the atfairs

of the ﬁrm, and to purchase the interest of his deceased partner.

It is contended, however, that the power which the will con-

ferred upon the executors was a power to sell the real or per-

sonal estate of the testator, and that the power thus conferred

was not well executed by the conveyance of the testator‘s inter-

est in the real estate of the ﬁrm in consideration of the agree-

estate to himself, is e\·erywhere held to be void. Martin vs.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; 74 Am. Dec. 209; Hunsucker vs. Smith,
49 Ind. 118; Murphy vs. Teter, 56 Ind. 545; Rochester VB. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4: N. E. Rep. 203; Nelson t:s. Hayner, 66 Ill. 487.
In the case of a saJe thus made or attempted, it can well be said,
it is of no aYail to show that the trustee acted in good faith.
Such transactions are poisonous in their tendencies, and viola·
tions of the principles of public policy. They are declared
Yoid, not for the purpose of affording a remedy against actual
mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong. Potter t:B.
Smith, 36 Ind. 231; Morgan 1:s. WattleR, 69 Ind. 261. These prin·
ciples d-0 not apply or control in the case of a sale made by the
personal representative of a deceased partnPr to a surviving
partner. No good reason can be suggested why a surviving'1
partner should be held legally incompetent and absolutelyl
disqualified from becoming the purchaser of the interest of\
bis deceased partner in the partnership business from his properJy authorized legal representative, while vecy many reasons
occur why such transactions, fairly entered into, should not
only be upheld, but encouraged. In addition, the adjudge~(· •
cases firmly support the right to make such sales. Brown t71J
S'lee, 103 U.S. 828; Baird VB. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 524, 31 Am.
Dec. 399; Chambers t'B. Hou:ell, 11 Beav. 6; Rays vs. Vilas, supra.
In Kimball i·s. Lincoln, 99 111. 578, after reiterating the rule
that a surviving partner could not become a purc·haser of th~
firm property at bis own sale, nor from a co-trustee, the court
said: "But the reason that would forbid a transaction of thi~
character has no application to a case where a _surviving partner purchases property from the executor or administrator of
the deceased partner, and hence the rule which would govern
the one case cannot control the other." See Ludloto's Heirs vs.
Cooper's Dedsccs, 4 Ohio St. 1. It bas thus been seen that the
E>Xecutors had plenary power to make settlements of the partnership account, and to sell and convey the real and personal
estate of the testator at their discretion, and that the surviving
partner was competent to nP~otiate a settlement of the affairs
of the firm, and to purchase the interest of his df>ceased partner.
It is contended, however, that the power which the will conferred upon the executors was a power to sell the real or per·
sonal estate of the testator, and that the power thus conferrt>d
was not well executed by the conveyancE> of the testator's interest in the real estate of the firm in consideration of the agree-
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ment to pay debts, as already indicated. The argument is that

the agreement between the executors and the surviving part-

ner was the same, in legal effect, as an exchange of property,

and that a power to sell does not authorize an exchange. Rus-

sell vs. Russell, 36 N. Y. 581; 93 Am. Dec. 540; Taylor vs. Gallo-

way, 1 Ohio, 232, 13 Am. Dec. 605; Rinyyold vs. Ringgold, 1 Har.

& G. 11, 18 Am. l)ec. 250; King vs. Whiton, 15 Wis. 684; Cleve-

larid vs. Bank, 16 Ohio St. 236, 88 Am. Dec. 445. Conccding

that the proposition above stated is correct as a general rule, it

cannot be made available in the appellant’s behalf, for two

reasons: (1) The power conferred upon the executor compre-

hended much more than a mere naked authority to sell and

convey the testator’s real estate. They were especially invested

with power to make settlement with the partners of the tes-

tator, and with each of them, of all matters pertaining to the

partnership business, and to adjust, settle, and compromise all

debts, claims or demands against the estate of the testator,

according to their best judgment; and, in addition to the fore-

going power, they were authorized, at their discretion, to sell

and convey the testator’s real estate. Regarding the partner-
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ship assets, although consisting of lands, as personalty, and

the power conferred by the fourth clause of the will to make a

settlement of the partnership affairs invested the executors

with ample authority, in case it became expedient or necessary,

in the course of the settlement, to transfer property to the sur-

viving partner to make such transfer. Ludlow’s Heirs vs.

('ooper’s Derisces, supra. Moreover, the power contained in the

ﬁfth clause must be construed in connection with the duties

imposed upon the executors by the fourth clause of the will.

It will be observed that the executors are directed to sell and

convey so much of the testator’s real estate as they shall deem

necessary to pay and satisfy his debts. Construing both

clauses of the will together, it becomes apparent that the execu-

tors had authority to make any proper settlement which, in

their discretion, seemed ﬁt and best. (2) A settlement and

ﬁnal accounting with the surviving partner of the partnership

matters having been actually consummated by the executors

who were duly empowered, to that end, a court of equity will

not disturb the settlement so made until it is impeached as

fraudulent or unfair, or unless collusion between the executors

and surviving partner is shown. Nothing less than fraud or

ment to pay debta, as already indicated. The argument is that
the agreement between the executors and the surviving partner wae the eame, in legal effect, as an exchange of property,
and that a power to sell does not authorize an exchange. Rusaell vs. Russell, 3G N. Y. 581; 93 Am. Dec. 540; Taylor vs. Galloway, 1 Ohio, 232, 13 Am. Dec. 605; Ringgold vs. Ringgold, 1 Har.·
& G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; King vs. Whiton, 15 Wis. 684; Cleveland vs. Bank, 1G Ohio St. 2!~6, 88 Am. Dec. 445. Conceding
that the proposition above stated is correct as a general rule, it
cann()t be made available in the appellant's behalf, for two
reasons: (1) The power conferred upon the executors comprehended much more than a mere naked authority to sell and
convey the testator's real estate. They were especially invested
with pown to make settlement with the• partners of the testator, and with each of them, of all matters pertaining to the
partnership business, and to adjust, settle, and compromi!::e all
debts, claims or demands against tlie estate of the testator,
acc01·ding to their best judgment; and, in addition to the fore·
going power, t11ey were authorized, at their discretion, to sell
and convey the testator's real estate. Regarding the partnership assets, although consisting of lands, as personalty, and
the power conferred by the fourth clause of the will to make a
settlement of the partnership affairs invested the executors
with ample authority, in case it became expedient or necessary,
in the colll'~e of the settlement, to transfer property to the surviving })'J.t·tner to make such transfer. Ludlow's Heirs vs.
Cooper's Derisccs, supm. Moreover, the power contained in th€'
fifth clause must be construed in connection with the duties
imposed upon the executors by the fourth clause of the will.
It will be observed that the executo~ are directed to sell and
convey so much of the testator's real estate as they shall deem
necessary to pay and satisfy bis debts. Construing both
clauses of the will together, it becomes apparent that the executors had authority to make any proper settlement which, in
their discretion, seemed fit and best. (2) A settlement and
final accounting with the surviYing partner of the partnership
matters having been actually consummated by the executors
who were duly empowered, to that end, a court of equity will
not disturb the settlement so made until it is impeached as
fraudulent or unfair, or unless collusion between the executors
and surviving partner is shown. Nothing less than fraud or
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collusion will invalidate an arrangement between an executor

and a surviving partner, whereby the latter became the pur-

chaser of the deceased partner’s share. Travis vs. Milne, 9

Hare, 141; Davies vs. Davies, 2 Keen 534; Chambers vs. Howell,

supra; Stainton vs. Carron Co., 18 Beav. 146; Smith vs. Everett,

27 Beav. 446; 2 Lind. Partn. (Rapalje’-s Ed.) 487. As has been

seen, there is no pretense of any fraud or oollus-i-on in the

-present case.

Finally, after the settlement and accounting between the

executors and the surviving partner has been had, and the

account closed, as appears to have been the fact in the present

case, a court of equity will not, after this long acquiescence,

unexplained by circumstances, decree the opening up of the

account, even though it appeared that the settlement had been

irregularly made. It is the settled doctrine of courts of equity

that unexplained delay in the prosecution of a right, until it

becomes stale, constitutes such laches as forbids the interfer-

ence of the court. Smith vs. Thompson, 7 Grat. 112, 54 Amer.

Dec. 126, and note; Hough vs. Coughlan, 41 Ill. 131; 2 Story,
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liq. J ur. § 1520. Here, as we have seen, there is an unexplained

delay of 14 years. The statute of limitations would have

barred an action between the partners themselves in case the

settlements had been made by them. After this lapse of time

a presumption of innocence and fair dealing arises, and

removes every inference or imputation of bad faith from the

transaction, and the settlement must repose as the parties

made it. Prcvost vs. Gratz, 6 \Vheat. 481; Rochester vs. Levc~r~

ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203.

The judgment is afﬁrmed, with costs.

NOTE: See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., §§ 268, 309.

JONES vs. YVALKER

Supreme Court of the United States, 1880.

103 U. S. 444, 26 L. Ed. 404.

_ W. H. Walker, who was a large dealer in liquors, in partner-

ship with his son Frederick, made his will in July, 1870. One

collusion will invalidate an arrangement between an executor
and a surviving partner, whereby the latter became the pur·
chaser of the deceased partner's share. Travis vs. Milne, 9
Hare, 141; Davie.& vs. Davies, 2 Keen 534; Chambers vs. Howell,
supra; Stainton -rs. Carron Co., 18 Beav. 146; Smitli vs. Everett,
27 Beav. 446; 2 Lind. Partn. (Rapalje'·s Ed.) 487. As has been
seen, there is no pretense of any fruud or oolltl.S'l·on i.n the
present case.
Finally, after the settlement and accounting between the
executors and the surviving partner has been had, and the
nccount closed, as appears to have been the fact in the present
<·ase, a court of equity will not, after this long acquiescence,
unexplained by circumstances, decree the opening up of the
uccount, even though it appeared that the settlement had been
irregularly made. It is the settled doctrine of courts of equity
that unexplained delay in the prosecution of a right, until it
becomes stale, constitutes such laches as forbids the interfer·
cnce of the court. Smith vs. Thompson, 7 Grat. 112, 54 Amer.
Dec. 126, and note; Hough 't;S. Coughlan, 41 Ill. 131; 2 Story,
El]. Jnr.§ 1520. Here, as we have seen, there is an unexplained
delay of 14 years. The statute of limitations would have
barred an action between the partners themselves in case the
settlements had been made by them. After this lapse of time
a presumption of innocence and fair dealing arises, and
removes every inference or imputation of bad faith from the
transaction, and the settlement must repose as the parties
made it. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 \Vheat. 481; Rochester vs. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 268, 809.

JONES vs. WALKER
Supnmc Court of tlie United Statea, 1880.
103 U. 8. 444, 26 L. Ed. 404.

-W. H. Walker, who wns a large dealer in liquors, in partner~hip with bis son Frederick, made his will in July, 1S70. One
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of the clauses of the will provided for the continuance of the

partnership and the conduct of this business after his death.

It is in this language:

“It is my wish that my son Frederick carry on the business

of W. H. Walker & Co. in that name and style, and in my

storehouse where it is now carried on, giving him power to

change the place, until my youngest child living to be twenty-

one years of age arrives at that age, or for a shorter time, if he

does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable. To that end all my capital and

interest in said concern shall be continued therein, and shall

be chargeable for its debts and liabilities; but my other prop-

erty shall not be so chargeable while Frederick carries on said

business; my share shall pay the salary of an eﬂicient man to

aid him therein or he shall have compensation for his services

as to and from my share. Agents and employés of the con-

cern are to be paid by it. Frederick is not to be charged with

$5,000 advanced by me to him on his coming of age, and he is

to have the privilege to purchase, at a fair valuation and upon

reasonable time, such portion of my share in said concern and

its good will as will make his share equal to one-half. What
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he may so pay is to be divided as proﬁts of the concern. While

my storehouse is occupied by the concern it shall pay rent

therefor. The proﬁts of said concern, which shall be ascer-

tained and declared in the ﬁrst of January after my death,

and annually thereafter, shall be divided between my wife and

children, or their descendants, and others. As my personalty

is’ to be divided among them when my youngest child living

to be twenty-one years of age arrives at that age, or at the

death of my son Frederick before that time, or when he dis-

continues the business, my interest in the concern and its

good will slhall be sold as my executors may direct, and the

proceeds divided, as the proﬁts thereof are to be divided, with

an obligation, if possible, that the business may be carried on

under the old name and style.”

The tcstator died in 1872, and the business was conducted

as directed in the will until February 27, 1877, when the ﬁrm,

on the petition of its members, was declared bankrupt by the

proper court. - \

' The appellant Jones was made assignee, and very shortly

afterwardﬁled the bill in the present case against the devi-

sees of ~W. I1. \Valker’s will.

»

of the clauses of the 1Vill provided for the continuance of the
partnership and the conduct of this busineSll after his death.
It is in this language:
"It is my wish that my son Frederick carry on the bnsineSB
of W. H. \Valker & Co. in that name and style, and in my
storehouse where it is n-0w carried on, giving him power to
change the place, until my youngest child living to be twentyone years of age arrives at that age, or for a shorter Ume, if he
does not find it profitable. To that end all my capital and
interest in said concern shall be continued therein, and shall
be chargea,b le for its debts and liabilities; but my other pr<>p·
erty shall not be so chargeable while Frederick carries on said
business; my share shall pay the salary of an efficient man to
aid him therein or he shall h~ve compensation for his services
aa to and from my share. Agents and employee of the concern are to be paid by it. Frederick is not to be charged with
f5,000 advanced by me to him on his coming of age, and he is
to have the privilege to purchase, at a fair valuation and upon
reasonable time, such portion of my share in said concern and
its good will as will make his share equal to one-half. ·what
he may so pay is to be divided as profits of the concern. While
my storehouse is occupied by the concern it shall pay rent
therefor. The profits of said concern, which shall be ascer·
tained and declared in the first of January after my death,
and annually thereafter, shall be divided between my wife and
children, or their descendants, and others. As my personalty
is to be divided among them when my youngest child living
to be twenty-one years of age arrives at that age, or at the
death of my son Prederick before that time, or when he discontinues the business, my interest in the concern and its
good will s:Jmll be sold as my executors may direct, n:nd the
proceeds divided, as the profits thereof are to be divided, with
an obligation, if possible, that the business may be carried on
under the old name and style."
The testator died in 1872, and the business was conducted
as directed in the will until February 27, 1877, when the firm,
on the petition of its members, was declared bankrupt by the
proper court.
'
The appellant ,Jones was made assignee, and very shortly
afterward · filed the bill in the present case against the deviseee of W. H. \Valker's will.

\
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803

WALK:BR.

Martin Bijur and W. 0. Dodd, for appellant.

John M. Brown, comtra.

Jl<Wtin Bijti1' and W. 0. Dodd, !or appellant.

MILLER, J. (After stating the facts as above.) The object

of the bill is twofold, namely, to subject the property of the

John M. Brown, conitra.

deceased, which had not been embarked in the partnership

enterprise, in the hands of the devisees, to the payment of the

partnership debts, and to recover from the defendants money

which they had received as dividends out of the proﬁts of the

business after the death of the testator.

In the recent case of Smith vs. Ayre, 101 U. S. 320, the

legal principle lying at the foundation of the ﬁrst of these

grounds of relief was fully discussed and determined. It was

there held that a testator might authorize the continuance of a.

partnership, in which he was engaged at the time of his death,

without subjecting any more of his property to the vicissitudes

of the business than what was then embarked in it, and that,

unless he had expressly placed the whole, or some other part of

his estate, under the operation of the partnership, it would not

be presumed that he had so intended. See also Burwell vs.
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Manderille, 2 How. (U. S.) 560; Ea: parts Garland, 10 V es. Jr.

110. In the case before us the testator declares, in express

terms, that his capital and interest in said concern shall be

continued therein, and shall be chargeable for its debts and

liabilities; but his other property shall not be so chargeable.

We see no reason in the present ease for departing from

the principle adopted in Smith vs. A3/re, after much considera-

tion.

If dividends of proﬁts out of the partnership business were

honestly and fairly made, and when paid did not diminish the

capital, nor withdraw what was necessary to pay the indebt-

edness of the concern, we see no reason why the persons receiv-

ing them should now be called on to refund them.

The will of the testator has a clause authorizing these divi-

dends. The partnership had a long time to run and a. large

part of his capital was engaged in the business. There were

children to be reared and educated, and it would have been

very unreasonable that all the proﬁts should be continually

converted into capital, and that neither these children, nor

Frederick, the other partner, should be permitted to receive

dividends of proﬁts, except on the condition of a liability to

50 '

HILLER1 J. (After stating the facts as above.) The object
of the bill is twofold, namely, to subject the property of the
deceased, which bad not been embarked in the partnership
enterprise, in the hands of the devisees, to the payment of the
partnership debts, and to recover from the defendants money
which they had received as dividends out of the profits of the
business alter the death of the testator.
In the recent case -0f Smith vs. Ayre, 101 U. S. 320, the
legal principle lying at the foundation of the first of these
grounds of relief was fully discussed and determined. rt was
there held that a testator might authorize the continuance of a.
partnership, in which he was engaged at the time of bis death,
without subjecting any more of bis property to the vicissitudes
of the business than what was then embarked in it, and that,
unless he had expressly placed the whole, or some other part of
his estate, under the operation of the partnership, it would ne>t
be presumed that be bad so intended. See also Burwell vs.
Mandeville, 2 How. (U. S.) 560; E[IJ parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr.
110. In the case before us the testator declares, in express
terms, that bis capital and interest in said concern shall be
continued therein, and shall be chargeable for its debts and
liabilities; but his other property shall not be so chargeable.
We see D() 1·eason in the present case for departing from
the priDJciple ado1Jted in Smith vs. A11re, after much oonsideration.
If dividends of profits out of the partnership business were
honestly and fairly made, and when paid did not diminish the
capital, nor withdraw what was necessary to pay the indebt·
edness of the concern, we see no reason why the persons receiving them should ne>w be called on to refund them.
The will of the testator bas a clause authorizing these divi·
dends. The partnership had a long time to run and a large
part of his capital was engaged in the business. There were
children to be reared and educated, and it would have been
very unreasonable that all the profits should be continually
converted into capital, and that neither these children, nor
Frederick, the other partner, should be permitted to receive
dividends of profits, except on the condition of a liability to

60
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that extent for any future transactions of the partnership

through a period of ﬁfteen or twenty years.

If these dividends -had not been declared in good faith, nor

really earned, if they had diminished the capital, or if, when

they were made, debts existed which would have been left

without means of payment, the persons sharing in the divi-

dends would probably have been liable to these creditors to

the extent of the money so received.

But we are satisﬁed that none of these conditions existed.

The case is mainly one of fact, and the testimony is very

full. We do not think its discussion here proﬁtable or useful.

We are satisﬁed that at the time the last dividend was made

the capital of the company was undiminished, and the ﬁrm

amply able to pay its debts. Its misfortunes followed after

this.

It very fully appears that the insolvency was brought about

by accommodation indorsements for others, made after the

last dividend was paid; thart the ﬁrm, but for this, would have

remained solvent, and that, in regard to this, none of the

defendants were to blame except Frederick, who, being a full
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partner, is liable personally for all the debts of the ﬁrm.

An important matter in the case is a stipulation of the

parties to the suit that all the debts owing by the ﬁrm were

1'01liZI‘£lCt€d subsequently to the declaration and payment of all

the dividends, and none of the debts of the ﬁrm were in exist-

ence at the time these proﬁts were declared and paid.

No creditor whose debt was in existence when these divi-

dends were made was injured. All the debts then existing

have been paid. What right had subsequent creditors to re-

claim these dividends, who had no interest in the matter

when they were paid? These defendants, except Frederick,

were not partners. Their money was in the concern, and they

received dividends instead of interest.

We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud or intentional

wrong.

Decree atiirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 269.

•
that extent for any future transactions of the partnership
through a period of fifteen or twenty years.
If these dividends ·had not been declared in good faith, nor
really earned, if they had diminished the capital, or if, when
they were made, debts existed which would have been left
without means of payment, the persons sharing in the dividends would probably have been liable to these creditors to
the extent of the money so received .
.But we are satisfied that none of these conditions existed.
The case is mainly one of fact, and the testimony is vecy
full. We do not think its discussion here profitable or useful.
\Ve are satisfied that at the time the last dividend was made
the capital of the company was undiminished, and the firm
amply able to pay its debts. Its misfortunes followed after
this.
It very fully appea.r s that the insolvency was brought about
by accommodation indorsements for others, made after the
last dividend was paid; thart the firm, but for this, would have
rPmained solvent, and that, in regard to this, none of the
defendants were to blame except Frederick, who, being a full
' the debts of the firm.
partner, is liable personally for all
An important matter in the case is a stipulation of the
parties to the suit that all the debts owing by the firm were
t·ontracted subsequently to the declaration and payment of all
the dividends, and none of the debts of the firm were in exist·
t>nce at the time these profits were declared and paid.
No creditor whose debt was in existence when these dividends were made was injured. All the debts then existing
have been paid. What ri~ht bad subsequent credit<>rs to redaim these dividends, who had no interest in the matter
when they were paid? These defendants, except Frederick,
were not partners. Their money was in the concern, and they
received dividends instead of interest.
We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud or intentional
wrong.
Decree affirmed.
NoTB: See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., § 2C9.
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Supreme Court of Illinois, 1884.

_ 108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565.

William E. Doggett died on the 3d of April}, 1876, testate,

and Kate E. Doggett, appellant, who was named as executrix.

qualiﬁed as such in the probate court of Cook county. Dog-

gett, at the time of his death, and for many years before, was

DOGGETT vs. DILL.

a member of the ﬁrm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills. In 1871, T.

U. H. and Lucy \V. Smixth executed their two promissory notes

Supreme Court of Illinoi8, 1884.

for certain sums of money, payable to Charles H. Dill. The

two notes, on the date of their execution, were guaranteed by

108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 5G5.

Doggett, Barrett & Hills, the ﬁrm name to the guarantee being

executed by Doggett. N-0 effort was made by Dill to collect

the amount due on the notes from the ﬁrm assets, or from

surviving members of the ﬁrm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills,

but after the death of Doggett he presented his claim to the

probate court, to be allowed against the estate of the deceased.

The probate court, upon the evidence introduced, allowed the

claim, and the executrix appealed to the circuit court where

a second trial was had resulting in a judgment against the
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estate. An ap-peal was then taken to the appellate court,

where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and

this record is brought here by the executrix for the purpose of

reversing the judgment of the appellate court.

Stiles and Lewis and R. W. Pike, for appellant.

Dexter, Herrick d5 Allen, for appellee.

Cmuc, J. (After stating the facts as above), proceeded:

It is insisted by appellant that a partnership demand can-

not be allowed against the individual estate of a deceased part-

ner until the legal remedy against t-he partnership assets and

surviving partners has been exhausted.

In Mason vs. Tiﬂ’a-ny, 45 Ill. 392, which was a proceeding in

chancery, by a creditor of a ﬁrm, to enforce payment of a ﬁrm

debt against the estate of Tiﬁany, a deceased member of the

ﬁrm, it was held, that every partnership debt being joint and

.

William E. Doggett died on the 3d <>f Aprilj, 1876, testate,
and Kate E. Doggett, appe11ant, who was named as executrix~
qualified as such in the probate court of Cook county. Dog- .
gett, at the time of his deatll, and for many years before, was
a member of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills. In 1871, T.
C. H. and Lucy W. Sm\th executed their two promissory not-a
for certain sums of money, payable to Charles H. Dill. The
two notes, on the date of their execution, were gu1ranteed by
Doggett, Barrett & Hills, the firm name to the guarantee being
executed by Doggett. No effort was made by Dill to collect
the amount due on the notes from the firm assets, or from
surviYing members of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills,
but after the death of Doggett he presented his claim to the
probate court, to be allowed against the estate of the deceased.
The probate court, upon the evidence introduced, allowed the
claim, and the executrix appealed to the circuit court where
a second tI·ial was. bad resulting in a judgment against the
t>state. An appeal was then taken to the appellate court,
where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and
this record is brought here by the executrix for the purpose of
reversing the judgment of the appellate court.

Stiles and Lewis and R. W. Pike, for appellant.
Deztcr, Herrick & Allen, for appellee.
CnAIG, J. (After stating the facts as above), proceeded:
It is insisted by appellant that a partnership demand cannot be allowed against the individual estate of a deceased partner until the legal remedy against the partnership assets and
surviving partners has been exhausted.
In Mason vs. Tiffany, 45 Ill. 392, which was a proceeding in
chancery, by a creditor of a firm, to enforce payment of a firm
debt against the estate of Tiffany, a decpasPd member of th£>
firm, it was held, that every partnership de-bt being joint and
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several, it follows necessarily, that resort may be had, in the

CA.SES OB P.AKTbi.B.BSHlP.

ﬁrst instance, for the debt, to the surviving partners, or to the

assets of the deceased partner. In the decision of the case it

-is said: “If it was a fact that the surviving partners remained

solvent for a long time before the assignment, and the assigned

assets were suﬂicient to pay this claim, still these did not

require the complainant to press his claim against them, the

estate of the deceased partner being equally a fund on which he

had a right to rely.” This case seems to establish the doctrine,

in plain words, that a creditor, in equity, has the right, where

he holds a claim against a ﬁrm, one mem-ber of which -has died,

to proceed against the estate of the deceased member or the

surviving partners, as he may elect.

In Silucrman vs. Chase, 90 Ill. 37, the same question arose,

and following the doctrine of the ease last cited, it was said:

“A partnership debt is joint and several, and the creditor has

the right to elect whether he will proceed against the assets

in the hands of the surviving partner or against the estate of

the deceased partner, as h-eld by this court in Mason vs. Tiffany,

45 Ill. 392. Nor will the laches of the creditor in following
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the assets of the ﬁrm preclude a recovery. The creditor has

the right to proceed against the estate at any time before the

statute of limitations has run, and a failure to pursue the

partnership assets cannot be relied upon as a defense when

suit is brought against the estate.”

These two cases would seem to be conclusive of the ques-

tion presented, so far, at least, as this court is concerned, as

they, in terms, decide the same question involved in the record

before us, and it would not be deemed necessary to say any-

thing more on the question were it not for the fact that it is

claimed that these cases are in conﬂict with prior decisions of

this court, and the doctrine therein announced is not sound,

and in harmony with the current of authority on the subject.

We have therefore concluded to brieﬂy refer to some of the

authorities which have a bearing on the question, with the

view of showing that the decisions of this court are fully sus-

tained by the weight of authority.

Story on Partners-hip, Sec. 362, says: “The doctrine for-

merly held upon this subject seems to have been, that the joint

creditors had no claim whatsoever in equity against the estate

of the deceased partner, except when the surviving partners

several, it follows necessarily, thflt resort may be had, in the
ftrst instance, for the debt, to the surviving partners, or to the
s.ssets of the deceased partner. In the decision of the case it
is said: "If it was a fact that the surviving partners remained
solvent for a long time before the assignment, and the assigned
assets were sufficient to pay this claim, still these did not
require the complainant to press his claim against them, the
estate of the deceased pa.rtner being equally a fund on which he
bad a right to rely." This case seems to establish the doctrine,
in plain words, that a creditor, in equity, bas the right, where
he holds a claim against a firm, one member of which ·has died,
to proceed against the estate of the deceased me.mber or the
surviving partners, as he may elect.
In Silverman "'· Cliaae, 90 Ill. 37, the same question arose,
and following the doctrine of the case last cited, it was said:
"A partnership debt is joint and .several, and the creditor has
the right to elect whether he will ·p roceed against the assets
in the hands of the surviving partner or against the estate of
the deceased partner, as held by this court in Ma8on vs. Tiffany,
45 Ill. 392. Nor will the laches of the creditor in following
the assets o't the ftrm preclude a recovery. The creditor haM
tbe right to proceed against the estate at any time before the
statute of limitations has run, and a failure to pursue the
partnership assets cannot be relied upon as a. defense when
soit is brought against the estate."
These two cases would seem to be conclusive of the ques·
tion presented, so far, at least, as this court is concerned, as
they, in terms, decide the same question involved in the record
before us, and it would not be deemed necessary to say any·
thing more on the question were it not for the fact that it is
claimed that these cases are in conflict with prior decisi001s of
this court, and the doctrine therein announced is not ~ound,
and in harmony with the current of authority on the subject. •
We have therefore concluded to briefly refer to some of the
authorities which haye a bearing on the question, with the
view of showing that the decisions of this court are fully sustained by the weight of authority.
Story on Partnerlii·hip, Sec. 362, says: "The doctrine for·
merly held upon this subject seems to have been, that the joint
creditors bad no claim whatsoever in equity against the estate
of the deceased partner, except when the surviving partners

Dooosn vs. Dun. 897

were at the time, or subsequently became insolvent or bank-

DOGGBT.r VB. DILL.

89'1

rupt. But that doctrine has been since overturned, and it is

now held, that in equity all partnership debts are to be deemed

joint and several, and consequently the joint creditors have,

in all cases, the right to proceed at law against the survivors,

and an electionalso to proceed in equity against the estate

of a deceased partnerfwhetiher the survivors be insolvent or

bankrupt or not.” The same doctrine, but in ditferent lan-

guage, is declared by Story in his work on Equity Jurispru-

deuce, Sec. V676.

Collyer on Partnership, Sec. 580, declares the law in the

following language: “It is now established beyond contro-

versy, that in the consideration of courts of equity a partner-

ship debt is several as well as joint, and that upon the death

of a. partner a joint creditor has a right in equity to proceed

immediately against the representative of the deceased part-

ner for payment out of his separate estate, without reference

to the question whether the joint estate -be solvent or insol-

vent, or to the state of accounts amongst the pa.rtners.”

Dixon on Partnership, 113, says: “When a liability exists
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the creditor may, at his option, either pursue his legal remedy

against the survivor, or resort in equity to tihe estate of the

deceased-, and this altogether without regard to the state of

the accounts between the partners themselves, or to the ability

of the survivor to pay.”

Lindley on Partnership, 1053, says: “Whatever doubt there

may formerly have been upon the subject, it was clearly settled

before the judicature acts, that a creditor of the ﬁrm could

proceed against -the estate of t-he deceased partner without

ﬁrst having recourse to the su1'v'ivin~g,' partners, and without

reference to the state of the accounts between them and the

deceased.” See also Pars. Mere. Law, 102; Adams Eq. 173;

Smith Mere. Law, '48; 3 Kent Com. 63, 64, and note.

From the citations made, it would seem that the l-aw, as

declared in Mason vs. Tiﬁany, and Silvcrman vs. Chase, supra,

is fully sustained, at least by text-writers of high authority

both in this country and in England. But it will not be nec-

sary to rely alone on the text-books for a solution of the ques-

tion. as the decisions in England and in many of the states are

in harmony with the rule declared in the text-books. In Eng-

land, as early as 1816, in Devayncs vs. Noble, 1 Mer. 529, it was

were at the time, or subsequently became insolvent or bankrupt. But that doctrine has been since overturned, and it is
now held, that in equity all partnership debts are to be deemed
joint and several, and consequently the joint creditors have,
in all cases, the right to proceed at law against the survivors,
and an election also to proceed in equity against the estate
of a deceased partner,· whetlher the survivors be insolvent or
bankrupt or not." The same doctrine, but in different language, is declarC'd by Story in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 676.
Collyer on Partnership, Sec. 580, declares the law in the
following language: "It is now established beyond controversy, that in the consideration of courts of equity a partnership debt is several as well as joint, and that upon the death
of a partner a joint creditor has a right in equity to proceed
immediately against the representative of the deceased partner for payment out of his Be'J)arate estate, without reference
to the question whether the joint estate ·be solvent or insolvent, or to the state of accounts amongst the partners."
Dixon on 1•artnership, 113, says: "When a liability exista
the creditor may, at his option, either pursue his legal remedy
against the survivor, or resort in equity to tihe estate of the
deceased) and this altoget·her without regard to the state of
the accounts ·between the partners themselves, or to the ability
of the survivor to pay."
Lindley on Partnership, 1053, says: "Whatever doubt there
may formerly have been upo:n the subject, it was clearly settled
before the judicature acts, that a creditor of the firm could
proceed against the estate of the deceased partner without
first having recom·se to the surviving partners, nnd without
r<'forPnce to thr fltatP of the acr.onnts b~tween them and the
deceased.'' See also Pars. !\lerc. Law, UI:.?; .\dams Eq. 173:·
Hmith Mere. Law, 48; :3 Kent Com. 63, 64, and note.
From the citations made, it would seem that the law, as
declared in Ma.~an vs. Tiffany, and Silverman t•s. Chase, supra,
is fully sustained, at least by text-writers of high authority
both in this country and in England. But it will not be necsary to rely alone on the text-books for a solution of the question, ns the decisions in Engl:md and in many of the states are
In harmony with the rule declared in the text-books. In England, as early as 1816, in Devayncs vs. Noble, 1 Mer. 52!>, it was
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decided, that in equity partnership debts are joint and several,

and a creditor holding a ﬁrm debt could resort to the estate

of the deceased partner for payment, without showing the

insolvency of the survivor. The rule adopted in the case cited

was subsequently adhered to and followed in Wilkinson rs.

Henderson, 1 M. & K. 582, and since the decision of these cases

the doctrine there announced has been regarded as the settled

law of England. In Nelson vs. Hill, 5 How. 127, the supreme

court of the United States held that the creditor of a partner-

ship may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving

partner, or go in the ﬁrst instance into equity against the rep-

resentatives of the deceased partner—that it was not neces-

sary to exhaust his remedy at law against the surviving part-

ner before proceeding in equity against the estate. In sup-

port of the rule announced, Story on Partnership, Sec. 362,

note 3, is cited. In a later case (Lewis vs. United States, 92 U.

S. 622), Nelson vs. Hill is cited with approval. In Camp vs.

Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321, the supreme court of

Connecticut, in an able opinion, adopt the rule of the courts

of England. In Weaver vs. Thornburg, 15 Ind. 124, the ques-
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tion arose, and the supreme court of that state adopt the rule

in the language of Story on Partnership, cited supra, and this

decision was followed in a number of subsequent cases. Dean

vs. Phillips, 17 Ind. 406; Hardy rs. Overman, 36 Id._ 549. In

Freeman vs. Stuart, 41 Miss. 141, the question arose, and the

supreme court of that state held, in equity all partnership

debts are joint and several, and a creditor has the right to

proceed in law against the survivor, and an election also to

proceed against the separate estate of the deceased partner,

whether the survivor be solvent or not. See also Irby vs.

Graham, 46 Miss. 428, where the English rule is fully approved.

The same doctrine has been adopted in Vermont, in Washbum

vs. Bank of Bellows Falls, 19 Vt. 278. In Tennessee, in

Saunders vs. Wilder, 2 Head 579. In Arkansas, in McLain

vs. Carson, 4 Ark.'164, 37 Am. Dec. 777. In New Jersey, in

W-i-sham vs. Lippincott, 1 Stockt. Eq. 353. In Alabama, in Travis

vs. Tartt, 8 Ala. 577. In Florida, in F-illyau cs. Laverty, 3 Fla.

72. In Texas, in Gaul -vs. Reed, 24 Texas 46, 76 Am. Dec. 94.

In New Hampshire, in Bowker vs. Smith, 48 N. H. 111, 2 Am.

Rep. 189. In New York and Georgia a contrary rule has been

adopted, as will be found in the following cases: Lamenas rs.

__..._ m_ W E __ _ __%,a§

decided, that in equity partnership debts are joint and several,
. and a creditor holding a firm debt could resort to the estate
of tbe deceased partner for payment, without sh<>wing the
, insolvency of the survivor. The rule adopted in the case cited
. was subsequently ad·hered to and followed in Wilkinson t 'B.
, Henderson, 1 M. & K. 582, and since the decision of these cases
·the doctrine there announced has been regarded as the settled
law of England. In Nelson vs. Hill, 5 How. 127, the supreme
court of the United States held that the creditor of a partnership may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving
, partner, -0r go in the first instance into equity against the representatives of the deceased partner-that it was not necessary to exhaust his remedy at law ag.1inst the surviving part. ner before p1·oceeding in equity against the estate~ In support of the rule announced, Story on Partne·rship, Sec. 362,
note 3, is cited. In a later case (Lewis n. United States, 92 U.
S. 622), Nelson t:s. Hill is cited with approval. In Camp vs.
Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321, the supreme court of
Connecticut, in an abie oPfnion, adopt the rule of the courts
·of England. In Weaver vs. Thqrnburg, 15 Ind. 124, the question arose, and the supreme court of that state adopt the rule
in the language of Story on Partnership, cited suvra, and this
decision was followed in a number of subsequent cases. Dean
vs. Phillips, 17 Ind. 40G; Hardy rs. Overman, 36 Id.. 549. In
Freeman vs. Stuart, 41 Miss. 141, the question arose, and the
supreme court of that state held, in equity all partnership
debts are joint and several, and a creditor bas the right to
proceed in law against the survivor, and an election also to
proceed against the separate estate of the deceased partner,
whether the survivor be f!olvent or not. See also Irby vs.
Graham, 4G Miss. 428, where the English rule is fully approved.
The same doctrine has been adopted in Vermont, in Wasl1burn
vs. Bank of Bcllmc's Palls, 19 Vt. 278. In Tennessee, in
Sa-unders t'S. Wil<ler, 2 llea.d 579. In Arkansas, in McLain
t:B. Oarson, 4 Ark. 1G4, a7 Am. Dec. 777.
In New Jersey, in
Wisl1am t~s. Lippincott, 1 Stockt. Eq. 353. In Alabama, in Tra·vis
V8. 1'artt, 8 Ala. 577. Jn Florida, in F-illyaii n. Laverty, 3 Fla.
72. In Texns, in Gattt vs. Reed, 24 Texas 46, 7G Am. Dec. 94.
In New Hampshire, in Bowker vs. Smith, 48 N. II. 111, 2 Am.
Rep. 189. In New York and Georgia a contrary rule bas been
adopted, aa will be found in the following cases: Lam.enas t'B.
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Trustees, 11 Paige 80; Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Bennett

DOGGETT

vs.

DILL.

399

vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213. Upon an examination of the New

York eases, it a.ppears that the rulethere adopted was sup-

posed to be predicated on the old English cases, and when

the courts of England esta.blished the doctrine which is laid

down as the law in Devaynes vs. Noble, and Wilkinson vs. Hen-

derson, supra, the New York courts refused to follow the Eng-

lish rule, but adhered to what was supposed to be the law in

England as declared in that court prior to that time. Georgia

seems to follow the New York rule. In a late case in

Wisconsin (Sherman vs. Kreul, 42 W'is. 33), the supreme

court say: “We are disposed to adopt the New York

rule, that in order to recover against the administrators

the plaintiff should allege and show that the surviving

partner is insolvent.” It is also claimed by appellant

that the New York rule has been adopted in North and South

Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania; but without stopping to

determine precisely what the rule of the courts of these states

may be, we are satisﬁed that the decided weight of authority

is in harmony with the rule adopted in this state, and we are
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not inclined to change the rule heretofore adopted in this state,

and follow the doctrine established by the courts of New York

and Georgia, although we fully recognize the great ability of

those courts.

It is also claimed that Silvcrman vs. Chase is in conﬂict with

Molina Water Power and Manufacturing Co. rs. Webster, 26 Ill.

233, and Pahlman vs. Graves, Id. 405. This position is, in our

judgment, based upon a misapprehension o-f those cases. In

those cases there was a controversy between the partnership

and individual creditors, and the principle of marshalling

assets was applied, as it should have been. Where there are

individual creditors, and partnership creditors, there is no

doubt in regard to the law that all individual creditors have

a prior claim against the individual assets, and partnership

creditors have a prior claim against ﬁrm assets, and an individ-

ual creditor would have the right to insist that no part of the

separate assets should be taken and applied in payment of ﬁrm

debts until all separate debts had been paid in full. This

familiar rule was applied in the two cases referred to, and also

in the case of Ladd vs. Griswold, 4 Gilm. 25, 46 Am. Dec. 443.

But there is no contest between the individual and partner-

Trustees, 11 Paige 80; Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Bennetl

vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213. Upon an examination of the New
York cases, it a.ppears that the rule. ihere adopted was supposed to be predicated on the old English cases, and when
the courts of England established the doctrine which is laid
down as the law in Devaynes vs. Noble, and WUkinson vs. Henderson, supra, the New York courts refused to follow the English rule, but adhered to what was supposed to be the law in
England as declared in that court prior to that time. Georgia
seems to follow the New York rule. In a late case in
Wisconsin (Slie1·man vs. Kreul, 42 '\Vis. 33), the supreme
court say: "\Ve are disposed to adopt the New York
rule, that in order to recover aga.inst the administrators
the plaintiff should allege and show that the surviving
partner is insolvent." It is also claimed by appellant
that the New York rule bas been ad-opted in North and South
Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania; but without stopping to
determine precisely what the rule of the courts of these states
may be, we are satisfied that the decided weight of auth-ority
is in harmony with the rule ad-0pted in this state, and we are
not inclined to change the rule heretofore adopted in this state,
and follow the doctrine established by the courts of New York
and Georgia, although we fully recognize the great ability of
those courts.
It is also claimed that Silverman 1'8. Chase is in conflict with
Moline Water Power and Manufacturing Co. vs. Webster, 26 Ill.
233, and l'ahlman vs. G1·aves, Id. 405. This position is, in our
judgment, based upon a misapprehension of those cases. In
those cases there was a controversy between the partnership
and individual creditors, and the principle of marshalling
assets was applied, as it should have been. Where there are
individual creditors, and partnership creditors, there is no
dQubt in regard to the law that all individual creditors have
a prior claim against the individual assets, and partnership
creditors have a prior claim against firm assets, and an individual creditor would have the right to insist thrut no part of the
separate assets should be taken and applied in payment of firm
debts until nll separate debts ha.d been paid in full. Thi8
familiar rule was applied in the two cases referred to, and also
in the case of Ladd vs. Griswold, 4 Gilm. 25, 46 Am. Dee. 44:.J.
But there is no contest between the individual and partner-
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assets does not apply. In this case no claims had been pre-

sented or allowed against the estate, of any character, except

the one in controversy, and no individual creditor is resisting

the allowance of the claim.

But independent of the authorities, we are satisﬁed that the

rule, holding the estate of a deceased partner primarily liable

in equity, is sound in principle. Doggett, in his lifetime, was

individually liable for this debt, and if he had been sued, and

a judgment obtained against him, any of his individual prop

erty would have been liable to be taken and sold in satisfaction

of the debt. It is true, if he had been sued at law in his life-

time, it would ha.ve been necessary to join his partners as

defendants in the action; but after judgment, it was not neces-

sary to exhaust the partnership assets before individual prop

erty could be taken, but the creditor could resort to such prop

erty in the ﬁrst instance, if he saw proper. Did the death of

Doggett in any manner change the liability which existed on

this contract before his death? “Ye think not. The liability

continued as before, but the remedy to enfore that lia.bility was
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changed from a court of law to a court exercising equitable

powers. Before his death the liability could only be enforced

by a joint action against Doggett and his partners; after his

death the liability continued, but could only be enforced in the

probate court, which in the allowance of claims exercises

equitable powers. The death of a debtor may extinguish a.

legal remedy on a joint contract, but we are not aware that it

has ever been held that the death of a debtor could extinguish

the debt or discharge the estate-of the deceased.

In conclusion, we are satisﬁed, under ‘the facts as disclosed

by this record, appellee’s claim was a proper one to be allowed

against the estate of the deceased, and that it was properly

allowed by the probate court.

The judgment of the appellate court will therefore be

atiirmed.

Judgment aﬂirmed.

\VALK1~:n, J. If the doctrine of this opinion is to be applied

in cases where there are individual creditors of the deceased

partner, I dissent.

NOTE: For other cases upon this question see Mechem’s Elem. of

Partn., Q 270.

ship creditors •here, and hence the doctrine of marshalling
assets does not apply. In this case no claims had been presented or allowed against the estate, of any character, except
the one in controversy, and oo individual creditor is resisting
the allowance of the claim.
But independent of the authorities,. we aire satisfied that the
rule, holding the estate of a deceased partner primarily liable
in equity, is sound in principle. Doggett, in his lifetime, was
individua11y liable for this debt, and if he bad been sued, and
a judgment obtained against him, any of his individua.l property would have been liable to be taken and sold in satisfaction
of the debt. It is true, if be had been sued a..t law in his lifetime, it would have been necessary to join bis partners a.a
defendants in the a.ction; but after judgment, it was not necessary to exhaust the partnership a.ssets. before individual pr<>perty could be taken, but the creditor could resort to such property in the fii'st instance, if be saw proper. Did the death ot
Doggett in any manner change the liability which existed on
this contract before his death? "\Ve think not. The liabilit7
continued as before, but the remedy to enfore that liability was
changed from a court of law to a court exercising equitable
powers. Before his death the liability could only be enforced
by a joint action against Doggett and his partners; after hia
death the liability continued, but could only be enforced in the
probate court, which in the allowance of claims exercises
equLtable powers. The death of a debtoir may extinguish a
. legal remedy on a joint contract, but we are not aware that it .
bas ever been held that the death of a debtor could extinguish
the debt or discharge the estate·of the deceased.
In conclusion, we are satisfied, under 'the facts as disclosed
by this record, appellee's claim was a proper one to be allowed
against the estate of the deceased, and that it was properl1
allowed by the probate court.
The judgment of the appellate court will therefore be
affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
\VALKER, J. If the doctrine of this opini()n is to be applied
in cases whel'e there are individual creditors of the deceased
partner, I dissent.
NOTE: For other cues upon thls question eee Mechem'e Elem. of
Pnrtn., i 271>.
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1

LINDNER vs. ADAMS COUNTY BANK.

Supreme Court of N obrasko, 1896.

8- Neb.;—i 5, as N. W. Rep. 102a

The Adams County Bank brought this action against Abra)-

ham Loeb and wife, Lindner, the administrator, Rosa Hirsch,

LINDNER vs. ADAMS COUNTY BANK.

the widow, and Benjamin and Jacob Hirsch, the heirs, of Sam-

Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1896.

uel Hirsch, deceased, to foreclose a mortgage executed by Loeb

'I?- Neb~68

and Samuel Hirsch in favor of the bank. The case proceeded

to foreclosure and sale, and a.fter satisfying the bank’s debt

there remained a larger surplus, one-half of which was after-

N. W. Rep. 1028.

wards, by the court, ordered paid to the guardian of the heirs

of Samuel Hirsch. The present controversy relates to the dis-

position of the remainder of the surplus, it being claimed on

one hand by an assignee of Loeb, and on the other hand by the

administrator of Hirsch. The district court made an order

directing its payment to William Kerr, the assignee of Loeb.

This order was made on consideration of the application and

the record in the case, without evidence; and the question pre-
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sented for review is substantially, therefore, whether the

administrator’s application, taken in connection with facts

established by the record, was suﬂicient, if the allegations con-.

tained in the application were true, to entitle him to the unpaid

surplus. The application alleges, in brief, that Loeb and

Samuel Hirsch were, in the latter’s lifetime, partners, and that

the real estate sold under the decree of foreclosure was part-

nership property; that, after the death of Hirsch, Loeb col-.

lected the rents and proﬁts of the real estate, and continued

to carry on the business and collect debts due the partnership,

but failed to pay the debts of the partnership, and had refused

to apply moneys coming into his hands for the purpose of

discharging such debts, but had converted the partnership

property to his own use; that the partnership owned property

largely in excess of its liabilities; that Loeb is insolvent; that,

on an accounting between Loeb and Hirsch’s administrator,

Loeb would be indebted to the latter in at‘ least $3,000. Lind-

ner brings error. ' '

51

The Ailams Connty Bank brought this action against Abl"D(hnm Loeb and wife, Lindner, the administrator, Rosa Hirsch,
the widow, and Benjamin and .Jacob Hirsch, the heirs, of Sam.
nel Ilirsch, deceased, to foreclose a mortgage executed by Loeb
:md Samuel Hi11sch in favor of the bank. The case proceeded
to foreclosure and sale, and after satisfying the bank's debt
there remained a larger surplus, one-half of which was afterwards, by the court, ordered paid to the guar(lia.n of the heirs
of Samuel Hirsch. The present controversy relates to the di&position of the remainder of the surplus, it being claimell on
one hand by an assignee of Loeb, and on the other hand by the
administrator of Hirsch. The district court made an order
directing its payment to William Kerr, the assignee of Loeb.
This order was made on consideration of the application and
the record in the case, without evidence; and the question presented for review is substantially, therefore, whet1her the
administrator's application, taken in connection with facts
established by the record, was sufficient, if the allegations con-.
tained in the application were true, to entitle him to the unpaid
surplus. The application alleges, in brief, that Loeb and
Samuel Hirsch were, in the latter's lifetime, partners, and that
the real estate sold under the decree of foreclosure was partnership property; that, after the death of Hirsch, Loeb col-.
lected the rents and profits of the real estate, and continued
to carry on the business and collect debts due th'e partnership,
but failed to pay the debts of the partnership, and had refused
to apply moneys coming into his hands for the purpose of
discharging such debts, but bad converted the partnemhip
property to his own use; that the partnership owned property
. largely in excess of its liabilities; that Loeb is insolvent; that,
on an accounting between Loeb and Hirsch's administratot1
Loeb would be indebted to the latter in at least $3,000. Lind·
ner brings error.
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OASES ON

PARTNERSDIP.

W. S. Morlan and J. E. Kelley, for plaintiff in error.

Oapps (E Stevens, for defendants in error.

Invmn, O. (After stating the facts.) In the briefs many

questions are discussed with regard to the rights of surviving

partners, and the propriety of an examination into their trans-

W. 8. Morlan and J.E. Kelley, for plaintiff in error.
Capps & Stevens, for defendants in error.

actions, and an accounting, in a proceeding of this character.

We think, however, a single principle controls the decision of

the case. The assignment of the surplus arising from the sale

from Loeb to Kerr was__made before the sale was conﬁrmed.

It recites a consideration of $1,250 paid by Kerr to Loeb. Its

legal effect was as an assignment oi! a chbse in a.ction belong-

ing to a partnership, by the surviving partner, to a stranger.

Neither by any averment in the administrators application for

the surplus, nor elsewhere in the record, is the bona /ides or

consideration of this assignment attacked. On the dissolution

of a partnership by the.death of one of the partners, the part-

nership property vests in the survivor, in trust, it is true, for

the settlement and winding up of the partnership business,

but nevertheless with power of disposition for that purpose;

and the surviving partner may, in such case, convey or trans-
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fer the property to a stranger, who will take title by virtue of

such conveyance or transfer. Fitzpatrick vs. Flamw-yan, 106

U. S. 648, 1 Sup. Ct. 369. Not only may tangible property be

so transferred by a surviving partner,but also choses in action.

Johnson 1:0. Berlizlzeirner, 84 Ill. 54, 25 Am. Rep. 427; Rays vs.

Vilas, 18 W’ is. 169; Daby rs. Eriesson, 45 N. Y. 786; Bohler vs.

Tappan, 1 Fed. 469. It follows from this principle that the

assignment by Loeb, the surviving partner, to Kerr, of any

surplus that might remain after satisfying the decree in favor

of the bank (such assignment being unimpeached) operated to

transfer the right of the partnership to such fund to Kerr,

and it remained no longer a partnership asset. So that the

question as to whether, in the absence of such an assignment,

an accounting might be had in this action between the surviv-

ing partner and the personal representative of the deceased

partner, and the surplus distributed in accordance with the

result of such accounting, is not material to the present case.

A case much in po-int is Willson vs. Nicholson, 61 Ind. 241. That

was an action on a promissory note made to a partnership,

which had been assigned by delivery to the plaintitf by the sur-

__ 4___.1ﬂ

l

--- ~~--an

IRVINE, C. (After stating the facts.) In the briefs mnny
questions are discussed with regard to the rights of surviving
partners, and the propriety of an examination into their transactions, and an accounting, in a proceeding of this chara'Ctcr.
We think, however, a single principle controls the decision of
the case. The assignment of the surplus arising from the s<lle
from Loeb. to Kerr was ,_ made bHore the sale was confirm~d.
It recites a considera'!;ion of fl,250 paid by Kerr to Loeb. Ita
legal efl'ect was as a'n assigTrment o~ a clWS& in action belonging to a partnership, by the surviving partner, to a stranger.
Neither by any averment in the administrator's application for
the surplus, nor elsewhere in the record, is the bona. fides or
consideration of this assignment attacked. On the dissolution
of a partnership by the.death of one of the partners, the partnership property vests in th.e survivor, in trust, it is true, for
the settlement and winding up of the partnership business,
bot nevertheless with power of disposition for that purpose;
and the surviving partner may, in such case, convey or transfer the property to a stranger, who will take title by virtue of
such conveyance or transfer. Fitzpatrick t:8. Flannct.yan, 106
U. S. 648, 1 Sup. Ct. 369. No.t only may tangible property be
so transferred by a surviving partner, but also choses in action.
Johnson t:.'/. Berlizllcimer, 84 Ill. 54, 25 Am. Rep. 427; Roys vB.
Vilas, 18 \Vis. 1G9; Daby ti8. Ericsson, 45 N. Y. 786; Bohler VB.
Tappan, 1 Fed. 469. It follows from this principle that the
assignment by Loeb, the surviving partner, to Kerr, of any
•urplus that might remain after safisfying the decree in favor
of the bank (such assignment being unimpeached) operated to
transfer the right of the partnership to such fund to Kerr,
and it remained no longer a partnership asset. So that the
question a.s to whether, in the a.b sence of such an assignment,
an accounting might be bad in this action between the surviving partner and the personal representative of the deceased
partner, and the surplus distributed in accordance with the
result of such accounting, is not material to the present case.
A case much in point is Willson V8. Niclwlson, 61 Ind. 241. That
was an action on a promissory note made to a partnership,
which had been assigned by delivery to the plaintiff by the sur-
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viving partner. Certain creditors of the partnership had ﬁled
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counter claims, alleging insolvency of the ﬁrm and of all its

members, and that the note in suit constituted the ﬁrm’s only

assets, and that the plaintiﬁf had purchased it with full knowl-

edge of the facts. They prayed that the proceeds of the

instrument should be applied to the payment of their claims.

The supreme court affirmed the action of the trial court in

striking out the counter claims, on the ground that the surviv-

ing partner succeeded to the assets, and had the right to dis-

pose thereof, and that, in theabsence of any allegation to the

contrary, it would be presumed that the assignment to the

plaintiff was bona /idc, ‘and for a.‘ valuable consideration.

Aﬁirmed.

NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 270. V

Compare with Durant vs. Pierson, next: following.

DU RANT vs. PIERSON.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1891.

124 N. Y. 444, 20 N. E. Rep. 1095, 21 Am. St. Rep. 088.

This action was brought to set aside an assignment made

by the defendant, Henry R. Pierson, as survivor of the late

. viving partner. .Certain creditors of the partnership had :flied
counter claims, alleging insolvency of the firm and of all its
members, and that the note in suit constituted the firm's only
assets, and that the plaintiff had purchased it with full knowledge of the facts. They praye~ that the proceeds of the
instrument should be applied to the payment of their claims.
Tlle supreme court aftirme<l the acti<>n of the trial court in
striking out the counter claims, on the ground that the surviving partner succeeded to the assets, and bad the right to dispose thereof, and that, in the 'absence of any allegation to the
contrary, it would pe presumed that the n.ssignment to the
plaintiff was bona fide, knd for · a · valuable consideration.
Affirmed.
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ﬁrm of Henry R. Pierson & Son, to the defendant Robert C.

Pruyn, for the beneﬁt of creditors, upon the ground that it was

fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the ﬁrm, for the

NOTE: See 11Pchem's Elem. of Partn., § 270.
Cumpare wiUl Durant v1. Pierson, next following.

reason that it directed the payment to the National Commer-

cial Bank of the sum of ﬁfteen thousand dollars.

The referee has found as facts that Henry R. Pierson, the

elder, died on the ﬁrst day of January, 1890, leaving the

defendant Henry R. Pierson, his son, as the sole surviving

member of the ﬁrm; -that the ﬁrm kept an account with the

National Commercial Bank of Albany in the name of Henry R.

Pierson & Son, which was open and unsettled upon the books

DURANT vs.

PIERSO~.

of the bank on the ninth day of January, 1890, at which time

the defendant Pierson made application to the bank for the

Court of Appeals of New York, 1891.

loan of $15,000; that upon making such loan there was credited

upon the books of the bank to the ﬁrm the sum so loaned, and

12t N. Y. 44t, 2o·N. E. Rep. 1093, 21 Am. St. Rep. 686.

This action was brought to set aside an assignment made
by the defendant, Henry R. Pierson, as survivor of the late
firm of Henry R. Pierson & Son, to the defendant Robert C.
Pruyn, for the benefit of creditors, upon the ground that it was
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the fl.rm, for the
reason that it directed the payment to the National C<>mmercial Bank of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars.
The referee bas found as facts that Henry R. Pierson, the
elder, died on the first day of January, 1890, leaving the
defendant Henry R. Pierson, his son, as the sole surviving
member of the firm; .that the firm kept an account with the
National Commercial Bank of Albany in the name of Henry R.
Pierson & Son, which was open and unsettled upon the book&
of the bank on the ninth day of January, 1890, at which time
the defendant Pierson made application to the bank for the
loon of f15,000; that upon making such Joan there was C'reditcd
upon the books of the bank to the firm the sum so loaned, and
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a note was given therefor, payable on demand, signed in the
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name of the ﬁrm by Henry R. Pierson, survivor; that $10,150

thereof was subsequently drawn out of the bank by the checks

of the defendant Ilenry R. Pierson, signed by him as survivor,

and the same was applied and used in the payment of the debts

of the ﬁrm. The referee further found as facts that the pur-

pose of said defendant Henry R. Pierson in applying for and

obtaining such loan was to procure money with which to pay

the obligations of the ﬁrm which had matured or were about to

mature, and that the bank understood such to be the purpose

of the loan at the time of making the same; that the ﬁrm was

in fact insolvent on the ﬁrst day of January, 1890, at the time

of the decease of the elder Pierson, but that such fact was not

known to either the defendant Pierson or to the National Com-

mercial Bank at the time the loan was made. He further

found as a fa.ct that in inserting in the assignment the direc-

tion to pay the National Commercial Bank of Albany from

the ﬁrm property the amount of the note, the defendant,

Pierson acted with intent to hinder, delay and defraud

the creditors of the ﬁrm, but that at the time of making such
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assignment the defendant Pierson believed that such note

was a ﬁrm obligation, or an obligation which was legally

enforceable against the property and assets of the ﬁrm, and

that he therefore was not morally changeable with wrong in

directing its payment out of the property of the ﬁrm; that the

appropriation by him of the money borrowed of the bank to

the payment of the ﬁrm deb-ts created a claim in his favor

against the estate which before the assignment could have

been properly paid out of the ﬁrm's assets. As a conclusion

of law, he found that the debt created by the loan by the

National Commercial Bank was the individual debt of the

defendant Pierson, and not that of the ﬁrm; that the assign.

ment was consequently fraudulent as to the plaintilf, and

directed judgment accordingly.

Marcus T. Hun, for appellants Pruyn and Pierson.

Abraham Lansing, for the National Bank of Albany, appel-

lant.

' George L. Stcadman, for the respondent.

Harem", J. (After stating the facts as above.) If the debt

created by the loan be the individual liability of the survivor,-

n note was given therefor, ~yable on demand, signed in. the
name of the firm by Henry R. Pierson, survivor; that fl0,150
thereof was subsequently drawn out of the bank by the checks
of the defendant Henry R. Pierson, signed by him as survivor,
nnd the same was applied and used in the payment of the debts
of the firm. The referee further found as facts that the pur·
pose of said defendant Henry R. Pierson in a.pplying for and
obtaining such loan was to procure money with which to pay
the obligations of the firm whiC'h had matured or were about to
mature, and that the bank understood such to be the purpose
c1f the loan at the time of making the same; that the firm waa
in fact insolvent on the first day of January, 1890, at the time
of the decease of the elder Pierson, but that such fact W?S not
known to either the defendant Pierson or to the National Commercial Bank at the time the loan was made. He further
found as a fa.ct that in inserting in the assignment the direction to pay the National Commercial Bank of Albany from
the firm property the amount of the note, the defendant,
Pierson acted with intent to hinder, delay and defraud
the creditors of the firm, but that at the time c1f making su<ili
rssignment the defendant Pierson believed that such note
was a firm obligation, or an obligation which was legally
enforceable against the property and assets of the firm, and
that he therefore was not morally chargeable with wrong in
directing its payment out of the property of the firm; that the
nppropriation by him of the money borrowed of the bank to
the payment of the firm debts created a claim in bis favor
against the estate which before the assignment could have
heen properly paid out of the firm's assets. As a conclusion
of law, he found that the debt created by the loan by the
National Commercial Bank was the individual debt of the
defendant Pierson, and not that <!f the firm; that the assign·
ment was consequently fraudulent as to the plaintiff, and
directed judgment accordingly.
Marcus T. Hun., for appellants Pruyn and Pierson.

Abrallam Lansing, for the National Bank of Albany, appel·
lant.
· Geo1·ge L. Steadman, for the respondent.

HAIGHT, J. (After stating the facts as above.) If the debt
created by the loan be tlw individual liability of the survivori
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and one that the ﬁrm ought not to pay, and the ﬁrm be insol.-

vent, the survivor had no right in his assignment to direct its

payment out of the ﬁrm’s assets, and by so doing the assign-

ment was rendered fraudulent as to the creditors of the ﬁrm.

Wilson vs. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Mcnagh vs. Wh-itwell, 52 N.

Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683; Second National Bank of Oswego vs.

Bu-rt, 93 N. Y. 233-245; Bulger vs. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459-465.

It thus becomes important to determine whether the loan

contracted by the survivor became a ﬁrm obligation for the

payment of which its assets may justly be applied. As we

have seen, the note given upon procuring such loan bore the

name of the ﬁrm and that of Henry R. Pierson as survivor,

but at the time this note was given it was known to all of the

parties concerned that the senior member of the ﬁrm had

died.

The death of a partner puts an end to the copartnership,

and there is no longer any power or authority of the surviving

partners to carry on for the future a partnership trade or

business, or to engage in new transactions, contract, or lia-

bilities on account thereof. Story on Part., sec. 342, 343; Hall

31-35.
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vs. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160-170; Farr vs. Merrill, 53 Hun (N. Y.)

It is thus apparent that whilst the note in form would

appear to create an obligation of the ﬁrm, it is at law unavail-

able as such, for the reason that there was no power in the

survivor to make it. But it does not follow but tha.t it is a.

claim which ought, in justice and equity, to be paid out of the

ﬁrn1’s assets. If it is, the preference in the assignment would

not be void, for the law will not declare fraudulent that which

equity adjudges right and proper. Denton vs. Merrill, 43 Hun

and one that the firm ought not to pay, and the firm be lnsol~
vent, the survivor had no right in his assignment to direct its
, payment oat of the firm's assets, and by so doing the assignment was rendered fraudulent as to the creditors of the firm.
Wilson VB. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Menagh vs. Whitwell, 52 N.
Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683; Second National Bank of Oswego vs.
B11-rt, 93 N. Y. 233-245; Bulger vs. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459-465.
It thus becomes important to determine whether the loan
contracted by the survivor became a firm obligation for the
payment of which its assets may justly be applied. As we
have seen, the note given upon procuring sueh loan bore the
name of the firm and that of Henry R. Pierson as survivo1·,
but at the time this note was given it was known to all of the
parties concerned that the senior member of the firm had
died.
The death of a partner puts an end to the copartnership,
and there is no longer any power or authority of the surviving
partners to carry on for the future a partnership trade or
business, or to engage in new transactions, contracts, or lia.
bilities on account thereof. Story on Part., sec. 342, 343; Hall
vs. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160-170; Fa1·r VB. Morrill, 53 Hun (N. Y.)

(N. Y.) 224-229.

\Ve must therefore consider whether there are equities

which will support the claim of the bank to be paid out of such

assets. It is apparent that the money borrowed from the

bank by the survivor was for the purpose of paying the credi-

tors of the ﬁrm the claims then matured and pressing. The

amount of the loan was credited upon the open account of

the ﬁrm with the bank, and subsequently ten thousand dollars

thereof, or thereabouts, were drawn out by the survivor upon

his check, and used in the payment of the liabilities of the ﬁrm.

At the time this loan was made, it was not supposed by the 0ﬂ1-

31-35.
It is thus apparent that whilst the note in form would

appear to create an obligation of the firm, it is at law unavailable as such, for the reason that there was no power in the
survivor to make it. But it does not follow but that it is a.
claim which ought, in justice and equity, to be paid out of the
firm's assets. If it is, the preference in the asf!tignment would
not be void, for the law will not declare fraudulent that which
equity adjudges right and proper. Denton vs. Merrill, 43 Ilun
(N. Y.) 224-229.
We must therefore consider whether there are equities
which will support the claim of the bank to be paid out of such
assets. It is apparent that the money borrowed from the
bank by the survivor was for the purpose of paying the creditors o.f the firm the claims then matured and pressing. The
amount of the loan was credited upon the open account of
the firm with the bank, and subsequently ten thousand dollars
thereof, or thereabouts, were drawn oat by the survivor upon
bis check, and used in the payment of the liabilities of the firm.
At the ti.me this loan was made, it was not supposed by the oftl-

406 Cxsss on PARTNERSHIP.

CASES Oll PARTNERSHIP.

cers of the bank,'o1' the surviving partner, that the ﬁrm was

insolvent, and no question is made but that both parties acted

in good faith. The question is therefore presented whether a

surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the

express purpose of paying the debts of his ﬁrm, and by so

applying the money borrowed create an equity for the satis~

faction of which the assets of the ﬁrm may properly be

devoted. As we have seen, the survivorbecame entitled to the

assets, which he had the right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of,

in order to pay the debts and close up the affairs of the copart~

nership. If he had the power to sell or mortgage, it would

seem to follow that he had the power to borrow and pledge

the assets for the repayment of the loan, and the amount bor-

rowed having been faithfully applied in liquidation of the debts

of the copartnership, equity will recognize the justness of the

claim of the party making the loan. Caes may a-rise where

the exercise of such authority may be highly expedient, if not

necessary, for the preservation of the rights of creditors and

persons interested in the distribution of the assets of the ﬁrm;

as, for instance, creditors may by levy expose the assets to a
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forced public sale under circumstances which would work

great sacriﬁce to the estate. In case a survivor should be

insolvent, he might be able to raise money by a pledge to repay

out of the partnership assets when he could not obtain it upon

his own credit. We do not see that harm could result to the

other creditors by permitting this to be done; for it would

not increase the obligations of the ﬁrm nor lessen their share

in the distribution of the assets in case the ﬁrm be insolvent.

It is not questioned but that the survivor had the right to turn

out as a security or pledge the assets of the ﬁrm in payment

for the money received by him. He could have sold the assets

and repaid the money loaned at any time before executing the

assignment, and without taint of fraud. It is not apparent

how the rights of the parties are changed and the act of the

survivor made fraudulent by doing that in the assignment

which he had the right to do immediately before executing it.

The precise question involved in this case does not appear

to have been passed upon in any reported case, so far as we

have been able to discover,_ except in Hag/mes vs. Brooks, 8 Civ.

Proc. Rep. 106-113, where an assignment was made for the

beneﬁt of creditors by a surviving partner. In that case, as

_ _., 1 __ _ _ _

cers of the bank,· or the surviving partner, that the ftrm W88
insolvent, and no question is made but that both parties acted
in good faith. The question is therefore presented whether a
surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the
express purpose of paying the debts of his firm, and by so
applying the money borrowed create an equity for the satisfaction of which the assets of the firm may properly be
devoted. As we~ have seen, the sul'Vivor became entitled to the
essets, which he had the right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of,
in order to pay the dPbts and close up the affairs of the c<>part·
nership. If he had the power to sell or mortgage, it would
seem to follow that he had the power to borrow and pledge
the assets for the repayment of the loan, and the amount borrowed having been faithfully applied in liquidation of the debts
of the copartnership, equity wHl recognize the justness of the
claim of the party making the loan. Cases may a·rise where
the exercise of such authority may be highly expedient, if n<>t
necessary, for the preservation of the rights of creditors and
persons interested in the distribution of the assets of the firm;
as, for instance, creditors may by levy expose the assets to a
forced public sale under circumstances. which would work
great sacrifice to the estate. In case a survivor should be
insoh·ent, be might be able to raise money by a pledge to repa,
out of the partnership assets when be could not obtain it upon
hie own credit. We do not see that harm could result to the
other creditors by permitting this to be done; for it would
not increase the obliga tione o_f the firm nor lessen their share
in the distribution of the assets in case the ftrm be insolvent.
It is not questioned but that the survivor had the right to turn
out as a security or pledge the assets of the firm in payment
for the money received by him. He oould have sold the assets
uud repaid the money loaned at any time before executing the
assignment, and without taint of fraud. It is not apparent
how the rights of the parties are changed and the act of the
Hurvivor made fraudulent by doing that in the assignment
which he had the right to do immediately before executing it
The precise question involved in this case does not appear
to have been passed upon in any reported case, so far as we
ha.ve been able to discoYer,_ except in Haynes vs. Brooks, 8 Civ.
rroc. Rep. 106-113, where an assignment was made for the
benefit of creditors by a surviving partner. In that case, as
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in this, the creditors had loaned money to the surviving part-

ner to pay a note of the ﬁrm. VAN Vonsr, J., in commenting

upon the transaction, said: “If a ﬁrm obligation was retired

by the use of the money loaned or advanced by Brown & Co.,

the surviving partner would have been entitled to be repaid

out of the ﬁrm property. As the moneys of Brown & Co. in

fact paid a ﬁrm obligation, I see no objection in the subroga-

tion of them in equity to the rights of the surviving partner, or

to the regarding of them as entitled to be repaid out of the ﬁrm

assets. That works injustice tono one.” The learned judge

concluded by ordering the complain-t dismissed, thereby sus~

taining the validity of the assignment. This case was aﬂirmed

in the general term, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 528, and in this court in

116 N. Y. 487. This question, however, was not considered

in either of the appellate courts.

In Matter of the Estate of Davis and Dcsauque, 5 Whart.

(Pa.) 530, 34 Am. Dec. 574, it was held that after the dissolu-

tion of a copartnership the partner authorized to settle the

estate may borrow money on the credit of the ﬁrm for the

purpose of paying its debts, and if the credit be given in good
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faith, though with a knowledge of the dissolution, and the

money borrowed be faithfully applied in liquidation of the

debts of the partnership, the creditor has a claim against the

ﬁrm assets, and is not to be considered as a creditor m-erely of

the partner borrowing.

In the -case of Prudhomme vs. Henry, 5 La. Ann. 700, it was

held that where a liquidating partner, after dissolution, has

lborrowed money to pay the debts of the ﬁrm, the partnership

is liable as far as the evidence shows that the money was used

for the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm.

In the last two cases the partnerships were not insolvent,

and the question arose as between the partners. The courts,

however, recognized the claim of the lenders as one which

ought to be paid by the partnership.

In the case under consideration, it is true that the part-

nership is insolvent, and the question arises as between the

bank and creditors of the partnership, but the creditors have

not been harmed or prejudiced by the action of the bank in

loaning the money to the survivor, for the assets were

increased in value to the amount of the loan, and the money

‘drawn out of the bank was applied in extinguishment of the

in this, the creditors had loaned mO'ney to the surviving partner to pay a note of the firm. VAN VoRsT, J., in commenting
upon the transaction, said: "If a :firm obligation was retired
by the use o.f the money loaned o.r advanced by Brown & Co.,
the surviving partner would have been entitled to be repaid
out of the firm property. As the moneys of Brown & Co. in
fact paid a firm obligation, I see no. objection in the subrogation of them in equity to the rights of the surviving partner, or
to the regarding of them as entitled to be repaid out of the firm
assets. That wo.rks injustice to ·no one." The learned judge
concluded by ordering the complaint dismissed, thereby sus.
taining the validity of the assignment. This case was affirmed
in the general term, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 528, and in this court in
116 N. Y. 487. This question, however, was not considered
in either of the appellate courts.
In Matter of the Estate of Dav-is an.a Desauque, 5 Whart.
(Pa.) 530, 34 Am. Dec. 574, it was held that after the dissolution of a copartnership the partner authorized to settle the
estate may borrow money on the credit of the firm for the
purpose of paying its debts, and if the credit be given in good
faith, though with a knowledge of the dissolution, a.nd the
money borrowed be faithfully appJ.ied in liquidation of the
debts of the partnership, the creditor bas a claim against the
firm assets, and is nat: to be considered as a creditor merely of
the partner borrowing.
In the -case of Prudhomme vs. Henry, 5 La. Ann. 700, it was
held that where a liquidating partner, after dissolution, has
cborrowed money to pay the debts <Yf the firm, the pal'ltnership
is liable as far as the evidence shows that the money was used
for the benefit of the firm.
In the last two cases the partnerships were not insolvent,
and the question arose as between the partners. The courts,
however, recognized the claim of the lenders as one which
ought to be paid by the partnership.
In the case under consideration, it is true that the partnership is insolvent, and the question arises as between the
bank and creditors of the partnership, but the creditors have
not been harmed or prejudiced by the action of the bank fn
loaning the money to the survivor, for the assets were
increased in value to the amount of the loan, and the money
·drawn out of the bank was applied in extinguishment of the
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claims of the creditors, thus reducing to that extent the lia-

bilities of the ﬁrm. _

When a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner,

the survivor is entitled to the possession and control of the

joint pro-perty for the purpose of closing its business, and to

that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled

principles of the law of partnership, administer the affairs of

the ﬁrm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition

of the property, make provision for meeting its obligations.

He may, for th-at purpose, borrow money, and give a valid

pledge of the copartnership property for its repayment. Wil-

liams vs. Whcdon, 109 N. Y. 333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Emerson

vs. Senter, 118 U. S. 3-8; Fltepatriclc vs. Flannaga-n, 106 U. S.

648; Butehart vs. Dresser, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 542, 10 Hare 453;

In re Clough, Bradford Commercial Banking Co. vs. Cure, L. R.

31 Ch. Div. 326.

In Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119-124, Mr. Justice Srnose,

in commenting upo-n the rights of partners in a suit involving

the marshalling of the assets, says: “The right of each part-

ner extends only to the share of what may remain after pay-
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ment of the debts 0-f the ﬁrm and a settlement of its accounts.

Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right

to .have the partnership property applied to the payment of

the partnership debts in preference to those of any individual

partner. This is an equity that partners have as between

themselves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the bene-

ﬁt of the creditors of the ﬁrm. The latter are said to have the

privilege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien,

to have the debts due to them paid out of the asset.s of a. ﬁrm

in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its

several members. This equity is a derivative one. It is not

held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a sub-

rogation to the equity of the individual partner, to be made

effective only through him. Hence if he is not in a condition

to enforce it, the creditors of the ﬁrm cannot be: Rice vs.

Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of York County

Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446.

“But so lo-ng as the equity of the partner remains in him, so

long as he retains an interest in the ﬁrm assets as partner,

a court of equity will allow the creditors of the ﬁrm to avail

tfhemselves of his equity and enforce through it the applica-

claims of the creditors, thus reducing to that extent the lia,
bilities of the firm.
\Vhen a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner,
:the survivor is entitled to the possession and control of the
joinrt: pro·perty for the purpose of closing its business, and to
that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled
principles of the law of partnership, administer the affairs of
the firm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition
of the property, make provision for meeiting its obligations.
He may, for that purpose, borrow money, and give a valid
pledge of the copartnership property for its repayment. Wiliiams i;s. Whedon, 109 :N. Y. 333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Emerson
fiB. Senter, 118 U. S. 3-8; Fitzpatrick vs. Flannagan, 106 U. S.
64:8; Butcha1't vs. Dresser, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 542, 10 Hare 453;
In re Clough, Bradford Commercial Banking Co. VB. Cure, L. B.
31 Ch. Div. 326.
In Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119-124, Mr. Justice STRONG,
fn commentin~ upoon the rights of partners in a suit involving
the marshalling of the assets, says: "The right of each partner extends only to the share of what may remain after payment of the debts of the firm and a settlement of its accounts.
Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right
. to have the partnership property applied to the payment of
the partnership debts in preference to those of any individual
partner. This is an equity that partners have as between
themselves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the benefit of the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have the
privilege or preft'rence, sometimes l?osely denominated a lien,
to have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its
~everal members. This equity is a de.r ivative one. It is not
held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a sub·
rogation to the equity of the individual partner, to be made
effective only through him. Hence if he is not in a condition
to enforce it, the creditors of the firm cannot be: Rice vs.
Barnard, 20 Vt. 47!l, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of York County
Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446.
"But so long as the equity of the partner remains in him, so
long as he retains an interest in the firm assets as partner,
a court of equity will allow the creditors of the firm to avail.
themselves of his equity and enforce through it the applica·

Dnnurr vs. Pmnsos‘. ' 409

DURANT vs. Pn:BisoN'.

tion of those assets primarily to the payment of the debts due

•

409

them, whenever t-he property comes under its administration.”

In the case of Saunders rs. Reilly, 105 N. Y. 12, 59 Am. Rep.

tion of those assets primarily to the payment of the debts due

472, it was held that a mere general creditor of a ﬁrm having

no execution or attachment has no lien whatever upon its per-

sonal assets; that while ﬁrm creditors are entitled to a prefer-~

ence over creditors of the individual members of the ﬁrm in

the payment of their debts out of the assets, in the course of

liquidation, their equity is not held or enforceable in their own

right, but it is a derivative one, practically a subrogation of

the equity of each individual partner to have the ﬁrm assets

applied primarily to the payment of its debts, and where no

such equity exists in favor of any member of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm

creditors have none, and therefore where a judgment is recov-

ered againt all the members of a ﬁrm upon a joint obligation,

but not an indebtedness of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm property may be

levied upon and sold on execution issued on the judgment;

See also Dimon vs. H azard, 32 N. Y. 65; Stanton vs. Westover,

101 N. Y. 265; Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 46;

Brown vs. H igginbotham, 5 Leigh, (Va.) 583, 27 Am. Dec. 618;
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Peyton vs. Stratton, 7 Gratt, (Va) 380; Stebbins vs. Willard, 53

Vt. 665.

It appears to us that the conclusion is warranted from t-he

authorities referred to that where a person in good fatth loans

money to a surviving partner, and where the money is faith-

fully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities

of the ﬁrm, the -claim becomes one which in equity should be

paid out of the asset of the ﬁrm; and in an accounting

between the survivor with the personal representative of the

deceased partner, equity will recognize the right olf the sur-

viving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied

by him repaid out of the assets of the ﬁrm, -and an amgnment

so directing is not fraudulent. ’

Attention is called to the fact that the deceased partner

left a will making his surviv-or his sole devisee and lcgatee,

and it is claimed that he left no individual debts. If this were

so, it is not apparent that it would aﬁcct the equities of the

bank, but the evidence is silent upon the question as to

whether or not the deceased left individual debts. The referee

refused to so ﬁnd, and we cannot assume that there were

none.
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them, whenever the property comes under its administration."
In the case of Saunders t·s. ReUly, 105 N. Y. 12, 59 Am. Rep.
4:72, it was held that a mere genernl creditor of a firm having
no execution or attachment has no lien whatever upon its personal assets; that while firm creditors are entitled to a prefer.
ence over creditors of the individual members of the finn in
the payment of their debts out of the assets, in the course of
liquidation, their equity is not held or enforceable in their own
right, but it is a derivative one, practically a subrogation of
the equity of each individual partner to have the firm assets
applied primarily to the payment of its debts, and where oo
such equity exists in favor of any member of the firm, the firm
creditors have none, and therefore where a judgmenrt is recovered against all the members of a firm upon a joint obligation,
but not an indebtedness of the firm, the firm property may be
levied upon and sold on execution issued on the judgment
See also Dimon t'8. Hazard, 32 N. Y. 65; Stanton vs. Westover,
101 N. Y. 26u; Kirb11 vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 46;
Brown vs. Higginbotham, 5 Leigh, (Va.) 583, 27 Am. Dec. 618;
Peyton vs. Stratton, 7 Grat~. (Va) 380; Stebbins vs. Willard, 53
Vt. 665.
It appears to us that the .c onclusion is warranted from the
authorities referred to that where a person in good fa/th loans
money to a surviving partner, and where the money is faithfully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities
of the firm, the 1:laim becomes one which in equity should be
paid out of the assets of the firm; and in an accounting
between the sur·v iyor with the personal representative of the
deceased p artner, equity will recognize the right oif the surviving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied
by him repaid out of the assets of the ftrm, and an assignment
so directing is not fraudulent.
Attention is called to the fact that the deceased partn~r
left a will making his survivor his sole devisee and legatee,
and it is claimed that he left no individual debts. If this were
so, it is not apparent that it would aff~ct the equities of the
bank, but the evidence is silent up<m the question as to
whether or not the deceased left individual debts. The referee
refused to so find, and we cannot assume that there were
none.
1
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It may also be claimed tha.t, the ﬁrm being insolvent, the

survivor has no equities to which the bank can be subrogated,

for the reason that he is liable individually for the payment of

the ﬁrm debts. But the bank is not asking for any relief by

way of subrogation; it is only defending the provision, already

made for it in the assignment, from the claim of fraud. Even

though both the ﬁrm and the survivor were insolvent, the sur-

vivor still had the right to have his contract recognized, and

to say which of the creditors should be paid ﬁrst, and to so

provide in his assignment. Williams vs. Whedon, 109 N. Y.

333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460.

It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a. new

trial granted, with costs to abide the ﬁnal award of oosts.

Vmzx, J., dissents, upon the ground that the note preferred

in the assignment as a ﬁrm debt was simply an individual debt

of the surviving partner, who, as he did not bind the ﬁrm in

creating the debt, could bind neither it nor its property by

directing payment out of the ﬁrm assets.

Judgment reversed.

NOTE: See l\Iechem‘s Elem. of Partn.. § 268.
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Compare also with cases in Subd. XV, post.

IIUMPHRIES vs. CHASTAIN.

Supreme Cou-rtof Georgia, 1848.

5 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Dec. 247.

Assumpsit on a note indorsed in the ﬁrm name of Chastain

& Harvey, the indorsement having been made by Harvey (now

insolvent), without the authority of C‘-hastain, after the disso

It may also be claimed that, the firm being insolvent, tbe
survivor has no equities to which the bank can be subrogated,
for the reason that be is liable individually for the payment of
the firm debts. But the bank is not asking for any relief by
way of subrogation; it is only defending the provision; already
made for it in the assignment, from the claim of fraud. Even
though both the firm and the survivor were insolveut, the survivor still bad the right to have his contract recognized, and
to say which of the creditors should be paid first, arid to eo
provide in bis assignment. WiUia1na va: Whedon, 109 N. Y.
333, 4 Am. St. Rep.•GO.
It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a new
trial granted, with costs to abide the final award of oosts.
VANX, J., dissents, upon the ground that the note preferred
in the assignment as a firm debt was simply an individual debt
of the surviving partner, who, as he did not bind the firm In
creating the debt, could bind neither it nor its property by
directing payment out of the firm assets.
Judgment reversed.

lution of the ﬁrm. Evidence, oﬂered to show that the indorse-

ment was in payment of a previous debt of the ﬁrm, having

been rejected, the plaintiff, after judgment against him,

brought error on that ground.

NoTE: See Mechem"s Elem. of Partn .. § 2GS.
Compare aLw with ca:ses in Subd. XV, post.

Lyon, for the plaintiff in error.

Strosicr, for the defendant in error.

#-— ii _ _m __ _

HUMPHRIES vs. CHASTAIN.

Supreme Court of

Georgia~

1848.

6 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Deo. 247.

Assumpsit on a note indorsed in the firm name of Cha.stain
Ha~vey (now
Insolvent), without the authority of Cha.stain, after the dissolution of the firm. Evidence, offered to show that the indorsement was in payment of a previous debt of the firm, having
been rejected, the plaintiff, after judgment against him,
brought error on that ground.

& Harvey, the indorsement having been made by

Lyon, for the plaintiff in error.
Strozier, for the defendant in error.

vAN

VAN KI-IUBEN vs. PARMELEE. 411

\VARNER, J. The question made by the record in this case

KEG.REI

vs. p AltllELEE.

is, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the copartner-

ship, can bind his copartner by a new contract, for the pay-

ment of a pre-existing copartnership debt.

' That after t-he dissolution of a copartnership, one copartner

cannot bind the other by indorsing a note in the copartnership

name, is, we think, well settled, both upon principle and

authority; and that the note so indorsed, is in payment of a

debt due by the copartnership, makes no difference. Lyon on

Part. 274; Sanford rs. lllickles, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Haekley vs.

Patrick, 3 Id. 536; Foltz vs. Pourie, 2 Desau. Eq. 40. In Bell vs.

Morrison, 1 Peters (U. S.) 352, it was held that a dissolution of

a copartnership puts an end to the authority of one partner

to bind the other; it operates as a revocation of all power to

create new contracts; and the court below did not err in reject-

ing the testimony offered, and ruling that Chastain was nort

bound by the iudorsement made by Harvey, in the name of the

partnership, after its dissolution.

Let the judgment of the court below be afﬁrmed.

NOTE: See l\Iechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 271, 272.
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VAN KEUREN vs. PARMELEE.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1849.

2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322.

Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, in favor of

the plaintiff, in assumpsit on a promissory note. The plea

was the tatute of limitations, and the only questi_on was,

whether, under the facts stated in the opinion by Bnoxsox, J.,

the apparent bar of the statute had been removed as against

'VARNER, J. The question made by the record in this case
Is, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the copartnerehip, can bind his copar.tner by a new contract, for the payment of a pre-existing copartnership debt.
· That after the dissolution of a copartnership, one copartner
cannot bind the other by indorsing a note in the copa.rtnership .
name, is, we think, well settled, both upon principle and
authority; and that the note so indorsed, is in payment of a
debt due by the copartnership, makes n<> difference. Lyon on
Part. 274; Sanford i:s. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Hackley va. ·
Patrick, 3 Id. 536; Foltz vs. Pourie, 2 Desau. Eq. 40. In Bell va.
Morrison, 1 Peters (U.S.) 352, it was held that a dissolution of
a copartnership puts a.n end to the authority of one partner
to bind the other; it operates a.s a revocation of all power to
create new contracts; and the court below did not err in rejecting the testimony offered, and ruling that Chastain wns nM
bound by the iudorsement made by narvey, in the name of the
partner1Jhip, after its dissolution.
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed.

I

all the makers, by a new promise ma.de by one only.

0'. W. Swift and H. Swift, for appellants, the makers not

NOTE: Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn.,

§~

271, 272.

parties to the new promise.

Dodge cﬁ Campbell, for the respondent, the holder of the note.

Bnoxsox, J. The question is on the statute of limitations;

and the case is shortly this: The plaintiﬂ’ sues on a note made

\

Q

V.\N KEUREN vs. PARMELEE.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1849.
2 N. Y. 523, 61 Am. Dec. 822.

Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, in favor of
the plaintiff, in assumpsit on a promissory note. The plea
was the statute of limitations, and the only questjon was,
whether, under the facts stated in the opinion by Bno~so:s, J,, •
the apparent bar of the statute bad been removed ns against
all the makers, by a new promise made by one only.
O. W. Stcift and H . Swift, for appellants, the makers not
parties to the new promise.

Dodge c£ Campbell, for the respondent, the holder of the note.
BnoNso~,

J. The question is on the statute of limitations;
and the case is shortly this: The plaintiff sues on a note ma.de
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by three partners, on the ﬁrst day of May, 1831, and payable

immediately. The partnership was dissolved in the spring of

I832; the suit was commenced in July, 1847, more than six-

teen years after the cause of action had accrued; and the jury

ﬁnd a promise by “John Van Keuren, one of the defendants,”

within six years before the action brought, but they ﬁnd no

promise by either of the other defendants. The new promise

by John Van Keuren was made more than nine years after

the partnership was dissolved, and more than four years after

an action upon the note had been barred by the statute of

Iimitatio-ns. It cannot but strike every one with some degree

of astonishment that the promise of one, made at such a time,

and under such circumstances, should bind all of the defend-

ants. But still the question must be considered upon author-

ity; and if the rule has been so settled, it must be followed,

whatever we may think of it as an original proposition.

» Before looking at the cases, I will inquire, for a moment,

h-ow the matter stands upon principle. And "however much it

may be out of the "ordinary course, I will begin by referring to

the statute. The words are: “The following actions [includ-
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ing assumpsit] shall be commenced within six years next after

the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” 2 R. S. 295,

sec. 18. If the plaintiff sues on the note, “the cause of action

accrued” more than sixteen years before the suit was com-

menced, and of course the action is barred. There is but one

possible mode of escaping this diﬂiculty, and that is by saying

that the plaintiff does not sue upon the note, but upon the new

promise; treating it as a new contract, springing out of, and

supported by, the original consideration. That will do very

well where the original promise was made by one, or if

by more than one, where all join in making the new

contract. But in this case, the new contract was made

by only one of the three original debtors; and the

question is, what binds the other two? As they did not

contract for themselves, it is not their agreement, unless

John Van Keuren, who made the new promise, had authority

to contract for them. The only authority claimed for him is,

that he had before been the partner of the other two. This

leads to an inquiry concerning the principle on which each

partner can bind all his associates. And it is generally agreed

that it is the principle of agency. Each partner, when acting

by three partners, on the first day of :May, 1831, ·a nd payabl~
immediately. The partnersllip was dissolved in the spring of
1832; the suit was commenced in July, 1847, more than sixteen years after the cause of action had accrued; and the jury
fi.nd a promise by "John Van Keuren, one of the defendants,"
within six years before the action brought, but they find no
promise by either of the other defendants. The new promise
by John Yan Keuren was made m<>re than nine years after
the partnersbip was dissolved, and more than four years after
an nction upon the note had been barred by the statute of
limitations. It cannot but strike every one with some degree
of astonishment that the promise of one, made at s_u ch a time,
and under such circumstances, should bind all of the defendants. But still the question must be considered upon authority; and if the rule has been so settled, it must be followed,
whatever we may think of it as an original proposition.
Before looking at the cases, I will inquire, for a moment,
bow the matter stands upon principle. And however much it
may be out of the -ordinary course, 1 will begin by referring to
the statute. The words are: "The foJl()wing actions [in~lud
iiig assumpsit] shall be commenced within six years next after
the cause of such action accrued, and n()t after." 2 R. S. 295,
sec. 18. If t11e plaintiff sues on the ne>te, "the cause of action
accrued'' more than sixteen years before the suit was com·
menced, and of course the action is barred. 'fhere is but one
possible mode of escaping this difficulty, and that is by saying
that the plaintiff does not sue upon the note, but upon the new
promise; treating it as a new contract, springing out of, and
supported by, the original consideration. That will do very
well where the original promise was made by one, or if
by more than one, where all join in making the new
contract. But in this case, the new contract was made
by only one of the three original d<>btors; and the
question is, what binds the other two? As they did not
contract for themselves, it is not their agreement, unless
John Yan KeurPn, who made the new promist>, had authority
to contract for them. The only authority claimt'<l for him is,
that be bad before been the partner of the othPr two. This
·leads to an inquiry concerning the principle on which each
partner can bind all his associates. Aud it is g-t>nerally agreed
tha.t it is the principle of agency. Ea<'h partner, when acting
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within the scope of the partnership, is deemed to be the author~

ized agent of all his fellows. The authority is presumed from

the nature and necessity of the case; for without it, third per-

sons would not be safe in dealing with one of the associates,

and the business of the partnership could not be carried on

with success. Now, how long does this presumed agency con-

tinue? Clearly, no longer that the necessity for it exists; and

for most purposes, the necessity ceases with the termination of

the partnership. When that is dissolved, there is no l-onger

any ground for presuming an agency, except as to such things

as are indispensable in winding up the concerns of the com-

pany. If there be no agreement to the contrary, it may be

presumed that each partner still has authority to dispose of
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the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay debts,

and give proper acquittances. But there is no ground what-

ever for presuming a power to make new promises or engage-

ments in the na.me of the ﬁrm, even though they only change,

without increasing the prior obligations of the partners. iVe

shall presently see, upon authority, that they have no such

power. -

In reference to the statute of. limitations, a distinction has

sometimes been taken between a new promise ma.de before the

statute has run, and one made after the parties have been

exonerated by the lapse of time. That would sustain the defense

in this case, for the statute had run upon the claim long before

the new promise was made. But the defense may be rested

upon the still broader ground, that the dissolution of the part-

nership was a revocation of the agency, and the power of the

partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from

that moment.

The statute of 21 James I, c. 16, which limited actions on

promises to six years, was not very well received by the legal

pl'0f6SSl0I1;_ and although the ea.rly decisions under it are not

open to much observation, it was not long before the courts

began to regard the statute with disfavor, and to resort to the

,most ubtle constructions for the purpose of restricting its

inﬂuence. There was a period when one who was spoken to on

the subject of an old debt could not well give a civil answer,

without saying enough to take the case out of the statute. At

Ia later period, and since the commencement of the present cen-

-tury, the courts began to regard this as a beneﬁcial statute_a

within the scope of the partnership, is deem~ to betbe auth~r.
The authority is presumed from
the nature and necessity of the case; f<>r without it, third persons would not be safe in dealing with one of the associates,
and the business of the partnership could not be carried on
with success. Now, how long does this presumed agency continue? Clearly, no longer that the necessity for it exists; and
for most purp<>Ses, the necessity ceases with the termination o-f
the partnership. When that is dissolved, there is no longer
any ground for presuming an agency, except as to such tJbings
~s are indispensable in winding u.p the ooneerna of the co-m~
pany. If there be no agreement to the contrary, it may be
presumed that each partner still bas authority to dispose of
the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay debts,
end give proper acquittances. But there is no ground wha~
ever for presuming a power to make new promises or engagements in the name of the firm, even though they only change,
without increasing the prior obligations of the partners. . We
shall presently see, upon authority, tha1: they have no such
power.
In reference to the statute of limitations, a distinction bas
sometimes been taken between a new promise ma.de b~fore the
statute bas run, and one made after the parties have been
exonerated by the la;pseof time. That would sustain the defense
in this case, for the statute had run. upon the claim long before
the new promise was made. But the defense may be rested
upon the still brooder ground, that the dissolution of the partnerNhip was a revocation of the agency, a.nd the power of the
partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from
that moment.
The statute of 21 James I, c. 16, which limited actions on
promises to six years, was not yery wen received by the legal
profession;· and although the early decisions under it are not
open to much observation, it was not long bef~re the courts
began to regard the statute with disfavor, and to reso.rt to the
.most subtle constructions for the purpose of restricting its
influence. There was a pPriod when one who was 8poken. to on
the subject of an old debt could not well give a civil answer,
without saying enough to take the case out of the statute. At
·a later period, and since the commencement of the present ce~
:tury, the conrls began to regard this as a beneficial etutut~
ized agent of all his fellows.
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statute of repose—and commenced the diﬁicult task of retrac-
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ing their steps. But there were many obstacles in the way of

the backward movement, and the legislature, both here and in

England, took up the matter, and went beyond the old statute,

by requiring the new promise or acknowledgment to be in

writing. In consequence of the early departure from prin-

ciple in the construction of the statute, the different views

which prevailed at different periods, and the unequal pace of

the courts in attempting to get back on to solid ground, the

books are full of conflicting decisions; and any attempt to

reconcile them would be a. useless waste of time. I shall

not, therefore, go into a general review of the cases.

The leading case on this question in England is Whitco-mb

vs. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, where Lord MANSFIELD and his asso-

ciates held, that part payment, witl1i_1Ls,ix..years, by one of four

joint and several makers of a promissory note, took the case

out 0-f the statute of limitations as to all of the makers. Thatt

case is distinguishable from the one before us in two particu-

lars. First, it does not appear in that case that the action was

barred pri-or to the payment, while here the statute bar was
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complete long before the new promise was made. Second,

t-hat was the case of a payment, which has been deemed much

safer ground to go upon than a new promise or acknowledg-

ment. Lord TE1~:'rEnnnx’s act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, which requires

a writing in the case of a new promise or acknowledgment,

leaves the effeort of a payment untouched; and such, in sub

stance, is the provision in our recent code. Stat. 1849, p. 638.

sec. 110. In Wyatt vs. Hudson, 8 Bing. 309, Tmnan, C. J., said:

“The payment of principal or interest stands on a different

footing from the making of promises, which are often rash

or ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without

deliberation, and payment is an unequivocal act, so little liable

to misconstruction as not to be open to the objection of an

ordinary acknowledgment.” There is force in these remarks.

But I do not intend to lay much stress upon the distinctions

between that case and the one at bar. Lord l\fAi\'sr1m.n made

no distinction between the inﬂuence of a payment and a prom-

ise, and if his reasoning is sound, it reaches this ease. His

words are, “payment by one is payment for all, the one acting

virtually as agent for the rest, and in the same manner, an

admission by one is an admission by all, and the law raises

statute of repose--.'.and ·commenced the difficult task of retracing their steps. Bot there were many obstacles in the way of
the baekward movement, and the legislature, both here and in
England, took o.p the matter, and went beyond the old statute,
by requiring the new promise ()(' acknowledgment to be in
writing. In consequence of the early departure from prin·
ciple in the oonstructi-0n of the sta:tute, the different views
which prevailed at different perio.ds, and the unequal pace of
the cou.rts in attempting to get back on to solid ground, the
books are full of conflicting decisions; and any attempt to
reconcile them would be a us<>less waste of time. I shall
not, therefore, go into a general review of' the cases.
The leading case on this question in England is Whitcomb
1'B. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, where Lord MAXSFIELD and his assocjates held, that pa.rt payment, within sjqears, by one of fowjoint and seveml makers of a promissory note, took the case
out of the statute of limihltions as to all of the makers. Thart
case is distinguisha~le from the one before us in two particulars. First, it does not appear in that case that the action was
barred prior to the payment, while here the statute bar was
complete long before the new promise was made~ Second,
t•hat was the case of a payment, which has been deemed much
safer ground to go upon than a new promise or acknowledgment. I...ord TE:-1'.TERDEx's act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, which requires
a writing in the case of a new promise or acknowledgment,
leaves the effect of a payment untouched; and such, in substance, is the provision in our recent code. Stat. 1849, p. 638.
sec. 110. In Wyatt tis. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309, T1:sDAL, C. J., said:
"The payment of principal or interest stands on a different
footing from the making of promises, which are often rash
or ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without
deliberation, and payment is an unequivocal a.ct, so little liable
to misconstruction as not to be open t-0 the objection of an
ol"dinary acknowledgment." There is force in these remarks.
But I do not intend to lay much stress upon the distinctions
between that case and the one at bar. Lord l\IAI'\s1nEr.o made
no distinction betw(>{'n the influence of a payment and a prom·
ise, and if his reasoning is sound, it reaches this case. His
words are, "payment by one is payment for all, the one acting
virtually as agent for the rest, and in the same manner, an
admission by one is an admission by all, and the law raises
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Nothing but the great name of Lord Ms1\'sru-11.1) could have

given currency to this reasoning. It is plain enough that

“payment by one is payment for all,” so far as rela.tes to the

satisfaction of the debt, but that fact neither shows, nor has

it any tendency to show, a new promise or acknowledgment

by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an

admission that the debt is due; and like any other admission,

it can only affect the party who makes it, unless he has

authority to speak for others, as well as himself. A join/t

debtor has no such authority. It cannot be justly inferred

from the relation which he sustains to the other joint debt-

ors; and though he may conclude himself by an admission,

he cannot conclude them. His lordship, after saying that “pay-

ment by one is payment for all,” adds, “the one acting virtually

as agent for the rest.” If the meaning be, that there is such

an agency as will make the payment by one inure to the bene~

ﬁt of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enough, but

it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning

be, that one join-t debtor is the agent of the others for the pur-
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pose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming

the very point to be proved, and the assumption had neither

authority nor argument to support it. There is no-thing in

the relation of joint debtors from which such an agency can

be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie which links

them together, and from the nature of the case, payment of

the debt is the only thing which one has authority to do for

all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been

made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed

at that time to get around the statute of limitations. It was

in direct conﬂict with Bland vs. Haselrig,2 Vent. 151,which was

decided ninety years before, when the statute was in better

repute; and which is an authority in point, against the judg-

ment under review. The case was this: in assumpsit against

four,’ the statute of limitations was pleaded, and the verdict

was, that one of the defendants promised within six years,

but the others did not. Upon this verdict, judgment was ren-

dered for the defendants. The case of Whiteomb vs. Whiting,

2 Doug. 652, has been several times questioned in England,

and in Atkins rs. Tredgold, 2 Barn. & Cress. 23, t-he court seem-ed

much disposed to disregard it. But the authority of a

the promise to pay, when the debt i.s admitted to be doe."
Nothing bot the great name of Lord MANSFIELD could have
given curren.cy to this reasoning. It is plain enough that
"payment by one is payment for all," so far as relates to the
eatisfaction of the debt, but that fa.ct neither shows, nor has
it any tendency fo show, a new promise or acknowledgment
,. by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an
admission that the debt is due; and like any other admission,
it can only affect tlte party who makes it, unless he has
authority to speak for others, as well as himself. A joirut
debtor has no such authority. It cannot be justly inferred
from the relation which he sustains to the other joint debt·
ors; and though he may conclude himself by an admission,
he cannot conclude them. His lordship, after saying that "pay·
ment by one is payment for all," adds, "the one acting virtually
as agent for the rest." If the meaning be, that tihere is such
an agency as will make the payment by one inure to the benefit of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enough, but
it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning
be, that one joint debtor is the agent of the others for the purpose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming
the very point to be proved, and the assumption had neither
authority nor argument to support it. There is nothing in
the relation· of joint debtors from which such an agency can
be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie which links
them toge.ther, and from the nature of the case, payment of
the debt is the only thing which one has authority to do for
all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been
made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed
at that time to get around the statute of limitations. It wa~
ln direct conflict with Bland vs. Hasclrig,2 Vent. 151, which was
decided ninety years before, when the statute was in better
repu.te; and which is an authority in point, against the judgment under review. The case was this: in assumpsit against
tour,· the statute of limitations was pleaded, and the verdict
was, that one of the defendants promised within six years,
but the others did not. Upon this verdict, judgment was rendered for the defendants. The case of Whitcomb t:B. Wliiti11!1,
2 Doug. 652, has been several times questioned in England,
and in Atkins vs. Trcdgold, 2 Barn. & Cress. 23, t·he court seemed
mnch disposed to disregard it. But the authority of a
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great name has proven more than a. match for common sense;

and the decision in Douglas is now regarded as good law in

England. Perh_a-m vs. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306; Pritchard vs. Draper,

1 Russ. & M. 191. But it is not so in this country. Although

the case in Douglas has been followed in some of the states,

it has been questioned in others; and in several of the states,

and by ~the supreme court of the United States, it has been

wholly disregarded. I shall hereafter have occasion to refer

to some of the oases.

I will now inquire how the question stands in this state. It

ﬁrst ca-me up in Smith vs. I/udlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, nearly

forty years ago, when the statute of limitations was in bad

repute, and when few men ventured to think for themselves

after Lord Mmsrlann had spoken. The court said, that where

the original debt was proved, the confession of one partner,

though made after thedissolution of the partnership, would

bind the other, so as to prevent him fro-m availing ‘himself of

"the statute of limitations. This was said on the authority of

;Whitcomb vs. Whiting, already mentioned, and Jackson vs. Fair-

bank, 2 H. Black. 340, which was decided on t-he authority of
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the same case, though it went a more extravagant length.

Of the case in Douglas I have already spoken; and of the case

in Blackstone it is enough to say that it has been condemned

in England, Brandram vs. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Ald. 463; and

-overruled in this state; Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)

266, 291. I may add, that what was said in Smith vs. Ludlow,

about binding one partner by the confession of the other,

made after the partnership had been dissolved, was not neces-

sary to the decision of the cause; for there had been con-

fessions by both of the partners, which the court held sufficient

to take the case out of the statute, without making the

admission of one evidence against the other. Still, on the

authority of this case, and those in Douglas and Blackstone,

it was decided in Johnson vs. Beardslce, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 3, that

the promise of one joint debtor was suﬂicient to take the case

out of the statute. And in Patterson vs. Ohoatc, 7 Wend (N. Y_.)

441, it was held, that although one partner can not after a dis-

solution bind the other by a new contract, yet his acknowledg-

ment of a previous debt due from the partnership will bind

the other partner, so far as to prevent him from availing him-

self of the statute of limitations. This doctrine has been men-

I

great name bas proven more than e. match for common sense;
and the decision in Douglas is now rega·rded as good 18.w in
England. Perlt.am vs. Raynal, 2 Iling. 306; Pritchard vs. Draper,
· 1 Russ. & M. 191. But it is not so in this country. Although
the case in Douglas bas been followed in s<>me of the states,
it has been questioned in others; and in several of the states,
and by ·the supreme court of the United States, it bas been•
wholly disreg-.irded. I shall hereafter have occasion to refer
to some of the oases.
I will now inquire how the question stands in this state. It
first ca.me up in Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, nearly
forty years ago, when the statute of limitations was in bad
repute, and when few men ventured to think for themselves
after Lord MANS.FIELD had spoken. The court said, that where
·the original debt was proved, the confession of one partner,
though made after the dissolution of the partnership, wc:>nld
bind the oth~r, so as to prevent him from availing himself of
the statute of limitations. This was said on the authority of
:Whitcomb vs. Whiting, already mentioned, and Jackson vs. Fair·
bank, 2 H. Black. 340, which was decided on the alllth<>rity of
the same case, though it went a more extravagant length.
Of the case in Douglas I have already spoken; and of the case
in Blackstone it is enough to say that it bas been condemned
in England, Rrandram vs. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Aid. 463; and
·overruled in this state; Roosevelt vs. ,lfark, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
'.266, 291. I may add, that what was said in Smith t'S. Ludlow,
about binding one partner by the confession of the other,
made after the partnership had been dissolved, was not necessary to the decision of the cause; for there ha.d been confessions by both of the partners, which the court held sufficient
to take the case out of the statute, without making the
admission of one evidence against the other. Still, on the
authority of this case, and those in Douglas and Blackstone,
it wa.s decided in Johnson '!:S. Beardslee, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 3, that
the promise of one joint debtor was sufficient to take the case
out of the statute. And in Patterson vs. Choate, 7 Wend (N. Y.)
441, it was held, that although one partner can not after a die:eolution bind the othe1· by a new contract, yet his aclmowledgment of a previous debt due from the partnership will bind
the 01ther partner, so far as to prevent him from availing him,
self of the statute of limitations. This doctrine has been men-
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tioned on other occasions: Hopkins rs. Banks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.)
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653; Roosevelt vs. Marla, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 291; Dean vs.

Hezc-it, 5 \Vend. (N. Y.), 262; but there -are, I believe, no other

decisions in this state to the like effect. In Patterson vs. Choate,

the six years had run, and the bar was complete before the

acknowledgment was made. No one, I venture to say, who

does not go upon the ground that the statute of limitations

ought not to be inforeed, can assign a solid reason for the

distinction between contracting a new debt against a former

partner, and making an acknowledgment which shall charge

him with that which, though once a debt, has ceased to be so

by the operation of law. I agree with the late Chief Justice

SPENCER, in Sands vs. Gelston, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 519, that “the

statute of limitations is the law of the land; ” and that in point

of principle “there is no substantial difference between a debt

barred by the statute of limitations and the debt for the pay-

ment of which the debtor has been exonera.ted by a discharge

under a bankrupt or insolvent act.” Still, if there was n-0

counterbalance in the adjudications of our own courts, I

should feel bound to follow the two or three cases which sup-
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port the plaintiff’s claim, and leave reforms to the legislature.

But those cases conﬂict, in principle, with many other deci-

sions in this state, and cannot be supported.

5 Although the rule is different in England in relation to

admissions concerning partnership transactions, Wood vs.

Braddiek, 1 Taunt. 104, it has been settled by a series of adjudi-

cations in this state that the authority of partners to bind

each other by any undertaking or admission, even though it

relate to partnership transactions, ceases with the partner-

ship. In Hackley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, a.lthough

it was mentioned in the notice of dissolution that Hastie, one

of the partners, would adjust the unsettled business of the

partnership, it was held that his subsequent admission of a

balance due from the ﬁrm to the plaintiffs on account would

not bind his copartner. The court said it was “a clear

case. After a dissolution of a copartnership the power

of one party to bind the. other wholly ceases. There is

no reason why his acknowledgment of an account should

bind his copartners, any more than his giving a promissory

note in the name of the ﬁrm or any other act.” This doctrine

was reasserted and applied in Sanford vs. M-ickles, 4 Johns. (N.

53

tioned on other occasions: Hopkins cs. Banks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.)
.653; Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 291; Dean vs.
Hew·it, 5 'Vend. (N. Y.), 262; but there .are, I believe, no other
decisions in this state to the like effecit. In Patterson vs. Choate,
the six years had run, and the bar was complete before the
acknowledgment was made. No one, I venture to say, who
does not go upon the ground that the statute of limitations
ought not to be in forced, can assign a solid reason for the
distinction between contracting a new debt against a former
partner, and making an ackn-0wledgmeut which shall charge
him with that which, though once a debt, has cea:sed to be so
by the operation of law. I agree with the late Chief Justice
SrE!\CEn, in Sa11ds vs. Gelston, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 519, that "the
8tatute of limitations is the law of the land;" and .that in point
of principle "there is no substantial difference between a debt
barred by the statute of limitations and the debt for the payment of which the debtor bas been exonerated by a discharge
under a bankrupt or insolvent act." Still, if there was no
counterbalance in tlie adjudicati-Ons of our own courts, I
should feel bound to follow the two or three cases which support the plaintiff's elaim, and leave reforms to the legislature.
But those cases conflict, in principle, with many other decisions in this state, and cannot be supported.
Although the rule is different in England in relation oo
admissions concerning partnership transactions, Wood vs.
Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104, it has beep settled by a series of adjudications in this state that the authority of partners to bind
each other by any undertaking or admission, even though it
rela:te t-0 partnership transactions, ceases with the partnership. In Hackle1J 1iS. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, a.lthough
it was mentioned in the notice of dissolution that Hastie, one
of the partners, would adjust itbe unsettled business of the
partnership, it wa!'I held that his subsequent admission of a
balance due from the firm to the plaintiffs on account would
not bind his copartner. The court said it was "a clear
case. After a dissolution of a copartnership the power
of one party to bind the . other wholly ceases. There is
no reMon why his acknowledgment of an account should
bind his copartners, any more than his giving a promissory
note in the name of the firm or any other acit." This doctrine
was reasserted and applied in Sanford vs. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N.
53
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Y.) 224, where it was held that a partner to whom authority

had been given on the dissolution to collect and pay debts,

could no-t indorse a promissory note belonging to the ﬁrm

so as to pass the title to the indorsee. See Yale vs. Eamcs,

1 Met. (Mass) 486. In Walden vs. She-rburne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.)

409, it was again decided that the admission by one of the part-

ners, after a dissolution, of a balance aga.inst the ﬁrm, did not

bind the other partner. And where the notice of dissolution

stated that the business would be settled by one of the part-

ners, who was duly authorized to sign the name of the ﬁrm

for that purpose, it was held that such partner could not renew

ta. note previously given by the ﬁrm, and which was running

in the bank at the time of the dissolution. National Bank vs.

Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 57 2. Mitchell rs. Ostrom, 2 Id. 520, asserts

the same general doctrine. And in Baker vs. Stackpoole, 9

Cow. 420, 18 Am. Dec. 508, the rule that one partner, after a

dissolution, cannot bind his fellows by an admission relating to

partnership transactions, was sanctioned by the unanimous

judgment of the court for the correction of errors.

Enough ha, I think, been said to justify the remark, that
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I the two or three cases on which the plaintiff relies cannot be

supported. They conﬂict in principle with a series of decisions

spreading over a period of forty yca.rs, and including a deter-

mination of the court of last resort. -

But this is not all. Since the supreme court ﬁrst fell into

rthe error of following Whitcomb vs. Whiting, the course of

decision upon the statute of limitations has undergone a great

change in this country, and particularly in this state. At the

former period, the statute amounted to little more, in judicial

construction, than a ground for presuming the debt paid,

which might be rebutted by the mere admission that such was

‘ not the fact. But the law is not so now. There must be a

promise, a new contract, though founded on the original con-

‘, sideration, to take a case out of the statute. If the promise is

l not express, the case must be such that it can be fairly implied.

There must, at the least, be a plain admission that the debt is

due, and that the party is willing to pay it. Allen vs. Webster,

15 \Vend. (N. Y.) 284; Stafford vs. Richardson, Id. 302; Bell rs.

‘Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 362. It is the new promise and not

the mere acknowledgment that revives the debt and takes it

out of the statute. Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns (N. Y.) Ch. 290.

Y.) 2,24, where it was held that a partner to whom authority
had been given on the dissolution to collect and pay debts,
oould not indorse a promissory note belonging to the firm
so as to pass the title to the indorsee. See Yale vs. Eames,
1 .Met. (Mass.) 486. In Walden vs. Sherburne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.)
409, it was again decided that the admission by one of the partners, after a dissolution, of a balance against the firm, did not
bind the <Yther partner. And where the notice of dissolution
stated that the business would be settled by one of the partners, who was duly authorized to sign the name of the firm
for that purpose, it was held that such partner could not renew
·a note previously given by the firm, and which was running
·i n the bank at the time of the dissolution. National Bank vs.
Norton, 1 llill (N. Y.) 57~. Mitchell i:s. Ostrom, 2 Id. 5~0, asserts
the same general doctrine. And in Baker fiB. Stackpoole, 9
Cow. 420, 18 Am. Dec. 508, the rule that one partner, after a
dissolution, cannot bind his fellows by an admission relating to
partnership transactions, wru1 sanctioned by the unanimous
judgment of the oonrt for the correction of errors.
Enough has, I think, been said to justify the remark, that
the two or three cases on which the plaintiff relies cann<>t be
supported. They conflict in principle with a serie8 of decisions
spreading over a period of forty years, and in.eluding a determination of the court of last resort.
But this is not all. Since the supreme court first fell into
ithe error of following Wltitcomb vs. lVltiting, the course of
decision upon the statute of limitations bas undergone a great
-change in this country, and particularly in this state. At the
former period, the statute amounted to little more, in judicial
construotion, than a ground for presuming the debt paid,
which might be rebutted by the me1·e admission that such was
- not the fact. But the law is not so now. There must be a
promise, a new contract, though founded on the original con. sideration, to take a case out of the statute. If the promise is
not express, the case must be such that it can be fairly implied.
There must, at the least, be a plain admission that the debt is
due, and that the party is willing to pay it. Allen vs. Webster,
15 \Vend. (N. Y.) 284; Stafford fiB. Richanlson, Id. 302; Bell vs.
-Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 362. It is the new promise and not
the mere acknowledgment that revives the debt and takes it
out of the statute. Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns (N. Y.) Ch. 290.
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This doctrine is sustained by many decisions in other states,

but I do not think it necessary to cite them.

The case of Whitcomb vs. Whiting has, to a limited extent,

been followed in Massachusetts: Cady vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick.

400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge vs. Gray, 14 Id. 55, 25 Am. Dec.

358; Sigourney vs. Drury, Id. 387, 391, 392; Final vs. Burrill, 16

Id. 401. In Connecticut: Bond vs. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336; Goit

vs. Tracy, 8 Id. 268; Austin vs. Bostwicl-a, 9 Id. 496; Clark vs.

Sigourncy, 17 Id. 511, 20 Am. Dec. 110. In Maine: Parker vs.

Merrill, 6 Greenl. 41; Pike vs. Warren, 15 Me. 390; Dins-more vs.

Dinsmore, 21 Id. 433; Shepley vs. Waterhouse, 22 Id. 497; and in

Vermont: Joslgn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Whcelock vs. Doolittle,

18 Id. -140. But I think that the judgment under review would

not be upheld in either of those states.

In North Carolina it has been held that the acknowledg-

ment of the -debt by one partner, though after the dissolution,

will prevent the operation of the statute. Mclntirc vs. Oliver,

2 Hawks 209, 11 Am. Dec. 760. And the same has been
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decided in Georgia, providing the new promise is made before

the action is barred, but not when the new pro-mise is made

afterwards, as it was in the case before us. Brewster vs.

Hardeman, Dudley 138. It has been decided by -the court of

appeals in South Carolina, that a promise by one partner,

made after the dissolution, and after the statute had run, will

not charge the other partner. Steele vs. Jennings, 1 McMull.

297. In the Ewetcr Bank vs. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124, the authority

of Whitcomb vs. Whiting was wholly denied, and the court held

that a payment by one of the joint makers of a promissory

note did not take the case out of the statute as to the other.

In Alabama, a promise by the principal debtor will not revive

the demand against a co-debtor, who is a surety. Lowther vs.

Chappel, 8 Ala. 353, 42 Am. Dec. 643. In Tennessee, a promise

by one partner after the dissolution of the partnership, to pay a

note made by the ﬁrm, does not take the case out of the statute

of limitations as to the other partner. Belotc’s Ea.-’rs vs.

Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Muse vs. Donelson, 2 Humph. 166, 36 Am.

Dec. 309. This is also the rule in Pennsylvania. Levy vs.

Cadet, 17 Serg. & R. 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight vs. Craig-

head, 1 Pen. & ‘V. 135. It is also held in Indiana, that the

power of one partner to bind the other by the admission of a.

debt ceases with the partnership. Yandes vs. Lefavour, 2

This doctrine is sustained by many decisions in other states,
but I do not think it necessary to cite them.
The case o.f Whitcomb vs. Whiting bas, to a limited extent,
been followed in Massachusetts: Cady t:B. Slwplterd, 11 Pick.
400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge vs. Gray, 14 Id. 55, 25 Am. Dec.
358; Sigourney t'B. Drury, Id. 387, 3Ut, 3!):!; Viual vs. Burtill, 16
Id. 401. In Connecticut: Bond VB. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336; Coit
vs. Tracy, 8 Id. 268; Austin VB. Bostwick, 9 Id. 4tlG; Olm·k vs.
S·igourney, 17 Id. 511, 20 Am. Dec. 110. In Maine: Parker vs.
Merrill, 6 Greenl. 41; l'i.ke vs. Warren, 15 Me. 390; Dinsmore n.
Dinsmore, 21 Id. 433; Shepley vs. Waterhouse, 22 Id. 497; and in
Vermont: Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 3u3; Wheelock vs. Doolittle,
18 Id. 440. But I think that the judgment under review would
not be upheld in either of those states.
In North Carolina it bas been held that the ackno-wledgment of the debt by one partner, though after the dissolution,
will prevent the operation of the statute. Mcintire vs. Olfocr,
2 Hawks 209, 11 Am. Dec. 760. And the same has been
decided in Georgia, providing the new promise is made before
the action is barred, but not when. the new promise is made
afterwards, as it was in the case before us. Brewster vs~
Hardeman, Dudlt>y 138. It has been decided by .fhe court of
appeals in South Carolina, that a promise by one partner,
made after the dissolution, and after the statute had run, will
not charge the other partner. Steele vs. Jennings, 1 Mc:Mull.
297. In the Exeter Bank vs. Sttllit;an., 6 N. H. 124, the authority
of Whitcomb 1;s. Whiting was wholly denied, and the court held
that a payment by one of the joiµt makers of a promissory
note did not take the case out of the statute as to the other.
In Alabama, a promise by the principal debtor will not revive
the demand against a co-debtor, who is a surety. Lowther vs.
r Chappel, 8 A la. 353, 4.2 Am. Dec. 64ft In Tennessee, a promise
by one partner after the dissolution of the parf:nership, to pay a
note made by the firm, does not take the case out of the statute :
of limitartions as to the other partner. Belotc's E:c'rs vs. ·
Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Jf1ise vs. Donelson, 2 Ilumph. 166, 36 Am..
Dec. 309. This is also the rule in Pennsylvania. Levy vs.
Cadet, 17 Serg. & R. 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight vs. Craighead, 1 Pen. & ,V. 135. It is also held in Indiana, that the
• power of one partner to bind the other by the admission of a
debt ceases with the partnership. Yandes t1B. Lefavour, 2
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Blackf. 371. And in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, the supreme

CASES O.N PARTNERSHIP.

court of the United States followed the decisions in Kentucky,

Blackf. 371. And in Bell vs. Morri8on, 1 Pet. 351, the supreme
court of the United States followed the decisions in Kentucky,
and held that the dissolution of the partnership put an end to
the authority of the partners to bind each other by any new
engagement, and consequently that the acknowledgment of a
debt by one partner, after the dissolution, would not take the
case out of the statute of limitatio.ns. The elaborate argument
of Mr. Justice STORY, w.ho delivered the opinion of the court,
covers the whole field of discussion, and stands on principles,
which, though they may be disregarded, cannot be overthrown. .
I have not stopped to inquire whether the statute operates
upon the debt or the remedy, for though this might be a point
to be considered in a court of .conscience, it is of no practical
importance in a court of law. \Ve are not dealing with moral,
but with legal obli~ations, and it is idle to talk of_a debt where
there is no legal obligation to pay it.
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and
that judgment should be rendered for the defendants on the
verdict.
JEWETT, C. J., also delivered a written opinion in favor of
reversal.
And thereupon the judgment of the sup~me court was
reversed, and judgment awarded for the defendants on the
spe~ial verdict.

and held that the dissolution of the partnership p-ut an end to

the authority of the partners to bind each other by any new

engagement, and consequently that the acknowledgment of a

debt by one partner, after the dissolution, would not take the

case out of the statute of limitations. The elaborate argument

of Mr. Justice Sronv, who delivered the opinion of the court,

covers the whole ﬁeld of discussion, and stands on principles,

which, though they may be disregarded, cannot be over-

thrown. -

I have not stopped to inquire whether the statute operates

upon the debt or the remedy, for though this might be a point

to be considered in a court of conscience, it is of no practical

importance in a court of law. \Ve are not dealing with moral,

but with legal obligations, and it is idle to talk of_a debt where

there is no legal obligation to pay it.

I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and

that judgment should be rendered for the defendants on the

verdict.
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Jnwn'r'r, C. J., also delivered a written opinion in favor of

reversal.

And thereupon the judgment of the supreme court was

reversed, and judgment awarded for the defendants on the

special verdict.

NOTE: Compare with the two eases following. See also a, valuable note

to the above casein 51 Am. Dec. 330. Three several views are represented

in the cases. One—that of the reasoning in the principal case-—that one

partner cannot after dissolution bind the others by a new promise; another

—tha.t of the following case—-that he may do so if the statutory period has

not yet elapsed; and a third-—hehl in a. few cases—that he may bind the

others notwithst tnding the operation of the statute. as in Wheelock vs.

Doolittle, 18 Vt. 440, 46 Am. Dec. 163. The last view held at one time in

North Carolina has there been changed by statute. See Parsons on Part-

nership, 4t.h Ed p. 160, where the authorities are collected.

»

Non: Compare with the two oases following. See also a valuable note
to the above case in In Am. Dec. 830. 'Ihree several views are represented
in the cases. One-that of the reasoniog in the principal case-that one
partner cannot after dissolution bind the others by a new promise; another
-that of the following case-that he may do so it the statutory period has
n•>t yet elapsed; and a third-held in a few cas?S-that h9 may bind the
others notwithshndiog the operation of the statute, as. in Wheelock va.
Doolittle, 18 Vt. 440, 46 Am. Deo. 163. The last view held at one time in
North Carolina. has there been changpd by statute. See Par11ona on Partnel'8hip, 4th Ed p. tall, where the authorities are collected.
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PENNOYBR VS. DAVID.

Supreme Court of Michigan, 1860.

8 Mich. 407.

This action was brought against James I. David and James

Campbell, as survivors, etc., of Daniel C. Vreeland, who

together, during the summer of 1855, constituted aipartner-

ship, which was dissolved by the death of Vreeland, in Novem-

PENNOYER vs. DAVID.

ber of that year. A

The declaration was upon an account stated, to prove which

Supreme Court of Mfoltigan, 1860.

“plaintiff oﬁered evidence that in December, 1855, after the

dissolution of the ﬁrm by the death of Vreeland, defendant

8 Mich. 407.

Cam-pbell accounted with plaintiff, and admitted that there

was a ﬁnal balance of $507 due the plaintiff. Various items

entered into -this account on both sides, spreading over t-he

time from May to DQC€IH|b€P§ some of them on both sides being

items that accrued after the death of Vreeland. The defend-

ant objected to the evidence,” and thereupon the circuit judge

reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:

1st. Can one partner, after the dissolution of the copart-

nership, bind the surviving copartner by his admissions?
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2d. Is the admission, by a surviving partner, of a balance in

an account, of which some items accrued after the dissolution,

evidence of an account stated against a surviving copartner,

who has neither before nor sinceisuch settlement authorized

or conﬁrmed the same?

J. M. Howard, for plaintiﬂf.

Hand (6 Hall, for defendants.

CHRISTIANCY, J. In reply to the ﬁrst question propounded,

we think it is well -settled, both upon principle and authority,

that one partner, after dissolution of the ﬁrm, cannot, by his

admission or contract, create a new partnership liability, nor,

for a like reason, can he, b_y his admission, revive a claim

against the ﬁrm which has been barred by the statute of limi-

tations, since this is equivalent to a new contract.

I

r

This action was brought against James I. David and James.
Campbell, as survivors, etc., of Daniel C. Vreeland, who
together, during the summer of 1855, constituted a partnership, which was dissolved by the death of Vreeland, in November of that year.
The declara.tion was upon an account stated, to prove which
"plaintiff offered evidence that in December, 1855, after the
dissolution of the firm by the death of Vreeland, defenda.n·t
Campbell accounted with plaintiff, and admitted that there
was a final balance of $507 due the plaintiff. Various items
en.tered into this account on both sides, sprea:d ing over the
time from May to December; some of them on both sides being
items that accrued after the death of Vreeland. The defendant objected to the evidence," and thereupon the circuit judge
reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:
1st. Can one partner, after the dissolution of the copa.rtnership, bind the surviving copartner by his admissions?
2d. Is the admission, by a surviving partner, of a balance in
an account, of which some items accrued after the dissolution,
evidence of an account stated against a surviving copartner,
who bas neither before nor since such settlement authorized
or confirmed the same?
J.M. Howard, for plaintiff.
Hand & Hall, for defendants.
CHRISTIANCY, J. In reply to the first question propounded,
we think it is well ·Settled, both upon principle and authority,
that one partner, after dissolution of the firm, cannot, by his ,
admission or contract, create a new partnership liability, nor,
for a like reason, can he, ~y his admission, revive a claim
against the firm which has been barred by the statute of limitati<>ns, since this is equivalent to a new contract.

~
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On the other hand, with the exception of claims barred by

the statute of limitations, and others coming within a similar

reason, we think it equally clear in principle, that the admis-

sion of one partner, made after such dissolution having refer-

ence to previous actual partnership dealings or transactions,

stands upon the same ground, and is evidence against the ﬁrm

in like manner as if made before such dissolution. The disso-

lution cannot destroy the joint liability of the partners, no-r

alter their relations to third persons in respect to contracts

made or transactions which occurred before the dissolution.

The dissolution operates upon future, not upon past trans-

actions. As to persons whose claims have been contracted on

the credit of the ﬁrm, the partnership, for all substantial pur-

po-ses, continues till such claims have been satisﬁed. And

persons who have had dealings with the ﬁrm during its con-

tinuance, are, as to all matters touching such dealings,

entitled to the same beneﬁt from the admissions of a single

partner, whether made before or afte.r the dissolution, unless

shown to be false or fraudulent in fact. See Wood vs. Brad-

dir-lc, 1 Taunt. 103; Lacy vs. Mc-Neale, 4 D. & R. 7; Cady vs.
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S'hopa~rd, 11 Pick. (Mass) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Vina! vs. B-ur-

rill, 16 Pick. (Mass) 401;"Coll. on Part. (Perkins Ed. of 1848)

sec. 546 and cases cited; Story on Part. sec. 328; see also Mann

vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246, where the principles upon which such

a-dmissions are receivable are very clearly and ably presented.

Bu-t it is objected that the power of a single partner, in such

case, to make an admission of a previousl_v existing liability,

involves the power of creating a new liability where there had

been no previous dealings with the ﬁrm, and no such prior lia-

Ibility existed in fact. It was doubtless this supposed diﬂ‘l-

culty which led the courts of New York, and a few others

which have followed their authority, to take the broad ground

excluding such admissions altogether. But the rule which

entirely excludes such admissions leads to another incon-

sislcncy, n-o less obvious than that which is sought to be

avoided by it. Thus, the same courts which deny all power of

one partner, after dissolution, to bind his former partners by

the admission of a previous liability, yet hold that he may liqui-

date a previous account (McPherson vs. Rathbone, 11 Wend. [N.

Y.] 96, 99), and that “if there be no agreement to the contrary,

it may be presumed that each partner still has authority to

On the other hand, with the exception of claims barred by
the statute of limitations, and others coming within a similar
reason, we think it equally clear in principlt', that the admission of one partner, made after such dissolution having reference to previous actual partnership dealings or transactions,
i;tnnds upon the same ground, and is evidence against the firm
in like manner as if made before such dissolution. The dissolution cannot destroy the joint liability of the partners, nor
a.lter their relations to third persons in respect to contracts
made or transactions which occurred before the dissolution.
/ The dis~wlution operates upon future, not upon past trans/ aotions. As to pel'sons whose claims have been contracted on
the credit of the fil'm, the partnership, for all substantial purposes, eontinu<>s ti11 such claims have been satisfied. And
persons who have had dealings with the firm during its continuance, are, as to all matters touching such dealings,
entitled to the same benefit from the admissions of a single
partner, whether made before or after the dissolution, unleS!I
Rhown to be false or fraudulent in fact. S<>e Wood vs. Bmddirlc, 1 Taunt. 103; Lacy vs. McNcale, 4 D. & R. 7; Cady vs.
F~hepa-rd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Vinal vs. Bur1'ill, 16 Piek. (Mass.) 401; ··con. on Part. (Perkins Ed. of 1848)
Rec. 546 and cases cited; Story on Part. sec. 328; see also Mann
vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 24:6, where the piinciples upon which such
ndmissions are receivable are very clearly and ably presented.
But it is objected that the power of a single partner, in such
ca~, to make nn admission of a previously existing lia.bility,
involws the powPr of creating a new liability where there had
been no prt>vious dealings with the firm, and no such prior liar bility exist<•d in fact.
It was doubtless this supposed difficulty _whi<'h lrd the courts of New York, and a few others
whie.h have followed their autho1·ity, to take the broad ground
excluding such admissions altogether. But the rule which
entirely excludes such admissions leads to another inconsi~teney, no less obvious than that which is sought to be
avoided by it. Thus, the same courts which deny all power of
one partner, after diE\solution, to bind his former partners by
the admission of a previous liability, yet hold that he may liquida 1-e a previous account (.lfcPTierson vs. Rathbone, 11 Wend. [N.
Y.] 96, 99), and that "if there be no agreement to the contrary,
It may be presumed that each pnrtner still has authority to

Pmnzorsu vs. Davm. 423

PENNOYER VS. DAVID.

dispose of the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay

42.3

debts, and to give proper acquittances” (per Bnossos, J., in

Van Kcurcn vs. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322, ante

p. 411).

Now the power to liquidate a previous account against the

ﬁrm, to adjust and pay debts, and to give acquittan-ces, would

seem necessarily to involve, if not to rest upon, the power to‘

:(lispose of the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay:
debts, and to give proper acquittances" (per BRONSON, J., in
Van Keuren vs. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322, anto
,p. 411}.

make an admission of the correctness of the account liqui-

dated, and the amount of the debt paid or adjusted. And

where (as is generally the case) there -are mutual accounts in

favor of and against the ﬁrm, the power to adjust, and to give a

valid acquittance or receipt for the amount found due the ﬁrm,

necessarily, we think, rests upon the power t state an account,

and to admit the claims against the ﬁrm. ilf he has power

to state an account, and to agree upon a balance when that bal-

ance is in favor of the ﬁrm, upon the same principle he must

have the like power when the balance happens to be against

it. \Without the power to admit a previous liability against

the rm, we can see no principle on which a receipt or acquit-

tance, in such case, could be admissible evidence against the
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ﬁrm.

But the admission by a single partner, after dissolution, of

a pre-existing partnership liability, must be conﬁned to cases

where there have been, in fact, previous partnership dealings

with the plaintiﬂ’, or s-ome transaction of the ﬁrm out of which

a liability to the plaintiff might have originated; and the fact

that there have been such dealings, or such transactions, must

be shown by some general evidence at least, outside of the

admission itself, otherwise the objection that the power to

admit a previous liability involves the power to create a new

one, would be insurmountable. But if such evidence be given,

it lays a proper foundation for the admission, as it brings the

subject matter within. the power of a single partner to make

an admission in respect to a liability which may have grown

out of such previous dealings or transactions, an-d the balance

that may have resulted therefrom. The admission is thus

shown to have reference to transactions which took place dur-

ing the existence of the ﬁrm, and as to which the dissolution

could not alter the relations of the parties. YVe think this

very clear in principle, though we have been referred to no

authorities, and none have come under our observation,

Now the power to liquidate a previous account against the
drm, to adjust and pay debts, and to give acquittan-ces, would
seem necessarily to involve, if not to rest upon, the power to ...
make an admission of the correctness of the account liqui·
dated, and the amount of the debt paid or adjusted. And
where (as is generally the case) there are mutual accounts in
favor of and against the firm, the power to adjust, and to give a
valid acquittance or receipt for the amount found due the firm,
necessarily, we think, rests upon the power t~ state an account,
and to admit the claims against the firm. \If he has power
to state an account, and to agree upon a balance when that balance is in favo1· of the firm, upon the same principle he must
have the like power when the balance happens to be against
it. \Without the power to admit a previous liability again~t
the ftrm, we can see no principle on which a receipt or acquit.tance, in such case, could be admissible evidence against the
.firm.
But the admission by a single partner, after dissolution, of
a pre-existing partnership liability, must be confined to cases
where there have been, in fact, previous partnership dealings
with the plaintiff, or some transaction of the firm out of which
a liability to the plaintiff might have originated; and the f.act
that there have been such dealings, or such tra.n.snctions, must
be shown by some general evidence at leiu1t, outside of the
admission itself, otherwise the objection that the power to
admit a previous liability involves the power to create a new
one, would be insurmountable. But if such evidence be given,
it lays a proper foundation for the admission, as it brings the
subject matter within the power O·f a single partner to make
an admission in respect to a liability which may have grown
out of such previous dealings or transartions, and the balance
that may have resulted therefrom. The admission is thus
Rhown to have reference to trnnsuctions which took place during the existence of the firm, and as to which the dissolution
oould not alter the relations of the parties. We think this
very clear in principle, though we have been referred to no
authorities, and none have come under our observation,

l
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directly in point for a case like the present. See, however, for

an analogous rule, 3 Kent Com. (3d Ed.) 50, and cases there

cited, especially Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. 267, and Cody vs.

Shepard, above cited.

In the case before us, there does not appear to have been any

evidence, aside from the admission of one of the surviving

partners, tending to show any partnership dealing or trans-

action with the plaintiff during the existence of the ﬁrm. The

ﬁrst question propounded must therefore, as it applies to the

present case, be answered in the negative. This, in our view,

disposes of the case, and the second question propounded

becomes abstract or hypothetical, and requires no answer.

The other justices concurred.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., Q 272.

FEIGLEY vs. WHITAKER.

Supreme Court of Ohio, 1872.

22 Ohio St. 606, 10 Am. Rep. 778.

Action by Whitaker against Feigley, as the survivor of Feig-

ley & Davis, to recover for money loaned. On the trial, in the

directly in poont for a case like the present. See, however, for
an analogous rule, 3 Kent Com. (3d Ed.) 50, and cases there
cited, especially Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. 267, and Cady os.
Shepard, above cited.
In the case before us, there does not appear to have been any
evidence, aside from the admission of one of the surviving
partners, tending to show any partnership dealing or transaction with the plaintiff during the existence of the fl.rm. The
first question propounded must therefore, as it a.pplies to the
present case, be answered in the negative. This, in our view,
dispotJes of the case, and the second question propounded
becomes abstract or hypothetical, and requires no answer.
The other justices concurred.
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court of common pleas, the plaintiff offered testimony tending

to prove that, in the year 1865, the ﬁrm of Feigley & Davis

NOTB: See M:echem's Elem. of Parto.,

f 272.

was doing business as merchants and produce dealers at New

Lexington, Ohio; that the business of the ﬁrm was under the

general management and control of James E. Davis, one of

the members of the ﬁrm; that the defendant, the other member.

resided at Cincinnati, and occasionally visited their place of

business; that, during the summer of 1865, the plaintiff was

engaged in buying wool at said town; that he kept his wool

FEIGLEY vs. WHITAKER.

money on deposit with Feigley & Davis, and took in -the wool

purchased by him at their store, where the money was paid to

Supreme Court of Ollio, 1872.

the plainti£f’s customers by Davis, who also adjusted their

accounts; that plaintiff purchased wool on commission for

22 Ohio St. 606, 10 Am. Rep. 778.

Cone & Rickley, of Columbus, and that the ﬁrm of Feigley &

Davis received a portion of his commission for their services

and the use of room; that the ﬁrm of Feigley & Davis was

I

__ _'_;—_Z_+-_>_n ----2

Action by Whitaker against Feigley, as the survivor of Feigley & Davis, to recover for money loaned. On the trial, in the
court of common pleas, the plaintiff offered testimony tending
to prove that, in the y.ear 1865, the firm of Feigley & Davis
was doing business as merchants and p1·oduce dealers at New
Lexington, Ohio; that the business of the firm was under the
general management and co.ntrol of James E. Davis, one of
the members of the firm; that the defendant, the othei~ member,
resided at Cincinnati, and occasionally visited their place of
business; that, during the summer of 1865, the plaintiff was
engaged in buying wool at said town; that he kept his wool
money on dPposit with Feigley & Davis, and took in the wool
purchased by him at th<"ir store, where the money was paid to
the plaintiff's customers by Davis, wh-0 also adjusted their
accounts; th.at plaintiff purchased wool on commission for
Cone & Rickley, of Columbus, and that the flrm of Feiglry &
Davis received a portion of his commission for their services
and the use of room; that the firm of Feigley & Davis was

.
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dissolved in September, 1865, and that plaintiff, about the same

time, quit the purchasing of wool; that the ﬁrm of Feigley &

Davis was succeeded by the ﬁrm of Feigley, Davis & Co., com-

posed of the partners of the old ﬁrm and one Perry A. Eding-

ton; that the new ﬁrgu continued the same business, and was

under the charge of avis. No settlement was shown to have

been made, between the plaintiff and Feigley & Davis, before

the dissolution of the ﬁrm. Davis died in August, 1866. The

plaintiff also offered testimony to show that after the dissolu-

tion of the ﬁrm of Feigley & Davis, and both before and after

the death of Davis, he had in possession a statement, in the

handwriting of Davis, as follows:

“February 15, 1866. Feigley & Davis, to J . C. Whitaker. Dr.

To wool money, $200.”

T-0 the introduction of the testimony touching this state-

ment, the defendant excepted. No testimony was offered by

the "defendant.

Thereupon, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury,
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that if they should ﬁnd that Whitaker did have in his posses-

sion a paper writing in these words: “February 15, 1866.

Feigley & Davis, to John G. Whitaker. Dr. To wool money,

$200,” which was written by Davis, after the ﬁrm of Feigley &.

Davis had been dissolved by the introduction of Edington, a

new member, the same cannot be regarded, and it is not evi-

dence to be considered by the jury of an indebtedness to Whita-

ker and against Feigley, which charge the court refused to

give, but did charge that it was competent, but not conclusive,

to charge the other party; and further asked the court to

charge the jury “that if they should ﬁnd that after the disso-

lution of the ﬁrm of Feigley & Davis, and Feigley no longer a

mem-ber of Ithe ﬁrm, Davis made any acknowledgments, or

admissions or statements, of an indebtedness of the late ﬁrm to

the plaintiff, the evidence could not be regarded by them, as a

late partner cannot bind the old members of the ﬁrm by any

admissions after the dissolution,” which the court refused to

charge. but did charge that the same was competent, but not

conclusive.

The bill of exceptions also showed that, -after verdict, the

defendant moved for a. new trial, upon the ground, among

others, that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that

said paper writing “was not evidence of an indebtedness of

54

dissolved in September, 1865, and that plaintiff, about the same
time, quit the purchasing of wool; that the firm of Feigley &
Davis was succeeded by the firm of Feigley, Davis & Co., composed of the partners of the old firm and one Perry A. Eding·
ton; that the new filpl continued the same business, and was
under the charge of :fiavis. No settlement was shown to have
been made, betw~n the plaintiff and Feigley & Davis, before
the dissolution of the firm. Davis died in August, 1866. The
plaintiff also offered testimony to s.h<>w that after the dissolu·
tion of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and both before and after
the death of Davis, he· had in possession a statement, in the
handwriting of DaYis, as follows:
"February 15, 1866. Feigley & Davis, to J.C. Whitaker. Dr.
To wool money, f~OO."
To the introduction of the testimony touching this statement, the defendant excepted. No testimony was offered by
the ·defendant.
Thereupon, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury,
that if they should find that 'Vhitaker did have in bis possession a paper writing in these words: "February 15, 1866.
Feigley & Davis, to JQbn C. 'Whitaker. :Or. To wool money,
f200," which was written by Davis, after the firm of Feigley &
Davis had been dissolved by the introduction of Edington, a
new member, the same cannot be regarded, and it is not evidence to be considered by the jury of an indebtedness to Whita.
ker and against Feigley, which charge the court refused to
give, but did charge that it was competent, but not conclusive,
to charge the other party; and further asked the court to
charge the jury "that if they should find that after the dissolution of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and Feigley no longer a
member of •the firm, Davis made any acknowledgments, or
admissions or statements, of an indebtedness of the late firm to
the plaintiff, the evidence could not be regarded by them, aS' a
late partner cannot bind the old members of the firm by any ;
admissions after the dissolution," which the court refused to
charge~ but did charge that the same was competent, but not
conclusive.
The bill -0f exceptions olso i:rhowed t,h at, .after verdict, the
defendant moved for a. new trial, upon the ground, among
others, that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that
said paper writing "was not evidence of an indebtedness of
64
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said ﬁrm to VVhitaker, even if in the handwriting of one of the

ﬁrm; and in charging that the same was an item of evidence

said firm to "\Vhitaker, even if in the handwriting of one of the
firm; and in charging that the same was an item of evidence
to go to the jury, to be considered by them, and upon which
they might render a verdict or not, according as they might
be of opinion that said pa.per writing was sufficient or insufficient, in connection with other testimony upon which to found
a verdict in favor of, or against, the plaintiff."

to go to the jury, to be considered by them, and upon which

they might render a verdict or not, according as they might

be of opinion that said pa-per writing was suiﬁcient or insuﬁi-

cient, in connection with other testimony upon which to found

a verdict in favor of, or against, the plaintiif.”

Kelly ¢€ Marsh, for plaintiff in error.

I/1/man J. Jackson, for defendants in error.

Mclnvsmn, J. (After stating the above facts continues.)

The rulings of the court below must be reviewed in the light

of the whole case, as developed in the record. The principal

Kelly & .tfarsh, for plaintiff in error.

question thus presented is, whether or not the admission of a

partner, made while engaged in the adjustment of unsettled

LtJman J. Jackson, for defendants in error.

partnership business, but after the dissolution of the ﬁrm, can

be used as evidence to charge the other partners in relation to

such business?

Reported eases upon this subject are in conﬂict with a

majority, perhaps, apparently in support of the negative of

the proposition. But when considered in the light of what
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we conceive to be the true rule, the weight of authority, we

think, is in favor of the aﬁirmative.

It cannot be disputed that the implied authority of a general

partner to bind his copartners to any new engagement, con-

tract, or promise, although within the scope of the partner-

ship business, is absolutely revoked by the dissolution of the

partnership.

But it is nevertheless true, when not otherwise agreed upon,

that an implied authority continues in each partner after the

dissolution to act for himself and his copartners in the matter

of winding up and adjusting the business of the ﬁrm; and while

acting within the scope of such limited authority, we can see

no reason why the several member of the ﬁrm should not be

bound by the acts and admissions of each other, as in other

cases of agency. The maxim, qui facit per alium facit per se,

should apply in its full force.

D-ou'bts may often arise in particular cases as to whet-her

or not a particular act or admission falls within or without the

scope of such limited authority. But it is quite clear to our

•

MclLvAuna, J. (After stating the above facts continues.)
The rulings of the court below must be reviewed in the light
of the whole case, as developed in the record. The principal
question thus presented is, whether or not the admission of a
partner, made while engaged in the adjustment of unsettled
partnership business, but after the dissolution of the firm, can
be used as evidence to charge the other paI"tners in relation to
snch business?
Reported cases upon this subject are in conflict with a
majority, perhaps, a.pparently in support of the negative of
the proposition. But when considered in the· light of what
we conceive to be the true rule, the weight of authority, we
think, is in favor of the affirmative.
It cannot be disputed that the implied authority of a general
partner to bind his copartners to any new engagement, contract, or promise, although within the scope of the partnership business, is absolutely revoked by the dissolution of the
partnership.
Bu.tit is nevertheless true, when not otherwise agreed upon,
that an implied autho1ity continues in each partner after the
dissolution to act for himself and his copartners in the matter
of winding up and adjusting the business of the firm; and while
acting within the scope of such limited authority, we can see
no reason why the several members of the :firm should not be
hound by the acts and admissions of each other, as in other
cases of agency. The maxim, qui facit per aTium faci.t per 8e,
·flhould apply in its full force.
Doubts may oftt>n arise in particular cases 8:8 to whether
or not a particular act or admission falls within or without the
i;.cope of such limited authority. But it is quite clear to our

..
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minds that the settlement of mutual accounts, pre-exi-sting

FEIGLEY

vs.

WIIIT.A.KEB.

427,

between the ﬁrm and its customers, and the adjustment and

ascertainment of balances on claims and demands in favor of

and against the ﬁrm, are within the scope of such agency.

We do not think that a paper writing, made by a partner

after dissolution of his ﬁrm, and purporting to be a statement

of accounts between the ﬁrm and a stranger, or of a balance

due him, would alone constitute even pri-ma facie proof of

indebtedness against the other partners. But with proof

aliundc that an account was current between such persons and

the ﬁrm before and at the time of its dissolution, such state-

ment would be admissible as tending to prove the state of

accounts between them at the date of the dissolution. Or, if

proof be made of certain dealings between the ﬁrm and a third

person, unsettled at the time of the dissolution, then an act or

admission made by a partner after the dissolution, if made in

the matter of adjusting such business, is competent to be given

in evidence for the purpose of proving a claim founded on such

dealings, against all the partners.

In Wood vs. Braddick, 1 Taunton 103, MANSFIELD, C. J., said:

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

“Clearly the admission of one partner, made after the partner-

ship had ceased, is not evidence to charge the other in any

transaction which has occurred since their separation; but the

power of partners, with respect to rights created pending the

partnership, remains after the dissolution. Since it is clear

that one partner can bind the other during all the partnership,

upon what principle is it that from the moment when it is dis-

solved, his account of their joint contracts should cease to be

evidence?” And Hnarn, J., said: “ls it not a clear proposition

that when a partnership is dissolved, it is not dissolved, with

regard to things past, but only with regard to things future?”

Though it is not necessary in thiggcase to approve, to the full

extent, the doctrine of Wood vs. raddick, it is nevertheless

true that the rule of that case is fully approved by all the

English common law decisions, and is adhered to in many

American cases. See Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Parker vs.

Merrill,’ 6 Greenl. (Me.) 41; Mann vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246; Cady

vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Gay cs.

Bowen, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 100; Brewster vs. Herdeman, Dudley (Ga.)

138; Wilton vs. .11 cNeile, 4 Dowl. 8: Ry. 7; Pritchard rs. Draper,

1 Russ. & My. 191; Whitcomb vs. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; Jack-

minds that the settlement of mutual accounts, pre-existing
between the firm and its customers, and the adjustment and
ascertainment of balances on claims and demands in favor fYf
and against the firm, are within the scope of such agency.
We do not thin.k that a paper writing, made by a partner
after dissolution of his firm, and purporting to be a statement
· of accounts between the firm and a stranger, or of a balance
· due him, would aloue constitute even prima facie proof of
indebtednefJs against the other partnel'S. But with proof
aJiundc that an account was current between such persc>ns iand
the firm before and at the time of its dis.solution, such statement would be admissible as tending to prove the state of
accounts between them at the date of the dissolution. Or, if
proof be made of certain dealings between the .firm and a third ·
person, unsettled at the time of the dissolution, then an act or
admission made by a partner after the dissolution, if made in
the matter of adjusting such business, is competent to be given
in evidence for the purpose of proving a claim founded on such
dealings, against all the partners.
In Wood vs. Braddick, 1 Taunton 103, MA~SFIELD, C. J., said:
"Clearly the admission of one partner, made after the partnership had ceased, is not evidence to cha.rge the other in any
transaction which ·has occurred since their separation; but the
power of partne~s, with respect to rights created pending the
partnership, remains after the dissolution. Since it is clear
that one partner can bind the other during all the partnership,
upon what principle is it that from the moment when it is dissolved, bis account of their joint contracts should cease to be
evidence?" And HEATH, J., said: "ls it not a clear proposition
that when a partnership is dissolvf'd, it is not dissolved, with
regard to things past, but only with regard to things future?"
Though it is not necessary in thiJ case to approve, to the full
extent, the doctrine of Wood vs. Bra<ldick, it is nevertheless
true that the rule of that case is fully approved by all the
English common law decisions, and is adhered to in many
American cases. See Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Parker vs.
Merrili,' 6 Greenl. (Me.) 41; Mann vs. f,ockc, 11 N. H. 246; Cad11
'18. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. ~79; Gay vs.
Bowen, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 100; Breicster vs. Herdeman, Dudley (Ga.)
138; Wilton vs . .Jf cNeile, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 7; Pritcltanl t'8. Draper,
1 RuSB. & My. 191; Whitcomb tis. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; Jack-
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son vs. Fairbank, 2 H. Bl. 340; Shelton vs. Cooke, 3 Munf. (Va.)

191; Simpson vs. Geddes, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 533. See, also, Smith

vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267; Bridge rs. Gray, 14 Pick.

~(Mass.) 55, 25 Am. Dec. 358; and Haclcley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns.

(N. Y.) 536.

It must be admitted, however, that the broad doctrine of

Wood vs. Braddick has been disapproved in many American

cases, especially by the courts of New York, Kentucky, Illi-

nois, Indiana and Missouri; and also by the supreme court of

the United States in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. But it will

be observed that no well considered case, either in England or

America, has denied that, in the absence of express stipula-

tion to the contrary, an implied authority after dissolution is

continued in the several partners to wind up the unsettled

affairs of the partnership.

In Bell vs. Morrison, it is expressly declared that “each part-

ner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his contract in

the partnership business; but he cannot bind it by any con-

tract beyond those limits. A dissolution, however, puts an

end to the authority. By force of its terms it operates as a
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revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right

of the partner can extend no further than to settle the part-

nership concerns already existing, and to distribute the

remaining funds. Even this right may be qualiﬁed and re-

strained by the express delegation of the whole authority to

one of the partners.”

This case (Bell vs. Morrison), is much relied on as an author-

ity against the power of a partner, after dissolution of the

ﬁrm, to bind his copartners, by his act or admission, in any

transaction whatever. The question decided arose on a plea

of the statute of limitations, and we think the doctrine of the

case is by no means as broad as that contended for. Justice

S'ronY, in delivering the opinion said: “The question is not

as to the authority of a partner, after dissolution, to adjust

an admitted and subsisting debt (we mean, admitted by the

whole partnership, or unbarred by the statute); but whether

he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of

time, revive it as against all the partners, without any new

authority communicated for that purpose. We think the

proper resolution of this point depends upon another; that

is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a mere

continuation of the original promise, or a new contract spring-

.on vs. Fairbank, 2 H. BI. 340; Shelton vs. Cocke, 3 Monf. (Va.)
191; Simpson 1'8. Geddes, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 533. See, also, Smith

Lwllow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267; Br·idge vs. Gray, 14: Pick.
'(Mass.) 55, 25 Am. Dec. 358; and Hackley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns.
(N. Y.) 536.
It must be admitted, however, that the broad doctrine of
Wood vr. Braddick has been disapproved in many American
cases, especially by the ooorts of New York, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana and Missouri; and also by the supreme court of
the United States in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. But it will
be observed that no well considered case, either in England or
America, has denied that, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, an implied authority after dissolution iR
continued in the several partners to wind up the unsettled.
affairs of the partnership.
In Bell vs. Morrison, it is expressly declared that "each partner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his c<>ntract in
the partnership business; but he cannot bind it by any contract beyond those limits. A dissolution, however, puts an
end to the authority. By force of its terms it operates as a
revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right
of the partner can extend no further than to settle the partnership concerns already existing, and to distribute the
remaining funds. Even this right may be qualified and restrained by the express delegation of the whole authority to
one of the partners."
This case (Bell vs. Morrison), is much relied on as an authority against the power of a partner, after dissolution of the
firm, to bind his copartners, by his act or admission, in any
transaction whatever. The question decided arose on a plea
of the statute of limitations, and we think the doctrine of the
case is by no means as broad as that contended for. Justice
STORY, in delivering the opinion said: "The question is not
as to the authority of a partner, after dissolution, to adjust
an .admitted and subsisting debt (we mean, admitted by the
whole partnership, or unbarred by the statute); but whether
he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of
time, revive it as against all the partners, without any new
authority communicated for that purpose. \Ve think the
proper resolution of this point depends upon another; that
is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a mere
conti~uation of the original promis~, or a new contract springOB.

FEIGLEY vs. W an AKEB. .429

ing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We

F&IGLEY vs. Wmu.xEn.

429

think it is the latter.” And again, he says: “The light in

which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after

a disolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause

of action against the other partners, except by a new author-

ity communicated to him for that purpose. ' “ ‘ When

the statute of limitations has once run against a debt,

the cause of action against the partnership is gone.

The acknoivledgment, if it is to operate at all, is to create

a new (nus-e of action, to revive a debt which is extinct.”

There is nothing in this decision that conﬂicts with the rule

we have stated. And it may be said that most of the cases

relied upon as supporting a contrary doctrine arose in the

same way, and were decided upon the principle that an

acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, barred by statute

of limitations, does not revive the old debt, but creates a new

one; and hence it is, that we stated above that the decided

weight of authority is, that a partner, after dissolution, to the

extent that is necessary to settle pre-existing claims against

the ﬁrm, may so exercise his authority as to bind all the part-
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ners; but never, without new authority from them, can he

create a new cause of action against them.

The court in Palmer vs. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. De-c.

271, held that the dissolution of a partnership worked an abso-

lute revocation of all implied authority in either of the part-

ners to bind the other to new engagements or promises, made

with persons having notice of the dissolution, although spring-

ing out of, and founded upon, the indebtedness of the ﬁrm;

and in Myers vs. Standish, 11 Ohio St., 29, it was held, that

under an averment of due demand and notice of the dishonor

of a bill of exchange, drawn by a ﬁrm, the declarations of

one of the partners made after dissolution (no notice, however,

of the dissolution -having been given to the payees), showing

an acknowledgment of liability thereon, and a promise to pay

the amount of the bill, were admissible in an action against

the other parties. But in each of these cases the doctrine is

distinctly aﬁirmed, that while the dissolution revokes the im-

plied authority of each partner to incur new obligations for

his fellows, it leaves upon each the duty, and continues to each

the right of doing whatever is necessary to collect the claims

due the partnership, and to adjust, settle, and pay its debts.

ing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We
think it is the latter." And again, he says: "The light in
which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after
a dissolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause
of action against the other partners, except by a new authority communicated to him for that purpose. • • • w·hen
the statute of limitati.ons has once run against a debt,
the cause of action against the partnership is gonb.
The ·acknowledgment, if it is to operate at all, is t<> create
a new muse of action, to revive a debt whi"h is extinct."
There is nothing in this decision that conflicts with the rule
we have stated. And it may be said that most of the cases
relied upon as supporting a contrary doctrine arose in the
same way, and were decided upon the principle that an
.acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, barred by statute
of limitations, does not revive the old debt, bnt creates a new
one; and hence it is, that we stated above that the decided
weight of authority is, that a partner, after dissolution, to the ·
extent that is necessary to settle pre-existing claims agai~t
the firm, may so exercise his authority as to bind all the partners; but never, without new authority from them, can he
create a new cause of action against them.
The court in Palmer vs. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. Dec.
271, held that the dissolution of a partnership worked an absolute revocation of all implied authority in either of the partners to bind the other to ncto engagements or prQmises, made
with persons having notice of the dissolution, although springing out of, and founded upon, the indebtedness of the firm;
·and in Myers i:s. Rtandish, 11 Ohio St., 29, it was held, that
under an averment of due demand and notice of the dishonor
of a bill of exchange, drawn by a firm, the declarations of
one of the partners made after dissolution (no notice, however,
of the di1:1solution having been given to the payees), showing
an acknowledgment of liability thereon, and a promise to pay
the amount of the bill, were admissible in an action against
the other parties. But in each of these cases the doctrine is
distinctly affirmed, that while the dissolution revokes the implied authority of each partner to incur new obligations for
his fellows, it leaves upon eaoh the duty, and continues to each
the right of doing whatever is necessary to collect the claims
due the partnership, and to adjust, settle, and pay its d~bts.
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And it is said in Palmer vs. Dodge, that “this right of each of

o~
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the partners to participate in the settlement of its co-ncerns,

can not be interfered with by his copartners without subject-

ing them to the controlling power of a court of equity.”

The ascertainment of the amount due to or from the part-

nership, on account of unsettled transactions, is a necessary

step in the winding up of its aﬁairs, and within the authority

vested by implication in each partner after dissolution.

\Ve are, therefore, of opinion that the testimony objected to

by the plaintiff in error was competent, and that the jury, hav-

ing found from other testimony in the case, that, at the date

of the dissolution of the ﬁrm of Feigley vs. Davis, there were

unsettled dealings between the plaintilf and the ﬁrm, and that

the paper referred to was made by Davis upon the settlement

of such dealings, were authorized to ﬁnd the amount due the

plaintiﬁ thereon from the admission of Davis so made.

It may be proper to add that the proof in this case did not

strictly conform to the allegations in the petition, but as no

objection has been made upon the ground of variance, we do

not deem it our duty to consider that question.
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Judgment aﬁirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 272.

Compare with the two eases preceding. There is much conﬂict of au-

thorily in the United Slates re>pecting the rule of Wood vs. Bracldick,

See the authorities collected in Parsons on Paxtnership, 4th Ed., pp. 162.

163.

-v

A7 ii

And it is said in Palmer vs. Dodge, that "this right of each of
the partners to participate in the settlement of its concerns,
can not be interfered with by his copartners without subjecting them to the controlling power of a court of equity."
The ascertainment of the amount due to or from the partnership, on account of unsettled transactions, is a necessary
step in the winding up of its affairs, and within the authority
vested by implication in each partner after dissolution.
"'e are, therefore, of opinion that the testimony objected to
by the plaintiff in error was competent, and that the jury, having found from other testimony in the case, that, at the date
of the dissolution of the tlrm of Feigley vs. Davis, there were
unsettled dealings between the plaintiff and the tlrm, and that
the paper referred to was made by Davis upon the settlement
of such dealings, were authorized to find the amount due the
plaintiff thereon from the admission of Davis so made.
It may be proper to add that the proof in this case did not
strictly conform to the allegations in the petition, but as no
objection has been made upon the ground of variance, we do
not deem it our duty to consider that question.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTE: See MPchem's Elem. cit Partn., § 272.
Compare with the two C'ase& pn>cPding. There is much conflict of authori1y in the Cnited StateR reo-pPcting the rule of lt"uod t:s. Braddick,
8Pe the authoritit!s collecteJ in Parsons on Pal"tner;;hip, (th EJ., pp. 162.

168.

XIVI

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTNERS AT DISSO~

LUTION RESPECTING PAYMENT OF DEBTS.

SMITH vs. SHELDON.

Supreme Uourt of Ancmgan, 1876.

85 Mich. 42, 24 Am. Rep. 529. _

Action by Sheldon against Smith and others, on a partner-

ship indebtedness. Prior to June, 1867, Eld-ad Smith, Isaac

Place and Francis B. Owen were partners in trade under the

ﬁrmname of Place, Smith& Owen, and as such became in-

debted to defendants in error in the sum of nine hundred and

XIV.

sixty-nine dollars on book account. '

In the month mentioned the ﬁrm was dissolved by mutual

consent, Place purchasing the assets of his co-partners and

agreeing to pay off the partnership liabilities, including that

to the defendants in error. On the second day of the following

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTNERS AT DISSOLUTION :dESPECTING PAY.MEN'f OF DEBTS.

month Place informed the defendants in error of this arrange-

ment, and that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabili-

ties of the ﬁrm, and they, without the consent or knowledge of

Smith and Owen, took from Place a note for the amount of

the ﬁrm indebtedness to them, payable at one day, with ten
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per centum interest. They did n_ot agree to receive this note

S!\IITH vs. SHELDON.

ig payment of the partnership indebtedness, but they kept it

and continued their dealings with Place, who made payments

Supreme vourt of M ic1iigan, 1876.

npon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the

interest. Place, in 1872. became insolvent and made an assign-

S:S Mich. 42, 24 Am. .Kep. b2V.

-ment, and Smith was then called upon to make payment of the

lnote. This was the ﬁrst notice he had that he wasdooked to

for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit was

brought on the original indebtednes and judgment recovered.

Action by Sheldon against Smith and others, on a partnership indebtedness. Prior to June, 1867, Eld 1d Smith, I.sane .
Place and Francis B. Owen were partners in trade under the
firm. name of Place, Smith.& Owen, and as such became indebted to defendants in error in the sum of nine hundred and
six.ty-nine dollars on book account.
In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual
consent, Place purchasing the a8sets of his co-partners and
agreeing to pay off the partnership liabjlities, including that
to the defendants in error. On the second day of the following
month Place informed. the defendants in error of this an·angement, and that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabilities of the firm, and they, without the consent or knowledge of
Smith and Owen, took from Place a note for the amount of
the fi1•m indebtedness to them, payable at one day, with ten
per centum interest. 'l!!ey qid n,ot ngl'ee t<> l'ec.eive this note
in paymeut of the partnership indebtedness, but they kept it
~d c~ntinued their dealings with Pla~e, who made payments
·npon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the
,interest. Place, in 1872, became insolvent and made an assign·ment, and Smith was then called upon to make payment of the
inote. This was the first notice he had that he was-looked to
1
for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit was
brought on the original indebtedness and judgment recovered.
0
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CA.SES ON

p A.RTN EBSHIP.

G. ¢£ W. M. Draper, and C. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error.

Mecldaugh ¢ﬁ- Driggs, for defendant in error.

Coomav, O. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon

the above stated facts. The position taken by the plaintiffs

below was, that as they had ‘never received payment of their

0. & W. M. Draper, and 0. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
Meddaugh & Driggs, for defendant in error.

bill for merchandise they were entitled to recover it of those

who made the debt, the giving of the note which still remained

unpaid being immaterial. On behalf of Smith it was con-

tended that, by the agreement between Place and his copart»

ners, the latter, as between the three, became the principal

debtor, and that from the time when the creditors were ju-

formed of this arrangement they were bound to regard Place

as the principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sureties, and

that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the

injury of the sureties would have the eifect to release them

from liability. And it is further contended that the taking of

the note from Place, and thereby giving him time, however

short, was in law presumptively injurious.

Upon this state of facts the following questions have been

argued in this court:
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1. Was the note given by Place in the copartnership name

for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the disso-

lution, binding upon Smith and Owen?

2. If Smith and Owen were not bound by the note, were they

entitled to the rights of sureties? And,

3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith

and Owen from their former liability?

On the ﬁrst point it" is argued in support of the judgment

that when a partnership is dissolved the partner who is in-

trusted with the settlement of the concern should be held to

have implied authority to give notes in settlement. On the

other hand, it is insisted that in ' law he has no such

authority, and that if he assumes, as was done in this case,

to give a note in the partnership name, it will in law be his,

individual note only. l ‘ '

VVhatever might be the case if the obligation which

was given had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount

due, in the form of a due-bill or I. O. U., we are satisﬁed that

there is no good reason for recognizing in the partner who is

to adjust the business of the concern any implied authority to

Coor,EY, C. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon
the above stated facts. The position taken by the plaintiffs
below was, that as they had 'never received payment of their
bill for merchandise they were entitled to recover it of those
• who made tb.e debt, the giving of the note which still remained
· unpaid being immaterial. On behalf of Smith it was contended that, by the agreement between Place and his copartners, the latter, as between the three, became the principal
debtor, nnd that from the time when the creditors were ,informed of this arrangement they were bound to regard Place
as the principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sureties, and
that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the effect to release them
from liability. And it is further contended that the taking of
the note from Plac~, and thereby giving him time, however
·
short, was in law preimm·p tively injurious.
{;pon this state of facts the following questions have been
argued in this court:
1. \Yas the note given by Place in the copartnership name
for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the dissolution, binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If Smifh and Owen were not bound by the note, were they
entitled to the rights of sureties? And,
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith
. and Owen from their former liability?
On the first point it" is argued in support of the judgment
that when a partnership is dissolved the partner who is in·
trusted with the settlement of the concern should be held to
have implied autholity to give notes in settlement. On the
-ot·her hand, it is insisted that in · law he has no such
authority, and that if he assumes, as )Vas done in this case;
·to give a note in the partnership name, it will in law be hiJt
:individual note only.
.
·
'\Vbatever might be the case if the obligation which
was given had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount
due, in the form of a due-bill or I. 0. U., we are satisfied that
there is flo good reason for recognizing in the partner who is
to adjust the business of the concern any implied authority t~
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execute such a note as was given in this case. This note was

something more than a mere acknowledgment of indebted-

ness; and it bore interest at a large rate. It was in every

respect a new contract. The liability of the parties upon their

indebtedness would be increased by it if valid, and their rights

might be seriously compromised by the execution of paper pay-

able at a considerable time in the future if the partner in-

trusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized

to make new contracts.

It was assumed in F.<tEM. Bank vs.Kercheval, 2 Mich. 506-

51!), that the law was well settled that no such implied author-

ity existed, and we are not aware that this has before been

questioned in this state. See Pennoyer vs. David, 8 Mich. 407

(a1nte,p. 421). \Ve think it much safer to require express

authority when such obligations are contemplated, than to

leave one party at liberty to execute at discretion new con-

tracts of this nature, which may postpone for an indeﬁnite

period t-he settlement of their concerns, when a settlement is

the very purpose for which he is to act at all.

For a determination of the question whether Smith and
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Owen were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only nec-

essary to point out the relative position of the several parties

as regards the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement,

had agreed to pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith

and Owen, he was legally bound to do so. But Smith and

Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and

the latter might look to all three together. Had they done so

and made collections from Smith and Owen, these parties

would have been entitled to demand indemnity from Place.

This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative rights

and obligations of all.

Now a surety, as we understand it, i a person who, being

liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it

is enforced against him, to be indemniﬁed by some other per-

son, who ought himself to have made payment or performed

before the surety wa compelled to do so. It is immaterial in

what form the relation of principal and surety is established,

or whether the creditor is or is not contracted with in the two

capacities, as is often the case when notes are given or bonds

taken} the relation is ﬁxed by the arrangement and equities

between the debtors or obligors, and may be known to the
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execute such a note as was given in this case. This note was
something more than a mere acknowledgment of indebtedness; and it bore interest at a large rate. It was in every
respect a new contract. The liability of the parties upon their
indebtedness would be increased by it if valid, and their rights
might be seriously compromised by the execution of paper payable at a considerable time in the future if the partner intrusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized
to make new contracts.
It was assumed in F. & M. Bank vs. Kerche1ial, 2 Mich. 50651!), that the Jaw was well settled that no such implied authority existed, and we are not aware that this has before been
questioned in this state. See Pennoyer vs. David, 8 MiC'h. 407
(Ohl.te, p. 421).
'Ve think it much safer to require express
authority when such obligations are contempla.ted, than to .
leave one party at liberty to execute at discretion new contracts <>f this nature, which m:iy postpone for an indefinite
period t·he settlement of their concerns, when a settlement is
the very purpose for which he is to act at all.
For a determination of the question whether "'mith and
Owen were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only nect"ssary to point out the relath·e position of the several parties
as regards the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement,
had agreed to pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith
and Owen, he was legally bound to do so. But Sntith· and
Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and
the latter might look to all three together. Had they done so
and made collections from Smith and Owen, these paM:ieR
would have been entitled to demand indemnity from Place.
This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative rights
and obligations of all.
Now a surety, as we understand it, is a person who, being
liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it ,
is enforced against him, to be indemnified by 1rnme other person, who ought himself to have made payment or performed
before the surety was compelled to do so. It is immaterial in·
what form the relation of principal and surety is established,
or whether the credito1· is or is not contracted with in the two
capacities, as is often the case when notes are given or bonds
taken~ the relation is fixed by the arrangement and equities
between the dPbtors or obligors, and may be known to the
55
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creditor, or wholly unknown. If it is unknown to th-im, 'his

rights are in no manner atfected by it; but if he knows that

one party is surety merely, it is only just to require of him

that in any subsequent action he may take regarding the debt,

he shall not lose sight of the surety’s equities.

That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the lat-

ter was principal debtor after the dissolution of the copartner-

ship seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of

Place to pay this debt and save them from being called upon

for the amount. But if the creditors having the right to pro-

ceed against them all, should take steps for that purpose, the

duty of Place to indemnify, and the right of Smith and Owen

to demand indemnity, were clear. Every element of surety-

ship is here present, as much as if, in contracting an original

indebtedness, the, contract itself had been made to show on

its fa-ce that one of the obligors was surety merely. As

already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or

whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrangement

which establishes it.

This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the
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right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities

of sureties. The cases which have held that retiring partners

thus situated are to be treated as sureties merely have at-

tempted no change in the law, but areientirely in harmony

with older authorities which have only applied the like prin-

ciple to different states of facts, where the relative position

of the parties as regards the debt was precisely the same. We

do not regard them as working any innovation whatever. The

cases we particularly refer to are Oakelcy vs. Pashellcr, 4 Cl.

& Fin. 207; lVilson vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60; and Millerrl

vs. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402.

And it follows as a necessary result from what has been

stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrange-

ment made by the creditors with Place. They took his note

on time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal

debtor, and without the consent or knowledge of the sureties.

They thereby endangered the security of the sureties, and as

the event has proved, indulged Place until the security became

of no value. True, they gave but very short time in the ﬁrst

instance; but, as was remarked by the vice-chancellor in Wil-

son vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cuts. 60, 71, “the length of time

i=__._i____ _ ~- * ‘ "'“’ —

creditor, or wh-0lly unknown. If it is unknown to 'him, 1his
rights are in no manner affected by it; but if he knows that
ooe party is surety merely, it is only just to require of him
that in any subsequent action he may take regarding the debt,
he shall not lose sight of the surety's equities.
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the latter was principal debtor after the dissolution of the copartnership seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of
Place to pay this debt and save them from being called upon
for the amount. But if the creditors having the right to proceed against them all, should take steps for that purpose, the
duty of Place to indemnify, and the right of Smith and Owen
to demand indemnity, were clear. Every element of suretyship is here present, as much as if, in contracting an original
indebtedness, the contract itself bad been made to show on
its face that one of the obligors was surety merely. As
already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or
whether the creditor is or is not a parts to the arrangement
which establishes it.
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the
right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities
of sureties. Tb.e cases which have held that retiring partners
thus situated are to be treated as sure.ties merely have attempted no change in the law, but are entirely in harmony
with older authorities which have only applied the like principle to different states of facts, where the relative position
of the parties as regards the debt was precisely the same. We
do not regard them a.s working any innovation whatever. The
•" cases we particularly refer to are Oakelcy vs. l'ashellcr, 4 Cl.
& Fin. 207; Wilson. vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60; and Millerd
t:s. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402.
And it follows as n necessary result from what has been
stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrangement made by the creditors with Place. They took his note
on time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal
debtor, and without the consent or knowledge of the sureties.
They thneby endangerPd the !wrnrity of the suretie8, and as
the event has proved, indulged Place until the security became
<>f no value. True, they gave but very short time in the first
instance; but, as was remarked by the vice-chancellor in Wilson vs. Lloyd, IJ. R., 16 Eq. O:is. 60, 7l, "the length of time
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makes no kind of difference.” The time was the same in Fel-

Boy EllS.

lows vs. Prentiss, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 512, 45 Am. Dec. 284, w-here

the surety was also held discharged. And see Okie vs. Spencer,

2 Whart. (Pa.) 253, 30 Am. Dec. 251. But that indulgence

beyond the time ﬁxed was contemplated when the note was

given is manifest from the fact that it was made payable with

interest. In a legal point of view this would be immaterial,

but it has a bearing on the equities, and it shows that the

creditors received or bargained for a consideration for the very

indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the insol-

vency of Place. When they thus bargained for an advantage

which the sureties are not to share with them, it is neither

right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the

risks. This is the legal view of such a transaction, and in

most cases it works substantial justice.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs and a new ‘trial

ordered.

The other justices concurred.

Judgment reversed. '

NOTE: For other cases to the same effect, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn. ,
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§ 275.

Compare Barnes vs. Buyers, following.

._~

BARNES vs. BOYERS.

Supreme Court of West Virginia, 1890.

, 84 W. Va. 303, 12 S. E. Rep. 708.

Action of debt by Barnes against Boyers and Harden as

partner. Plea of payment, and also a special plea that Boyers

makes no kind of difference." The time was the same in Fel·
lows vs. Prentiss, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 512, 45 Am. Dec. 284, where
the surety was also held discharged. And see Okie vs. Spencer,
2 Whairt. (Pa.) 253, 30 Am. Dec. 251. But that indulgence
beyond the time fixed was contemplated when the note was
given is manifest from the fact that it was made payable with
interest. In a legal point of view this would be immaterial,
but it has a bear:ing on the equities, and it shows that the
crroitors received or bargained for a conside1\1 tion fo1• the very
indulgence which was granted, and which ended in th~ insolvency of Place. \Vhen they thus bargained for an advantage
which the snreti£lR are not to share with them, it is ne-ither
right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the
risks. This is t4e leg:il view of such a transaction, and in
most ca~es it works substantial justice.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs and a new .trial
order~d.

The other justices concurred.
Judgment reversed.

& Harden had dissolved partnership; that on such dissolution

Harden had assumed and agreed to pay all the debts of the late

ﬁrm, and, among others, the one sued upon; that after the

claim had become due and while Harden was solvent, Boyers

Nom: For other oases to the same effect, see Mechem·a Elem. of Partn.,
§ 275.

Compare Barnes va. Boyers, following.

in pursuance of the statute had expressly requested the‘

plaintiff to sue Harden for the claim; that plaintiff had

neglected to do so; and that Harden had since become insolv-

ent. The statutes of the State provided t_hat a surety might

BARNES vs. BOYERS.

Supreme Court of West Virginia, 1890.
84 W. Va. SOS, 12 S. E. Rep. 708.

Action of debt by Barnes against Boyers and Harden as
partners. Plea of payment, and also a special plea that Boyers
& Harden had dissolved partnership; that cm such dissolution
Harden bad assumed and agreed to pay all the debts of the late
firm, and, among others, the one sued upon; that after the
claim bad become due and while Harden was solvent, Boye~
in pursuance of the statute 'had expres-sly requested the-.
plaintiff to sue Harden for the claim; that plaintiff bad
neglected to do so;_and that Harden had since become insolvent. The statutes of the State provided that a surety might
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request the creditor to sue the principal debtor, and that if the

creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time he should

thereby forfeit his claim against the surety, but against the

principal debtor the creditor’s rights remained unimpaired.

Code of W. Va. Ch. 101, §§ 1, 2.

Judgment for plaintiff and Boyers appealed.

J. A. Haggcrty, for Boyers.

U. N. A-rnctt, Jr., and W. S. Hag/moind, for plaintiff.

Lucas, J. (After referring to a defect in the notice and

request served by Boyers, under the statute, upon the plaintiﬂi)

request the creditor to sue the principal debtor, and that if the
creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time be should
thereby forfeit his claim against the surety, but against the
principal debtor the creditor's rights remained unimpaired.
Cod-e of W. Va. Ch. 101, §§ 1, 2.
Judgment for plaintiff and Boyers appealed.

But, independently of this defect, it will be observed that all

the rights and remedies against the principal debtor are care-

fully guarded in these sections, and are to remain unimpaired.

And the question is whether both partners did not remain

J. A. Haggerty, for Boyers.

U. N. Arnett, Jr., and W. S. Haymond, for plaintiff.

bound to the creditors of the ﬁrm as principals notwithstand-

ing the dissolution and agreement whereby, as between them-

selves, one of them became primarily liable, alnd the other took

the position of his security. It is not in the power of joint

debtors to change their relations to a. common creditor, with-

out his consent, and the plea d-oes not allege that the plaintiﬂf
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was ever consulted or ever consented to any such arrangement.

In fac-t, he ignored the notices which were served upon him,

as I think he had a right to do.

The case of Johnson vs. Young, 20 W. Va., 614, which has been

cited in support of a contrary doctrine, goes no further in the

syllabus than to decide that Where one of two partners pur-

chases the interest of the‘ other in the partnership property,

and assumes an-d agrees to pay the partnership debts, as to

such debts the -former becomes in equity the principle debtor,

and the latter a surety. This annunciation must be taken in

connection with the application to the actual facts of that

case, which did not, in any manner, inv-olve the question we

are now discussing, as to whether the copartners can, by any

private arrangement between themselves, change their rela-

ti-ons, as principals, to the common creditor. It is true there

are some expressions in the opinion (see Id. 657), which inti-

mate such seeming concurrence in the doctrine contended for

by the plaintiff in error; but, on the other -hand, there is

quoted, with approval, an extract from Bucha-na/n vs. Clark, 10

Gratt. (Va.) 164 which states the correcpdoctrine in terse -and

7

/

LucAs, J. (After referring to a defect in the notice and
request served by Boyers, under the statute, upon the plaintiff.)
But, independently of this defect, it will be observed that all
the rights and remedies against the principal debt-Or are care·
fully guarded in these sections, and are to remain unimpaired.
And the question is whether both partners did not remain
bound to the creditors of the firm as principals notwithstanding the ~issolution and agreement whereby, as between them·
selves, one of them became primarily lia.ble, and th.e other took
the position of bis security. H Ls not in the power of joint
debtors to change their relations to a common creditor, without his consent, and the plea d-0es not allege that the plaintiff
was ever consulted or ever consented to any such arrangemeD't.
In fact, he ignored tbe notices which were served upon him,
as I think he had a right to do.
The case of Johnson vs. Young, 20 W. Va., 614, which has been
cited in support of a contrary doctrine, goes no further in the
syllabus than to decide that where one of two partners purC'ha-ses the intere&t <>f the· other in the partnership property,
and assumes and agrees to pay the partnerE1hip debts, as to
such debts the former becomes in equity the principle debtor,
and the latter a surety. Thii:i •annunciation must be taken in
connection with the a.pplication to the oactual facts of that
case, which did not, in any manner, inv·olve the question we
are now discussing, as to whether the copartners can, by any
prh"ate arrangement between themselves, change their rela·
tions, as principals, to the common creditor. It is true there
are some expressions in the opinion (see Id. 657), which inti·
mate such :.;;erming concurrenl'e in the doctrine contended for
by the plaintiff in error; but, on the other ih.and, there is
quoted, with approval, an extract from Bu.chana.n t:B. Clark, 10
Gratt. (Va.) 164, which states the corre_;S.,doctrine in terse and
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unambiguous language, as follows: “As between the partners

and -the creditor, they were all equally bound; and no under-

standing and agreement between themselves could change

that relation so as to impair his rights.”

'1‘-his is the doctrine of the early text-books, and it is the

later English, doctrine. Story lays it down thus: “In the

ﬁrst place, the dissolution of a partnership, w.hether it be by

the voluntary act or will of the parties, or by the retirement

of a partner, or by mere afflux of time, will not in any manner

change the rights of third persons as to any past contract-s and

transactions with or on account of theﬁrm; but their obliga-

tion and eﬂicacy and validity will remain the same, and be

bin-ding upon t-he partnership in the same manner as if no

dissolution had taken place.” See Story, Partn., sec. 334.

Thus he states the general rule; and upon this particular

illustration which we are now considering he is no less em-

phatic. “It frequently happens that, upon the retirement of

one partner, the remaining partners undertake t-o pay the

debt, and to secure the credits of the ﬁrm. This is a mere
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matter of private arrangement and agreement between the

‘partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary t'he rights

“of the existing creditors of the ﬁrm. But in all cases of this

sort it may be stated as a general doctrine that, if the arrange-

-ment is made known to a creditor, and he assents t-o it, -and

by his subsequent acts or conduct or binding contract he

agrees to consider the remaining partners as h-is exclusive

debtors, he may lose all right and claims against the retiring

partner, especially if the retiring partner will sustain a preju-

dice, and the creditor will -receive a beneﬁt, from such acts,

con-duct, or contract.” Id. sec. 158.

S0, also, Collyer says: “O-f course, any arrangement be-

"tween the partners themselves can -n-ot limit or prevent their

ordinary responsibilities to third persons, unless the latter

assent to such arangement.” I Colly. Partn. c. 17, sec. 407.

Again he says: “In order that one liability may be replaced

by another, by agreement, it is essential that the person in

whom the correlative right resides should be a party to the

agreement, or should alt all events show by so-me act of his

own that he accedes to the substitution. If A, being indebted

Jto B, transfers his liability to C, and B does not assent to the

transfer, his rights ax-5: wholly unaffected; he will neither

'
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unambiguous language, as foll<>ws: "As between t'he partnel'B
end the ereditor, they were all equally bound; and no understanding and .agreement between themselves could chunge
that relation so as to impair his rights."
This is the doctrine of the early <text-books, and it is the
later English. d·octrine. Story lays it down thus: "In the
first place, the dissolution <1f a partnership, w.hether it be by
the voluntary act or will of the parties, or by the retirement
of a partner, or by mere affiux of time, will not in any manner
• change the rights of third persons as to any past contracts and
transactions with or on account of the firm; but their obligation and efficacy and validity will remain the same, and be
binding upon t·he partnership in the same maJiner 1:is if no
disS-Olution had taken place." See Story, Partn., sec. 334.
'fhns be states the general rule; and upon this particular
illustration which we are now considering he is no less emphatic. "It frequently happens that, upon the retirement of
one partner, the remaining partners undertake to pay the
debt, and to secure thP. credits of the firm. This i.s a mere
matter Qf private arrangement and agreement between the
partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary the rights
~of the existing creditors of the firm. But in all cases of this
sort it may be stated as a gen~ral doctrine that, if the arronge·ment is made known to a creditor, and be _a ssents to it, a.nd
by his subsequent acts or conduct or binding contract ·he
agrees to consider the remaining partners as his exclusive
dehtors, he may lose all right and claims against the retiring
partner, egpecially if the retiring pa.rtner will sustain a prdudice, and the creditor will receive a benefit, from such acts,
conduct, or oontroct." Id. sec. 158.
So, also, Collyer says: "Of e-0urse, any arrang~ment be·1:ween the partners themselves can not limit or prevent their
ordinary responsibilities to third persons, unless the latter
assent to such arangement." I Colly. I\utn. c. 17, sec. 407.
Again he says: "In ordt>r that one liability may be replaced
by another, by agre:.'ment, it is es8Pnlial that the person in
whom the correlative right resides should be a party to the
agreement, or should ait ail events show by some act of his
own that he accedes to the substitution. If A, being indebted
:t-o B, transfers Ms liability to C, and B does not ass-ent to the
transfer, his rights ars wholly unaffected; he will neit'her
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acquire any right against C, nor lose his former right against
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A. As regards B, the agreement between A and C is -res inter

alias acta, and it does not in any way beneﬁt or prejudice him.

But if B assents to the arrangement come to between A and

C, and adopts C as his debtor instead of A, then A’s liability

to B is at a-n end, and B must look for payment to C, and to

him alone. To apply this to cases of partnership, let it be sup-

posed that a ﬁrm of three mem-bers, A, B, and C, is indebted to

D; that A retires, and B and C-, either alone or together with

a new partner, E, take upon themselves the liabilities of the

old ﬁrm. D’s right t-0 obtain payment from A, and B, and C is

not affected by the above arrangement, and A does not cease

to be liable to him for the debt in question.” 2 Colly. Partn.

c. 24, sec. 596.

Mr. Parsons is, if possible, still more emphatic. He says:

“No dissolution of any kind affects the rights of third parties

who have had dealings with the partnership without their con-

sent. '1‘his is a universal rule, without any exception what-

ever. Undoubtedly the partners may agree -as they please

about their joint property, and all the parts of it, and so they
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may about their joint -obligations; and all such agreements

are valid, so far as they do not atfect the rights of strangers,

tbn-t where they do, they are wholly void. Thus three partners

may agree today to dissolve and to divide all_ the property in

a certain way, specifying that one shall have this, another

'th.a.t, and the third that thing. Or they make such an agree-

ment about some one or more things, and not about all. And

these agreements determine the property in these things

effectually as to the partners themselves. But they are all

responsible in solido for the debts due by t-he ﬁrm, and all the

joint property of the ﬁrm is just as liable for the joint debts

after such division or settlements among themselves as it was

before. So, too, it is very common for the partners to agree,

not only that one of them may settle and wind up the partner-

ship concern, but that one or more shall wind it up, and for

that purpose shall have in full property all the goods or funds

and business, -or -a certain part of them, and shall pay all the

debts, and this he undertakes to do. Such an agreement is so

far binding on the partners that, if either of the others is

obliged to pay a debt thus assumed by a partner, the partner

paying may have his action for the money against the partner

who undertook to pay; but, so far as the creditors are con-

acquire anJ right against C, nor lose his former right against
A. As regards B, th~ agreement between A and C is 1·es inter
alios acta, and it does not in any way benefit -or prejudice him.
But if B assents to the arrangement come to between A and
C, and adopts C as his debtor instead of A, then A's liability
to B is at a-n end, and B must look for p1yment to C, and to
him alone. 'l'o appJy this to cases of partners11ip, let it be supposed that a firm of thl"'ee members, A, B, and C, b~ indebted to
D; that A retit·es, and B and C, either alone or together wHb
a new partner, E, take upon themselves the lia.bilities of the
old firm. D's right to obtain p·ayment from A, and B, and C is
not affected by the above arrangement, a·nd A d-0::>-s not cease
to be liable to him for the debt in qu·estion." 2 CoJly. Partn.
c. 24, sec. 59G.
Mr. Parsons is, if possiblP~ stm more emphatic. He s'.lys:
"No dissoJution of any kind aff2cts the rights of third partil·s
who have bad dealings with tbe partnership without their consent. 'l'his is a universal rule, without any exception whatever. Undoubtedly the partners may agre2 •i.1S they please
about their joint p1•operty, and all the parts of it, and so tlwy
may about their joint -0b1igations; and alJ such agreemc•nts
are valid, so far as they do not affect the rights of strangers,
but whe1•e they do, they are who11y void. Thus three partners
may agree today to dissolve ana to divide an the property in
n cc>rtnin way, specifying that one shaJI have this, another
th:tt, and the third that thing. Or they make such an agreenwnt about some one or more things, and not about all. And
these agreements determine the prope1·ty in tl1ese things
effectually as to the partners tbemsel ves. Rut they are aIJ
·r esponsible in solido for the debts due by the firm, and all the
joint property of the firm is just as liable for the joint debts
after such division or settlements among themselves as it was
before. Ho, too, it is very common for the partn::>rs to agree,
not only that one of them may settle and wind up tlle partnership concern, but that one 01· more sba)] wind it up, and for
1hat purpose shaJl have in full property an the goods or funds
and busin<.>ss, ·or a certain part of them, and shall pay nIJ the
d<~bts, and this be undert:akes to do. Such an agreement is so
far binding on the partners that, if either of the others is
obliged to pay a debt thus assumed by a partner, t•he partner
pnying may h'.lve his action for the money against the partrn•r
who undertook to pay; but, so far as the Cl'editors are con-

1
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cerned, all the partners remain just asresponsible to all the

439

creditors after such an agreement as they were before.” Pars.

Partn. (3d Ed.) 428.

I t is very true that, notwithstanding the unanimity of the

text-books upon this subject, -some very respectable decisions

are t-o be found, both in England and in the United States,

which hold otherwise, and decide that, when once the retiring

partner has brought to the notice of a creditor the fact that

the remaining member has received all the assets and under-

tak-en t~o pay the debts, such creditor is bound to recognize the

new relation of principal and surety existing by operation of

law; and if requested by the retiring partner to collect his

claims, and he refuses or neglects so to do, if at the time of

the request the principal was solvent and able to pay, but

thereafter becomes insolvent, -the retiring partner is dis-

charged. Perhaps the leading American case which thus holds

is Colgrzwe vs. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. That ca-se

is fortiﬁed by, if not found-ed directly upon, the English case

of Oakclcy vs. Pashcller, 10 Bligh. (N. S.) 548, in which the opin-

ion was delivered by Lord Lyndhurst. But this case (0aIcclcy
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vs. Pashellcr), has been much shaken, if not entirely overruled,

by the more recent English decisions. According to the state-

ment of the case in the recent and able work on Partnership

by Mr. Bates, that case (Oakcley vs. Pashcller), is the very reverse.

of Miller vs. Miller. decided by this court in 1875, and reported

in 8 W. Va. 542, and the latter case is binding upon us, while

the old English case (1836), would only be persuasive. The

wh-ole array of authorities, both English and American, upon

both sides of the question, are collated by Mr. Bates, who

himself evidently inclines to t.he sounder opinion, supported,

as it is, as I have shown, by all of the older text writers. 1

Bates, Partn. secs. 533, 534.

Having concluded, for the reasons stated, that the special

plea was bad, the circuit court erred in not sustaining the

demurrer to it, but did not err in rejecting all the evidence

tending to support it, and the judgment must therefore be

aﬂirmed.

Aﬂirmed.

NOTE: Compare with the preceding case—-Smith vs. Sheldon. See also

the note to that case. To the s me ell"e;:Z’as Barnes vs. Buyers, isSl1f1p-

leigh Hardware Co. vs. Wells,§l Tex. , 37 S. \V. Rep. 411 (denying

Smith vx. Sheldon).

Compare with Colgrove rs. Tallmrm, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 00.

cerned, all the partnel"S remain just as.responsible to all the
creditors art.~r such 1ln agreement as they were before." Pars.
P•Jrtn. (3d Ed.) 428.
It is very tme that, notwithstanding the unanimity of the
text-books upon this subject, .some very re~pectable de-cisi-ons
are to be fouud, both in England and in the United States,
which hold otherwise, and decide that, when once the retiring
partner •bas brought to the notice of a creditor the fact tbiat
the remaining member hJ.s reeeived all the assets and undertaken to pay tbe dt.>bts, such creditor is bound to recognize the
new relation of principal and sur~t.v existing by operation of
law; nnd if requested by the retiring partner to collect his
claims, and he refuses or neglects so to do, if at the time of
the request tbe principal Wai! soh·ent and a.ble to pay, but ,
thereafter becomes ins-oh·ent, the retiring partner is discharged. Pe1·baps the leading American case which thus holds
is Ool!Jrot'e vs. Tallman, 61 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. That case
is fortified by, if not found·Pd directly upon, the English case
of Oakcfo.11 i:s. Pasltcllcr, 10 Bligh. (N. S.) 548, in which the opinion was delivered by Lord Lyndhurst. But this case (Oakeley
tiB. Pasltcllcr), hJs been much shaken, if not en ti rely overruled,
by the more r~cent English dr-cisions. According to the statement of the case in the recent and able work 0on Partnership
by l\lr. Bates, that case (Oakelcy vs. Pashcller), is the very reverse
of MWer i:s. Miller. de-cided by this court in 1875, and reported
in 8 \V. Va. 542, and the latter case is binding upon us, while
the old English case (183G), would only be per.suasive. The
wkole array of autho1·ities, both En~lish and American, upon
both sides of the question, are collated by l\Ir. Bates, who
.him~elf (•vicl<.•nt l,v inelinPs to the sounder opinion, supported,
as it is, as I have shown, by all of the older text writers. 1
Bates, Partn. se-cs. 533, 5:34.
Having C'OncludPd, fot• the reasons stated, that the special
plea was bad, the circuit court erred in not sustJining the
demurrer to it, but did not err in rejecting all the evid•ence
tenrting- to .support it, ancl the judgment must thc-refore be
affirmed.
Aftirmed.
NOTE: Compare with th~ prPC(>rting case-Smith"·'· Shelrlon. SPP nleo
the note to that c11se. To the is~e t;II~F,t..S.!I Bal'fl.NI V!I. B1111ertf, i~ Slu1pleigl1 Hardii-nre Co. vs. Wells, T Tex. UI, 37 S. \V. .Ht>p. 411 (cfonyiug

Smith v11. Shd,fo11).

Compare witll Colgrove t:B. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90.
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APPLICATION OF ASSETS TO CLAIMS OF

- CREDITORS.

»

CASE vs. BEAUREGARD.

Supreme Court of the United States, 1878.

93 U. S. 119, 2') L. Ed. 370.

Action in equity brought July 10, 1869, by Case, as receiver

of the First Nation-al Bank of New Orleans, against Beaure-

gard, May, Graham, Binder, Bonneval, Hernandez, the New

xv.

Orleans & Carrollton R. R. 00., and the Fourth National Bank

J

of New York, to recover a debt of $237,000, which he claimed

was due from, and had been contracted by, Beauregard, May

and Graham as copartners; and to have certain transfers of

partnersliip property set aside -and the property subjected to

APPLICATION OF ASSETS TO CLAIMS OF
CR.EDITORS.

the payment of the debt.‘ He claimed that the First National

Bank, being creditor of the ﬁrm, had a lien upon the partner-

ship property and priority in payment out of the ﬁrm assets;

that the ﬁrm and the individual partners were insolvent; and

thwt the deeds referred to in the opinion were in fraud of the

rights of the Bank and should -be set aside.

CASE vs. BEAUREGARD.·

\
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Complain-ant’s bill was dismissed below and he appeals.

Supreme Court of the United States, 1818.

J. D. Rouse and Chas. Oasc, for appellant.

John A. Campbell and H. C‘. Miller, for appellee.

Asst. Atty. Gen’l. Smith, for the United States.

9:J U. S. 119, 2:> L. Ed. 870.

Mr. Justice Srnoxo delivered the opinion of the court. The

object of this bill is to follow and subject to the payment

‘For other aspects of the same controversy, see Bank vs. (Jarrolltmi

Railroad, ante, p. 147. -

Action in equity brought July 10, 1869, by Case, as receiver
of the First National Bnnk of New Orleans, against Beauregard, May, Graham, Binder, Bonneval, Hernandez, the New
Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., and the Fourth National Bank
of New York, to recover a debt of $237,000, which he claimed
wa.s due from, and ·had been contracted by, Beauregard, May
and Gra·ham as copartners; and to have certain transfers of
p1.rtnership property set aside and the property -subjected to
the payment of the debt.1 He claimed that the First National
Bank, being creditor of the firm, ·b ad a lien upon the partnership property and priority in payment out of the firm assets;
that the firm and the individual partners were insolvent; and
thwt the deeds referred to in the opinion were in fr.a.ad of the
rights of the Bank and should be set aside.
Complninant's bill was dismissed ·b elow and he appeals.
J. D. Rouse and Clras. Case, for appellant.

John A. Campbell a.nd H. C. Miller, for appellee.

A.sst. Atty. Gen'l. Smith, for the United States.

Mr. Justice STRO~G doelivered the opinion of the court. The
object of this bill is to follow and subject to the payment
1 For other aspects of the same controversy, see Bank vs. C:url'olltoa
Railroad, ante, p. 147.
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of a partnership debt property which formerly belonged to the

441

partnership, but which, before the bill was ﬁled, had been

“transferred to the defendants. There is little if any contro-

versy respecting the f-acts, and little in regard to the princi-

ples of equity invoked by the complainant. The important

question is whether those principles are applicable to the facts

of the case. '

No doubt the effects of a partnership belong to it as long as

it continues in existence, and not to the individuals who

compose it. (The right of each partner extends only to a.

share of what may remain after the payment of the debits

of the ﬁrm and the settlement of its accounts. Growing

out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right to

have the partnership property applied to the payment of the

partnership debts in preference to those of any individual part-

ner. This is an equity the partners ‘have as between them-

selves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the beneﬁt of

the credit-ors of the ﬁrm. The latter are said to have a privi-

lege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien, to

have the debts due to t-hem paid out of the assets of a ﬁrm
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in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its

several members. Their equity, however, is a derivative one.

It is not held or enforceable in their own right. It is practi-

cally a subrogation to the -equity of the individual partner, t-o

be made effective only through him. Hence, if he is not in

a condition to enforce it, the creditors of the ﬁrm ca-nnot be.

Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54. Appeal ofthe

York County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. But so long as the equity

of the partner remains in him, so long as he retains an interest

in the ﬁrm assets, as a partner, a court of equity will allow

the creditors of the lirm to avail themselves of his equity, and

enforce, through it, the application of those assets primarily

to payment of the debts due them, whenever the property

comes under its administration.)

It is indispensable, ‘however, to isulch relief, when tihe credit-

ors are, as in the present case, simple-contract creditors, that

the partnership property should be within the control of the

court and in the course of administration, brought there by

the bankruptcy of the ﬁrm, or by an assignment, or by the crea-

tion of a trust in some mode. This is because neither the part-

ners nor the joint creditors have any speciﬁc lien, nor is there

c
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of a partnel"S'hip debt property which formerly belonged t-0 the •
partnership, but which, before the bill wa.s filed, had been
transferred to the defendants. There is little if any contron·rsy res-pecting the facts, and little in regard to the principles <>f· equity invoked by the complainant. The important
question is whether those principles are applicable to tihe facts
<Jf the case.
·
No doubt the effects of a partnership bel<>ng to it as long as •
it oontinues in existence, and not to the individuals who
c'Omp<>Se it. The right (}f e11ch partner extends only to a
shar8 of what may remain after the payment of the debts
of the firm and the settlement of its accounts. Growing
out of this right, or ra1her included in it, is the right to
have the partnership property applied to the payment of the 1
•!
partnership debts in pr~ference to those of any individual 1nrt- /
ner. This is an equity 1he partners ·have as between them- ,
selves, and in certain circumstances it inures to t·he benefit of
the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have a privi- 1
lege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien, to • '
•
I
·have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm I
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its
several members. Their equity, however, is a derivative one.
It is not held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a subrogation to ·t he equity of the individual partner, to
be made effective only through him. H{'nce, if he is not in
a condition to enforce it, the creditors of the firm cannot be.
Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54. Appeal of the
Y.01·k County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. But so long as the equity
&f the partner remains in him, so long as be reta.ins an interest
in t.h e firm assets, as a partner, a court of equity will a·llow
the creditors of the ilrm to avail themselves of his equity, and
enforce, through it, the application of those a.ssets primarily
to payment of the debts due them, whenever the property
comes under its administration.)
It is indispensable, however, to •suich relief, when t1he credit·
ors are, as in the pl'esent case, simple-contl'act creditors, that
the partnership property shou1d be within the control of the ·•
coul't and in the course of administration, bl"ought there by
the bankruptcy of the firm, or by an assignment, or by the creati-0n of a trust in some mode. This is because neither the part- ners nor the joint creditors have any specific lien, nor is there 1
56
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any trust that can be enforced until the property h-as passed

in custodiam lcgis. Other property can be followed only after

a judgment at law has been obtained and an execution has

proved fruitless.

S0, if before the interposition of the court is asked the prop-

erty has ceased to belong to the partnership, if by a bona ﬁde

r

transfer it -has become the several property either of one

partner or of a third person, the equities of the partners are

extinguished, and consequently the derivative equities of the

creditors are at an end. I-t is, therefore, always essential to

1

any preferential right of the creditors that t-here shall be

!

property owned by the partnership when the claim for prefer-

I

ence is so-ught to be enforced. Thus, in Ea: parte Ruﬁi-n (6 Ves.

I

119), where from a partnership of two persons one retired.

assigning the pa.rtnersl1ip property to the other, and taking a

·J

bond for the value and a covenant of indemnity against d-ebts,

it was ruled by Lord Ennozv t-hm-t the joint creditors h-ad no

equity attaching upon partnership effects, even remaining in
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specie. A-nd su-ch -has been the rule generally accepted ever

since, with the single qualiﬁcation that the assignment of the

retiring partner is not mala ﬁde. Kimball vs. Thompson, 13

Metc. (Mass) 283; Allen vs. The Centre Valley Company, 21 Conn.

130, 54 Am. Dec. 333; Ladd rs. G~ri-swold, 9 Ill. 25, 46 Am. Dec.

443; Smith rs. Edwards, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. Dec. 71;

Robb vs. Mudgc, 14 Gray (Mass) 534; Baker’s Appeal, 21 Pa. St.

76; Sigler vs. Ii'noa.- County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; W-ilcoav vs.

Kellogg, 11 Ohio 394.

The joint estate is converted into the separate estate of the

assignee by force of the contract of assignment. And it makes

n-o difference whether the retiring partner sells to the other

partner or to a third person, or whether the sale is mad-e by

him or under a judgment against him. In either case his

equity is gone. These principles are settled by very abundant

autliorities. It remains, therefore, only to consid-er whether, in

view of the rules thus settled and of the facts of this case, the

complainant, through any one of the partners, "has a right to

follow the speciﬁc property which formerly belonged to the

partnership, and compel its application to the paym-en-t of the

debt due from the ﬁrm to the bank of which he is the receiver.

The -partnership, while it was in existence, was composed of

three persons, May, Graham, and Beauregard, but it -bad

\

any trust that can be enforced until the property baa passed
in custodiani. legis. Other property can be followed only after
a judgment at law has ·been obtained and an executfon bu
proved fruitless.
So, if before the interposition of the court is a.sked the pr<>perty has ceased to belong to the p1rtnl'r&h.ip, if by a bona {Uk
tran.sfer it has become the several property either of one
partner or of a third person, the equities of the partners a.re
extinguishl'd, and C'onsequently the derivative equities of the
creditors are at an end. It is, therefore, always essentill to
any preferential right of the creditor.a that there shall be
property owned by the partnership when the clajm for preference is sought to be enforced. Thus, in Ex parte Ruffin (6 Ves.
llll), where from a partnersl1ip of two persons one retired,
assigning the partnership property to the other, and taking a
bond for the value and a covenant of ind·enmity against debts,
it was ruled by Lord ELDON thu.t the joint creditors bad n•o
equity attilching upcm partnership effects, ev.en remaining in
specie. And such ·has been the rule generally a:ccepted ever
sinee, with the singl~ qualification that the assignment of th£'
retiring partner is not mala fide. l{imball vs. Thompson, 13
Mete. (Mass.) 283; A.lien t:s. The Centre l1alley Company, 21 Conn.
130, 54 Am. Dec. :l33; Ladd 1·s. Gris1cold, 9 Ill. 25, 46 Am. Dec.
443; Smith t'S. Edtcards, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. Dec. 71;
Robb t'S. Mudge, 14 Gray (Mass.) 5:J4; Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St.
76; Sigler vs. K11o:r Oount.l/ Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; Wilct>.J) vs.
/(cllogg, 11 .Ohio 3!l4.
'l"he joint estate is converted into the separate estate of the
assignee by fo1·ce of the contl'act of assignment. And it m:.lke,s
n-o differenre whether the retiring partner sells to the otiber
partnn or to a third person, or whether the sale is mad·e by
him or under a judgm<>nt a~ainst him. In either ca.se bis
equity is gone. These principles are settled by very abundant
authorities. It remains, therefore, only to consid·er whether, in
view of the rules thus settled and of the facts of this case, th~
oomplainant, through any one of the partners; bas a right to
f.ollow the specific property which formerly belon~ to the
partnership, and compel its application to the pay1neut of the
debt due from the firm to the bank of which he is the receiver.
1'lH' partnerl.'"lhip, while it wa.s in existence, wa.s composed of
three pers()ns, May, Graham, and Beauregard, but it bad
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ceased to exist before this suit was commenced. It was en-

tirely insolvent, and all the partnership etfects -had been trans-

ferred to others for valuable considerations. None of the

property was ever within the jurisdiction of the court for

administration.

On the 8th of May, 1867, Graham, one of the partners,

assigned all his right and interest in any property and elfects

of the partnership, and whatever he might be entitled to under

the articles thereof, together with all debts due to him from

the partnership or -any member thereof, to the Fourth National

Bank of the city of New York. By subsequent assignments

made on the 14th and 16th of May, 1869, May, the sec-ond part-

ner, transferred all his interest in the partnership property to

the United States, and by the same instrument transferred to

the United States, by virtue of a power of attorney which he

held, t-he interest of Graham. On the 21st of August, 1867, the

United States sold and transferred their interest obtained

from May and Graham in all the partnership property, includ-

ing real estate, t-o Alexander Bonneval, Joseph Hernandez,

and George Binder. On the 15th of October next following, an
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act of fusion was executed between the New Orleans and Oar-

rollton Railroad Company, Beauregard, Bonneval, Hernandez,

and Binder, by which the rights of all the parties became

vested in the railroad company, subject to the debts and lia-

bilities of t-h-e company, whether due or claimed from the

lessee or the stockholders.

The eﬁect of these transfers and act of fusion was very

clearly to convert the partnership property into property held

in severalty, or, -at least, to terminate the equity of any part-

ner to require the application thereof to the payment of the

joint debts. Hence if, as we have seen, the equity of the part-

nerhip creditors can be worked out only through the equity of

the partners, there was no such equity of t-he partners, or any

one of them, as is now claimed, in 1869, when this bill w-as ﬁled.

No one of the partners could then insist that the property

should be applied first -to the satisfaction of the joint debts,

f-or his interest in the partnership and its assets had ceased.

Baker’s Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 823. That was ~a ca-se where a ﬁrm

had consisted of ﬁve brothers. Two of them withdrew, dispos-

ing of their interest in the partnership estate and eifects to the

other three, the latter agreeing -to pay the debts of the ﬁrm.

teased to exist before this suit was commenced. It was entirely insoh'ent, and all the partnership effects ·had been tran1ft>rred to f)thers for valuable considerations. None of the
property was ever within the jurisdic.tion of the court for
administrn ti on.
On the 8th or May, 1867~ Graham, one of the partners,
assigned all his right and interest in any property and effects
()f the partnership, and whatever he might be entitled to under •
the articlf's thereof, t·ogether with all de'bt.s due to him from
the partnership-or ·any member thereof, to the Foorth National
Bank ()f the city of New York. By subsequent assignments
m:i.de on the 14th and 16th of :May, 18G9, May, rtlle second partner, transferred all bis interest in the partnership pToperty to '
the United States, and by the same instrument trausferred to
the United States, by virtue <>fa power of attorney whieh he
held, the interest of Graham. On the 21st of August, 1867, the
United States sold and transferred their interest obtained
from May and Graham in all the partnership property, including real estate,. to Alexander Bonneva.l, Joaeph Hernandez,
and George Binder. On the 15th of Octobel.· next following, ·an
act of fusi-0n was executed bE-tween the New Orleans and Carrollton Uailroad Company, Beauregard, B<>nneval, Hernandez,
and Binder, by which the rights of a.II the parties became
vested in the raill'oad company, subject to the debts and liabilities -of the company, whether due or claimed fr<>m the
lessee or the stockholders.
'l'he effE'ct of thE>se transfers and act of fusion was very
clearly to convert the partnership property into property h~ld
in severalty, or, at least, to terminate the equity of any part- ner to require the application thereof to the payment of the
joint debts. Hrnce if, as we have seen, the equity of the partnership creditors can be worked out only through the equity of
the par.tners, there was n'O such equity of the partners, or any
one of thejn, as is now claimed, in 1869, when this bill wa.s tiled.
No one of the partners could then insist that the property
should be oapplied firm :to the satisfaction of the joint del>ts,
f.or his interest in the partnerghip and its a.s sets had ceased.
Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 8:?3. That was a case where a firm
had consisted of ft-ve brothers. Two of them withd1-ew, disposing of their interest in the partn-ership estate and effects to the
ather three, the latter agreeing to pay the debts of the firm.
0

444 Gases on PARTNERSHIP.

CA.SES ON

P ARTN'ERSHIP.

Some time after, one of the remaining three sold his interest

in the partnership property to one of the remaining two part-

ners. The two remaining, after contracting debts, made an

assignment of their partnership property to pay the debts of

the last ﬁrm composed of the two; and it was held that the

creditors off the ﬁrst two ﬁrms had no right to claim any por-

tion of the fund last assigned, and that it was distributable

exclusively among the creditors of the last ﬁrm. So in llIcNutt

vs. Strayhorn (39 Id. 269), it was ruled that though the general

rule is that the equities of the creditors are to be worked out

through the equities -of the partners, yet where the property

is parted with by sale severlally made, and neither partner has

dominion or possession, there is nothing through which the

equities of the creditors can work, and, therefore, there is no

ease fo-r the application of the rule. See, also, Coover-’s

Appeal, 29 Pa. st. 9, 70 Am. Dec. 149.u1nless the-refo-re, the

conveyances of the partners in this case and the act of fusion

were fraudulent, the bank of which the complainant is receiver

has no claims u-pon the property now held by the New Orleans

and Carrollton Railroad Company, arising out of t.-he facts that
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i-t is a creditor of the partnership, and was such -a creditor

when the property belonged to the ﬁrm».

The bill, it is true, charges that the several transfers of the

partners were illegal and fraudulent, witlrout specifying

wherein the fraud consisted. The charge seem-s to be only a

legal oonclusio-n from the fact that some of the transfers were

made for the payment of the private debts of the assigrrors,

Oon-ceding such to -have been the case, it was a fraud up-on the

other partners, if a fraud at all, rather th|.1'n upon the joint

credit~ors,—a fraud which those partners could waive, an-d

which was subsequently waived by the act of fu-si-on; Besides,

that act made provisicln for some of the debts of the pa'rt;ner-

ship. And it has been ruled that wih-ere one of two partners,

with the consent of the other, sells and conveys one-half of

the eﬂects -of the ﬁrm to a third person, and the other partner

afterwards sells and conveys the other half to the same per-

son, sac-h sale and conveyances are not prima facie void, as

again-st creditors -of the ﬁrm, but are prima facie valid against

all the world, and can be set aside by the creditors of the ﬁrm

only by proof that the transactions were fraudulent as against

them. Kimball vs. Thompson, 13 Metc. (Mass) 283; Flack vs,

A

Some time after, -one ()f the remaining three &old his interest
is the partnership property to <me of the remaining two partners. The two remaining, after contracting debts, made an
assignment .of their part:rn.ership property to pay the debts of
the last fl.rm comp0sed of the tw-0; a.nd it was held that the
creditors <Jf the first two firms bad no right to claim any portion of the fund last assigned, and th:lt 'it was distributable
exclusively among the credit-0rs <>f the last firm. So in McNutt
f18. Strayhorn (39 Id. 269), it was ruled that though the general
rule is that the equities <>f the c-redit:iors are ro be worked out
thr<>ugb the equities •e>f the partners, yet where the property
is parted with by sale sevemlly made, and :neither partner has
dominion or possession, there is nO'thi·ng thl'ough w·hfoh the
equities o.f the creditors can work, and, the-refore, there ts noo
case for the a.pplication of the rule. See, also, Coover's
App.eal, 29 Pa. St. 9, 70 Am. Dec. 149-1.!nless therefore, the
conveyances of the partners in this case ~md the act of fusion
were fraudulent, the bank of which the complainant is receiver
h:as no claims upon the property now held by the New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Company, arising out of the facts that
it is a creditor of the partnership, and was such a crediti0r
when the property belonged to t>he firm~
The bill, it is true, charges that the several transfers of the
partners were illegal and fraudulent, without specifying
wherein the fraud coosisted. Tihe charge seems to be only a
legal oonclosion foom the fact that some t()f the tranosfe11s were
made for the payment of th~ private debts of the assignors•
• Oonceding such to .h ave been the case, it was a fraud upoin the
other partners, if a fraud at all, rather thlm upQn the joint
creditori:;,-a fraud which those partners could waive, and
which was subsequently waived by the act of fusion, Besides,
that act made provi·si<Jin for some of the debts of the pa1rtnerebip. And it has been ruled that w1here one of two partners,
with the consent of the other, sells and conveys one-half of
the effects o()f the firm t<> a third person, an-cl the other pa.rtner
afterwards sells and conveys the otiher half to the 11ame persoo, such sale :and conveyances are not prima facie void, as
against creditors of the firm, but are prim.a facie valid against
all the world, and can be set aside by the creditors of the firm
only by proof that tbe transactions wel'e fraudulent as aguinst
them. Kimball vs. Thompson, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 283; Flack va.
1
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(Yharron, 29 Md. 311. A similar doctrine is asserted in some

of the other cases we have cited; and see 21 Conn. 130. In

the present case we ﬁnd no such proof. We discover nothing to

impeach. the bona ﬁdes of the transaction, by which the prop-

erty became vested in the railroad company.

Thus far we have considered the case without reference to

the provisions of the Louisiana Code, upon which the appel-

lant relies. Art. 2823 of the Code is as follows: “The part-

nership property is liable to the credito-rs of the partnership

in preference -to those -of the individuial partner.” ‘Ye do not

perceive'that this provision differs materially from -the genem-l

rule of equity we have stated. It creates no speciﬁc lien upon

partnership property, w-hich continues after -the property has

ceased to belong t-0 the partnership. It does n-ot forbid bona

ﬁde conversion by t-he partners of the joint property into right

in several-ty, held by third persons. It relates to partnership

property alone, and gives I11 rule for mla rshalling such property

between creditors. Ooncede that it gives to joint creditors a

privilege while the property belongs to the partnership, -there

is n-0 subject upon which it can act when the joint ownership
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of the partners has ceased. Art. 3244 of the Code declares

that privileges become extinct “by the extinction of the thing

subject to the privilege.”

What we have said is sufficient for a determination of the

case. If it be urged, as was ibarely intimated during the argu-

ment, that the property sought to be followed belongs in

equity to the bank, or is clothed with a trust for the bank,

-because it was purcha.sed with the br.'1.nk’s money, the answer

is plain. There is no satisfactory evidence -that it was t-huts

purchased. It cannot be identiﬁed as the subject to the acqui-

sition of which money belonging to the bank was applied.

The bank has, therefore, no speciﬁc claim upon the property,

nor is there any trust which a count of equity can enforce;

and it was well said by the circuit justice, that, without some

constituted trust or lien, “a creditor h:-is only the right to

prosecute his cl-aim in the ordinary courts -of law, and have it

adjudicated before die can pursue the property of his debtor

by a direct proceeding” in equity.

Decree affirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 289.

Cha1·ron, 29 Md. 311.

A similar d-0ctrine is asserted in so.me
of the other cases we have cited; and see 21 Conn. 130. Iin
the pre.sent case we find no such proof. We discover nothing to
impeach. the bona fides of the transaction, by which the pl"oiper.ty became vested in the railroad oe>mpany.
Thus far we have considered the case without reference to
the provisions of the Louisiana Code, upon which the appellant relies. Art. 2823 of the Code is as f.ollows: "The part·
nership property i-s liable t-0 the credito-rs of the partnel'ship
in preference .to those -of the individual partner." We do n'<Jt ·
perceive•that this provision differs materially from the genem·l
rule of equity we have stated. It creates no specific lien upoin
partnership property, which continues after the property bas
ceased to belong to the partnership. It does uot f.orbid bona
fide oonversion by the partners of the joint property inro rights
in severalty, held by third persons. It relates to pa.I"tnership
property alcme, and· give-s ia rule for miarshallfog such property
between creditors. Concede that it gives to joint creditors a
privilege while the property belongs t<> the 'Partnership, .there
-is n<> subject upon which it can act whein the joint ownership
-0f the partn~rs has ceased. Art. 3244 of the Code dedaree
tha.t privileges become extinct "by the extinction of the thing
~object to the privilege."
'Vhat we have -said is sufficient for a determin·aticm of the
caise. If it be urged, as was ·barely intimated during the argument, that the proper(Y. sought to be followed belo·ngs in .
equity to the bank, or is dotbed with a trust for ihe bank,
hec·anse it was purcha.sed with the ba:nk's money, the an.swe_r
is plain. There is no satisfact:ory evide-nce that it was thus
pure-based. It cannot be idootified as the subject to the 1:i1cquisilion of which money belonging to the hank was applied.
The bank has, therefore, no specific claim upon the pl'operty,
nor is there any trust which a court of equity can enforce;
and it was well said by the cireuit justice, that, without some
constituted trust -or lien, "a creditor bas only the right to
prosecute his cla.im in the -ordinary courts 'Of law, and have it
:1<1judic-ated before 1he can pnrsue the property of his d·ebtor
hy a direct proceeding" in equity.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 289.
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ARNOLD vs. HAGERMAN. / '

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1889.

45 N. J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl. Rep. ea, 14 Am. st. Rep. 712'

On_July 17, 1883, John C. Farr, having a lumber business at

Hoboken and a manufacturing business at Asbury Park,

ARNOLD vs. HAGERMAN.

formed a partnership as to the latter business with J. H.

J

Hagerman and J. S. Fielder, under the ﬁrm name of J. C. Farr

& Co. Hagerman and Fielder gave Farr their note for the

Oottrt of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1889.

interests they acquired in the Asbury Park business. On

October 29, 1883, the new ﬁrm was embarrassed ﬁnancially and

43 N. J . Eq. 186, 17 Atl. Rep. 93, 14 Am. St. Rep. 71r

dissolved. Hage-rman and Fielder assigned to Farr all their

interests in the business, and Farr returned their notes and

agreed to pa-y t-he debts. On November 30, 1883, Farr assigned

all his property, under the statute, to Arnold, for the beneﬁt

of creditors. ln -the early part of 1884, the Second National

Bank of Red Bank obtained judgments against the members

of ;t-he ﬁrm of J. C. Farr & 00., for debts due from that ﬁrm,

and caused executions to be levied on what had been the prop-

erty of that ﬁrm. The bank afterwards ﬁled a bill to set

aside the transfers from Hagerman and Fielder to Farr, -and
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the assignment of Farr to Arnold on the ground th-it they

were fraudulent as against the creditors of J. C. Farr & Co.

The court below held the transfers by Hagerman and Fielder

to Farr to be void. V

Appeal.

Gilbert Collins, for appellant.

A. G. Hartshorne, for Hagerman and Fielder.

J. 0'. Applegatc and F. W. Hope, for the Bank.

DIXON, J. (After disposing of other matters.) In equity a

partnersh-ipis for some purposes deemed a single entity. Thus,

when the property involved in the business of a partnership

is to be arpplied by a court of equity t-0 the payment of debts,

that property is treated a-s belonging, not to the persons com-

posing the ﬁrm, -bu-t to a distinct debtor, the partnership, and

is used ﬁrst to liquidate the deb-ts contracted in the business

I

On. July 17, 1883, John C. Farr, having a lumber busines-s at
H~boken and a m:rnufaoturing business at Asbury Park,
formed a partnership as to the latter business wil.h J. H.
Hagerman and J. S. Fielder, under the firm name of J.C. Farr
& Co. Hagerma.n and :Fielder gave I•'arr theil· note for t·he
intere.sts they acquired in the Asbury Park busi·ness. On
Octo-ber 29, 188.1, the new firm was embarrassed financially and
dissolved. Hagerman and Field-er assigned to Farr all their
interests in the .business, and Farr returned their notes and
agreed to p1.y the debts. On November 30, 1883, Farr assigned
all his property, und<!r the statute, to Arnold, for the benefit
of creditors. ln the early part of 1884, the Second National
Dank -of Red Bank obtained judgments against the members
of the firm of J. C. Parr & Co., for debts due from that firm,
and caused executions to be levied on what h:td been the property of that firm. The bank afterwards filed a bi11 to set
aside tbe transfers fr.om Hagerman and "F ielder to Farr, and
the assignment ()f Farr to Arnold on the ground tb1 t tbej·
we1-e fraudulent as against the creditors of J. C. Farr & Co.
The court below held the transfers by Hagerman and Fielder
to Farr to be void.
Appeal.

Gilbert Collins, for appellant.

A.. 0. Hartsliorne, for Hagerman 1and Fielder.
J. 0. Applegate a.nd F. W. Hope, for the Bank.
D1xoN, J. (After disposing of other matters.) In equi~y a
partnership is for some purposes deemed a sing-le entity. TL us,
when t he pmperty involved in tlie business of a partnership
is t-0 be applied by a court of equity to the payment of debts,
that property is treated .ais belonging, not to the persons composing the firm, ·b ut to a distinct d-ebtor, the partnership, and
is U'Sed first to liquidate the deb-ts co·ntracted in the business
1

·
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of that debtor, and only the surplus, if any, is surrendered to

the individual partners. This equitable practice rests upon

the presumed intention of the partners themselves, and hence

is primarily considered as their equitable right against eao

other. (Yonsequen-tly, since the decision of Lord Ennox in

parts Ruﬂin, 6 Ves. 119, it has been generally held that t

partners could put an end to this right, and that if, by their

agreement, the partnership is dissolved, and its property is

assigned to one of their number, or to a stranger, as his own,

without reservation of -the right, the right -to have piart-nez-ship

debts paid out of that property is extinct. Growing out cl

this right of partners has arisen a corresponding equity in

partnership creditors to have their debts ﬁrst satisﬁed out of

the ﬁrm property, which is now deemed a substantial element

of their demands. Generally it may be said that this equity

of creditors continues only so long a the right of the partners

against each- other subsists, and perishes when that termi-

nates; but this is not universally true, for this equity may

survive the right to which, ordinarily, it is attached. In this

respect it resembles the claim which the general creditors of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:08 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

an individual -have upon his property. It is neither an estate

nor a lien. It is, ordinarily, but a right by lawful procedure

to acquire alien during the ownership of the debtor; yet, under

certain circumstances, that lien may be acquired after the

debtor’-s -ownership has ended. This results from the provis-

ions of the ancient statute for the prevention ’of frauds and

perjuries, by force of which, when a person has alienated his

property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,

the rights of those creditors remain as if no alicnati-on had

taken place, except against the claims of bona /idc purchasers,

for good consideration, without notice. Equity applies this

statute to :1 partnership, its property and creditors, just as it

would in case of an individual, and t-herefore, while generally

it is true that a partnership may defeat the equity of its credit-

ors by the alienation of its ‘property and consequent extin-

guis-hment of the right of its partners inter scsc, yet, if the

alienation be effected with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

the ﬁrm creditors by defeating their equity, the claims of

creditors will be unimpaired, and t-he property will be treated

as partnership assets, unless it shall have passed into -the

hands of those whom the statute protects. This doctrine -h-zus

'·

of toot debtor, and only tbe surplus, if any, is surrendered to
the individaal partners. This equitable practice rests upon
the presumed intenUon of the partneTs themselves, mid .hence
Ml p.rimiarily C'Onsidered as thefr equibble right again.st eac
other. 0onsequen.tly, since the decision of Lord ELDO~ in
parte Ruffen, 6 Ves. 119, it has been generally held that t
partners could put an end to this right, and that if, by their
agreement, the partnership is dissolved, and its property is
assigned to <>ne -0f their number, or to a stranger, a.s his o.wn,
without reservation of the right, the right to have partnership
del>ts paid 'Out of that property is extinct. Growing out d/f
this right of partners has arisen a correspo;ziding equity in
partnership creditors to have their debts first satisfied out of
the firm property, which is now deemed a substantial element
of their demands. Generally it may be said that rthis equity
of creditor,s continues only so long as the right of the partn·ers
against each other subsists, and perishes when that termiD'ates; but this is not unive:rs:illy true, for this equity m:ay
eurvive the right to which, ordinarily, it is attached. In this
respe'Ct it resembles the claim which the general creditors o.f
an individual ·have upon his property. It is neither an eistate
ll'Or a lien. It is, ordinarily, but a right by lawful pr·ocedure
to acquire a lien during the ownersllip of the debtor; yet, under
certain circum.st:mces, that lien may be acquired after the
debtor'·s ownership has ended. This results from tlJ.e provis- '1
ions of the ancient sta:tute for the prev~ntion 'of frauds and I
,crjuries, by f-Orce of which, wbPn a person has alienated his (
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, 1
tl:e rights of those credi~-ors remain as if no alienation had
taken place, except against the claims of bona fide purchasers,
f-or g()od consideration, without notice. Equity applies this
statute to a partnership, its propt-rty and creditors, just as it
wo·uld in case <>fan individual, and therefore, while generally
it is true that a partnership may defeat the equity <>fits credit-0rs by the alienation of its property and consequent extinguishment <>f the right of its partners inter scsc, yet, if the
alienation be effected with intent to hinder, delay, or de fraud
the firm cred'it.o rs by defeating their equity, the claims of
creditors will be unimpaired, a.nd the property will be treated
as partnership a•ssets, unless it shall have passed into the
·h ands of those whom the statute protect& This doctrine ·ha1s
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repeatedly been recognized in the cou-rt.s of New Jersey. Thus,

in Matlaclc vs. James, 13 N. J. Eq. 126, two members of a ﬁrm

consisting of four persons conveyed their undivided half of

and, held for partnership purposes, to an outsider, in payment

their individual debt to him. Ghancellor GREEN, ﬁnding

at the conveyance was designed to defeat -the equitable

claim of pzrrtnerslnip creditors, adjudged it void, and applied

the wh-ole proceeds of the land to paying t-hose creditors. In

Bank vs. Spraguc, 21 N. J. Eq. 530, 544, Mr. Justice VAN

SYCKLE, speaking for this court, plainly intimated an opinion

‘(the case not calling for a decision on the po-int) that an insol-

vent ﬁrm could not defeat this equity of partnership creditors

by giving to credit-ors of the individual members a prior lien

on partnership property, and referred to Chnicellor WAL-

won'rn’s opinion in Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. C11. 47, 49

Am. Dec. 160, as supporting that doctrine by sound reasoning.

The language of the chancellor thus approved was: “The

copartners certainly h-ave the right to dissolve the partnership,

and divide the property of the ﬁrm between them, provided

there is no intention of delaying or hindering their creditors
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in the collection of debts. ' " ' The case would have

been entirely different if copartners, who were insolvent, and

mnazble to pay the debts of tlhe ﬁrm, eitilrer out of their copart-

nership elfecrts oir of their ind-ividuial property, had made an

assignment of the property of bo-th to pay the Pindivi-dual debt

of one of the copartners only; for an insolvent copartner, who

was unable to pity the debts which the ﬁrm owed, would be

guilty of a fraud upon the joint credit.-ors if -he autzlrorized his

share of the property of the ﬁrm to be applied to the -payment

of a debt for which neait-her he nor his property was l"ia~ble at

law or in equity.” So, in Van Dorcn vs. Sticklc, 24 N. J . Eq.

331, affirmed by this court, 27 N. J. Eq. 498, i-t was declared

that ta voluntary transfer by a ﬁrm of notes own-ed by the pa.rt-

nership to the wife of one of the partners was fraudulent as

to partnership creditors, and th-e notes in the hands of the

wife were decreed to be pa.rtners~hip assets. To the like effect

is the language of Mr. Justice Dnrum, delivering the opinion

of this court in Clements rs. Jcssup, 36 N. J . Eq. 569: j“Part-

nership creditors, in equity, have an inherent priority of claim

upon partnership property over individual creditors, and a

transfer’-of partnership property by one partner, with the

repeatedly been recognized in the c-0urls -of New Jersey. Thus,
in Matlack va. James, 13 N. J. Eq. 1~6, two memibers of a firm
consisting of four persons conveyed their undivided half of
and, held for partnership purp-0ses, to an outsider, in payment
their individual debt to him. ChanceHor GREEN, tin-ding
at the c-0nveyance was designed ro defeat .the equitable
claim of pa:rtnership creditors, adjudged it void, and applied
the whole proceeds of the la.n d to paying thO"Se creditors. In
.Bank vs. Sprague, 21 N. J. Eq. 53(), 544, Mr. Justice VA..~
SYCKLE, speaking for this court, plainly intimated an opinion
lthe case not calling for a decision on the p<>int) th1.t an insolvent firm oould n<>t defeat this equity of partnership creditors
by giving to credit•ors <>f the individual members a prior lien
~n partnership property, and referred to Ch:mcellor WALWORTH's opinion in Kirby va. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 47, 49
Am. Dec. 160, as supporting that doctrine by sound reasoning.
The l·anguage of the chanceUor thus approved wa·s : "The
oopartners certainly have the rig-ht to dissolve the partnership,
and divide the property of the firm between them, provid-ed
t·here is n-0 tntention of delaying or ·hindering their creditors
in the collectfon of debts. • • • The case would b1ve
been entire]y different if copa-rtners, who we.re im:•olvent, and
Uilla:ble to pay the debt.s o-f tihe firm, either ()lllt <>f their copa.r tnership effeots or of their ind·ividuial pr-0perty, had made an
assignment -Of the property Qf ooth to pay the 1ndividua.l debt
of one af the copart.ners <>'Illy; for an insolvent ropoa.rtner, who
wa1s u.nabJe ro pl~ the debts which th'e firm owed, would be
guilty of a fraud upon the j-oint creditors if ohe authiorized his
share of the property of the firm t<> be applied to the ·payme.nt
of a debt for which- neif.her be n<0r his property was li.abJe at
la.w or in equity." So, in Van Doren vs. Stickle, 24 N. J. Eq.
331, affirmed by this court, 27 N. J. Eq. 498, i-t was declared
that ·a voluntary trans·f er by a firm of notes owned by the pa.rt_nership to the wife of one of the pa.rtners was frauduJent as
to pa.rtnership creditors, a.nd the notes in t11e hands of the
wife were decreed to be pa.rtnership assets. To the Jike effect
is the language of Mr. Justice DEPUE, delivering the ·opinion
of this court in Clements i·s. Jessup, 36 N. J. Eq. 569: ]"Partnership creditors, in equity, have an inherent priority of claim
upon partnership property over individu.:il creditors, and a
transfer· of partnership property by -0ne partner, with the
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consent of the other partners, or by all the partners, to pay

individual debts, ls fraudulent and void as to ﬁrm creditors,

unless the ﬁrm was then solvent, and had -suﬂioient property

remaining to pay the partnership de.bts.” '

The case before us comes clearly within the reach of this

principle. At the time -of the transfer by Hagerman and

Fielder to Farr theinisolvency of each of these persons, and

of the ﬁrm of J. C. Farr & Co., was patent to them all, and,

indeed, was the moving cause of the -transfer. They all knew

that, in the condition of affairs then existing, none of them

could meert maturing obligations, and it was in the hope of

facilitating an extensi-ocn or compromise with creditors that

the tra-n-sfer was mla-de. The transfer embraced all the part-

nership property. If valid in all respects, it appropriated the

shares of Hagerman and Fielder to the puym-ent of the debts

of Farr, for which those shares were previously not liable,

and left Hagerman and Fielder with-out any -property what-

ever, as we gather from the testimony, toupay -their debts.

Inevitably, therefore, by defeating the equi-ty -of the partner-

ship oreditors, it would hinder them in the collection of their
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just claims. It is a reasonable inference that these partners

intended this mavnifest effect of their act, Ian-d consequently

the assignment by Hagerman and Fielder to Farr must,

according to the terms of the statute, be deemed void as

against the partner-sl1i‘p creditors. Not only upon ~t-he ground

of a common intent to hinder partnership creditors, thus

inferred from the knowledge which all parties must have had

of the necessary consequences of the -t-ransfer itself, ‘but also

upon the ground that the transfer was made with-out valuable

consi~d~eration,—was voluntary in the legal sen.se,—it should

be decreed invalid against the -partnership creditors, all of

whose debts were the-n in existence. Huston rs. C'a.stnc-r, 31

N. J. Eq. 697. Tihe consideration nominally given by Farr to

Hagerm-an and Fielder was the surrender of -their notes and

his c-oven-ant to indemnify them against ﬁrm creditors. But

according to the testimony those notes were payable on-ly on-t

of -the proﬁt accruing to Hagerman arn-d Fielder from the

ﬁrm of J . G. Farr & Co., and as that ﬁrm h-ad fa.iled, and was

dissolved without realizing any proﬁts, the notes had become

absolutely valueless. Farr’s eovcnanit to indemnify does not

constitute a valuable consideration, since he may be relieved

5'7

oonsent of the other partners, or by all the pactners, t.o pay
individual debts, ls fraudulent and v-0id a.s to firm creditors,
unless the firm was then 801vent, iamd h·ad ·sufficient propert7
remaining to pay the partnership d·ebts."
The case before us comes clearly within the reac-h of thiB
principle. At the time of the transfer by Hagerman and
Fielder to Farr thie·inMlvency of each of these p2rsons, and
of the firm of J. C. Farr & Co., was patent t-0 them all, and,
indeed, was the moving cause of the transfer. Tiley all knew
that, in the condition of affair.a then existing, none of them
could meet matming obligations, and it was in the ho:pe of
facilitating an extension or compromise wi·th crediuors th1t
the transfer was ma.de. The transfer emrbr.aced all the pa.rtne1·ship property. If v·alid in all res·pects, it app11e>priated the
shares of Hagerman and Fielder to the p:iymfint of the debts
of Farr, for which th.o se shares were previously not liable,
a.nd left Hagerman and Fielder withiout any property whatever, as we gather from the testimony, t.o. ·pay their debts.
Inevitably, therefore, by defeating tl1e equHy •O'f tih2 p:l.,bnership creditors, it w'-Ould hinder tihem in the collection of their
just claims. It is a i·ro•sonable inference that these partners I
mt~nd-ed this manife~t eff("Ct .of their a.eot, 'Rnd consequently \
the assignment by Hagerman and Fielder to Fa:rr must,
acoording to the tP.rms of the statute, be d·eemed void aa
against the partne·r.ship creditors. Not only upon the gronnd
of a common intent to hinder pa.r tnership oreditors, thu.:;
inferred from the knowledge which all parties must hoave had
of the necessary consequences of the ·transfer itself, ·but also
upon the ground that the transfer was made wi.t::1Qut V.lluable
cmnsideration,-was voluntary in the legal sense,-it should
be decreed invalid against the ·partnership cred.ito.rs, all of
whose dr bts wc>re tht'-n in existence. Haston vs. Castner, 31
N. J. Eq. 697. T;hp co.nsid('!ration niominally given by Farr lflo
Hagerman urnd Fidder was the surrende:r of their notes and
his coven·ant to indemnify t11em against firm creditors. But
according to tihe testimony those nlO'te.s were payable only -Oll't
of •the profits accruing to Hagenuan and Pielder from the
firm of J. C. Farr & Co., and as that firm had failed, ;a.n d was
dissolved without realizing any profits, the notes :h ad become
absolutely valueless. Farr's oov('na.Illt to indemnify does not
constitute a valuable consideration, sinoc he may be relfoved
1
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therefrom on the total failure of the transfer for which it

was made. 2 P-om. Eq. Jur. §§ 751, 969; notes to Basset vs.

Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Gas. Eq. 82; Haugh-wout vs. Murphy, 22 N. J.

Eq. 531. It thus appearing that, notwithstanding this

transfer, all the rights and remedies of the creditors of

J. G. Farr & Co. remained against the ﬁrm property in

in the hands of Farr, we are brought to. consider the assign-

ment to Arnold for the beneﬁt of Farr’s creditors. \Vith

respect to this assignment, t-he following propositions may,

I think, be mainitainedz First, -that the credit-ors of J . C. Farr

& Co. are included among its beneﬁciaries; second, that it con-

veyed, not only the property of Farr as an individual, but also

that which had been the property of J. C. Farr & 00.; third,

that it conveyed this latter property subject to the equity of

the creditors of that ﬁrm; and, fourth, that, so construed, the

assignment cannot be succesfully impeached by the com-

plainant.

The ﬁrst proposition is unquestionable. The creditors of J.
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C. Farr & Co. were all creditors of Farr, for whose beneﬁt

ﬂhe assignment was expressly made.

In considering the second proposition, it must be remem-

bered that at the time of this transfer Farr was in reality the

owner of the property previously belonging to J. C. Farr &

Co. He had become so. by the conveyance from ‘his partners,

which then nobody had disputed, so that the assignment to

Arnold of all the property owned by Farr included in its terms

the ﬁrm property. This was made still clearer by the inven-

tory annexed, which speciﬁed in det-ail the property at Asbury

Park. Even if the transfer from Hagerman and Fielder to

Farr be disregarded, still it will appear that the assignment

to Arnold included the property of J. C. Farr & Co.; for, in

view of the fact that it purported to convey such property,

the conduct of Hagerm-an and Fielder precludes their denial

of its eﬁiciency. They bot-h knew that Farr was about to

assign the ﬁrm property to Arnold; they both, with-out objec-

tion, delivered over that property to Arnold in pursuance of

Farr’s assignment; they both took part in t-he management

of that property un~der,Arnold as assignee; and neitiher of

them raised any question as to Arnold’s title until after -credit-

ors of J. G. Farr & Co. had proved their debts under the

-assignment. Whether, in these circumstances, we look for a

therefrom on the total failure of the transfer for which it
was made. 2 Porn. Eq. Jur. §§ 751, 969; nMes to Basset vs.
-Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Oas. Eq. 82; Haughwout vs. Mm·phy, 22 N. J.
Eq. 531. It thus appearing that, notwit~standing this
transfer, all the rights and remedies -0f the creditors of
J. C. Farr & Co. remained against cthe fl.rm property in
in the bands of Farr, we are brought to. consider the assign·
ment ·t-0 Arnold for the benefit of. Fa.rr's credit-Ors. With
respect to this assignment, the following proposi.ti·ons may,
I think, be maintained: First, ·that the creditors of J.C. Fa1~r
& Co. are included among its beneficiaries; second, that it con·
veyed, not only the prop~rty of Farr as an individual, but also
that which ·had been the property of J. C. Far.r & Oo.; third,
tha.t it conveyed this latter property subject to thP PQuity of
the creditors -0f that fl.rm; and, fou1·th, that, so con..Q,trued, the
_a ssignment cannot be successfully impeached by the oom·
plainant.
The :first proposition is unquestionable. T·he creditors of J.
C. Farr & Co. were all creditC>rs of Farr, for whose benefit
t!he assignment was expressly made.
In considering the second proposition, it must be remem·
bered that at the time <>f this tronsfer Farr WtlS in reality the
owner af the property ·p reviously belonging to J. C. Farr &
Co. He had become so. by the conveyan-oe from 'his partnerH,
whioh then nobod;; had disputed, so t"aat the assignment to
Arnold -0f :ill the property ownoPofl by Fa.rr included in its terms
the :firm property. This was made still clea.rer by tb:e inveJi·
tory annexed, whiC'h specified in detail the property a:t A·sbury
Park. Even if the transfer from Hagerman and Fielder .tu
Farr be d-Isregarded, still it will appear that the assignment
to A,imold included the proiwrty of J. C. Farr & Co.; for, in
view -0f 1:.he fact that it purported to CO'llvey sueh prroperty,
the conduct -of Hagerman ~·rnd Fielder precludes their denial
of its efficiency. They both knew that Farr was about to
assign the firm property to Arnold; th<3y both, with-out objection, delivered over that property to Arnold in pnr.suanee of
Farr's a'Ssignment; they both took part in the management
-of that property under Arnold as assignee; and neitJher of
them raised any question as to Arnold's title until after ·credit·
ors of J. C. Farr & Co. had proved their debts under the
·assignment. Whether, in these circumstances, we look for a
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ratiﬁcation by Hagermian and Fielder of the -transfer of ﬁrm-

property by Farr as their partner and agent, or for a. transfer

directly by the joint act of all the partners, or for an estoppel

preventing Ilagerman and Fielder from denying that the

assignment conveyed the effects inventoried and delivered,-

in any view the property of J. C. Farr & Co. passed to the

assignee. '

Touching the third proposition, that this property was con-

veyed su'bject to the equity of the ﬁrm creditors, it would be

beyond cavil, had t-he assignment show-n upon its face a con-

veyance of the property of Farr, and also of J. C. Farr & Co.,

for the beneﬁt of creditors. As was said by Chief Justice

HOBNBLOWER,_ in Scull vs. Alter, 16 N. J. Law, 147: “If it is

an assignment, not only of the partnership eﬂ"ects and property

of the ﬁrm, bu.t also an individual and several assignment by

the members of their respective and separate estates, then it

must be treated as such. The estates and debts must be mar-

shalled; the partnership effects applied in the ﬁrst instance

to the partnership debts; the effects of each member applied
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in the ﬁrst instance -to the payment of -his separate debts.”

See, also, Garretson vs. Brown, 26 N. J. Law, 425, 435. But

as this assignment speaks of all the property embraced in it

as belonging to Farr alone, a d-ilferent view might be taken of

it. Usually, indeed, courts have held that an assignee for the

beneﬁt of creditors is not a purchaser for value, but takes the

property subject to all equities that would have been valid

against tlhe assignor. Notes to Basset rs. N0su:orth_1/, 2 Lead.

Gas. Eq. 87. Many of the decisions to this eifect, however.

have gone upon la theory that debts proved u-nder the assign-

ment are n-ot extinguished except so far as they are paid by

dividends, or tlra-t a pre-existing debt is not a valuable con-

sideration for a conveyance; and as neither of these it-heories is

tenu-ble in New Jersey, th-ere may be found suﬂicient reasons

for holding, in this state, that a cred-it-or proving under an

assignment should be regarded in equity as favorably a a

purchaser for value, although, in Vandoren vs. Todd. 3 N. J.

Eq. 397, -the opposite doctrine prevailed.

But conceding to the assignee and to the individual credit-

ors of Farr, who have proved their debts, the rights of pur-

chasers for value, they still are b-ound by the equity of the

ﬁrm creditors, for they had notice of that equity. “The rule,”

j

ratification by Hagerman .and Fielder <>f the transfer of firm
property by Farr as their partner and agent, or for ·a transfer
directly by the j.oint act of all the paMn€rs, or for Hu -:!Stoppel
preventing Hagerman and l<'ielder from denying that the
a.ssignment conveyed the effects inventoried and delivered,in any view the property '-Of J. C. Farr & Co. passed t-0 the
assignee.
'!'ouching the third proposition, that this property was coo·
veyed subject to the equity of the firm creditors, it would be
beyond cavil, bad the assignment shown upon its face a conveyance -0f the property of Farr, .and also of J. C. Farr & Co.,
f-or the benefit of creditors. As was said by Chief Justice
HORNBLOWER, in Scull vs. Alter, 16 N. J. Law, 147: "If it is
an assignment, not only of tbe partnersllip effects and property
of the firm, but also an individual and several assignment by
the members of their respective and sep1rate estates, t•ben it
mwrt be treated as such. The estates and d·ebts must be marshalled; the partnership effects applied in the first instance
to rthe partners.hip debts; the effects of each member applied
in the first instance to the payment of ·bis Eepar:ate debts."
See, also, Garretson vs. Broirm, 26 N. J. Law, 425, 435. But
as 1his assignment speaks of all the property embraced in it
as belonging to Farr alone, a dHf erent view might be taken of
it. Usually, indeed, courts ha.ve held tha t an assignee for the
benefit of credit<>rs is not a pureha.ser for value, but takes the
property subject to all equities that would have been V'alid
against t:ihe assign.or. N<>teis
Basset t:s. Nos10or·tl1y, 2 Lead.
Oul5. Eq. 87. Many <>! t•he decisions to this effect, however.
bave g.one upon a theory that debts pr.ov<'d under ithe .asfrignment are n<>t ex•tinguished except so far as they are paid by
dividends, or tha.t a pr~xistb1g debt is not a valuable c.ooisideration for a conveyance; and as neither of these theories is
ten•:i·b le in New Jersey, there may be found Ruffici<>™ reaso.ns
for bolding, in this state, that a credH'Or proving un-deT an
assignment should be N>garded in equity as favora:bly as a
pnrobaser f.or value, alth01Ug.b, in Vand-0ren vs. Todd. 3 N. J.
Eq. 397, .the opposite doctrine preva-iled.
But conoeeding to the aRs.ignee and to the individ'Ual creditors of Farr, who have proved their debts, the rights of purchasers fo.r value, they still are b<>und by the equity of the
firm creditors, for they had n-0tice 0-f that equity. "The rule,"
0

to
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says Prof. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. J ur. § 7 53), “is universal and

elementary that if a purchaser in any f-orm receives notice of

prior adverse rigihts in and to the same subject-matter, before

he [has completely acquired or perfec his own irnterests

under the purchase, his posivti~a ﬁde purchaser is

thereby destroyed, even though e may have paid a valuable

consideration.” That Arnold, before the assignment, and all

the personal creditors of Farr before they proved their claims,

were notiﬁed tlnat the Asbury Park property ha-d belonged

-to J. C. Farr & 00., and had been transferred to Farr when

that ﬁrm -and all its members were insolvent, is fully estab-

]-ished -by the evidence in the cause. This notice before -the

assignment was acquired by Arnold from conversations with

Fa-rr, and -by Arnold and m-any, if not ull, of Farr’s individual

creditors, th-rough inquiries made by Eat-on and Lawson, va.

comm-ittee appointed by the creditors to investigate the affairs

of Farr arnd J . O. Farr & O0. After the assignment, but before

any debts were proved, -such not-ice was still more deﬁnitely

communicated to all of Farr’s creditors, through the report

of their committee, in which the assets and liabilities of Farr
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and of J. G. Farr & Co., respectively, are distinctly stated.

'Dhis report also plainly indicates an understanding or expecta-

tion that the property assigned would be marshalled between

-the creditors of Fa-rr and the credit-ors of the ﬁrm. It was

made Jamuary 19, 1884, while the ﬁrst claim proved was pre~

sented to the assignee January 28, 1884. Fuller notice than

this report contained of the equity of the ﬁrm creditors could

l1I0t well be given.‘ Hence those creditors are still entitled to

have the partnership property applied to -the payment of their

\

\

\

debts, in preference to the debts of Farr’s in-dividual creditors.

The fourth proposition denies -the right of the 0_(L1'Il‘Ql2"l.l.I18_11l

to impeach this assignment. The assignment was in the form

sanctioned by our statute. It was for the beneﬁt of all credit-

ors who were entitled to any share in the property assigned;

it created n-0 preferences; an-d it provided for no delay beyond

what was necessary for the execu-tio-n of the trust which it

properly declared. Although such assignments do hinder

creditors from obtaining -that priority of lien which otherwise

their vigilance might secure, yet they are not on that account

within the meaning and scope of the statute which avoids

transfers to defraud creditors. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 994, note.

Bays Prof. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 753), "is univenal and
elem<'ntary that if a pur("baser in any form receives n'O'tice of
prior adverse rigihts in and to the same .subject-matter, before
he 1hoas completely acquired or~rlec hls own i1J1terests
under the purchase, bis posiUon
on.a fide purchaser is
thereby destroyed, even though e may have paid a valuable
oonsideratio.n." That Arnold, before the assignment, and all
the personal credito1·s of Farr before they proved their claims,
were uotified t:11:it the Asbury Park pr.operty had belonged
.t.o J. C. Farr & Co., and ·had been transferred to Farr when
that firm and all its members were insolvent, is fully estabMshed 1by the evidence in the cause. 'Dhis ·n otice before the
assignment was acquired by Arnold from conversations with
Farr, and ·by Arnold and many, if not iall, of Farr's individual
creditors, through inquiries made by Eaton and Lawson, a
oommittee a.ppointed by the creditors to investigate the affairs
of Farr rund J.C. Farr & Co. After tthe assignment, but before
any debts were proved, -such nl()Hce was still more .d efinitely
oommmlicated to all of Farr's creditoi,s, tb1~ough the report
of their oommittee, in which the assets and liabilities -0f Farr
and of J. C. Farr & Co., respectively, are distin'Ctly stated.
'11liis report also plainly indicates an understanding or expectatiooi that the p1·operty assigned would be marS'halled between ·
;the creditors of Fa.rr and tthe creditoors of the firm. It was
made Jrunuary 19, 1884, while the first claim proved wasp.resell'ted fo the assignee January 28, 1884. Fuller n.otice than
this report oonfained of the equity of the firm creditors could
not well be given: Hence th<>se creditors are still entitled to
have the partnership property a.pplied to the payment of their ,
d·ebts, in preference to the debts of Farr's individual creditors. (, 1 L
'l'he fourth pr-0position denies .the right of the complainant V ~'-?!
~ to impeach t·his assignment. T·he assignment was intbe fo~ -sanctioned by our statute. It was for the benefit of all creditors who WP.re entitlc>d to any ·s hare in the property assigned;
H created no preferences; and it pr:ovided for no del.ay beyond
what was n(•·eessary for the exc>cntio·n of the trust which it '
properly d<>"Clared. Altb-011g:h suC"b assignments d-0 hinder
creditiors from obtaining that priority 'Of lien which otherwise
their vigilance might secure, yet they are not on that account
within the meaning and scope of the statute whicf1 avoids
transfers to defraud creditors. 2 P-0m. Eq. Jur. § 994, note.
\..
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The assignment was perfected before the entry of complain-

vs.

HA.GB

CAHPBELL.

ant’s judgments, and, as it operated to divest the legal title

of the debtors, the complainant’s executions did n-ot become a.

lien 'D'ie assignment as we construe it placed all the credit-

The assignment WaB perfected •before the entry of oomplainant's judgments, and, as it <>perated to divest i he le_gal title
<>f the debtors, the complainant's executicms did not beoome a
lien. 'D:1e assignment, as we oonstrue it, placed all the creditors of the same class u~n.. equal footing, and in such .~s
equality is equity. Co~~~tly both in law and in equity, the
compla.i nant is bound.
The conclusion o-f the maHer is that the property of Farr
·and the property <>f J. C. Farr & Co. should be marshalled between .the creditors -0f th<>se two de-btors, resp€ctively. • • •
Let the decree ap1>ealed from be reversed, and a decree be
entered in accordainc..-.e with these views.
U n-animously reversed.
1

-‘'>1

ors of the same class um equal foo-ting, and in such cases

equality 1s equity. Consequently both m law and 111 equity, the

complainant is bound. .

The conclusion of the matter is that the property of Farr

and the property of J . C. Farr & Co. should be marshalled be-

tween -the creditors of those two debtors, respectively. ' ‘ '

Let the decree appealed from be reversed, and a decree be

entered in accordance with these views.

Unanimously reversed.

NOTE: See Mecliem’s Elem. of Partn., § 288.

~1

HAGE vs. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.

78 Wis. 572, 47 N. ¥V. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422.

:n·

Action for conversion of goods. Plaintiff claimed the goods ,
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under a chattel mortgage given by the ﬁrm of Hage Bros.

Defendant, as sheriff, had levied upon the goods at the suit of

NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 283.

unsecured creditors of the ﬁrm. Other facts are stated in the

opinion. Plaintiff had judgment below and defendant appeals.

R. S. Reid, for appellant.

W. Goss, for respondent.

Com-1, C. J . The plaintiffs right to recover the value of the

goods in controversy depends entirely upon the validity of a.

chattel mortgage given to him by the Hage Bros., dated May

HAGE vs. CAMPBELL.

3, 1886. If that mortgage is valid, as against the creditors of

the ﬁrm, the judgment is correct. The objection taken to this ,-

mortgage is that it was not given to secure the payment of a

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.

.p£lI'tI1€I‘Shlp debt, and is therefore void as to the ﬁrm creditors.

We think the jury must have found, under the charge of the

78 Wis. 572, 47 N. W. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422.

court, that the mortgage was given to secure the bona ﬁde

Action for conversion of goods. Plaintiff claimed the goods
nnder a chattel mortgage given by the firm of Hage Bros.
Defendant, as sheriff, had levied upon the goods at the suit of
unsecured creditors of the firm. Other facts are stated in the
opinion. Plaintiff had judgment below and defendant appeals.

1

R. S. Reid, for appellant.

W. Goss, for respondent.
COLE, C. J. The plaintiff's right to recover the value of the
goods in controversy depends entirely upon the validity of a
<·hattel mortgage given to him by the Hage Bros., dated May
~. 1886. If that mortgage is valid, as against the creditors of
the firm, the judgment is correct. The objection taken to this .
mortgage is that it was not given to secure the payment of a
.partnership debt, and is therefore void as to the firm creditors.
"\Ve think the jury must ha.Ye found, under the charge of the
court, that the mortgage was given to secure the bona fik
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indebtedness of the ﬁrm, and that there was no fraudulent

intent in giving it. That there was evidence tending to estab-

lish these facts cannot be successfully denied if the plaintiffs

testimony is to be believed; for he testiﬁed, in substance, that

he loaned Iver Hage $600 in June, 1884, and that before Christ-

mas, 1885, he loaned both Iver and Torger $200 more. In

June, 1884, Iver and one Canudson were in partnership, and

the plaintiff said the $600, which he loaned Iver Hage, was

used by them to purchase goods for the ﬁrm. It docs not

clearly appear that Iver made the loan of $600 for the ﬁrm of

Hage & Canudson, though probably the loan inured to the

beneﬁt of the ﬁrm. The plaintiff does say that Canudson had

nothing to do in borrowing the $600 from him, by which he

means, as we understand his testimony, that Canudson did

not act in the matter. This, of course, might be true, and

still it might be the fact that Iver acted for the ﬁrm in making

the loan. It satisfactorily appears that the ﬁrm had the bene

ﬁt of the loan, and that the money was a-pplied to purchase
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goods for the ﬁrm. But, it is said, non consta-t, but this $600

was Iver’s contribution to the capital stock of the partnership.

But the matter, as to whether this debt was one that the ﬁrm

was liable to pay, does not rest upon the facts above stated.

Itappears that, in the spring or summer of 1885, Torger Hage

purchased the interest of Canudson in the ﬁrm, and that then

he and Iver both promised to pay the plaintiff the $600 loan.

Now, if it be assumed that the $600 was originally loaned to

Iver, and that it was his individual debt, yet as the money had

been used to purchase goods for the ﬁrm, could not the part-

ners, when the new ﬁrm was organized, assume this debt and

bind the ﬁrm to pay it? There is nothing to show ‘that the

ﬁrm was insolvent at this time, and we suppose it might bind

the ﬁrm to pay the individual debt of one of the partners. TVe

do not understand that such an application of the assets, or

such a liability assumed, would be a fraud upon partnership

creditors, if the ﬁrm was -solvent and able to pay its other debts

at the time. The learned circuit court distinctly charged that,-

if the debt was the individual debt of Iver Hage, it must have

been assumed by the partnership so as to become a ﬁrm liabil-

ity, in order to sustain the mortgage which was subsequently

given. But, that a solvent ﬁrm might assume the individual

1

indebtedness of the firm, and that there was no fraudulent
intent in giving it. That there was evidence tending to establish these facts cannot be successfully denied if the plaintiff's
testimony is to be believed; for he testified, in substance, that
he loaned Iver Hage fGOO in June, 1884, and that before Ohristmas, 1885, -he loaned both h'er and Torger f200 more. In
June, 18&4, Iver and one Canudson were in partnership, and
the plaintiff said the $600, which he loaned Iver Hage, was
used by them to pm·chase goods for the firm. It does not
clearly appear that Iver made the loan of $600 for the firm of
Hage & Canudson, though probably the loan inured to the
benefit of the firm. The pJaintiff does say that Canudson had
nothing to do in borrowing the $600 from him, by which he
, means, as we understand his testimony, that Canudson did
hot act in the matter. Thls, of course, might be true, and
still it might be the fact that Iver acted for the firm in making
the loan. It satisfactorily appears that the firm had the benefit of the loan, and that the money was a·pplied to -purchase
goods for the firm. But, it is said, non constat, but this f600
was Iver's contribution to the capital stock of the partnership.
But the matter, as to whether this debt was one that the firm
was liable to pay, does not rest upon the facts above stated.
It-appears that, in the spring or summer of 1885, Torger Hage
purchased the interest of Canudson in the firm, and that then
, . he and Iver both promised to pay the plaintiff the $600 loan.
Now, if it be assumed that the $600 was originally loaned to
Iver, and that it was his individual debt, yet as the money bad
·been used to purchase goods for the firm, could not the partners, when the new firm was organized, assume this debt and
bind the firm to pay it? There is nothing to show "tbn.t the
firm was insolvent at this time, and we suppose it might bind
the firm to pay the individual debt of one of the partners. ~Ve
do not understand that such an application of the assets, or
such a liability assumed, would be a fraud upon partnership
creditors, if the firm was .solvent and able to pay its ot·h·er debts
at the time. The learned circuit court distinctly charged that,.
if the debt was the individual debt of Iver Hage, it must have
been assumed by the partnership so as to become a firm liability, in order to sustain the mortgage which was subsequently
given. But, that n solvent firm might assume the individual
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debt of one of the partners, and agree to pay it out of the part-

nership property, and give a valid mortgage on its stock for

that purpose, providing the transaction was free from fraud,

is clear. So that, if, at the time the new ﬁrm was organized,

the debt became the partnership liability by the ﬁrm’s assum-

ing it and agreeingto pay it, then the claifn stood upon the

same footing as any other ﬁrm debt. This is not the la.nguage

of the charge but is its meaning, and the sense in which the

jury must naturally have understood it. It seems to us the

court was right in this view of the law. There can be no doubt

that the jury were satisﬁed, from the evidence, that, when

the new ﬁrm was organized, this $600 loan was assumed by the

ﬁrm and became the partnership debt of Hage Bros.; and it is

not claimed that the ﬁrm was insolvent at that time. glf the

ﬁrm was insoluent, it could not assume the individual ebt of‘,

a partner, and secure its payment by a mortgage upon the

partnership property, as such an act would be in fraud of the

partnership creditors, who had the right to be ﬁrst paid, and

so the jury were instructed. ) ,

As to the $200 which the plaintiﬁ ‘loaned Hage Bros. about
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a month before Christmas, in 1885, there can be no question

but that it was a‘ partnership debt. ‘ It is argued that, if the

$600 loan had in fact become a partnership debt, the books of

Hage Bros. should have shown a credit for tha.t amount in

favor of the plaintiﬁ’, or that a note or some security should

have been given to the plaintiif as evidence of the ﬁrm liability.

Correct business methods would doubtless have required some

entry of the transaction upon the books of the ﬁrm, but the

business seems to have been done very loosely, the parties

having conﬁdence in each other, and trusting to the oral agree-

ment. It does not appear that there was an entry made of

the $200 on the ﬁrm books, or any note given for it, though,

unquestionably, it was a loan to the ﬁrm of Hage Bros. The

court instructed the jury that the facts that the books of Hage

Bros. did not show a credit in favor of the plaintiff foir his

money loa-ned, and that no note was given nor security taken,

nor agreement made as to when the money was to be repaid,

were circumstances to be weighed when considering the credi-

bility of the plaintiff’s testimony. These were proper matters

to be considered in determining the question as to whether the

debt was a valid partnership liability, or whether the chattel

debt of one of the partners, and agree to pay it out of the partnership property, and give a valid mortgage on its stock for
that purpose, providing the transaction was free from fraud,
is clear. So that, if, at the time the new firm was organized,
the debt became the partnership liability by the firm's assuming it and agreeing· to pay it, then the claim stood upon the
same footing as any other firm debt. This is not the language
of the charge but is its meaning, and the sense in which the
jury must naturally have understood it. It seems to ns the
<·ourt was right in this view of the law. There can be no doubt
that the jury were satisfied, from the evidence, that, when
the new firm was organized, this $600 loan was assumed by the
firm· and bec-.ime the partnership debt of Hage Bros.; and it is
not claimed that the firm was insolvent at that time. (If the
firm was insol'4ent, it could not assume the individual "aebt of J .
a partner, and secure its payment by a mO'rtgage upon the
partnership property, as such an act would be in fraud of the
partnership creditors, wh-0 had the right to be first paid, and
so the jury were instructed. )
As to the $200 which the plaintiff loaned Hage Bros. about
n. month before Christmas, in 1885, there can be no question #
but that it was a· partnership debt. · It is aI"gued that, if the
'GOO loan bad in fact become a partneI"ship debt, the books of
Hage Bros. should have shown a credit for that amount in '
fuvor of the plaintiff, or that a note or some secuI"ity should
have been given to the plaintiff as evidence of the firm liability.
Correct business methods would doubtless have required some
entry of the transaction upon the books of the firm, but the
business seems to have been done very loosely, the parties
having coofidence in each other, and trusting to the oral agreement. It does not appear that th.era was an entry made of
the $200 on the firm books, or any note given for it, though,
unquestionably, it was a loan to the firm of Hage Bros. The
court instructed the jury that the facts that the books of Hage ,
Bros. did not show a credit in favor of the plaintiff for his
money loaned, and that no note wRs given nor security ta.ken,
n~r agreement made as to when the money was to be repaid,
were circumstances to be weighed when considering the credibility of the plaintiff's testimony. These were proper matters
to be considered in determining the question as to whether the
debt was a valid partnership liability, or whether the chattel
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mortgage was given for any fraudulent purpose. The mort-

gage was given, as we have said, on the 3d of May, 1886. At

that time the ﬁrm of Hage Bros. was embarrassed and in fail-

ing circumstanees. But the mortgage was given by one part-

ner, in the absence of the other partner, to secure a.n existing

ﬁrm liability. Could not such a security be given to secure

an honest brma ﬁde debt, where there was no intent to cover

up property for the beneﬁt of Hage Bros., or to defraud their

other creditors? We suppose the plaintiif had the right to

take the mortgage and secure himself, even though the other

creditors might suffer by his doing so. One creditor has the

right to induce a failing debtor to pay or secure his debt, and

the fact that this might lessen the ability of the debtor to pay

other creditors does not necessarily avoid the payment or

invalidate the security. The mortgage was given to secure

the payment of $910.61, the amount of the ﬁrm debt, and the

property mortgaged was not worth much more than that sum.

There is an objection that the property was not sutﬁeiently

described in the mortgage, but we think the objection is not

well taken: The schedule referred to, and attaohed to the
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mortgage, clearly identiﬁes and describes the property

embraced in the instrument. It does describe the articles in

the “show cases” with suﬁicient fullness to indicate what prop-

erty was in-tended to be covered by the mortgage. The mort-

gage was given by Torger Hage on behalf of the ﬁrm, in the

absence and without the knowledge of the other partner, Iver

Hage, who was absent in Dakota. We suppose one partner

may, without the consent of his copartner, being absent, pay

a debt or execute a mortgage in the name of the ﬁrm upon

partnership property, to secure a ﬁrm debt. The power of

each partner to bind the ﬁrm fairly extends to such a trans-

action, unless restricted by the articles of copartnership, and

it does not appear that there was any such restriction on the

power of the partner in this case. It was clearly within the

scope of the implied authority of Torger to execute the mort-

gage, as much as selling the goods or collecting the debts due

the ﬁrm. This proposition seems too plain to require discus-

sion. The mortgagee, deeming himself insecure, took posses-

sion at onoe of the mortgaged property, as he had the right to

do, and employed Torger, as agent or clerk, to sell the goods

and pay over the proceeds to him, to be applied upon the mort-

mortgage was given for any fraudulf'nt purpose. The mortgage was given, as we have said, on the 3d of May, 1886. At
that time the firm of Hage Bros. was embarrassed and in failing ckcumstanc-es. But the mortgage was given by one partner, in the absence of the other partner, to secure an existing
firm lia.bility. Could not such a security be given to secure
an h-0nest bona fide debt, where the1·e was no inten.t to cover
up property for the benefit of Hage Bros., or to defl"'J.ud their
other creditors'! "'e suppose the plaintiff had the right to
, take the mortgage and secure himself, e\·en though the other
creditors might suffer by his doing so. One creditor has the
right to induce a failing debtor to pay or secure his debt, and
the fact that this might lessen the ability of the debtor to pay
other creditors does not necessarily aYoid the payment or
invalidate the security. The mortgage was given to secure
the payment of $910.61, the amount of the firm debt, and the
property mortgaged was not wol'th much more than that sum.
There is an objection that the propc>rty was not sufficiently
descl"ibed in the mortgage, but we think the objection is not
well taken: The scbedule referred to, and attached to the
mortgage, clearly identifies and describes the property
embraced in the instrument. It does describe the articles in
the "show cases" with sufficient fullness to indicate what property was in.tended to be covered by the mortgage. The mortgage was given by Torger Hage on behalf of the firm, in the
absence and without the knowledge of the other partner, Iver
Hage, who was absent in Dakota. ·we suppose one purt-ner
may, without the conS<.'nt of his copartner, being absent, pa.Y
a debt or execute a mortgage in the name of the firm upon
partnership property, to secure a firm debt. The power of
each pal'tner to bind the firm fairly extends to such a transactiO'Il, unless restricted by the artides of copartnership, and
it does not a.ppear that there was any such restriction on the
power of the partner in this case. It was clearly within the
scope of the implied authority of Torgn to execute the mortgage, as much as sernng the goods or collecting the debts due
the firm. This proposition seems too plain to require discussion. The mortgagee, de<>ming himself insecure, took possession at once of the mortgaged property, as he had the right to
do, and employed Torger, as agent or clerk, to sell the goods
and pay over the proceeds to him, to be applied upon the mort-
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gage debt. There is no legal objection to such an arrange-

457

ment. It certainly did not create any secret trust, as counsel

suggests. The plaintiff might employ the mortgagor to sell the

goods for him and pay over the proceeds of all sales madel

The action is for a wrongful conversion of the goods, alleged

in the complaint to be of the value of $1,147.41. The defend-

ant, as sheriﬂ', seized the goods under attachments issued in

favor of the creditors of the ﬁrm of Hage Bros. In the answer

the defendant denies that the goods were “of any other or

gage debt. There is no lPgal objection to such an arrangement. It certainly did not create any secret trust, as counsel
suggests. The plaintiff might employ the mortgagor to sell the
goods for him and pay over the proceeds of all sales ma.de~
The action is for a wrongful conversion of the g-0ods, alleged
in the complaint to be of the value of $1,147.41. The defendant, BJ!! sheriff, sf.>ized the goods under a tta.chments issued in
favor of the creditors of the firm of Hage Bros. In the answer
the defendant denies that the goods were "of any other or
greater value than $917.63." This, fairly C()ll)strued, must be
deemed to refer to the mortgaged property mentioned in the
complaint. A point is made that the value of the property
was not proven on the trial. It certainly appears that the
property did not exceed the amount due upon the note and
mortgage, and, in view of the admission in ~he answer as t<>
the value, we think no further proof as to that fact was necessary. The recovery was less than the value stated in the
answer and the interest thereon, to the commencement of the
action. This disposes of all the material questions. The case
Meems to have been fairly submitted, under proper instructions
as to the law for the guidance of the jury, and the judgment of .
the circuit court must be affirm€d.

~

greater value than $917.63.” This, fairly construed, must be

deemed to refer to the mortgaged property mentioned in the

complaint. A point is made that the value of the property

was not proven on the trial. It certainly appears that the

property did not exceed the amount due upon the note and

mortgage, and, in view of the admission in the answer as to

the value, we think no further proof as to that fact was neces-

sary. The recovery was less than the value stated in the

answer and the interest thereon, to the commencement of the

action. This disposes of all the material questions. The ease

seems to have been fairly submitted, under proper instructions
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as to the law for the guidance of the jury, and the judgment of

the circuit court must be aﬁirmed.

None: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 28a '

J .__.i_____

GODDARD-PECK GROCERY CO. vs. McCUNE.

Supreme Court of Missouri, 1893.

122 Mo. 426, 25 S. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681.

This case was certiﬁed to the supreme court from the St.

Louis court of appeals for the reason that one of the judges of

that court was of the opinion that the decision ﬁled in that

r'0l1I't was in conﬂict with the decision in the case of Sexton vs.

lnderson, 95 Mo. 373, 8 S. \V. 564. The opinion of the oourt

of appeals is reported in 47 M0. App. 307. The statem-ent of

'l‘no1ursoN, J ., of said court, is as follows: “John McCune pre-

NOTB: See Mechem•a Elem. of Partn., § 288.

sented for allowance against the assigned estate of the part-

nership ﬁrm of Edwards & Wigginton a promissory note

7

58

J
GODDARD-PECK GROCERY CO. vs. McCUNE.
Supreme Court of Missouri, 1893.
122 Mo. 426, 27i S. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681.

This case was certified to the supreme court from ·t he St.
fJouis court of appeals for the reason that one of the judges of
that court was of the opinion that the decision filed in that
c·onrt was in conflict with the decision in the case of Se:cton vs.
. lnderson, 95 Mo. 37::l, 8 S. \V. 564. The opinion of the court
of appeals is reported in 47 Mo. App. 307. The statement of
THOllPSON, J., of said court, is as follows: "John McCune presented for all<>wance againi;t the aRsigned estate of the partnership firm of Edwards & \Vigbrinton a promissory note,
58

458 Casns on _P.mnu~:nsnn>.

458

C~SES ON

.P~B.TNEBSIIIP.

made by said ﬁrm on the ﬁrst day of July, 1880, for $2,000,

payable one day after date, to his order, and bearing interest

from date at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Calvin Wig-

ginton also presented a note of the same date and tenor for

the sum of $1,926. The assignee allowed both of these notes,

and certain other creditors of the ﬁrm appealed to the circuit

court. The circuit court disallowed the notes, and from its

judgment disallowing the notes in favor of l\IcCune this appeal

is prosecuted. The case was, by consent of parties, submitted

to the court without a jury, and no declaration of law was

asked or given. It appeared in evidence that the partnership

ﬁrm of Edwards & \Vigginton was founded in March, 1880,

and made an assignment for the beneﬁt of its creditors in

July, 1800. The business was a retail grocery store. The

basis of the business was a stock in trade owned by the appel-

lant, McCune, which 1\IcCune sold to Edwards in 1887 for

$2,600. When Edwards took ¥Vigginton in as a partner, in

March, 1889, the stock was invoiced at between $3,300 and

$3,400. They were to be equal partners, and the arrangement

was such that Wigginton purchased a half interest in the stock
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in trade and business for $1,626, and then each partner put

into the business in cash the sum of $300. The indebtedness

of Edwards to McCune was originally evidenced by three

unsecured promissory notes, maturing, respectively, in six,

twelve, and eighteen months from date. Edwards had bor-

rowed other money of McCune, and had made such payments

that on the 1st of July, 1880, the indebtedness of Edwards to

McCune stood at $2,000. The $1,926 that \Vigginton put into

the _ﬁrm, as above stated, was entirely borrowed from his

father, Calvin Wigginton. Of this $900 was a note, due one

day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent

per annum; $500 was a like note, and the rest was not evi-

denced by any note. Thus it was that the interest of each

partner consisted entirely of borrowed capital; that Edwards

still owed this claimant, l\lcCune, $2,000 for his interest in the

partnership capital and buiness; and that Wigginton, for his

interest therein, owed his father $1,926. \\'e proceed on the

view that what each partner had thus severally borrowed to

purchase his interest in the business was an individual, and

not a partnership debt. The ﬁrm seems to have lost money

almost from the start, and McCune, becoming imeasy,

made by said firm on the first day of July, 1889, for ,2,000,
payable one day after date, to bis order, and bearing interest
from date at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Calvin Wigginton also presented a note of the same date and tenor for
the sum of ,1,926. The assignee allowed both of these notes,
and certain other creditors of the firm appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court disallowed the notes, and from its
judgment disallowing the notes in favor of McCune this appeal
ls prosecuted. The case was, by consent of parties, submitted
to the court without a jury, and no declaration of law was
asked or given. It appeared in evidence that the partnership
firm of Edwards & Wigginton was founded in March, 1880,
and made an assignment for the benefit of its creditoM in
July, 18!)0. The business was a retail grocery store. The
basis of the business was a stock in trade owned by the appellant, McCune, which McCune sold to Edwards in 1887 for
$2,600. When Edwards took \Vigginto.n in as a partner, in
March, 1889, the stock was invoiced at between '3,300 and
'3,400. They were to be equal partners, and the arrangement
was such that Wigginton purchased a half interest in the stock
in trade and business for fl,626, and then each partner put
into the bpsi11ess in cash the sum of '300. The indebtedness
of Edwards to McCune was originally evidenced by three
unsecured promissory notes, maturing, respectively, in six,
twelve, and eighteen months from date. Edwards bad borrowed other mooey o.f McCune, and had made such payments
that on the 1st of July, 1889, the indebtedness of Edwards to
McCune stood at $2,000. The $1,926 that '\Vigginton put into
the _ti.rm, as above stated, was entirely borrowed from his
father, Calvin '\Vigginton. Of this $900 was a note, due one
day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent
per annum; $500 was a like note, and the rest was not evidenced by any note. Thus it was that the interest of each
partner consisted entirely of borrowed capital; that Edwards
still owed this claimant, McCune, $2,000 for his interest in the
partnership capital and business; and that Wigginton, for his
interest therein, owed his father $1,92G. We proceed on thf'
view that what each partner had thus severally borrowed to
purcha.se bis interest in the business was an individual, and
not a partnership debt. The firm seems to have lost money
almost from the start, and :McCu'lle, becoming uneasy,
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requested Edwards to take up the individual notes of Edwards,

459

held by McCuue, withlthe note of the ﬁrm. At the same time

Wigginton, Sr., thought that if McCune was going to have

ﬁrm paper for the individual note of Edwards, he, Wigginton,

ought to have ﬁrm paper for what was due him from his son,

as already stated. It was accordingly arranged between the

partners, an-d these individual creditors, respectively, that the

two creditors should have ﬁrm papers; and on the ﬁrst day

of July, 1889, the ﬁrm executed its note to McCune in settle-

ment of the individual notes of Edwards, and also its note to

Wigginton, Sr., in settlement of the individual debt of Wig-

ginton, Jr., to him. The testimony leaves no room to doubt

that this was done in contemplation of a possible suspension,

and the avowed purpose of it was to put these individual credit-

ors, in the event of a suspension, on an ‘even footing with ﬁrm

creditors. Edwards testiﬁed: ‘It was this way: I had a

great deal of sickness, and had lost on grain I had bought, and

McCune insisted on some plan of securing him. He was will-

ing to aid us tide over our diﬁieulties, if in any way to make

himself afe,—to take joint note for the ﬁrm’s note. I spoke
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to iVigginton, my partner, about it. He at the same time

owed his father a like amount, or very near it. He insisted

that he would want to secure his father as well as John

McCune, so we mutually agreed to give them the ﬁrm’s note for

the amount of each claim. Both of these notes were given at

the same time!‘ Further on Edwards testiﬁed: ‘We gave a.

ﬁrm note, so that, in case of death or failure, they would share

and fare like our other creditors.’ On the same point the

other partner testiﬁed: ‘We saw the business was losing

money; saw no prospect of times getting better, owing to the

competition on each side of us; and we did not care to favor

one person and not others. \Ve wanted to treat everybody

alike.’ When the ﬁrm failed, some six months later, its liabili-

ties, including these notes, footed up to about $5,600. Its

assets were invcntoried at $3,149.95, but the assignee realized

only the sum of $770 from the sale of the entire stock of goods

under order of the court at public auction, and had succeeded

in collecting only $70 of the $626 due the ﬁrm from its custom-

ers. Of these liabilities about $1,500 were due to merchants

from whom it had bought goods.”

Fagg & Ball, for appellant.

•

requested Edwards to take up the individual notes of Edwards,
held by McCune, with ,the note of the firm. At the same time
'Wigg-inton, Sr., thong-ht that if McCune was going to have
firm paper for the individual note of Edwards, he, Wigginton,
ought to have ft.rm paper for what was due him fr<>m bis son,
as already stated. It was accordingly arranged between the
partners, and these individual creditors, respectively, that the
two creditm-s should have firm papers; and on the first day
of July, 1889, the firm executed its note to McCune in settlement of the individual notes of Edwards, and also its note to
\Vigginton, Sr., in settlement of the individual debt of \Vigginton, Jr., to him. The testimony leaves no room to doubt
tha·t this was done in contemplation of a possible suspension,
and the avowed purpose of it was to put these individual creditol."9, in the event of a suspension, on an ·even footing with firm
creditors. Edwards testified: 'It was this way: I had a
greait deal of sickness, and had lost on gr;iin I had bought, and
McCune insisted on some plan of securing him. He was willing to aid us tide over our difficulties, if in any way to make
himself safe,-to take joint note for the firm's note. I spoke
to Wigginton, my partner, about it. He at the same time
owed his fath.er a like amount, or very near it. He insisted
that he would want to secure his father as well as John
McCune, so we mutually agreed to giv~ them the firm's note for
the amount of each claim. Both of these notes were given at
the same time.' , Further on Edwards testified: '\Ve gave a
firm note, so that, in case of death or failure, they would share
and fare like our other creditors.' On the same point the
other partner testified: '\Ve saw the business was losing
mqney; saw no prospect of times getting better, owing to the
competition on each side of u.s; and we did n<>t care to favor
one person and not others. We wanted to treat everybody
alike.' When the firm failed, some six months later, its liabilities, including these notes, footed up to about f5,GOO. Its
assets were inventoried at $3,140.95, but the assigne~ rPa.lized
only the sum of $770 from the sale of the entire stock of goods
under order of the court at public auction, and had succeeded
in collecting only $70 of the $626 due the firm from its custom~
ers. Of these liabilities about fl,500 were due to merchants
from whom it had bought goods."
Fagg & Ball, for appellant.
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J. D. Hostetter, E. W. Major and Eben Richards, for respond-

eat.

Buncnss, J. (After stating the facts.) 1. No principle of

law is better settled than that, in the administration of an

J. D. Hostetter, E. W. Major and Eben Richards, for respondt>nt.

insolvent partnership estate, the assets of the ﬁrm'must be

applied to the satisfaction of the ﬁrm creditors to the exclusion

of the creditors of the individual partners. H undley vs. Farris,

103 Mo. 78, 15 S. W. 312; Bank vs. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 148, 10 S.

W. 884, and cases cited in each. The principle we think equally

well settled by the more recent decisions of this court,as well as

by the weight of judicial authority in other jurisdictions, that

the assets of an insolvent ﬁrm, before dissolution, may, with the

consent of all the partners, be applied to the satisfaction of all

the individual debts of the members of the ﬁrm, when done in

good faith. Sea-ton vs. Anderson, 95 Mo. 380, 8 S. W. 564; Rey-

burn vs. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592, and cases cited in

each; Seger vs. Thomas, 107 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 33. As Phelps vs.

McNeely, 66 M0. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 398,is in conﬂict with the cases‘

last cited and the great weight of authority, it should not be

followed, and is overruled. Jones vs. Lush, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 356;
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George vs. Wamsley, 64 Iowa 175, 20 N. W. 1;‘ Schaeﬁer vs.

Fithian, 17 Ind. 463; Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 46, 49

Am. Dcc. 160; Kennedy vs. Bank, 23 Hun, 494; In re Kahley, 2

Biss. 383, Fed. Cas. No. 7,593; Warren vs. F'arm-er, 100 Ind. 593;

Trentman vs. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443; Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.

S. 119; Purple vs. Farrlngton, 119 Ind. 164, 21 N. E. 543; Pep-

per vs. Peck, 17 R. I. 55, 20 Atl. 16; Anderson vs. Norton, 15 Lea

14; Haiskamp vs. Wagon Co., 121 U. S. 310, 7 Sup. Ct. 899; Goﬂin

vs. Day, 34 Fed. 687. In the case at bar the ﬁrm notes were

given in satisfaction of individual debts long prior to the disso-

lution of the partnership, and that transaction cannot be

declared fraudulent at law on the ground simply that the ﬁrm

was at the time insolvent, or was made so by the act of making

these notes.

2. If the partners composing the ﬁrm of Edwards & Wiggin-

ton had by agreement, in good faith, mortgaged or assigned all

the assets of the ﬁrm, for the purpose of securing or paying the

debts owing by them individually to McGune and Wigginton,

respectively, though with the intention of giving them a pref-

erence over the ﬁrm creditors. the tranaction could not be

BURGESS, J. (After stating the facts.) 1. No principle of
law is better settled than tba t, in the administration of an
insolvent partnership estate, the assets of the firm· must be
applied to the satisfaction of the firm creditors to the exclusion
of the creditors of the individual partners. Hundley vs. Farris,
103 l!o. i8, 15 8. W. 312; Bank v8. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 148, 10 S.
\V. 884, and cases cited in each. The principle we think equally
well settled by the more recent decisions of this court, as well as
by the weight of judicial authority in other jurisdictions, that
the assets of an insolvent firm, before dissolution, may, with the
consent of all the partners, be applied to the satisfaction of all
t.he individual debts of the members of the firm, when done in
good faith. Se:cton v8. Anderson, 95 Mo. 380, 8 8. ·w. 564; Reyburn vs. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592, and cases cited in
each; Seger vs. Thomas, 107 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 33. As Phelps vs.
McNeely, 66 Mo. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 398, is in conftict with the cases
last cited and the great weight of authority, it should not be
followed, a·n d is overruled. JoMs vs. Lusk, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 356;
George vs. Wamsley, 64 Iowa 175, 20 N. W. 1; · Schaeffer vs.
Ji'ithian, 17 Ind. 463; Kirby v.'1. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Cb. 46, 49
Am. Dec. 160; Kennedy vs. Bank, 23 Hun, 494; In re Kaliley, 2
Biss. 383, Fed. Ca.s. No. 7,593; Warren t'S. Farmer, 100 Ind. 593;
Trentman vs. Swai·tzell, 85 Ind. 443; Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.
S. 119; P1trp'le vs. Farrington, 119 Ind. 164, 21 N. E. 543; Pep·
per vs. Peele, 17 R. I. 55, 20 Atl. 16; Anderson vs. Norton, 15 Lea
14; Huiskam.p vs. Wagon Co., 121 U.S. 310, 7 Sup. Ot. 899; Coffin.
vs. Day, 34 Fed. 687. In the case at bar the firm notes were
given in satisfaction oo individual debts long prior to the disso·
lutioo of the partnership, and that transaction cannot be
declaTed fraudulent a.t la.won the ground simply that the firm
was at the time insolvent, or was made so by the a:ct of making
these notes.
2. If the partners composing the firm of Edwards & Wigginton had by agreement, in good faith, mortgaged or assigned all
the assets of the firm, for the purpose of securing or paying the
debts owing by them individually to McCune and Wigginton,
respectively, though with the intention of giving them a preference (\"Pr the firm creditors, the transaction could not be

Ganoasn-Pscx Gaocsnr Co. vs. MCCUNE. -161'

impeached. If, on the other hand, they had given these individ-

GuDDA.RD-P.ECK GnocEn.Y

Co.

vs. McCu.NB.
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ual creditors a mortgage on the ﬁrm property, and to secure

their individual debts, with the understanding that they should

continue in possession of the property, and sell and dispose of

it in the usual course of business, the mortgage would have

been fraudulent and void as to the other creditors. The object

in giving these notes in the name of the ﬁrm to McCune and

VVigginton was not to give them a preference over the part-

nership creditors, but was to put them all on an equal footing,

so that they might share alike in the distributiorn of the ﬁrm’s

assets in case of the ﬁrm’s assignment. So long as a ﬁrm

exists, it has the same right to dispose of the ﬁrm assets that an

individual has of his own property, providing always that such

disposition is bona ﬁdc; but, if no lien has_ been created by it

on its ﬁrm assets, and the ﬁrm assigns, as in the case at bar,

then the ﬁrm creditors must be ﬁrst paid. That the debts of

McCune and Wiggin-ton, when ﬁrst created, were the individual

debts of the members of the ﬁrm of McCune & Wigginto-n,

seems clear. “\Vhere there is a separate loan of money to one

of several joint adventurers for the purpose of founding a part-
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nership or joint adventure, the ﬁrm, when formed, will not be

liable for the advance, for the case is not distinguishable

from one where several persons are to con-tribute their

separate proportions of money towards a common fund

for joint purposes, and each is to borrow and does bor-

row his own share upon his own separate ac-count and

credit. In short, in all cases of this sort, in order to bind the

ﬁrm, the intended partner must either have had an original

authority to purchase goods or borrow money upon the joint

account, and have exercised that authority by a purchase or

loan on their account ; and not on his own exclu-

sive credit, or the transaction must have been sub-

sequently ratiﬁed and adopted by the ﬁrm as one for

which they were originally liable, or for which they now

elect to give their joint security.” Story, Partn. § 148. See,

also, Donally vs. Ryan, 41 Pa. St. 306; Wild rs. Erath, 27 La.

Ann. 171. The doctrine that ﬁrm assets must be ﬁrst appplied

to the payment o-f the ﬁrm’s debts is a principle of administra-

tion adopted by the courts when from any cause they are called

upon to wind up the ﬁrm business, and ﬁnd that the members

have made no disposition or charge upon its assets. This is

impeached. If, on the other hand, they had given these individual creditors a mortgage on the firm property, and t-0 secure
their individual debts, with the understanding that they should
continue in possession of the property, and sell and dispose of
it in the usual course of business, the mortgage would have
been fraudulent and void as to the other creditors. The object
in giving these nt>tes in the name of the firm to McCune and
Wigginton was not to give them a preference over the partnership creditors, but wa.s to put them all on an equal footing.
so that they might share alike in the distributicm of the firm's
assets in case of the firm's assignment. So long as a firm
exists, it has the same right to dispose of the firm assets that an
individual bas of his own property, providing always that such
disposition is bona fide; but, if no lien has. been created by it
on its firm assets, and the firm assigns, as in the case at bar,
then the firm creditors must be first paid. That the debts of
McCune antl \Vigginfon, w-hen first created, were the individua:l
debts of the members of the firm of McCune & Wigginton,
seems clear. "Where there is a separate loan of money to one
of several joint adventurers for the purpose of founding a partnership or joint adventure, the firm, when formed, will not be
liable for the a:dvance, for the case is not distinguishable
from -0ne where several persons are to contribute their
separate propo1·tions of money towards a common fund
for join1: purposes, and each is to borrow and does borrow hie own share upon his own separate acoount and
credit. In short, in all cases of this sort, in order to bind the
firm, the intended partner must either have bad an origin.al
authority to purchase goods or borrow money upon the joint
:i0<'ount, and have exercised that authority by a purchase or
loan on their account ; and not on his own exclusive credit, or the transaction must have been subsequently ratified and adopted by the firm as one for
which they were originally liable, or for which they norw
elect to give their joint security." Story, Partn. § 148. See,
also, Donally vs. Ryan, 41 Pa. St. 306; Wild tis. Erath, 27 La.
Ann. 171. The doctrine that firm assets must be first appplied
to the payment of the firm's debts is a principle of administration adopted by the courts when from any ca.use they are called
npon to wind up the firm business, and find that the members
have made no disposition or charge upon its assets. This is
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accomplished by marshalling the assets, by ap-plying the part-

nership property to the partnership debts. The right of the

ﬁrm creditors “is worked out through the partners,” the mean-

ing of which is that they may demand the primary application

of the ﬁrm assets to the payment of their debts. Schmidlapp rs.

C’-urric, 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530. As the right of the ﬁrm

creditors is “worked out through the partners,” it neo-

essarily follows that whatever the ﬁrm, with the con-

senrt of all its members, does in good faith with

the partnership property, is binding upon them. If, then,

the ﬁrm had the right to assume, by and with the con-sent of

-both of its members, the individual debts due by them respect-

ively to McCune and Wigginton, when this was done, and they

gave the ﬁrm notes, and thereby assumed their payment, they

became ﬁrm debts, and should share pro rat-a in the distribu-

tion of the proceeds arising from the sale of the partnership

assets with the other ﬁrm creditors. This is said to be the con-

version of debts, so that, if they were separate debts of the re-

spective partners,they become, by the consent of the memhersnf

the ﬁrm, the join-t debts of all the partners, and will thereafter
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be treated as such. Story, Partn. §§ 368, 369; Ea: parts Pecle, 6

Ves. 601; Ex parte Jackson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131; Sicgcl vs. Ohidsey, 28

Pa. St. 279. That the ﬁrm had the right to assume the individ-

ual debts of its members and thereby convert them into debts

of the ﬁrm, in the absence of fraud, and that the individual

indebtedness was suﬁicien-t consideration for such promise by

the ﬁrm, the authorities abundantly show. Siegel vs. Clzidsey,

supra; Case vs. Ellis (Ind. App.) 30 N. E. 907. From these con-

siderations we are of the opinion the judgment of the court of

appeals should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that

court, with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit

court, and remand the cause for a new trial in conformity with

the opinion of this court. It is so ordered.

All concur.

Norm: See Me0hem's Elem. of Partn., § 288, and cases there cited.

I
/

accomplished by marshalling the assets, by ap·plying the partnership property to the partnership debts. The right of the
firm creditors "is worked <>1,lt through the partners," the meaning "Of which is that they may demand the primary application ·
of the firm assets to the payment of their debts. Schmidlapp t;8.
Currie, 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530. As the right of the firm
creditors is "worked out through the partners," it neceSStlrily follows that whatever the firm, with the COD·
sen.it of all its members, d0€9 in good faith with
the partnership property, is bindin~ upon them. If, theu,
the firm had the right to assume, by and with the con.sent of
bath of its members, the individual debts due by them respectively to McCune and Wigginton, when this was done, and they
gave the firm notes, and thereby assumed their payment, they
became firm debts, and should share pro rata in the distributioo of the proct>eds arising from the sale of the partnership
assets with the oither firm creditors. This is said to be the COD·
version en debts, so th.at, if they were separate debts of the re.epective partners, they become, by the consent of the mc-mue:·soi'
the firm, the joint debts of all the partners, and will thereafter
be treated as such. Story, Partn. §§ 368, 369; E:c pa-rte Peele, 6
Ves. 601; E:r pm·te Ja-ckson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131; Siegel t:s. Ohidsey, !:!8
Pa. St. 279. That the firm had the right to assume the indiYidnal debts of its membeors and thereby convert them into debts
of the firm, in the a.bsence of fraud, and that the individual
indebtedness was sufficient consideration for such promise by
the firm, the authorities abundantly show. Siegel vs. Cltidsc!t,
81tpra; Gase vs. Ellis (Ind. App.) 30 N. E. 907. Fr001 these considera•tions we are of the <>pinion the judgment of the court of
nppeals should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that
court, with directions to reverse the judgment o·f the circuit
court, and remand the oouse for a new trial in conformity with
the opinion of this oourt. It is so ordered.
All concur.
NOTE: Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 288, and cases there cited.
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f RODGERS vs. MERANDA.

vs.

MERANDA..

Supreme Court of Ohio, 1857.

7 Ohio St. 180. '

The original proceeding was a petition for an order of dis-

tribution of the separate or individual assets of an insolvent

debtor, as between separate and partnership creditors.

It appears from the record, that about the 13th of June,

1854, Peter Murray, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment

j

RODG ERB vs. MERAND.-\..

Bu.preme Court of Ohio, 1851.

of all his estate, real and personal, to the plaintiﬁ, in trust for

the payment of his individual creditors, in proportion to the

7 Ohio St. 180.

amount of their respective demands. Though possessed of a

large and valu-able estate, it had been found insutlicien-t to pay

his separate debts and liabilities, in full. At the date of his

failure and assignment, he was a partner with John W. Dever,

in a mercantile ﬁrm, under the name and style of Dever &

Murray; which ﬁrm had also become insolvent, and likewise

Dever; and the ﬁrm had made an assignment of the partner-

ship properly and assets, about the same time, to John Mer-

and-a., one of the defendants, in trust for the payment of the

joint debts or liabilities of the ﬁrm.
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In this condition of affairs, the partnership credito-is,

although they had ﬁled their claims with the assignee of the

ﬁrm for their distributive shares out of the partnership pI'0'p-

erty, claimed the right to be admitted to a participation in the

dividends of the separate estate of Murray, pari passu with

his individual creditors; while the latter denied the right, and

insisted that his separate estate shall be applied to the satis-

faction of his individual debts in preference to his partnership

debts.

It appeared further, that Murray, besides advancing his part

of the capital of the ﬁrm, also loaned money to the ﬁrm to a

large amount, for which he held the obligation of the ﬁrm,

which obligation, by the assignment of Murray, came into

the hand-s of the plaintiff, who presented the same to the

assignee of the ﬁrm, and claimed to have the same paid out of

the as-sets of the ﬁrm, part passu with the other partnership

debts. The other creditors resisted this, and plaintiff asked an

order of distribution to that eifect out of partnership assets.

A

The or1gin-a1 proceeding was a petition for a.n order of distribution of the separate or indiviqnal assets of an in.solvent ,
debtor, as between separate and partnership creditors.
It appears from the record, that about the 13th of June,
1854, Peter Murray, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment •
of all 11is estate, real and perS()nal, to the plaintiff, in trust for
the payment of hi.s individual creditors, in proportion to the
amount of their respective demands. Though possessed of a
large and vnlu·a ble estate, it bad been found insufficient to pay
his separate debts and lia.bilitie13, in full. At the date of his
failure a:nd assignment, he was a partner with John W. Dever,
_in a mercantile firm, under the name and style of Dever &
Murray; which firm bad also become insolvent, and likewise
Dever; and the firm had made an assignment of the partnership property and assets, about the same time, to John Mer- ...
anda., one of the defendants, in trust for the payment of the
joint debts or liabilities of the firm.
In this condition of affairs, the pa;rtnersbip credifors,
_although they had filed their claims with the a8Sig'nee of the ,
firm for their distributive shares out of the partnership property, claimed the right to be admitted to a participation in thf&
dividends of the separate l'1iitate of Murray, pari passu with
bis individual creditors; while the latter denied the right, an.d
insisted that his separate eBtate shall be applied to the satis- ·
faction of his individual debts in preference to his partnership
. debts.
It appeared further, that Murray, besides advancing his part
of the capital of the firm, also loaned money to the firm to a
large amount, for which be held the obligation of the ftrm,
Which obligation, by the assignment of Murray, came into ·
the hands of the plaintiff, who presented the eame to the
assignee of the firm, and claimed to have the same paid out of
the assets of the firm, pari passu with the other partnership
debts. The other creditors res1sted this, and plaintiff asked an
order of distribution to that effect out of partnersb..ip assets.
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Defendants demurred to the petition. The court below sus-

tained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defend-

ants. And thi petition in error is ﬁled to review and reverse

that judgment.

W. White and S. (E R. Mason, for plaintiff.

Anthony <£ Goodc, for defendant Meranda.

Gonovcr d2 Graighead, for defendants Tracy, Irwin & Co.

Defendants demurred to the petition. The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defendant..9. And this petition in error is filed to review and reverse
that judgment.

BARTLEY, C. J. Two questions are presented for determinw

tion in this case. The ﬁrst is, whether in the distribution of

W. White and 8. & R. Uason, for plaintiff.

the assets of insolvent partners, where there are both indi-

vidual and partnership as-sets, the individual creditors of a

Anthony & Goode, for defendant Meranda.

partner are entitled to be ﬁrst paid out of the individual effects

of their debtor, before the partnership creditors are entitled to

Conover & Craighead, for defendants Tracy, Irwin & Co.

any dis-tributio-n therefrom. It is well settled that, in the dis-

tribution of the assets of insolventpartners, the partnership

creditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership effects;

so that the partnership debts must be settled before any divi-

sion of the partnership funds can be made amon-g the indi-

vidual creditors of the several partners. This is incident to

the nature of partnership property. It is the right of a part-
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ner to havethe partnership property applied to the purposes

of the ﬁrm; and the separate interest of each partner in the

partnership property is ‘his share of the surplus after the pay-

ment of the partnership debts. And this rule, which gives the

partnership creditors a preference in the partnership effects,

would seem to produce, in equity, a; corres-ponding and cor-

relative rule, giving a preference to the individual creditors of

a partner in his separate property-; so that partnership credit-

ors can, in equity, only look to the surplus of the separate prop-

erty of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts;

and, on the other hand, the individual creditors of a partner

can, in like manner, only claim distribution from the debtor’s

interest in the surplus o-f the joint fund, after the satisfaction

of the partnership creditors, The correctness of this rule, how-

ever, has been much controverted; and there has not been

always a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for it

by those courts which have adhered t-o it. By some, it has been

said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations

of convenience; by others, that it rests on the basis that a

BARTLEY, C. J. Two questions are presented for determinar
tion in this case. The first is, whether in the distribution of
the assets of insolvent partners, where there are both individual and partnership assets, the individual creditors ()f a
1 partner are entitled to be first paid out of the individual effects
of their debtor, before the partnership creditors are entitled to
any distribution therefrom. It is well settled that, in the di.8tributio.n of the assets of insolven.t· partners, the partnership
, -0reditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership effects;
so that the partnership debts must be settled before any division of the partnership funds can be made among the individual creditors of the several partners. Thi-s is incident to
the nature of partnership property. It is the right of a partner to have the partnership property applied to .t he purpoees
of the firm; and th~ separate interest of eaoh partner in the
partnership property is his share of the surplus after the payment of the partnership debts. And this rule, whiob gives the
partnership creditors a preference in the pa.rtnership effects,
would seem to produce, in equity, a corresponding and correlative rule, giving a preference to the individual creditors of
a partner in his separate property-; so that partnership creditors can, in equit11, only look to the surplus of the separate property of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts;
and, on the other band, the individual creditors of a partnercan, in like manner, only claim distribution from the debtor's
interest in the surplus o·f the joint fund, after the satisfactioa
of the partnership creditors~ The correctness of this rule, however, has been much controverted; and there has not been
always a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for it
by those courts which have adh~red to it. By some, it has been
said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations
of convenience; by others, that it rests on the basis that a
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primary liability attaches to the fund on which the credit was

465

given—-that in contracts with a partnership, credit is given on

the supposed responsibility of the ﬁrm; while in contracts with

a partner as an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed on

his separate responsibility: 3 Kent Com. 65. And again, others

have assigned as a reason for the rule that the joint estate is

supposed to be beneﬁted to the extent of every credit which is

given to the ﬁrm, and that the separate estate is, in like manner,

presumed to be enlarged by the debts contracted by the individ-

ual partner; and that there is consequently a clear equity in

conﬁning the creditors, as to preferences, to each estate respect-

ively, which has been thus beneﬁted by their transactions;

.lIcC-‘ulloh rs. Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill (Md) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271.

But these reasons are not entirely satisfactory. So important a

rule must have a better foundation to‘ stand upon than mere

considerations of convenience; and practically it is undenia-

ble that those who give credit to a partnership look to the indi-

vidual responsibility of the partners, a well as that of the

‘ﬁrm; and also, those who contract with a partner in his sep-

arate capacity, place reliance on his various resources or
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means, whether individual or joint. And inasmuch as indi-

vidual debts are often contracted to raise means which are put

into the business of a partnership, and also partnership effects

often withdrawn from the ﬁrm and appropriated to the sepa-

Izrte use of the partners, it cannot be practically true that the

separate estate has been beneﬁted to the extent of every credit

given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate has

retained from the separate estate of each partner the beneﬁt

of every credit given to the ﬁrm. Unsa'tisfactoryTeasons may

weaken conﬁdence in a rule which is well founded.

What then is the true foundation of the rule which gives

the individual creditor a preference over the partnership cred-

itor, in the distribution of the separate estate of a partner?

To say that it is a rule of general equity, ais has been some-

times said, is not a satisfactory solution of the diﬂiculty; for

the very question is, whether it be a rule of equity or not. In

the distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality is equity;

and to say that the rule which gives the individual creditor a

preference over the partnership creditor in the separate estate

of a partner is a rule of equality, does not still rid the subject

of difficulty. For leaving the rule to stand, which gives the

59

primary liability attaches to the fund on which the credit was
given-that in ce>ntraots with a partnership, credit is given on
the supposed responsibility of the firm; while in ce>ntracts with
a partner as an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed e>n
his separate responsibility:
3 Kent Com. 65 • .And again, others
I
have assigned as a reason for the rule that the je>int e.state is
supposed to be benefited to the extent of every credit which is
given to the firm, and that the separate estate is, in like manner,
presumed to be enlarged by the debts contracted by the individual partner; and that there is consequently a clear equity in
<-:onfining the creditors, as to preferences, to each estate respeot·
b·ely, which has been thus benefited by their transactions;
JleCulloh iw. Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271.
But these reasons are not entirPly satisfactory. So important a
rule mus't have a better foundation to· stand upon than mere
considerations of convenience; and practically it is undenia.
ble tha.t those who ~ive credH to a partnership look to the individual responsibility of the partners, as well as that of the
_firm; and also, those who contract with a partner in his sepamte capacit,v, pla<'.e reliance on his various resources or
means, whPtht•r individual or joint. And inasmuch as individual rl<'bts are often contracted to raise means wllich are put
into the business of a partne1·ship, and also partnership effects
often withdrawn from the firm and approp1·iated to the separa'te use of the part1wrs, it cannot be practically true that the
separate estate has been brnefitrd to the extent of en>ry credit
given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate bas
retained from tlw sPparate estate of each partner the benefit
of every credit given to the firm. Unsatisfactory""l·easons may
weaken confidence in a rule which is well founded.
What then is the true foundn tion of the rule which gives
the individual Cl'Pditor a prl'f Pl'l'\llte Over the partJH~l'sbip creditor, in the distl'ibution of the separate estate of a partner?
To say that it is a rule of g<"neml equity, ais has been sometimes said, is not a satisfactory solution of the .d ifficulty; for
the very question is, whether it be a rule of equity or not. In
the distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality is equity;
and to eay that the rule which gives the individual creditor a
preference e>ver the partnership creditor in the separate estate
of a partner is a rule of equality, doe.snot ·still rid the subject
of difficulty. }~or leaving the rule to stand, which gives the
ti9
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preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property,
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and perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors,

is, perhaps, rarely attainable. That it is, however, more equal

and just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised,

the joinit estate. cannot be successfully controverted. It orig-

inated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership

creditors in the joint estate, and for the purposes of justice,

became necessary as a correlative rule. \Vith whart semblance

of equity could one class of creditors, in preference to the rest,

be exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, and, concur-

rently with the rest, entitled to the separate estate of each part-

ner? The joint creditors are no more meritorious than the sepa-

ra.te creditors; and it frequently happens, that -the separate

debts are oontra.cted to raise means to carry on the partnership

business. Independent of this rule, the joint creditors have,as a

general thing, a great advantage over the separate creditors.

Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, they

take their distributive share in the surplus of the separate

estate of each of the several partners, after the payment of the
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separate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity, that where

one creditor is in asituation to have two or more distinct secur-

ities or funds to rely on, the court will not allow him, neglect-

ing his other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the

prejudice of those who have a claim upon that, and no other to

depend on. And besides the advantage which the joint credit-

ors have, arising from the fact that the partnership fund is

usually much the largest, as men in trade, in a great majority

of cases, embark their all, or the chief part of their property, in

it; and besides their distributive rights in the urplus of the

separate estate of the other partners, the joint creditors have a

degree of security for their debt and facilities for recovering

them, which the separate creditors have not; they can sell both

the joint and the separate estate on an execution, while the

separate creditor can sell only the separate property and the

interest in the joint eﬁ’ec-ts that may remain to the partners,

after the accounts of the debts aznd effects of the ﬁrm are taken,

as between the ﬁrm and its creditors, and also as be-

tween the partners themselves. With all these advan-

tages in favor of partnership creditors, it would be grossly in-

equitable to allow them the exclusive beneﬁt of the joint fund,

~A~ _ _

preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property,
and perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors,
is, perhaps, rarely attainable. That it is, however, more equal
and just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised,
consilrtently with the preference to the partnership creditors in
the joinit estate, cannot be successfully controverted. It originated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership
creditors in the joint estate, and for the purposes of justice,
became necessary as a correlative rule. \Vith what semblance
of equity could one class of creditors, in preference to the rest,
be exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, and, coucur~
rently wi.th the rest, entitled to the separate estate of each partner? The joint creditol'6 are no more meritorious than the separate creditors; and it frequently happens, that the separate
debts are contracted to rajse means to carry 001 the partnership
business. Independent of this rule, the joint creditors have,as a
general rthing, a great advantage over the separate creditors.
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, they
take their distributive share in the surplus of the separate
' etitate of eaclt of the several pm·tners, alter the payment of the
separate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity, that where
one creditor is in a situation to have two or more distinct secur·
ities or funds to rely on, the court will not allow him, neglectin~ J1is other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the
prejudice of tho~e who have a claim upon that, and no other to
df:'pend on. And lx:sides the advantage which the joint creditors have, arising from the fact that the partnership fond is
usually much the larg<•st, a1il men in trade, in a great majority
of cases, embark their all, or the chief part of their property, in
it; and besides their distributive rights in the surplus of the
separate estate of the other partners, the joint creditors have a
degree O'f security for their debts and facilities for recovering
1hem, which the separate creditors have not; they can sell both
the joint and the separate estate o.n an execution, while the
separate creditor can sell only the separate property and the
interest in the joint effects that may remain to the partners,
after the a.ccounts of the debts and effects of the firm are taken,
as between the firm and its creditors, and also as between the partners themselves. With all these advantages in favor of partnership creditors, it would be grossly inequitable to allow them the exclusive benefit of the joint fund,
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and then a concurrent right with individual creditors to an

equal distribution in the separate estate of each partner.

VVhat equality and justice is there in allowing partnership

creditors, who have been paid eighty per cent on their debts,

out of the joint fund, to come in pa-ri pa-ssu with the individual

creditors of one of the partners, whose separarte property will

not pay twenty per cent to his separate creditors? How could

that be said to be an equal distribution of the assets of insolv-

ents among their creditors? It is true that an occasional case

may arise where the join-t effects are proportionably less than

the separate assets of an insolvent -partner. But, as a general

thing, a very decided advantage is given to thepartnership

creditors, notwithstanding this preference of the individual

creditors in the separate property. And that advantage, arising

out of the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoidable.

Some general rule is necessary; and that must rest on the basis
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of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the

joint effects, and their further right to some claim in the sep-

ararte property of each of the several partners. The preference,

therefore, of the individual creditors of a partner in the distri-

bution of his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity,

from the preference of partnership creditors in the partnership

funds, and their advantages in having different funds to resort

to, while the individual creditors have but the one.

It has been argued that partnership contract-s are several

as well as joint, and consequently have an equal legal

right with separate creditors upon the individual prop-

erty of a partner. But the right of partn-ership creditors

against the separate property of individual partners in

proceedings at law, is not in controversy. The question

here relates to the relative equitable rights of two classes

of creditors in the distribution of the estates of insolv-

ents. Much of the confusion upon this subject has prob-

ably arisen from confounding the abstract rights of creditors in

proceedings at larw, with their relative rights to an equitable

adjustment in m-arshalling_ the assets of insolvents in chancery.

The rule here adopted appears to have been followed in

Engl-and for near a century and a half. We ﬁnd it distinctly

recognized in the case of Em parte Orowder, 2 Vernon 706, de-

cided in 1715. And i-n Ea: partc Cook, 2 Peere YVill'inms 500,

Lord Chancellor Kmo declared it settled as a rule of conven~

and then a concurrent right with individual creditors to an
t>qual distribution in the separate estate of each partner.
What equality and justice is there in allowing paritnership
creditors, who have been paid eighty per cent on their debts,
out of the joint fund, to come in pari passu with the individual
creditors of one of the partners, whose separarte property will
not pay twenty per cent to his separate creditors? How could
that be said to be an equal distribution of the assets of insolvents among their c·reditors? It is true that an occasional case
may arise where the joint effects are proportionably less than
the separate assets of an insolvent ·p artner. But, as a general
tbing, a very decided advantage is given to the · partnership
creditors, notwithstanding thHi preference of the individual
credifors in the separate property. And that advantage, arising
out of. the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoidable.
Arone general rule is necessary; and that muin rest on the basis
of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the ,
joint effects, and their further right to S()me claim in the sepamte property of each of the several partners. The preference,
therefore, of the individual creditors of. a partner in the distributi-On of. his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity,
from the preference of partnership creditors in the partnership .,
funds, and their advantages i-n having different funds to resort
to, while the individual creditors have but the one.
It has been argued that pa.rtnerS'hip contracts are several
es well as joint, and consequently have an equal legal
right with separate creditors upon the individual property of e. partner. But the right <>f partnership creditors
against the seJ)'arate property elf individual p:utners it1
proceedings at la.w, is not in controversy. The question
·hf>re relates to the relative equitable riglita of two classes
of credit-0rs in the distribution of the estates of insolvents. Much of tbe confusion upon this subject bas probably arisen from confounding the abstract rights of creditors in .
proceedings at law, with their relative rights to an equitable
adjustment in marshalling the assets of in.solvents in chancery.
The rule here ad<>pted appea1•s to have been followed in
EngJ.a.nd for near a century and a half. We find it distinctly
recognized in tbe case of Ex parte Orou;der, 2 Vernon 706, decided in 1715. And in Ex parte Cook, 2 Peere WiUi.llms 500,
Lord ChancellO'r KING declared it settled as a rule of conven-
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jen-ce in bankruptcy that joint creditors should be ﬁrst paid out
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of the partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the

separate estate of each partner; and if there be a surplus of the

joint estate after paying the join-t creditors, the share of each

partner should be distributed to his separate creditors; and if,

on t-he other hand, there should be a surplus of the separate

estate of a partner after the satisfaction of his individual cred-

itors, it ‘should be applied to any deﬁciency of -the joint funds

in the satisfaction of the partnership debts. Lord HARD\VICKE

followed the same rule, in Em parte Hunter, 1 Atkins 228. But

it appears that in Ea: pa-rte Hodgson, 2 Bro. ch. c., decided in

1785, Lord Tnunnow made an innovation on the rule in bank-

ruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between joint

ajnd separate creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the

bankrupt’s estate, and his moiety of the joint estate; and that

the joint creditors ought to come in part pa-ssu with the sepa-

rate creditors. This ruling of Lord Tmmnow appears to have

had reference to proceedings at law, and in bankruptcy, for it is

said that, consistently therewith, it was competenrt for the

assignees to conﬁne the joint creditors, where there was a joint
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estate, to that fund exclusively, by ﬁling a bill in equity against

the other partners, and obtaining an injunlction on the order

in bankruptcy. But how far this innovation went, in practice,

to affect the ultimate righ.t-s of the parties, is wholly imma-

terial, inasmuch as Lord Louonnonouon, in Ea: parte Elton, 3

Ves. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which previously

prevailed, holding thait the rule introduced by the case of Hodg-

son was inconvenient, inasmuch as every order which he

passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a‘ dividend out of

the separate estate of a partner, would give rise to a bill in

equity, on the part of the separate creditors, to restrain the

order, and secure the application of the separate estate to the

saitisfaction of the separate debts; and although it was ad-

judged that a joint creditor might prove his claim under a sep-

ararte commission, yet he could not receive any dividend there-

from, until the amount of his distribution in the joint fund

could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors

satisﬁed. And the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in this case,

puts an end to the assertion, which has been sometimes made,

that this rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy.

Touching this, he said: “If it stands as a rule of law, we must

;i ence in bankruptcy that joint creditors should be first paid out
of the partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the
separate estate of ea'Ch partner; and if there be a surplus of the
joint estate after paying the joint creditors, the share of each
partner should be distributed to his separate creditors; and if,
o-n the <>ther hand, there should be a surplus of the separate
estate of a partner after the satisfaction of his individual creditors, it 'should be a·pplied to any dPficiency oif the j<>int fonds
in the saUsfaction of the partnership debts. Lord HARDWICKB
followed the same rule, in Ex parte Hunter, 1 Atkins 228. But
it appears that in E:D parte Hodgson, 2 Bro. ch. c., decided in
1185, Lord THURLOW made an innovation on the rule in oonkruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between joint
~nd separa..te creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the
bankrupt's estate, and his moiety <>f the joint estate; and that
the joint creditors ought to oome in pari passu with the separate creditors. This ruling of J,,ord THURLOW appears to have
had reference to proceedings at law, and in bankruptcy, for it is
~aid that, consistently therewith, it was coimpeterut for the
assignees to confine the joint creditora, where there was a joint
~state, to that fund exclusively, by filing a bill in equity against
the other partners, and obtaining an injunction on the order
in bankruptcy. But how far this innovation went, in practice,
to affect the ultimate right·s o.f the parties, is wholly immaterial, irnasmuch as Lord LouaHnonouan, in Ea: parte Elton, 3
Ves. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which previously
prevailed, holding thrut the rule introduced by the case of Hodgson W18S inconvenient, im1smuch as every order which he
passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a· dividend out of
the separttte estate of a partner, would give rise to a bill in
equity, on the part of the separate creditoNJ, to restrafa the
order, and secure the application of the separate estate to the
srutisfaction of the separate debts; and although it was adjudged that a joint creditor might prove his claim under a sepiiract:e commission, yet he could not receive any dividend therefrom, until the amount of his distribution in the joint fund
could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors
satisfied. And the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in this case,
puts an end to the assertion, which has been sometimes made,
that this rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy.
Touching this, he said: "If it stands as a rule of law. we must
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consider, what I have always understood to be settled by a vast
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variety of cases, not only in bankruptcy, but -upon general equity,

that the joint estate is applicable to partnership debts, and the

separate estate to the separate debts.” Again, in speaking of

the inconvenience of Lord T1=nmLow’s rule, he said, “What I

order here to-day, sitting in bankruptcy, I shall forbid tomor-

row, sitting in chancery; for it is quite of course to stop the

dividend on a bill ﬁled. The plain rule of distribution is that each

estate shall bear its own debts. The equity is so plain, that it is of

course upon a bill ﬁled.”

Lord Ennon, with some characteristic doubts and misgiv-

ings, consistently followed this rule of his immediate prede-

cessor: Gray vs. Chiswcll, 9 Ves. 118; Dutton vs. Morrison, 17

Ves. 194, 207. And it has ever since remained the settled larw

of England, applicable, not simply to proceedings in bank-

ruptcy, but as a general rule of equity, in the distribustion of the

assets of insolvents. -

The supposition that this rule arose from any provision of

the statutes concerning bankruptcy, in England, is a mistake;

it was long and well settled as a rule of equity, before any
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statute was enacted touching this subject. It does not appear

to have been sanctioned by any positive enactment until the

statute of 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 16.

It is not a little remarkable that this rule of equity, so long

settled and acted on in England, should have encountered so

much opposition as it has in the courts of the several states in

this country.

In Pennsylvania the rule was discarded, by a majority of the

court, in the case of Bell rs. Newman, 5 Serg. & R. 78, decided

in 1819. And the rule adopted in that case was that where a

surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and also to indi-

vidual creditors, and leaving joint assets and also separate

assets, the separate creditors should receive as much out of the

separate property as the joint creditors could receive from the

separate portion or share of such partner in the joint property;

and th-at, then, the balance of the separate property should be

divided pro rata among both classes of creditors. This was

placed partly on the ground of equity, and partly on the ground

of a statute directing equality of distribution of the assets of

deceased persons. Judge Gmson. however, dissented, insisting

consider, what I have always understood to be settled by a vast
variety of cases, not only in bankruptcy, but ·upon general equity,
that the joint estate is applicable to partnership debts, and the
separate estate to the separate debts." Again, in speaking of
the inconvenience of Lord TnuRLow's rule, be said, "What I
order here to-day, sitting in bankruptcy, I shall forbid tomorrow, sitting in chancery; for it is quite of course to l!ltop the
dividend on a bill filed. The plain rul.e of distribution is that each
estate shall bear its own debts. Tlie equity is so plain, tllat it is of
course upon a bill filed."

Lord Er.uos, with some characteristic doubts and misgivings, consistently followed this rule of his immediate pred~
cessor: G ra11 1:8. Chiswell, 9 Ves. 118; D1ttton vs. Morrison, 17
Ves. 194, 20_7. And it bas ever since remained the settled laiw
of England, applicable, not simply to proceedings in bankruptcy, but a.s a general rule of equity, in the distribwtion of the
assets of insolvents.
The supposition that this rule arose from any provision of
the statutes concerning bankruptcy, in England, is a mistake;
it was long and well settlc>d as a rule of equity, before any
statute was enacted touching this subject. It does not appear
to have been sanctioned by any positive enactment until the
statute of 6 Geo. JV, c. 16, § 16.
It is not a little remarkable that thls rule of equity, so long
settled and acted on in England, should have encountered so
much opposition as it has in the courts of the several states in
this country.
In Pennsylvania the rule was discarded, by a majority of the court, in the case of Bell rs. Ne1oman, 5 Serg. & R. 78, decided
in 1819. And the rule adopted in that case was that where a
surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and alS-O to individual creditors, and leaving joint assets and also separate
assets, the separate creditors should receive as much out of the
separate property as the joint creditors could receive from the
separate portion or share of such partner in the joint proi}erty;
and that, then, the balance of the separate property should be
divided pro rata among both classes of creditoM. This wu
placed partly on the ground of equity, and partly on the ground
of a statute directing equality of distribution of the aBSets ot
deceued persons. Judge GIBSON. however, dissented, insisting
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forcibly on the rule adopted in England, as a general principle
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founded in equity.

And it has been insisted that this case did not strictly fall

within the application of the principle, inasmuch as the estate

to be distributed in that case was the estate of a surviving

partner, against which the claims of the joint creditors were as

pu-rely legal as those of the separate creditors. And Chief

Justice TILGHMAN remarked, in the opinion in the case, that

“no rule was intended to be laid down which may aﬁect cases

differently circumstanced.”

The case of Sperry’s Estate, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 347, did not

directly aﬂ’eot the question, inasmuch as it came fully within

the exception, that where there is no joint fund, and no solvent

partner, -the separate and joint creditors should be paid ratably

out of the separate estate. The question was again brought to

the attention of the court in that state, in Walker vs. Eyth, 25

Pa. St. 216, where the court express the opinion that it is a rule

of equity “that, where there a.re partnership and separate

creditors, each estate should be applied exclusively to the pay-

ment of its own creditors, the joint estate to the joint creditors,
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and the separate estate to the separate creditors.” But the

question was not directly decided, the decision of the case being

put upon another ground. So that the general principle, in a

case proper for its applicati-on, is said to remain still an open

question in Pennsylvania: 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 483.

In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case

of -M0rris’s Adm'1' vs. Morri-s’s Adm’r, 4 Grattan 293, and was

elaborately discussed on both sides, but the court was equally

divided on the question of the adoption of the rule as a

general rule of equity, and the decision of the case was put on

other grounds.

In New Jersey, in the case of Wisham vs. Lippincott, 19 N. J .

Eq. 353, the rule was doubted as a. general princirfe. of equity,

although not decided.

In Vermont, in the case of Bardwell vs. Perry, 19 Vt. 292, 47

Am. Dec. 687, the rule was discarded as a principle of equity,

with this qualiﬁcation, that the separate creditors could require,

in equity, that the joint creditors should ﬁrst exhaust the part-

nership funds, before coming in with the separate creditors of

a partner for a pro ra-ta distribution out of his separate estate.

It does not appear that the doctrine of the English courts on

forcibly on the rule adopted in England, as a general principle
founded in equity.
And it bas been insisted that this case did not strictly fall
within the applioation of the principle, inasmuch as the e!Jtate
to be distributed in that case was the estate of a surviving
partner, against which the claims of the joint creditors were as
purely legal as tho8e <Jf the separate creditors. And Chief
Justice Tu,GHMAN remarked, in the opinion in the case, that
"no rule was intended to be laid dQwn which may atfect cases
differently circumstanced."
The case of Sperry's Estate, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 347, did not
directly affeot the question, inasmuch as it came fully within
the excepti()n, that where there is no joint fund, and no 90lvent
partner, the separate and joint creditors should be paid ratably
out of the separaite estate. The question was again brought tQ
the attention of the court in that state, in Walker vs. Eyth, 25
Pa. St. ~16, whe1'<? the court express the opinion that it is a rule
of equity "that, where there are partnership and separate
creditiors, each estate should be applied exclusively to the pay·
ment of its own creditor.a, the joint estate to the joint creditors,
and the separate estate to the separate creditors." But the
q uesti.on was n<>t directly decided, the decision of the case being
p111t upon another ground. So that the general prineiple, in a
case proper for its application, is said to remain still an open
question in Pennsylvania: 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 483.
In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case
of ·Morris's Adm.'1· vs. Morris's Adm'r, 4 Grattan 293, and was
elaborately discussed on both sides, but the court was equally
divided on the question of the adoption of the rule as a
general rule of equity, and the decision of the case was put on
othn grounds.
In New Jersey, in itbe case of Wisham 1'8. Lippincott, 19 N. J.
Eq. 353, the rule was doubted as a general princir> of equity,
although not decided.
In Vermont, in the case of Bardwell vs. Perry, 19 Vt. 292, 47
Am. Dec. 687, the rule was disoa.rded as a principle of equity,
with this qualification, that the separate creditors could require,
·in equity, that the joint creditors should first exhaust the part·
nel"Ship funds, before coming in with the separate creditors of
·a partner for a pro ra.ta distribut.ion out of bis separate estate.
It does not appear that the doctrine of the English oonrts on
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this subject was ever adopted as a rule of equity by the courts

in Massachusetts; but it is said that a statwte was enacted in

that state, in 1838, providing, as a rule for the distribution of,

insolvents’ estates, that the net proceeds of the separate estate

shall go to the separate creditors, and that of the partnership

estate to the joint creditors.

The rule appears to have been discarded in Connecticut, in

the case of Camp vs. Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; and

also in Mississippi, in the ease of Dahlgren vs. Duncan, 7 Sm. &

M. 280; but adopted in Alabama in Bridge vs. McCullough, 27

Ala. 661.

In New York it ha-s been -adjudged that “the rule of equity

was uniform and stringent, that the partnership property of a

ﬁrm shall all be applied to -the partnership debts to the exclu-

sion of the creditors of the individual members of the ﬁrm;

and that the creditors of the latter a-re to be ﬁrst paid out of the

separate effects of'their debtor, before the partnership cred-

itors can claim anything therefrom ;” Jackson vs. Cornell, 1

Sandf. Ch. 348. The history of the English rule was somewhat

reviewed by Chancellor KENT, in Murray vs. Jlurraiy, 5 John.
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(N. Y.) Ch. 60, and, upon full consideration, adopted as a rule

of equity, by Chancellor Wsnworrrn, in Wilder vs. Keelcr, 3

Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec. 781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige

19, 29 Am. l)ec. 738; Hutchinson vs. Smith, 7 Ib. 26.

The same doctrine was adopted by Chancellor Dnsaussnnn,

in South Carolina, as early as 1811, in Woddrop vs. Ward, 3

Des. Eq. 203; and also by the Supreme Court of New Hamp

shire, in J arr-is vs. Brooks, 23 N. H. 136.

Tl‘-he subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals

of Maryland, in M c0ulloh vs, Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill 96, 18 Am.

Dec. 271, wherein it was settled in that State that in equity the

individual creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference

over the joint creditors in the distribution of the separate

estate of their debtor.

And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Court

of the United States, on full consideration, in Murrill vs. Neill,

8 How. 414. And it has been liavid do-wn generally by the ele-

mentary writers, both in England and in this country, as a set-

tled rule of equity.

Story in his work on Partnership, ch.15, §§ 365 and 366, says:

this subject was ever adopted as a rule of equity by the courts
in Massachusetts; but it is said that a statulte was enacted in
that state, in 1838, providing, as a rule for the distribution ~
insolrnnts' estates, that the net proceeds of the separate eetate
shall go to the separate creditors, and that of the partnership
estate fo the joint creditors.
The rule appears to have been discarded in Conneotiout, in
the case of Camp vs. Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; and
also in l!ississippi, in the case of Dahlgren vs. Duncan, 7 Sm. &
M. 280; but adopted in Alabama in Bridge vs. McCullough, 21
Ala. 661.
In New York it has been adjudged that ''the rule of equity
was uniform and stl'ingent, that the partnership property of a
ftrm shall all be applied to ·the pa11nersbip debts to the exclusion of the creditors of_ the individual members of the firm;
and that the creditors of the latter are to be first paid out of the
separate effects of'their debtor, before the partnership cred·
itors can claim anything therefrom;" Jackson vs. Cornell, 1
8andf. Ch. 348. The history of the English rule was somewhat
reviewed by Chancellor KENT, in Mtwray vs. Murray, 5 John.
(N. Y.) Ch. 60, and, upon full oonsideration, adopted as a rule
of equity, by Chancellor WALWORTH, in Wilder vs. Keeler, 3
Pa!ge (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec. 781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige
19, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Hutchinson vs. SmUh, 1 lb. 26.
The s1mw doctrine was adopted by Chancellor DEsAussunE,
in South Caro.Jina, as early as 1811, in Woddrop vs. Ward, 3
Des. Eq. 203; and also by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Jarvis vs. Brooks, 23 X. H. 136.
'!Tue subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, in McCulloh vs, Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill 96, 18 Am.
Dec. 271, wherein it was settled in that State that in equity the
individual creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference
over the join'1: crediitor:s in the distribution of the separate
estate of their debtor.
And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Court
of the United States, on full consideration, in Murrill vs. Neill,
8 How. 414. And it has been ladd down generally by the elementa·ry writers, both in England and in t'his oountry, as a settled rule of equity.
Story in his work on Partner.ship, ch.15, § § 365 and 366, says:
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“This principle of equity jurisprudence, that the joint cred-

itors shall be entitled to a priority of payment out of the joint

eﬁects, and the separate creditors to a like priority out of the

separate effects, before the other class of creditors shall be en-

titled to any portion of the surplus, is not, perhaps, under all

its aspects, so purely artiﬁcial, as it has sometimes been sug-

gested to be; at least, it been has often relied upon, as the

dictate of natural justice.”

It is true, the'sa.me aurthor, in § 377, of his same work,

qualiﬁes this opinion as follows:

“ ‘This rule, although now ﬁrmly established,’ ‘stands as

muoh, if not more, upon the general ground of authority, and

the maxim, stare decisis, than upon the ground of any equitable

reasoning,’ and further, t-hat ‘After the repearted doubts which

have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent

judges, it is not, perhaps, too much to say that it rests on a

foundartion as questionable and as unsatisfactory as any rule

in the whole system of our jurisprudence.’ ” And he adds:

“Such as it is, however, it is for the public repose thaat i-t

should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to substitute any
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other rule, which would uniformly work with perfect equality and

equity in the mass of intricate transactions connected with com-

mercial operations.” .

Kent, in his C-omimentarie, 3 vol., 65, says: “The

joint creditors have the Primary claim upon the joint

fund in the distribution of the assets of bankrupts or insolvent

partners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before

any division of the funds takes place. So far as partner-

ship p.roperty has been acquired by means of partnership debts,

those debts have, in equity, a priority of claim to be discharged;

and the separate creditors are only entitled in equity to seek

payment from the surplus of the joint fund after satisfaction of

the joint debts. The equity of the rule, on the other hand, equally

requires that the joint creditors should only look to the surplus of

the separate estates of the partners, after payment of the separate

debts. It was a principle of the Roman law, and it has been

acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England,

and the United States, -that partnership debts must be paid out

of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out of

the private and sepurate estate of the individual partner. If

the partnership creditors cannot obtain payment out of the

"This principle of equity jurisprndence, that the joint creditors shall be entitled to a priority of payment out of the joint
effects, and the separate creditors to a like priority out of the
separate effects, before the other class of creditors shall be entitled to any portion of the surplus, is not, perhaps, under all
its aspects, so 1>urely artificial, as it bas S<>metimes been suggested to be; at least, it been has often relied upon, as the
dictate o.f natuml justice."
It is true, the· same allltbor, in § 377, of h,is same work,
qualifies this opinion as follows:
"'This rule, although now firmly established,' 'stands as
much, if not more, upon the general ground o.f authority, and
the maxim, stare decisis, than upon the ground of any equitable
.reasoning,' and further, that 'After the repeaited doubts which
have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent
judges, it is not, perhaps, too much to say that it rests on a
foundaition as que>stionable and as unsatisfacto.ry as any rnle
hi the whole system of our jurisprudence.'" And he adds:
"Such as it is, however, it is for the public repose thait it
should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to stibstitute any
other rule, which would uniformly work with perfect equality and
equity in the mass of intricate trawmctions connected with com·
mercial opera1tions." .
Kent, in bis Commentaries, 8 vol., 65, says: "The
joint creditors ·ba.ve the primary claim upon the joint
fnnd in the distribution of the assets of bankrupts or insofrent
partners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before
any division of the funds takes place. So far as partnership property has been acquired by means of partnership debts,
those debts have, in equity, a pI"iority of claim to be discharged;
and the sepnraite cI"editors are only entitled in equity to seek
payment from the surplus of the joint fund after saitisfaction of
the joint debts. The equity of the rule, on the other hand, equally
requires that tl11e joint creditors should only look to the surplm of
the separate estates of the partners, after payment of the separate
debts. It was a principle of the Roman law, and it has be~n
acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England,
and the United States, that partnership debts must be paid out
of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out of
the ·private and sepurate estate of the individual partner. If
the par.tnership creditors cannot obtain payment out of. the

Rononns vs. MERANDA. 4.-73

RODGERS VS. MERANDA..

partnership estate, they cannot in equity resort to the private

4-73

and separate estate, until private and eparate creditors are

satisﬁed; nor have the creditors of the individual partners any

claim upon the partnership property, until all the partnership

creditors are satisﬁed.” ,

It is argued, however, that this doctrine was overruled in

Ohio, in the case of G'r0svenm' vs. Austin, 6 Ohio Rep. 104, 25

Am. Dec. 743. It is true, that the reasoning of the court in the

opinion is to that eﬁect; but the case decided falls within one

of the acknowledged exceptions to the rule. Where the part-

nership has become insolvent, and there are n.o partnership

assets for distribution. and no living solvemt partner, it has

been uniformly conceded that the principle of the rule does not

apply. The case of Groin-enor vs. Austin was a bill in equity by

the creditors of the ﬁrm of Seymour Austin & Galvin Austin,

for a. distributive share with the individual creditors of Sey-

mour Austin out of the asets of -his separate estate in the

hands of his administrator. There were no partnership assets,

and both parties had died insolvent. This was not a case,

thereforevfor the application of the principle Sunder considera-
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tion, and Judge LANE, in delivering the opinion, says, as to

this rule: “This Court are -of opinion, that if any such rule

exist, it must have been of frequent application, and thus have

become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the

books, except the one in 9 Vesey, and the South Carolina case,

that touches such a doctrine, unless cases founded on the stat-

utes of bankruptcy. A claim so novel in a case necessarily of

such common occurrence, must be listened to with caution

amounting t-o jealousy,” etc. Touching the subject of this obiter

opinion, the following remarks o-f the Supreme Uourt of the

United States, in M urrill vs. Neill, supra, are in point:

“The rule in equity governing the administration of insolvent

partnerships is one of familiar acceptation and practice; it is

one which will be found to have been in practice in this country

from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been

generally, if not universally, received. This rule, with one or

two eccentric variations in the English practice which may be

noted hereafter, is believed to be identical with that prevailing

in England, and is this: that partnership creditors shall, in the

ﬁrst instance, be satisﬁed from the partnership estate; and sep-

arate or private creditors of the individual partners from the

60

partnership estate, they cannM in equity resort to the private
and separate eetait:e, until private and separate creditors are
sartisfied; nor have the creditors of the individual partners any
claim upon the partnersb1p property, until all the partnership
creditors are satisfied."
It is aTgued, however, that 1:.bh1 doctrine was overruled in
Ohio, in the case of Grost'enor vs . .Austin, 6 Ohio Rep. 104, 25
Am. Dec. 743. It is true, that the rea.soning of the oourt in the
opinion is to that effect; but the case decided falls within one
of the acknmvledged exceptioDB to the rule. Where the part· .
nership has become insolvent, and there are no partnership
assets for distribution. and no living solvewt partner, it has
been uniformly conceded that the principle of the rule does not
apply. The ca.se of Grosrenor vs . .Austin was a bill in equity by
the creditors of the firm of Seymour Austin & CalviD: Austin,
for a di•stributive share with the individual creditors of Seymour Austin out of the assets of ·his separate estate in the
hands of his administrator. There were no partnership ~ts,
and both parties had died insolvent. This was oot a case,
therefore ,for the application of the principle under consideratie>n, a.nd\ Judge LANE, '{n delivering the e>pinion, eays, as to
this rule: "This Court are of opinion, that if iany such rule
exist, it must have been <?f frequent application, and thus have
become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the
books, except the one in 9 Vesey, and the South Carolina case,
that touches such a doctrine, unless cases founded on the statutes of bankruptcy. A claim so novel in a case necessarily 0;f
such common occurrence, must be liB'tened to with caution
amounting to jealousy," etc. Touching the subject of this obiter
opinion, the following remarks o-f the Supreme Oourt of the
United States, in Murrill vs. Neill, supra, are in point:
"The rule in equity governing the administration of insolvent
partnerships is one of familiar acceptation and practice; it is
one which will be found to have been in practice in this country
from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been
generally, if not universally, received. This rule, with one or
two eccentric variations in the English pra.c tice which may be
noted hereafter, is believed to be identical with that prevailing
in England, and is this: that partnership credite>rs shall, in the
first instance, be Bfttisfied from the partnership estate; and separate or private creditors of tbe individual partnen1 from the
60
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separate and private estate of the partners with whom they

have made private and individual contracts; and that the pri-

vate and individual property of the partners shall not be ap-

plied in extinguishment of partnership debts, until the separate

and individual creditors of the respective partners shall be

paid. The reason and foundation of this rule, or its equality

and fairness, the court is not called on to justify. \Yere these

less obvious than they are, it were enough to show the early

adoption and general prevalence of this rule, to stay the hand

of innovation at this day; at least, under any motive less strong

than the most urgent propriety.”

It has been argued that the statute in this State, relative to

the equal distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and

also the statute providing that all assignments of property in

contemplation of insolvency, giving preferences to creditors,

had established, in this State, a policy inconsistent with the

ru.le in question. These statutes were certainly never intended

to have such an eﬂ'ect. The equality required by them is

subordinate to the- settled equities and priorities of diﬁerent

grades and classes of creditors. It was manifestly not the de~
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sign of these statutes to change the nature of partnership con-

tI‘€llOtS, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in

the distribution of the partnership assets. And as this was

mot done, the rule of equality adopted in equity, requires the

corresponding preference to be given. to the individual credit-

ors of each partner in his separate estate.

The remaining matter for determination, in this case,

involves the inquiry, whether, in case of an indebtedness for

money lent to the partnership by a partner who afterward

becomes insolvent, -the separate creditors of the latter shall be

entitled therefor to a pro rata distribution with the partnership

creditors, out of the joint fund. It is claimed that -the liability

of the ﬁrm to a partner for money loaned is a partnership

debt, and that the individual creditors of that partner a-re, in

equity, entitled to an equal distribution therefor, out of the

partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed that

as each partner is individually liable for the debts of the ﬁrm,

and as no partner can be allowed to participate with his own

creditors in the distribution of a fund, the separate creditors

of a partner, as they can only claim through the rights of

their debtor, cannot be allowed such participation with the

joint creditors.

separate and private estate of the partners with whom they
have made private and individual contracts; and that the private and individual property of the pa-rtners shall not be applied in extingui.shment of partnership debits, until the separate
and individual creditors of the respective partners shall be
paid. The reason aDd foundation of this rule, or its equality
and fairness, the court is not called on to justify. Were these
leas obvious than they are, it were enough to show the early
adoption and general prevalence of this rule, to stay the hand
of innovation at this day; at least, under any motive less strong
than the most urgent propriety."
It bas been argued that the statute in this State, relative to
the equal distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and
also 1Jhe statute providing that all assignments of property in
contemplation of insolvency, giYing preferences to creditors,
had es.tablished, in this State, a policy inconsistent with the
1·ule in question. These statutes were certainly never intended
to have such an effect. The equality required by them is
subordinate to the· settled equities and priorities of different
grades and classes of creditors. It was manifestly not the design of these statutes to change the nature of partnership contracts, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in
the distribution of the partnership assets. And as this was
D10t done, the rule of equality adopted in equity, requires the
corresponding preference to be given to the individual creditors of each partner in his iwparate estate.
The remaining mattRr for determination, in this case,
involves the inquiry, whethc>r, in case of an indebtedness for
money lent to the partnership by a partner who afterward
.becomes insolvent, the separate creditors of the latter shall be
ent1tled therefor to a p1·0 rata distribution with the partnership
creditors, out of the joint fund. It is claimed that the liability
of the firm t-0 a partner for money loaned is a partnership
debt, and that the individual crc>ditors of that partner are, in
equity, entitled to an equal distribnti-00 therefor, out of the
partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed that
as each partner is individua1ly liable for the debts of the firm,
and as no partner can be allow,ed to participate with his own
creditors in 1:he distribution of a fund, the sepa·r ate creditors
of a partner, as they can only claim through the rights of
their dc>btor, cannot be allowed such pa.rticipation with the
joint creditors.

Rooanns vs. MERANDA. 475

It was at one time -held to be the law, on the authority of

RODGERS VB. MERANDA.
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adjudications by Lord T.u.1so'r and Lord HARDWICKE, that if a

partner has loaned money to the partnership, or the partner-,

ship has loaned money to the separate estate of one of the

partners, according to the equitable rule of distribution of the

assets after insolvency, in -the former case, the separate credit-

ors of the partner would be entitled to an equal share out of

the joint assets to the extenrt of the debt created for the money

lent; and that, in the latter case, the partnership creditors

would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of the

individual estate of the partner: Em parte H unter, 1 Atk. 223;

Story on Part., § 390. But this doctrine has long since been

overruled; and the contrary appears now to be well settled.

In Ea: parts Lodge, 1 V es. Jr. 166, Lord Tnonnow held that

the assignees on behalf of the joint estate could not be entitled

to distribution out of the separate estate of Lodge, for money

which he had abstracted from the partnership, unless he had

taken it with a fraudulent intent to augment his separate

estate. And in Ea; parts Harris, 2 Ves. and Beam. 210, 212,

Lord ELDON said: “There has long been an end of the law
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which prevailed in the time of Lord Hnnnwxoxn, whose opinion

appears to have been that if the joint estate lent money t-0 the

separate estate of one partner, or if one partner lent to the joint

estate, proof might be made by the one or the other, in each

case. That has been put an end to, among other principles,

upon this certainly, that a partner cannot come in competition

with separate creditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate

with the joint creditors. The consequence is, that if one pa.rt-

ner lends £1,000 to the partnership, and they become in-solvent

in a week, he cannot be a creditor of the partnership, though

the money was supplied to the join-t estate; so, if the partner-

ship lends to an individual partner, there can be no proof for

the joint again-st the separate estate; that is, in each case no

proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partners

may certainly have the right against each other.”

This doctrine proceeds upon the principle that, in the dis-

tribution of the assets of insolvents, the equities of the credit-

o'rs, whether joint or separate, must be w-orked out through

the medium of the partners; that creditors can only step into

the shoes of their immediate debtors in reaching their eﬁects

where there are conﬂicting claims; and that, inasmuch as an

It was at one time held to be the law, on the authority of
adjudicatious by Lord TALBOT and Lord HARDWICKE, that if a
partner has loaned money to the partnership, or the partner-,
ship has loaned money to the separate estate of one of the
pa.Nners, according ro the equitable rule of distribution &f the
assets after insolvency, in the former case, the separate creditors of the partner would be entitled to an equal share out of
the joint assets to the exterut of the debt created for the money
lent; and that, in the latter case, the partnership creditors
would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of the
individual estate of the partner: EiC parte H-unter, 1 Atk. 223;
St.ory on Part., § 390. But this doctrine has long since been
overruled; and the contrary appears now to be well settled.
In E:c parre Lodge, 1 Ves. Jr. 166, Lo-rd THURLOW held that
the assignees on behalf of the joint esta~ could not be entitled
to distribution out of the separate estate of Lodge, for money
which he had abstraded from the partnership, unless he had
taken it with a fraudulent intent to augment bis separate
estate. And in E3J parte Harris, 2 Ves. and Beam. 210, 212,
Lord ELDON said: "There has long been an end of the law
which prevailed in the time of Lord HARDWICKE, whose opinion
appears to have been that if the joint estate lent money to the
separate estate of one partner, or if one partner lent to the joint ,,
estate, proof might be made by the one or the other, in ea.ch
case. That has been put an end to, among other pr'inciples,
upon this certainly, that a partner cannot come in competition
with separate crPditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate
with the joint creditors. The consequence is, that if one partner lends £1,000 to the partnership, and they become insolvent
in a week, he cannot be a creditor of the partnership, though
the money was supplied to the joint estate; so, if the partnership lendoS to an individua·l partner, there can be n.o proof for
the joint against the sepa1·ate estate; that is, in each case no
proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partners
may certainly have the right against each other."
This doctrine proceeds upon the principle that, in the distribution of the asset·s of insolvents, the equities of the creditOTs, whether joint or separate, must be worked out through
the medium of the partners; tha;t creditors can only step into
the shoes of their immediate debtors in reaching their effects
where there are conflicting claims; alld that, inasmuch as an
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individual partner could not himself come in and compete
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with the partnership creditors, who are in fact his own credit-

ors, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice

those who were not only creditors of the partnership but also

of himself; therefo-re the separate creditors of a partner could

not enforce any claim to a distributive share o-f the joint effects

against the partnership creditors, which could not have been

enforced by the partner himself for his own beneﬁt. Story on

Partnership, § 390. The rule, however, that these several

funds are to be thus administered as they stood at the time of

the insolvency, is to be received with this important limita-

tion, that it does not apply in case, either where the effects

obtained, creating the debt, were taken from the separate

estate to augment the joint estate, or from the joint estarte to

augment the separate estate, fraudulently, or under circum~

stances from which fraud may be inferred, or under which it

would be implied.

In the case before us, however, it is not pretended that the

ﬁrm obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly.

The separate creditors of Murray, therefore, are not, on
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account of this claim for money lent by Murray to the ﬁrm,

entitled to participate with the partnership creditors in the dis-

tribution of the joint effects. '

Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and ordered that

the separate effects of Peter Murray be distributed pro rata

ﬁrst among his individual creditors, before any application

thereof be made to the payment of the partnership debts of

Dover & Murray; and that the partnership effects be applied

ﬁrst to the payment of the partnership debts, irrespective of

the claim of the partner, Peter Murray, for money loaned by

him to the ﬁrm.

All of the other justices concurred.

No'rE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 293, et seq.

Compare with the cases following.

See also, 2 Bates on Partn. , § 825, where this case is referred to as the lead-

in g case, setting forth the reasons assigned for the various rulings. See also

the note to McCulIoh vs. Dashiell, 18 Am. Dec. 280, where Rodgers vs.

Mcranda, and many other cases are referred to.

individual partner oould no1 himself come in and compete
with the partnership creditors, who are in fact his own oredlltors, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice
those who were not only creditors of the partnerehip but e.lso
Ott himself; therefore the separate creditors of a partner could
not enforce any claim to a distributive share of the joint effects
against the partnership creditors, which could not have been
enforced by the partner himself for his own benefit. Story on
Partnership, § 390. The rule, however, ithat these- several
funds are to be thus administered as they stood at the time of
the insolvency, is to be received with this important limitation, that i.t does not apply in case, either where the effects
obtained, creating the debt, were taken from the separate
estate to augment the joint estwte, or from the joint estwte to
augment the separate estate, fraudulently, or under circum·
stances from Wthich fraud may be inferred, or under which it
would be implied.
In the case before us, .h owever, it is not pretended thwt the
firm obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly.
The separate creditors of Murray, therefore, are not, on
account of this claim for money lent by Murray to the ft.rm,
entitled fo participate with the partnership creditors in the distribution of the joint effects.
Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and OTdered that
the separate effects of Peter Murray be distributed pro rata
first among bis individual creditors, before any application
thereof be made to the payment of the partnership debts ()f
Dev~r & Murray; and that the partnership effects be applied
first to the payment of the partnership debts, irrespective of
1:he claim of the partner, Peter Murray, for money loaned by
him to the firm.
All of the other justices concurred.
NOTE: See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 293, et seq.
Oompare with the CIW".S following.
See also, 2 Bates on Partn., § 825, where this case is referred to as the lead- ·
Ing case, setting forth the reasons assigned for the various rulings. See also
the note to Mcculloh va. Dashi~l. 18 Am. Dec. 280. where Rodger• iia.
M.,-and.a, and many other cases are referred to.
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Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1889.

a1 s. Car. 346, 9 s. E. Rep. 1033, 17 Am. sc. Rep. so.

Action to set aside an assignment fo r i rs azgivoig E:

because of references. Decree below for and -

BLAIR vs. BLACK.

'P

ants appeal?

On January 29, 1889, James W. Black and Jacob K. Car-

penter, of the old mercantile ﬁrm of Black & Carpenter, and

Supreme Court of South Oarnlina, 1889.

also of its successor, Black, Carpenter & Davies, made an as-

signment of both their individual and partnership property for

81 S. Car. 846, 9 S. E. Rep. 1038, 17 Am. St. Rep. 80.

the payment of their debts to John G. Black, as assignee and

trustee. J . L._ Davies, one of the latter ﬁrm, did not sign the

original deed of assignment, being absent at the time it was

executed, but ratiﬁed it some days later, and indeed executed

another deed, conforming substantially to the ﬁrst. The

assignment provided that the property and assets of the indi-

vidual members of the respective ﬁrms should be ﬁrst applied

to the payment of the individual debts of the members of the

ﬁrm, a-nd that the property and assets of the ﬁrms, respectively,
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should be ﬁrst applied to the debts of the partnership, and that

-if a surplus should remain after paying the debts of the one

class, then such surplus should be paid to debts of the other

class, and so reciprocally of the other class. The assignment

also provided that, if there should not be suﬂicient funds to

pay the debts, the assignee should pay them ratably, or such

as should, with 30 days from the date of the assignment, agree

to accept the terms of it, and to release the parties from all

liability on their debts and claims, etc. The cases stated above

were instituted by creditors of the respective ﬁrms for the

purpose of setting aside the deed of assignment, and, being

identical in object and purpose, were consolidated and heard

together.

O. E‘. Spencer and W. B. M cCaw, for appellants.

H art cé H art, for appellees. r

McG0wAN, J. Several grounds were urged sufficient, as

alleged, to set aside the assignment, and subject the property

Action to set aside an ·assignment f~r~if'lrs a~Y919~.ti
because of preferences. Decree below for _ diL and ~
ae+.& appeal1
On January 29, 1889, James W. Black and Jacob K. Car·
penter, of the old mercantile firm of Black & Carpenter, and
e.lso of its -successor, Black, Carpenter & Davies, mane an as·
eignment of both their individual and partnership property for
the payment of their debts to John G. Black, as assignee and
trustee. J. L.. Davies, one o1 the latter firm, did not sign the
original deed of assignment, being absent at the time it was
executed, but ratified it some days later, and indeed executed
another deed, conforming substantially to the first. The
assignment provided that the property and assets of the indi·
vidual members of the respective firms should be first applied
to the payment of the individual debts of the members of the
firm, and that t:he property and assets of the firms, respectively,
ehonld be first applied to the debts of the partnership, and that
if a surplus should remain after paying the debts of the one
class, then such surplus should be paid to debts of the other
class, and so reciprocally of the other class. The assignment
also provided that, if there should not be sufficient funds to
pay the debts, the assignee should pay them rafably, or such
as should, with 30 days from the date of the assignment, agree
to accept the terms of it, and to release the parties from all
liability on their debts and claims, etc. The cases stated above
were instituted by creditors of the respective firms for the
purpose of setting aside the deed <>f assignment, and, being
identical in object and pul'p()Se, were consolidated and heard
together.

O. E. Spencer and W. B. McOaw, for appellants.
Hart & Ha,rt, for appellees.
McGOWAN, J. Several grounds were urged sufficient, as
alleged, to set aside the assignment, and subject the property ·
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-to the claim of creditors according to law, but, from the view

which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider any

of the objections except the one chieﬂy relied on by the assail-

ing creditors, viz., that in violation of section 2014 of the gen-

eral statutes, which denounces assignments giving preferences

as “absolutely void,” this assignment gives undue and illegal

preference to individual over copartnership creditors, in

excluding the partnership creditors, after exhausting the part-

nership assets, from coming in and participating with the indi-

vidual creditors in the individual property of the members of

the different ﬁrms; the proposition relied on being that, under

the law of this state, the individual creditors are not entitled to

be paid ﬁrst out of the individual property, but have only an

equity to require that the partnership creditor should exhaust

the assets of the ﬁrm, and, after that is applied, they are then

entitled, as to any balance due them, to share equally and

ratably with the individual creditors in the individual assets.

While, on the other hand, in support of the assignment, it is

urged that the rule is that the joint debts are primarily pay-

able out of the joint effects, and are entitled to a preference
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over separate debts; and so, in the converse case, the sepa-

rate debts are primarily payable out of the separate effects, and

as to that possess a like preference, and the surplus only, after

satisfying such priorities, can be reached by the other class of

creditors, so that really the only question involved is one purely

of law. \Vhat was the law of this state upon the subject when

the assignment was executed? ‘

The cause ea.me on to be heard by Judge Knnsnaw, who,

making a full and interesting review of the authorities both in

the English and American courts, in la-w and in equity, held

that the question as to priority of the individual over the part-

nership creditors in the individual property of the members

of the ﬁrm was till an open question in this state, and “fur-

thermore that the departure from this settled rule of adminis-

tration of partnership assets, where there are individual claims

and individual property, is wholly founded upon the case of

Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dud. (S. Car.) Eq. 110, and that wholly upon

a total misconception of the English cases cited to support it.

VVith great deference to the opinions of the eminent jurists

whose decisions are here reviewed, I am impelled to the con-

clusion that in the case under consideration the individual

to the claim of creditors according to law, but, from the view
which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider any
of the objections except the one chiefly relied on by the assailing creditors, viz., that in violation of section 2014 of the general statutes, which denounces assignments giving preferences
ns "absplutely void," this assignment gives undue and illegal
preference to individual over copartnership creditors, in
excluding the partners·bip creditors, after exhausting the partnership assets, fro~ coming in and participating with the individual creditors in the individual property of the members ot
the different firms; the proposition relied on being that, under
the law of this state, the individual creditors are not entitled te
be paid first out of the individual property, but have only an
equity to require that the partnership creditor should exhaust
the assets of the firm, and, after that is applied, they are then
e-ntitled, as to any balance due them, to share equally and
ratably with the individual creditors in the individual assets.
While, on the other hand, in support of the assignment, it is
urged that the rule i.s that the joint debts are primarily pay·
able out of the joint effects, and are entitled to a preference
over separate debts; and so, in the oonverse case, the sepa.·
rate debts are primarily payable out of the separate effects, and
as to that possess a like preference, and the surplus only, after
satisfying sn<'h priorities, can be reached by the other class of
creditors, so that really the only question involved is one purely
of law. 'Vhat was the law of this state upon the subject when
•
the assignment was executed?
The cause ca.me on to be beard by Judge KERSHAW, who,
making a full and interesting review of the authorities both in
the English and American oourts, in law and in equity, held
that the question as to priority of t·he individual over the partnership creditors in the individual property of the members
of the firm was still an open question in this state, and "furthermore t'hat the departure from this settled rule of administration of partnership assets, where there a·re individual claims
and individual property, is wholly founded upon the case of
Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dud. (S. Car.) Eq. 110, and that wholly upon
a total misconception of the English cases cited to support it.
'\\"'ith great deference to the opinions of the eminent jurists
wh,lse decisious are here reviewed, I a.m impelled to the oonclu.sion that in the case under consideration the individual
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property is ﬁrst applicable to the individual debts, and that the

Bu.IR ·vs.

BLACK.

479

provisions upon that subject in the assignment are in strict

conformity to the established rule, and therefore constitute no

improper preference,”—a.nd dismissed the complaints. From

this decree the plaintiff’s partnership creditors appeal to this

court upon the ground, inter alia, that it was error of la.w to

hold “that, as between the partnership creditors of a ﬁrm and

the individual creditors of its members, the individual assets

are ﬁrst liable to individual debts before any application

thereof may be made to partnership debts, and for not holding"_

that if, after applying partnership assets to partnership debts,

any portion of such debts should remain unsatisﬁed, such por-

tion hould come in ratably with the individual debts of the

several members as against their individual assets,” etc.

The question is certainly an important one, which in the

affairs of business life may arise daily, and it should be,

if it has not already been, clearly and fully settled, so that all

may know what the law is to which their actions should be

conformed. It is true that there has been much discussion and

some difference of opinion on the subject involved, not, as it
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seems to us, arising so much from the inherent diﬁiculty of

the subject, as from an artiﬁcial rule originally adopted in the

English bankrupt courts, mainly, as it would seem, on account

of its simplicity and convenience of application, vi1.., that part-

nership creditors are entitled to partnership property, and e

com-crso, individual creditors are entitled to individual prop-

ei-ty,—»a rule of which Judge S'rom' says: “It is not too much

to say that it rests on a foundation as questionable and unsat-

isfactory as any rule in the whole system of our jurisprudence.”

Story, Partn. 577. As we understand it, no rule upon the sub-

ject has ever been declared by positive statute, either in

England or America; but whatever rule there may be has

grown up entirely from the dicta of elementary writers and

adjudications of the courts supposed to be founded on some

principle. But so far as concerns this “rule of reciprocity,”

as it is sometimes called, it does not seem to us to have been

based upon any principle or general equities of the parties.

All agree that the partnership creditors have an equity to

exhaust the partnership assets, for the double reason that they

have two funds, and the individual members have no interest

until t‘he partnership is settled. But the same cannot be said

property is first applicable to the individual debts, and that t~e
provisions upon that subject in the assignment are in strict
conformity to the established rule, and therefore constitute no
improper preference,"-and dismissed the complaints. From
this decree the plaintiff's partnerehip creditors a.ppeaJ to this
conn upon the ground, inter alia, that it wM error of law to
h-0ld ''that, as between the partnership creditors of a :ft.rm and
the individual creditors of its members, the individual a88€'ts
are first liable to individual debts before any application
thereof may be made to partnership debts, and for not holding+fhat if, after applying partnership assets to partnership debts,
any portion of such debts should remain unS1atisfied, such po-rtion should come in ratably with the individual debts of the
several members as against their individual assets," etc.
The question is certainly an important one, which in the
a1fairs of business life may arise daily, and it S'hould be,
if it has not already been, clearly and fully settled, eo that all
may know what the law is to which their actions should be
conformed. It is true that there has been much discussion and
some difference of opinion on the subject involved, not, as it
seems to us, arising so much from the inherent difficulty cd
the subject, as from an artificial rule originally adopted in the
English bankrupt courts, mainly, as it would seem, on account
of its simplicity and convenience of application, viz., that partnership creditors are entitled to partnership property, and 6
convcrao, individual creditors are entitled to individual property,~ rule of which Judge STORY says: "It is not too much
to say that it rests on a foundatfon as questionable and unsatisfactory as any rule in the whole system of our jurisprudence."
Story, Partn. 577. As we understand it, no rule upon the subject haiS eve1· been declared by positive statute, either in
England or America; but whatever rule there may be has
grown up entirely from the dicta of elementary writers and
adjudications of the courts supposed to be founded on some
principle. But so far as concerns this "rule of reciprocity,"
as it is sometimes called, it does not seem to us to have been
based upon any principle or general equities at the parties.
All agree that the partnership creditors have an equity to
exhaust the partnership assets, for the double reason that they
have two funds, and the individual members have no interest
until t'he partnership is settled. But the same cannot be said
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of the individual creditors. They are not creditors of the ﬁrm

at all, but only of their individual debtor, whose individual

property, including his clear share of the ﬁrm, is liable for all

his debts alike, both partnership and individual. It strikes us

that there is nothing in the relations or the equities of the

respective classes to authorize or justify the application of the

convenient Procrustean rule of “reciprocity.” But it is

argued that the circuit decree is in conformity with the English

rule, and we should follow it, without regard to its reason or

equity, and disregard our own cases, which have made a depart-

ure from it, for the sole reason that it was error to make that

departure, and it should be corrected by returning to the rule.

Without going back to ascertain what is the precise rule

adopted in the English courts of bankruptcy and chancery,

it is quite clear that, as far back as the case of Wardlaw rs.

Gray (1837), cited in the circuit decree, the doctrine was

announced in this state “th-at a partnership creditor has the

right to resort either to the partnership property or to the sep-

arate property of the parties; but, as a party having two funds,

he may be compelled by the separate creditors of one of the
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pa-rtners to exhaust the partnership property before he pro-

ceeds against that of an individual partner,” etc. YVhether

this decision did or did not run counter to what is said to be

the English rule upon the subject, it is quite as clear that it

has never been expressly overruled; but on the contrary has

been recognized and followed, and at the time of the execution

of the assignment under consideration was, as we think, the

law of the state. In (Iowan rs. Tzmno, Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. Cas.

369 (1832), it was held that, “though partnership effects should

be ﬁrst applied to partnership debts, yet, after these are

exhausted, a judgment against the partners as such binds the

separate estate of each partner from its date.” In Fleming

vs. Billings, 9 Rich. Eq. 149 (1856), it was held that “copartner-

ship creditors are ﬁrst to he paid out of the copa rtnership fund,

and if that prove insufficient then they are to come in with the

private creditors [respect being had to liens], as against the

individual property of the copartners.” In Gadsden vs. Carson,

Id. 252, 77 Am. Dec. 207 (1857), it was held that “the individual

creditors of a partner have not such exclusive right to be paid

out of his individual property as to render fraudulent an

assignment of it for the beneﬁt of the creditors of the ﬁrm.

~>

of the individual creditors. They are not creditors of the firm
at all, but only of their individual debtor, whose individual
property, including his clear share of the firm, is liable for all
his debts alike, both partnership and individual. It strikes us
that there is nothing in the relations or the equities of the·
respective classes to authorize or justify the application of the
oonvenient Procrustean rule of "reciprocity." But it is
'argued that the circuit decree is in conformity with the English
rule, and we should follow it, without regard to its reason ooequity, and disregard our own oases, which have made a departure from it, for the sole reason that it was error to make that
departure, and it should be corrected by returning to the rule.
Without going back to ascertain what is the precise rule
adopted in the English courts of bankruptcy and chancery,
it is quite clear that, as far back as the case of Wardlaw t·s.
Gray (18.37), cited in the circuit decree, the doctrine waa
announced in this state "that a partnership creditor has the
right to resort either to the partnership property or to the separate property of the parties; but, as a party having two funds,
he may be compelled by the separate creditors of one of the
pa•rtners to exhaust the partnership property before he proceeds against thnt of an individual partner)' etc. "rbether
this decision did or did not run counter to what is said to be
the English rule upon the subject, it is quite as clear that it
bas never been exprPssly overruled; but on the contrary has
been recognizro and followed, and at the time of the execution
of the assignment under c-on~icl(•ratio-n was, as we think, the
law of the state. In Oo1rnn rs. 7'unno, Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. Ca.s.
369 (18il2), it was held that. "though partnership effects should
be first applied to partnership debts, yet, after these are
exhausted, a judgment against the partners as such binds the
separate <'Statt• of each partner from its date." In Fleming
vs. Billin,qs, U Rich. Eq. 14!1 (ll-t5G), it wa.l'I held that "copartnership creditors are first to hf' pa.id out of the copartnership fund,
and if that prove insufficient then they are to come in with the
private creditors [r<'spect being had to liens], as against the
individual property of the ropartne1'S." In Gadsden i·s. Carso11,
Id. 252, 77 Am. Der. 207 (18i'J7), it was held that "the individual
creditors of a partner haw not sueh exclusive right to be paid
out of his individual lll'OJ>t'rty as to render fraudulent an
assignment of it fo1· the benefit of the c1·editors of the firm.
\
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Partnership creditors having two funds to which they can re

sort, and individual creditors of the partners having but one,——

rthe private property of the debtor, including any balance which

may remain to him from the ﬁrm, after its affairs are settled,-

such individual creditors have an equity to compel the partner-

ship creditors to resort ﬁrst to the partnership assets; but,

after they are exhausted, the partnership creditors have as

good right to be paid out of the private property of a partner

as his individual creditors,” etc. In this case Chancellor

JOHNSTON remarked that it “was in conformity to Wm-dlaw

vs. Gm-_1/, with which we see no reason to be dissatisﬁed.” In

Wilson vs. McOmmell, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857), it was held that

“where a copartner, having a separate estate, dies, the copart-

nership creditors have the right ﬁrst to exhaust the copart-

ship estate, and, if that proves insuﬂicient to pay their

demands, then they are to be paid from the separate estate of

the copartners, pro rata with his separate creditors.” In

Adickes vs. Lowry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880), it is true that an intima-

tion is given that the question might be still open, but that

was not intended to decide anything. The remark was: “But,
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even if this were so, there .would still remain the very impor-

tant and interesting question whether the separate creditors of

Bratton would not have in equity a preference over the part-

nership creditors t'o the separate assets of Bratton, etc. But

inasmuch as this question was not raised in the court below,

and has not been argued here, we do not propose to enter upon

its consideration now,” etc. In Hutzler vs. Ph-illips, 26 S. C.

136, 1 S. E. Rep. 5012, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687 (1886), it was held

“that partnership creditors, after exhausting partnership

assets, are entitled to share the separate property of the part-

ners pro Tatar with unsecured individual creditors.” The chief

justice reviewed all the authorities, saying, among other

things: “\Ve think the true doctrine is as stated by the circuit

judge with respect to the right o-f the separate creditors, if any

equity exists in his behalf, such as two funds " “ ' to

throw the copartnership creditors on the partnership assets in

the ﬁrst instance; but, after the partnership assets ‘have been

fully and fa.irly exhausted, to come in pro rata with the sepa-

rate creditor. This seems to be the weight of -authority with

us. Besides a debt contracted by a copartnership is not only

a debt of the ﬁrm, but a debt, in substance, of each individual

61

Pa.Itnership creditors having tw<> funds to which they can resort, and individual credit-Ors of the partners having but one,the private property -of the debtor, including any balance which
may remain to him from the firm, after its affairs are settled,such individual creditors have an equity to compel the partnership creditors to reBOrt first to the partnership assets; but,
after they are exhausted, the partnership creditors have as
good right to be paid out of the private property of a partner
as his individual creditors," etc. In this case Chancell<>r
JOHNSTON remarked that it "was in conformity to Wardlaw
vs. Gray, with which we see no reason to be dissatisfied." In
Wilson vs. McConnell, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857), it was held that
"where a copartner, having a separate estate, dies, the copartnership creditors have the right first to exhaust the ·copartship estate, and, if that proves insufficient to pay their
demands, then they are to be paid from the .separate estate of
the copartners, pro rata with his separate creditors." In
Adickes vs. L01vry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880), it is true that an intimation is given that the question might be still open, but that
was not ~ntended to decide anything. The remark was: "But',
eYen if this were so, there .would st.ill remain the very important a.nd intc>rf'sting question whether the separate creditors of
Bratton would not have in equity a preference over the partnership creditors t'o the sc-part~te assets of Bratton, etc. But
inasmuch as this qut>stion was not raised in the court below,
and has not hN•n arg1wd hc>re, we do not propose to enter upon
its oonRideration now," etc. Jn Hutzler t 1s. Phillips, 26 S. C.
136, 1 S. :E. Rep. 50:!, 4 Am. St. Rep. G87 (188H), it was held
"that partnersllip creditors, after exhausting partnership
assets, are entitlPd to share the separate property of the partners pro rata with unsecured individual creditors." The chief
justice reviewed all th~ a11tho1·ities, saying, among other
things: "\Ve think the true dodrine is as stated by the circuit
judge with respP-ct to the right nf the separate creditors, if auy
equity exists in his h('ha lf, sneh a.s two funds * * * to
tb1·ow the copartnership crPditors on the partnership assets in
the first instance; but, after the partnership assets ·h ave been
fully and fairly exhausfrd, to come in pro rata with the sepa.rate creditor. This seems to be the weight of authority with
us. Besides a d<>bt eontradt>d by a copartnership is not only
a debt of the firm, but a debt, in substance, of each individual
61
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member of the ﬁrm, and the property of the ﬁrm and of each

member is liable for it. But the property of the ﬁrm is not

liable for the separate debt of a member; only the interest of

the member is liable, which is nothing until the ﬁrm debts are

paid,” etc. XV e think this case ﬁnally settled the law in this

state. But, as if to put the matter beyond all dispute, the

very last work, upon the subject of pa.rtnership, published this

year (1889), expressly approves and cites from this case, as con-

taining the proper exposition of the law upon the subject, both

on principle and authority. The author says: “The insolvent,

by ‘his inability to meet his liabilities. is not the less, but all

the more, a debtor. He owes to his creditors, not the property

itself, nor any other asset, but merely the price of the property.

The debt is personal, without any lien or preference for its pay-

ment out of the debtor’s estate. The individual partner is, how-

ever, not less liable for a ﬁrm debt than is the ﬁrm itself. The

several liability of -the partners is no less a constituent of the

partnership obligation ‘than is their joint obligation. Both

spring from the root of partnership. The joint creditors, there-

fore, are entitled at law to share the separate estate of a part-
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ner with his individual creditors,” etc. See Pars. Partn. § 108;

citing Hutzler vs. Phillips, and other cases.

We have not the least idea that the parties intended to do

arnythingwrong,but the assignment was not in conformitywith

the law as we understand it, and had the effect of creating

preferences not allowed by law. The judgment of this court

is that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and the

oases remanded to the circuit court for such further proceed-

ings as the parties may be advised, in accordance with the con-

clusions herein announced.

Smrsorz, C. J., and Mclvsn, J., concur.

NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 294, and cases citt d.

_ __ _ _____ ______ _~

member of the firm, and the propert,Y of t'he firm and of ea.ch
member is liable for it. But the property of the :firm is not
liable for the separate debt of a member; only the interest of
the member is liable, which is nothing until the firm debts are
paid," etc. "'e think this case :finally settled the law in this
state. But, as if to put the matter beyond all dispute, t'he
very last work, upon the subject of partnership, published this
year (1889), expressly approves and cites from this case, as containing the proper exposition of the law upon the subject, both
on principle and auth<>rity. The author says: "The insolvent,
by ·bis inability to meet bis liabilities, is not the less, but all
the more, a debtor. He owes to his creditors, not the property
itself, nor any other asset, but merely the price of the property.
The debt is personal, without any lien or preference for its payment out of the debtor's estate. The individual pa-rtner is, however, not less liable for a firm debt than is the firm itself. Th~
several liability of the partners is no less a constituent of the
partnership obligation 'than is their joint obligation. Borh
spring from the root of partnership. The joint creditors, therefore, are entitled at law to share the separate estate of a partner with his individual creditors,'' etc. See Pars. Partn. § 108;
citing Hutz1Rlr vs. Phillips, and other cases.
We have not the least idea that the parties intended to do
arnythingwrong, but the a&Signment was not in c-0nformitywith
the law as we understand it, and had the effect of creating
prefereuc-es not allowed by law. The judgment of this court
is that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and the
cases rema.nded to the circuit oourt for such further proceedings as the parties may be ad vised, in a'Ccordance with the conclusions herein announced.
SIMPSON, C. J., and l\IclvER, J., concur.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 294, and cues cittd.
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HARRIS VS. PEABODY.

HARRIS vs. PEABODY.

Supreme Court of Maine, 1881.

73 Me. 262.

Bill in equity.

Royal \Villiams and James A. Norton, copartners under the

ﬁrm name of Williams & Norton, upon their own petition, we're

HARRIS vs. PEABODY.

individuallyand as copartners dulyadjudged insolvent debtors.

The assets of the partnership, amounting to one dollar and

Supreme Court of M ai.ne1 1881.

nineteen cents only, were absorbed by the expenses of selling

the same. Norton’s individual estate had no assets, while Wil-

78 Me. 262.

ilams’, after deducting legal costs and charges, amounted to

eleven hundred and seventy-seven dollars and thirty-six cents.

Against -the partnership estate, claims amounting to more

than twenty-two hundred dollars were proved; against Wil-

liams‘ individual estate eleven hundred and thirty-three dollars

a.nd sixty-seven cents; and against Norton’s, no claims.

Before the court of insolvency the parrtnership creditors

claimed a pro ram dividend from the separate estate of Wil-

liams pari passu with his individual creditors; but the judge

denied the claim and decreed that the assignees should distrib-
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ute those asserts among the individual creditors. Thercupon

the complainants brought this bill (claimed by them to be

authorized by the insolvent statute of 1878, c. 74, sec. 11, as

amended by stat. 1879, c. 154, sec. 3), somewhat in the nature

of an appeal from the decree of the judge of insolvency; and

the parties have brought the case before us on an agreed state

men-t, reserving the question of jurisdiction of this court, which

is expressly raised.

William L. Putnam, for the plaintiﬂ's. _

George C. Hopkins, Charles P. Mattocks, and Strout té Holmes

and E. P. Payson, for different defendants.

Vmon\', J. (After disposing of the question of jurisdiction,

continues.) 2. The next question is, was the decree of the

court of insolvency correct in ordering a distribution of Wil-

liams’ individual assets among his separate creditors, to the

I

r

I

I

Bill in equity.
Royal 'Villiams and James A. Norton, copartners under the
ftrm name of Williams & Norton, upon their own petition, were
individually and as oopartners duly adjudged insolvent debtors.
The assets of the partnership, amounting to one dollar and
nineteen cents only, were absorbed by the expenses of selling
the same. Norton's individual estate bad no assets, whlle Wililams', after deducting legal costs and charges, amounted to
eleven hundred and seventy-seven dollars and thirty-six cents.
Against .the partnership estate, cl.ajms amounrting to more
than twenty-tw-0 hundred dollars we.re proved; against WilIiams' individual estate eleven hundred and thirty-three dollars
and sixty-seven cents; and against Norton's, no claims.
Before the court of ineolvenicy the parlnershlp creditol"B
claimed a pro rata dividend from the separate estate of Williams pari passu with hls individual creditors; but the judge
denied the claim and decreed itbait the assignees should distribute those assets among the individual creditors. Thereupon
the complainants brought this bill (claimed by them to :t>e
authorized by the inStOlvent &tatute of 1878, c. 74, sec. 11, as
amended by stat. 1879, c. 154, sec. 3), somewhat in the nature
of an appeal from the decree of the judge o<f insolvency; and
the parties have brought t·he case before us on an agreed statement, reserving the question of jurisdiction of this court, which
is expressly raised.

WilUam L. Putnam, for the plaintiffs.
George C. Hopkins, Charks P. Mattocks, and Strout & Holmes
and E. P. Payson, for different defendants.

J. (After disposing of the question of jurisdiction,
continues.) 2. The next question is, was the decree of the
court of insolvency correct in ordering a distribution of Willia.ms' individual assets among his separu.te credit-Ors, t-0 the
VIRGIN,
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exclusion of the complainants, the creditors of the ﬁrm. The

respondents rely upon the provisions of sec. 54, stat. 1878, c. 74,

and certain cases cited of their brief.

It is familiar history that as early as 1715, Lord Oh. HAR-

COURT laid down a the rule of administering the joint and sep-

arate estates in bankruptcy, that the joint estate shall be

applied in payment of the partnership debts, and the separate

estate, of the separate debts, a-ny surplus of either estate

being carried over to the other. Ea: parte Crow-der, 2 Vern. 706.

This doctrine was followed by Lord Ch. Kn\'o., in Ea: parte Cook,

2 P. VVms. 500. But it -seems tilrat this rule was departed from

by Lord Trwnnow, who let in creditors of the ﬁrm concurrently

with the separate creditors, upon the separate estate, upon the

ground that they were equally credlitors of the ﬁrm and of the

partners. Ea: pa-rte Oobham, 1 Brow~n’s Ch. 576; Em parte Hodg-

son, 2 Bro-wn’s Ch. 5; Er parte Page, 2 Bro-w'n’s Oh. 119. The

former rule was restored, however, by Lord LOUGHBOROUGH

(Ea: parte Elton, 3 Ves, 239;E.r parte Abell, 4 Ves 837), conﬁrmed

by Lord ELDON; (E:/v parte Clay, 6 Vesey 813; Em parte To/itt, 16

Ves. 193), and it has been the prevailing general rule ever since
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tin England. Lindl. Part. (3d. En. ed.) 1201; Robs. Bank. 584;

Golly. Part. (Perkin-s’ ed.) 775-6; Lodge vs. Pritcharrl, 1 De G. G.

axnd S. 609; and in this country as well. Among the numerous

cases, see Wilder cs. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec.

781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige 1.9, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Murray

vs. Murray, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Oh. 60; 3 Kent, 64, 65; Story Partn.

secs. 376-378. In re Marwick, 2 Ware 233 ; Pars. Partn. 480, et

seq. and notes. This rule was also adopted in the U. S. Bank-

rupt Law, 1841 (5 U. S. stat. 440, 448. sec. 14); U. S. Bankrupt

Law, 1867 (sec. 36, R. S., U. S. sec. 5121); in the Insolvent Laws

of Massachusetts (1838, sec. 21), and in the Insolvent Laws of

this state, stat. 187 8, c. 74, sec. 54. Jarvis vs. Brooks, 23 N. H.

136.

This rule applies to the estates as they exist when the parties

are declared bankrupt or in-solvent. and not before; for the

creditors of the ﬁrm have no lien upon its property which can

prevent the partners from bona ﬁde changing its character

and converting it into the separate estate of one of them prior

thereto. Em partc Ru/ﬁn. 6 Ves. 119; Case rs. Beauregard, 99

U. S. 119 (ante p. 440); Robb rs. Jlfudge, 14 Gray (Mass) 534.

The reasons assigned for giving the partnership creditors the

preference over the joint estate in bankruptcy have been vari-

exclusion of the complainants, the creditors of the firm. The
respondents rely upon the provisions of sec. 54, stat. 1878, c. 74,
and certain cases cited of their brief.
It is familiar history tha.t as early as 1715, Lord Ch. HARCOURT laid down as the rule of admin.istering the joirut and separate estates in bankruptcy, that the joint estate shell be
applied in payment of the partnership debts, tmd the separate
estate, of the separate debts, any surplus of either estate
being carried over to the other. EJJ pa rte Crowder, 2 Vern. 706.
This doctrine was followed by Lord Cb. KING, in Ea: parte Cook,
2 P. Wms. 500. But it seems fuat this rule was departed from
by Lord THURLOW, who let in creditors of the firm concurrently
with the separate creditors, upon the separate estate, upon the
ground thrut they were equally credlitors of the firm and of the
partners. E:c pa1·t.e Cobham, 1 Brown's Ch. 576; Eic parte Hodgson, 2 Brow.n's Ch. 5; Ea; parte Page, 2 Brown's Ch. 119. The
former rule was restored, however, by L<>rd LouGHBOROUGH
(E:c parte Elton, 3 Ves, 289; E:c parte Abell, 4 Ves 887), confirmed
by Lord ELDON; (E{J) parte Clay, 6 Vesey 813; E;c parte Tatitt, 16
Ves. 193), amd it has been the prevailing general rule ever since
li.n Englrand. Lindl. Part. (3d. En. ed.) 1201; Robs. Bank. 584;
Colly. Part. (Perkins' ed.) 775-6; Lodge li8. Pritchard, 1 De G. G.
wnd S. 609; and in this country as well. Among the numerous
cases, see Wilder t'S. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec.
781; Payne vs. Matt1ze1cs, 6 Paige l.9, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Murra.y
vs. Murray, 5 J.ohns. (N. Y.) Ch. 60; 3 Kent, 64, 65; Story Partn.
secs. 376-378. In re Ma.rtcick, 2 \Vare 233 ; Pars. P1artn. 480, et
Beq. and notes. This rule was also adopted in the U. S. Bankrupt Law, 1841 (5 V. S. stat. 440, 448, sec. 14); U. S. Bankrupt
Law, 1867 (sec. 36, R. S., U.S. sec. 5121); in the Insolvent Laws
of Massa0husetts (1838, sec. 21), and in the Insolvent Laws of
this state, stat. 1878, c. 74, sec. 54. J ari~is vs. Brooks, 23 N. H.
136.
This rule applies to the est.ates as they exist when the parties
are declared bankrupt or insolvent. and not before; for the
creditors of the firm have no lien upon its property which can
prevent the pa1'tners from bona fide ch:m~ing its character
and converting it into the st>parate estate of one of them prior
ithereto. Em partc Ruffen, 6 Ves. 119; Case i·s. Beauregm·d, 99
U.S. 119 (ante p. 440); Robb t\~. Jlu(Tf/C, 14 Gray (Mass.) 534.
The reasons nssignPd for gh•ing the partnership creditors the
• preference owr the joint estate in bankruptcy have been vari-
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or superior claim which they primarily have, but upon a

privilege or preference sometimes denominated a lien derived _

from the equitable right which each partner, who being liable

for all the partnership debts and whose interest in its property

being simply his share of the residue after payment of its debts

and settlements" of its accounts, consequently has that the

partnership property shall go to pay its debt in preference

to those of any individual partner. Case vs. Beauregard, supra;

Johnson vs. Hersey, 70 Maine 74, 35 Am. Rep. 303; Washburn vs.

Bellows Falls Bank, 19 Vt. 286, 288. It has also been said that

this priority in joint assets and equality in the separate are

founded on the fact that the partnership creditors trusted each

and all the partners, while the separate creditor trusted butt

one; and that natural justice warrants the marshalling of the

assets so as to give the former the preference. Brock vs. Bate-

man, 25 Ohio St. 609. That it is familiar law that a creditor of

a partnership, having recovered a judgment against it, may

saitisfy his execution against partnership property or against

the individual property of any of the partners (Juche-ro vs.
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Arley, 5 Crunch (U. S.) 34, 40; Egery vs. Howard, 64 Maine 68,

73; Washburn rs. Bellows Falls Bank, supra), and in the case of

intervening insolvency, having two funds, from which to sat-

isfy his claim, the principle familiar in marshalling assets or

securities comes in and compels him to exhaust the fund to

which he has the exclusive right before he be allowed to com-

pete with a creditor who has a claim only on one of the funds.

E1: parte Elton-, 3 Ves. 240; 1 Story Eq. sec. 558. Lord Justice

TURNER said: “This rule may perhaps proceed upon this: that

the joint estate is clearly liable both at law and in equity for

the join-t debts, at lafw, by reason of the survivorship, and in

equity by virtue of the rights of the partners, inter so, to have

it so applied; and that the separate estate is as clearly liable,

both at law and in equity, for the separate debts; and that the

carrying over the surplus of the one estate to the other,

although it may not strictly work out the right, may afford

the best means of adjusting the complications which arise

from t-he joint estate being liable for the separate debts only

so far as the interest of the partners from whom the debts

may be due may extend, and from the separate estate, if

taken for the joint debts, having recourse over against the

one. But the view generally, taken founds it not upon any lien
or superior claim which they primarily have, but upon a
privilege or preference sometimes denominated a lien derived ..
from the equitable right which each partner, who being liable
for all the partnership debts and whose interest in its property
being simply bis share of the residue after payment of its debts
and settlements of its accounts, conf!e<JU€'11tly bas tiha.t the
partnership property shall go to pay its debts in preference
to those of a.ny individual pa11ner. Case ·1,s. Beaureganl, Stl.pra;
Johnson vs. Hersey, 70 Maine 74, 35 Am. Rep. 303; Washburn vs.
Bellows Falls Banlc, 19 Yt. 286, 288. It bas also been said that
this priority in joint assets and equality in the separate are
founded on the fact that the partnel'8hip creditors trusted each
and all the partners, while the separate creditor trusted buit
one; and that n.atm"dl justice warrants the marshalling of the
assets so ns to give the former the preference. Brock vs. Bateman, 25 Ohio ~t. 60!l. That it is familiar law that a credi•t or of
a pa11nership, having recovpred a judgment against it, may
saitisfy his execution against partnership property 00" against
the individual property of any of the partners (Juc1icro vs.
A.xley, 5 Cran'<'l1 (U. S.) 34, 40; Egery vs. Howard, 64 Maine 68,
7:~; Washburn rs. Bcll<>ws Falls Bank, .itupra)~ and in the case of
intervening insolvency, having two funds, from which to satisfy his claim, the principle familiar in marshalling assc•ts or
securities oomes in and compels him to exhaust the fund to
which he IJas the exclush·e right before he be allowed to compete with a creditor who has a claim only on one of the funds.
E.r. parfe Elton, 3 Ves. !!40; i Story Eq. Sf'<'. 558. Lord J nstice
TuR:\'ER said: "This rule may perhaps proceed upon this: that
the joint estate is clearl,v liable botlJ at Ia.w and in equity for
the joint debts, at htw, by rpason of the survivorship, and in
e11uity by viI1ue of the rightH of the partners, inter sr, to have
it so applied; and that the sc•parate estate is as clearly liable,
both at law and in equit~·, for the SPparate debts; and that the
carrying over the surplus of the one estate to the other,
although it may not stri«tly work out the rights, may afford
the best mean.s of adjusting the complications which arise
from the joint estate being liable for the separate dt>bts only
so far as the interest of the partners from whom the debts
may be due may ext1md, and from the separate estates, if
taken for the joint df'bts, having recourse over against the
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joint estates, and which arise also from the equities between
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the parties.” Lodge vs. Pritcha-rd, supra. Prof. Parsons sug-

gests the ground that a partnership is a distinct entity, con-

tracting its own debts, having its own creditors, and possess-

ing its own property applicable to its debts. That when it

has ceased to exist, it is resolved into its elements, and the

relations between its members and creditors arise. If the joint

debts have been pa.id, the former partners sha.re the remaining

property. If the joint funds are not suﬂicient to pay its debts,

they who were its members become the debtors of the joint

creditors. Pars. Part. 346-7.

The rule th-at each estate is to beapplied to its own debts,

and the surplus of each to the creditors remaining of the other,

is applicable only to the facrts upon which it is predicated, i. e.,

when there is joint estate, and all the partners are insolvent.

Buit if there is no available joint estate and no solvent partner,

then the creditors oft-he partnership have no exclusive fund to

exhaust, but may share concurrently with the separate credit-

ors the separate estate. Ea: parts Hayden, 1 Brown’.s Ch. 454,

and notes in Perkins’ ed. 398; Colly. P-art. sec. 926; Lindl. Part.
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1234; Story Part. sec. 380; Pars. Part. 482. In some of the

cases this is called an exception to the rule. Professor Par-

sons says that “instead of being an exception it is a case that

falls without the rule.” Others say that it is a part of the

rule. Judge Dnumrosn, after stating what he deno-mina-tes

“the well established rule upon the subject,” says: “It is

partly on the ground that, although it is a debt of the ﬁrm,

it is still a debt against each individual member of it, fo-r the

satisfaction of which the property of each is responsible; and

that being the -only source to resort to for the payment of the

debt of the ﬁrm, it should be appropriated as well to pay the

debts due from the ﬁrm as fro1n the individual members.” In

re Knight, 8 N. B. R. 436, 438. The same doctrine prevails in

all the federal district courts. In re Marwick, 2 Ware 233;

Bump, Bankruptcy (9th ed.) 771, and cases there cited. Such,

evidently, is the opinion of Mr. Justice CLIFFORD. Amsink vs.

Bean, 11 N. B. Reg. 495; S. C. 22 \Vall. (U. S.) 395, and the cases

of Ea: parte Leland, which he cites there.

We are aware that this question has been decided otherwise

in Massachusetts (Howe vs. Lawrence, 9 Cush. (Mas-s.) 553, 57

Am. Dec. 68, and Som. P. Works vs. Minot, 10 Cush. 592); but

joint estates, and whioh arise also from the equitieir between
the parties." Lodge vs. Pritchard, supra. Prof. Parsons suggESts the ground that a partnership is a distinct entity, contracting its own debts, having its own creditors, and poss-eseing its own property applicable to its debts. That when it
has ceased to exhrt, it is resolved into its elements, and the
relations between its members aud credit<>rs airise. If the joint
debts have been paid, the former partners share the remaining
property. If the joint funds are not sufficient to pay its debts,
they who were its members become the debtors of the joint
creditors. Pars. Part. 346-7.
The rule that eaoh estate is. to bl applied to its own debb't,
and the surplus of eaoh to the creditors remaining of the other,
is applicable only to the facts upon which it is predicated, i. e.,
when there is joint estate, and all t·he partners are insolvent.
Buit if there is no available joint estate and no eolvent partner,
, then the creditors of the partnership have no exclusive fund to
exhaust, but may share corncurrently with the separate creditors the. separate estate. E:JJ parf-e Heyden, 1 Brown's Ch. 454,
and notes in Perkins' ed. 398; Colly. Part. sec. 926; Lindi. Part.
1234:; Story Part. sec. 380; Pars. Pact. 482. In some of the
cases this is called an exception to the rule. Professor Parsons says that ''instead of being an exception it is a case that ·
falls without the rule." Others say that it is a part of the
rule. Judge Dnu:m1miD, after stating what he denominatee
''tlle well established rule upon the subject," says: "I:t is
pa:rtly e>n the ground that, although it is a debt of the firm,
it is still a debt against each individual member of it, for the
satisfaction of which the property of each is responsible; and .
that being the .only source to resort to for the payment of the
debt of the firm, it should be appropriated as well to pay the
debts due from the firm as from ihe individual members." In
re Knight, 8 N. B. R. 4:JG, 438. The same doctrine prevails in
all the federal district courts. In re Marwick, 2 'Vare 233;
Bump, Bankruptcy (9th ed.) 771, and cases there cited. Such,
evidently, is the opinion of l\Ir. Justice CLIFJ..'ORD. Am.sink vs.
Bean, 11 N. B. Reg. 495; S. C. 22 'Vall. (U.S.) 393, and the oases
of Erc parte Leland, which he cites there.
We are aware that this question has been decided otherwise
in Massachusetts (Howe vs. Lawrence, 9 Cush. (:Mass.) 553, 57
Am. Dec. 68, and Som. P. Works vs. Minot, 10 Cush. 592); but
0
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the answer of Judge Dnuuxuom) is more satisfactory to our
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minds. In re Knight, supra. Neither does the dictum of

Mr. Justice Ihmrnn outweigh the great weight of current

authority. See also Rodgers vs. llleranda, 7 Ohio St. 179 (ante

p. 463; Brock vs. Ba,teman§25 Ohio St. 609. It seems there were

some join-t assets, though not enough to pay the costs of sell-

ing; and hence (in the language of the sta-tute) no “net pro-

ceeds.” In such case, there should be considered no joint

assets. Though when there are any available joint assets, how-

ever small in value, the rule is applicable. Lindl. P-artn. 1235;

Colly. Partn. sec. 926; Story Partn. sec. 380, says they must be

enough to be “available.” The question is -thoroughly exam-

ined in In re McE1ccn, 12 N. B. R. 11. As recently as December,

1880, the question came before Judge Cnoarn (S; D. N. Y.),

who said: “It is, however, unnecessary to go into this ques-

tion, because in a recent decision, which is conclusive on this

court, -the right of ﬁrm creditors to share paw’. pa-ssu with indi-

vidual creditors in the individual estate has been recognized

and enforced, w‘here the ﬁrm, as well as the individual part-

ners, had been adjudicated, and'the ﬁrm assets were not more
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than suﬂicient to pay the costs and expenses properly charge-

able to the ﬁrm estate. In re Slocum, D. C. Vt. Oct. 4, 1879;

S. C. aftirmed on review, by Bnwrcrwonn, O. J., December 13,

1830.” I n re Litchﬁeld, 5 Fed. Rep. 47, 50.

Decree reversed. Decree that the partnership creditors of

\Villiams & Norton are entitled to dividends from the assets of

the etate of Royal .Williams, part passu with his separate

creditors.

V\’aL'ro1\', Bumows, Lusnv and S\'Mo.\'ns, J.J., concurred.

APPLETON, C. J ., did not concur.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 295, and cases there cited.

MEECH vs. ALLEN.

Court of Appeals of New York, 1858.

17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465.

Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a com-

plaint-seeking to establish a prior judgment lien. The judg-

the answer of Judge DRUMMOND is more satisfactory to our
minds. In re Knight, supra. Neither does the dictum of
Mr. Justice DANIEL outweigh the great weight of current
authority. See also Rodgers vs. Meran.da, 7 Ohio St. 179 (ante
p. 463; Brock vs. Bateman)25 Ohio St. 609. It seems there were
some joint assets, thoug;h not enough to pay the coets of sell- •
ing; and hen-re (in the language of the statute) no "net proceeds." In such case, there should be considered no joint
assets. Th<>ugh when there are any available joint assets, however small in value, the rule is applicable. Lindi. Pa.ctn. 1235;
Colly. Partn. sec. 926; Story Partn. sec. 380, says they mUBt be
enough to be "available." The question is thoroughly examined in In re McEu:rm, 12 N. B. R.11. As recently as December,
1880, the question came before Judge CnoA'l'E (S·. D. N. Y.),
who SB;id: "It is, however, unnecessary to go into this question, because in a recent decision, which is conclusive on this
court, the right of firm creditors to Bhare pari passu with individual creditol"8 in the individual estate lias been recogbized
and eniforced, Where the firm, as well as the individual partners, had been adjudicated, and 'the firm assets were not more
-.ban sufficient to pay the costs and expenses properly chargeable to the firm estate. In re Sloc1tm, D. C. Vt. Oct. 4, 1879;
S. C. affirmed on review, by BLATCHFORD, C. J., December 13,
1880." In re Litchfield, 5 Fed. Rep. 47, 50.
Decree reversed. Decree that the partnership creditors of
Williams & Norton are entitled to dividends from the assets <>f
the estate of Royal .Williams, pari passu with his separate
creditors.
"'ALTON, BAnnows, LIBBY and SYMONDS, J.J., concurred.
APPLETON, C. J., did not concur.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. ot Partn.,

~

293, and cases there cited.

MEECH vs. ALLEN.

-Court of Appools of New York, 1858.
17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Deo. 465.

Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a complaint ·seeking to establi.sh a prior judgment lien. The judg-
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CA.Sll~ ON PABTJUBSHIP.

meat for which plai»ntiﬂ’s claimed priority was recovered in

1847 against E. P. Taylor, upon his individual debt. The judg-

ment for which defendants claimed priority was recovered in

1842 against Taylor individually and as surviving partner, and

was founded upon an indebtedness of his late ﬁrm. Bo-th judg-

ments were docketed in Erie county, wherein Taylor owned

real property in his individual right. In 1850 executions on

both judgments were issued to the sheriff of Erie county, and

he proceeded to make sale of this real property. At the sale

the plaintiffs gave no-tice of their claim that -their judgment, by

reason of its being founded on Taylor-Ts individual debt, and

being therefore a lien on his individual property, had a prefer-

ence, so ﬁar as the property offered for sale was concerned, over

the other though earlier judgment founded on a. partnership

debt. Taylor owned no other individual property available to

plaintiffs, bu-t there was partnership property available t-o the

other judgment creditors. .The sheriff refused to recognize this

claim, and sold the property to the defendant. The plaintiifs

then brought this suit to establish the priority claimed by

them; but the supreme court sustained defendanrt’s demurrer
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to the complaint. _

S. G. H (wen, for the appellants.

O. Tucker, for the respondent. I

Snnnxcs, J . It is a settled rule of equity that as between the

joint and separate creditors ovf partners the partnership prop-

erty is to be ﬁrst applied to the payment of the partnership

debts, and the separate property of the individual pa-rtners to

the payment of their separate debts; and that neither class of‘

creditors can claim anything from the fund which belongs pri-

marily to the opposite class, until all the claims of the latter are

me0;t for which plai·ntiffs claimed priority was recovered in
1847 against E. P. Taylor, upon his individual debt. The judgment for whic'h defendants claimed priority was recovered in
1842 against Taylor individually and as surviving partner, and
was founded upon an indebtedness of his late firm. Both judg·
ments were dQcketed in E.rie county, wherein Taylm.• owned
real property in his individual right. In 1850 executions on
both judgments were issued to the tiheriff of Erie county, and
he proceeded to make sale of this real property. At the sale
the plain.tiffs gave notice -0f their claim that .their judgment, by
reuon of its being founded <>n T.aylor'e individual debt, and
being therefore a lien 001 his individual property, had a preference, so tlar as the property offered for sale was concerned, over
the other though earlier judgment founded on a partnership
debt. Taylor owned n.o other individual property available to
pla.intiffs, but there was pa rtnerehip p·ropecty available to the
other judgment creditors. .The sheriff ref used to recognize this
claim, and sold the property to the defendant. 'rb.e plain:tiffs
then brought this suit to establish the priority claimed by
them; but the supreme court sustained defendant's demurrer
to the oompla.int.
0

satisﬁed. This, however, is a rule which prevails in courts of

equity in the distributio-n of equitable assets only. \Th0se

S. G. Haven, for the a.ppellante.

courts -have never assumed to exercise -the power of setting

aside, o-r in any way interfering with, an absolute right of

0. Tucker, for the ref!pondent.

priority obtained at law. In regard to all such cases the rule is,

Equitas sequitur lcgem, 1 Stor_v’s Eq. J ur., § 553.

In Wilder vs. Keelcr, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 171, 23 Am. Dec. 781,

Chancellor WALWOR'PH says: “Equitable rules are adopted by

this court in the administration of legal assets, except so far

as the law has given an absolute preference to one class of cred-

SEr,DEN, J. It is a settled rule of equity t'hat as between the
joint and separate creditors of partners t·h e partnership property ie to be first applied to tbe payment of the partnership
debts, and the separa.te property of the individual pa·rtners to
the payment of their separate debts; and that neither class of·
creditors can claim anything from the fund which belongs pri·
marily to the opposite class, until all the claims of the latter are
satisfied. This, however, is a rule which prevails in oourts of
equity in the distribution of equitable a.ssets only. \Those
c-0urts have never assumed to exercise the power of setting
aside, or in any way interfering with, an -absolute right of
priority obtained at law. In regard to all surh cases the rule is,
Equitas sequitur lt'yern, 1 Stor~r·s Eq. Jur., § 553.
In Wilder vs. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 171, 23 Am. Dec. 781,
Chancellor WALWORTH says: "Equit:a ble rules are adopted by
this court in the administration of legal assets, except so far
as the law has given an absolute preference to one class of cred-
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itors over another.” So in ﬂhe case of Acerill vs. Loucka, 6

489

Barb. (N. Y.) 470, Paton, P. J., says: “Courts of equity, in the

administration of assets, follow the rules of law in regard to

legal assets, and recognize and enforce all antecedent liens,

claims, and charges existing upon the property, according to

their priorities.” This is also conceded in the case of McCulloh

cs. Dashiell, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271, where the

whole doctrine of t-he distribution in equity of the joint and sep-

arate property of partners is very elaborately examined.

ARCHER, J., by whom the opinion of the court was delivered,

there says: “At law the joint creditors may pursue both the

joint and separate estate to the extent of each, for the satis-

faction of their joint demands, which are at law considered

joint and several, without the possibility of the interposition of

any restraining power of a court of equity.” But especially

must it be beyond the power of such courts to interfere, where

an absolute right of legal priority is given by force of a positive

statute, as in case of -a judgment. Chancellor Wanyvonrn, in

Mower vs. Kip, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 88, 29 Am. Dec. 748, says: “The

rule of this court is to give effect to the lien of a judgment upon
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a legal ti-tie, so far as it can be enforced by execuition at larw.”

As there is no doubt that at law the judgment for a pa.rt~ne-r-

ship debt attaches and becomes a lien upon the real estate of

each of the partners, with the same effect as if such judgment

were for the separate debt of such partner, it is obvious, from

the preceding authorities, -that the theory upon which the com-

plaint in this case was drawn is erroneous. The principle that

the separate property of an individual partner is to be ﬁrst ap-

plied to the payment of his separate debts has, as we have seen,

never been held to give priority, as to such property, t-o a sub-'

sequent judgment for an individual over a prior judgment for

a partnership debt. It is true that courts of equity will some-

times give to a mere equitable lien, which is prior in point of

time, a preference over a subsequent judgment; but this will

be done only where such prior lien is speciﬁc in its character,

as in the case of White cs. Carpenter, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 219. The

mere general equity of the separate creditors to have their

debts first paid out of t-he individual property of the partners

does not amount to a lien at all, much‘less a lien of the kind

necessary to give it a preference over a judgment for a partner-

ship debt.
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itore over a.nother." So in the case of Averill tJB. Loucks, 6
Barb. (N. Y.) 470, PAIGE, P. J., says: "Courts of equity, in the
administra1:fon of assets, follow the rules of law in regard to
legal assets, and recognize and enforce all antecedent liens,
claims. and charges existing upon the property, according to
their priorities." This is also conceded in the case <JI! ·McOulloh
1'B. Dashiell, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271, where the
whole doctrine of the distribution in equity of the joint and separate property of partners is very elaborately em.mined.
ARCHER, J., by whom the opinion of the court was delivered,
,there says: "At law the joint creditors may pursue both the
joint and separa1te estate to the extent of each, for the se:tlsfaction of their joint demands, which are at law considered
joint and severa:l, without the possibility of the interposition of
any restraining power of a court of equity.'' But especially
must it be beyond the power of such courts to interfere, where
an aibsolute right of legal priority is given by force of a poeitive
statute, as in case of a judgment. Chancellor WALWORTH, in
Mo1.cer t:B. K-ip, 6 P.aige (N. Y.) 88, 29 Am. Dec. 748, says: "The
rule of this court is to give effect to the lien of a judgment upon
a legal title, so far as it can be enJorced by execUJtion at la:w."
As there is no doubt that at la.w the judgmeut for a partne.rehip debt attaches and becomes a lien upon the real esro.te of
each of the partners, with tf:he same effect as if such judgment
were for the separate debt of such partner, tt is obvious, fr-0'm
the preceding authorities, .th3t the theory upon whioh the complaint in this case was drawn is erroneous. The principle that
the separate property of an individual partner is to be first applied to the paynu•nt of his sPparatedebts lms, as we have seen,
never been lwld to give priority, as to such property, to a su~
sequent judgment for an individuail over a prior judgmenrt: for
a partnership debt. It is true that courts of equity will some-times give to a mere equitable lien, whkh is prior in point of
time, a preferc>nce over a subsPquent judgmenit; but this will
be done only where such prior lien is specific in its chairacter,
as in the case of White t:s. Carpenter, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 219. The
mere general equity of the separate creditors to have t:beir
debts first paid out of the individual property of the partn~rs
does not amount to a lien at all, mueh 'less a lien of the kind
necessary to give it a preference over a jndgmenrt: for a partnership debt.
62
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The plaintiffs cannot, under the averments in the complaint,

avail themselva of that principle of equity which ena.bles a

creditor having a lien upon one fund only to compel a creditor

who has a lien not merely on the same fund, but also upon

another, to resort ﬁrst to the latter, to the end that both may

be paid. If the complaint had averred that there was suﬂi-

cient partnership property, upon which the defendant’s judg-

ment was a lien, to satisfy such judgment, it is possible thart,

under the principle referred to, the plaintiﬁs might have been

entitled to some relief; and in that event it would not have

been a valid objection to the complaint that it did not ask for

the relief appropriate to the case. But the averment in the

complaint is simply that there is suiﬁcient estate of the

deceased partner, Hiram Pratt, to satisfy the defendant’s judg-

ment.

This averment brings the case directly within the doctrine

laid down by Lord Enoon in Ea: parte Kendall, 17 Ves. 520. He

says: “If A has a right to go upon two funds, and B upon one,

having both the same debtor, A shall take payment from that

fund to which he can resort exclusively, that by those means
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of distribution both may be paid. That takes place where

both are creditors of the same person, and have dem-ands

against funds the property of the sa.me person. But it was

never said that if I have a demand against A and B, a creditor

of B sh-all compel me to go against A without more, as if B

himself could insist that A ought to pay in the ﬁrst in-stance

as in the ordinary case of drawer and acceptor, or principal

and surety, to the intent that all obligations arising out of

these -complicated relations may be saxtisﬁed. But if I have a

demand against both, the creditors of B have no right to com-

pel me to seek payment from A, if not f-ou-nded in some equity,

giving to B the right for his own sake to compel me to seek pay-

ment from A.”

The point has also been expressly decided in this state in

the case of Dorr rs. Shaw, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Oh. 17. The only

difference in principle between that case and this is that there

it did not appear that the joint debtors were partners. This,

however, is a difference which operates against the claim of

the plaintiffs -here. \Vhere two individuals, not partners, are

jointly indebted, it might seem to be just to presume thart

each owed one-half 0-f the debt, and to that extent, therefore,

The plaintiffs cann<>t, under the averments in the complaint,
avail themselves of that principle of equity which enables a
creditor having a lien upon ooe fund only to compel a creditor
who has a lien not merely on the same fund, but also upon
another, to ~rt first to the latter, to the end that both may
be paid. If the complaint had averred that there was sufficient partnel"Sbip property, upon w1hich the defendant's judgment was a lien, to satisfy such judgment, it is possible thait,
under the pri_nciple refer1·ed to, the plaintiffs might 1have been
en.titled to some relief; and in that evelllt it would not have
been a valid objection to the oomplaint that it did not ask for
the relief appropriate to the case. But the averment in the
C()mplain.t is simply 'Nlat there is sufficient estate of the
deceased partner, Hiram Pratt, to satisfy the defendant's judgment.
This averment brings the case directly within the doctrine
laid down by Lord ELDON in Ea: parte Kendall, 17 Vee. 520. He
says: "If A has a right to go upon two funds, and B upon one,
having both the same debtor, A shall take payment from that
fund to which he can resort exclusively, thBJt by those means
of distribution both may be paid. That fakes place Where
both are creditors of the same person, and have demands
aga.inst funds the property o-f the same person. But it was
never said that if I have a demand against A and B, a creditor
of B shall compel me to g<> against A with'C>ut mo~, as if B
himself could insist that A ought to pay in the first instance
BJJ in the ordiuary ca.se of drawer and aeceptor, or principal
and surety, to the intent that all obligations arising out of
these .complicated relations may be srut:isfied. But if I have a
demand against both, the creditors of Il have no right to compel me to seek payment from A, if not founded in 8'0me equity,
giving to B the l'ight for his own sake to compel me to seek payment from A."
The point lrnR also been expr<'Rsly decided in tlhis state in
the ease <>f Dorr n. Shaw, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 17. The only
difference in principle between that case n.nd this is thait there
it did not appear that the joint debtors were partners. This,
J10wever, is a difference which operates agafost the claim of
the plaintiffs ·here. 'Vhere two individuals, n.ot partners, are
jointl.v indebted, it might sc>em to be just to presume thait
(•:tch owed one-half o-f the debt, and to fhat extent, therefore,
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there might be an equity in favor of the one owing an indi-
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vidual debt to have so much of the joint debt paid by his

codeb-tor. But in regard to partners, it is now well settled,

upon an analogous question, that no such presumption can be

indulged. Formerly a judgment creditor of one of two part-

ners might levy his execution upon property belonging to the

ﬁrm, and upon the presumption that the interests of the part-

ners were equal, might proceed to sell and appropriate one-half

of the avails to the satisfaction of his debt. This, howevecr,

was long since overruled.

In the case of D-utton vs. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193, Lord ELDON,

in discussing this question, says: “It may be represented that

the world cannot know what is the distinct interest of each

(11. e., each partner), and therefore it is better that the apparent

interest of each should be considered as his actual interest

But courts of equity have long held otherwise.” He then lays

down the rule ever since acted upon, that the creditor in such

a case must wait until the partnership accounts are settled

before he can claim anything from the partnership property.

The principle here asserted by Lord Ennox is directly appli-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-12 18:09 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112203535374
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cable to the present case. It is, that no inference can be safely

drawn from the mere external relations of partners to the

world as to the situation of their affairs inter se, and that in all

judicial proceedings involving the latter an investigation is

ﬁrst to be made; and such is the variety and frequent com-

plexity of partnership dealings that any other rule would

obviously lead to gross injustice. It is impossible, therefore, in

this case to assume, without any averments on the subject in

the complaint, that the estate of the deceased partner Pratt

ought, in equity, to pay any portion of the defendant’s judg-

ment. Hence, upon the principles laid down by Lord ELDON,

and universally acted upon by courts of equity, the complaint

is clearly insufficient.

The judgment of the supreme court, therefore, should be

aﬂlrmed, with costs.

All the judges concurred. ~

Judgment aﬁirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 800.
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I

there might be an equity in favor of the one owing an individual debt to have 80 much of tbe joint debt paid by his
oodebtor. But in reg·ard. fo partners, it is now well settled,
upon an aniafogous question, that no such presnmptio.n can be
indulged. Formerly a judgmeDJt creditor <>f one of two partners might levy his execution upon property belonging to the
firm, and upon the presumption that the interests of the partners were equal, might proceed to sell and appropriate one-half
ol the avails to the satisfaction of his debt. Tb.is, h<>wever,
was long since overruled.
In the case of Dutton vs ..Morrison, 17 Ves. 193, Lord ELDON,
in discussing this question, says: "It may be represented thart:
the w<>rld cannot know what is the distinct interest of each
(i.e., each partner), and therefore it is better that the apparenrt
interest of each should be considered as ibis actual interelJt.
But oourts of equity have long held otherwise." He then lays
down the rule ever since acted upon, that the creditor in such
a case mulrt wait until the partnership accounts are settled
before he can claim anything from the partnership property.
The principle here asserted by Lord ELDON is directly a.pplicable to the present case. It is, that no inference can be sa:fely
drawn from the mere ex~nal relations of partners to the
world as to the situation of their affairs inter se, and that in all
judicial proceedings inv-0lving the latter an investiga•tion is
first to be made; and suach is the variety and frequent oomplexity of partnership dealings that any other rule would
obviously lead to gross injustice. It is impossible, therefore, in
this case to assume, without any averments on the subjeot: in
the complaint, that the eSltate of the deceased partner Pratt
ought, in equity, to pay any portion of the defendant's judgment. Hence, upon the principles laid down by Lord ELDON,
and universally ncted upon by courts of equity, the complaint
is clearly insuJlicient.
The judgment of the supreme court, therefore, should be
affirmed, wi tb costs.
All the judges concurred.
Judgment affirmed.
NOTii:: See l\fechem's Elem. of Partn., § 800.
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DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

W HITCOMB vs. CONVERSE.

Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1875.

119 Mass. as, 20 Am. Rep. 311.

DISTRIBU'fION OF ASSETS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

Bill in equity by Whitoomb, a partner in the la-te ﬁrm of

Converse, \Vhitcomb & Co., against Converse, Stan-ton and

Bladgen, the other partners, to compel contribution to make

good the losses of t*he ﬁrm. The ﬁrm was organized January

2, 1871, to continue one year under articles which provided that

Converse was to contribute $25,000, receive 75$ thereon, give

WHITCOMB vs. CONVERSE•

such time to the bu-siness as he was able, and receive one-

fourth of the net proﬁts; Whitcomb was to contribute $50,000,

have 7% interest, give all his time and take one-fourth of the net

.Supreme OO'Urt of Massachusetts, 1875.
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proﬁts; Blagden and Stanton were each to contribute all his

time and receive one-fourth of the net proﬁts. Whiteomb put

in $25,000 of the agreed $50,000. The partnership was dissolved

119 Maas. 8&, 20Am. Rep. 811.

by mutual consent March 9, 1871, and \Vhitcomb was author-

ized to close up the business. He did so and claimed a loss to

the ﬁrm was shown of $25,000, for which he claims contribu-

tion. Blagden is insolvent and unable to pay any part of the

loss. Stanton brought -the bulk of the business to the ﬁrm,

and he contended that he was not liable to make good any of

the losses, and, if liable, was not liable to make good aﬂ of the

amount which Blagden ought to make good. Cause reserved

for opinion of supreme court.

C’. T. Russell, for plaintiﬂ.

G. O. Shattuck and O. W. Holmes, J-r., for Stanton.

ii

Bill in equity by Whitcomb, a partner in the late firm of
Converse, \Vhitcomb & Co., against Converse, Stan.ton and
Bladgen, the other partners, to compel oontribution to make
good the losses of ttie firm. The firm was organized January
2, 1871, to continue one year under articles which prov~ded tha.t
Converse was to contribute '25,000, receive 7% thereon, give
such time to the business as he was able, and receive onefourth of the net profits; \Vhitcomb ~as to contribute '50,000,
have 7% interest, give all his time and take one-foul"th of the net
profits; Blagden and Stanton were each to contribute all his
time and receive one-fourth of the net profits. Whitcomb put
in $25,000 of the agreed $50,000. The partnership was dissolved
by mutual consent March 9, 1871, and \Yhitcomb was authorized to close up the business. He did l!IO and claimed a loss to
the firm was shown of $25,000, for which he claims contribution. Blagden is insolvent and unable to pay any part of the
loss. Stanton brought the bulk of the business to the firm,
and he contended that be was not liable to make good any of
, the losses, and, if lia.ble, was not liable to make good a_!f of the
amount whkh Blag-den ought to make good. Cause reserved
for opinion of sup~me oourt.

,

0. T. Russell, for plaintiff.
G. 0. Shattuck and 0. W. Holmes, Jr., for Stanton.

Wnrrconn vs. Gosvnnsn. 493

GRAY, C. J. In the absence of controlling agreement, part-

WBITOO.HB VS. CONVERSE.

493

ners must bear the losses in the same proportion as the proﬁts

of the partnership, even if one contributes the whole capital,

and the other nothing but his labor or services: 3 Kent’s Com.

28, 29. \Vhether a loss of capital is a partnership loss, to be

borne byvall the partners, depends upon the nature and extent

of the contract of partnership.

I1’, as is not unfrequently the case in a partnership for a

single adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed by

one partner, and the partnership is in the proﬁts and losses

only, the capital remains the property of the individual partner

to whom it originally belonged, any los-s or destruction of it

falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes the prop-

erty of the partnership, the partnership owes him nothing in

consideration thereof. Story on Partn. _§§ 27 , 29; Heron vs. Hall,

1 B. Monr. (Ky.) 159, 35 Am. Dec. 178.

But where, as is usual in an ordinary mercantile partnership,

a. partnership is created not merely in proﬁts and losses, but in

the property itself, the property is transferred from the original

owners to the partnership, and becomes the joint property of
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the latter; a corresponding obligation arises on the part of the

partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals who

originally contributed it; such payment cannot indeed be de-

manded during the continuance of the partnership, nor are the

contributors, in the absence of agreement or-usage, entitled to

interest, but if the assets of the partnership, upon a ﬁnal settle-

ment, are insuﬂicient to satisfy this obligation, all the partners

must bear it in the same proportion as other debts -of the part-

nership. Julio vs. I nyalls, 1 Allen (Mass) 41; Bradbury] vs.

Smith, 21 Me. 117; Barﬁeld vs. Loughborough, L. R. 8 Ch. 1; In re

Anglesea Colliery Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 379, 387, s. c. L. R. 1 Ch. A-p.

555; Nowell vs. Nowell, L. R. 7 Eq. 538; In re Hodges Distillery

Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 51; 1 Lindley on Partn. (3 Ed.) 696, 827, 828.

Only two cases were cited in the learned argument f_or the

defendant Stanton, in which opinions inconsistent with this

view have been expressed. The one is Ercrly vs. Durborow, 1

Leg. Gaz. Rep. 127, a nisi prius decision, with no reference to

authorities except an early edition of Lindley on Partnership,

which has been corrected by the learned author, ubi supra, con-

forrnably to the adjudged cases. The other is Cameron vs.

Watson, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. 64. That was a bill in equity to
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GRAY, C. J. In the absence of controlling agreement, partners m~st bear the lOBBeB in the same proportion as the proflts
of the partnership, even if one contributes the whole capital,
and the other nothing but his labor or services: 3 Kent's Com.
28, 29. Whether a loes of capital is a partnership loss, to be
borne by all the partners, depends upon the nature and extent
of the contract of partnership.
If, as is not unfrequently the case in a partnership for a
aingle adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed by
one .partner, and the partnership is in the profits and losses
only, the capital remains the property of the individual partner
.to whom it originally belonged, any loss or destruction of it
falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes the property of the partnership, the partnership owes him nothing in
consideration thereof. Story on Partn . .§§ 27, 29; Heron vs. Hall,
1 B. Moor. (Ky.) 159, 35 Am. Dec.178.
But where, as is usual in an ()rdinary mercantile partnership,
a partnership is created not merely in profits and losses, but in
the property itself, the property is transferred from the original
owners to the partnerahip, and becomes the joint property of
the la:tter; a corresponding obligation arises on the part of the
partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals who
originally contributed i,t; such payment cannot indeed be demanded during the continuance of the partnership, nor are the
contributors, in the absence of agreement or·usage, entitled to
interest, but if the assets of tl1e partnership, upon a final settle·
ment, are insufficient to satisfy this obligation, all the partners
mul!Jt bear it in the same proportion as other debts of the partnership. Julio vs. Ingalls, 1 Allen (Mass.) 41; Bmdbury vs.
8mit11, 21Me.117; Barfield vs. Lougllborough, L. R. 8 Ch. 1; In re
A.nglesea Colliery Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 379, 387, s. c. L. R. 1 Ch. Ap.
555; Nowell rs. Kmcrll, L. R. 7 Eq. 5!~8; In re Hodges Distillery
Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 51; 1 Lindley on P.artn. (3 Ed.) 696, 827, 828.
Only two cases were cited in the learned argument (or the
defendant Stanton, in which opinions inconsistent with this
view have been expressed. The one is Ei:erly vs. Durborow, 1
J..ieg. Gaz. Rep. 127, a nisi prius decision, with no reference to
authorities except an early edition of Lindley on Partnership,
which has been corrected by the learned author, ubi supra, conformably to the adjudged cases. The other is Cameron vs.
llotson, 10 Rich. (8. Cnr.) Eq. 64. Thnt was a bill in equity to

..

•

"'

_

•

494 Gasus on PARTNERSHIP.

OASES ON PARTNERSHIP.

settle the aﬁairs of a partnership, to which Cameron had con-

tributed labor and Watson capital. The master, to whom the

case was referred, allowed the claim of Watson for so much

of the capital as he had not withdrawn during the continuance

of the pa.rtnership, but disallowed his claim for interest there-

on; pp. 68, 73. Cameron excepted to the allowance of Watson’s

claim for capital, and Watson excepted to the disallowance of

interest. The chancellor, before whom the exceptions were

heard in the ﬁrst instance, overruled the exception of Cameron,

and also that of V\'a.tson as regarded interest before the dissolu-

tion of the partnership, but su-stained it 0 far as to allow ‘him

interest after the dissolution, pp. 80-90, 95, 96. The court of

appeals, although in one part of it-s opinion appearing to dis-

oountenance \Vatson’s claim for capital, ended by conﬁrming

the master’s report in every particular, pp. 103, 107, 108. So

that the ﬁnal judgment, while it disallowed Wa-tson’s claim

for interest, established his claim for capital, and was in exact

accordance with our conclusion.

In the case at bar, the partnership was not for a single enter-

prise, but for the transaction of a commission business in New
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York and Boston for a year. Converse and Whitcomb cou-

tributed the whole capital in unequal proportions. Converse

was to contribute “su-ch time as he may be able to give”; and

Whitconib and the other two partners, Blagden and Stanton,

were each “to contribute all his time to the business.” Those

partners who contributed the capital did not contribute merely

the use thereof, but the capital itself, and were by the express

agreement to receive interest thereon at rates speciﬁed in the

articles of co-partnership. The partners were by agreement to

receive each one-fourth of the net proﬁts, and by implication of

law must share the losses in the same proportion. The capital

contributed became the property o-f the partnership; and the

partnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to

Whitcoinb and Converse respectively for the amount of capital

paid in by them.

Blagden, one of rthe partners, being insolvent and unable to

discharge any part of the obligation, it must rest in equity upon

the three solvent partners in equal proportions. Whit-man vs.

Porter, 107 Mass. 522; 1 Lindley on Partn. 789, 790.

Decree for the plaintiﬁ accordingly.

NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 305, 308.

Compare with the following case.

eettle the affairs of a partnership, to which Cameron had con·
tributed labor and Watson capital. The master, to whom the
case was referred, allowed the claim of Watson for 'so much
of the capital a.s he had not withdrawn during the continuance
of the partnership, but disallowed his claim for interest there·
on; pp. 68, 73. Cameron excepted to the allowance of Watson's
claim for capital, and Watson excepted to the disallowance of
interest. The chancellor, before whom the exceptions were
heard in the first instance, overruled the exception of Oameron,
and also that of Watson as regarded interest before the dissolution <>f the partnership, but sustafaed it so far as to allow 'him
interest after the di880lution, pp. 80-90, 95, 96. The court of
appeals, although in one part of its opinion appearing to disoountenance Watson's claim f<>r ca.pital, ended by confirming
the ma-ster's report in every pa:N:icular, pp. 103, 107, 108. So
that the final judgment, while it disallowed Watson's claim
fc>r interest, established his claim for capital, and was in exact
acoordance with our conclusi-0n.
In the case at bar, the partnership wa.s not for a single enterprise, but for the .transaction of a commission business in New
York and Boston for a year. Converse and Whitcomb contributed the whole capital in unequal proportions. Converse
was to contribute "such time as he may be able to give"; and
' Whitcomb and ·t he other two partners, Blagden and Stanton,
were ea.ch "to contribute all his time to the business." Those
partners who contributed the capital did not contribute merely
the use thereof, but the capital itself, and were by the express
agreement to receive interest thereon at rates specified in the
artioles of copa.c tnership. The partners were by agreement to
receive each one-fourth of the net profits, and by implication of
law must share the losses in the same proportion. The capital
eontributed became the property of the partnership; and ithe
partnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to
Whitcomb and Converse respectively for the amount of capital
,paid in by them.
Blagden, one of itbe partners, being insolvent and unable to
discharge any part of the obligation, it must rest in equity upon
the three solvent partners in equal proportions. Wliit·man v1.
Perter, 107 Mase. 522; 1 Lindley on Partn. 789, 790.
Decree for ·the plaintiff accordingly.
NOTE: See Hechem's Elem. of Partn.,
Compare with the following case.
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SHEA vs. DONAHUE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1885. -

15 Lea, 160, 54 Am. Rep. 407.

Bill for partnership accounting between Shea and Donahue.

They became partners under written agreement for one year

“as merchants in making, buying and selling all kinds of tin-

SHEA ve. DONAHUE.

ware, stoves, pumps, etc.” “And to constitute a fund for the

purpose Timothy Shea has paid in as stock one thousand dol-

Supreme Oourt of Tennessee, 1885.

lars, which will constitute a common stock, to be used and em-

ployed between us in buying goods, wares and merchandise.

15 Lea, 160, M Am. Rep. 407.

John Donahue being a practical workman and having consid-

erable experience in the above named business, it is agreed tihat

he will give the business his entire personal attention and the

beneﬁt of hisexperience, to place again-st the cash furnished by

said Shea. We are to bear the expenses and losses jointly and

share the proﬁts equally. The capital stock is n-ot to be with-

drawn by either party until the end of the term, but to be em-

ployed as capital unless otherwise mutually agreed between

us in writing.” The business was in fact carried on for about

three years. Upon the settlement, Donahue claimed to be en-
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titled to one-half of the capital advanced by Shea. The chan-

cellor decided against Donahue, and he appealed. ,

J. W. Green, for complainant.

H. H. Taylor, for defendant. '

Goormn, J . (After stating the facts.) The contention of the

defendant is, that by the terms of the agreement he was en-

titled art the end of one year to an equal share of the proﬁts

of the business, and to one-half of the capital advanced by h-is

partner, and this, although it goes without saying he would

retain all his practical experience which was to be placed

against the cash furnished by his partner. But the agreement

is that the partners are only to “share the proﬁts equally,” not

the proﬁts and the capital. And the proﬁts of any business are

only what remains after deducting debts and expenses, and the

capital paid in. Lindley on Partn. 791, 806. The provision that

Bill for partnership accounting between Shea and Dona.h ue.
'!'hey became partnem under written agreemen,t for one year
"as merchants in making, buying and selling all kinds of tinware, stoves, pumps, etc." "And to constitute a fund for the
purpose Timothy Shea has pa.id in as stock one th-0usand dollars, which will constitute a common stock, t-0 be used and employed between us in bl?ying good.ii, wares and merchandise.
John Donahue being a practica:l workm1Ul and having con.siderable experience in the a.hove named business, it is agreed that
he will give the business his entire personal attention and the
benefit of his·experience, to place ag-a.inet the cash furnished by
said Shea. We a:re t-0 bear the expenses and losses jointly and
sha.re the profits equally. The capital stock is not to be withdTawn by either party until the end of the term, but to be employed ae capital unless otherwise mutually agreed between
us in writing." The business was in fact carried on for aoou.t
three yeaTs. Upon the settlement, Donahue claimed to be entitled ro one-half of the capital advanced by Shea. The chancellor decided against Donahue, and he appealed.
J. W. Green., for complainant.
H. H. Taylor, for defendant.
COOPER, J. (After stating the facts.) The contention of the
.defendant is, that by the terms of the agreement he was .entitled art the end of one year to an equal share of the profits
of the business, and to <me-half <>f the capital advanced by his
partner, and this, although it goes without saying he would
, retain all hie practical ex.perience which was to be placed
against the cash furnished by his partner. But the agreement
is that the partners are only to "share the profits equally," not
the profits and the capital. And the profits O'f any business are
only whait remains after deducting debts ana expenses, and the
capital paid in. Lindley on Partn. 791, 806. The provision that

496 Gasns on PARTNERSHIP.
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CASES O.N

p ARTNERSHIP.

the capital stock shall constitute a common stock to be used in

buying the materials and wares of their trade, merely desig-

nates the mode in which ist is agreed that the capital shall be

invested. And the further provision that the capital stock

shall not be withdrawn by either party until the end of the

term, was only intended to restrain the partners from drawing

funds from the business so as to trench upon the capital while

the partnership continued. There is nothing in the article of

agreement to take -the case out of the ordinary one of a partner-

ship in proﬁt and loss u-pon unequal capitals.

Of course the articles of a partnership may expressly provide

for an equal division of the assets, upon a dissolution, notwith-

standing an unequal advance of capital by the respective part-

ners. The same result may follow a continu-ous course of deal-

ing upon a ba'sis'which implies such equal division. For if

there is no evidence from which any different conclusion as to

what was agreed can be drawn, t-he shares of all the partners

will be adjudged equal, upon the favorite maxim of chancery,

that equality is equity. But, as Mr. Lindley tells us, the rule

is when the partners have advanced unequal capitals, and have
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agreed to share proﬁts and losses equally, with-out more, that

each partner is entitled to his advance before division, and a

deﬁciency in the capital must be treated like any other loss,

and borne equally by the partners. Lindley Partn. 807.

The only authorities adduced by the lea.rned counsel of the

defendant, in support of his contention in this case, a.re to the

effect that property brought into the partnership business by

the members of the ﬁrm, or bought with capital advanced, be-

comes partnership property, and may be disposed of as such by

one of the partners un-der his general powers as a member of

the ﬁrm. And so it does beyond all question, for the very

object of contributing capital, either in property or money, is‘

to secure a partnership stock for the purpose of carrying on the

common business. But this fact has nothing to do with the

settlement between the partners of their accounts at the end of

the partnership. “By the capital of a partnership,” says Mr.

Lindley, “is meant the aggregate of the sums contributed by

its members for the purpose of commencing or carrying on the

partnership business. The capital of a partnership is not

therefore the same as its property; the capital is a sum ﬁxed by

the agreements of the partners, whilst the actual assets of the

- » i___._

the capital stock shall constitute a common stock to be used in
buying the materials and· wares of their trade, merely designates the mode in whio.h irt: is agreed that the capital shall be
invested. And the further provision that the capital stock
shall not be withdrawn by either party until the end of the
term, was only intended to restrain the partners from drawing
funds from the business so ail to trench upon the capital while
the partnership continued. There is nothing in the article of
ag.reement ·to take the case ou:t f!f the ordinary one of a pam:nership in profit and loss upon unequal capitals.
Of course the articles of a partnership may expressly provide
f<>r an equal division oft~ assets, upon a dissolution, notwithstanding an unequal advance of capital by the respective partners. The same result may follow a oontinuous course of dealing upon a ba'Eri.s which implies such equal division. For if
there is no evidence from which any different conclusion as to
what was agreed can be drawn, t·he shareti of all the partners
will be adjudged equal, upon the favorite maxim of chancery,
tbat equality is equity. But, as Mr. Liudley tells us, the rule
is when the pal'ltners have advanced unequal capitals, and have
agreed to share profits and losses equally, without more, that
eaoh partner is entitled t-0 bis advance before division, a.nd a
deficiency in the capital must be treated like any other loss,
and borne equally by the partners. Lindley Partn. 807.
'!'he only authorities adduced by the learned counsel of the
defendant, in support of his oontention in this case, a.re to the
effect that property br-0ugbt into the partnership business by
the members of the firm, or bought with capita.I advanced, becomes pa.1•tnership property, and may be disposed of as suoh by
one of the partners under hls general powers a.s a member of
the firm. And so it does beyond all question, for the very
object of oonrtributing ca.pita.I, either in property or money, is·
to secure a partnership stock for the purpose of ca.rrying on the
common business. But this faot has nothing to do with the
settlement between the pa1'i:ners of their accounts at the end of
the partnership. "By the capital of a partnership," says l\Ir.
Lindley, "is meant the aggrPgate of the sums contributed by
its members for the purpose of commencing or carr;ring on the
partnership business. The capital of a partnership is not
the1·efo.re the same as its propPrty; the eapital is a sum fixed by
the agreements of the par·tners, whilst the actual assets of the

SHEA vs. Dorunon. 497

ﬁrm vary from day to day, and include everything belonging to
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the ﬁrm and having any money value. Moreover, the capital

of each partner is not necessarily the amount due to him from

the ﬁrm; for not only may he owe tlhe ﬁrm money, so that less

than his capital is due to him, but the ﬁrm may owe him money

in addition to his capital, e. g., for money loaned. The amount

of each partner’s capital ought therefore always to be accurate-

ly stated, in order to avoid disputes upon a ﬁnal adjustment of

accounts; and this is more important where the capitals of the

partners are unequal, for if there is no evidence as to the

amounts contributed by them, the shares of rthe whole assets

will be treated as equal.” Lindley Partn. 610. [1 Ewe]l’s Lind-

ley, 2d Am. Ed. 320.] The same author adds in another place:

“\Vhen it is said that the shares of partners are prima facile

equal, although their capitals are unequal, what is meant is

that the losses of capital, like other losses, must be shared

equally, bu-t it is not meant that on a ﬁnal settlement of ac-

counits capitals contributed unequally are to be treated as an

aggregate fund which ought to be divided between tlhe part-

ners in equal shares.” Lindley, Partn. 67. On the contra.ry, in
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his chapter devoted to partnership accounts [2 Lindley, Parrtn.

2d Am. Ed. 402], he expressly tells us that the assets of a part-

nership should be a.pplied as follows:

“1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the ﬁrm to non-part

ners. v

“2. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the

ﬁrm to him for advances as distinguished from capital.

“3. In paying to each partner rartably what is due from the

ﬁrm to him in respect of capital.

“4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible as

proﬁt between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary

can be shown.”

In accordance with tlhese principles, the following decision

has been made by the supreme court of New York in a case

cited in a note to page 610 of Lindley on Partnership: “W-here

by the terms of the agreement the defendant furnished the cap-

ital stock, and the plainititf contributed his skill and services,

and the proﬁts of the copartnership were to be equally divided,

the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the capital stock on a

settlement of the affairs of the partnership. He -has no interest

63

firm vary from diay to day, and include everything belonging to
the tlrm and having any money value. Moreover, the capital
of ea.eh partner is not necessarily the amount due to him from
the tlrm; fo.r not only may he owe the firm money, so that less
than his capital is due to him, but the firm may owe him money
· in addition to his capital, e. g., for money loaned. The amounrt
of ea.ch partner's oa.pital ought therefore always to be accurate·
ly stated, in order it:o avoid disputes upon a final 8.djustment of
accounts; a.nd this is more important where the ca.pitills of the
partners are unequal, for if t!here is n-0 evideD'ce a.s to the
amounts contributed by them, the shares of ithe whole assets
will be treated as equal." Lindley Partn. 610. [1 Ewell's Lind·
ley, 2d Am. Ed. 320.] The same author adds in .another place:
"When it is eaid that t'he &hares of partneM are prim.a facie
equal, although their capitals are unequal, what is meant is
that the loeses of capit!a.l, like other losses, muErt be shared
equally, but it is n.ot meant that on a final settlement of accounrt:s ca.p itals contributed unequally are fo be treated ea an
aggregate fund whi~ ought to be divided between the partnel'8 in equal shares." Lindley, Partn. 67. On the contrary, in
bis chapter devoted to partnership accounts (2 Lindley, Partn.
2d Am. Ed. 402), he expressly tells us that the 8.88ets of a pa.l"f:·
nership should be applied a.s follows:
"1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to non-part•
ners.
"2. In paying fo each partner ratably what is due from the
flrm to him for advanees as distinguished from capital.
"3. In paying to each partner rart:ably what is due from the
firm to him in respect of oapital.
"4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible aa
profit between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary
can be shown."
In accordance with these principles, the following decision
has been made by the supreme oourt of New Y <>rk in a case
cited in a note to page 610 of Lindley on Partnership: "W·h ere
by the terme of tlle agreement the defendant furnished the cap·
it.al etock, a.nd the plaintiff oontributed his skill and services,
and the protlts of the oopa.rtnersbip were to be equally divided,
the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the capital stock on a
settlement of the affairs of the partnership. He ·has oo interest
63
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in any part of the capital excepting so far as in the progress of

4:98
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the business the same may have been converted into proﬁts.”

Conroy vs. Campbell, 13 Jones & Sp. 326. The case, it will be

noticed, is exactly in point. And to the same eﬂeot in principle

are Whitcomb vs. Converse, 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311, ante

p.492; Knight vs. Ogden, 2 Tenn.Oh. 473, and Shepherd, Em parte,

3 Tenn. Ch. 189. No ease ‘has been found to the contrary.

Ohancellor’s decree aﬂirmed.

NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 305-306.

I

J

‘ _@ _,

in any part of the capital excepting so far as in the progre9B of
the business the same may have been converted into profits."
Oon.rQ1J vs. Oampbell, 13 Jones & Sp. 326. The case, it will be
ooticed, is exactly in point. And to the same effect in principle
a.re Whitcomb vs. Converae, 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311, ante
p.li92; Knight v8. Ogden, 2 Tenn.Oh. '73, and 8'hepher4, E111 parle,
3 Tenn. Cb. 189. No CB8e 'has been found to the cont.rar1.
Ohancell-0r's decree aftlrmed.
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NOTE: See :Mechem'& Elem. of P&rtn., §§ 800-808.
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ACCOUNT,

duty of partner to account for clandestine proﬁts: Latta vs. Kil-

bourn, 212.

INDEX.

ACCOUNTING,

between partners: See Ac'r1oNs BETWEEN Panrnnnsz CAPITAL.

between partners and creditors; See APPLICATION OF ASSETS. -

of illegal transactions: Woodworth vs. Bennett,_ 25; Craft vs. Ho-

Conoughy, 30.

reopening, after long time: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382.

ACCOUNTS,

duty of partner to keep: Webb vs. F01-dyce, 228.

ACCOUNT STATED,

action between partners upon: Wycoﬂ’ vs. Parnell, 238.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT,

See STATUTE or LIMITATIONS.
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ACTIONS,

nonjoinder of partner as party: Cleveland vs. Woodward, 318.

ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS,

1. AT LAW, when can be maintained: Wycoﬂ‘ vs. Purnell, 238; Bullard

vs. Kinney, 240; Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242; Beede vs. Fraser, 246.

ondorsee of note given by ﬁrm to partner may sue ﬁrm: Carpenter

vs. Greenop, 242.

ﬁrm can not sue other ﬁrm having common partner: Beede vs. Fraser,

246.

for failure to launch ﬁrm as agreed: Hill vs. Palmer, 249.

for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 251.

2. IN EQUITY, for accounting and settlement: Spear vs. Newall, 257;

Pirtle vs. Penn, 259; New vs. Wright, 263.

ACCOUNT,
duty of partner t.o account for clandestine profits: Latta w. KUboum, 212.
AOOOUNTING,
between partnen: See AC'TIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS; CA.PIT.AL.
between ]>artnen and creditors; See APPLICATION OF AssETS.
•
of illegal tranaactiona: Woodioorth VB. Benmtt,. 25; Oro.ft w. JLoOonough'll, 80.
reopeninJ[, after long time: Valentine VB. W'llBOr, 882.
ACCOUNTS,
duty of partner t.o keep: Webb w. Fordy~, 228.
ACCOUNT STATED,
action between partners upon: Wgco§ w. Purnell, 288.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT,
Bee 8TATUTB Oll' LDIITATION&

ADMISSIONS.

of a partner, when bind the ﬁrm: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.

tobar operation of statute of limitations: See STATUTE or Luan-

TIONS.

ADVERTISEMENT,

See N01-1cE or Dissonnrros.

AGENCY,

as test of partnership: Com vs. Hickman, 70. et seq.

ACTIONS,

nonjoinder of partner as party: Cleveland w. Woodward, 818.
ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS,
1. AT LAW, when can be maintained: Wyoof!vB. Purnell, 288; Bullard
v1. Kinne.11, 240; Carpenter va. Gnenop, 242; Bude"'· JiraNr, .246.
endorsee of note given by firm to partner may aue firm: Carpenter
VI. Green.op, 242.
firm can not aue other firm having common partner: Bude VB. Ff'GM,1',
246.
for failure t.o launch firm as agreed: Hill va. Palmer, 249,
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley va. Smith, 251,
2. IN EQUITY, for accounting and settlemt'nt: Spear "'· N6VWU, 1!671
Pirtle v1. Penn, 269; New w. Wright, 268.
ADMISSIONS,
of a partner, when bind the firm: Swut VB. Wood, l'TO.
t.o bar operation of ttatute of limitations: See Sr.a.TUTS o• lixrrA·
TIONB.

ADVERTISEMENT,
See NoTIO& OJ' Dls8o1A1TIO•.
AGENCY,
u test of parin.enhip: Ooa: va.

Hie~,

'rO, et -.q.

,..

600 Immx.

AGENT, (See Powaas or Pswmsss; LIABILITY’).

500

INDBX.

partner as agent of ﬁrm: Chester vs. DlCk€T8OTl., 20; Sweet vs. Wood,

270, et seq.; Pith-in vs. Benfer, 313, et seq.; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee,

411, et seq.

APPLICATION OF ASSETS,

to claims of ﬁrm creditors: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.

Hagerman, 446; Huge vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery Co. vs. McCune,

457; Rodgers vs. Meranda, 463; Blair vs. Black, 477; Harris vs. Pea-

body, 488.

ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP,

duty of partner not to violate: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs.

- Leeka, 232.

ASSETS,

See FIRM NAME; Goon WILL; REAL Esnrn. -

ASSIGNEE, _

of partner cannot sue ﬁrm, when: Bullard vs. Kinney, 240.

A.GENT, (See POWERS OF P.A.RTNEBS; LliBILITY).
partner 88 agent of firm: Cheater vs. Dickerson, 20; Swut
Wood,
270, et~.; Pitkin vs. Benfer, 818, et ~.q.; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee,

"1.

411,

et seq_.

APPLICATION OF ASSETS,
to claims of firm creditors: Case VI. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vi.
Hagerman, 446; Hage vs. Campbell, 4l')8; Grocery Co. vs. McCune,
457; Rodgers VB. Meranda, 468; Blair VB. Black, 477; Harri& VI. Pea'body, 488.
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP,
duty of partner not to violate: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden 111.

Leeka, 282.

of note, may sue ﬁrm, when: Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242.

of bankrupt partner, suit by: Halsey vs. Norton, 353.

ASSIGNMENT,

when valid as to ﬁrm creditors: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446.
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as assets, by surviving partner: Linder vs. Bank. 401.

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.

power of partner to make: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296.

ASSETS,
See FIR.JI NAJB; Goon WILL; REAL F.8TATB.
ASSIGNEE,
of partner cannot sue firm, when: Bullard vs. Kinney, 240.
of note, may sue firm, when: Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242.
of bankrupt paftner, suit by: Hallley vs. Norton, 8l')3,

by surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson, 403.

ASSOCIATIONS,

if not for pecuniary gain, not partnerships: Queen vs. Robson, 1; Burt

vs. Lathrop, 4. . _

ASSIGNMENT,
when valid 88 to firm creditors: Arnold"'· Hagerman, 446.
as assets, by surviving partner: Linder vs. Bank. 401.

ASSUMPTION OF DEBT,

of partner by ﬁrm: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery Co. vs. McO'une,

457.

BANKRUPTCY,

distribution of assets, upon: See APPLICATION O1!‘ ASSETS,

dissolves ﬁrm: Halsey vs. -Norton, 353.

BILLS AND NOTES: See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS,
power of partner to make: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296.
by surviving partner: Durant VB. Pieraon, 408.
ASSOCIATIONS,
if not for pecuniary gain, not partnerships: Queen VB. Robson, 1; Burt
vs. Lathrop, 4.

power of partner to make: Pease vs. Cole, 282.

BOND,

power of one partner to execute: Fox vs. Norton, 295.

BORROW,

power of surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson,, 408.

BUYING GOODS,

powers of partner as to: Boardman vs. Adams, 277; Porter vs. Curry,

281; Johnston vs. Dutton, 304.

CAPITAL,

contributions to, what may be: Griﬂith vs. Buﬁum, 315; Whitcomb

ASSUMPTION OF DEBT,
of partner by firm: Hage w. Campbell, 458; Grocery Co. vs. McOu~
~7.

BANKRUPrCY,
distribution of &BBets, upon: See APPLICATION OF AsSETB.
dissolves firm: Halsey vs•.Norton, 858.
BILLS AND NOTES: See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUKENTB.
power of partner to make: Peaae vs. Cole, 282.

vs. Converse, 492; Shea vs. Donahue, 495.

rights of partners in: Whitcomb vs. Converse, 492; Shea vs. Donahue,

495.

0

BOND,
pow"r of one partner to execute: Fo;r: vs. Norton, 295.
BORROW,
power of surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson,, 408.
BUYING GOODS,
powers of partner 88 to: Boardman VB. Adams, 277; Porter 111.
281; Johnston va. Dutton, 804.
CAPITAL,
contributions to, what may be:

°"""•

Griffith va. Buffum, 815; Whitcomb
vs. Converse, 492; Shea vs. Donahue, 495.
rij!;hts of partners in: Whitcomb vs. ConverBe, 492; Shea. v1. Donahue,
495.

•

INDEX. 501

INDEX.

CAPITAL-—COI1tIl1l19d.

601

how divided on dissolution: Id.

losses of, how made good: Id.

CARE,

degree of, required between partners: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,

not a partnership: Queen vs. Robson, 1.

CLANDESTINE PROFITS,

made by partner inure to ﬁrm, when: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

COLLECTION, ‘

power of partner as to means of: Clarke vs. Wallace, 301.

COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP: See Tnsmse FIRM.

p0\vers of partners in: Pease vs. Cole, 282.

COMMUNITY OF INTEREST,

as test; of partnership: Spaulding vs. Stubbings. 117; Magovern vs.

Robertson, 122; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139. ‘

COMPENSATION,

for extra services, partners no implied right to: Lindsey vs. Shana-

han, 231.

COMPETITION,
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when partner hot to trade in competition with his ﬁrm: Latta vs.

Kilbourn, 212.

C.APITAL-Continued.
how divided on dissolution: IcJ.
losses of. how made good: JcJ.
CARE,
degree of, required between partners: Inttleg va. Shire, 222.
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.
not a partnership: Queen va. Robson, 1.
CLANDESTINE PROFITS,
made by partner inure to firm, when: Latta va. Kilboum, 219.
COLLECTION,
power of partner as to means of: Clarke VB. Wallace, 801.
COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP: See TRADING Fnul.
powers of partners in: Pease va. Cole, 282.
COMMUNITY OF INTERES'i,
as test of partnership: Spaulding va. Stubl>inga. 117; Magovern aa.
Robertson, 122; Morgan vs. Farrel, 189.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT,

power of partner to make: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294.

CONSULT,

duty of partner to consult with copartner: Yorks vs. Tozer, 230,

CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIP,

does not constitute one: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors vs. Nixon-Jones

Co., 53; Kerriclc vs. Stevens, 55; Duryea vs. Whitcomb, 57; Griﬂlth

vs. Buﬁum, 315.

CONTINUING BUSINESS.

by surviving partner underwill: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382; Jones vs,

Walker. 391.

CONTRIBUTION,

right of partners to: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330; McFadden vs. Leeka, 232,

CONVERSION,

of ﬁrm into individual property: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446; Case ‘Us,

Beauregard, 440.

of individual into ﬁrm liability: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery C0.

vs. McCune, 457.

CORPORATION,

may not enter into partnership: Whittenton Mills vs. Upton, 44.

CORPORATION—DEFECTIVE,

COMPENSATION,
for extra services, partnen no implied right to: Lindsey vs. Stra.n~
han, 231.
COMPETITION,
when partner bot to trade in competition with his firm: Latta"'•
Kilbourn, 212.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT,
power of partner to make: Morgan va. Richardson, 294.
CONSULT,
duty of partner to consult with copartner: Yorks va. Tozer, 230.
CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIP,
does not constitute one: Atkins va. Hunt, 49; Sailors va. Ni:ron-Jonea
Co., 58; Kerrick vs. Stevena, 55; Duryea va. Whitcomb, 57; Grijftth
t.'B. Buffum, 315.
CONTDTUING BUSINESS,
by surviving partner under'will: Valentine VB. Wyaor, 882; Jonea'va.
Walker, 391.

See DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPOR.-\TI()NS—DE Fsoro CORPORA-

TIONS.

CONTRIBUTION,
right of partners to: Hua va. Lowrey, 380; McFadden va. Luka, 282.
CONVERSION,
of firm into individual property: Arnold va. Hagerman, 446; Caae VB.
Beauregard, 440.
of individual into firm liability: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Gro~ Co.
va. McCune, 457.
CORPORATION,
may not enter into partnership: Whittenton Milla va. Upton, 44.
CORPORATION-DEFECTIVE,
See DEFECTIVELY 0BG.A.NIZ&D CORPORATIONS-DE FACTO CORPORATIONS.

602- INDEX.

1.NDBX.

OREDITORS,

carrying on business of debtor, whether partners: Cow vs. Hickman,

OREDITOR9,

70.

CREDITORS OF FIRM, (See APPLICATION or Assars.)

rights of, in partnership assets: Durant vs. Pierson, 403 et seq.

carrying on buainesa of debtor, whether partners:
70.

Co:r: "'·Hickman,

DAMAGES,

from partner for violating articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.

for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 251.

DEATH OF PARTNER,

dissolves partnership: Hoard vs. Clam. 350; Imley vs. Shire, 222.

effect upon actions: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.

DECEASED PARTNER,

liability of his estate for partnership debts: Doggett vs. Dill, 395.

DECLARATIONS,

of partner when bind ﬁrm: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.

CREDITORS OF FIRM, (See APPLICATION OF AssETS.)
rights of, in p&rtnership assets: Durant"'· Pier8on, 403 et aeq.
DAM.AGES,

from partner for violating articles: Murphy '18, Cr~fta, 227.
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley"'· Smith, 251.
DEA.TH OF PARTNER,

diSBOlves partnership: Hoard vs. Clum. 350; Inile11 vs. Shire, 222.
effect upon actions: Hua vs. Lowrey, 830.

DE FACTO CORPORATION,

what necessary to constitute: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan vs.

Noerenberg, 13.

DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATION,

when members of liable as partners: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan

DECEASED PARTNER,

liability of his estate for partnership debts: Doggett vs. Dill, 395.
DECLARATIONS,

of partner when bind firm: Sweet V8. Wood, 270.
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vs. Noerenberg, 13; Kaiser vs. Bank, 16. _

DILIGENCE.

required between partners: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

DISPUTES,

DE FACTO CORPORATION,

what necessary to constitute: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan ve.
Noerenberg, 18.

between partners, dissolution for, when: Howell vs. Harvey, 854.

Gerard vs. Gateau, 366.

DISSOLUTION,

by'death: Hoard vs. Clam, sso. ‘

by bankruptcy: Halsey vs. Norton, 353.

power of one partner as to: Johnston vs. Dutton, 804; Solomon vs.

DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATION,

when members of liable as partners: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan
vs. Noerenberg, 13; Kaiser V8. Bank, 16.
DILIGENCE,

required between partners: Inaley V8. Shi1'e, 222.

Kirkwood, 361.

what will justify in equity: Howell vs. Harvey, 354; New -vs.

Wright, 263; Gerard vs. Gateau, 866.

reasonable notice of : Id.

DISPUTES,

between partners, dissolution for, when:
Gerard vs. Gateau, 366.

Howell v.s. Harve1J, SM.

action in equity for: New vs. Wright, 263.

notice of, how given: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361; Austin vs. Hol-

land, 870: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.

effect upon liabilities of all partners: Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.

eﬁect on powers of partners: Durant vs. Pierson, 408; Humphries vs.

Chastain, 410; VanKeuren vs. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David,

421; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424.

action for wrongfully causing: Bagley vs. Smith, 251; Howell vs. Har-

vey, 354.

DORMANT PARTNER, (See Unmscnossn PARTNER).

liability of: Pitkin vs. Benfer, 313; Griﬂith vs. Buﬁum, 315; Chester

vs. Dickerson, 20.

notice of retirement of: Bank vs. Bergstrom, 378.

DISSOLUTION,
byd~ath: Hoard vs. Clum, 850.

by bankruptcy: Halsey vs. Norton, 858.
power of one partner aa to: .Iohnaton '18. Dutton, 804; Solomon va.
Kirkwood, 861.
what will justify in equity: Howell ve. Harvey, 85•; New vs,
Wright, 268; Gerard V8. Gateau, 866.

reasonable notice of: .Jd.
aotion in equity for: New vs. Wright, 263.
notice of, how given: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, SIU; Amtin ve. Holland, 870; Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.
effect upon liabilities of all partners: BarnM vs. Boyers, 485.
effect on powers of partners: Durant V8. Pierson, 403; Huniphriea V8.
Chastain, 410; VanKeuren '18. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David,
,21; Feigley VB. Whitaker, 424.
action for wrongfully causing: Bagley vs. Smith, 251; Howell vs. Harvey, 854.
DORMANT PARTNER, (See UNDISCLOSED PARTNER).
liability of: Pitkin '18. Benfer, 818; Griffith "'· Buflum. 815; Cli.uter
vs. Dick~son, 20.

notice of retirement of: Bank"'· Bergstrom, 878.

INDEX. 503

503

INDEX.

DOWEB,

in partnership realty: Robinson Bank vs. Miller, 155; Paige vs. Paige.

170.

DUTY OF PARTNERS,

to act in good faith: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

to be diligent: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

not to violate articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.

to keep accounts: Webb vs. Fordyce, 228.

to consult with copartners: Yorks vs. Tozer, 230.

ENTITY,

ﬁrm as: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446.

EQUITY,

actions in: See ACTIONS.

dissolution in: See DISSOLUTION.

distribution of assets in: See APPLICATION or Assam.

ESTOPPEL, (See Honnmo OUT).

to deny partnership: Fletcher vs. Pullen, 134; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139,

EVIDENCE.

what admissible to prove partnership: Jacobs vs. Shorey, 131; Fletcher

vs. Pullen, 134.
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EXECUTOR, (See SURVIVING PARTNER).

of deceased partner, continuing business creates new ﬁrm: Insley vs.

Shire, 222.

rights against surviving partner: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382.

EXPRESS PROMISE,

when necessary to sustain action between partners: Wycoﬁ vs, Pu;-.

nell, 238 and note.

EXTRA COMPENSATION,

for extra services, partner cannot claim: Lindsey vs. Stranahan, 231.

FALSE IBIPRISONMENT,

DOWEB,
in partnenhip realty: Rob&naoR. Ban'lo va. Miller, 155; Paige va. Paige.
170.
DUTY OF PARTNERS,
to act in good faith: Latta""· Kilbourn, 212.
to be diligent: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
not to violat.e articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.
to keep accounts: Webb vs. Fordyce, 228.
to consult with copartners: Yorks vs. Tozer, 280.
ENTITY,
firm as: Arnold vir. Hagerman, 446.
EQUITY,
actions in: s00 ACTIONS.
dissolution in: See DISSOLUTION.
distribution of assets in: See APPLICATION 011' ASSETS.
F.sTOPPEL, (See HOLDING OUT).
to deny partnership: Fletcher vs. Pullen, 134; Morgan va. Farrel, 189.
EVIDENCE,
what admissible to prove partnership: Jacobs v•. Shorey, 181; Fletcher
VB. Pullen, 134.
EXECUTOR, (See SURVIVING PARTNER).
of deceased partner, continuing business creat.es new firm: Insley vs.
Shire, 222.
rights against surviving partner: Valentine VB. Wysor, 882.

by one partner, when binds ﬁrm: Rosenkrans vs. Barker, 835,

FIDELITY,

duty of partner to his ﬁrm: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

FIDUCIARY RELA1 ION,

between partners: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

FIRM CREDITORS.

EXPRF.88 PROMISE,
when necessary to sustain action between partners: Wycoff ""· Purnell, 238 and note.
EXTRA COMPENSATION,
for extra services, partner cannot claim:

Lindsey vir. Stranahan, 281.

rights of, in ﬁrm property: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.

Hagerman, 446; Grocery C0. vs. McC'une, 457; Rodgers vs. Meranda,

463; Blair vs. Black, 477; Harrie vs. Peabody, 483; Meech vs. Allen,

457.

FIRM NAME. I

rights respecting: Williams vs. Farrand,174: Snyder Mfg. C0, vs,

Snyder, 192.

FRAUD, (See TORT).

of one partner binds ﬁrm, when: Chester vs. Dickerson, .20; Jaoobg

vs. Shore]/, 131.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT,
by one partner, when binds ftrm: Rosenkrans VB. Barker, 835.
FIDELITY,
duty of partner to his firm: Latta VB. Kilbourn, 212.
FIDUCIARY RELA 1 ION,
between partner": Latta 1."B. Kilbourn, 212.
FIRM CREDITORS,
rights of, in firm proporty: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; AMtold vir.
Hagerman, 446; Grocery Co. v.9. 1~IcCuue, 457; Rudgers vs. Meranda,
.(63; Blair VB. Black, 477; Harris VB. Peabod11, 483; J[eech vs. Allen,
·b7.

FIRM NAME.
rights respecting:
Snyder, 192.

Williams vs. Parrand, 174: Snuder lt{fg. Oo. " 8 ,

JfRAtTD, (See TORT).
of one partner binds firm, when: Chester va. Dickeriron, .20; JCU'.obs
vs. Shorey, 181.

504 Innnx.

604

INDEX.

FUTURE PARTNERSHIP, '

when become operative: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors vs. Nixon-Jomc

Co., 53; Kerrick vs. Stevens, 55.

GOOD FAITH,

duty of partners to each other: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212; Insley vs.

Shire, 222.

GOOD WILL,

what. constitutes and how protected: Williams vs. Farrand, 174; Sny-

der Mfg. Co. vs. Snyder, 192; Trcgo vs. Hunt, 199.

GROSS PROCEEDS, .

sharing of, as test of partnership: Beecher vs. Bush, 86; Harvey rs.

Childs, 97; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.

HEIRS,

rights against surviving partner: Valentine vs. VVy-801', 882.

HIRING OF PROPERTY,

by one partner: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.

HOLDING OUT, (See Fs'r0PPsL).

liability as partner by: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125; Fletcher vs. Pullen,

184; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.

HOTEL,
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lessor of hotel, whether partner with proprietor: Beecher vs. Bush, 86.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

as partners: Artman vs. Ferguson, 37; Suau vs. Cafe, 40.

ILLEGALITY, (See Punrosss or PARTNERSHIP).

of purpose of partnership: Woodworth vs. Bennett, 25; Craft vs.

McConoughy, 30.

INFANT, _

rights and liabilities as partner: Adams vs. Beall, 83.

INDEMNITY, '

. duty of partner to indemnify copartner for losses caused by former‘s

violation of articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.

partner cannot claim, for unauthorized acts: McFadden vs. Leeka,

232.

INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP,

cannot exist: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361.

INDIVIDUAL ASSETS, (See APPLICATION or Asssrs).

prior claim of individual creditors in: Rodgers rs. Meranda, 463;

Blair cs. Black, 477.

INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY,

of each partner for whole debt: Haralson vs. Campbell, 840; Mason

vs. Eldred, 343; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341.

INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY,

of partner may be taken for ﬁrm debt: Haralson vs. Campbell, 840.

INDORSEMENT,

implied power of partner to indorse: Clarke vs. Wallace, 301.

after dissolution: Humphries rs. Chastain, 410.

FUTURE PARTNERSHIP,
when become operative: ,Atkin.a va. Hunt, 49; Sailors"'· Nizon-Jonc •
Co., 68; Kerrick '''· Stet-en3, 65.
GOOD FAITH,
duty of partners t.o each other: Latta w. Kilboum, 212; Inalq "'·
Shire, 222.
GOOD WILL,
what constitutes and how prot.eoted: Williama 111. Farrand, 174; Snyder Mfg. Co. VB. Snyder, 192; Trego 11B. Hunt, 199.
GROSS PROCEEDS,
sharing of, as test of partnership: Bucher w. Bush, 86; Harvey t·s.
Childa, 97; Morgan vs. Farrel, 189.
HEIRS,
rights against surviving partner: Valentine ""' Wy1or, 883.
HIRING OF PROPERTY,
by one partner: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
HOLDING OUT, (See FsTOPPEL),
liability 88 partner by: Burnett "'· Snyder, 125; FldcMr- VI. Pullen~
184; Morgan v1. Farrel, 189.
HOTEL,
Jeesor of hot.el, whether partner with proprietor: BucMr w. Btuh, 86.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
as partners: Artman vs. Fergu1on, 87; Suau VB. Caf!e, 40.
ILLEGALITY, ( ~ PuRPOSES OF PARTNERSHIP).
of purpose of partnership: Woodworth vs. Bennett, 25; Craft t•t.
McConoughy, 80.
INFANT,
rights and liabilities 88 partner: Adam.t v1. Beall, 83.
INDEMSITY,
duty of partner t.o indemnify copartner for loeees caused by former'&
violation of articles: Murphy v1. Crafts, 227.
part•1er cannot claim, for unauthorized acts: McFadden v1. Leeka,
232.

INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP,
cannot exist: Solomon v1. Kirkwood, 861.
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS, (See APPLICATION OF ASSETS).
prior claim of individual creditors in: Rodger1 t'B. Meranda, 468;.
Blair i·s. Black, 477.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY,
of each partner for whole debt: Haralson 111. Campbell, 840; Ma80tt
t•• Eldred, 848; Oil Co. 11s. Hubbell, 841.
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY,
of partner may be taken for firm debt: Haralson v1. Campbell, 840.
INDORSEMENT,
implied power of partner t.o indone: Clarke v1. Wallace, 301.
after dissolution: Humphries t•s. Cha1tain, 410.

INDEX. 505
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INDEX.

INJUNCTION,

to restrain use of ﬁrm name: See FIRM N AME.

to protect good will: See G001) WILL.

INSOLVENCY,

distribution of assets upon: See APPLICATION or Asssrs.

INTENTION,

INJUNCTION,
to restrain use of firm name: See FIRM NAK&
to protect good will: See GooD WILL,
INSOLVENCY,

to become partners, how far eﬁective: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors rs.

Nixon-Jones Co., 53; Kerrick vs. Stevens, 55; Du:-yea vs. Whitcomb,

57.

J OINDER,

of partners as partia: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.

JOINT CREDITORS,

distribution of asset.a upon: See APPLICATION OJ' ASSRTB.

INTENTION,
to become partners, bow far effective: .Atlcim va. Hunt, 49; Sailor• t·a.
NiJ:on-Jonea Co., 53; Kerrick VB. Stevena, 65; Duryea VB. Whitcomb,
~7.

rights of a ﬁrm assets: See APPLICATION or Ass:-:'rs.

JOINT OBLIGATION,

of individual partners when a partnership one: Berkshire Co. vs.

Juillard, 319.

JOINT PURCHASERS,

JO INDER,
of partners as parties: Hus vs. Lowrey, 880.

JOINT CREDITORS,
rights of a firm asset.a: See APPLICATION OB' ASSETS.

for resale, whether partners: Coope vs. Eyre, 64; Harvey vs. Childs,

97; Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117.

JOINT AND SEVERAL,
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partnership debts are in equity: Doggett vs. Dill, 395.

not at law: Mason vs. Eldred, 343.

JUDGMENT,

against partners, in what form; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341.

JOINT OBLIGATION,
of individual partnera when a partnership one:

Berkshi~

Co. v•.

Juillard, 319.
JOINT PURCHASERS,
for resale, whether partners: Coope vs. Eyre, 64; Harveu v.s. Childs,
97; Spaulding vs. StubbingB, 117.

merges obligations, when: Mason vs. Eldred, 343.

confession of. by one partner: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294.

LAND, (See REAL ESTATE).

partnerships to deal in: Chester vs. Dickerson, 20.

may be created by parol: Id.

LIABILITY, (See PowERs or PARTNERS; NEGLIGENCE; Tom).

of partners is joint: Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341; Mason vs. Eldred, 343.

of ﬁrm, for acts of partner: Sweet vs. Wood 270, et seq.; Pith-in vs.

Benfer, 318, et seq.

LIEN,

of ﬁrm creditors on ﬁrm assets: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.

Hagerman, 446, et seq.

LOAN,

whether constitutes partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Harvey rs.

Childs, 97; Meehan vs. Valentine, 103; lVaverly Bank vs. Hall, 113;

, Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117.

MAJORITY,

power of; Johnston vs. Dutton, 304; Leavitt vs. Peck, 808; Wipper-

man vs. Stacy, 309; Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,

by one partner binds ﬁrm, when: Rosenkrans vs. Barker, B35.

MALPRACTICE,

by one partner, ﬁrm liable when: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.

6-L

JOINT AND SEVERAL,
partnership debts are in equity: Doggett vs. Dill, 895.
not at law: Mason VB. Eldred, 343.

JUDGMENT,
against partners, in what form; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 841.
merges obligations, when: Mason vs. Eldred, 348,
confession et, by one partner: Morgan VB, Richardson, 294.

LAND, (See REAL

ESTATE),

partnerships to deal in: Chester vs. Dickeraon, 20.
may be created by parol: Id.
LIABILITY, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS; NEGLIGENCE; TORT).
of partners is joint: Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341; Mason VB. Eldred, 848.
of firm, for acts of partner: Sweet vs. Wood 270, et seq.,· Pitlcin vs.

Benfer, 318, et seq.
LIEN,
of firm creditors on firm asset.a: Case w. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vr.
Hagerman, 446, et seq.
LOAN,
whether constitutes partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Han:ey 1·s~
Childs, 97; ~Ieehan t"s. Valentine, 103; Waverly Bank i·s. Hall, 113;
Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117.

MAJORITY,
power of; Johnston vs. Dutton, 804; Leavitt vs. Peck, 808; Wipper·
man vs. Stacy, 309; Latta vs, Kilbourn, 212.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
by one partner binds firm, when: Rosenkram w. Barker, 835,
MALPRACTICE,
by one partner, firm liable when: Hess vs. Lowrey, 880,

64:

808 Isnxx.

MARRIED WOMEN,

as partners: Artman vs. Ferguson, 37: Suau vs. Cafe, 40.

MARSH ALLING,

of assets: See APPLICATION or Asssrs.

on what principle: Rodgers vs. Meranda, 463.

MERGER,

of partnership debt; in judgment: Mason vs. Eldred, 348.

MINORITY, (See MAJORITY).

MISCONDUCT, °

of partner, when justifies dissolution: New vs. lVn'ght, 203; Howell

vs. Harvey, 354; Gerard vs. Gateau, 366.

MISMANAGEMENT,

liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

MORTGAGE.

implied power of one partner to make: Hage vs. Campbell, 453.

N IME, (See FIRM NAME).

in what name ﬁrm bound: Berkshire Co. vs. Juillard, 319; Hastings

Nat. Bank vs. Hibbard, 322.

two ﬁrms of same name, which bound: Hastings Bank vs. Hibbard,

822.
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NEGLIGENCE,

of one partner, liability, of ﬁrm for; Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.

liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

NEGOTIA BLE INSTRUMENTS,

power of partner to make: Pease vs. Cole, 282.

NET PROCEEDS.

sharing in. as test of partnership: Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.

NEW CONTRACT,

partner no power to make after dissolution: Humphries vs. Chastain,

410; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David, 421; Feigley

vs, Whitaker, 424.

NEW PROMISE, (See S'm'ro'rs: or Liurmrioss).

-

J U.BRIED WOMEN,
as partners: Artman w. Ferguacm, 87: Suau oa. CaJfe, 4.0.
IU.RSHALLING,
of asaeta: See APPLICATION OJ' ASSETS.
on what principle: Rod.aer• w. Meranda, .(81.
MERGER,
of partnenhip debt in judgment: Jlcuon va. Eldred, 84.8.
llINORITY, (See MA.JoRITY).

lrlISCONDUCT,
of partner, when justifies dissolution: New w. Wright, 268; Howell
va. Hart'ey, 854; Gerard va. Gateau, 866.
MISMANAGEMENT,
liability of partner t.o partner, for: Inalq va. Shire, 222.
HORTGAGE,
implied power of one partner t.o make: Hage w. Oamp'bell, 458.
N _\.ME, (See Fmx N.AJ(E).
in what name firm bound: Berkahire Oo. w. Juillard, 819; Haatinga
Nat. Bank va. Hibbard, 822.
two firms of eame name, whioh bound: Hasting• Bank w. Hibbard,
822.
NEGLIGENCE,
of one partner, liability, of firm for; Hua va. LotDrtJJ, 830.
liability of partner t.o partner, for : Ina~ vs. Shire, 222.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
power of partner to make: Peaae va. Ook, 282.

N DN-JOINDER,

of partners: Cleveland vs. Woodward, 818.

)1 )N-TRADING FIRM,

power of partner in, to make negotiable paper: Peass vs. Cole, 282.

NOTICE.

by one partner that he will not be bound by contemplated acts of

another: Johnston vs. Dutton, 304; Leavitt vs. Peck, 308; Wipper-

man vs. Stacy, 309.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

what suﬁicient: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361; Austin vs. Holland, 870;

Dickinson -us. Dickinson, 374.

so whom required: Austin vs. Holland, 870; Dickinson vs. Dickinson,

374.

eﬁk-ct of not giving: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.

NET PROCEEDS,
sharing in. as teat of pa.rtnenhip: Morgan w. Farrel, 189.
NEW CONTRACT,
partner no power t.o make after dissolution: Humphriu va. Oha.Btain,
.flO; Van Keuren va. Parmelee, 411: Pennouer w. David, '21; Feigley
w. Whitaker, 424.
NEW PROMISE, (See STA.TUTE OF LillITATIONS).

NJN-JOINDER,
of partners: Oleveland o& Woodward, 818.
)I )N-TRA.DING FIRM,
power of partner in, t.o make negotiable paper: Pean va. Ook, 282;
NOTICE,
by one partner that he will not be bound by contemplated act.9 of
another: Johnston n. Dutton, 804; Leavitt va. Peck, 808; WipperStacy, 809.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION,
what sufficient: Solomon"'· Kirkwood; 861; Amt£n va. Holland, 870;
Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.
t.o whom required: Au.tin va. Holland, 870; Dicki11aon v•. Didnntan,
:JR
effect of not gh'iq: Dickinaon w. Dickinaon, 874.

man"'·
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burden of proving: Bank vs. Bergsirom, 378.

by dormant partner: Id.

NOVATION, '

necessary to discharge retiring partner: Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.

PARTNER,

who may be: S6e_INFAN'1‘; Msmunn Woman; CORPORATION.

powers of: See Pownss or PARTNERS.

liability of: See LIABILITY.

duties of: DUTY OF PARTNERS.

PARTNERSHIP,

what constitutes: Queen vs. Robson, 1, et seq.

burden of proving: Dunham vs. Loveroclc, 6.

for what purpose may be organized: Chester vs. Dickerson, 20, et seq.

who may organize: Adams vs. Beall, 33, et seq.

construction of contracts for: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49, et seq.

what contracts create: Grace vs. Smith, 61, et seq.

interest in property of: Bank vs. Carrollton Railroad, 147, et seq.

ﬁrm name and good will of: Williams vs. Farrand, 174, et seq.

rights and duties of members of : Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212, et seq.
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actions between members of: Wycoﬂ’ vs. Parnell, 238, et seq.

powers of partners: Sweet vs. Wood, 270, et seq.

liability of ﬁrm: Pitkin vs. Benfer, 313, et seq.

nature and extent of partner‘s liability: Haralson vs. Campbell, 340,

et seq.

dissolution of: Hoard vs. Clum, 850, et seq.

consequences of dissolution of :- Hawkins vs. Capron, 381, ct seq.

distribution of assets of, on dissolution: Case vs. Beauregard, 440,

ct seq.

capital of, how distributed between partners: Whitcomb vs. Converse,

492, et seq.

PARTNERSHIP AT WILL,

right to dissolve: Howell vs. Harvey, 354: Solomon vs. Kirkwood,

361.

PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTION,

what is: Berkshire Co. vs. Juillard. 819.

PART PAYMENT,

See STATUTE or LIMITATIONS.

POWERS OF PARTNERS.

to make admissions: Sweet vs. Wood, 2'70.

to hire property: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.

to subscribe for stock: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 272.

to engage in other business: Banner Tobacco Co. vs. Jenison, 271.

Dis.SOLUTION-Continued.
burden of proving: Bank vs. Bergstrom, 878.
by dormant partner: Id.
NOVATION,
necessary to discharl(e retiring partner: Barnu v1. B07/tf'8, 481S,
PARTNER,
who may be: Bee.INFANT; MARRIED WOMEN; CORPORATION.
powers of: &e POWERS 011' p ARTNE&S.
liability of: See LIABILITY.
duties of: DUTY OF PARTNEBS.
PARTNERSHIP,
what constitutes: Queen vs. .RobBOn, 1, et aeq.
burden of proving: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6.
for what purpose may be organized: Oh.ester"'· Dickeraon, 20, et aeq.
who may organize: Adams vs. Beall, 83, et seq.
construction of contract.a for: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49, et seq.
what contract.a create: Grace v8. Smith, 61, et 1eq.
interest in property of: Bank'"· Carrollton Railroad, 147, et seq.
firm name and good will of: Williams vs. Farrand, 174, et 11eq.
right.a and duties of members of: Latta VB. Kilbourn, 212, et seq.
actions between members of: WycoJ! VB. Purnell, 288, et 11eq.
powers of partners: Sweet vs. Wood, 270, et seq.
liability of firm: Pitkin 11s. Benfer, 818, et seq.
nature and extent of partner's liability: Haralaon va. Campbell, 840,
et seq.
diBBOlution of: Hoard vs. Clum. 800, et aeq.
consequences of dissolution of:· Hawkins 11B. Capron, 881, et aeq.
distribution of asset.a of, on dissolution: Case va. Beauregard, 440,
ct seq.
capital of, how distributed between partners: Whitcomb va. Oonverae,
492, et seq.
PARTNERSHIP AT WILL.
right to di880lve: Howell VB. HaMJeU, BM: Solomon w. Kirkwood,

NOTICE OF

861.

PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTION,
what is: Berkshire Co. vs, Juillar<l, 819.

to execute negotiable instruments: Pease vs. Cole, 282.

to confess judgment: Ilforgan vs. Richardson, 294.

to execute sealed instrumentp: Foa: vs. Norton. 295.

to make assignment for creditors: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296.

to sell property: Lowman vs. Sheets, 300.

to bind ﬁrm as surety for third persons: Clarke vs. Wallace. 801.

PART PAYMENT,

Bee STATUTE 011'

LIJrllTATIONB.

POWERS OF PARTNERS,

to make admissions: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
to hire property: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
to subscribe for stock: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 27!. ·
to engage in other business: BanMr Tobacco Co. vs. Jeii-iMm, 2'14.
to execute ne1r;otiable instrument.a: P.eaae va. Cole, 282.
to confess judgment: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294.
to execute aealed in1trument,: Fo~ vs. Norton. 295,
to make assignment ror creifitors: Shattuck w. Chandler, 200.
to sell property: Lowman vs. Sheeta, 800.
to bind firm aa 1urety for third peraon:i: Clarke va. Wallooe, 801.
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to mortgage ﬁrm property: Hage vs. Campbell. 453.

to enlarge scope of business: Boardman vs. Adams. 277.

by ratiﬁcation: Banner Tobacco Co. vs. Jenison, 274.

right of partner to limit. by previous dissent: Johnston vs. Dutton,

804: Leavitt vs. Peck, 308; H"1'ppcrman vs. Stacy, 309

after dissolution to make note: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.

after dissolution, to make admissions or promises: Van Keuren vs.

Parmelee, 411, et seq.

after dissolution, to endorse paper: Humphries vs. Chastain, 410.

to prevent operation of statute of limitations: Van Keuren vs.Parmelee,

411; Feigley 18. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,

relation of, as test of partnership: Cos: vs. Hickman, 70; Beecher vs.

Bush, 86; Harvey vs. Childs, 97; Meehan vs. Valentine, 103.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,

relation between retiring and other partner who assumes ﬁrm debts:

Smith vs. Sheldon, 431; Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.

PRIORITY,

in distribution of assets: See APPLICATION or Assnrs; INDIVIDUAL
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Asssrs.

PROFITS, (See Cnssnssrms Pnorrrs).

sharing of, as test of partnership: See SHARING PROFITS.

PROMISSORY NOTE, (See NEGOTIABLE Issrnumnsrs).

PROPRIETARY INTEREST, (See Comwmrv or Iurnnnsr).

as test of partnership: Magovern vs. Robertson, 122: Spaulding vs.

Stubbings, 117.

PURCHASE, (See BUYING).

by one partner binds ﬁrm, when: ‘ Griffith vs. Bujfum, 815.

RATIFICATION, (See Pownss or Psnrsnns).

by other partners of act of one partner: Banner Tobaco Co. vs. Jeni-

son, 274; Porter vs. Curry, 281.

REAL ESTATE.

when deemed assets: Robinson Bank vs. Miller, 155; Paige vs. Paige,

170; Shanks vs. Klein, 164.

power of one partner as to: Shanks vs. Klein, 164.

when deemed personalty: Shanks vs. Klein, 164.

RECEIVER,

in actions for dissolution; New vs. Wright, 263.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE, (See ILLEGAL-ITY).

partnership to eﬁect: Craft vs. McC'onoughy, 30.

REVOCATION,

by one partner of authority of the other: Johnston vs. Dutton, 304;

Lga1;ift1?8. Peck, 308; Wipperman vs. Stacy, 309.

of partner’s power by dissolution: Humph-ries vs. Chastain, 410; Van

Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411.

RIVALRY,

not to be, between partner and his ﬁrm: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

POWER8 OJ' PARTNERS-Continued.
to mortpge firm property: H~ vs. Campbell. 458.
to enlarge soope of business: Boardman w. Adams. 277.
by ratification: Banner Tobacco Co. t:B. Jenison, 274.
right of partner to limit. by previous dissent: Johnston va.

I?uffon,

804: Leavitt va. Peck, 808; W(pperman tP. Stacy, 809

after dissolution to make note: Dickinson 111. Dickinson, 87-'.
after dissolution, to make admissions or promises: Van Keunm "'·
Parmelee, 411, et aeq.
after dissolution, to endorse paper: Humphries vs. Chastain, .(10.
to prevent operation of statute of limitatioui<: Van Keuren va.Parmelea.
411; Feigley u. Whituker, 424; Pemwyer VB. Dai,-id, 421.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
relation of, as test of partnership: Co:c tis. Hickman, 70; Beecher tis.
Bush, 86; Harvey va. Chil~, 97; Meehan VB. Valentine, 108.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,
relation between retiring and other partner who assumes firm debts:
Smith t.•s. Sheldon, 481; Barnea VB. Boyer•, 4M.
PRIORITY,
in distribution of a11eta: See APPLICATION 01' ASSETS; llmIVIDl7AL
ASSETS.

PROFITS, (See CLANDESTINE PROFITS).
sharing of, as test of partnership: See SHARING PROFITS.
PROMISSORY NOTE, (See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUHKNTS),
PROPRIETARY INTEREST, (See ColUIUNITY OF INTEREST).
as test of partnership: Magovern vs. Ro'bertaon, 122: Spaulding vs.
Stubbing•, 117.
PURCHASK, (See Bu'YING).
by one partner binds firm, when: · ·GritfUh va. Bujfum, 8115.
RATIFICATION, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS).
by other partners of act of one partner: Banner Tobaoo Co. "'· Jenison, 274; Porter vB. Curry, 281.
REAL ESTATE,
when deemed assets: Robinson Bank vs. Mt1ler, 155; Paige w. Paige,
170; Shan1c8 t'B. Klein, 164.
power of one partner as to: Shank• vs. Klein, 164.
when deemed perBOnalty: Shan1c8 vs. Klein, 164.
RECEIVER,
in actions for dissolution; New vs. Wright, 268.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, (See ILLEGALITY).
partnership to e~ect: Craft"'· McConoughy, 80.
REVOCATION,
by one partner of authority of the other: Johnston "'· Dutton, 804;
Leavitt tis. Peck, 808; Wipperman vs. Stacy, 809.
of partner's power by diBSOlution: Humphriea vs. Chastain, 410; Van
Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411.
RIVALRY,
not to be, between partner and his firm: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
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SALE, (See Pownas or Paarxnas).

implied power of partners to make: Lowman vs. Sheets, 300.

SALE OF BUSINESS.

effect upon ﬁrm name: See FIRM NAME.

eﬁect upon good will: See G001) WILL.

SCOPE, ,

duty of each partner to keep within: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212; Murphy

vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.

not to be enlarged without consent: McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.

may be enlarged by consent: Boardman vs. Adams, 277.

SALE, (See POWERS OJ' PARTNERS).

implied power of p&rtnen to make: Lowman vs. Sheets, 800.
SALE OF BUSINESS,
effect upon firm name: See FIRM NA:an.
effect upon good will: See GooD WILL.
SCOPE,
•
duty of each partner to keep within: Latta v1. Kilbourn, 212; Murph1J

w. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs. Lteka, 232.
not to be enlarKE!d without consent: McFadden vs. Luka, 232.
may be enlarged by consent: Boardman vs. Adams, 277.
what not sufficient to enlarge: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
firm not entitled to profits of one partner in dealings outaide: Latta
w. Kilbourn, 212.

what not sufﬁcient to enlarge: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.

ﬁrm not entitled to proﬁts of one partner in dealings outside: Latta

vs. Kilbourn, 212.

SEALED INSTRUMENTS, ‘ »

execution by one partner: Fox vs. Norton, 295.

SECRET PARTNER, (See Doamsnr PARTNER).

what constitutes: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Jacobs vs. Shorey, 181.

SEPARATE ESTATE,

SEALED INSTRUMENTS,

execution by one partner: Fo:r: vs. Norton, 29:;.

of partner how applied: See APPLICATION or Assnrs.

SHARE OF PARTNER.
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what constitutes: Bank 'vs. Railroad, 147; Staats vs. Bristow, 152;

Sindelare vs. Walker, 154.

how ascertained: Id.

SHARING PROFITS.

as a test of partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Ooope vs. Eyre, 64;

SECRET PARTNER, (See DORMANT PARTNER).
what constitutes: Grace v1, Smith, 61; Jacobi vs. S'A'>rey, 131.
SEPARATE ESTATE,
of partner bow applied: See APPLICATION OF ASSETS.
SHARE OF PARTNER,

Waugh vs. Carver, 67; Coa: vs. Hickman, 70: Jacobs vs. Show-ey, 131.

what constitutes: Bank ·vs. Railroad, 147; Staats vs. Bristoio, 11S2s
Sindelare vs. Walker, 154.
how B11Certained: Id.

SOLICITING CUSTOMERS,

of old ﬁrm: See Goon WILL

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

not usually granted of partnership agreements: Bunk vs. Smith, 266.

SHA.RING PROFITS,

as a t.est of partnership: Gra~ va. Smith, 61; Ooope va. Eyre, 64;
Waugh vs. Carver, 67; Coa: va. Hickman, 70; Jaooba va. Shorey, 181.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

whether will prevent parol partnership to deal in land: Chester vs.

Dickerson, 20.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,

power of partner after dissolution, to remove bar of: Van Keuren vs.

Pa-rrnelee, 411; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421.

SOLICITING CUSTOMERS,
of old firm: See GooD WILL.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,

not usually gr11-nt.ed of partnel'Bhip agTeement.a: Buck vs. Smith, 266.

STIPULATIONS, (See ARTICLES or PARTNERSHIP).

between partners, duty of partner to observe: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227;

McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.

SUBPARTNERSHIP,

l rights and liability of subpartner: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125.

SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK.

partner's power to make: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 272.

SUITS, (See Acrross.)

SURETY, (See PRINCIPAL AND Snmvrr).

implied power of partner to bind ﬁrm as: Clarke vs. II/allace, 801.

when retiring partner is, as to other who assumes debts: Smith vs.

Sheldon, 431; Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS,

whether will prevent pa.rol partnership to deal in land: Chester v'])ickeraon, 20.
BT ATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
power of partner after dissolution, to remove bar of: Van Keuren vs.
Parmelu, 411; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421.
STIPULATIONS, (See ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP).
between partners, duty of partner to observe: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227;
McFadden vs. Luka, 282.
SUBPARTNERSHIP,

·

right.a and liability of subpartner: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125.

SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK,

partner's power to make: Barnard tJB. Plank Road Oo., 272.
SUITS, (See ACTIONS.)
SURETYI (See PRINCIP.&.L A.ND SURETY).

implied power of partner to bind firm as: Clarke vs. Wa~, 801.
when retiring partner is, as to .other who B88umee debts: Smith 111.
Sheldon, 481; Barnes vs. Bo11ers, 43li.

610 INDEX.
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SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS,

after death of one partner: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.

SURVIVING PARTNER,

right to possession of assets: Hawkins vs. Capron, 381; Valentine vs.

lVys0r, 352.

right and powers of: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382; Linder vs. Bank,

401; Durant vs. Pierson, 403.

as a. trustee: Id.

liability of, for ﬁrm debts: Doggett vs. Dill. 395.

power of, to dispose of assets: Linder vs. Bank, 401.

to borrow money: Durant vs. Pierson. 403.

power to dispose of ﬁrm real estate: Shanks cs. Klein, 164.

liability of, for mismanagement: Insley vs. Shire, 222.

TENANTS IN COMMON,

not partners: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6.

TORT,

of one _pa.rtner binds ﬁrm, when: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330; Rosenkrans

vs. Barker, 335.

TRADING FIRM,

power of partner in, to make bills or notes: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
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TROVER,

\ by surviving partner for possession of assets: Hawkins vs. Capron,

381.

TRUST FUNDS,

when ﬁrm liable for: Englar vs. Oﬁutt, 328.

UNDISCLOSED PARTNER, (See Donussr Psnrsms).

liability of: Griﬂlth ‘UI. Buﬂ um, 315; Cleveland vs. Woodward, 318.

8URVIVAL OF ACTIONS,
aftier death of one partner: Heas t1& Lou!rq, 830.
SURVIVING PARTNER,
right to poese88ion of a.eta: Ha10kin1 v1. Capron, 881; Vaz-tine w.
Wyaor, &52.
ri&ht and powers of: Vakntine 1.11. Wy.sor, 882; Linder w. Bau,
401; Du.rant v•. Piera<m, 408.
aa a trustee: Id.
liability of, for firm debt.a: Doggett VB. Dill, 895.
power of, to dispoee of aaset.a: Linder vs. Bank, (01.
to borrow money: Du.rant v1. Pieraon, 403.
power to diapoee of firm real estate: Shanka v•. Klein, 16'.
liability of, for mismanagement: Insley va. Shire, 222.
TENANTS IN COM.MON,
not partner&: Dunham w. Low:rock, 6.
TORT,
of one _partner bind8 firm, when: HeaB va. Lowrey, 880; ~
VB. Barker, 885.
TRADING FIRM,
power of partner in, to make bills or note&: Peaae va. Cole, .288.
TBOVER,
· ~ by surviving partner for poaM!llllion of .-a.: Hawkin.1 w. Capron,
881.
TRUST FUNDS,
when firm liable for: Englar w. O§utt, 828,
UNDISCLOSED PARTNER, (See DoRllANT P .ARTNBR).
liability of: G1·i.Jlth va. Bu§um, BUS; Clcwlantl w. Wood...-d, 818.

